
# Background and Technical Interview Presentation


Rick Hudson June 6, 2025

# Rick Hudson – Robotic Systems, Vision & Safety Engineering


System safety, perception, and control — battle-tested at every scale.



# Why Smarter Perception Safety Testing Became Critical




Expansion Goals Drove Testing Challenges Complexity rose exponentially, but testing coverage lagged behind.




Each vehicle had to get safer and smarter—even as scenarios grew more unpredictable and complex

# Why Simulated End-to-End Testing Wasn't Enough



Failures were either missed entirely or passed to manual triage — late, expensive, and unscalable.

# Catching Sub-System Failures Before E2E Risk



Physics-based constraints existed- we just didn't test against them. Injecting them completely changed the calculus of risks required to achieve acceptable level of performance.

# System Impact: Safety, Engineering, and Risk Reduction

**Event Count** 

### Critical Safety Benefits

Caught +40% Critical Failures on tested scenarios Identified 5× more long-tail pedestrian road events Fully automatable or used with ground truth labels Successfully scaled to new scenarios in internal tests Potential use as on-AV perception warning\*\*

## Engineering Benefits\*

Detect Non-Safety Performance Issues Eliminated Manual Triage for use Cases Perception Issues Identified Object & Frame

## Events by Severity\*




Occurance Rate (Miles)

This system caught what we didn't even know we were missing - faster, earlier, and without labels or human review.

# Let's Build Better Systems

- Rick Hudson
- robopuffin@gmail.com
- github.com/robopuffin
- linkedin.com/in/rick-hudson-0463194



Past Project: Teledyne Eagleray
Commercial product
(Still bitter Robopuffin was rejected as the name)

Available to help design safer, smarter robotic systems — from diagnostics to deployment.

Grateful to my colleagues for the opportunity to work on such high-stakes and high-impact challenges in autonomy.


# Appendix A: What Physics-Based Constraints?

## 3 Concrete Examples:

U.S. Customary				
Design Speed	Brake Reaction	Braking Distance	Stopping Sight Distance	
(mph)	Distance (ft)	on Level	Calculated (ft)	Design (ft)
15	55.1	21.6	76.7	80
20	73.5	38.4	111.9	115
25	91.9	60.0	151.9	155
30	110.3	86.4	196.7	200
35	128.6	117.6	246.2	250
40	147.0	153.6	300.6	305
45	165.4	194.4	359.8	360
50	183.8	240.0	423.8	425
55	202.1	290.3	492.4	495
60	220.5	345.5	566.0	570
65	238.9	405.5	644.4	645

#### 1: Stopping Sight Distance\*

- Based on published roadway safety standards
- Defines how far perception must see to allow safe stop



#### 2: Conservation of Mass

- "Sudden" detections imply prior miss or occlusion
- Physics implies they existed earlier, even if not seen

## 3: Limiting Items

- Object in blocked path (e.g. behind stopped truck) may not require behavioral change
- Not all false negatives are equal

\*From "A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets"

# Appendix B: Concrete Perception Test Cases

System detects perceptions errors and prioritizes those that should be fixed first.

1: Police have command power so should be recognized; children require extra caution.



3: Must assume possible child occlusion; reduce speed to

ensure stopping margin.

4: Crossing Guard- Must be detected by comfortable stopping distance

> 5: Crosswalk Right-Of-Way: Car errors only critical if unlikely to stop prior to entering crosswalk

6: Detect frontmost pedestrian in time to stop. At least one actor must be recognized as a child for increased caution.

\*I implemented this logic on Terramax (DARPA offroad AV). Instead of demanding Perception see further in low-visibility, Behavior used physics to pull the safe stop distance closer.