

# The consequences of affective polarization

## Is accountability still working?

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November, 2021

### Abstract

Affective polarization has become the political phenomenon of the moment. Although specially American scholars have studied thoroughly its causes, less effort has been devoted to explain its consequences. In order to do so, I propose a causal mechanism through which affective polarization impacts political attitudes. By a process of motivated reasoning, more polarized people are expected to a) assess incumbent's performances worse, b) form political preferences (i.e. public policy choice) in a perhaps pernicious way for them, and c) be less supportive in general for incumbent's measures (specially during times of crisis). In this paper, I propose to test empirically the first of these effects, namely, the impact of affective polarization on economic voting. My hypothesis is that those who are more polarized will be less rational or, in other words, they will be less able to reward or punish the incumbent according to economic events. Hence, this paper tries to make a contribution to our knowledge of affective polarization and speaks to the general problem of accountability in our contemporary polarized societies.

## 1 Introduction

Some scholars have recently pointed out that American people are far more polarized than 40 years ago (Lelkes, 2018). Since the seminal piece of work by Iyengar et al. (2012) we know that political polarization is not only related to ideology but also to affects. Inter-party animosity has been increasing at least since the 1980s in American politics. Nonetheless, some others have shown that United States is by no means the most polarized nation around the world. From a comparative perspective, (Gidron et al. 2018 and 2019, and Westwood et al. (2018)) (see Figure 1) have pointed out that whereas Americans display just average levels of affective polarization, in Europe, we find much higher levels, for instance, in countries like Spain, Greece or even France. The ugly discourse surrounding recent elections in the US, the Brexit campaign, or the regional elections in Community of Madrid (Spain) on may 2019, held in a frame with only two apparent options 'Communism or Freedom', are just some examples of the increasingly divisive political discourse of our times. What we call affective polarization is, loosely speaking, the phenomenon that voters like their political co-partisans and, usually at the same time, they dislike their political opponents, that is, they see themselves belonging to an in-group and therefore, they dislike (or sometimes even hate) the out-group members.

Affective polarization has been well-documented since 2012 –specially regarding its causes–, at least in the US (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017; Lelkes, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019; Klein, 2020). However, scholars in Europe –and also in Spain– have only started to focus on this issue recently, although as Miller (2019) points out, the prominence of the concept makes it the “political phenomenon of the moment”. Moreover, little effort has been made investigating the consequences of the phenomenon. Perhaps, the reason behind the lack of studies focused on the consequences of affective polarization is related to poor data (that is the case of Spain), or that's simply because it is a very complex phenomenon that depending on the country can be very correlated




Figure 1: Levels of affective polarization across countries. Source: [Gidron et al. \(2018\)](#)

with simple ideological polarization and other similar phenomena, making it difficult to disentangle its effects. Others have even suggested that affective polarization does not have such political consequences (BROOCKMAN), and hence, there is no reason to explore them. However, some facts point towards the opposite direction and we have already measured the increasing levels of polarization. For example, we already know that 2008 financial crisis had a great impact on the european party systems. In some places like Spain, after more than two decades of stable bipartidism, a multiparty system emerged. This increase in the number of parties confronting in parliament brought altogether a sharp increase of affective polarization which, in the case of Spain, has ended up leading spanish people to polarize even more in two big blocks of parties ([Orriols and León, 2020](#)).

The majority of studies addressing this question points out that high levels of affective polarization could be dangerous for democracy. Scholars usually argue that it makes democracy work worse although they do not usually test in which way. This lack of theoretical contributions leading towards empirical ways of looking for the consequences of affective polarization is what mainly inspire this work. Some exceptions are worth noting, though: [Wagner \(2021\)](#) finds that affective polarization has an impact on democratic values. Specifically, he finds a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy. Similarly, [Ward and Tavits \(2019\)](#) find that affective polarization affects perceptions of political choice as well as turnout and participation. Likewise, there is a common intuition in the literature that polarized citizens are less able to collaborate and to work together to solve collective action problems ([Kelly Garrett et al., 2014](#)). Citizens trust in political institutions and legitimacy of governments are also negatively affected ([Orriols, 2021](#)). In the same vein, affective polarization can also foster political radicalism ([Levendusky, 2013](#); [Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016](#); [Webster and Abramowitz, 2017](#)) since the dynamics of polarized politics makes the radicals more prone to speak and, at the same time, it makes polarized –but less radical– people, more prone to follow the former. There is also a concern regarding satisfaction with democracy, electoral participation, and a long list of attitudes towards western liberal electoral democracy. However,

almost none of those pernicious effects of affective polarization have been empirically tested. In this study, I propose a mechanism through which affective polarization may affect different key stages of the democratic process and I try to test one of them.

The general argument is that affective polarization makes people assess political phenomena –and also non-political phenomena– using their own ‘political glasses’. Hence, they are less permeable to political information and political cues, or in other words, they are less prone to process political information from a critical standpoint. We already know that partisanship have a say on this (HOBOLT TILLEY). The fact that people feel very attached to a certain party, has been proved to bring this kind of polarization, however, when polarization is based not only on the identification with a party but also on affects and specially on the animosity towards the out-group (as I will explain below), the already known effects might, I argue, be even more pronounced and, consequently, worse for democracy. As I will develop in subsequent sections, the basic idea is that our own biases (already present in simple partisans) are exacerbated because we identify an (social) in-group to which we belong, and an (social) out-group that we see as totally opposed to us, that is, political militancy turns into identity. This situation reduces our critical assessment of political –and non-political– phenomena. Therefore –I argue– it has implications in, at least, three key democratic mechanisms: voting, public policy choice (i.e. preferences) and political support. First, polarized people should be less able to assess government performance and to vote accordingly, so the first implication of affective polarization is related to economic voting but also to accountability itself. Second, they should be less able to place themselves in the ideological scale when affective polarization implies a high party identification which, in turn, makes some citizens be for (or against) policies that are pernicious (or beneficial) for them (i.e. working class people being against universal basic income if the policy is not endorsed by their party). And third, specially during political crisis (of economic, health or other nature) they should be less prone to support the incumbent (unless they voted for it) and, more importantly, the incumbent response to the crisis (measures or policies) that can even be necessary in such a context. This last point has more to do with a lack of civic values like, for instance, the fact that voters against the socialist government of Pedro Sánchez in Spain might have avoided using masks during the pandemic but also organize demonstrations against the government and the measures taken during the pandemic when, in the end, these measures not only were taken under scientific advice (was it correct or not), but to a large extent political consensus also in almost every country in the world.

Hence, the goal of this study is twofold: first, I propose a theoretical mechanism that explains why affective polarization has negative effects on the democratic process. And second, although the theory is presented in full for the sake of completeness, in this paper I only test empirically if that is the case regarding economic voting (i.e. performance voting). According to the argument, we should see polarized people unable to reward or punish incumbents according to economic performance, that is, we should observe that accountability does not work properly. The remaining of this study proceed as follows: first I present my argument discussing the relevant literature on affective polarization and economic voting. Second, I present my data and experimental design. In a subsequent section I discuss the main results. Finally, I conclude.

## 2 Understanding affective polarization

Affective polarization is a fairly new field of research. The concept relates to the fact that citizens feel sympathy towards partisan in-groups and antagonism towards partisan out-group (Wagner, 2021). Regardless of its novelty, it has been largely studied in the US. After the work of Iyengar et al. (2012) came out, a lot of different aspects of this phenomenon have been empirically tested in many different

countries. However, the vast majority of the literature has focused on the causes, and only a few instances have said something about its consequences. Also, given the salience of the topic in American politics, scholars have measured affective polarization <sup>1</sup> mostly in the arguably most straightforward case, the american two-party system (Wagner, 2021). However, some authors have recently tried to fill this gap and they have proposed new ways of measuring it in multi-party systems (Reiljan, 2020). Moreover, affective polarization is usually addressed at the aggregate level, that is, as the average affective polarization of the political system. Nonetheless, it can also be studied from an individual perspective, since in the end, each individual has a level of affect (or disaffect) for these in-group and out-group members. (Wagner, 2021).

So far, we know that affective polarization is more complex than one might think at first glance. It is neither ideological polarization (although correlation is high in certain contexts), nor party identification (although this is an essential part of it). It is rather something related to social identity. Therefore, it is rooted in political psychology and more precisely in social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). From this standpoint, affective polarization relates to the belonging sentiment to certain social groups. Although it can be the case that belonging to a social group is a matter of ideology, affective polarization is not exactly the same as ideological polarization since specially in a multiparty context, people who belong to the same part of the ideological spectrum can have different in- and out-groups for different reasons. In fact, as some scholarship has shown, in some settings affective polarization can increase while ideological divisions shrink (Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016; Iyengar et al., 2019). Nonetheless, some other scholarship has shown that ideological polarization somehow impacts affective polarization (Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017).

Moreover, affective polarization is not only party identification (i.e. positive in-group affect towards a party and its supporters) because it also relates to the positive or negative out-group affect towards other parties and their supporters. That is, as some have already pointed out (Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016), there is ‘negative partisanship’ as well as positive partisanship. Moreover, specially in multiparty systems (in which I am interested here) the in-group and the out-group are not necessarily conformed by one single party each. On the contrary, there can be several combinations regarding the number and the distribution of parties in those groups and, even more importantly, these combinations may be related to country’s cleavages in specific contexts and moments like, for instance, Spain and the Catalan secessionist movement during the last 5 years.

### 3 Economic voting revisited

Contrary to what happens with affective polarization, economic voting is not a new issue. According to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2018), we can find studies dating as far back as 1878. But the pioneer papers on the topic are very well known since the 1930s (Tibbitts, 1931; Gosnell and Colman, 1940; Wilkinson and Hart, 1950). However, the first scientific proposition of the relationship between the economy and electoral results was placed in a chapter of the seminal *The American Voter* by Campbell et al. (1960, Chapter 14), where they even suggest that economic prosperity is associated to the incumbent presidential party. Since then, a huge literature has been produced on economic voting. Moreover, the classical theory has received considerable empirical support (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011). The basic claim of this theory is based on rational choice theory and says that voters, trying to maximize their utility, would vote accounting for the government economic performance. This is usually understood as one of

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<sup>1</sup>To see a more in depth discussion about the concern about how to measure affective polarization see Druckman and Levendusky (2019)

the main accountability mechanisms in western liberal democracies. When economy goes bad, voters punish incumbents, whereas when they do well, voters reward them.

A similar way of putting the core argument of this theory is looking at one of the main ‘stylized facts’ about economic voting, which is the following: retrospective voting is usually more important than prospective voting (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). This is sometimes called the ‘responsibility hypothesis’: voters hold the government responsible (i.e. accountable) for economic events. Hence, according to this theory, we should observe that voters properly assess the performance of the incumbent and vote accordingly.

However, some scholarship has already pointed out that economic voting is influenced by the context (Dorussen and Palmer, 2002; Anderson, 2007; Singer and Carlin, 2013). Dorussen and Palmer (2002) argue that the most explosive growth of the economic-voting literature was, interestingly, related to the emergence of controversies about the nature of the economic-voting calculus. Although previous literature had proved that economic performance had such an important salience among the electorate to influence election outcomes, it was not clear which economic policies matter most to voters. Also, it was far from clear if this salience vary accross groups of voters, electoral contexts and political systems (Dorussen and Palmer, 2002).

According to this literature, we shouldn’t look at the relation between vote and economy isolated, but accounting for contextual factors. As (Singer and Carlin, 2013, p. 1) point out, “there is still a debate about whether voters focus on past or future performance and whether they view the economy in primarily sociotropic or egotropic terms”. They find that prospective voting predominates early in the election cycle and retrospective voting gains traction as people observe incumbent’s performance. Moreover, they also find that sociotropic views predominates over the egotropic ones except for the least developed countries. In the same vein, in a provocative paper, (Anderson, 2007, p. 1) argues that economic voting does not work as ‘envisioned by advocates of democratic accountability’. He calls for a reconsideration of the normative underpinnings of economic voting paradigm in light of recent evidence. His argument is that although the findings supporting empirically the theory enumerated above exist, they are contingent for both institutional and psychological reasons. Precisely building on that argument, I try to disentangle both potential reasons in this study and I focus specifically on the latter. That is, as suggested above, although economic voting works in general, it can fail under certain circumstances, I argue that affective polarization –through psychological biases– is one of those.

### **3.1 Selective attribution and selective assessment. Putting economic voting and affective polarization together.**

Nonetheless, the core ‘empirical assumption of the theory still holds. It is more likely to find people voting retrospectively than prospectively. Only when people observe incumbent’s performance they start thinking in voting in prospective terms. As I would argue in the next section, it is reasonable to expect that retrospective voting (and economic voting in general) is less important as people is more polarized. The more polarized they are, the less able they are to assess economic performance. I expect to see voters to use some other strategies and shortcuts in order to maximize their utility. Although this is not to say that they will achieve their goal, contrary to what happen with center oriented and instrumental (i.e. ‘rational’) voters, polarized individuals should avoid to a larger extent the use of information to make their final decision and cast their votes.

**Include Hobolt and Tilley’s theory about selective attribution and selective evaluation here.**

## 4 Argument

Once I have presented the most relevant literature to understand affective polarization and economic voting, the linking nexus must be analyzed. I argue that affective polarization has a direct effect on political attitudes, more specifically on the way citizens assess political (and economic) performance, because it activates a process of motivated reasoning (see Figure 2).

Affective Polarization  $\longrightarrow$  Motivated Reasoning  $\longrightarrow$  Poor economic voting assessment

Figure 2: Effect of affective polarization on Economic Voting

Motivated reasoning is usually studied in cognitive science and social psychology and refers to the fact that some people use emotionally biased reasoning to produce justifications (or make decisions) that are most desired rather than those that accurately reflect the evidence (Kunda, 1990). In my setting, this is reflected by the fact that ‘affectively’ polarized people are so according to their emotions, that is, to the level of animosity against both the in-group and the out-group. They would use motivated reasoning to avoid being at odds with their in-group. They would prefer to be ‘loyal’ to their in-group than to punish them if economic situation goes bad. Or the other way around, they would avoid rewarding their out-group when economic performance was good. In other words, those more polarized are expected to use motivated reasoning to a larger extent and hence, would be less able to process (i.e. evaluate) and integrate political (or economic) information. They will be less willing to hold their party accountable for policy performance. That is, this motivated reasoning would lead them to vote in a less rational way, or in other words, economic voting will work worse. It is also reasonable to expect partisans to undermine rather than promote responsible government.

Nonetheless, there is a major issue with the causal chain proposed. As I discuss in the next subsection, we already have some evidence of motivated reasoning being the cause of political polarization. This is not exactly a problem of reverse causality since, in the end, the combination of both –affective polarization and motivated reasoning– is what would influence economic voting. However, it is important to dig deeper into the concept of motivated reasoning in order to clarify the causal mechanism and the causal chain proposed as much as possible.

### 4.1 Motivated reasoning

As suggested by many scholars (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Boyer et al., 2020), reasoning seems to play a crucial role in the formation of political attitudes. Citizens are not only motivated in the sense of holding *accurate* beliefs, but also “*directional* motivations, or motivations to reach a certain predetermined belief” (Boyer et al., 2020, p.2). Such directional motivations are, according to (Kunda, 1990, p. 440), “any wish, desire or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task”. In order to better understand the underpinnings of the process by which polarized people activate a motivated reasoning process, it is interesting to discuss the different effects that positive and negative partisanship may have.

As noted before, affective polarization is not only a matter of hate or dislike, it also may increase due to a reinforcement of individual’s positions and views being closer to his/her party, that is, an increase of positive partisanship. Some authors have already studied the effect of motivated reasoning focusing on the level of trust and how people process Fake News (Thaler, 2021). He finds that motivated reasoning from political messages on topics like immigration, income mobility, crime, racial discrimination, gender, climate change, gun laws and performance of other subjects, leads to people’s beliefs to become more polarized (Thaler, 2021). According to him, the causal chain would be slightly different since polarization

would be a byproduct of such psychological process or bias. However, I am not totally sure this is the case. I think that when a certain level of affective polarization (probably different in each country and context) is reached, the context fosters or reinforces this psychological bias, hence, motivated reasoning can bring political polarization at first, but after a certain threshold, a feedback loop is produced. Thus, in countries where affective polarization is very high, I expect this context to be the cause that exacerbate the psychological bias that ultimately would lead people to assess economic events in a *non-rational* way. We also have evidence that motivated reasoning could be the cause of polarization when focusing on Identity Politics. [Boyer et al. \(2020\)](#) find that group status is a powerful moderator of political motivations. High-status groups members –for instance, men compared to women– are more strongly motivated, which leads them to political polarization between left-wing and right-wing more easily ([Boyer et al., 2020](#)).

However, if we look at the characterization of motivated reasoning proposed by [Thaler \(2021\)](#), we would find that the causal chain proposed in Figure 2 is valid. He argues that motivated reasoning “posits that people distort their inference process in the direction of states they find more attractive”. Taking this characterization, we see that people activate the motivated reasoning process once they find a state considered as “more attractive”. Thus, since affective polarization is a byproduct of the in-group and out-group feelings, or rather, of positive and negative partisanship, this context of affective polarization is required prior to motivate the reasoning. Put it differently, only once people is polarized because they like or dislike a certain party or set of parties (and ,maybe their supporters), they can motivate their reasoning when assessing, for instance, economic events. The bias is produced once they know which is their in-group and out-group and only then, they direct themselves to a certain state they find more attractive. Nonetheless, this does not restrict the possibility that one of the causes for an individual placing herself in a certain group is related to certain goals or states found “attractive”. In short, what I argue is that a context of affective polarization can reinforce the psychological process by which biases make people more unable to process new political information.

## 4.2 Elasticity

I introduce now the concept of elasticity to try to shed light on the economic voting part of the argument. I use the term elasticity to refer to the extent to which people is permeable to political information. Polarized people is, in general, less permeable to political information, specially when this information is at odds with their prior beliefs. This is to say –in Bayesian terms– that they (almost) do not update their priors. Moreover, I argue that when political polarization is not only about policy choice, but also related to affects, (lacking) permeability turns into (lacking) elasticity. These two concepts, may look the same at first glance but I would try to elaborate a bit more on the distinction in what follows.

Someone less permeable to political information may reject information coming from a political opponent, for instance a party leader, a congressman of the (or one of the) opposing party (parties), etc. However, someone inelastic with respect to political information is someone that not only does not trust political opponents but other sources of information either. These inelastic (i.e. *affectively* polarized) people, would not accept information at odds with their beliefs even when it comes from a *a priori* neutral source of information. The bias in this kind of people is much stronger and applies immediately. As soon as the information received goes against their in-group or the party they vote for, they do not trust it or do not believe it. In the same vein, information against their opponents is taken as an absolute truth, regardless of their party leaders making this information. In short, elasticity is a stronger effect when it comes to process political information. That is because one can be slightly permeable but



not necessarily unable to assess the data or information, whereas someone inelastic is characterized as someone unable to assess rationally even external (i.e. non partisan) sources of information.

#### 4.2.1 Elasticity and positive and negative partisanship

Moreover, elasticity may be different regarding in-group and out-group feelings. That is related to the distinction between positive and negative partisanship and allows us to distinguish between levels and types of affective polarization. As stated above, affective polarization is not only a matter of one of the two, but can be (and so I argue) a combination of both. This can yield different results and profiles, whereas the level of affective polarization is an absolute number capturing the *amount* of polarization, this amount can be decomposed in two “components” or what I call *types* of affective polarization (see Figure 3). There are people that are polarized because they like their in-group very much (i.e. positive partisanship), people that is polarized because they dislike their opponents a lot, or even hate them (i.e. negative partisanship) or a combination of both. The latter would be the most *clearly* polarized in the sense that both effects are playing a role. People with this profile like her in-group and dislike her out-group at the same time, which in turn should be the most common case. The other two profiles are less common and would represent people whose level of polarization is due to only one of the two components. Please note that this does not mean that the level of polarization is smaller in the latter case. The amount of polarization (e.g. the vector’s module) can be as large as one made up of a combination of two parts. Hence, it is expected to find what I call *supporters*, people with average to high levels of elasticity; what I call *partisans* with average levels of (lack of) elasticity and *fans*, with very low levels of elasticity. In short, elasticity is a function of positive and negative partisanship. One of the goals of the present study is to disentangle these effects in order to better understand affective polarization when it is decomposed in its two constituent components.




Figure 3: Types and levels of Affective Polarization

## 5 Hypotheses

Given that my dependent variable is (as it is explained in section 6) the likelihood of voting for the incumbent, it is important to first distinguish between people who explicitly identify themselves as supporters of the government or, on the contrary, supporters of the opposition. Moreover, as suggested above, people can be characterized either as a *supporter*, a *partisan* or a *fan* according to its level of



elasticity, hence, for the sake of simplicity, I will now define the groups of people involved and the theoretical expectations that would ultimately yield the different empirical hypotheses to be tested.

First, people is identified either as someone willing to vote for the incumbent (e.g. incumbent supporters) or someone willing to vote for any opposition party (e.g. opposition supporters). This means that people reporting to be not sure about which party they would vote for in a hypothetical election, or people reporting that they would not vote are excluded from the analysis. Second, within each group, we can further distinguish three groups of voters according to its level of elasticity (e.g. affective polarization level). On the extremes we identify: on the one hand people with low to average levels of affective polarization<sup>2</sup> (supporters) and, on the other hand, people with average to high levels of affective polarization (fans). In the middle, we identify those with average levels of affective polarization (partisans) (see Figure).

Moreover, affective polarization (at the individual level) is conceived as a measure of the overall spread of affects someone has towards political parties, hence, it could be defined in many valid ways. Following Wagner (2021) it is measured as the weighted average party affect difference compared to each respondent's weighted average party affect. However, this is useful to see individual's level of affective polarization in general terms but not too much so when it comes to look at positive and negative partisanship. Thus, to be able to explore the differences between positive and negative partisanship, it is important to have at least two measures: one capturing the level of polarization towards the out-group and one capturing the level of polarization towards the in-group.

If we start by considering the general affective polarization level (towards all the parties) it is reasonable to expect, following the theoretical framework, different results for incumbent and opposition voters. The former are expected to use economic voting to a lesser extent the more polarized they are. This means that fans should display a higher probability of voting for the incumbent than supporters and partisans. Although that should be the case in general, the theory advanced here tells us that among those who rate the state of the economy as worse when asked, polarized people should be more willing to vote for the incumbent. That is to say that, even when the economy is assessed as worse, people is willing to vote for the government, that is, economic voting work worse the more polarized they are. Therefore:

*H1: Among those who assess the economy as worse than in the past, and are identified as incumbent voters, fans are more willing to vote for the government than supporters and partisans.*

Since the categorization of the affective polarization measure is expected to be lineal, I actually expect also partisans to be more willing to vote for the incumbent than supporters.

Regarding opposition voters, they are supposed not to be willing to vote for the incumbent in a future election by definition. However, it is reasonable to think that some of the opposition voters would be able to reward the incumbent if the economy goes better. In fact, otherwise the electoral results would never change. Hence, among those who assess the economy as better, I expect those more polarized to be less willing to vote for the incumbent than supporters and partisans. Therefore:

*H2: Among those who assess the economy as better than in the past, and are identified as opposition voters, fans are less willing to vote for the government than supporters and partisans.*

Once again, since the affective polarization measure is expected to be lineal, the three categories should be ranked in the following order regarding their likelihood of voting for the incumbent: supporters, partisans and fans.

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<sup>2</sup>It is important to note that if I do not say explicitly if I consider negative or positive partisanship, affective polarization refers to the general index, considering the main parties in the system, all together.

Some additional hypotheses subject to be tested are related to disentangling the two main components of affective polarization, namely, positive and negative partisanship. Since it is possible that economic voting works even better or more “strongly” among those who didn’t vote for the incumbent, it is important to highlight that the goal of the paper is to compare the level of affective polarization among those that didn’t vote for the incumbent. Conversely, we need to compare the level of polarization of those who voted for the incumbent and, for both groups, check the level of economic voting. That is, the level of economic voting is not an absolute measure but a relative one. It is relative to the level of affective polarization of those in the in-group and out-group respectively.

Even when these hypotheses are able to account for all possible combinations between level of affective polarization and electoral group, we don’t know if the relationship is driven by negative or positive partisanship. In fact, because of how I have phrased them, I am assuming that in the former case, somewhat is positive partisanship what drives the results, whereas in the latter case, it is the other way around. This is because everything here gravitates around the incumbent: if you are expected to support the incumbent, in case of polarization it should be positive, otherwise, it should be negative. However, that could not necessarily be the case. Within each group (incumbent and opposition) it is reasonable to see people that is either very close to their in-group and people that, on the contrary, hate the out-group very much.

Thus, I can test if among the most polarized, economic performance is less important. However, the effects don’t have to be necessarily of the same size. It is reasonable, for instance, to find that among the opposition voters economic voting is more important on average than among supporters for the incumbent. This is because even people who is not very polarized is less willing to support a government that they didn’t vote for.

## 6 Research design

Since my hypotheses refer to individuals, I use a micro level database to empirically test them. Data comes from the E-DEM dataset, a new micro-level online panel survey of the Spanish voting age population with more than 8.109 interviews collected (Torcal et al., 2020). Although I could have used a more comparative politics approach using, for instance, CSES data, I still think that Spain is an interesting case where testing my hypotheses. Moreover, given my theoretical expectations, a comparative approach would imply a huge effort categorizing first which parties are the incumbent and which ones the opposition in each country, along with accounting for the voting patterns in all of them. This is, of course, an interesting design for future research but, unfortunately, it lays out of the scope of a Master Thesis. On the contrary, using this dataset I can leverage my knowledge of the Spanish system and I can track individuals’ opinions and their assessment of the economy during a crucial period in Spanish recent politics.

This dataset contains four waves spanning a period between October 2018 and May 2019. During that period of time, most of the key political events affecting Spanish politics after 15M happened: for instance, local, regional, national and European elections took place within this period, but also the conviction of Catalan secessionist leaders. And, more importantly, it also covers the six-month period of surge of Spain’s new radical right party, Vox (Torcal et al., 2020). This last event is expected to be very related to the increase of affective polarization levels in Spain (either as a cause or a consequence). An important caveat to make is that unfortunately, although data is panel I cannot leverage this feature since most of the question about future elections are only asked in certain waves. Hence, I use the data as a pull of more than one period but there is not a proper temporal dimension. Also because of that and to avoid unnecessary complexity, I drop observations from wave 1 in which the incumbent is the

Partido Popular (PP). This would yield approximately 7500 valid observations. However, since I only have information about vote intention for the last two waves, observations drop to a maximum of 5000, a still good number to work with.

This dataset also contains both variables capturing individuals assessment of the economy, and a lot of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables useful to control for. However, it also has a downside. Although there are questions about leaders' assessment and party identification, there is no thermometer scale included. I can use though some questions about "feelings towards people from certain regions, voters of certain parties, and party leaders" as a different measure of affective polarization. In fact, I think that specially for the case of "feelings towards voters of different parties", this would be an even more accurate measure of affective polarization as described in section 2. The scale is slightly different, it ranges from 0 to 100 with jumps of 15 points. Nonetheless, this measure could still fit [Wagner \(2021\)](#)'s formula.

## 6.1 Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is simply a dummy variable taking on value 1 if someone reports to be willing to vote for the incumbent in a hypothetical future (national) election. The difficult part, however, is to define the incumbent given that during the period considered the first coalition government at the national level in Spanish electoral history (since the Second Spanish Republic) was formed. There are different possibilities<sup>3</sup> but my preferred one (and closest to reality) is the one in which both PSOE (in wave 3) and Podemos (along with PSOE in wave 4) are considered to be the incumbent. It is important to note that this variable is constructed in a rather convoluted way because of data constraints. Ideally, I would use either actual vote recall or vote intention in a certain election. However, since the time span of the survey only covers April 28th national elections, I have combined two different variables to construct my dependent variable. As explained above, I can only use third and fourth waves pulled together but only in wave 3 there is the proper question about vote intention. Hence, for wave 4 I use a question about the probability of "ever voting for" different parties as a proxy. In that case, those reporting a probability equal or greater than 5 of voting for either PSOE or Unidas Podemos are considered a 1, the rest are considered opposition voters.

## 6.2 Explanatory variables

### 6.2.1 Affective Polarization Index

The usual way of measuring affective polarization is the one used by [Gidron et al. \(2018\)](#). They use survey data from a module of the CSES asking respondents to rate political parties in the classical 0-10 thermometer scale (that is, how much they like or dislike a certain party). After that, they basically inverse the scale so that 10 denotes the most negative party evaluation and 0 the most positive. However, instead of calculating an average level of affective polarization, I need to compute the individual amount of polarization. That is obtained as a measure of the spread of the affect an individual shows for a certain number of parties, in other words, it is a "weighted average party affect difference compared to each respondent's weighted average party affect" ([Wagner, 2021](#)):

$$\text{Spread}_i = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^p \nu_p (\text{like}_{ip} - \overline{\text{like}}_i)^2}$$

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<sup>3</sup>See the appendix to see an analysis of them

Where  $\nu_p$  is the vote share of each party so I can account for party size. Moreover, the mean affect should itself be weighted by party size, calculated as:

$$\overline{\text{like}}_i = \sum_{p=1}^p (\nu_p * \text{like}_{ip})$$

This allows me to compare individuals using their level of affective polarization. An easy and *a priori* objective way to define the typology of voters according to its level of elasticity (e.g. affective polarization) is to cut the index in three slices according to the standard deviation. Hence, **supporters** would be those whose affective polarization level is below one standard deviation, **partisans** would be defined as those between minus one and plus one standard deviations and **fans** are defined as those above one standard deviation. That yields the next distribution of voters:




Table 1: Groups of voters according to its level of Affective Polarization

	Observations	Percentage
Supporters	535	15.44
Partisans	2,404	69.36
Fans	527	15.20
Total	3,466	100.00

In order to explore the data a bit before I turn to the models, I first include two general pictures of the affective polarization index distribution. One distinguishing between government and opposition partisans<sup>4</sup> (Figure 4) and a second one distinguishing by party identity (Figure 5).

<sup>4</sup>Here everyone who is not a government partisan, is considered a opposition partisan. However, I am considering to include a graph in the appendix desegregating this category with partisan of the opposition and those without a partisan identity.




Figure 4: Affective Polarization Index by partisanship




Figure 5: Affective Polarization Index by party identification

In Figure 6 we can see the distance in feelings towards voters of each party for those whose level of affective polarization is above and below the average. This is an important measure because reveals the extent to which positive and negative partisanship is present in the Spanish system. The horizontal axis plots the level of warmth that an individual has regarding voters of every one of the four biggest parties. It ranges from 0 being feeling very cold to 100 being feeling very close or warm. In the vertical axis I separate the results for each party to explore the plausible heterogeneity. The parties are ordered

according to their position in the ideological scale (left to right is top to bottom) in order to ease the interpretation of the results. The results are somewhat mixed although they can give us some insight to explain later the main empirical findings.

First of all, there is a common pattern among parties and their supporters. As we could expect, those more polarized than the average tend to have stronger sympathy for their party’s voters. This is the case for all the parties except for VOX for which the distance between more and less polarized is not statistically different from zero at the 90% level<sup>5</sup>. It looks like –at least for the Spanish case– positive partisanship is working powerfully. Moreover, we see that PSOE voters tend to be




Figure 6: Feelings towards party voters and affective polarization

Now, although most of the distances measured are not significantly different from zero, we see some clear patterns in the data. For example, looking at the two main traditional parties (PP and PSOE) we see that those more polarized tend to have colder feelings towards voters of the other party. This offers a clear –and if anything conservative– measure of the level of polarization between the two main parties which, in turn, are the most moderate on average.

The reason behind plotting parties ordered by ideology in the vertical axis is to better see that except for Ciudadanos who is put at the end of the panel on purpose, we see a mirror image on the pattern. In line with (Orriols and León, 2020), there is a clear pattern regarding the out-group formation that basically has to do with two ideological blocks. If we look at Figure 6 by rows, we see that left parties’ voters display feelings that are a mirror image of those of the rightwing voters. Moreover, the spread of those feelings, in line with (Wagner, 2021) is grater as the parties move apart ideologically, that is,

<sup>5</sup>I have included here the plot with the 95% confidence intervals, which make no significant the distances between more and less polarized for Ciudadanos, PP and VOX.

feelings towards both the in-group and the out-group are more extreme for UP and VOX voters than they are for PSOE and PP respectively. Interestingly enough, we also see that PSOE and UP supporters are significantly warmer towards their in-group when they are more polarized whereas PP and VOX supporters tend to be colder towards their out-group the more polarized they are. This suggests that positive partisanship is stronger on the left whereas negative partisanship tend to be stronger on the right.

### 6.2.2 Economic assessment

Now, In order to check if economic voting ‘is working’ as expected, I need a measure of national economy assessment made by respondents. E-DEM dataset includes the most straightforward and common question about economic assessment. Respondents are not asked to give a very precise assessment of the economic situation, they are just asked if they think economy is either better or worse than in the last 12 months. The variable as it appears in the dataset takes on values 1 (“A lot worse”) to 5 “A lot better”. I recode this variable to be an index ranging from -2 to 2 so positive values of the index represents positive assessments of the economy and vice-versa.

Table 2: Assessment of the Spanish economy

	Observations	Percentage
A lot worse	654	11.68
A little worse	1,271	22.70
No difference	2,326	41.54
A little better	1,314	23.47
A lot better	34	0.61
Total	5,599	100.00

## 6.3 Models

Therefore, the model to be estimated is as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \beta_3 Z_i + \eta_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $y_i$  is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if the respondent will vote for the incumbent in the following election and 0 otherwise<sup>6</sup>,  $\beta_1$  is the expected effect of economic voting alone,  $\beta_2$  is the effect of affective polarization index<sup>7</sup> on the probability of voting for the incumbent and, the outcome of interest,  $\beta_3$  is the interaction between both  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ . Thus,  $\beta_3$  capture the effect of economic voting according to the level of affective polarization of the individual. Finally,  $\eta_i$  is a vector of sociodemographic control variables, and  $\epsilon$  is the error term.

<sup>6</sup>For respondents in wave 4, since there is no question asking about a hypothetical future election, a 1 represents people with a score of more than 5 in the question about the probability of ever voting for either PSOE or Unidas Podemos (Podemos+IU)

<sup>7</sup>In some specifications, this variable is a continuous measure, in others it is a dichotomous one, splitting the sample between those above and those below the average level of affective polarization



## 7 Results

Now we turn to the main results of the paper. In this section I summarize and discuss the empirical evidence for or against my two main hypotheses:

*H1: Among those who assess the economy as worse than in the past, and are identified as incumbent voters, fans are more willing to vote for the government than supporters and partisans.*

*H2: Among those who assess the economy as better than in the past, and are identified as opposition voters, fans are less willing to vote for the government than supporters and partisans.*

Table 3: Effects of affective polarization on economic voting (preferred specification)

	Likelihood of voting for the incumbent	
	Baseline	+ Sociodemographic controls
Economic assessment	0.560*** (3.47)	0.528** (3.24)
Partisans	0.880*** (6.40)	0.967*** (6.94)
Fans	0.748*** (4.01)	0.902*** (4.75)
Partisans $\times$ Economic assessment	-0.0758 (-0.44)	-0.111 (-0.64)
Fans $\times$ Economic assessment	0.0279 (0.13)	-0.0574 (-0.27)
Opposition supporter	-3.872*** (-20.65)	-3.881*** (-20.54)
Pseudo $R^2$	0.324	0.337
Observations	3459	3459

*t* statistics in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$




Figure 7: Economic voting and affective polarization




Figure 8: Only opposition supporters




Figure 9: Only incumbent supporters




Figure 10: Electoral groups and elasticity

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## Appendix