A HYPERSEQUENT CALCULUS FOR CONTINGENT EXISTENCE

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MOTIVATION

THE PROBLEM WITH QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC

► The most technically natural way of presenting quantified modal logic yields a modal logic in which we can derive the Barcan formula.

$$\Diamond \exists x A \to \exists x \Diamond A$$

Motivation 3/2

THE PROBLEM WITH QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC

► The most technically natural way of presenting quantified modal logic yields a modal logic in which we can derive the Barcan formula.

$$\Diamond \exists x A \to \exists x \Diamond A$$

▶ But the Barcan formula has false instances according to commonsense metaphysics.

Motivation 3/22

AWKWARDNESS VS SUPERSTITION

"In both areas [quantified tense and modal logic], in fact, we have a choice between a certain amount of awkwardness and a certain amount of superstition."

-ARTHUR N. PRIOR
Past, Present and Future, p.160

Iotivation 4/:

HYPERSEQUENTS

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Motivation 5/22

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- ► Goal here is to navigate between awkwardness and superstition by looking at what's going on in proofs of the Barcan formula.
- ► To do this we will use modal hypersequents in the style of Restall (2012). A *Hypersequent* is a multiset of sequents which we will write as

$$X_1 \vdash Y_1 \mid \ldots \mid X_n \vdash Y_n$$

Motivation 5/

Hypersequents: Rules

▶ Rules for the propositional connectives are 'local' to a sequent component $X_i \vdash Y_i$.

$$\frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash A, B, Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash A \lor B, Y} \ ^{[\lor R]} \qquad \frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X, A \vdash Y \quad \mathcal{H} \mid X, B \vdash Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X, A \lor B \vdash Y} \ ^{[\lor L]}$$

Motivation 6/22

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▶ Rules for the modal perators have a more 'global' flavour

$$\frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X' \vdash Y', A \quad \mid \ X \vdash Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X' \vdash Y' \quad \mid \ X \vdash Y, \Diamond A} \text{ [\lozengeR]} \qquad \frac{\mathcal{H} \mid \vdash A \quad \mid \ X \vdash Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X, \Diamond A \vdash Y} \text{ [\lozengeL]}$$

Motivation 6/2

DERIVATIONS OF THE BARCAN

FORMULA

A BARCAN DERIVATION

$$\frac{\frac{Fa \vdash Fa}{Fa \vdash | \vdash \Diamond Fa}}{\frac{Fa \vdash | \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}{\exists x Fx \vdash | \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}} \stackrel{[\exists R]}{\exists L]}{\frac{\exists L}{\Diamond \exists x Fx \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}}$$

A BARCAN DERIVATION

$$\frac{\frac{F\alpha \vdash F\alpha}{F\alpha \vdash | \vdash \Diamond F\alpha}}{\frac{F\alpha \vdash | \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}{\exists x Fx \vdash | \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}} \stackrel{[\ni R]}{\underset{[\lozenge L]}{\exists L}}$$

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A BARCAN DERIVATION

$$\frac{\frac{F\alpha \vdash F\alpha}{F\alpha \vdash | \vdash \Diamond F\alpha}}{\frac{F\alpha \vdash | \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}{\exists x Fx \vdash | \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}} \stackrel{[\exists R]}{\underset{[\Diamond L]}{\exists x Fx \vdash \exists x \Diamond Fx}}$$

- ► An adequate quantified modal logic needs to tell us not only that the above proof is invalid...
- ... but also, by way of justifying the logical awkwardness that may be involved, where it led us astray and why.

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- ... involving tacit appeals to principles very similar to those they are meant to be proofs of.
- ► If we make the implicit binding of free-variables in formulas explicit then we can no longer derive the Barcan formula.

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- ➤ So his solution only works due to a "deliberate impoverishment of the formal machinery"
- ► Is this the only way to bring out this insight?

► Let us employ variables in both their usual *object denoting* role, as well as a new *scope-indicating* role.

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► Where we can only bind a with a quantifier in the first case, but not the second.

A SKETCH OF A FORMAL LANGUAGE

- ► Formulas in the langauge which we'll be concerned with can be constructed by taking closed sentences of the standard language of modal logic and:
 - 1. Removing occurrences of '∃'
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- ▶ Our rules for the existential quantifier, then, are the following (where in $[\exists L]$ a must be an *eigenvariable*):

$$\frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash Y, u_1 \dots u_m u A_u^x}{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash Y, u_1 \dots u_m \exists x A}$$
 [3R]
$$\frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X, u_1 \dots u_m a A_a^x \vdash Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X, u_1 \dots u_m \exists x A \vdash Y}$$
 [3L]

So our rules for the quantifiers only bind variables whose scope-marking occurrence has wide-scope.

OPAQUE & TRANSPARENT

RULES

► With our scope markers we can now draw a distinction between two different kinds of insertion rules for connective.

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- ► *Transparent* insertion rules make the terms available to be bound in the premises so available in the conclusion.
- ▶ Disjunction, for example, has transparent insertion rules

$$\frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X, u_{1} \dots u_{m}A \vdash Y \qquad \mathcal{H} \mid X, u_{1} \dots u_{m}B \vdash Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X, u_{1} \dots u_{m}(A \lor B) \vdash Y}$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash u_{1} \dots u_{m}A, u_{1} \dots u_{m}B, Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash u_{1} \dots u_{m}(A \lor B), Y}$$
[$\lor R$]

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- ► The rules for the modal operators are opaque in this sense.

$$\begin{split} \frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash Y \quad \mid \quad t_{1} \dots t_{n} A \vdash}{\mathcal{H} \mid X, \Diamond t_{1} \dots t_{n} A \vdash Y} \\ \frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash Y \quad \mid \quad X' \vdash Y', t_{1} \dots t_{n} A}{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash Y, \Diamond t_{1} \dots t_{n} A \quad \mid \quad X' \vdash Y'} \\ \stackrel{[\lozenge R]}{} \end{split}$$

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► Similarly the rules for negation are also opaque.

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- ► We just want to restrict when such quantification can occurr.
- ► Exportation Rules allow for this possibility. The exportation rules for \Diamond are the following, where for $[\Diamond ExpR]$ we require that there be some formula α $B \in X$.

$$\frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash Y, \Diamond \alpha A}{\mathcal{H} \mid X \vdash Y, \alpha \Diamond A} \text{ [$\Diamond ExpR$]} \qquad \frac{\mathcal{H} \mid X, \Diamond \alpha A \vdash Y}{\mathcal{H} \mid X, \alpha \Diamond A \vdash Y} \text{ [$\Diamond ExpL$]}$$

&The Barcan Formula

UNRESTRICTED EXPORTATION

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- ▶ But it is derivable in the system we get by replacing the [◊ExpR] rule with the rule of 'unrestricted exportation', which drops the restriction placed on that rule.

aF	a⊢	αFα	[⊘ R]
aFa ⊢		⊢⊘aFa	[2.4=]
a Fa ⊢			[UE]
αFα ⊢	İ	$\vdash \exists x \Diamond F x$	[∃R]
$\exists x Fx \vdash$	<u>'</u>	$\vdash \exists x \Diamond F x$	
	<u> </u>		[◊L]
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► This approach gives us a very natural explanation of what goes 'wrong' in Barcan derivations—they involve exportation inferences which are hidden in the standard language.

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- Moreover, the only justification for those inferences appears to be question begging (e.g. all terms denote an existent in every possibility).
- ► So we have a system which does away with the unwanted superstition without causing *too* much formal awkwardness.

