

Semantic Fuzzing with Zest

Rohan Padhye, Caroline Lemieux, Koushik Sen, Mike Papadakis, Yves Le Traon












Fuzz Testing









Fuzz Testing is Extremely Popular and Effective

Releasing jsfunfuzz and DOMFuzz

Tuesday, July 28th, 2015

Today I'm releasing two fuzzers: jsfunfuzz, which tests JavaScript engines, and DOMFuzz, which tests layout and DOM APIs.

Over the last 11 years, these fuzzers have found 6450 Firefox bugs, including 790 bugs that were rated as security-critical.

What is Microsoft Security Risk Detection?

Security Risk Detection is Microsoft's unique fuzz testing service for finding security critical bugs in software. Security Risk Detection helps customers quickly adopt practices and technology battle-tested over the last 15 years at Microsoft.

Google Testing Blog

Announcing OSS-Fuzz: Continuous Fuzzing for Open Source

Software

Thursday, December 01, 2016

CVE-2014-6277: "ShellShock" bug in Bash

CVE-2014-0160: "Heartbleed" bug in OpenSSL

Linux 4.14-rc5

From: Linus Torvalds

Date: Sun Oct 15 2017 - 21:48:40 EST

The other thing perhaps worth mentioning is how much random fuzzing people are doing, and it's finding things. We've always done fuzzing (who remembers the old "crashme" program that just generated random code and jumped to it? We used to do that quite actively very early on), but people have been doing some nice targeted fuzzing of driver subsystems etc, and there's been various fixes (not just this last week either) coming out of those efforts. Very nice to see.

CVE-2015-1606

CVE-2015-1607

CVE-2014-9087

CVE-2014-6355

CVE-2015-0061

CVE-2015-7855

CVE-2016-7434

CVE-2015-7941

CVE-2015-8035

CVE-2015-8241

CVE-2015-8242

CVE-2015-8317

CVE-2016-4658 CVE-2016-5131

012 2010 010

CVE-2015-5309

CVE-2015-5311

CVE-2015-0232

CVE-2017-5340

CVE-2015-2158


CVE-2015-0860 CVE-2015-8380

CVE-2016-1925

CVE-2014-9771

CVE-2016-3994


Fuzz Testing is Extremely *Popular* and *Effective*




CVE-2015-1607 CVE-2014-9087 CVE-2014-6355 CVE-2015-0061 CVE-2015-7855 CVE-2016-7434 CVE-2015-7941 CVE-2015-8035 CVE-2015-8241 CVE-2015-8242 CVE-2015-8317 CVE-2016-4658 CVE-2016-5131 CVE-2015-5309 CVE-2015-5311 CVE-2015-0232 CVE-2017-5340 CVE-2015-2158 CVE-2015-0860 CVE-2015-8380 CVE-2016-1925 CVE-2014-9771 CVE-2016-3994

CVE-2015-1606


Many test programs look like this:



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



Many test programs look like this:



This Talk: Sneak Peak

Fuzzing Apache Ant	Syntax Error	Semantic Error	Semantically Valid
Baseline 1 (AFL)	99.63 %	0.37 %	0 %
Baseline 2 (QuickCheck)	0 %	99.99%	0.0000005%
Semantic Fuzzing with Zest	0 %	80.12 %	19.88 %





1. Coverage-guided Fuzzing (prior work)

2. Generator-based Fuzzing (prior work)


3. Semantic Fuzzing with Zest (our work)

1. Coverage-guided Fuzzing (prior work)

2. Generator-based Fuzzing (prior work)

3. Semantic Fuzzing with Zest (our work)

Case Study



\$ ant -f build.xml

Mutation-based Fuzzing


Valid Seed Input (build.xml)

```
<project default="dist">
  <target name="init">
    <mkdir dir="${build}"/>
  </target>
...
```

New Input (Mutated from Seed)

```
ct default="dist">
  <taWget name="init">
    <madir dir="2{build}"/@
  </tar?get>
...
```

Coverage-guided fuzzing




Fuzzing Apache Ant

AFL generates ~500,000 new <u>build.xml</u> files in 1 hour

	Syntax Error	Semantic Error	Semanically Valid
AFL (Coverage-guided fuzzing)	99.63 %	0.37 %	0 %

Example: ... <taWget name="init"><madir dir="2{build}"/@</tar?get> ...





1. Coverage-guided Fuzzing (prior work)

2. Generator-based Fuzzing (prior work)

3. Semantic Fuzzing with Zest (our work)


Let's generate syntactically valid inputs

- QuickCheck Generator Functions
- Context-Free Grammars
- Peach Pits
- Protocol Buffers
- etc.


public XMLElement genXML(Random random) {

foo


```
XMLElement node = new XMLElement(random.nextString());
    "foo"
```




```
XMLElement node = new XMLElement(random.nextString());
int children = random.nextInt(0, MAX_CHILDREN);
```



```
XMLElement node = new XMLElement(random.nextString());
int children = random.nextInt(0, MAX_CHILDREN);
for (int i = 0; i < children; i++) {
    node.addChild(genXML(random));
}</pre>
```



```
XMLElement node = new XMLElement(random.nextString());
int children = random.nextInt(0, MAX CHILDREN);
for (int i = 0; i < children; i++) {
    node.addChild(genXML(random));
if (random.nextBoolean()) {
    node.addText(random.nextString());
/* ... Maybe add attributes ... */
return node;
```



```
XMLElement node = new XMLElement(random.nextString());
int children = random.nextInt(0, MAX_CHILDREN);
for (int i = 0; i < children; i++) {
    node.addChild(genXML(random));
}
if (random.nextBoolean()) {
    node.addText(random.nextString());
}</pre>
```

```
<foo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></foo>
```

public XMLElement genXML(Random random) {

Observations:

ng());

1. Generators are easy to write

bar

 $Attr{a=42}$


2. Every execution produces a <u>syntactically valid</u> input (not necessary <u>semantically</u> valid)

<foo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></foo>

Fuzzing Apache Ant

	Syntax Error	Semantic Error	Semantically Valid
AFL	99.63 %	0.37 %	0 %
QuickCheck (Generator-based fuzzing)	0 %	99.99%	0.000005%

Example: <sleep><delete copy="propertyhelper" /></sleep>





1. Coverage-guided Fuzzing (prior work)

+

2. Generator-based Fuzzing (prior work)

333

1. Coverage-guided Fuzzing (prior work)




2. Generator-based Fuzzing (prior work)



3. Semantic Fuzzing with Zest (our work)

Pseudo-random bits: 0000 0011 0110 0110 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0010


Pseudo-random bits: 0000 0011 0110 0110 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0010



```
XMLElement node = new XMLElement(random.nextString());
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    node.addChild(genXML(random));
}
if (random.nextBoolean()) {
    node.addText(random.nextString());
}</pre>
```

```
<foo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></foo>
```


Pseudo-random bits: 0000 0011 0110 0110 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0010



```
<foo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></foo>
```


Pseudo-random bits: 0000 00110110 0110 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0010

public XMLElement genXML(Random random)




<foo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></foo>

Pseudo-random bits: 0000 00110101 01110110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0010




```
<foo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></foo>
```

Pseudo-random bits: 0000 0011 0101 0111 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0010




```
<woo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></woo>
```

Pseudo-random bits: 0000 0011 0101 0111 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0010....



```
<woo><bar a="42" /><baz>xyz</baz></woo>
```

Pseudo-random bits: 0000 0011 0101 0111 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0001...



```
XMLElement node = new XMLElement(random.nextString());
int children = random.nextInt(0, MAX_CHILDREN);
for (int i = 0; i < children; i++) {
    node.addChi (genXML(random));
}
if (random.nextString());
}</pre>
```

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Pseudo-random bits: 0000 0011 0101 0111 0110 1111 0110 1111 0000 0001 ...


Key takeaways:

1. Mutations in "parameter" bits = <u>structural mutations</u> in input


2. Every execution produces a syntactically valid input

<woo><bar a="42" /></woo>


Coverage-guided fuzzing



Coverage-guided fuzzing with Parametric Generators




Zest: Validity Fuzzing + Parametric Generators



Fuzzing Apache Ant

	Syntax Error	Semantic Error	Semantically Valid
AFL	99.63 %	0.37 %	0 %
QuickCheck	0 %	99.99%	0.0000005%
Semantic Fuzzing with Zest	0 %	80.12 %	19.88 %

Example:





Evaluation of **Zest**

Benchmark	Generator	Semantic Validity
Apache Ant - Process build.xml		Ant Build Schema
Apache Maven	XML Generator (75 LOC)	NA DONAG I
- Process pom. <u>xml</u>		Maven POM Schema


Evaluation of **Zest**

Benchmark	Generator	Semantic Validity
Apache Ant - Process build.xml		Ant Build Schema
Apache Maven - Process pom.xml	XML Generator (75 LOC)	Maven POM Schema
Google Closure Compiler - Optimize <u>JavaScript</u>		Valid ES6
Mozilla Rhino - Translate <u>JavaScript</u>	JavaScript AST Generator (300 LoC)	Can be translated to JVM bytecode


Evaluation of **Zest**

Benchmark	Generator	Semantic Validity
Apache Ant - Process build.xml		Ant Build Schema
Apache Maven - Process pom. <u>xml</u>	XML Generator (75 LOC)	Maven POM Schema
Google Closure Compiler - Optimize <u>JavaScript</u>	JavaScript AST Generator (300 LoC)	Valid ES6
Mozilla Rhino - Translate <u>JavaScript</u>		Can be translated to JVM bytecode
Apache BCEL - Verify <u>.class files</u>	Java Class Generator (500 LoC)	Passes bytecode verification

Zest attains significantly higher semantic coverage




Zest finds semantic bugs reliably and quickly




Zest finds complex semantic bugs

```
while ((1_0)){
    while ((1_0)){
        if ((1_0))
        { break; var 1_0; continue }
        { break; var 1_0 }
    }
}
Zest-generated JavaScript input
```







More semantic bugs...



Google Closure Compiler: Function inlining fails during decomposition

Apache BCEL: Assertion violation when invoking unresolved method

Zest is open-source!





https://github.com/rohanpadhye/jqf


Integrated into JQF, our Java fuzzing framework [ISSTA '19 Best Tool Demo]


Used by OSS-community + industry to find 40+ new bugs / CVEs

Summary










Backup slides

Validity Fuzzing

Generators

Syntax vs. Semantic Analysis

Related Work



Backup slides


Generators in Practice


- Erdős–Rényi model: Generator for random graphs (1959)
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erdos-Renyi model
- DartFuzz: Generator for Dart programs written in Dart
 - https://github.com/dart-lang/sdk/blob/master/runtime/tools/dartfuzz/dartfuzz.dart
- Csmith: Generator for C programs written in C++
 - https://github.com/csmith-project/csmith [PLDI '11]
- StringFuzz: Generator for SMT-lib formulas written in Python
 - https://github.com/dblotsky/stringfuzz [ASE '18]
- ... and many more!

Backup slides

Benchmarks: Identification of Stages

Name	Syntax Analysis Classes	Semantic Analysis Classes
Apache Ant - Process build.xml	com.sun.org.apache.xerces	org.apache.tools. ant
Apache Maven - Process pom.xml	org.codehaus.plexus.util. xml	org.apache.maven.model
Google Closure Compiler - Optimize <u>JavaScript</u>	<pre>com.google.javascript.jscomp.parsing</pre>	com.google.javascript. jscomp. [A-Z]
Mozilla Rhino - Translate <u>JavaScript</u>	org.mozilla.javascript. Parser	org.mozilla.javascript. optimizer org.mozilla.javascript. CodeGen
Apache BCEL - Verify <u>.class files</u>	org.apache.bcel. classfile	org.apache.bcel. verifier





Structure-aware greybox fuzzing

- Zest [ISSTA '19]
- libFuzzer + protobuf [LLVM '18]
- Nautilus [NDSS'19]
- Superion [ICSE'19]
- Greybox fuzzing with grammars [fuzzingbook.org]
- AFLSmart
- CGPT [OOPSLA 2019]