FORESHADOW

Breaking the Virtual Memory Abstraction

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Introduction


- Speculative Execution
- Abuse of speculative execution: Meltdown
- Good news: Enclaves (eg. SGX)
- Breaking SGX: Foreshadow

Meltdown Overview: Flush + Reload

- Step 1: Dereference pointer to unauthorized memory illegal! Leads to page fault
- Step 2: Fetch secret dependent array index into cache in transient execution window
- **Step 3**: User fault handler compares array access time


Listing 1: x86 assembly.

Listing 2: C code.



SGX: What is special?

- Define private regions of memory: enclaves
- External access to enclave lead to abort page semantics
- Reads return -1 (0xff), writes ignored
- No exception raised meltdown unsuccessful



L1TF mechanism

- Trigger page fault to evade abort page semantics
 - Unmap page table entry using mprotect() system call
- Strict caching requirements: Required that enclave loads are served from L1 cache
 - Doesn't work if data in L2
 - Intel dubbed this L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF)
- Deduce secrets using Flush and Reload
 - Enclave entry/exit flushes TLB, reload oracle array for fast access

Mitigations

- Side channel hardening techniques don't work
 - TSX detection can be evaded through advanced versions of Foreshadow
- Silicon based and microcode patches by Intel
- Hardware-software co-mitigation strategies possible
 - Like ensuring L1 cache flushed on enclave entry/exit

Acknowledgement

• We are very grateful for the help received from Jo Van Bulck

- References:
 - Images taken from <u>USENIX</u>
 - Demo taken from Jo Van Bulck
 - Other references for report

Demo Upcoming! Get ready to know the enclave secrets