

Proof-of-Training Verifier: Efficient Black-Box Model Identity Verification with Anytime Confidence Sequences

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Abstract

We present a post-training behavioral verifier for model identity that decides whether two models are behaviorally equivalent under black-box query access. Our method combines cryptographically pre-committed challenges with anytime-valid Empirical-Bernstein confidence sequences [? ? ?] to achieve sample-efficient verification with controlled error rates. The verifier outputs SAME, DIFFERENT, or UNDECIDED decisions based on statistical hypothesis testing with early stopping. In experiments on 8 model pairs (ranging from 70M to 7B parameters), the method achieves perfect separation using 14–40 queries at $\alpha = 0.01$ confidence, representing a 96% reduction compared to fixed-sample baselines requiring 1000 queries [?]. Decision times range from 17–92 seconds for small models to 22 minutes for 7B models with memory-constrained shard loading, compared to 45–60 minutes for baseline approaches. The cryptographic pre-commitment scheme prevents adaptive attacks, while the anytime-valid confidence sequences maintain statistical validity under optional stopping.

1 Introduction

The deployment of large language models increasingly relies on API access or weight-inaccessible checkpoints, creating challenges for stakeholders who need to verify that a deployed model matches an audited reference. This verification problem arises in regulatory compliance, model governance, and supply chain security contexts where behavioral equivalence must be established without white-box access to model parameters.

Existing approaches face fundamental trade-offs. Weight-based verification [? ?] requires full parameter access, making it unsuitable for API-only settings. Gradient-based proof-of-learning [?] similarly requires white-box access and incurs $O(\text{model_size})$ memory overhead. Fixed behavioral test sets [? ?] lack statistical guarantees and are vulnerable to overfitting when challenges are known in advance.

We propose a black-box verifier that addresses these limitations through three technical contributions:

1. *Cryptographic pre-commitment*: Challenges are derived from HMAC-based pseudorandom generation [?] with revealed keys, preventing adaptive selection while enabling third-party reproducibility.
2. *Anytime-valid statistical testing*: Empirical-Bernstein confidence sequences [? ?] with time-uniform alpha-spending enable early stopping while maintaining validity, reducing queries from 1000+ to 14–40 in practice.
3. *Memory-efficient verification*: Shard-based loading for large models (tested up to 34B parameters, 206GB) enables verification on commodity hardware with <10GB active memory.

The combination of these techniques yields a practical verifier suitable for continuous integration workflows, with decision latencies under 2 minutes for models up to 2.7B parameters.

1.1 Problem Formulation

Let M_{ref} and M_{cand} be two language models accessible only through a query interface $f_M : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \Delta(\mathcal{Y})$ that maps input prompts to distributions over next tokens. We seek to test the hypothesis $H_0 : M_{\text{ref}} \equiv M_{\text{cand}}$ (behavioral equivalence) against $H_1 : D(M_{\text{ref}}, M_{\text{cand}}) > \delta$ for some divergence measure D and threshold $\delta > 0$.

The verifier must decide among three outcomes:

- SAME: Accept H_0 with confidence $1 - \alpha$
- DIFFERENT: Reject H_0 with confidence $1 - \alpha$
- UNDECIDED: Insufficient evidence for either decision at sample limit n_{\max}

Under the constraint that challenges must be pre-committed before any model queries to prevent adaptive attacks.

2 Related Work

2.1 Model Verification

White-box methods. Parameter checksums provide instant verification but require full weight access. Neural network watermarking [? ?] embeds verification signals during training but assumes verifier control of the training process. Proof-of-learning [?] verifies training integrity through gradient checkpoints but requires $O(\text{parameters})$ memory and white-box access.

Behavioral methods. Robustness benchmarks [? ?] use fixed test sets to evaluate model behavior but lack statistical guarantees for identity verification. Adversarial example transfer [?] can distinguish models but does not provide confidence bounds. Our work extends behavioral testing with anytime-valid statistical guarantees and cryptographic pre-commitment.

2.2 Sequential Testing

Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) [?] established the foundation for early-stopping hypothesis tests. Recent work on anytime-valid inference [? ? ?] provides time-uniform confidence sequences that remain valid under optional stopping. Empirical-Bernstein bounds [? ?] achieve variance-adaptive concentration for bounded random variables.

We combine these techniques with cryptographic commitment to enable sample-efficient model verification with pre-committed challenges, addressing both statistical validity and security requirements simultaneously.

3 Method

3.1 Pre-committed Challenge Generation

To prevent adaptive attacks where an adversary observes early challenges before responding, we use HMAC-based deterministic generation [?]:

$$s_i = \text{HMAC}_K(\text{run_id} || i) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{prompt}_i = \text{template}(\text{hash}(s_i) \bmod |\text{templates}|) \quad (2)$$

The verifier publishes the run metadata (run_id, challenge count, seed hash) before querying models, then reveals the key K after collecting all responses. Third parties can regenerate the exact challenge sequence to verify the commitment was honored.

3.2 Behavioral Divergence Scoring

For each challenge prompt x_i , we compute teacher-forced cross-entropy divergence over the next K token positions:

$$X_i = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \left| H(p_{\text{ref}}^{(k)}, p_{\text{cand}}^{(k)}) - H(p_{\text{ref}}^{(k)}, p_{\text{ref}}^{(k)}) \right| \quad (3)$$

where $p_M^{(k)}$ is model M 's distribution over the k -th next token. The delta formulation (cross-entropy against self) controls for inherent uncertainty, yielding non-negative scores with $X_i = 0$ for identical models.

We clip scores to $[0, 1]$ for numerical stability in the confidence sequence construction, though raw divergences may exceed 1 for highly different models.

3.3 Anytime Empirical-Bernstein Confidence Sequences

Let $\bar{X}_n = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ and $\hat{\sigma}_n^2 = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^n (X_i - \bar{X}_n)^2$ denote the sample mean and variance. An Empirical-Bernstein half-width is:

$$h_n = \sqrt{\frac{2\hat{\sigma}_n^2 \log(1/\delta_n)}{n}} + \frac{7 \log(1/\delta_n)}{3(n-1)} \quad (4)$$

With alpha-spending $\delta_n = \frac{2\alpha}{n(n+1)}$, we have $\sum_{n=2}^{\infty} \delta_n = \alpha$ (telescoping series). This yields time-uniform coverage:

$$\mathbb{P}(\forall n \geq 2 : \mu \in [\bar{X}_n - h_n, \bar{X}_n + h_n]) \geq 1 - \alpha \quad (5)$$

The confidence interval $CI_n = [\bar{X}_n - h_n, \bar{X}_n + h_n]$ remains valid regardless of when we stop [?].

3.4 Decision Rules

Define relative margin error $RME_n = h_n / \max(|\bar{X}_n|, \epsilon)$ with $\epsilon = 10^{-10}$ for numerical stability. We decide at step n :

- **SAME** if $CI_n \subseteq [-\gamma, \gamma]$ and $h_n \leq \eta\gamma$
- **DIFFERENT** if $|\bar{X}_n| \geq \delta^*$ and $RME_n \leq \epsilon_{\text{diff}}$
- **UNDECIDED** otherwise (or if $n = n_{\text{max}}$)

Parameters are set through calibration: $\gamma = 0.025$ (equivalence margin, below perceptual threshold [?]), $\delta^* = 0.05$ (minimum effect size), $\eta = 0.5$ (signal-to-noise requirement), $\epsilon_{\text{diff}} = 0.3$ (relative error tolerance).

3.5 API Verification and Provider Authentication

The verifier establishes behavioral equivalence through API queries but cannot authenticate the service provider without additional infrastructure. Provider authentication requires either:

- Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) attestation [?] proving code/data integrity
- Vendor cryptographic signatures committing to the serving model
- Zero-knowledge proofs [? ?] of verifier computation (proves correctness of decision from transcript, but not endpoint identity)

4 Implementation

4.1 Evidence Bundle Format

Each verification run produces a structured output directory:

- *manifest.yaml*: Configuration, commitment metadata, revealed HMAC key
- *transcript.ndjson*: Per-challenge prompts, model outputs, scores
- *evidence_bundle.json*: Decision, confidence interval, sample size, bundle hash
- *metrics.json*: Memory usage, timing breakdown, system metadata

The bundle hash (SHA-256 of manifest + transcript + evidence) enables reproducible verification.

4.2 Memory-Efficient Verification

For models exceeding available RAM, we implement shard-based loading:

1. Partition model weights into shards of size S (typically 4–10GB)
2. For each query: load shard i , compute activations, release shard i , load shard $i + 1$
3. Cycle through shards while maintaining cumulative decision statistics

Peak memory usage is $\max(S, \text{activation_memory})$, enabling verification of 206GB models on 64GB hosts (measured 52% peak RAM usage for Yi-34B).

5 Experimental Setup

5.1 Models and Baselines

We evaluate on model pairs ranging from 70M to 7B parameters:

- Small (<1B): GPT-2 (124M), DistilGPT-2 (82M), DialoGPT-Medium (345M), Pythia-70M, GPT-Neo-125M
- Large (7B): Llama-2-7b-hf, Llama-2-7b-chat-hf

Baselines include:

- Fixed- N with $N = 1000$ (standard practice [?])
- Mixture SPRT (mSPRT) [?] without pre-commitment
- Always-valid p -values [?]

5.2 Evaluation Protocol

For each model pair, we run:

1. Self-consistency test (model vs. itself, expect SAME)
2. Cross-model test (model A vs. model B, expect DIFFERENT if architecturally distinct)
3. Fine-tuning detection (base vs. instruction-tuned variant)

We report: (i) decision accuracy (SAME/DIFFERENT), (ii) queries to decision, (iii) wall-clock time, (iv) peak memory usage. All experiments use $\alpha \in \{0.01, 0.025\}$ corresponding to AUDIT and QUICK modes.

6 Results

6.1 Query Efficiency

Table ?? summarizes verification results. The method achieves perfect separation (8/8 correct decisions) using 14–40 queries, compared to 1000 for fixed-sample baselines.

Table 1: Verification results on 8 model pairs. All decisions correct (8/8).

Models	Mode	Queries	Time (s)	Decision	Memory (GB)
<i>Self-consistency verification</i>					
pythia-70m → pythia-70m	AUDIT	30	66.9	SAME	1.27
gpt2 → gpt2	AUDIT	30	71.7	SAME	1.56
llama-7b-base → base	QUICK	14	1346.7	SAME	8.01
llama-7b-chat → chat	QUICK	14	1381.4	SAME	7.95
<i>Architecture and scale differences</i>					
gpt2 → distilgpt2	AUDIT	32	92.2	DIFFERENT	1.33
gpt2 → gpt2-medium	AUDIT	40	84.6	DIFFERENT	1.71
gpt-neo → pythia	AUDIT	32	133.3	DIFFERENT	2.36
<i>Fine-tuning detection</i>					
dialogpt → gpt2	QUICK	16	17.3	DIFFERENT	1.85

6.2 Baseline Comparison

Table ?? compares against sequential testing baselines. Our method reduces queries by 3–6× compared to mSPRT and 4–7× compared to always-valid p -values, while uniquely providing cryptographic pre-commitment.

6.3 Computational Requirements

Wall-clock timing breaks down as: (i) model loading (5–10s for small models), (ii) inference (0.5–2.5 s/query), (iii) verifier overhead (<1% of total). For 7B models with sharding, shard loading dominates (contributing 95% of wall-clock time).

Memory usage scales with model size: 1.3–2.4GB for models under 1B parameters, 7.9–8.0GB for 7B models with active shard caching.

Table 2: Comparison with sequential testing baselines on GPT-2 models.

Method	Queries	Time (min)	Pre-commit	FAR/FRR
Fixed- N (1000) [?]	1000	45–60	No	0.05/0.05
mSPRT [?]	87–142	4–7	No	0.08/0.06
Always-valid p [?]	95–180	5–9	No	0.05/0.05
Ours	14–40	0.3–1.5	Yes	0/0*

*Empirical error rate: 0/8 decisions incorrect

7 Discussion

7.1 Theoretical Guarantees

The method provides:

- Type-I error control: $\mathbb{P}(\text{SAME}|H_1) \leq \alpha$ (anytime-valid CI)
- Type-II error control: $\mathbb{P}(\text{DIFFERENT}|H_0) \leq \beta$ (power depends on n_{\max} , effect size)
- Pre-commitment security: Adversary cannot adapt responses to observed challenges (HMAC pre-commitment)

The UNDECIDED outcome occurs when evidence is insufficient at budget n_{\max} , corresponding to effect sizes in the indifference zone $[\gamma, \delta^*]$.

7.2 Limitations

Scope of experiments. Our evaluation focuses on models up to 7B parameters due to computational constraints. Generalization to larger models (70B+) requires validation, though the method’s sample efficiency should improve with larger models (more distinctive behavioral signatures).

Provider authentication. The verifier establishes behavioral equivalence but cannot authenticate the API endpoint without additional infrastructure (TEEs, vendor commitments).

Semantic drift. The method detects distributional differences but may not capture semantic changes that preserve token-level distributions (e.g., factual accuracy degradation).

7.3 Comparison to Prior Work

Compared to proof-of-learning [?], our method trades white-box gradient access for black-box efficiency, achieving practical verification latencies (<2 minutes vs. hours). Compared to fixed test sets [?], we provide statistical guarantees and 96% query reduction through adaptive early stopping. The combination of pre-commitment, anytime validity, and memory efficiency is novel.

8 Conclusion

We presented a black-box model verifier combining cryptographic pre-commitment, anytime-valid confidence sequences, and memory-efficient inference to achieve sample-efficient identity verification. Experiments demonstrate 96% query reduction compared to fixed-sample baselines while maintaining perfect decision accuracy (8/8 model pairs). The method enables practical continuous verification workflows, with decision latencies under 2 minutes for models up to several billion parameters.

Future work includes: (i) evaluation on larger models (70B+), (ii) integration with TEE-based provider authentication, (iii) extension to multi-model verification scenarios.

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A Technical Details

A.1 Alpha-Spending and Optional Stopping

α -Spending Schedule: We use $\delta_n = \frac{\alpha \cdot c}{n(n+1)}$ with $c = 2$ to ensure $\sum_{n \geq 2} \delta_n = \alpha$ for time-uniform type-I error control under optional stopping.

Proof Sketch:

1. By telescoping: $\sum_{n=2}^{\infty} \frac{c}{n(n+1)} = c \sum_{n=2}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n+1} \right) = c \cdot 1 = c$
2. Setting $c = 2$ and $\delta_n = \frac{\alpha \cdot 2}{n(n+1)}$ yields $\sum_{n \geq 2} \delta_n = \alpha$
3. The EB bound with this schedule satisfies $\mathbb{P}(\exists n \geq 2 : |\bar{X}_n - \mu| > h_n) \leq \alpha$
4. This holds *anytime*, even under data-dependent stopping (optional stopping theorem)
5. The confidence sequence $[\bar{X}_n \pm h_n]$ maintains coverage uniformly over all n
6. Early stopping at any τ preserves validity: $\mathbb{P}(|\bar{X}_{\tau} - \mu| > h_{\tau}) \leq \alpha$

This construction enables valid inference regardless of when we stop, crucial for adaptive early termination.

A.2 Evidence Bundle Schema

Bundle Structure: Each run produces a directory with cryptographic commitments, raw transcripts, and decisions. Bundle hash = SHA-256(manifest + transcript + evidence).

Directory structure:

```
runs/val_20250825_142945/
|- manifest.yaml                                # Run config, HMAC key (revealed post-run)
|- transcript.ndjson                            # Per-query: {prompt, outputs, scores}
|- evidence_bundle.json                         # Decision, CI, n_used, bundle_hash
|- metrics.json                                 # (Optional) RSS, timing, sharding events
```

Key JSON fields (evidence_bundle.json):

```
{
  "decision": "SAME|DIFFERENT|UNDECIDED",
  "confidence_interval": [lower, upper],
  "n_queries": 14,
```

```

    "mean_effect": 0.001,
    "bundle_hash": "sha256:abc123...",
    "timestamp": "2025-08-25T14:29:45Z"
}

```

Reviewers can verify: (1) bundle hash matches table entry, (2) transcript reproduces scores, (3) HMAC seeds are deterministic.

A.3 Statistical Guarantees Under Early Stopping

The Empirical-Bernstein confidence sequence maintains validity under optional stopping through careful α -spending:

Theorem (Anytime Validity): For confidence sequence $C_n = [\bar{X}_n \pm h_n]$ with

$$h_n = \sqrt{\frac{2\hat{\sigma}_n^2 \log(2/\delta_n)}{n}} + \frac{7 \log(2/\delta_n)}{3(n-1)}$$

and $\delta_n = \frac{2\alpha}{n(n+1)}$, we have for any stopping time τ :

$$\mathbb{P}(\mu \notin C_\tau) \leq \alpha$$

This enables aggressive early stopping without inflating type-I error, crucial for achieving the reported query reductions.

A.4 Behavioral Fingerprinting Algorithm

The behavioral fingerprinting classification triggers when:

1. $n \geq \max(50, 2 \times n_{\min})$ (sufficient samples)
2. $\text{CV} = \frac{\sigma}{|\mu|} < 0.1$ (stable convergence)
3. $\text{RME} > \epsilon_{\text{diff}}$ (cannot meet DIFFERENT threshold)

Classification thresholds:

Relationship	Mean Effect Range
NEAR_CLONE	$ \bar{X}_n < 0.001$
RELATED_TRAINING	$0.001 \leq \bar{X}_n < 5$
DIFFERENT_TRAINING	$5 \leq \bar{X}_n < 10$
DIFFERENT_ARCH	$ \bar{X}_n \geq 10$

A.5 Implementation Details

Challenge Generation: Prompts are generated via HMAC-SHA256 with revealed key:

- $\text{seed}_i = \text{HMAC}(\text{key}, \text{"challenge_"} || i)$
- $\text{prompt}_i = \text{select_prompt}(\text{seed}_i \bmod \text{num_templates})$
- $\text{position}_i = (\text{seed}_i \gg 32) \bmod \text{context_length}$

Scoring Function: KL divergence between output distributions:

$$S(P, Q) = \sum_{v \in V} P(v) \log \frac{P(v)}{Q(v) + \epsilon}$$

where V is the vocabulary, $\epsilon = 10^{-10}$ for numerical stability.

Memory Management for Large Models:

- Models > 5GB: Sequential loading with `gc.collect()` between runs
- Models > 10GB: Sharded loading, process 4-8 queries per shard
- Peak memory usage: $\approx 0.52 \times$ model size via aggressive unloading

A.6 Reproducibility Checklist

To reproduce results from Table 1:

1. Install dependencies: `torch>=2.2.0, transformers>=4.36.2, numpy, scipy`
2. Download models to `~/LLM_Models/`
3. Run: `python scripts/run_e2e_validation.py --ref-model gpt2 --cand-model gpt2-medium --mode audit`
4. Verify bundle hash matches reported value
5. Check `experimental_results/*/evidence_bundle.json` for full metrics

Code available at: [URL upon publication]