## **Game Theory Course Miniproject (25 to 35 marks)**

- There are 68 students in the class. Assigning miniprojects was clearly a challenge. So I have come up with this protocol. There are 68 papers listed here. The papers are selected mostly from EC 2020, WINE 2020, and EC 2019.
- I have done a truly random assignment of papers to students. Student \$i\$ gets Paper \$i\$. Some of you may prefer another paper but in the interest of simpler miniproject logistics, please stick to the paper that is assigned to you.
- Each student is expected to do the following.
- Read the paper diligently. Read all the important related papers (cited in the assigned paper) thoroughly. Look at all citations to this paper and read those papers as well. See this video by Prof. Andrew Ng on how to read papers:
   <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&t=160&v=733m6qBH-il&feature=youtu.be">https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&t=160&v=733m6qBH-il&feature=youtu.be</a>
- April 15, 2021: Make a two page summary of this work and related papers in your own words (repeat in your own words) (5 Marks). I will advise you where to upload this two page writeup. Use the NeurIPS template:
   <a href="https://neurips.cc/Conferences/2021/PaperInformation/StyleFiles">https://neurips.cc/Conferences/2021/PaperInformation/StyleFiles</a>
- May 10<sup>,</sup> 2021: Make a 10 page writeup of this topic in the above NeurIPS format and submit it. Use the above template. See this nice presentation by Dimitris Bertsekas on math writing: <a href="https://www.mit.edu/~dimitrib/Ten Rules.pdf">https://www.mit.edu/~dimitrib/Ten Rules.pdf</a>. There are other excellent articles on how to write papers well. I will advise you where to upload this 10 page writeup.
- In the 10 page writeup, there should be an abstract, introduction, review of relevant work (with positioning of this paper), main contributions with simplified proofs, etc. Page number 9 should be devoted completely to your own ideas on how the paper can be non-trivially extended/enhanced and to any other creative new directions. Page number 10 should have at least 20 key references with complete details. (10 marks).
- May 20<sup>,</sup> 2021: Submit a 15 minute video presentation with 15 slides and upload to OneDrive. I will indicate the details later. (10 marks)
- Additional Bonus Marks: Please note that you can get up to 10 additional bonus marks if you extend this work in a novel way and you are able to get some preliminary results. This could be written up in any number of pages in an appendix of the 10 page writeup.
- As soon as the 2 page writeups, 10 page writeups, slides, and video presentations are uploaded, they will all be made available to all of you, so you can get an idea of some of the best recent work in the area.

## **List of Papers and List of Students**

(Paper \$i\$ is assigned to student \$i\$ in the list of students that appears after the list of papers).

- 1. Paul Duetting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath. Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning, ICML 2019
- 2. Lukas Graf and Tobias Harks. The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria, WINE 2020
- 3. Will Ma. Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Auctions for Multiple Buyers with Ordinal Preferences over Fixed-price Items, WINE 2020
- 4. Niclas Boehmer and Klaus Heeger. A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas, WINE 2020.
- 5. Grant Schoenebeck and Fang-Yi Yu. Two Strongly Truthful Mechanisms for Three Heterogeneous Agents Answering One Question. WINE 2020.
- 6. Haris Aziz. Simultaneously Achieving Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness. WINE 2020.
- 7. Caspar Oesterheld and Vincent Conitzer. Decision Scoring Rules. WINE 2020.
- 8. Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias and Benjamin Plaut. Almost Envy-free Repeated Matching in Two-sided Markets, WINE 2020.
- 9. Benjamin Plaut. Optimal Nash Equilibria for Bandwidth Allocation. WINE 2020.
- 10. Ben Berger, Alon Eden and Michal Feldman. On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. WINE 2020.
- 11. Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poças and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis. Robust Revenue Maximization Under Minimal Statistical Information. WINE 2020.
- 12. Devansh Jalota, Qi Qi, Marco Pavone and Yinyu Ye. Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with Social Distancing. WINE 2020.
- 13. Hanrui Zhang. A Generic Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions, WINE 2020.

- 14. Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar and Nisarg Shah. Optimal Bounds on the Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods. WINE 2020.
- 15. Daniel Halpern, Ariel Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas and Nisarg Shah. Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All, WINE 2020.
- 16. Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier and Neil Newman. Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates, WINE 2020.
- 17. Niclas Boehmer and Klaus Heeger. A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas. WINE 2020.
- 18. Francisco Benita, Vittorio Bilò, Barnabé Monnot, Georgios Piliouras and Cosimo Vinci. Data-Driven Models of Selfish Routing: Why Price of Anarchy Does Depend on Network Topology. WINE 2020.
- 19. One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy Authors: Johannes Brustle, Jack Dippel, Vishnu Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki and Adrian Vetta, EC 2020
- 20. Efficient Matchmaking in Assignment Games with Application to Online Platforms Authors: Peng Shi. EC 2020.
- 21. Quick or Cheap? Breaking Points in Dynamic Markets
  Authors: Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Heinrich Nax and Bary Pradelski, EC 2020
- 22. Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents
  Authors: Nikhil Devanur, <u>Kira Goldner</u>, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman and <u>S</u>
  <u>Matthew Weinberg</u>, EC 2020
- 23. Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests
  Authors: Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz and Yakov Babichenko, EC 2020
- 24. Matching Algorithms for Blood Donation Authors: Duncan Mcelfresh, Sergey Pupyrev, <u>Christian Kroer</u>, Karthik Sankararaman, John Dickerson, Eric Sodomka, Zack Chauvin and Neil Dexter, EC 2020
- 25. Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism
  Authors: Dominik Peters and Piotr Skowron, EC 2020
- 26. Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Division Authors: <u>David Zeng</u> and <u>Alexandros Psomas</u>, EC 2020

27. Budget-Constrained Incentive Compatibility for Stationary Mechanisms
Authors: Santiago Balseiro, Anthony Kim, Mohammad Mahdian and Vahab Mirrokni
EC 2020

28. Data and Incentives

Authors: Annie Liang and Erik Madsen, EC 2020

29. Driver Surge Pricing

Authors: Nikhil Garg and Hamid Nazerzadeh, EC 2020

30. The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

Authors: Siddharth Barman and Federico Echenique, EC 2020

31. Product Ranking on Online Platforms

Authors: Mahsa Derakhshan, Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh Manshadi and <u>Vahab</u> Mirrokni, EC 2020

32. Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosure
Authors: Nicole Immorlica, <u>Jieming Mao</u>, Aleksandrs Slivkins and Zhiwei Steven Wu EC 2020

- 33. Adversarial Perturbations of Opinion Dynamics in Networks Authors: Jason Gaitonde, <u>Jon Kleinberg</u> and <u>Eva Tardos</u>,EC 2020
- 34. Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems Authors: Jason Gaitonde and Eva Tardos, EC 2020
- 35. Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study
  Authors: Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom and Ilya Segal, EC 2020
- 36. Differentially Private Call Auctions and Market Impact
  Authors: Emily Diana, Hadi Elzayn, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth, Saeed SharifiMalvajerdi and Juba Ziani, EC 2020
- 37. Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion Authors: <u>Jerry Anunrojwong</u>, <u>Krishnamurthy Iyer</u> and <u>Vahideh Manshadi</u>, EC 2020
- 38. Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias Authors: Ramesh Johari, Hannah Li and Gabriel Weintraub, EC 2020
- 39. A Learning Framework for Distribution-Based Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts Authors: Tushant Jha and <u>Yair Zick</u>, EC 2020

- 40. Optimal Communication-Distortion Tradeoff in Voting
  Authors: Debmalya Mandal, Nisarg Shah and David Woodruff, EC 2020
- 41. EFX Exists for Three Agents
  Authors: Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg and Kurt Mehlhorn, EC 2020
- 42. Fair Cake Division Under Monotone Likelihood Ratios Authors: <u>Siddharth Barman</u> and <u>Nidhi Rathi</u>, EC 2020
- 43. Online Policies for Efficient Volunteer Crowdsourcing Authors: Vahideh Manshadi and Scott Rodilitz, EC 2020
- 44. Learning through the Grapevine: the Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias
  Authors: Matthew Jackson, Suraj Malladi and David McAdams, EC 2020
- 45. A Formal Separation Between Strategic and Nonstrategic Behavior Authors: James Wright and Kevin Leyton-Brown, EC 2020
- 46. Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards: Optimal Competitive Ratio via Path Based Formulation
  Authors: Vineet Goyal and Rajan Udwani
- 47. Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions
  Authors: Costis Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis and
  Santhoshini Velusamy, EC 2020
- 48. Best of Both Worlds: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness in Resource Allocation Authors: <u>Rupert Freeman</u>, <u>Nisarg Shah</u> and <u>Rohit Vaish</u>, EC 2020
- 49. Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk Authors: <u>Steffen Schuldenzucker</u> and <u>Sven Seuken</u>, EC 2020
- 50. Pricing for the Stars: Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Rating Systems Authors: Andre Stenzel, Christoph Wolf, and Peter Schmidt, EC 2020
- 51. Does Quality Improve with Customer Voice? Evidence from the Hotel Industry Authors: Uttara Ananthakrishnan, Davide Proserpio, and Siddartha Sharma, EC 2020
- 52. Ganesh Ghalme, Amleshwar Kumar, Sujit Gujar, Shweta Jain, and Y. Narahari. Design of Coalition Resistant Credit Score Functions for Online Discussion Forums. AAMAS 2018.

- 53. Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, and Y. Narahari. A quality assuring, cost-optimal multiarmed bandit mechanism for expert sourcing. Artificial Intelligence, 2018.
- 54. Swaprava Nath, <u>Tuomas Sandholm</u>:
  Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains. Games and Economic Behavior. 2019.
- 55. Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-offs Authors: Jiehua Chen, Piotr Skowron and Manuel Sorge, EC 2019
- 56. Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
  Authors: Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang and David C. Parkes, EC 2019
- 57. Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals
  Authors: Rupert Freeman, David Pennock, Dominik Peters and Jennifer Wortman
  Vaughan, EC 2019
- 58. Envy-freeness up to any item with high Nash welfare: The virtue of donating items Authors: Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin and Xin Huang, EC 2019
- 59. How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically? Authors: Jon Kleinberg and Manish Raghavan, EC 2019
- 60. How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization
  Authors: Sameer Mehta, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman and Vijay Mookerjee,
  EC 2019
- 61. The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue. Authors: Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw and Sikander Randhawa, EC 2019
- 62. Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India Authors: Surender Baswana, Partha P Chakrabarti, Sharat Chandran, Yash Kanoria and Utkarsh Patange, EC 2019
- 63. Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars Authors: Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz, EC 2019
- 64. Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin, EC 2019
- 65. Credible Mechanisms. Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li, EC 2019
- 66. Incentivizing Exploration. Peter Frazier, David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and Robert Kleinberg. EC 2019

- 67. Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles. Authors: Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, William S. Zwicker ITCS 2019
- 68. Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods
  Authors: Rupert Freeman, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish, Lirong Xia . IJCAI 2019

## **List of Students**

Taken from the Attendance Report of the Class on March 29, 2021. Auditors are also welcome to do the miniproject.

- 1. Umang Bhat
- 2. Chinmay S I
- 3. Yash Narayan
- 4. Shubham Kumar
- 5. GORANTLA SRUTHI
- 6. Bhushan

Dhananjay Deo

- 7. SIMRAN JAYKUMAR
- 8. Ankita Koley
- 9. Saurabh Sushilkumar Chavan
- 10. Pallavi R Naik
- 11. Hari Govid Shrawgi
- 12. Somya Sangal
- 13. Hitesh Poply
- 14. Azal Fatima
- 15. Aditya Kumar
- 16. Abhilash Mukherjee
- 17. Shreyas Bhat
- 18. SRIRAM S
- 19. Prateek Somani
- 20. Hariom Choudhary
- 21. Hemanth Kongara
- 22. Ritik Patidar
- 23. Aanchal Satpuri

- 24. Prathamesh Gajanan Patil
- 25. Nancy Agrawal
- 26. Raj Jha
- 27. Vatan Goyal
- 28. Sajid Ahamed M A
- 29. Vishnu Teja Kunde
- 30. Hemanta Makwana
- 31. Vijayakumar Thanelanka
- 32. Manthan Sharma
- 33. Debabrata Kumar Karan
- 34. S GAURANG
- 35. Harishwar Reddy Kasireddy
- 36. Meghnath Singh
- 37. ADIT VISHNU P M
- 38. Abhigyan Dutta
- 39. Saankhya Subrata Mondal
- 40. Rohit Patel
- 41. Yash Bagdi
- 42. Rokkam Sandeep Reddy
- 43. Banuprasad Bathala
- 44. Omprakash Vishwakarma
- 45. Shaikh Danish Mahemood
- 46. Deepanshu
- 47. Girish Kumar Madugula
- 48. Rohit Chowdhury
- 49. Nikita Yadav
- 50. Darshika Tiwari
- 51. Hemang Jain
- 52. DHARANISH R
- 53. Meghal Sachdev
- 54. Ankit Sharma (EE)
- 55. Sowjanya Pidathala
- 56. Aman Sachan

- 57. Vijay Kumar Boda
- 58. Nandini Gour
- 59. Pranshul Kushwaha
- 60. Shankararama Sharma R
- 61. Amit Kumar Prajapat
- 62. Ashish Shashikant Bokil
- 63. Anshul Kumrawat
- 64. Akash A
- 65. Abhinav Jaiswal
- 66. Ramarajan R
- 67. PIYUSH BHUWAN SATI
- 68. Eklavya Sharma