
# Decision Analytic Support in Non-Cooperative Sequential Games

Roi Naveiro, Tahir Ekin, Aberto Torres, David Ríos <a href="mailto:roi.naveiro@icmat.es">roi.naveiro@icmat.es</a> | Inst. of Mathematical Sciences (ICMAT-CSIC) Madrid | ADA 2022

#### Sequential Defense Attack Games




- Gaining Importance due to the raise of AML!
- Classical Decision Makers, Humans: discrete and low dimensional decision spaces.
- New Decision Makers, Algorithms: **continuous** and **high dimensional** decision spaces.

#### New Solution techniques

- Forget about (general) analytic solutions!
- Must work with uncertain outcomes
- Must acknowledge uncertainty about adversary
- We propose a **Simulation-based** solution approach:
  - Solves general security games, with uncertain outcomes, complete and incomplete information
  - Explain it for Sequential Defend-Attack games under incomplete information

## Seq. Games with Uncertain Outcomes



#### Game theoretic approach

- **Common Knowledge Assumtion**: the Defender knows the Attacker's probabilities and utilities.
- Compute expected utilities.

$$\psi_A(a,d) = \int u_A(a, heta)\,p_A( heta|d,a)\;\mathrm{d} heta \quad ext{and} \quad \psi_D(d,a) = \int u_D(d, heta)\,p_D( heta|d,a)\,\mathrm{d} heta.$$

ullet Attacker's best response to defense d

$$a^*(d) = rg \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \ \psi_A(d,a)$$

Defender's optimal action

$$d^*_{\mathrm{GT}} = rg\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \ \psi_D(d, a^*(d)).$$

•  $\left[d^*_{ ext{GT}},\,a^*(d^*_{ ext{GT}})
ight]$  is a Nash equilibrium and a sub-game perfect equilibrium.

#### ARA approach

- ullet Weaken Common Knowledge Assumption: the Defender **does not know**  $(u_A,p_A)$ .
- We need  $p_D(a|d)!$
- ullet Then,  $d_{ ext{ARA}}^* = rg \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \psi_D(d)$  , where

$$\psi_D(d) = \int \psi_D(a,d) \, p_D(a|d) \, \mathrm{d}a = \int \left[ \int u_D(d, heta) \, p_D( heta|d,a) \, \mathrm{d} heta 
ight] \, p_D(a|d) \, \mathrm{d}a,$$

#### ARA approach

- To elicitate  $p_D(a|d)$ , Defender analyses Attacker's problem.
- Model uncertainty about  $(u_A,p_A)$  through distribution  $F=(U_A,P_A)$ .
- Induces distribution over attacker's expected utility  $\Psi_A(a,d) = \int U_A(a,\theta) P_A(\theta|a,d) \,\mathrm{d} heta.$
- ullet And  $A^*(d) = rg \max_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \Psi_A(x,d)$
- Then,

$$p_D(A \leq a|d) = \mathbb{P}_F\left[A^*(d) \leq a
ight],$$

#### ARA approach

- In practice, discretize decision set
- ullet Draw J samples  $\left\{\left(P_A^i,U_A^i
  ight)
  ight\}_{i=1}^J$  from F and

$$\hat{p}_D(a|d) pprox rac{\#\{a = rg \max_{x \in \mathcal{A}} \, \Psi_A^i(x,d)\}}{J},$$

ARA solution is a Bayes-Nash Eq. (in sequential games)

#### MC solution method

```
\begin{aligned} & \textbf{for } d \in \mathcal{D} \textbf{ do} \\ & \textbf{for } i = 1 \textbf{ to } J \textbf{ do} \\ & & \begin{vmatrix} \text{Sample } u_A^i(a,\theta) \sim U_A(a,\theta) \\ \text{Sample } p_A^i(\theta \,|\, a,d) \sim P_A(\theta \,|\, d,a) \\ \text{Compute } a_i^*(d) \text{ as } \arg\max_a \int u_A^i(a,\theta) p_A^i(\theta \,|\, a,a) \, \mathrm{d}\theta \\ & & \hat{p}_D(A^* = a \,|\, d) = \frac{1}{J} \sum_{i=1}^J I[a_i^*(d) = a] \end{aligned} Solve \max_d \int u_D(d,\theta) p_D(\theta \,|\, a,d) \hat{p}_D(A^* = a \,|\, d) \, \mathrm{d}\theta \, \mathrm{d}a
```

• Requires generating  $|\mathcal{D}| imes (|\mathcal{A}| imes Q imes J+P)$  samples.

#### APS - Idea 1

- ullet Assume we can sample from  $p_D(d|a)$
- Max expected utility

$$d_{ ext{ARA}}^* = rg \max_d \int \int u_D(d, heta) \cdot p_D( heta|d,a) \cdot p_D(d|a) d heta da$$

• Define

$$\pi_D(d,a, heta) \propto u_D(d, heta) \cdot p_D( heta|d,a) \cdot p_D(d|a)$$

• Mode of marginal  $\pi_D(d)$  is  $d_{ ext{ARA}}^*$  !

#### APS - Idea 2

- Flat expected utilities, complicates mode identification
- Define

$$\pi_D^H(d, heta_1,\ldots, heta_H,a_1,\ldots,a_H) \propto \prod_{i=1}^H u_D(d, heta_i) \cdot p_D( heta_i|d,a_i) \cdot p_D(a_i|d)$$

• Marginal more peaked around max!

$$\pi_D^H(d) \propto \left[ \int \int u_D(d, heta) \cdot p_D( heta|d,a) \cdot p_D(d|a) d heta da 
ight]^H$$

#### **APS - Implementation**

- Sample from  $\pi(d, \theta_1, \theta_2, \dots, \theta_H, a_1, \dots, a_H)$  using MCMC.
- Find mode of *d* samples.
- 1. State of the Markov chain is  $(d, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_H, a_1, \ldots, a_H)$ ;
- 2.  $ilde{d} \sim g(\cdot|d)$ ;
- З.  $ilde{a}_i \sim p_D(a| ilde{d}\,)$  for  $i=1,\ldots,H$ ;
- 4.  $ilde{ heta}_i \sim p_D( heta| ilde{d}\,, ilde{a}_i)$  for  $i=1,\ldots,H$ ;
- 5. Accept  $ilde{x}, ilde{ heta}_1, \ldots, ilde{ heta}_H, ilde{a}_1, \ldots ilde{a}_H$  with probability

$$\min\left\{1,rac{g(d| ilde{d}\,)}{g( ilde{d}\,|d)}\cdot\prod_{i=1}^{H}rac{u_{D}( ilde{d}\,, ilde{ heta}_{i})}{u_{D}(d, heta_{i})}
ight\}$$

- 6. Repeat
- Embed this MCMC within an annealing schedule that increases H!

# APS for ARA - $p_D(a|d)$


- For given d, random augmented distribution  $\Pi_A(a,\theta|d) \propto U_A(a,\theta) P_A(\theta|d,a)$ ,
- Marginal  $\Pi_A(a|d)=\int \Pi_A(a, heta|d)d heta$ , proportional to A's random expected utility  $\Psi_A(d,a)$ .
- ullet Random optimal attack  $A^*(d)$  coincides a.s. with mode of  $\Pi_A(a|d)$ .
- Then:
- 1.  $u_A(a, heta) \sim U_A(a, heta)$  and  $p_A( heta|d,a) \sim P_A( heta|d,a)$
- 2. Build  $\pi_A(a, \theta|d) \propto u_A(a, \theta) p_A(\theta|d, a)$  which is a sample from  $\Pi_A(a, \theta|d)$ .
- 3. Find  $\operatorname{mode}[\pi_A(a|d)]$  which is a sample of  $A^*(d)$ , whose distribution is  $\mathbb{P}_F\left[A^*(d) \leq a\right] = p_D(a \leq d).$

#### APS vs MC

- ullet MC requires  $|\mathcal{D}| imes (|\mathcal{A}| imes Q imes J+P)$  samples
- ullet APS requires at most N imes (2M+5)+2M+4 samples
- Simple game with continuos decision sets
- Several in parallel
- Compute min number of samples s.t. 90% solutions coincide with truth (to required precision)


		Samples		Power		
Precision	Algorithm	Outer	Inner	Outer	Inner	Time (s)
0.1	MC APS	1000 60	100 100	900	20	$0.007 \\ 0.240$
0.01	$rac{\mathrm{MC}}{\mathrm{APS}}$	$717000 \\ 300$	$\begin{array}{c} 100 \\ 100 \end{array}$	6000	100	$13.479 \\ 2.461$

# Application




## **Application**


• Elicited probability p(a|d) for some security controls.





# Application


• Histogram of samples of security controls.
























































#### Conclusions

- APS for games, both standard and ARA.
- APS better when cardinality of decision spaces is big (or spaces are continuous).
- Suggested algorithmic approach
  - 1. Use MC for broad exploration of decision space.
  - 2. Use APS within regions of interest to get refined solutions.

# Thank you!!

Website roinaveiro.github.io/

**Email** roi.naveiro@icmat.es

**GitHub** github.com/roinaveiro