



Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Informatics
Department of Measurement and Information Systems

Formal modeling and verification of process models in component-based reactive systems

Scientific Students' Association Report

Author:

Ármin Zavada

Advisor:

dr. Vince Molnár
Bence Graics

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Kivonat

A biztonságkritikus rendszerek komplexitása folyamatosan növekedett az elmúlt években. A komplexitás csökkentése érdekében a modellalapú paradigma vált a meghatározó módszerre ilyen rendszerek tervezéshez. Modellalapú rendszertervezés során a komponensek viselkedését általában állapotalapú, vagy folyamatorientált modellek segítségével írjuk le. Az előbbi formalizmusa azt írja le, hogy a komponens milyen állapotokban lehet, míg az utóbbié azt, hogy milyen lépéseket hajthat végre, valamint milyen sorrendben. Gyakran ezen modellek valamilyen kombinálása a legjobb módja egy komplex komponens viselkedésének leírásához.

Formális szemantikával rendelkező modellezési nyelvek lehetővé teszik a leírt viselkedés (kimerítő) verifikációját. Formális verifikáció használatával már a fejlesztés korai fázisaiban felfedezhetőek a hibák: a módszer ellenőrzi, hogy a rendszer egy adott (hibás) állapota elérhető-e, és amennyiben elérhető, ad hozzá egy elérési útvonalat. A formális verifikációs eszközök emiatt gyakran csak alacsony szintű, állapotalapú modelleken működnek, melyek messze vannak az emberek által könnyen érthető nyelvektől. Ezért, hogy magas szintű viselkedési modelleket tudjunk verifikálni, implementálnunk kell egy olyan modell transzformációt, mely megtartja a folyamat- és állapotalapú modellek szemantikáját azok kombinációja után is.

Ebben a dolgozatban megvizsgálom a folyamatalapú modellek szemantikáját, valamint a kapcsolatukat egyéb hagyományos állapotalapú modellekkel. Emellett megoldásokat vetek fel a potenciális konfliktusokra a kombinált alacsonyszintű modellben. Munkám során a Gamma állapotgép kompozíciós keretrendszerre építék, mellyel komponensalapú reaktív rendszereket modellezhetünk és verifikálhatunk. Mivel a Gamma még nem támogatja az aktivitásokat, bevezetek egy új aktivitás nyelvet, melyhez a SysMLv2 szolgál inspirációként. Ezzel együtt implementálom hozzá a szükséges transzformációkat a Gamma alacsony szintű analízis formalizmusára. Végezetül pedig kiértékelem a koncepcionális és gyakorlati eredményeket esettanulmányokon és méréseken keresztül, valamint felvetek lehetséges fejlesztéseket és alkalmazásokat.

Abstract

The complexity of safety-critical systems has been increasing rapidly in recent years. To mitigate said complexity, the model-based paradigm has become the decisive way to design such systems. In model-based systems engineering, we usually define the behaviour of system components using state-based or process-oriented models. The former formalism describes what states the component can be in, while the latter describes what steps it can perform and in what order. Oftentimes, the best way to model the behaviour of a complex component is to combine these models in some way.

Modelling languages with formal semantics enable the (exhaustive) verification of the described behaviour. Formal verification may be used to detect errors early during development by checking if a given (erroneous) state of the system can be reached, and if so, providing a way to reach it. Formal verification tools often require low-level state-based mathematical models, which are far from human-understandable languages. Thus, to enable the verification of high-level behavioural models, a model transformation must be implemented that preserves the semantics of both process-oriented and state-based models, even when combined.

In this report, I analyse the semantics of process-oriented models, as well as its relation to traditional state-based models, and propose solutions for the possible conflicts in a combined low-level model. In my work, I build on the Gamma Statechart Composition Framework, which is a tool for modelling and verifying component-based reactive systems based on statecharts. Since Gamma does not support activities yet, I introduce a new activity language inspired by SysMLv2, and implement the necessary transformations to Gamma's low-level analysis formalism. Finally, I evaluate the conceptual and practical results through case studies and measurements then propose potential improvements and applications.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The complexity of safety-critical systems has been increasing rapidly in recent years. To mitigate said complexity, the model-based paradigm has become the decisive way to design such systems. In model-based systems engineering, we usually define the behaviour of system components using state-based or process-oriented models. The former formalism describes what states the component can be in, while the latter describes what steps it can perform and in what order. Oftentimes, the best way to model the behaviour of a complex component is to combine these models in some way.

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Gamma Statechart Composition Framework is a tool for bridging the gap between the two models. It is a tool for modelling and verifying component-based reactive systems based on statecharts. Since Gamma does not support activities yet, I introduce a new activity language inspired by SysMLv2, and implement the necessary transformations to Gamma's low-level analysis formalism.

ezt még át kéne írni

kicsit beszélni a létező implementációkról

Chapter 2

Background

In this chapter I address the foundations of this work. In Section 2.1 I introduce concept of model-based systems engineering, which is a well known approach for complex system design. This includes SysML as well (Section 2.1.1). After this I talk about Formal Verification in Section 2.2, and introduce Petri nets (Section 2.2.2 and a mapping from between activities and Petri nets (Section 2.2.3). Lastly, I introduce the Gamma Composite Statechart Framework, which is a tool for stating and verifying composite models using statechart behavioursSection 2.3, and a low-level formalism created for model checking used by Gamma in Section 2.4.

2.1 Model-based Systems Engineering

The INCOSE SE Vision 2020[1] defines Model-based systems engineering (MBSE) as:

the formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later life cycle phases. MBSE is part of a long-term trend toward model-centric approaches adopted by other engineering disciplines, including mechanical, electrical and software. In particular, MBSE is expected to replace the document-centric approach that has been practiced by systems engineers in the past and to influence the future practice of systems engineering by being fully integrated into the definition of systems engineering processes.

Applying MBSE is expected to provide significant benefits over the document centric approach by enhancing productivity and quality, reducing risk, and providing improved communications among the system development team.[2]

In MBSE, one of the most important concepts is the term "model" itself. In the literature it has many different definitions:


1. A physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process.[5]
2. A representation of one or more concepts that may be realized in the physical world.[7]

3. A simplified representation of a system at some particular point in time or space intended to promote understanding of the real system.[4]
4. An abstraction of a system, aimed at understanding, communicating, explaining, or designing aspects of interest of that system.[6]
5. A selective representation of some system whose form and content are chosen based on a specific set of concerns. The model is related to the system by an explicit or implicit mapping.[9]

2.1.1 Systems Modeling Language

This work focuses only on the *behavioural* modeling tools SysML provides. In the following section, I present two of the most used concepts.

Reactive systems are all around us in our daily lives; in smart phones, avionics systems or even our calculators. Frequently, reactive systems appear in areas, where safety-critical operation is crucial, as even the slightest misbehaviour can have catastrophic consequences. This makes the verification of these systems a must during their design process.



SysML state machines (see 2.1) extend the concept of statecharts with hierarchical state-refinement, orthogonal regions, action-effect behaviour and state machine composition (explained in more detail in ??). These advanced constructs make state machines easy to use for engineers, but lead to the formal verification process being challenging. This

challenge can be overcome using a transformation tool, such as Gamma, of which I will be talking in Section 2.3.

2.1.1.2 Activity Diagram

Reactive systems however cannot describe the complicated semantics of distributed systems with concurrent, parallel behaviour, where the *interesting* thing is what the system *does* step-by-step. SysML activity diagrams are a primary representation for modeling process based behaviour[8] for distributed, concurrent systems. Figure 2.2 shows the set of interesting artifacts used in this work. In the following, I will introduce the different artifacts and show an example of a SysML activity diagram.




Figure 2.2: Artifacts of SysML activity diagrams.

SysML activity diagram is a graph based diagram, where the nodes are connected via flows. The dynamic behaviour of activity diagrams comes from *tokens* travelling from node to node; based on the given node's semantics a connected flow removes tokens from the source node and puts them onto the target node.

A *control* token is a simple token without any value associated with it, a *data* token is a token that contains some value. The difference between the nodes capture the various behaviours a given activity diagram can model. Simple **actions** represents a single step of behaviour that converts a set of inputs to a set of outputs. Both inputs and outputs are specified as pins. Behaviour is represented as a flow of tokens, the flow is started from the initial node, which generates and passes a token to each node to which it is connected. Fork nodes generate tokens on all of its leaving paths, and join nodes generate a token on the leaving path when all entering paths have at least one token. Merge nodes consume all incoming tokens, and only sends out one on its outgoing flows, likewise, decision nodes take one token from its input flows, and sends it out on its one and only one enabled outflows. There are two kinds of flows, control and object flows. Control tokens travel through control flows, and data tokens travel through object flows. Object flows must start from an output pin, and must end with an input pin. The execution of an activity diagram ends when the activity final node receives a token. The detailed specification can be found in OMG[8].

Activity example description, and figure. This example will be used for all activity examples.

2.2 Formal Verification

In order to raise the reliability of system analysis, a system analysis technique is required that can have the precision of paper-and-pencil based mathematical proofs, and thus does

not rely upon computer-arithmetic, and utilizes the computers for bookkeeping, to be able to handle complex systems without having to worry about human-errors. Formal verification methods, which are primarily based on theoretical computer science fundamentals like logic calculi, automata theory and strongly type systems, fulfil these requirements. The main principle behind formal analysis of a system is to construct a computer based mathematical model of the given system and formally verify, within a computer, that this model meets rigorous specifications of intended behaviour. Due to the mathematical nature of the analysis, 100% accuracy can be guaranteed.[13]

2.2.1 Model Checking

Model Checking is a formal verification method to verify properties of finite systems, i.e., to decide whether a given formal model M satisfies a given requirement γ or not. The name comes from formal logic, where a logical formula may have zero or more models, which define the interpretation of the symbols used in the formula and the base set such that the formula is true. In this sense, the question is whether the formal model is indeed a model of the formal requirement: $M \models \gamma$?

Model Checker algorithms (see Figure 2.3), such as UPPAAL¹[3] or Theta²[20] use SAT solvers to answer this question; and can even return a *proof* (i.e., a part of the model) that M indeed does satisfy said requirement³.




Figure 2.3: An illustration of model checking.

2.2.2 Petri Net

Petri nets are a widely used formalism to model concurrent, asynchronous systems [18]. The formal definition of a Petri net (including inhibitor arcs) is as follows (see Figure 2.4 for an illustration of the notations).

Definition 1 (Petri net). A Petri net is a tuple $PN = (P, T, W, M_0)$

- P is the set of *places* (defining state variables);
- T is the set of *transitions* (defining behaviour), such that $P \cap T = \emptyset$;

¹<https://uppaal.org/>

²<https://inf.mit.bme.hu/en/theta>

³These proofs usually come in the form of an execution trace




Figure 2.4: An example Petri net with 2 transitions and 4 places.

- $W \subseteq W^+ \cup W^-$ is a set of two types of arcs, where $W^+ : T \times P \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ and $W^- : P \times T \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ are the set of input arcs and output arcs, respectively (\mathbb{N} is the set of all natural numbers);
- $M_0 : P \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is the *initial marking*, i.e., the number of *tokens* on each place. ▪

The state of a Petri net is defined by the current marking $M : P \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. The behaviour of the systems is described as follows. A transition t is enabled if $\forall p \in P : M(p) \in W(p, t)$. Any enabled transition t may fire non-deterministically, creating the new marking M' of the Petri as follows: $\forall p \in P : M'(p) = M(p) - W^-(p, t) + W^+(t, p)$.

In words: W describes the *weight* of each flow from a transition to a place, or from a place to a transition. Firing a transition t in a marking M consumes $W^-(p_i, t)$ tokens from each of its input places p_i , and produces $W(t, p_o)$ tokens in each of its output places p_o . One such transition t is *enabled* (it may *fire*) in M if there are enough tokens in its input places for the consumptions to be possible, i.e., if and only if $\forall p : M(p) \geq W(s, t)$.

2.2.3 Activities as Petri Nets

Formal verification requires models to be specified using *mathematical* precision. In the paper called "Verifying SysML activity diagrams using formal transformation to Petri nets"[15] by Edward Huang, Leon F. McGinnis and Steven W. Mitchell they propose a way to *partially* map SysML activity diagrams to Petri nets. In the following, I will summarise their work.

2.2.3.1 Constrained Sub-set of SysML

Since SysML Activity Diagrams do not have exact execution semantics[16], the PN mapping can only be done for a limited subset of the modeling elements: *actions*, *initial nodes*, *final nodes*, *join nodes*, *fork nodes*, *merge nodes*, *decision nodes*, *pins* and *object/control flows*, which have precise execution semantics as defined in the Foundational Subset for Executable UML Models.[10]

The paper also assumes some other constrains:

1. The value of tokens is not considered.
2. Control flows with multiple tokens at a time are not considered.

These constraints allow the mapping between activities and Petri nets, however, the constructed PN will not be semantically equivalent. This fact will be addressed in Chapter 4.

2.2.3.2 Mapping Rules

Activity elements can be grouped into two sets: *load-and-send* (LAS) and *immediate-repeat* (IR)

LAS nodes are fired when all their inputs have tokens. When an LAS node fires, the number of tokens associated with the input arcs/pin is consumed and the number of tokens associated with an output arc/pin is added. Examples of LAS nodes in Petri nets are transitions. In SysML activity diagrams, the execution semantics of fork nodes, join nodes, and basic actions are also LAS because these nodes are fired when all their input nodes have at least one token.

In contrast, as soon as an IR node receives a token from any input, it immediately adds a token to its output nodes. Places in PN are an example of IR nodes. For UML/SysML activity diagrams, activity final nodes, merge nodes, decision nodes and pins are IR nodes because they are fired immediately when any token is received.

Given the set of assumptions in Section 2.2.3.1, control flows and object flows in an activity diagram can be mapped to arcs in a Petri net.

IR és LAS jobb kidolgozása, matek behozása, valamint az algoritmus kb leírása

2.2.3.3 Example Mapping

Figure ... shows an example mapping from a SysML activity diagram to a Petri net

For more information, please refer to the Paper!

2.3 The Gamma Statechart Composition Framework

2.3.1 Statechart

2.3.2 Activity

2.4 Extended Symbolic Transition System

The high-level nature of engineering models means they are easy-to-use for engineers, but leads to difficulties during the formal verification process. SysML state machines and activity diagrams for example contain high-level constructs that make the modeling workflow more intuitive and enable the modeling of significantly more complex systems, however they are difficult to process using formal methods that are defined on low-level mathematical formalism and verified using SMT solvers. In this section, I introduce the XSTS[17] language, which is a low-level modeling formalism designed to bridge the aforementioned gap between engineering models and formal methods.

2.4.1 Formal definition

Definition 2 (Extended symbolic transition system). An *Extended symbolic transition system* is a tuple $XSTS = (D, V, V_C, IV, Tr, In, En)$, where:

- $D = \{D_{v1}, D_{v2}, \dots, D_{vn}\}$ is a set of value domains;

- $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$ is a set of variables with domains $D_{v_1}, D_{v_2}, \dots, D_{v_n}$;
- $V_C \subseteq V$ is a set of variables marked as *control variables*;
- $IV \in D_{v_1} \times D_{v_2} \times \dots \times D_{v_n}$ is the *initial value function* used to describe the initial state. The initial value function IV assigns an initial value $IV(v) \in D_v$ to variables $v \in V$ of their domain D_v ;
- $Tr \subseteq Ops$ is a set of operations, representing the *internal transition relation*; it describes the internal behaviour of the system;
- $In \subseteq Ops$ is a set of operations, representing the *initialisation transition relation*; it is used to describe more complex initialisation, and is executed once and only once, at the very beginning;
- $En \subseteq Ops$ is a set of operations, representing the *environmental transition relation*; it is used to model the system's interactions with its environment. ▪

In any state of the system a single operation is selected from the sets introduced above (Tr , In and En). The set from where the operation can be selected depends on the current state: In the initial state - (which is described by the initialization vector IV) - only operations from the In set can be executed. Operations from the In set can only fire in the initial state and nowhere else. After that, En and Tr are selected in an alternating manner.

Operations $op \in Ops$ describe the transitions between states of the system, where Ops is the set of all possible transitions. All operations are atomic in the sense that they are either executed in their entirety or none at all. XSTS defines the following operations:

Basic operations Basic operations contain no inner (nested) operations. **Assignments** assign a given value v from domain D_n to variable V_n . **Havocs** behave likewise, except the value is not predetermined; giving a way to assign random value to a variable. Lastly, **assumptions** check a condition, and can only be executed if their condition evaluates to *true*.

Composite operations Composite operations contain other operations, and can be used to describe complex control structures. Note that while these are composite operations, their execution is still atomic; meaning that an *assume* operation prevents its containing operations from firing. **Sequences** are essentially multiple operations executed after each other, while **parallels** execute all operations at the same time. And lastly, **choices** model non-deterministic choices between multiple operations; one and only one branch of the choice operation is selected for execution, but that selected operation can still only be executed atomically - e.g., a single failing assume operation can prevent execution.

2.4.2 Simple example

Below is an example XSTS model defined in the language. For a more exact presentation please see Section A.1 in the Appendix.

```
itt majd egy szép xsts példa lesz a running example-re (vagy valami hasonlóra).
Akár lehetne egy Gamma által generált statechart is.
```

Chapter 3

Gamma Activity Language

The high-level nature of SysML activities means they are easy to model complicated behaviours including many different *actors* for engineers, but leads to an increasingly harder time trying to run formal verification on them. In the real world, SysML models often contain state machines that call activity diagrams as so called *do behaviour*, because often times this makes the design process easier. However, models containing *do activity* actions cannot be verified directly; the activities have to be pre-processed and transformed into something else, like javascript or state machines (cite Pragmatic Verification and Validation of Industrial Executable SysML Models). As discussed above in Section 2.2.3, we can define a mapping between activities and Petri nets (which have exact semantics), however, that mapping is not exhaustive.

In this work, I propose the Gamma Activity Language, which aims to be an intermediary language between SysML and XSTS by having exact semantics alongside statecharts. I will also propose a transformation from Gamma Activity Language to XSTS in Chapter 4, and integrate it into Gamma in Chapter 5.

3.1 Language Design

During the design phase of the language SysML served as the basis when deciding what is should and should not contain. When deciding the scope of the language the following statement served as target: The language should be easy to transform into XSTS, while also following SysML activity semantics.

To conform to the previous statements, the language should resemble SysML, however, should be as *lightweight* as possible. For this reason, we determined a sub-set of the SysML activity feature set that the language will contain.

3.1.1 SysML Feature Sub-set

ez a rész csak jegyzet

Initial/final node, action node, composite activity node, decision/merge node, fork/join node, pins, control/data flows.

Do behaviour:

call activity action on transitions is not supported, would have to be inlined and flattened, atomic functions, interlaced with line execution semantics (future work)

- call activity context függő - hosszú (nem atomikus) dolgot nem lehet akárhol meghívni (transition, sima action, stb) - validáció: inline környezetben tilos várakozás és ciklus (vagy csak x mélységig) - sok köztes nem stabil állapot - nagy változás a trafóban
ezért csak do activity van

3.2 Formal modelling

formal modeling howto, why needed, etc

semantic part, formal model, enforcing well formedness, etc

Due to the complexity of the meta-model, I have split it into multiple parts for easier understanding.

In order to offer mathematical precision, formal verification methods require formally defined models with clear semantics.

Activities are composed of activity nodes,

nodes have tokens nodes are idle -> running -> done flows can have tokens nodes put tokens onto flows when done node take tokens from flows when idle if a node contains a token, it is considered running.

In this section, I present the meta-model and the formal semantics of the Gamma Activity Language.

3.2.1 Formal Definition

Definition 3 (Gamma Activity Language). A Gamma Activity is a tuple of $GA = (N, P, F, G, D, F_{Action})$, where:

- $N = N_{Initial} \cup N_{Final} \cup N_{Pseudo} \cup N_{Decision} \cup N_{Merge} \cup N_{Action}$ is a set of *Nodes*, where $N_{Initial}$ contains the *Initial* nodes, N_{Final} contains the *Final* nodes, N_{Pseudo} contains the *Pseudo* nodes, $N_{Decision}$ contains the *Decision* nodes, N_{Merge} contains the *Merge* nodes and N_{Action} contains the *Action* nodes;
- $P \subseteq P_{In} \cup P_{Out}$ is a set of two types of pins, where $P_{In} : N_{Action} \rightarrow \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$ and $P_{Out} : N_{Action} \rightarrow \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$ are the set of *InputPins* and *OutputPins*, respectively, with domains $\{d_1, \dots, d_n\} \subseteq D$;
- $F \subseteq F_C \cup F_D$, where $F_C = \{F_{C1}, \dots, F_{Cn}\}$ and $F_D = \{F_{D1}, \dots, F_{Dn}\}$ are the control and data flows, respectively. Let us denote the input/output flows of node n as $\delta(n)$ and $\Delta(n)$, and the source/target pins of flow f as $\phi(f)$ and $\Phi(f)$. For any given node n , $\delta(n) \neq \Delta(n)$ and for any given action node n_a $\Phi(f) \in P_{In}(n_a) \forall f \in F_D \cap \delta(n_a)$ and $\phi(f) \in P_{Out}(n_a) \forall f \in F_D \cap \Delta(n_a)$ shall always hold. This means, that a flow cannot be input and output to the same node at the same time, and for a given action node, all input/output flows shall be associated with an input/output token, respectively;
- $G : F \rightarrow \{True, False\}$ is a function determining whether a given flow is enabled;
- $D = \{D_1, D_2, \dots, D_n\}$ is a set of value domains;
- $F_{Action} : N \rightarrow D$ is a function running the contained action, and returning it's result values. ■

Informally, Gamma Activities are composed of *nodes* (*Initial/Final*, *Decision/Merge*, *Action* and *Pseudo*) and flows (*Control* and *Data*) in between them. A given action can also have any number of *Pins* with a domain, for which, there must be one and only one *data* flow connected to the node. An action node also has a special F_{Action} , which implements its specific behaviour, and returns the values of its output pins.

Definition 4 (Gamma Activity State). The state of a GA is defined the following:

- $S_N : N \rightarrow \{Idle, Running, Done\}$ is a function returning the *state* of a node;
- $S_F : F \rightarrow \{Empty, Full\}$ is a function returning the *state* of a flow;
- $V_N : N \rightarrow D$ is a function returning the current *value* contained in a node;
- $PV_N : N \times P \rightarrow D$ is a function returning the current *value* contained in a node's pin;
- $V_F : F \rightarrow D$ is a function returning the current *value* contained in a flow. ▪

Informally, the state of Gamma Activities are determined by the nodes' *state* (*Idle*, *Running*, *Done*) and their (or their pins') values, the flows' *state* (*Empty*, *Full*) and their values. The following state configuration is notated with a '*r*'.

Definition 5 (State Transition Functions). The state of Gamma Activities are changed by the following functions:

$$F_{In} : N \rightarrow \begin{cases} \begin{cases} \text{select } f_s, \text{ such that } f_s \in \delta(n) \wedge S_F(f_s) = Full \\ V'_N(n) = V_F(f_s) \\ S'_F(f_s) = Empty \\ S'_N(n) = Running, \end{cases} & \text{if } n \in N_{Merge} \\ \begin{cases} PV'_N(n, \Phi(f)) = V_F(f) : \forall f \in \delta(n) \bigcap F_D \\ S'_F(f) = Empty : \forall f \in \delta(n) \\ S'_N(n) = Running, \end{cases} & \text{if } n \in N_{Action} \\ \begin{cases} V'_N(n) = V_F(f) : f \in \delta(n) \bigcap F_D \\ S'_F(f) = Empty : \forall f \in \delta(n) \\ S'_N(n) = Running, \end{cases} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.1)$$

$$F_{Run} : N \rightarrow \begin{cases} \begin{cases} V'_N(n) = F_{Action}(n, V_N(n)) \\ S'_N(n) = Done, \end{cases} & \text{if } n \in N_{Action} \\ S'_N(n) = Done, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.2)$$

$$F_{Out} : N \rightarrow \begin{cases} \begin{cases} \text{select } f_s, \text{ such that } f_s \in \Delta(n) \wedge S_F(f_s) = Empty \wedge G(f_s) = True \\ V'_F(f_s) = V_N(n) \\ S'_F(f_s) = Full \\ S'_N(n) = Idle, \end{cases} & \text{if } n \in N_{Decision} \\ \begin{cases} V'_F(f) = PV_N(n, \phi(f)) : \forall f \in \Delta(n) \bigcap F_D, \quad S'_F(f) = Full : \forall f \in \Delta(n) \\ S'_N(n) = Idle, \end{cases} & \text{if } n \in N_{Action} \\ \begin{cases} S'_F(f) = Full : \forall f \in \Delta(n) \\ S'_N(n) = Idle, \end{cases} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.3)$$

▪

At any point, any enabled function is selected and run for a node non-deterministically.

Ide fogok tenni egy szép diagrammot ami ábrázolja a fentebb említett állapotokat és függvényeket + egy rövid leírást hozzá.

3.2.2 Root Structure

Every model has to have a root element structure; Activity Language is not any different. The meta-model described in this section can be seen in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: The root structure of the language

Activity Declaration All elements inside an activity are contained in a root *ActivityDeclaration* element. It contains *Pins* needed for value passing (see Section 3.2.6) and a *Definition*. A declaration can be *InlineActivityDeclaration*, which means they are declared in an other declaration, or *NamedActivityDeclaration*, which is a standalone activity declaration. The difference will be clarified in ??.

Definition The definition *defines* how the activity is described; using activity nodes, or by the Gamma Activity Language¹. *ActionDefinition* contains a single *Block*², which is executed as-is when the activity is executed³. *ActivityDefinition* contains *ActivityNodes* (Section 3.2.3) and *Flows* (Section 3.2.5).

¹Gamma Activity Language is a lightweight programming language-like construct for writing simple algorithms

²A *Block* contains multiple *Actions* which are executed one after the other

³This fact means, that if one used Action to define an activity, that activity is executed atomically; it will not be interlaced with other XSTS transitions. See Chapter 4.

3.2.3 Activity Nodes

In the following, I will talk about the different kinds of *ActivityNodes* and their special meanings. All nodes are considered *LAS* nodes by default. The meta-model described in this section can be seen in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2: The Activity Node structure

Pseudo Activity Node *PseudoActivityNodes* are nodes, that do not represent a specific action, however are needed to convey specific meanings, e.g., the initial active node, or a decision between flows.

Initial Node *InitialNodes* have one token in them when the containing activity is started. They shall only have (one or more) outgoing flows, and no input flows.

Final Node When an activities *FinalNode* gets a token the containing activity is considered *Done*; after which the activity does not process any more tokens.

Data Node *DataNodes* encapsulate the meaning of *data* inside activities. A token may contain data (or value) of any kind, but that token can only travel to and from data *sources* and *targets*. More about this in Section 3.2.5.

Fork Node *ForkNodes* are used to model parallelism, by creating one token on each of its output flows when executed. Fork nodes shall only have one input flow.

Join Node *JoinNodes* are the pair of fork nodes; the additional created tokens are swallowed by this node, by only sending out one token, regardless of the number of input flows.

Decision Node *DecisionNodes* create branches across multiple output flows. An input flows token is removed, and sent out to one, and only one of its output flows - depending on which of the output flows are *enabled* (see Section 3.2.5).

3.2.4 Composing Activities

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


Figure 3.3: The

3.2.5 Flows

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Control Flow Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Ut vehicula turpis eget enim maximus, vel rutrum dui ullamcorper. Nulla enim ex, dapibus non aliquam vitae, molestie quis magna. Maecenas mattis turpis non ex feugiat, vitae pulvinar nisl vulputate.

Data Flow Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Ut vehicula turpis eget enim maximus, vel rutrum dui ullamcorper. Nulla enim ex, dapibus non aliquam vitae, molestie quis magna. Maecenas mattis turpis non ex feugiat, vitae pulvinar nisl vulputate.




Figure 3.4: The Flows structure

3.2.6 Pins

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Input Pin Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Ut vehicula turpis eget enim maximus, vel rutrum dui ullamcorper. Nulla enim ex, dapibus non aliquam vitae, molestie quis magna. Maecenas mattis turpis non ex feugiat, vitae pulvinar nisl vulputate.

Output Pin Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Ut vehicula turpis eget enim maximus, vel rutrum dui ullamcorper. Nulla enim ex, dapibus non aliquam vitae, molestie quis magna. Maecenas mattis turpis non ex feugiat, vitae pulvinar nisl vulputate.




Figure 3.5: The Pins structure

3.2.7 Data Source-Target Reference

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


Figure 3.6: The Data node reference structure

3.2.8 Pin Reference

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


Figure 3.7: The Data node reference structure

3.3 Domain-specific Language

ide még jöhet később xtext kód

In order to make it easier to test both the XSTS and SysML transformations, I created an **Xtext** domain-specific language. Easy readability and writing was not one of the main priorities, because the end goal is to have a higher-level systems modelling language as a source. As a result, many many constructs are inherently repetitive to write.

3.3.1 Language elements

The following section gives high level introduction into the syntax of the Gamma Activity DSL.

Inherited from Gamma

Some of the used constructs were reused from the other languages of the Gamma framework in order to provide tighter integration.

Lehet ez is rossz helyen van.. Végülis visszamehet a background részre

Pins

Pins can be declared the following way, where <direction> can be either in or out, and type a valid Gamma Expression type.

```
<direction> <name> : <type>
```

For example:

```
in examplePin : integer
```

where the direction is in, the name is examplePin and the type is integer.

Nodes

Nodes can be declared by stating the type of the node and then it's name. The type determines the underlying meta element. See figure ??

The available node types:

```
initial InitialNode
decision DecisionNode
merge MergeNode
fork ForkNode
join JoinNode
final FinalNode
action ActionNode
```

Flows

The behaviour of the Activity can be described by stating data or control flows between two nodes. Flows may have guards on them, which limits when the flow can fire. Activities may only be from the current activity definition's children. Pins can be accessed using the `.` accessor operator, the activity on the left hand side, and the pin's name on the right. The enclosing activity's name is `self`.

Flows can be declared the following way, where `<kind>` is the kind of flow, `<source>` and `<target>` is the source/target node or pin, and `<guard>` is a Gamma Expression returning boolean:

```
<kind> flow from <source> to <target> [<guard>]
```

```
control flow from activity1 to activity2
control flow from activity1 to activity2 [x == 10]
data flow from activity1.pin1 to activity2.pin2
data flow from self.pin to activity3.pin2
```

Declarations

Activity declarations state the *name* of the activity, as well as its *pins* 3.3.1.

```
activity Example (
  ..pins..
) {
  ..body..
}
```

You can also declare activities inline by using the `:` operator:

```
activity Example {
  action InlineActivityExample : activity
}
```

Definitions

Activities also have definitions, which give them bodies. The body language can be either activity or action depending on the language metadata set. Using the action language let's you use any Gamma Action expression, including timeout resetting, raising events through component ports, or simple arithmetic operations.

An example activity defined by an action body:

```
activity Example (
  in x : integer,
  out y : integer
) [language=action] {
  self.y := self.x * 2;
}
```

Inline activities may also have pins and be defined using action language:

```
activity Example {
  action InlineActivityExample : activity (
    in input : integer,
    out output : integer
  ) [language=action] {
    self.output := self.input;
  }
}
```


}

3.3.2 Integration into Gamma

3.4 Examples

3.4.1 Adder Example

The following is a basic example of an adder activity. It 'reads' two numbers, adds them, and then 'logs' the result.

diagram, opaque action

Ehelyett egyébként lehetne a running example, amit még az egész elején definiálunk

```
package hu.mit.bme.example

activity Adder(
  in x : integer,
  in y : integer,
  out o : integer
) [language=action] {
  self.o := self.x + self.y;
}

activity Example {
  initial Initial

  action ReadSelf1 : activity (
    out x : integer
  )
  action ReadSelf2 : activity (
    out x : integer
  )
  action Add : Adder
  action Log : activity (
    in x : integer
  )

  final Final

  control flow from Initial to ReadSelf1
  control flow from Initial to ReadSelf2
  control flow from Initial to Add
  data flow from ReadSelf1.x to Add.x
  data flow from ReadSelf2.x to Add.y
  data flow from Add.o to Log.x
  control flow from Log to Final
}
```

Chapter 4

Activity Model Verification

4.1 Activities as State-based Models

activity vagy proces-model?

ahogy fentebb írtam, tokenek haladnak, és tranzíciók vannak.

A process-orientated model előnye itt a hátrányunk; mivel sok process mehet teljesen függetlenül egymástól, ezért nagyon nehéz szépen leírni őket

tegyük fel, hogy a node-ok és csatlakozók token-tartalma egy állapot; vagy van benne, vagy nincs. ehhez még hozzátesszük azt, hogy a node éppen fut, kész, vagy nem csinál semmit.

ezek alapján le tudunk írni bármilyen process-orientált modellt állapot alapú modellben, feltételezve, hogy bármikor bármelyik tranzíció tüzelhet.

itt leírom az activity különböző node-jait, és azoknak a különböző szabályait (merge, choice, stb)

majd leírom a különböző csatlakozók segítségével is

4.2 Activities Alongside Statecharts

fentebb leírtam, hogyan lehet leképezni proces modelleket, de így csak magukban futhatnak. Itt most leírom, hogy milyen nehézségeket okozhat, amikor egymás mellett futtatjuk őket:

do activity:

amikor a state aktív, futhat az activity, de ez pár problémával jön: párhuzamossági és szinkronizációs problémák

action:

egy activity értékét ki kell lapítani, hogy a tranzíció tüzelése után azonnal értelmezhető legyen (nem felelhetjük el az adott tranzíciót, mert akkor érvénytelen állapotaink lesznek)

unblock:

még nagy kérdés, hogy milyen szinten bontsuk fel a lépéseket, mennyire legyenek atomikusak, mik futhatnak egymás mellett, stb

alap elképzelésben akár egy activity akár egy állapotgép definiálhat egy komponens viselkedését, de jelenleg ezt is egyszerűsített módon implementáltuk; az activity az állapotgép része lehet

megoldás a kérdésekre:

megoldásként a legegyszerűbb módszert választottuk, mert első sorban az a kérdés, hogy ez a módszer egyáltalán alkalmazható-e; a másik mindenképpen bonyolítja az implementációt és a létrejövő modellt is

Chapter 5

Implementation

TODO: rövid leírása az implementációnak; kb milyen méretű a változtatás. nem szeretném hosszúra, annyira nem érdekes, viszont jó lenne valahogy mutatni, hogy nem volt azért triviális.

Chapter 6

Evaluation

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

Ez nem kötelező, akár törölhető is. Ha a szerző szükségét érzi, itt lehet köszönetet nyilvánítani azoknak, akik hozzájárultak munkájukkal ahhoz, hogy a hallgató a szakdolgozatban vagy diplomamunkában leírt feladatokat sikeresen elvégezze. A konzulensnek való köszönetnyilvánítás sem kötelező, a konzulensnek hivatalosan is dolga, hogy a hallgatót konzultálja.

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Appendix

A.1 XSTS Language Constructs

In this appendix I introduce the exact language constructs for the XSTS language

A.1.1 Types

XSTS contains two default variable types, logical variables (*boolean*) and mathematical integers (*integer*). Types defined this way make up the domains $D_{v1}, D_{v2}, \dots, D_{vn}$ introduced in State Transition Functions 2.4.1. XSTS also allows the user to define *custom types*, similarly to enum types in common programming languages.

A custom type can be declared the following way:

```
type <name> : { <literal_1>, . . . , <literal_n> }
```

Where $D_{name} = \{literal_1, \dots, literal_n\}$.

A.1.2 Variables

Variables can be declared the following way, where <value> denotes the value that will be assigned to the variable in the initialization vector:

```
var <name> : <type> = <value>
```

Where v_{name} will be in domain D_{type} .

If the user wishes to declare a variable without an initial value, this is possible as well:

```
var <name> : <type>
```

A variable can be tagged as a control variable with the keyword `ctrl`:

```
ctrl var <name> : <type>
```

In which case the variable v will also be added to V_C (the set of control variables).

A.1.2.1 Basic operations

Operations make up the set Ops introduced in State Transition Functions 2.4.1. These operations, and their compositions define the behaviour of the XSTS model.

Assume An assumption operation can only be executed, if and only if its *expression* evaluates to *true*. This fact means, that if a composite operation contains a *falsy* assumption, the whole composite operation will not fire.

A simple assumption operation can be stated like the following:

```
assume <expr>
```

Assignment Assignments have the following syntax, where <varname> is the name of a variable and <expr> is an expression of the same type:

```
<varname> := <expr>
```

An assignment operation overwrites the variables value upon execution.

Havoc Havocs give the XSTS models randomness, by randomly *assigning* a value.

The syntax of havocs is the following, where <varname> is the name of a variable:

```
havoc <varname>
```

A.1.3 Composite operations

Composite operations give way to building up more complicated transition trees, by providing nesting the already introduced simple operations.

Choice Non-deterministic choices work by randomly executing one and only one of its composed operations.

Non-deterministic choices have the following syntax, where <operation> are arbitrary basic or composite operations:

```
choice { <operation> } or { <operation> }
```

Sequence Sequences execute all composed operations one-by-one from top to bottom.

Sequences have the following syntax:

```
<operation>
<operation>
<operation>
```

A.1.4 Transitions

Each transition is a single operation (basic or composite). We distinguish between three sets of transitions, *Tran*, *Init* and *Env* - associating to the three different operation sets introduced in State Transition Functions 2.4.1. Transitions are described with the following syntax, where <transition-set> is either tran, env or init:

```
<transition-set> {  
    <operation>  
} or {  
    <operation>  
} or  
...  
or {  
    <operation>  
}
```

A.2 Gamma Activity Language