## Navigating by Falling Stars: Monetary Policy with Fiscally Driven Natural Rates

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### Determination of long-term inflation in the standard New Keynesian framework

• Taylor rule:

$$i_t = \overline{r} + \overline{\pi} + \phi(\pi_t - \overline{\pi}).$$

• Natural Rate

$$r^* = 1/\beta - 1.$$

• Long-term inflation determination: If the central bank sets  $\overline{r} = r^*$ , then it can achieve its inflation target  $\overline{\pi}$ .

### What happens in a heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model?

- In a HANK model, the natural rate is a function of the stock of debt  $B_{ss}$ :  $r^* = r(B_{ss})$ .
- Debt-financed fiscal expansions then act as "natural rate" shocks.
- To achieve its target, the central bank must adapt its monetary policy to the long-term fiscal stance  $\bar{r} = r(B_{ss})$ .
- This is a new form of monetary-fiscal interaction, unrelated to the FTPL.

### **Preview of findings**

- 1. There is a minimum level of debt compatible with the inflation target.
- 2. If the central bank does not adapt its monetary policy to a permanent fiscal expansion, then long-term inflation will be higher.
- **3.** In the short-run, inflation can deviate substantially from the target even if the central bank adjusts, due to income effects.
- **4.** Robust monetary policy rules à la Orphanides-Williams perform much better in this environment than Taylor rules.
- **5.** We can infer the *policy gap* between the central bank intercept  $\overline{r}$  and the natural rate  $r^*$  using market data.

# A simple model

### Model overview

### 1. Heterogeneous households

• Mass 1 of households, subject to idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks.

### 2. New Keynesian block

- Unions are similar to intermediate goods producers in a NK model.
- Sticky wages: they set wages on behalf of workers.
- Yields a simple wage Phillips curve.

### 3. Monetary and Fiscal Policy

- Central bank follows a Taylor rule.
- Treasury follows does not choose an explosive path for debt.

### 4. Firms

- Representative firm with aggregate production function.
- Flexible prices.

### Households

Households solve:

$$V(a_{i,t}, z_{i,t}) = \max_{c_{i,t}, a_{i,t+1}} u(c_{i,t}) - v(n_{i,t}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[V(a_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1})]$$
s.t.  $c_{i,t} + a_{i,t+1} = (1 + r_t)a_{i,t} + (1 - \tau)\frac{W_t}{P_t}z_{i,t}n_{i,t} + T_t,$ 

$$a_{i,t+1} \ge 0.$$

- They choose  $c_{i,t}$  and  $a_{i,t+1}$ . Their labor choice  $n_{i,t}$  is is performed by unions.
- $\circ$   $n_{i,t}$ : working hours
- $\circ$   $a_{i,t}$ : asset position
- $\circ$   $c_{i,t}$ : consumption  $\circ$   $r_t$ : return of bonds
  - $\circ W_t$ : nominal wage
    - $\circ P_t$ : price level
- $\circ$   $z_{i,t}$ : idiosyncratic productivity
- $\circ$   $T_t$ : net transfer

### **Treasury: Fiscal Policy**

• The treasury can issue one-period nominal bonds. Tax collection is given by:

$$\mathcal{T}_t = \int_0^1 \tau \frac{W_t}{P_t} z_{i,t} n_{i,t} di.$$

Public debt B<sub>t</sub> accumulates according to:

$$P_tB_t = (1+i_{t-1})P_{t-1}B_{t-1} + P_t(G_t + T_t - T_t).$$

•  $G_t$ : government consumption

- $\circ$   $\mathcal{T}_t$ : tax collection
- $\circ$   $B_t$ : public debt

### Central bank: Monetary Policy

• The central bank follows a Taylor rule:

$$i_t = \max \left\{ \overline{r} + \overline{\pi} + \phi_{\pi} \left( \pi_t - \overline{\pi} \right), 0 \right\}.$$

- $\circ$   $i_t$ : nominal rate
  - $\circ \pi_t$ : inflation
- $\circ \ \overline{\pi}$  : inflation target

### Firm

• Representative firm with linear aggregate production function:

$$Y_t = \Theta N_t$$
.

• Flexible prices:  $W_t/P_t = \Theta$ .

 $\circ Y_t$ : output

 $\circ$   $\Theta$  : constant productivity

 $\circ$   $N_t$ : aggregate labor

### **Unions**

• Wage Phillips curve:

$$egin{split} \log\left(rac{1+\pi_t^w}{1+\overline{\pi}}
ight) &= \kappa_w \left[-rac{\epsilon_w-1}{\epsilon_w}(1- au)rac{W_t}{P_t}\int u'(c_{it})z_{it}di + v'(N_t)
ight]N_t \ &+eta \log\left(rac{1+\pi_{t+1}^w}{1+\overline{\pi}}
ight) \end{split}$$

• Proportional allocation of labor:  $n_{i,t} = N_t$ 

 $\circ \pi_t^w$ : wage inflation

 $\circ$   $n_t$  . Wage illiation

 $\circ$   $N_t$ : aggregate labor

 $\circ$   $W_t$ : nominal wage

o  $P_t$ : price level

### Aggregation and market clearing

• In equilibrium all agents optimize and the labor, bond, and good markets clear:


$$G_t + C_t = Y_t,$$
$$A_t = B_t,$$

where aggregates are:


$$N_t = \int_0^1 z_{i,t} n_{i,t} di,$$
 $A_t = \int_0^1 a_{i,t+1} di,$ 
 $C_t = \int_0^1 c_{i,t} di.$ 

Monetary-fiscal interaction in the long run

### **Natural rate determination**



### The natural rate and long-run inflation




### The policy gap

The Fisher equation + Taylor Rule imply the following steady-state relationship:

$$\pi_{ss} = \overline{\pi} + rac{r^* - \overline{r}}{\phi_\pi - 1}.$$

### There is a minimum debt level compatible with price stability



Steady-state nominal interest rate and inflation for different inflation targets

# Long-run quantitative effects of a fiscal expansion

### Description of the exercise

- Calibrate the model to US data (as in the NBER WP).
- Consider an initial steady state with debt at 70% of GDP.
- Compute a new steady state with debt at 80% of (initial) GDP.
- In this new steady state, the treasury chooses a new level of  $G_{ss}$  that satisfies debt stability.
- The central bank adjusts  $\overline{r}$  in its Taylor rule and sets it equal to value of  $r^*$  in the new steady state to avoid inflation above its target in the long run (matters only for nominal variables).

### Long term impact

	Initial steady state	New steady state HANK RANK		Difference HANK RANK	
Bonds (% GDP)	70.00	80.00	80.00	10.00	10.00
Real interest rate	1.00	1.16	1.00	0.16	0.00
Nominal interest rate	3.02	3.19	3.02	0.17	0.00
Output	100.00	99.90	99.96	-0.10	-0.04
Consumption	80.00	80.16	80.07	0.16	0.07
Govt. consumption	20.00	19.74	19.89	-0.26	-0.11
Tax revenue	27.70	27.67	27.69	-0.03	-0.01
Primary surplus (% GDP)	0.70	0.93	0.80	0.23	0.10

Table 1: Steady state in the simple HANK model and in a RANK model

The natural rate  $r^*$  increases by 16 bp.


### Is the model quantitatively accurate?

• Semi-elasticity:

$$\eta_B \equiv \frac{dr^*}{d \ln B_{ss}} pprox \frac{\Delta r^*}{\Delta \ln B_{ss}} = \frac{0.16}{\ln 0.8 - \ln 0.7} = 1.2$$

• Does this fit the data?

### Estimating the response of the natural rate to a permanent increase in debt is quantitatively similar to simulations of the model



IRF of  $r^*$  to a 1 pp increase in the government debt-to-GDP ratio

Note: We estimate an LP with  $r_{t+h}^* = \alpha_h + \beta_h D_{t-1} + \mathbf{x}_t \gamma_h + u_{t+h}$  and plot the regression coefficient  $\beta_h$  (the solid line) associated with the lagged public debt-to-GDP ratio  $D_{t-1}$ . We use the natural rate estimated by Lubik and Matthes (2015) as our measure of  $r^*$ . The control variables  $\mathbf{x}_t$  include four lags of the change in  $r^*$ , three additional lags of the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and four lags of the federal funds rate, the GDP deflator, and the unemployment rate. The shaded areas represent the 68% and 90% confidence intervals using Eicker–Huber–White standard errors.

### **Empirical evidence**

- The point estimate from our empirical exercise is 2.4.
- Summers and Rachel (2019) estimate a semi-elasticity of 2.1.
- Bayer, Born, and Luetticke (2023) also argue in favor of semi-elasticities above 2.
- All of these estimates are well above the semi-elasticity delivered by the simple model when calibrated to US data.
- Next step: construct a quantitative model that matches various aspects of the US economy.

# A quantitative model

### **Changes**

- Households have two accounts: one liquid, one illiquid.
- Adjusting illiquid assets is costly (as in the model of Alves, Kaplan, Moll and Violante).
- Liquid assets are invested fully in public debt. This debt has a duration that is longer than one period.
- Illiquid assets are invested full in firm equity.
- We add capital as an input in the production function. Capital is owned by firms.
- It is costly to adjust the capital stock.
- Prices and wages are sticky.
- Firm profits and wages are taxed.
- The Taylor rule has interest rate smoothing.

### Households

Households solve:

$$\begin{split} V(b_{i,t},a_{i,t},z_{i,t}) &= \max_{c_{i,t},b_{i,t+1}a_{i,t+1}} u(c_{i,t}) - v(n_{i,t}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[V(b_{i,t+1},a_{i,t+1},z_{i,t+1})] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad c_{i,t} + b_{i,t+1} + a_{i,t+1} &= (1+r_t^b)b_{i,t} + (1+r_t^a)a_{i,t} + (1-\tau_n)\frac{W_t}{P_t}z_{i,t}n_{i,t} + T_t - \Psi(a_{i,t+1},a_{i,t}), \\ b_{i,t+1} &\geq 0, \quad a_{i,t+1} \geq 0. \end{split}$$

• They choose  $c_{i,t}$  and  $a_{i,t+1}$ . Their labor choice  $n_{i,t}$  is is performed by unions.

- o  $c_{i,t}$ : consumption o  $a_{i,t}$ : illiquid assets o  $n_{i,t}$ : working hours o  $r_t^b$ : liquid rate o  $b_{i,t}$ : liquid assets o  $r_t^a$ : illiquid rate
- $\begin{array}{lll} \circ & W_t : \text{nominal wage} & \circ & T_t : \text{net transfer} \\ \circ & P_t : \text{price level} \\ \circ & z_{i,t} : \text{idiosyncratic} & \circ & \Psi(\cdot,\cdot) : \text{adjustment} \\ & \text{productivity} & \text{function} \\ \end{array}$

### Aggregation and market clearing

In equilibrium, the labor, liquid asset, illiquid asset, and good markets clear:

$$N_t = \int_0^1 z_{i,t} n_{i,t} di,$$


$$B_t = \int_0^1 b_{i,t+1} di,$$

$$p_t = \int_0^1 a_{i,t+1} di,$$


$$C_t = \int_0^1 c_{i,t} di,$$

and the aggregate resource constraint holds:  $G_t + C_t + I_t + \xi_t + \Phi_t = Y_t$ , where we define aggregate gross investment as  $I_t = \zeta(K_t/K_{t-1})K_{t-1} = K_t - (1-\delta)K_{t-1} + \phi(K_t/K_{t-1})K_{t-1}$ , so that it includes the cost of adjusting capital.

### The full model



### Steady states depending on which fiscal variable adjusts




### Is the model quantitatively accurate?

• Semi-elasticity:

$$\eta_B \equiv \frac{dr_{ss}^b}{d \ln B_{ss}} \approx \frac{\Delta r_{ss}^b}{\Delta \ln B_{ss}} = \frac{0.31}{\ln 0.8 - \ln 0.7} = 2.3$$

### The two interest rates in SS




### Alternative fiscal policies in the short run

- Government consumption rule
  - The tax rate and net transfers remain constant. The treasury adjusts government consumption *G* each period according to a rule.

$$G_t = G_{ss} - \phi_G(B_{t-1} - B_{ss}).$$

- Endogenous tax rate
  - o The treasury adjusts the tax rate  $\tau$  each period so that the evolution of public debt issuance replicates the evolution in our baseline analysis. **Government consumption** jumps to **the new SS value** and **net transfers** remain **constant**.
- Lump-sum net transfers:
  - The treasury adjusts net transfers T each period so that the evolution of public debt issuance replicates the evolution in our baseline analysis. Government consumption jumps to the new SS value and the tax rate remains constant.


### **Short term impact**




Dynamics after a surprise debt-financed fiscal expansion

# Explore the short run when the expansion is due to G

### Decomposition of the response of inflation and consumption






### **Extensions: Robust monetary rules**

- An alternative to adjusting the intercept in the Taylor rule would be to use a monetary policy rule that does not require knowing the value of the natural rate.
- Orphanides and Williams Rule (2002):
   This rule links the **change** in nominal interest rates i<sub>t</sub> i<sub>t-1</sub> to the deviation of inflation from its target π<sub>t</sub> π̄:


$$\log(1+i_t) = \log(1+i_{t-1}) + \phi_\pi \log\left(\frac{1+\pi_t}{1+\overline{\pi}}\right)$$

### Monetary policy rules



Comparison of different monetary policy rules

### **Extension: Anticipated effects**



Dynamics of an anticipated debt-financed fiscal expansion

The empirical policy gap

### Inferring the policy gap from market data

• From the Taylor rule in the DSS and the Fisher equation we obtain:


$$\pi_{ss}pprox \overline{\pi}+rac{r^*-\overline{r}}{\phi_\pi-1},$$


• If  $\overline{r}$  is constant, then the policy gap can be computed as

$$r^* - \overline{r} = rac{\mathsf{cov}\left(r^*, \pi_{\mathsf{ss}}
ight)}{\mathsf{var}\left(\pi_{\mathsf{ss}}
ight)} \left(\pi_{\mathsf{ss}} - \overline{\pi}
ight).$$

• With this equation we can infer the policy gap from market data.

### Inferring the policy gap from market data







Long-term nominal and real rates and inflation

Policy gap  $r^* - \overline{r}$ 

Note: Daily data.  $i_{ss}$  is the 5y5y forward nominal rate obtained from the zero-coupon U.S. yield curve.  $\pi_{ss}$  is the 5y5y ILS.  $r^*$  is computed as the difference  $i_{ss}-\pi_{ss}$ . The dashed vertical line marks the date when the 2% inflation target was announced (January 24, 2012).

### Correcting for the term premium





Data adjusted for term premia

Policy gap  $r^* - \overline{r}$  (adj. data)

*Note*: Monthly data. The estimated term premia are removed from market data using the methodology described by Hördahl and Tristani (2014). The dashed vertical line marks the date when the 2% inflation target was announced (January 24, 2012).

Thank you!