

Reverse Engineering Embedded Hardware

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Agenda

- Before you start...
- Background investigation
- Gaining entry
- Extracting the firmware
- Analysis
- What next?



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Legalities, ethics, and morals

- Is it legal?*
- In some jurisdictions, maybe not. The DMCA in the US is intended to prevent this
- Did you agree to a licence? If so, you probably want to read it...
- Do you actually own the product?
- Are you violating IP laws?
 - Copyright? Maybe if you decide to distribute some derived results
 - Trademarks and design? Once again, only if you try to copy it
 - Patents? This has nothing to do with how you obtain your information
 - Are you violating trade secrets? Sure!

* IANAL



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Legalities, ethics, and morals

- Is it ethical?
 - Sure, there is a rich tradition of dismantling technology to see how it works
 - As an individual there can be a lot to learn
 - You can customise a product as you wish
 - Assuming you own the product
- Is it moral?
 - That's up to you
 - What do you intend to do with the information?



Some examples

- The DD-WRT project takes wireless routers (e.g. Linksys WRT45G) and replaces the firmware with their own
- The result is a much more capable and configurable router
- Or an opportunity for you to make it do whatever you want



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Some examples

- The Canon Hack Developers Kit (CHDK) and Magic Lantern projects enhance the firmware on various models of Canon digital cameras
- These offer functionality well beyond what Canon envisage (or wish to provide)



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Some examples

- My choice of project was the Canon MG5560 printer
 - Contains CiSRA software
 - I don't know much about the internals
 - Actually, I know next to nothing, so I'm starting from scratch
 - I didn't rely on the few tidbits that I did know



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Know your opponent

- Google around for background information
 - Sometimes the manufacturer will reveal some useful details- look at the product specs
 - Maybe other people have done some investigation
 - Look at similar products
 - For older products you can often find a service manual online
- Look at the product capabilities. The MG5560 has:
 - Wireless networking
 - Scanner
 - Print from LAN and Cloud
 - Web server for local access
 - Web client for printing from Picasa, Flickr etc.
 - Updateable firmware (directly over the net)




Know your opponent

- Open it up and have a look at the main board[s]
 - Is there anything interesting written on the board?
 - Look up the major part numbers on the internet; you probably won't find some of them
 - Custom ASICs will have no data
 - Sometimes parts are rebranded for a company
 - Sometimes parts are created specifically for a company
 - Smaller parts often have abbreviated part codes
 - Sometimes part numbers are sanded off



MG5560 main board



MG5560 main board

- So... we have:
 - 128 MB SDRAM (working memory)
 - 16 MB Serial Flash (firmware)
 - 4 MB Serial Flash (more firmware?)
 - 8 KB Serial EEPROM (settings)
 - Custom ASIC (???)
 - Probably the motor controller
 - Several other unidentified ICs





Methods of attack

- There are several different ways we could choose to attack the device:
 - Download someone else's tools (*boooring!*)
 - Try a customised firmware load
 - can be hard in the face of encrypted, signed data
 - the MG5560 gets its firmware directly over the internet
 - Extract data from the device
 - monitor the address/data lines
 - dump any ROM or Flash chips
 - Look for a JTAG or serial port on the board
 - Look for network application weaknesses
 - Look for suspicious network ports
- Companies developing embedded consumer hardware have a responsibility to make them secure
 - ... but they usually don't do a very good job
 - It's the usual cost/benefit tradeoff (gamble)



Looking for JTAG / Serial ports

- Generally this is pretty easy – manufacturers often need some form of access to the board for verification
- Let's look at our board



Unpopulated headers

- J401/J402 are unpopulated 4-pin headers (Ground + 3.3V + 2 data lines)
 - These could possibly be serial connections
- There is another unlabeled missing connector, but it is missing associated components so it may be for a different product
- There are other test points around, maybe some combination of these provide a JTAG connection, but it would be a fair amount of work to be sure
- Connecting an oscilloscope up to the data lines and restarting the printer a couple of times revealed signals on one line
 - Looks like 19.2K 8-bit serial traffic
 - The protocol is a bit non-standard though
 - Connect via a USB/Serial bridge to my desktop, start up a terminal program and after much mucking around I get command prompt



J401 serial port

DRYOS version 2.3, release #0049+SMP

Copyright (C) 1997-2011 by CANON Inc.

subsystem version : build_13f_130617_01

wlan available

Dry> **help**

[OTG]

otg otg_init otg_cleanup

[Debug]

task sem event mutex cond mq timer itsk isem iflg idtq imbx impf impl icyc mkobjsize prio release
resume suspend kill delete mkcfg objinfo meminfo xd xm cmp

[Test]

echod gtime loosesock netecho netrace mctalk mktest iotest chkit4 time arpsend chkspi pingall
setipsec

[Miscellaneous]

date dminfo exit shutdown vers

[Network]

arp dnsutil host ifconfig netstat nsupdate mbufs ping route sockhalt tcputil pngl slaup

[deleted]

- DryOS is a Canon proprietary embedded OS (no information available)
- based on μ ITRON (some information can be found on the net)
- DryOS is also used in newer Canon DSLRs
 - so check out the CHDK & Magic Lantern webpages



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DryOS

- xd – memory dump, xm – memory modify
 - Playing about with xd, eventually crash it:

```
Dry> xd 45800000 20 b
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0123456789abcdef
--- Error User Exception ---
[InfoReg]:A0      0x9f946a74      A8      0x9f95cb44
[InfoReg]:A1      0x1fc979e0      A9      0x0000005f
[InfoReg]:A2      0x45800000      A10     0x0000000a
[InfoReg]:A3      0x1fa39d40      A11     0x45800000
[InfoReg]:A4      0x00000001      A12     0x1fd9c708
[InfoReg]:A5      0x00000000      A13     0x00000000
[InfoReg]:A6      0x1fc979e0      A14     0x00000010
[InfoReg]:A7      0x00000002      A15     0x00000000
[InfoReg]:PS      0x00060130      EXCAUSE 0x00000003
[InfoReg]:EPC1    0x1f95cb79      EPC2    0x00000000
[InfoReg]:WINDOWBASE 0x00000007      WINDOWSTART 0x00000080
[InfoReg]:EPC     0xc283c9fe      EPS     0x00000000
[InfoReg]:EXCSAVE1 0x1fa39d40      EXCSAVE2 0x00000000
[InfoReg]:LBEG    0x1fa1f404      LEND    0x1fa1f40e
[InfoReg]:LCOUNT  0x9fa247b5      SAR     0x00000019
[InfoReg]:IBREAKENA 0x00000000      EXCVADDR 0x45800000
[InfoReg]:DDR     0x00000000      DEBUGCAUSE 0x00000000
[InfoReg]:IBREAKA0 0x00000000      IBREAKA1 0x00000000
[InfoReg]:DBREAKA0 0x00000000      DBREAKA1 0x00000000
[InfoReg]:DEPC    0x00000000      EPS2    0x00000000
[InfoReg]:INTERRUPT 0x00000001      INTENABLE 0x00000002
[InfoReg]:CCOUNT  0xe46dcc9      ICOUNT  0x00000000
[InfoReg]:ICOUNTLEVEL 0x00000000
```

Register names –
very interesting!




Firmware dumping

- Dumping out memory using xd is interesting, but I want more data
- ...what about those Serial Flash chips?
 - Data sheet is readily available, including protocols
 - Desolder from board, connect to some wires
 - Put on breadboard with an AVR microcontroller
 - Write some code to retrieve data from Flash, and dump over a serial connection to my desktop
 - Put the IC back on the board
- Now we can do some serious analysis of the firmware



My setup



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Firmware dumping

- Firmware will contain code and data (binary and text)
- Dump out all the string data – lots of info there
 - Strings from zlib code + compressed data → write a script to decompress the deflated blobs
- What about the executable code?
 - Sometimes you can tell from the hex dump
 - Repeated patterns every 4 bytes suggests 4-byte instructions (RISC, e.g. MIPS, SPARC, ARM)
 - Try googling a few dozen bytes of hex code
 - Try disassembling using different tools
 - onlinedisassembler.com lets you choose from dozens of processors
- I identified ARM code + unknown code
- Remember the register names I found?
 - They provided the clue that the other code was for a “Relax” processor
- Downloaded gcc cross-compiler tools for both architectures
- Code disassembly gives clues about relevant address spaces



Constructing a memory map

- I divided the address space up into 16M chunks and started working out what data (if any) was in each
 - There is some element of trial and error

	-0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	-7	-8	-9	-A	-B	-C	-D	-E	-F
0-								1F	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	1F
1-	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	1F	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	
2-	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	1F	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	1F
3-	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	1F	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	1F
4-																
5-																
6-																
7-																
8-																
9-																
A-																
B-																
C-																
D-																
E-		E0	E0	E0	E0	E0	E0	E0	?	E8	E8	E8	E8	E8	E8	E8
F-		F0	F0	F0	F0	F0	F0	F0		F8	F8	F8	F8	F8	F8	F8

Flash

Hardware?

RAM

ROM

invalid

EEPROM?

Constructing a memory map

- As I built up my understanding, I would dump out 16M blocks using xd and save to disk
 - This gave me access to RAM and ROM, as well as the Flash-based data
 - So, this gives me complete access to the Relax side of the dual-CPU device
 - I've written a bunch of scripts that disassemble code and annotate functions that I've worked out
 - (I've identified about 250 functions out of 6600)



Where to next?

- First, I need to unbrick the printer 😊
- It would be nice to get access to the ARM processor
 - Presumably J402 is the way in, but it doesn't respond in the same way
- Maybe introduce some non-trivial changes to the OS
- Ideal goal is to work out a way to get entry without a physical connection

