FX Interventions Rules for Central Banks A Risk-Based Framework

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Contributions

- Design a rule to address tail-risks related to direct and indirect exposures to exchange rate in the economy
- ▶ Provides guidance on **when** to intervene ("triggers")
- Appropriate for **floating exchange rate regimes** with FX macrofinancial risks (e.g. FX unhedged exposures, dollarization, etc.)
- Consistently target FX risk rather than arbitrary FX volatility/level threshold
- ▶ A risk management framework for central banks' financial stability mandate: aligned with industry's best practices in risk management

Key Messages

Foreign Exchange intervention rules should be:

- ▶ Adaptative, depend on market conditions
- Objective, anchored to a risk tolerance level rather than an aribtrary FX level threshold
- Capture FX non-linearities and asymmetries between appreciation and depreciation
- ▶ Be easily **operationalizable**, and **financially viable**


We propose an FX intervention rule based on Conditional Value-at-Risk

Concept: Value-at-Risk FXI Rule

- ▶ Rather than using a fixed volatility rule (e.g. intervene if daily exchange rate varies by more than 2%)
- ▶ Use a **risk-based rule**: intervene when the daily exchange rate log-returns fall within the tails of the conditional distribution
- Measure the tail-risk via the concept of Value-at-Risk (the conditional quantile of the log returns distribution)
- The conditional distribution is estimated daily with a standard financial GARCH model and varies with market conditions
- ▶ The central bank decides on the **risk tolerance**: e.g. intervene in the tail at 1%, 5%, 10%, etc.

VaR FXI Rule

Conditional density and intervention rule based on 2020-05-07 information



A Risk-Management Approach to FX Interventions

- Tail-risks hedge not always available: incomplete markets
- ▶ The central bank is transferring FX risk from the market to its balance sheet. It buys a risky asset (FX) and issues a risk-free asset (local currency)
- Provide a public good to address market failure. Leave a fix share of risk for the market to hedge
- Risk tolerance should depend on the macrofinancial risk (FX unhedged exposures from residents, dollarization, etc.)
- ► The financial stability mandate of the central bank is properly formalized and quantified via VaR metric

Main Features

- 1. Allows flexible exchange rate to act as a **shock absorber**: more flexibility in crisis time => **avoid overshooting**
- 2. No excessive interventions in crisis time, which are often ineffective and costly (exhaust central bank FX reserves)
- 3. No free insurance to the market: avoid **moral hazard** and foster the **development of hedging market**
- 4. Prevent market speculation and windfall effects
- 5. Guarantees **fixed-frequency** interventions:
 - Certainty about interventions: the central bank can intervene with larger amounts, more efficiently
 - ▶ Budget neutrality with symmetric risk preference
- 6. Financially optimized: always buy/sell at the best price

Operational Implementation

- Standard data requirements, easily accessible for a central bank, can be customized
- Parsimonious GARCH model featuring embedded heteroskedasticity, asymmetries (appreciation/depreciation), non-linearities (exponential volatility) and parametric density forecasting
- We created a Python wrapper, free and open-source: estimation, forecasting, out-of-sample evaluation, benchmarking, etc. Results are fully replicable
- Can be readily used by central banks and deployed during Technical Assistance missions

Challenges

- Some central banks might be reluctant to use a VaR-rule: more difficult to communicate to the public
- However, FXI occur on the wholesale FX market, where market participants are fully aware of the VaR concept
- ▶ Some policy markers might prefer to keep discretion
- ▶ Trade-off: a transparent rule anchors better market expectations, maximize efficiency and isolate the central bank for political pressures

Usages

- 1. Determine FX Intervention triggers
- 2. Conduct market monitoring and provide policy guidance
- 3. Benchmark FX interventions, including discretionary interventions
 - We present below an application of the toolkit to the Mexican Peso, based on publicly available data
- ▶ More than 4500 daily observations, from 2009 to 2018, with Bank of Mexico (public) FX interventions, mostly concentrated in 2009 and 2016

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Specification

- ▶ Non-linear, Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model
- ▶ The dependent variable is the FX log-returns, $r_t = \log(\frac{e_t}{e_{t-1}})$, where e_t is the bilateral market exchange rate against the major currency (e.g. USD)
- ▶ **Drift AR-X(1):** $r_{t+1} = \alpha_d + \rho r_t + \beta X_{t+1} + \epsilon_{t-1}$
- Exponential volatility: $\log \sigma_{t+1}^2 = \omega + \beta g(r_t)$ where $g(r_t) = \alpha_v r_t + \gamma(|r_t| \mathbb{E}|r_t|)$
- Error term distribution $\epsilon_t = \sigma_t \varepsilon_t$, $\varepsilon_t \sim \text{TSK}(0, 1, \nu)$
- ► The forecasted conditional probability distribution function is defined as:

$$\hat{f}(r_{t+1}|r_t, X_{t+1}) = \text{TSK}(\hat{r}_{t+1}, \hat{\sigma}_{t+1}^2, \hat{\nu})$$

Estimation

- The GARCH estimation is standard and done with maximimum likelihood
- ▶ Selection of parameters is done via AIC/BIC criteria.
- Our Python package allows to flexibly select:
 - The set of exogeneous regressors
 - ► The number of lags
 - ► The volatility specification (exponential, RiskMetric, standard GARCH, etc.)
 - ► The distribution family of the error-terms (Gaussian, Student, Tskew, Generalized Gaussian, etc.)

Exogeneous Regressors

- 1. **FX microstructure**: FX bid-ask spread (averaged over the day)
- 2. CIP: daily interest rate differential with the US Libor
- 3. **Hedging costs**: one-month forward exchange rate
- 4. Past policy interventions: lagged amount of central bank FX intervention
- 5. Global risk sentiment: The VIX, implied volatility on the S&P 500
- 6. Global FX factor: The EURUSD exchange rate

Regression Table

	Constant	Microstructure	CIP	FXI	Baseline	Robustness
Intercept	1.09	-2.16	2.15	1.67***	1.63	1.64***
Lag FX log returns	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
Bid-ask spread abs value		0.11**	0.15***	0.14***	0.15***	0.15***
Forward points first difference		0.32***	0.32***	0.32***	0.27***	0.27***
Interbank rate vs Libor			-1.11***	-0.98***	-1.02***	-1.03***
FX intervention in USD lag				0.04	0.04	
VIX first diff					9.78***	9.79***
EURUSD log returns					0.13***	0.13***
FX intervention dummy lag						4.13
Omega	0.15***	0.14***	0.13***	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***
Alpha	0.17***	0.19***	0.18***	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***
Gamma	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
Beta	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.99***	0.98***	0.98***
Nu	8.81***	9.11***	9.18***	9.15***	7.77***	7.77***
Lambda	0.13***	0.11***	0.12***	0.12***	0.1***	0.1***
R2	0.4 %	4.9 %	5.1 %	5.1 %	14.3 %	14.3 %
R2 adjusted	0.4 %	4.8 %	5.0 %	5.0 %	14.2 %	14.1 %
Number of observations Significance *10%, **5%, ***1%	4511	4511	4511	4510	4510	4510

Formalization of the Intervention Rule

ightharpoonup Consider the estimated conditional distribution of the exchange rate log returns r_t defined as

$$\mathbb{P}[r_t \leqslant x] = \int_{-\infty}^x \hat{f}(r_t|r_{t-1}, X_t) dr_t$$


▶ The Conditional Value-at-Risk at threshold τ is simply defined as the conditional τ -quantile

$$Q(r_t, \tau) \equiv \mathbb{P}[r_t \leqslant Q(r_t, \tau)] = \tau, \text{ for } \tau \in (0, 1)$$

▶ The FXI intervention rule is a simple boolean rule, based on two risk-thresholds $(\underline{\tau}, \overline{\tau})$, for depreciation and appreciation, potentially risk-symmetric $(\overline{\tau} = 1 - \underline{\tau})$

$$\mathbb{1}\left[\left\{r_t \leqslant Q(r_t, \underline{\tau})\right\} \cup \left\{r_t > Q(r_t, \overline{\tau})\right\}\right]$$

Dynamics of the Mexican Peso against USD



Conditional In-Sample Volatility of the Mexican Peso In-sample FX returns conditional volatility




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
Forecasting

Benchmarking


Policy Implications and Future Work

Forecasting

- ▶ Real-time forecasting based on market conditions
- Estimate the GARCH and derive the forecasted drift and volatility
- ► Infer the full-fledged conditional distribution of FX log returns for any point in time
- ▶ Assess model accuracy via (i) in-sample metrics and (ii) out of sample performance (probability integral transform test)
- ▶ The probability integral transform test assess on whether the random variable defined as $PIT(R) \equiv F_R R$ is uniformally distributed $F_R R \sim U(0,1)$, where R is the stochastic process of the FX log returns $r_t, \forall t \in [0,T]$





Fan Chart



VaR FXI Rule

Conditional density and intervention rule based on 2020-05-07 information





Conditional Exceedance Log returns and conditional VaR exceedance at 5 percent (green dot: below VaR 2.5 percent, red dot: above VaR 97.5 percent) 500 -500Corresponding FX level 25.0 22.5 20.0 26/37

Density Evaluation Probability Integral Transform (PIT) Test, Out-of-sample 1.2 Out-of-sample empirical CDF 1.0 Theoretical CDF 5 percent critical values Cumulative probability 0.8 0.6 0.40.2 0.0 -0.20.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Quantiles

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
Policy Implications and Future Work


Bank of Mexico FX Interventions Setup

- ▶ The Banco Mexico (BM) implemented both discretionary and fixed-volatility FXI and intervened via transparent FX auctions
- ▶ Difference between rule and discretion was the reservation rate applied to the auction:
 - Rule-based setting: BM operated an auction every day with a pre-announced reservation rate, a minimum rate for eligible bids
 - Discretionary setting: the auction was organized at the BM's discretion without reservation rate
- Often, no demand for the ruled-based auction as the market rate was below the reservation rate
- ▶ Use the conditional cumulative distribution function (CDF) as benchmark: what was the risk level when the central bank intervened?

Rule-Based Benchmarking


FX interventions and FX log returns with minimum price (sell USD)






Rule-Based Benchmarking: Risk-Level


Conditional CDF of FX interventions with minimum price (sell USD)



Discretion-Based Benchmarking


FX interventions and FX log returns with no minimum price (sell USD)





Discretion-Based Benchmarking: Risk-Level

Conditional CDF of FX interventions with no minimum price (sell USD)



Benchmarking Results

- ► The fixed volatility rule did not fully prevented BM to intervene outside of the tails of the conditional distribution
- In that respect, VaR-based intervention would have been better
- However, interventions under fixed volatility were significantly less frequently outside of the tails than discretionary interventions
- Discretion triggers are not identifiable based on risk

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Policy Implications

- Useful for floating rate regimes, where the central bank is concerned with FX risks to financial stability
- ► The VaR-based rule could be considered **as one option** to improve the rules that central banks currently use
- ▶ Let the nominal exchange rate acts as a **shock absorber**
- Could be used to accompany the transition to exchange rate flexibility, with gradually less and less interventions
- ► Foster the development of hedging markets
- Properly fix market incentives and anchor expectations: avoid moral hazard and windfall effects
- More generally, could be used by central banks for market and risk monitoring

Future Work

- 1. Use expected shortfall (ES) instead of VaR, as ES has better risk properties
- 2. Look **beyond spot FX markets** and apply a similar and consistent approach to:
 - ► FX derivatives, e.g. forward spreads
 - Offshore/onshore interest rate markets
 - Fixed income market
- 3. Determine the risk tolerance by **identifying vulnerabilities** and their impact to the economy. Align with the "at-risk" work done in MCM