

# FX Interventions Rules for Central Banks

## A Risk-Based Framework

Romain Lafarguette    Romain Veyrune

IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department  
Central Bank Operations Division

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# Contributions

- ▶ Design a rule to **address tail-risks** related to direct and indirect exposures to exchange rate in the economy
- ▶ Provides guidance on **when** to intervene ("triggers")
- ▶ Appropriate for **floating exchange rate regimes** with FX macrofinancial risks (e.g. FX unhedged exposures, dollarization, etc.)
- ▶ Consistently target **FX risk** rather than arbitrary FX volatility/level threshold
- ▶ A **risk management framework** for central banks' financial stability mandate: aligned with **industry's best practices** in risk management

# Key Messages

Foreign Exchange intervention rules should be:

- ▶ **Adaptative**, depend on market conditions
- ▶ **Objective**, anchored to a risk tolerance level rather than an arbitrary FX level threshold
- ▶ Capture FX **non-linearities and asymmetries** between appreciation and depreciation
- ▶ Be easily **operationalizable**, and **financially viable**


We propose an FX intervention rule based on **Conditional Value-at-Risk**

## Concept: Value-at-Risk FXI Rule

- ▶ Rather than using a fixed volatility rule (e.g. intervene if daily exchange rate varies by more than 2%)
- ▶ Use a **risk-based rule**: intervene when the daily exchange rate log-returns fall within the tails of the conditional distribution
- ▶ Measure the tail-risk via the concept of **Value-at-Risk** (the conditional quantile of the log returns distribution)
- ▶ The conditional distribution is estimated daily with a standard financial GARCH model and **varies with market conditions**
- ▶ The central bank decides on the **risk tolerance**: e.g. intervene in the tail at 1%, 5%, 10%, etc.

# VaR FXI Rule

Conditional density and intervention rule based on 2020-05-07 information



# A Risk-Management Approach to FX Interventions

- ▶ Tail-risks hedge not always available: **incomplete markets**
- ▶ **The central bank is transferring FX risk from the market to its balance sheet.** It buys a risky asset (FX) and issues a risk-free asset (local currency)
- ▶ Provide a **public good** to address market failure. Leave a fix share of risk for the market to hedge
- ▶ Risk tolerance should depend on the **macrofinancial risk** (FX unhedged exposures from residents, dollarization, etc.)
- ▶ The financial stability mandate of the central bank is properly formalized and quantified via VaR metric

## Main Features

1. This rule allows flexible exchange rate to act as a **shock absorber**: provides more flexibility in crisis time.
2. No excessive interventions in crisis time which are often ineffective and costly (exhaust central bank FX reserves)
3. Doesn't provide a free insurance to the market: avoid **moral hazard** and foster the **development of hedging market**
4. Adaptative rule prevent **market manipulation and windfall effects**
5. This rule guarantees that the interventions will occur with a **fixed frequency** over the medium term => **budget neutrality** with symmetric risk preference
6. **Financially optimized**: always buy/sell at the best price



# Operational Implementation

- ▶ **Standard data requirements**, easily accessible for a central bank, can be customized
- ▶ Parsimonious GARCH model featuring **embedded heteroskedasticity, asymmetries** (appreciation/depreciation), **non-linearities** (exponential volatility) and parametric **density forecasting**
- ▶ We created a Python wrapper, **free and open-source**: estimation, forecasting, out-of-sample evaluation, benchmarking, etc. Results are **fully replicable**
- ▶ Can be readily used by central banks and deployed during Technical Assistance missions

# Challenges

- ▶ Some central banks might be reluctant to use a VaR-rule: more difficult to communicate to the public
- ▶ However, FXI occur on the wholesale FX market, where market participants are fully aware of the VaR concept
- ▶ Some policy markers might prefer to keep discretion
- ▶ Trade-off: a transparent rule anchors better market expectations, maximize efficiency and isolate the central bank for political pressures

# Usages

1. Determine FX Intervention triggers
2. Conduct market monitoring and provide policy guidance
3. Benchmark FX interventions, including discretionary interventions
  - ▶ We present below an application of the toolkit to the Mexican Peso, based on publicly available data
  - ▶ More than 4500 daily observations, from 2009 to 2018, with Bank of Mexico (public) FX interventions, mostly concentrated in 2009 and 2016

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# Specification

- ▶ Non-linear, Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model
- ▶ The dependent variable is the FX log-returns,  
 $r_t = \log(\frac{e_t}{e_{t-1}})$ , where  $e_t$  is the bilateral market exchange rate against the major currency (e.g. USD)
- ▶ **Drift AR-X(1):**  $r_{t+1} = \alpha_d + \rho r_t + \beta X_{t+1} + \epsilon_{t-1}$
- ▶ **Exponential volatility:**  $\log \sigma_{t+1}^2 = \omega + \beta g(r_t)$  where  $g(r_t) = \alpha_v r_t + \gamma(|r_t| - \mathbb{E}|r_t|)$
- ▶ **Error term distribution**  $\epsilon_t = \sigma_t \varepsilon_t$ ,  $\varepsilon_t \sim \text{TSK}(0, 1, \nu)$
- ▶ The forecasted conditional probability distribution function is defined as:

$$\hat{f}(r_{t+1}|r_t, X_{t+1}) = \text{TSK}(\hat{r}_{t+1}, \hat{\sigma}_{t+1}^2, \hat{\nu})$$

# Estimation

- ▶ The GARCH estimation is standard and done with maximum likelihood
- ▶ Selection of parameters is done via AIC/BIC criteria.
- ▶ Our Python package allows to flexibly select:
  - ▶ The set of exogeneous regressors
  - ▶ The number of lags
  - ▶ The volatility specification (exponential, RiskMetric, standard GARCH, etc.)
  - ▶ The distribution family of the error-terms (Gaussian, Student, Tskew, Generalized Gaussian, etc.)

# Exogeneous Regressors

1. **FX microstructure:** FX bid-ask spread (averaged over the day)
2. **CIP:** daily interest rate differential with the US Libor
3. **Hedging costs:** one-month forward exchange rate
4. **Past policy interventions:** lagged amount of central bank FX intervention
5. **Global risk sentiment:** The VIX, implied volatility on the S&P 500
6. **Global FX factor:** The EURUSD exchange rate

# Regression Table

	Constant	Microstructure	CIP	FXI	Baseline	Robustness
Intercept	1.09	-2.16	2.15	1.67***	1.63	1.64***
Lag FX log returns	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***
Bid-ask spread abs value		0.11**	0.15***	0.14***	0.15***	0.15***
Forward points first difference		0.32***	0.32***	0.32***	0.27***	0.27***
Interbank rate vs Libor			-1.11***	-0.98***	-1.02***	-1.03***
FX intervention in USD lag				0.04	0.04	
VIX first diff					9.78***	9.79***
EURUSD log returns					0.13***	0.13***
FX intervention dummy lag						4.13
Omega	0.15***	0.14***	0.13***	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***
Alpha	0.17***	0.19***	0.18***	0.18***	0.19***	0.19***
Gamma	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
Beta	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.99***	0.98***	0.98***
Nu	8.81***	9.11***	9.18***	9.15***	7.77***	7.77***
Lambda	0.13***	0.11***	0.12***	0.12***	0.1***	0.1***
R2	0.4 %	4.9 %	5.1 %	5.1 %	14.3 %	14.3 %
R2 adjusted	0.4 %	4.8 %	5.0 %	5.0 %	14.2 %	14.1 %
Number of observations	4511	4511	4511	4510	4510	4510
Significance *10%, **5%, ***1%						



# Formalization of the Intervention Rule

- ▶ Consider the estimated conditional distribution of the exchange rate log returns  $r_t$  defined as

$$\mathbb{P}[r_t \leq x] = \int_{-\infty}^x \hat{f}(r_t|r_{t-1}, X_t) dr_t$$

- ▶ The Conditional Value-at-Risk at threshold  $\tau$  is simply defined as the conditional  $\tau$ -quantile


$$Q(r_t, \tau) \equiv \mathbb{P}[r_t \leq Q(r_t, \tau)] = \tau, \text{ for } \tau \in (0, 1)$$

- ▶ The FXI intervention rule is a simple boolean rule, based on two risk-thresholds ( $\underline{\tau}, \bar{\tau}$ ), for depreciation and appreciation, potentially risk-symmetric ( $\bar{\tau} = 1 - \underline{\tau}$ )


$$\mathbb{1} [\{r_t \leq Q(r_t, \underline{\tau})\} \cup \{r_t > Q(r_t, \bar{\tau})\}]$$

# Dynamics of the Mexican Peso against USD


Historical FX level



Historical FX returns




Historical FX returns distribution



# Conditional In-Sample Volatility of the Mexican Peso

In-sample FX returns conditional volatility



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
Benchmarking

Policy Implications and Future Work

# Forecasting


- ▶ Real-time forecasting based on market conditions
- ▶ Estimate the GARCH and derive the forecasted drift and volatility
- ▶ Infer the **full-fledged conditional distribution** of FX log returns for any point in time
- ▶ Assess model accuracy via (i) in-sample metrics and (ii) out of sample performance (probability integral transform test)
- ▶ The probability integral transform test assess on whether the random variable defined as  $PIT(R) \equiv F_R R$  is uniformly distributed  $F_R R \sim U(0, 1)$ , where  $R$  is the stochastic process of the FX log returns  $r_t, \forall t \in [0, T]$

# Out-of-sample conditional density




# Fan Chart

Fan chart of predictive FX log returns  
1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, 95 Conditional Quantiles



# VaR FXI Rule

Conditional density and intervention rule based on 2020-05-07 information






# Conditional Cumulative Distribution Function

Conditional cumulative distribution function and intervention thresholds




# Conditional Exceedance

Log returns and conditional VaR exceedance at 5 percent  
(green dot: below VaR 2.5 percent, red dot: above VaR 97.5 percent)




Corresponding FX level



# Density Evaluation

Probability Integral Transform (PIT) Test, Out-of-sample



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
Policy Implications and Future Work

# Bank of Mexico FX Interventions Setup

- ▶ The Banco Mexico (BM) implemented both discretionary and fixed-volatility FXI and intervened via transparent FX auctions
- ▶ Difference between rule and discretion was the reservation rate applied to the auction:
  - ▶ **Rule-based setting:** BM operated an auction every day with a pre-announced reservation rate, a **minimum rate** for eligible bids
  - ▶ **Discretionary setting:** the auction was organized at the BM's discretion without reservation rate
- ▶ Often, no demand for the ruled-based auction as the market rate was below the reservation rate
- ▶ Use the conditional cumulative distribution function (CDF) as benchmark: what was the risk level when the central bank intervened?

# Rule-Based Benchmarking

FX interventions and FX log returns with minimum price  
(sell USD)




FX interventions and FX level (sell USD)




# Rule-Based Benchmarking: Risk-Level

Conditional CDF of FX interventions with minimum price  
(sell USD)




# Discretion-Based Benchmarking

FX interventions and FX log returns with no minimum price  
(sell USD)




FX interventions and FX level (sell USD)





# Discretion-Based Benchmarking: Risk-Level

Conditional CDF of FX interventions with no minimum price  
(sell USD)



# Benchmarking Results

- ▶ The fixed volatility rule did not fully prevented BM to intervene outside of the tails of the conditional distribution
- ▶ In that respect, VaR-based intervention would have been better
- ▶ However, interventions under fixed volatility were significantly less frequently outside of the tails than discretionary interventions
- ▶ **Discretion triggers are not identifiable based on risk**

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## Policy Implications

- ▶ Useful for floating rate regimes, where the central bank is concerned with FX risks to financial stability
- ▶ The VaR-based rule could be considered **as one option** to improve the rules that central banks currently use
- ▶ Let the nominal exchange rate acts as a **shock absorber**
- ▶ Could be used to accompany the **transition to exchange rate flexibility**, with gradually less and less interventions
- ▶ **Foster the development of hedging markets**
- ▶ Properly **fix market incentives and anchor expectations**: avoid moral hazard and windfall effects
- ▶ More generally, could be used by central banks for **market and risk monitoring**

# Future Work

1. Use expected shortfall (ES) instead of VaR, as ES has better risk properties
2. Look **beyond spot FX markets** and apply a similar and consistent approach to:
  - ▶ FX derivatives, e.g. forward spreads
  - ▶ Offshore/onshore interest rate markets
  - ▶ Fixed income market
3. Determine the risk tolerance by **identifying vulnerabilities** and their impact to the economy. Align with the "**at-risk**" work done in MCM