1.2 THE STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

But what exactly *is* this "wave function", and what does it do for you once you've *got* it? After all, a particle, by its nature, is localized at a point, whereas the wave function (as its name suggests) is spread out in space (it's a function of x, for any given time t). How can such an object be said to describe the state of a *particle*? The answer is provided by Born's **statistical interpretation** of the wave function, which says that $|\Psi(x,t)|^2$ gives the *probability* of finding the particle at point x, at time t—or, more precisely,[2]

$$\boxed{|\Psi(x,t)|^2\,dx = \left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{probability of finding the particle}\\ \text{between } x \text{ and } (x+dx),\ \text{ at time } t.\end{array}\right\}} \qquad [1.3]$$



Figure 1.2: A typical wave function. The particle would be relatively likely to be found near A, and unlikely to be found near B. The shaded area represents the probability of finding the particle in the range dx.

For the wave function in Figure 1.2, you would be quite likely to find the particle in the vicinity of point A, and relatively unlikely to find it near point B.

The statistical interpretation introduces a kind of **indeterminacy** into quantum mechanics, for even if you know everything the theory has to tell you about the particle (to wit: its wave function), you cannot predict with certainty the outcome of a simple experiment to measure its position—all quantum mechanics has to offer is *statistical* information about the *possible* results. This indeterminacy has been profoundly disturbing to physicists and philosophers alike. Is it a peculiarity of nature, a deficiency in the theory, a fault in the measuring apparatus, or *what*?

[2]The wave function itself is complex, but $|\Psi|^2 = \Psi^*\Psi$ (where Ψ^* is the complex conjugate of Ψ) is real and nonnegative—as a probability, of course, must be.

Suppose I *do* measure the position of the particle, and I find it to be at the point C. Question: Where was the particle just *before* I made the measurement? There are three plausible answers to this question, and they serve to characterize the main schools of thought regarding quantum indeterminacy:

1. The **realist** position: *The particle was at C.* This certainly seems like a sensible response, and it is the one Einstein advocated. Note, however, that if this is true then quantum mechanics is an **incomplete** theory, since the particle *really was* at C, and yet quantum mechanics was unable to tell us so. To the realist, indeterminacy is not a fact of nature, but a reflection of our ignorance. As d'Espagnat put it, "the position of the particle was never indeterminate, but was merely unknown to the experimenter."[3] Evidently Ψ is not the whole story—some additional information (known as a **hidden variable**) is needed to provide a complete description of the particle.

2. The **orthodox** position: *The particle wasn't really anywhere.* It was the act of measurement that forced the particle to "take a stand" (though how and why it decided on the point C we dare not ask). Jordan said it most starkly: "Observations not only *disturb* what is to be measured, they *produce* it. . . . We *compel* [the particle] to assume a definite position."[4] This view (the so-called **Copenhagen interpretation**) is associated with Bohr and his followers. Among physicists it has always been the most widely accepted position. Note, however, that if it is correct there is something very peculiar about the act of measurement—something that over half a century of debate has done precious little to illuminate.

3. The **agnostic** position: *Refuse to answer.* This is not quite as silly as it sounds—after all, what sense can there be in making assertions about the status of a particle *before* a measurement, when the only way of knowing whether you were right is precisely to conduct a measurement, in which case what you get is no longer "before the measurement"? It is metaphysics (in the perjorative sense of the word) to worry about something that cannot, by its nature, be tested. Pauli said, "One should no more rack one's brain about the problem of whether something one cannot know anything about exists all the same, than about the ancient question of how many angels are able to sit on the point of a needle."[5] For decades this was the "fall-back" position of most physicists: They'd try to sell you answer 2, but if you were persistent they'd switch to 3 and terminate the conversation.

Until fairly recently, all three positions (realist, orthodox, and agnostic) had their partisans. But in 1964 John Bell astonished the physics community by showing that it makes an *observable* difference if the particle had a precise (though unknown) position prior to the measurement. Bell's discovery effectively eliminated agnosticism as a viable option, and made it an *experimental* question whether 1 or 2 is the correct choice. I'll return to this story at the end of the book, when you will be in a better position to appreciate Bell's theorem; for now, suffice it to say that the experiments have confirmed decisively the orthodox interpretation[6]: A particle simply does not have a precise position prior to measurement, any more than the ripples on a pond do; it is the measurement process that insists on one particular number, and thereby in a sense *creates* the specific result, limited only by the statistical weighting imposed by the wave function.

But what if I made a *second* measurement, immediately after the first? Would I get C again, or does the act of measurement cough up some completely new number each time? On this question everyone is in agreement: A repeated measurement (on the same particle) must return the same value. Indeed, it would be tough to prove that the particle was really found at C in the first instance if this could not be confirmed by immediate repetition of the measurement. How does the orthodox interpretation account for the fact that the second measurement is bound to give the value C? Evidently the first measurement radically alters the wave function, so that it is now sharply peaked about C (Figure 1.3). We say that the wave function **collapses** upon measurement, to a spike at the point C (Ψ soon spreads out again, in accordance with the Schrödinger equation, so the second measurement must be made quickly). There are, then, two entirely distinct kinds of physical processes: "ordinary" ones, in which the wave function evolves in a leisurely fashion under the Schrödinger equation, and "measurements", in which Ψ suddenly and discontinuously collapses.[7]



Figure 1.3: Collapse of the wave function: graph of $|\Psi|^2$ immediately after a measurement has found the particle at point C.

[5]Quoted by Mermin (previous footnote), p. 40.

[6]This statement is a little too strong: There remain a few theoretical and experimental loopholes, some of which I shall discuss in the Afterword. And there exist other formulations (such as the **many worlds** interpretation) that do not fit cleanly into any of my three categories. But I think it is wise, at least from a pedagogical point of view, to adopt a clear and coherent platform at this stage, and worry about the alternatives later.