# Phishing Attacks

Mendel Rosenblum

# Phishing

- Basic idea:
  - Get unsuspecting users to visit an evil Web site
  - Convince them that the evil Web site is actually a legitimate site (such as a bank or PayPal)
  - Trick the user into disclosing personal information (password, credit card number, etc.)
  - Use the personal information for evil purposes such as identity theft.
- How to attract users?

### **Emails**






# Spoofing legitimate sites

How to spoof the legitimate site?

- Copy HTML
- Include images from legitimate Web site
- Many links refer back to the legitimate Web site
- After collecting login info, log user into legitimate site, redirect to legitimate site
- User has no idea that password has been stolen

# URL could be obviously Illegitimate



# Or very subtly different: Look-alike characters



### International Character Sets


What does this URL refer to:

www.bank.com/accounts/login.php?q=me.badguy.cn


Chinese characters that look like "/", "?", and "="

This is a host name only!

## Picture in picture



# Legitimate Partners Can Look Fishy



### Counter-measure: visual indicators


- Help users identify legitimate sites:
- Lock symbols to indicate HTTPS
  - Color change to indicate HTTPS

#### Problems:

Lock symbols not always obvious

### **HTTPS Indicators**


#### Chrome



#### Firefox



google.com



web.stanford.edu

# Problem: too easy to obtain certificates


Problem: too easy to obtain certificates that look like legitimate sites

- Example: bankofamerica-secure.com
- Pressure on certificate authorities to issue certificates quickly
- E.g. "domain validation only" certificates: certificate authority only verifies that applicant has right to a particular Internet domain name; no verification of legal status of organization.

### Counter-measure: extended validation certificates

- Goal: prevent attackers from obtaining certificates that look like legitimate sites
- Certificate authority must thoroughly vet the organization obtaining the certificate; prevent look-alike names.
- Certificate authority must undergo audits to ensure it is doing the vets carefully.
- Browser provides special indicator for extended validation sites
- Problems:
  - Small organizations don't like delays and cost of extended validation
  - Until recently, extended validation indicators not very visible in browsers (but much better nowadays).

### **Extended Validation Certificates**



### Other counter-measures:

- Browsers starting to include anti-phishing measures (warn users about known phishing sites)
- Legitimate Web sites can monitor traffic; changes may indicate attacks under way:
  - Spike in download rates for official images
  - Unusual rate of password changes, funds transfers
- Legitimate sites can incorporate personal information in emails to authenticate them: phishers won't have such information.
  - Spear phishing Phishing with attacker having personal information

### Other issues

- Legitimate Web sites often use deceptive techniques to get users to click through ("your last chance for ..."), which reduces distinction between honest and dishonest sites.
- Education ineffective against phishing: response rates to phishing e-mails comparable to those for "legitimate" commercial e-mail.
- Warnings about shady certificates are ineffective: people just click through.

# Two examples in the news in recent years

- Snapchat divulged employee information in phishing attack
  - "Last Friday, Snapchat's payroll department was targeted by an isolated email phishing scam in which a scammer impersonated our Chief Executive Officer and asked for employee payroll information, ...
- Stanford staff member and student got an email with a Word doc they opened
  - Word doc contained a macro that encrypted the user's home directory and provided instruction how how to buy the encryption key.
    - Ransomware
  - Memo: Stanford won't reimburse you for paying ransoms