

CS351
Ass 1

Ran Nathan

\$1 Affine Cipher

$$1^{\text{st}} \text{ most freq} = B$$

$$2^{\text{nd}} \text{ most freq} = V$$

A(?)

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Plaintext} \\ \hline E(4) \\ T(19) \end{array} \rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{Ciphertext} \\ \hline B(1) \\ V(20) \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} 4x + b \equiv 1 \pmod{26} \\ 19x + b \equiv 20 \pmod{26} \\ \hline 15x \equiv 19 \pmod{26} \\ \rightarrow 15x \equiv 45 \pmod{26} \\ \hline x \equiv 3 \pmod{26} \end{array}$$

$$[19 \cdot 26 = 45]$$

$$\text{Key} = (3, 15)$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Sub} \rightarrow 4x + b \equiv 1 \pmod{26} \\ 4(3) + b \equiv 1 \pmod{26} \\ 12 + b \equiv 1 \pmod{26} \\ \hline b \equiv -11 \pmod{26} \\ \hline b \equiv 15 \end{array}$$

Cipher Key

$$[26 - 11 = 15]$$

Test 1

$$4x + b \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

$$4(3) + 15 \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

$$12 + 15 \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

$$27 \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

$$27 \% 26 = 1 \checkmark$$

Test 2

$$19x + b \equiv 20 \pmod{26}$$

$$19(3) + 15 \equiv 20 \pmod{26}$$

$$57 + 15 \equiv 20 \pmod{26}$$

$$72 \equiv 20 \pmod{26}$$

$$72 \% 26 = 20 \checkmark$$

BOTH TEST PASSED, AFFINE CIPHER KEY $(x=3, b=15)$

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$$\$ 2 \quad \text{Key} = \begin{pmatrix} 9 & 4 \\ 5 & 7 \end{pmatrix} = K$$

" M E E T ME AT THE USUAL
 12 4 4 19 12 4 0 19 19 7 4 20 18 20 0 11

S P O T AT T E N R A T H E R T H A N
 18 15 14 19 0 19 19 7 13 17 0 19 7 17 19 7 0 13
 E I G H T O C L O C K
 4 8 6 7 19 19 2 11 14 2 10

	M		K.		MK	
	12	4	0	19	0	9
M	4	19	7	4	19(9) + 7(5)	19(4) + 7(7)
1	12	4	17	19	4(9) + 19(5)	4(4) + 19(7)
2	0	19	7	0	19(9) + 7(5)	19(4) + 7(7)
3	19	7	13	4	4(9) + 20(5)	4(4) + 20(7)
4	4	20	8	6	18(9) + 20(5)	18(4) + 20(7)
5	18	20	7	19	0(9) + 11(5)	0(4) + 11(7)
6	0	11	14	2	18(9) + 14(5)	18(4) + 14(7)
7	13	15	11	14	17(9) + 19(5)	17(4) + 19(7)
8	14	19	2	10	0(9) + 19(5)	0(4) + 19(7)
9	0	19			19(9) + 4(5)	19(4) + 4(7)
10	19	4			13(9) + 17(5)	13(4) + 17(7)
11						
12					(23 x 2) x (2 x 2)	cont...
13						

$$(23 \times 2) \times (2 \times 2)$$

$$K = \begin{pmatrix} 9 & 5 \\ 5 & 7 \end{pmatrix}$$

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\$2 cont.

$$MK = \begin{matrix} 19 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 17 \\ 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ 21 \\ 22 \\ 23 \end{matrix} \left| \begin{array}{cc} 0(9) + 19(5) & 0(7) + 19(7) \\ 7(9) + 4(5) & 7(7) + 4(7) \\ 17(9) + 19(5) & 17(7) + 19(7) \\ 7(9) + 0(5) & 7(7) + 0(7) \\ 13(9) + 4(5) & 13(7) + 4(7) \\ 8(9) + 6(5) & 8(7) + 6(7) \\ 7(9) + 19(5) & 7(7) + 19(7) \\ 14(9) + 2(5) & 14(7) + 2(7) \\ 11(9) + 14(5) & 11(7) + 14(7) \\ 2(9) + 10(5) & 2(7) + 14(7) \end{array} \right|$$

1	24	24	14	17	3
2	1	19	15	5	7
3	24	24	16	14	19
4	17	3	17	11	2
5	14	7	18	7	2
6	6	0	19	24	22
7	2	7	20	2	5
8	3	25	21	6	18
9	3	21	22	13	12
10	13	7	23	16	0
11	17	3			
12	9	0			
13	20	15			

= "YY BT YY RD' OHG ACED Z
 24 24 1 19 24 24 17 3 14 7 6 0 24 3 25

D V N H RD JAU P R D F E O
 3 21 13 7 17 3 9 0 20 15 17 3 5 4 14

"TLCH CY WCF G S NM QA
 19 11 27 24 22 23 6 18 13 12 16 0

row =
 (12, n)

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\$ 3

"YYBT YY RD OHG ACEDZ

DNNH RD JAV PRDFEO

TLCH CYWCF LSNMQA "

H? random == 12es

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\$ 4

Mathematically, this scheme would work.

However, a Man in the Middle, who has access to read from the channel, can very easily utilize these SAME principles to find the original secret key. XORing the Request and Response together calculates the secret key.

Since this is just bitwise OR on the same subject twice, it will return to the original subject, but an intruder could use these intermediate numbers to get the key used on the subject. To show:

$$\text{Key} = 0x222$$

Person A

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{random} = 0x333 \\ \text{req} = \text{Key}^{\wedge} \text{random} \\ [\text{Person A sends Req down channel}] \end{array} \right.$$

Person B

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} [\text{Person B receives Req}] \\ \text{res} = \text{Key}^{\wedge} \text{req} \\ [\text{Person B sends Res down channel}] \end{array} \right.$$

Person A

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} [\text{Person A receives Res}] \\ \text{random} == \text{Res} \end{array} \right.$$

Man in Middle

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Key} = \text{req}^{\wedge} \text{res} \\ \text{Key} = 0x222 \end{array} \right.$$

Very simply,
the original secret
key is calculated.

Ru Nathan

\$ 5

\$\$ A Availability and Integrity

Availability is violated as Carol should never be able to access Angelo's check in the first place. If she had access, Availability was not enforced.

Integrity is violated as the figures on Angelo's check are unreliable and incorrect now. If Angelo were to review the check now, the data would be wrong.

\$\$ B Integrity

Integrity is violated as Brian posed as Roger, sending word to Rachel in Roger's name. When Rachel reads the letter, she will be reading unreliable and falsified data.

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\$ 5 cont.

\$\$ C Availability

Availability is violated as, while legal to register any available domain name, it is now forcing the publishing house to have a fitting name.

\$\$ D Integrity and Availability

Integrity is violated as, not only was Peter lying and disgracing to Jonah, but now Jonah will be unsure of what is correct and incorrect when seeing his balance.

Availability is violated as Jonah, who needs access and is authorized to the card, lost access, and Peter, who does not need access and is unauthorized

\$\$ E Confidentiality and Integrity

Confidentiality as Mary's Pin was not for Henry.

Integrity as the Trojan Horse was malware disguised as a normal document.

Ron Natheral

\$ 6

No, a collision resistant function for hashing would not be a good encryption tool. It is a double-edged sword, that makes encryption very difficult. If $\text{CRHash}(x) \neq \text{CRHash}(y)$, then we have no way of verifying Equality, in the example of Stand Password. If they are equal, then there is no Decryption method for it. Using this hashing function would not be a good idea.

\$ 7

This is a very similar problem to \$4. The man in the middle can intercept and relay as normal, holding his premise. Of course, it is him who gets all the original keys. If they were encrypted with a symmetrical encryption method, the MITM can now decrypt the keys to retrieve the original message.