

Initial clauses

- Clause 0: $\text{attacker}(\text{true})$
(The attacker applies function true.)
- Clause 1: $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{spk}(v))$
(The attacker applies function spk.)
- Clause 2: $\text{attacker}(v) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v_1) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{sign}(v, v_1))$
(The attacker applies function sign.)
- Clause 3: $\text{attacker}(v) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v_1) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(v, v_1))$
(The attacker applies function sencrypt.)
- Clause 4: $\text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(x, v)) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(x)$
(The attacker applies function sdecrypt.)
- Clause 5: $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{pk}(v))$
(The attacker applies function pk.)
- Clause 6: $\text{attacker}(\text{sign}(m_1, k_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(m_1)$
(The attacker applies function getmess.)
- Clause 7: $\text{attacker}(\text{false})$
(The attacker applies function false.)
- Clause 8: $\text{attacker}(v) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v_1) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(v, v_1))$
(The attacker applies function encrypt.)
- Clause 9: $\text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(x, \text{pk}(v))) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(x)$
(The attacker applies function decrypt.)
- Clause 10: $\text{attacker}(0)$
(The attacker applies function 0.)
- Clause 11: $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v + 1)$
(The attacker applies function +.)
- Clause 12: $\text{attacker}(v + 1) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$
(The attacker applies function - 1.)
- Clause 13: $\text{attacker}(v) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v_1) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v_2) \rightarrow \text{attacker}((v, v_1, v_2))$
(The attacker applies function 3-tuple.)
- Clause 14: $\text{attacker}((v, v_1, v_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$
(The attacker applies function 1-proj-3-tuple.)
- Clause 15: $\text{attacker}((v, v_1, v_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v_1)$
(The attacker applies function 2-proj-3-tuple.)
- Clause 16: $\text{attacker}((v, v_1, v_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v_2)$
(The attacker applies function 3-proj-3-tuple.)

- Clause 17: $\text{attacker}(v) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v_I) \rightarrow \text{attacker}((v, v_I))$
(The attacker applies function 2-tuple.)
- Clause 18: $\text{attacker}((v, v_I)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$
(The attacker applies function 1-proj-2-tuple.)
- Clause 19: $\text{attacker}((v, v_I)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v_I)$
(The attacker applies function 2-proj-2-tuple.)
- Clause 20: $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}((v))$
(The attacker applies function 1-tuple.)
- Clause 21: $\text{attacker}((v)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$
(The attacker applies function 1-proj-1-tuple.)
- Clause 22: $\text{mess}(v, v_I) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v_I)$
(The attacker can listen on all channels it has.)
- Clause 23: $\text{attacker}(v) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(v_I) \rightarrow \text{mess}(v, v_I)$
(The attacker can send messages it has on all channels it has.)
- Clause 24: $\text{attacker}(\text{fail-any_type})$
(Initial knowledge of the attacker.)
- Clause 25: $\text{attacker}(c[])$
(Initial knowledge of the attacker.)
- Clause 26: $\text{equal}(v, v)$
(Definition of equal.)
- Clause 27: $\text{attacker}(\text{new-name_I})$
(The attacker can create new names.)
Abbreviations:
 - $\text{new-name_I} = \text{new-name}[\text{!att} = v]$
- Clause 28: $\text{attacker}(\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]))$
(The message $\text{spk}(\text{skA}[])$ may be sent to the attacker at output $\{3\}$.)
- Clause 29: $\text{attacker}(\text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$
(The message $\text{pk}(\text{skB}[])$ may be sent to the attacker at output $\{6\}$.)
- Clause 30: $\text{b-inj-event}(\text{beginBparam}(pk2_I), @occ10_I) \ \&\& \ \text{attacker}(pk2_I) \rightarrow$
 $\text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), pk2_I, k_2), \text{skA}[]), pk2_I))$
 (If the message $pk2_I$ is received from the attacker at input $\{9\}$,
 event $\text{beginBparam}(pk2_I)$ is executed at $\{10\}$,
 then the message $\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), pk2_I, k_2), \text{skA}[]), pk2_I)$ may be sent to the attacker at
 output $\{12\}$.)
 Abbreviations:
 - $k_2 = k[pk2 = pk2_I, !1 = @sid]$
 - $@occ10_I = @occ10[pk2 = pk2_I, !1 = @sid]$
- Clause 31: $\text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))) \rightarrow$
 $\text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(\text{secretB}[], k_2))$
 (If the message $\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$ is received from the

attacker at input $\{17\}$,

then the message $\text{sencrypt}(\text{secretB}[], k_2)$ may be sent to the attacker at output $\{20\}$.)

- Clause 32: $\text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k_2), \text{skA}[], \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))) \rightarrow \text{inj-}$
 $\text{event}(\text{endBparam}(\text{pk}(\text{skB}[])), @occ21_I)$
(If the message $\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k_2), \text{skA}[], \text{pk}(\text{skB}[])))$ is received from the
attacker at input $\{17\}$,
then event $\text{endBparam}(\text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$ may be executed at $\{21\}$ in session $@sid$.)

Abbreviations:

- $@occ21_I = @occ21[km = \text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k_2), \text{skA}[], \text{pk}(\text{skB}[])), !1 = @sid]$