

# Initial clauses

- Clause 0:  $\text{attacker}(\text{true})$   
(The attacker applies function true.)
- Clause 1:  $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{spk}(v))$   
(The attacker applies function spk.)
- Clause 2:  $\text{attacker}(v) \&\& \text{attacker}(v\_I) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{sign}(v, v\_I))$   
(The attacker applies function sign.)
- Clause 3:  $\text{attacker}(v) \&\& \text{attacker}(v\_I) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(v, v\_I))$   
(The attacker applies function sencrypt.)
- Clause 4:  $\text{attacker}(\text{sencrypt}(x, y)) \&\& \text{attacker}(y) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(x)$   
(The attacker applies function sdecrypt.)
- Clause 5:  $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{pk}(v))$   
(The attacker applies function pk.)
- Clause 6:  $\text{attacker}(\text{sign}(m\_I, k\_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(m\_I)$   
(The attacker applies function getmess.)
- Clause 7:  $\text{attacker}(\text{false})$   
(The attacker applies function false.)
- Clause 8:  $\text{attacker}(v) \&\& \text{attacker}(v\_I) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(v, v\_I))$   
(The attacker applies function encrypt.)
- Clause 9:  $\text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(x, \text{pk}(y))) \&\& \text{attacker}(y) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(x)$   
(The attacker applies function decrypt.)
- Clause 10:  $\text{attacker}(0)$   
(The attacker applies function 0.)
- Clause 11:  $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v + 1)$   
(The attacker applies function +.)
- Clause 12:  $\text{attacker}(v + 1) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$   
(The attacker applies function - 1.)
- Clause 13:  $\text{attacker}(v) \&\& \text{attacker}(v\_I) \&\& \text{attacker}(v\_2) \rightarrow \text{attacker}((v, v\_I, v\_2))$   
(The attacker applies function 3-tuple.)
- Clause 14:  $\text{attacker}((v, v\_I, v\_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$   
(The attacker applies function 1-proj-3-tuple.)
- Clause 15:  $\text{attacker}((v, v\_I, v\_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v\_I)$   
(The attacker applies function 2-proj-3-tuple.)
- Clause 16:  $\text{attacker}((v, v\_I, v\_2)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v\_2)$   
(The attacker applies function 3-proj-3-tuple.)

- Clause 17:  $\text{attacker}(v) \&\& \text{attacker}(v\_I) \rightarrow \text{attacker}((v, v\_I))$   
(The attacker applies function 2-tuple.)
- Clause 18:  $\text{attacker}((v, v\_I)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$   
(The attacker applies function 1-proj-2-tuple.)
- Clause 19:  $\text{attacker}((v, v\_I)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v\_I)$   
(The attacker applies function 2-proj-2-tuple.)
- Clause 20:  $\text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}((v))$   
(The attacker applies function 1-tuple.)
- Clause 21:  $\text{attacker}((v)) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v)$   
(The attacker applies function 1-proj-1-tuple.)
- Clause 22:  $\text{mess}(v, v\_I) \&\& \text{attacker}(v) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(v\_I)$   
(The attacker can listen on all channels it has.)
- Clause 23:  $\text{attacker}(v) \&\& \text{attacker}(v\_I) \rightarrow \text{mess}(v, v\_I)$   
(The attacker can send messages it has on all channels it has.)
- Clause 24:  $\text{attacker}(\text{fail-any\_type})$   
(Initial knowledge of the attacker.)
- Clause 25:  $\text{attacker}(c[])$   
(Initial knowledge of the attacker.)
- Clause 26:  $\text{equal}(v, v)$   
(Definition of equal.)
- Clause 27:  $\text{attacker}(\text{new-name\_I})$   
(The attacker can create new names.)  
Abbreviations:
  - $\text{new-name\_I} = \text{new-name}[\text{!att} = v]$
- Clause 28:  $\text{attacker}(\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]))$   
(The message  $\text{spk}(\text{skA}[])$  may be sent to the attacker at output  $\{3\}$ .)
- Clause 29:  $\text{attacker}(\text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$   
(The message  $\text{pk}(\text{skB}[])$  may be sent to the attacker at output  $\{6\}$ .)
- Clause 30:  $\text{b-inj-event}(\text{beginBparam}(pk2\_I), @occ10\_I) \&\& \text{attacker}(pk2\_I) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), pk2\_I, k\_2), \text{skA}[]), pk2\_I))$   
(If the message  $pk2\_I$  is received from the attacker at input  $\{9\}$ ,  
event  $\text{beginBparam}(pk2\_I)$  is executed at  $\{10\}$ ,  
then the message  $\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), pk2\_I, k\_2), \text{skA}[]), pk2\_I)$  may be sent to the attacker at  
output  $\{12\}$ .)  
Abbreviations:
  - $k\_2 = k[\text{pk2} = pk2\_I, \text{!1} = @sid]$
  - $@occ10\_I = @occ10[\text{pk2} = pk2\_I, \text{!1} = @sid]$
- Clause 31:  $\text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k\_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))) \rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{s encrypt}(\text{secretB}[], k\_2))$   
(If the message  $\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k\_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$  is received from the

attacker at input {17},  
then the message  $\text{encr}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k\_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$  may be sent to the attacker at output {20}.)

- Clause 32:  $\text{attacker}(\text{encrypt}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k\_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))) \rightarrow \text{inj-} \text{event}(\text{endBparam}(\text{pk}(\text{skB}[])), @occ21\_1)$   
(If the message  $\text{encr}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k\_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$  is received from the attacker at input {17},  
then event  $\text{endBparam}(\text{pk}(\text{skB}[]))$  may be executed at {21} in session  $@sid$ .)  
Abbreviations:
  - $@occ21\_1 = @occ21[\text{km} = \text{encr}(\text{sign}((\text{spk}(\text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[]), k\_2), \text{skA}[]), \text{pk}(\text{skB}[])), !1 = @sid]$