Hypotheses

# Hypothesis 1: emotion has positive effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/emotion>

Description IV: Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).   
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | neutral | Often used as a baseline in studies that elicit emotions. Participants are exposed either to stimuli with neutral emotional valence or engage in a non-emotional control task |
| T2 | anger | The response to interference with pursuit of a goal the participant cares about (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJCMA-10-2015-0068>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167213500998>

# Hypothesis 2: real communication has negative effect on contributions

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/contributions>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/communicationReal>

Description IV: Whether the communication received by participants was real or fake. TRUE = Real communication, FALSE = Fake communication.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value |
| T1 | 1 |
| T2 | 0 |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.75.3.695>

# Hypothesis 3: punishment agent has negative effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/punishmentAgent>

Description IV: Who can enact punishment on other participants (See Agent type).  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | peer | Other participants of the same role |
| T2 | leader | A participant with some form of higher, relative social power; see Power |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0190272517703750>

# Hypothesis 4: emotion has negative effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/emotion>

Description IV: Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).   
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | neutral | Often used as a baseline in studies that elicit emotions. Participants are exposed either to stimuli with neutral emotional valence or engage in a non-emotional control task |
| T2 | disgust | The repulsion by the sight, smell, or taste of something; disgust may also be provoked by people whose actions are revolting or by ideas that are offensive (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167213500998>

# Hypothesis 5: game type has positive effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/gameType>

Description IV: Game that participants play during the experimental session. Code it when participants' behavior is compared across multiple games.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | prisoner's\_dilemma\_game | In the standard prisoner's dilemma game, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: DC > CC > DD > CD |
| T2 | dictator\_game | In standard dictator game, participants are assigned to either the role of dictator or recipient. The dictator is given a fixed amount of money and is entitled to decide how much money to keep and how much money to give to the recipient |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.03.002>

# Hypothesis 6: partner's emotion has negative effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/partnerEmotion>

Description IV: Emotion of the participant's partner in the social interaction (as it is reported in the paper). Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).   
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | guilt | The response when a person regrets having violated an agreement, principle, or value (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) |
| T2 | neutral | Often used as a baseline in studies that elicit emotions. Participants are exposed either to stimuli with neutral emotional valence or engage in a non-emotional control task |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.015>

# Hypothesis 7: anonymity manipulation has positive effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/anonymityManipul>

Description IV: Degree to which participants' actions were identifiable by their partner(s) and/or the experimenter.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | high | The treatment was classified as having a relative high level of anonymity |
| T2 | low | The treatment was classified as having a relative low level of anonymity |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2016.1174664>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.11.004>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.0689>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(93)90001-6>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224540209603917>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1997.1203>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst040>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.007>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.002>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9377-5>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/jep.11.2013.3.3>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0037450>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2556325>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)00073-n>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200276500900308>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.02.008>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9389-1>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430209342258>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02093.x>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0082799>

# Hypothesis 8: svo type has positive effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/sVOType>

Description IV: Participants were classified according to the specific type of social value orientation that resulted in the SVO measure.   
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | prosocial | Prosocials aim to equalize and/or maximize joint outcomes |
| T2 | proself | Individualists (who aim to maximize their own outcomes, regardless of the othersâ outcomes) and competitors (who aim to maximize the relative difference between their own and the othersâ outcomes) are often combined in a proself category |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.743>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002710372329>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0984(199905/06)13:3&lt165::aid-per322&gt3.0.co>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.418>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199911)29:7&lt871::aid-ejsp962&gt3.0.co>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2008.00359.x>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0011991>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//1089-2699.4.4.330>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2013.855158>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst040>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.08.011>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/014466605x52290>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0020151>

<http://dx.doi.org/http://10.1002/ejsp.414>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.023>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0021467>

<http://dx.doi.org/doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.53>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-85261-9_6>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031233>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.01.001>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.972>

<http://dx.doi.org/NA>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.276>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.556>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0012976>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep23919>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/07.09.PR0.114k27w5>

# Hypothesis 9: mpcr has positive effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/mPCR>

Description IV: The ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account. Calculated as multiplier divided by group size.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value |
| T1 | (-0.401, 0.3] |
| T2 | (0.3, 0.55] |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-006-9067-1>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(93)90001-6>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.07.013>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0120379>

# Hypothesis 10: partner's emotion has positive effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/partnerEmotion>

Description IV: Emotion of the participant's partner in the social interaction (as it is reported in the paper). Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).   
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | guilt | The response when a person regrets having violated an agreement, principle, or value (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) |
| T2 | neutral | Often used as a baseline in studies that elicit emotions. Participants are exposed either to stimuli with neutral emotional valence or engage in a non-emotional control task |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.07.015>

# Hypothesis 11: heterogeneous gender has positive effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/heterogeneousGender>

Description IV: Whether groups had a mixed gender composition (both males and women). TRUE = Groups had a mixed gender composition (both males and women), FALSE = Groups had a homogeneous gender composition (only males or only women).  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value |
| T1 | 0 |
| T2 | 1 |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.015>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566(80)90043-4>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200277101500110>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0022678>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2787085>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2786779>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200277401800411>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2786248>

# Hypothesis 12: endogenous motivational orientation has negative effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/endogenousMotivationalOrientation>

Description IV: Participants have adopted a specific goal when interacting in the game (both as result of self report measures and classified as such based on behavior in other tasks). Some studies falling into this category allow participants to select the goal they want to pursue among a set of possible goals.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | cooperative | Cooperative goals aim to equalize and/or maximize joint outcomes |
| T2 | individualistic | Individualistic goals aim to maximize own outcomes, regardless of the othersâ outcomes |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0077081>

# Hypothesis 13: partner type has negative effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/partnerType>

Description IV: The type of partner that interacts with the participant in the game.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | stranger | General others outside the game (in formulations such as 'most people'; 'others in general'...) |
| T2 | computer | Computerized opponent. Players must be informed to be interacting with a computer |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2890495>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830150205>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.70.1.47>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2016.04.002>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad0740555>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0747-5632(98)00035-1>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2010.11.006>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12369-015-0323-x>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0096654>

# Hypothesis 14: position in game has positive effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/positionInGame>

Description IV: The positional order of the participant in the sequence of decisions (in a sequential game).  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value |
| T1 | 1 |
| T2 | 3 |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1016364608108>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-013-9370-6>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.006>

# Hypothesis 15: svo type has positive effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/sVOType>

Description IV: Participants were classified according to the specific type of social value orientation that resulted in the SVO measure.   
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | individualist | Individualists aim to maximize their own outcomes, regardless of the othersâ outcomes |
| T2 | prosocial | Prosocials aim to equalize and/or maximize joint outcomes |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/NA>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00211-6>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0749-5978(02)00511-3>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.72.5.1093>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00779954.2011.556069>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.32.5.922>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.34.1.69>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002783027003007>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12139>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550617699256>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2235360>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1245>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019027250406700404>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00042-5>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.77.2.337>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430211402102>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.2410060505>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.77.4.762>

# Hypothesis 16: endogenous motivational orientation has positive effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/endogenousMotivationalOrientation>

Description IV: Participants have adopted a specific goal when interacting in the game (both as result of self report measures and classified as such based on behavior in other tasks). Some studies falling into this category allow participants to select the goal they want to pursue among a set of possible goals.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | cooperative | Cooperative goals aim to equalize and/or maximize joint outcomes |
| T2 | individualistic | Individualistic goals aim to maximize own outcomes, regardless of the othersâ outcomes |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0077081>

# Hypothesis 17: real communication has positive effect on withdrawals

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/withdrawals>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/communicationReal>

Description IV: Whether the communication received by participants was real or fake. TRUE = Real communication, FALSE = Fake communication.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value |
| T1 | 1 |
| T2 | 0 |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.75.3.695>

# Hypothesis 18: position in game has negative effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/positionInGame>

Description IV: The positional order of the participant in the sequence of decisions (in a sequential game).  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value |
| T1 | 2 |
| T2 | 5 |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.006>

# Hypothesis 19: iterated strategy has positive effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/iteratedStrategy>

Description IV: The specific strategy played by the participant's partner in an iterated game.  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | preprogrammed\_cooperation\_rate | The partner cooperates randomly with a given cooperation rate across the duration of the game |
| T2 | other | Other strategies |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1970.9922453>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002783027003007>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002794038004006>

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200276901300108>

# Hypothesis 20: punishment agent has negative effect on cooperation

Dependent Variable (DV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/id/dependentvariable/cooperation>

Inependent Variable (IV): <https://data.cooperationdatabank.org/vocab/prop/punishmentAgent>

Description IV: Who can enact punishment on other participants (See Agent type).  
  
The IV values that were researched and (if available) their descriptions are shown below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| treatment | IV value | description |
| T1 | peer | Other participants of the same role |
| T2 | leader | A participant with some form of higher, relative social power; see Power |

The paper(s) that researched this topic is/are the following:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0190272517703750>