

# UNVEILING VULNERABILITIES

**SECURITY RISKS AND ATTACKS IN  
MODERN DESKTOP APPLICATIONS**

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# PRODUCT SECURITY@LOGITECH


Expertise areas : Pentesting, Application security, Cloud and cloud native, Devsecops, GRC and privacy

Certifications : CISSP, AWS Security, CEH, MCTS, MCP

OWASP and Defcon Chennai chapter leader,  
Public speaker



# Thick client vs Thin client



# Tech stack

## Front end

React js

Electron

Flutter

## Back end

C++

Run as process

## Communication

Websockets

gRPC

Windows name pipes  
| unix pipes

## Storage


Local file system

S3 buckets

# DLL Hijacking

Temp directory - Installer creates temporary executable files, then executes them during installation. These files are created with user writable permissions, meaning that a user, or a process running as a user can modify them, and execute instructions as root.

Unquoted service path - If a malicious individual has access to the file system, it is possible to elevate privileges to NT\System by placing a file such as "C:\Program.exe" and wait for/force a restart of the service or system.



Tools: Procmon

# Symlink

The installer process with high privileges does not carefully check the junction and symlink, and mistakenly takes the target pointed by the symlink as the creation object, which will trigger privilege escalation, resulting in arbitrary directory creation and further causing a permanent system crash.

```
md C:\ProgramData\trap  
mklink /J C:\ProgramData\App C:\ProgramData\trap  
CreateSymlink.exe C:\ProgramData\trap\ups\220 C:\Windows\System32\cng.sys
```

# Oauth

OAuth2.0 with PKCE has been implemented improperly which leads to csrf to login in desktop applications, this can be used for any desktop application that uses the endpoint,

State parameter is needed, this protects the app against CSRF where the same request can be relayed again to login server.

## Scenarios:

The code-challenge is random but once a user initiates a login flow, it doesn't change even after a successful login, which means the old code challenge can be used again to get a valid login request for different accounts. This will log the person out of his actual account and connect his application to the attacker's account who can now control it.

## Problems we have noticed:

### Lack of state param

The code\_challenge can be reused since the server side does not limit one session to one code\_challenge. And the app uses code challenge as STATE because of its absence.


# Electron

vulnerability allows attackers to compromise integrity. By exploiting this, unauthorized code can be injected into the product's processes, potentially leading to remote control and unauthorized access to sensitive user data.

ASAR - Atom shell archive format

```
% npx @electron/asar extract
```

```
/Applications/test.app/Contents/MacOS/Contents/Resources/app.asar  
asar
```



r3ggi/electroniz3r

Take over macOS Electron apps' TCC permissions

1 Contributor 0 Issues 142 Stars 9 Forks

**r3ggi/electroniz3r: Take over macOS Electron apps' TCC permissions**

Take over macOS Electron apps' TCC permissions. Contribute to r3ggi/electroniz3r development by creating an account on GitHub.

[GitHub](#)

**Electron Fuses | Electron**  
Package time feature toggles  
[electronjs.org](https://electronjs.org)

# Hardcoded Passwords/API keys

You can find juicy informations either in two or three places Like Memory, JS files and while reverse engineering the application

# Thank's For Watching

**Connect with Me.**



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