



# UCL

# Causal Algorithmic Recourse from Revealed Preferences

**Rory Creedon**

University College London

Department of Computer Science

Submitted to University College London in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the award of the degree of

*Master of Science in Data Science and Machine Learning.*

Industry supervisor: **Colin Rowat**

Academic supervisor: **Matthew Caldwell**

Submission date: **11<sup>th</sup> September 2023**

This thesis is substantially the result of my own work except where explicitly indicated in the text. It may be freely copied and distributed provided the source is explicitly acknowledged.

---

# Abstract

- Most works in algorithmic recourse assume a simple, pre-specified cost function for changing feature values.
- Understanding *individual* cost functions is important for generating recourse and understanding *global* cost functions is important for strategic classification.
- Whilst there has been research into generating individual recourse through preference elicitation, there has not been research into learning *global* cost functions.
- Learning algorithms are proposed to learn cost function from the users' revealed preferences - their responses to a series of pairwise comparisons of different recourse options.
- The algorithms are evaluated on synthetic and semi-synthetic data.
- Recourse costs are compared for users with different protected attributes, showing if learning costs functions aids or exacerbates fairness of recourse.

---

# Contents

|          |  |           |
|----------|--|-----------|
| <b>1</b> | <b>Introduction</b>  | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>2</b> | <b>Literature Review</b>   | <b>6</b>  |
| 2.1      | Algorithmic Recourse . . . . .   | 6         |
| 2.1.1    | Problem Formulation . . . . .  | 6         |
| 2.1.2    | Cost Functions . . . . .   | 6         |
| 2.1.3    | Recourse methods . . . . .   | 8         |
| 2.2      | Learning from Revealed Preferences . . . . .                               | 8         |
| <b>3</b> | <b>Causal Algorithmic Recourse</b>   | <b>9</b>  |
| 3.1      | Motivation . . . . .   | 9         |
| 3.2      | Structural Causal Models . . . . .   | 10        |
| 3.2.1    | Soft (Parametric) Interventions . . . . .                                  | 12        |
| 3.2.2    | Sequential Interventions . . . . .   | 13        |
| 3.3      | Differentiable Sorting . . . . .   | 14        |
| 3.4      | Generating Recourse . . . . .  | 15        |
| <b>4</b> | <b>Cost Learning</b>   | <b>17</b> |
| 4.1      | Learning from Revealed Preferences . . . . .                               | 17        |
| 4.2      | Cost Learning Formulation . . . . .  | 18        |
| 4.2.1    | Perfect Knowledge of the Structural Causal Model . . . . .                 | 18        |
| 4.2.2    | Linear Approximation of the Structural Causal Model . . . . .              | 19        |
| 4.2.3    | Noisy Responses . . . . .  | 20        |
| 4.3      | Cost Function . . . . .  | 21        |
| <b>5</b> | <b>Experiments</b>   | <b>22</b> |
| 5.1      | End-to-End Methodology . . . . .   | 22        |
| 5.2      | Synthetic Data . . . . .   | 23        |
| 5.2.1    | Linear SCM . . . . .   | 23        |
| 5.2.2    | Non-Linear SCM . . . . .   | 23        |
| 5.3      | Evaluation Criteria . . . . .  | 23        |
| 5.4      | Results . . . . .  | 24        |
| 5.4.1    | Noiseless responses with perfect knowledge of the causal graph . . . . .   | 24        |
| 5.4.2    | Noiseless responses with imperfect knowledge of the causal graph . . . . . | 24        |
| 5.4.3    | Noisy responses . . . . .  | 25        |
| <b>6</b> | <b>Conclusion</b>  | <b>27</b> |
|          | <b>References</b>  | <b>28</b> |

# 1 Introduction

Picture a scenario where, after renting for the last 10 years, you are in the process of buying your first home. You require a mortgage of £300,000. Your salary is £50,000, you have savings of £40,000 (excluding that saved for the deposit) and a credit score of 800<sup>1</sup>. You decide to apply for a mortgage with a new digital bank, which promises to instantly provide a decision, through its ‘AI-powered system’. After entering all your details online, you press ‘Submit’. A new screen appears, informing you that your mortgage application has been unsuccessful. However, it also informs you that if you can increase your income to £70,000 and increase your savings to £50,000, you will be approved for the mortgage. These actions you can take in order for your mortgage to be approved are known as *algorithmic recourse*.

Algorithmic or automated decision making systems are widely used in the real world, often in high stakes environments, where they have a significant impact on the lives of individuals. Some examples include credit scoring, where classifiers are widely used to approve loans and mortgages (O’Dwyer, 2018), in criminal justice, to assess the risk of re-offending (Angwin et al., 2016) and hiring, where candidate screening and video interviews are often automated (Kramer, 2022). Algorithmic recourse refers to a set of actions an individual can take to remedy a negative decision made by an algorithmic or automated decision making system. For example, in the mortgage approval case, the recourse provided was to increase income and credit score. In a hiring setting, it may involve increasing educational achievements or work experience.

cite this

Whilst algorithmic decision making is highly prevalent, algorithmic recourse is not as common. This is concerning, given that recourse has benefits such as increasing trust in algorithmic systems and aiding individuals’ ability to make plans and decisions over time (Venkatasubramanian and Alfano, 2020). Moreover, algorithmic recourse has been argued to have a legal basis in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), where individuals have a *right to recourse* (Voigt and Bussche, 2017).

cite this

check this, not sure if this is true - written in survey paper

Generating algorithmic recourse involves finding a feasible alternative set of actions  $\mathbf{x}'$  that results in a minimal cost to the individual, subject to a positive outcome from the classifier  $h$ . Mathematically, we can formulate the algorithmic recourse problem as follows, where  $\mathbf{x}$  are the individual’s original features, the classifier is assumed to be a binary classifier  $h : \mathbb{R}^D \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  and  $\mathcal{F}$  represents the set of feasible features values (e.g, if  $x_{\text{RACE}} = \text{“Black”}$ , then  $x'_{\text{RACE}} = \text{“White”}$  is not feasible).

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}^* &= \underset{\mathbf{x}'}{\operatorname{argmin}} \operatorname{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') & (1.0.1) \\ \text{s.t. } & h(\mathbf{x}') = 1, \\ & \mathbf{x}' \in \mathcal{F} \end{aligned}$$

<sup>1</sup>Assume that this is an Experian credit score, where a score 800 corresponds to a ‘fair’ score, see more details [here](#).

These alternative sets of features are often referred to as *counterfactual explanations* - counterfactual features that would have resulted in a positive or more favourable outcome<sup>2</sup>. There have been various different methods proposed to generate counterfactual explanations, which can accommodate different types of classifiers (e.g., linear models, tree-based models, neural networks), which have different feasibility, plausibility and other constraints, which can be used on different types of data (e.g., tabular data, image data) and can be computed using different methods (e.g., gradient descent, integer linear programming, brute force) (see Table 1 in Karimi et al. (2022)).

could more citations here, but survey paper should do fine

One of the key challenges in providing algorithmic recourse is the cost function itself. Given that humans are not able to express their individual costs/preferences mathematically, it is a highly non-trivial task to estimate the cost of changing features  $\mathbf{x}$  to  $\mathbf{x}'$ . Estimating the cost function is crucial to providing algorithmic recourse, as without a good understanding of the cost of changing features, the recourse provided could be very costly and difficult to achieve. Again consider the scenario where you have unsuccessfully applied for a mortgage on your first home. Imagine that a highly inaccurate cost function has been used to generate recourse and you have been told to increase your income from £50,000 to £80,000 and to increase your savings from £40,000 to £42,500. This may be highly costly, as it is difficult to obtain a 60% increase in salary, whilst increasing your savings by £2,500 may be comparatively much easier. Another set of features on the classification boundary, is to increase your income to £65,000 and to increase your savings to £55,000. You would consider the second set of features much less costly to achieve than the first. However, due to the poor estimation of your true cost function, you have been provided with recourse that is difficult to achieve.

cite and explain why this is

In this thesis, we highlight and propose solutions for three key issues with existing cost functions in the algorithmic recourse literature.

1. A set of actions (e.g, increase income to £70,000, increase savings to £50,000) are typically enacted sequentially, as opposed to simultaneously. Costs should consider the order of these actions, as actions (or *interventions*) have downstream (causal) effects on other variables. For example, after obtaining a raise and increasing your income to £70,000, it now becomes much easier to increase your savings to £50,000. This is addressed in chapter 3.
2. The cost function should take into account user preferences over feature mutability. For example, picture a scenario where an individual is applying for a PhD and is provided with recourse. They are asked to increase their GRE<sup>3</sup> quantitative reasoning score and produce more academic work (i.e., published papers). It is likely that increasing your GRE quantitative score is more easily mutable than producing additional published papers, which take considerable time and effort. This is addressed in chapter 4, where a novel human-in-the-loop approach is proposed to learn user preferences.
3. Causal algorithmic recourse requires specification of the underlying Structural Causal Model (SCM). When we intervene on income (by increasing it to £70,000), we use the SCM to evaluate the downstream (causal) effects, such as leading to an increase

<sup>2</sup>This thesis will focus on binary classification problems where there is a positive outcome and a negative outcome. However, the problem naturally extends to multi-class classification, where there are different counterfactual explanations for each class.

<sup>3</sup>The [Graduate Record Examination](#) (GRE) is a standardised test that is an admissions requirement for some Masters and PhD programmes.

in savings. The size and form of this effect are dictated by the SCM. It could be a simple linear relationship (such as 40% of income is savings, so an increase in income of £20,000 leads to an increase in income of £8,000) or a more complex relationship that includes many non-linear and non-convex functions. An incorrectly specified SCM can lead to an incorrect cost function. For the actions (a) increase income to £70,000 and then (b) increase savings to £50,000, if we believe that in the SCM, there is a linear relationship between income and savings where an increase in income of £1 leads to a £0.40 increase in savings, then we assume that after the increase in income, savings are £8,000 higher (original income is £50,000). However, the true relationship is linear, where an increase in income of £1 leads to a £0.20 increase in savings. This means after the increase in come, savings are only £4,000 higher. The true cost of two actions are higher than the estimated cost in the our estimation of the SCM. This problem is also addressed in chapter 4, where human-in-the-loop approach learns an *linear approximation* of the SCM as well as user preferences.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Relevant literature is reviewed in chapter 2, causal algorithmic recourse and sequential interventions are discussed in chapter 3, the methodology proposed to learn costs is discussed in chapter 4, results of and discussion of experiments on synthetic data are in chapter 5 and concluding remarks are made in chapter 6.

The accompanying code to replicate the experiments in the thesis can be found here: [https://github.com/rorycreedon/msc\\_thesis](https://github.com/rorycreedon/msc_thesis).

## 2 Literature Review

### 2.1 Algorithmic Recourse

Algorithmic recourse was first defined in the machine learning literature as “the ability of a person to obtain a desired outcome from a fixed model” (Ustun et al., 2019). In our example from the introduction, where you are declined a mortgage, the digital bank provides recourse in the form of an alternative set of features (also referred to in the literature as ‘flipsets’). Should you change your features to the alternative set of features (where your income is £70,000 and savings are £40,000), then the mortgage will be approved (a positive outcome). In this example, the digital bank’s mortgage approval classifier is fixed - the alternative set of features will not result in the mortgage being declined again when you re-apply.

#### 2.1.1 Problem Formulation

The algorithmic recourse problem can be defined formally as shown in equation 2.1.1, where an individuals’ original features are  $\mathbf{x}$ ,  $h : \mathbb{R}^D \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  is the classifier and  $\mathcal{F}$  is the set of feasible features values. The set of feasible feature values constrains  $\mathbf{x}'$  by only allowing positive/integer/similar constraints values of  $\mathbf{x}'_i$  where relevant (e.g, number of credit cards must be either 0 or a positive integer, credit score must be between 0 and 999<sup>1</sup>). For *immutable* variables (e.g., race, birthplace, etc.) it must be that the new feature value is the same as the original, that is  $\mathbf{x}_i = \mathbf{x}'_i$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}^* = \underset{\mathbf{x}'}{\operatorname{argmin}} \operatorname{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') \\ \text{s.t. } h(\mathbf{x}') = 1, \\ \mathbf{x}' \in \mathcal{F} \end{aligned} \tag{2.1.1}$$

#### 2.1.2 Cost Functions

Typically, the cost function is either of the form  $L_p(\mathbf{x}' - \mathbf{x})$ , with the  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  norm being the most common (Karimi et al., 2022; Ramakrishnan et al., 2020). For the  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  norms, this cost function is always greater than or equal to 0, and is minimised when  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}'$ . The further away from the original features  $\mathbf{x}$  that the counterfactual values  $\mathbf{x}'$  are, the higher the cost. Intuitively, this means that leaving the features unchanged will result in a cost of 0, whilst significant changes (either positive or negative) will occur a cost that increases with the size of the changes.

Another function prevalent in the algorithmic recourse literature is the total log percentile shift (Ustun et al., 2019), shown in equation 2.1.2, where  $D$  is the number of features and  $Q_i$  represents the CDF of  $\mathbf{x}_i$ . This cost function also considers the cost of each feature changed independently. It punishes increasing from the percentile  $Q_i(\mathbf{x}'_i)$  is larger than the original percentile  $Q_i(\mathbf{x}_i)$ . A key advantage of this cost function is that changes

<sup>1</sup>Experian credit scores run from 0-999, see link [here](#).

become harder when starting from a higher percentile, e.g, moving from the 50<sup>th</sup> to 55<sup>th</sup> percentile carries a cost of 0.105, where as moving from the 90<sup>th</sup> to 95<sup>th</sup> percentile carries a cost of 0.693. This is likely to reflect reality more than the same cost for increasing percentile by 5 percentage points. Whilst the cost is 0 when  $\mathbf{x}_i = \mathbf{x}'_i$ , it becomes negative when  $Q_i(\mathbf{x}'_i) < Q_i(\mathbf{x}_i)$ . Therefore, for this cost function to applied correctly, it requires a monotonic constraint (e.g. increasing income is positively associated with credit score).

improve this

$$\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') = \sum_{i=1}^D \log \left( \frac{1 - Q_i(\mathbf{x}_i)}{1 - Q_i(\mathbf{x}'_i)} \right) \quad (2.1.2)$$

A related branch of literature, *strategic classification* studies the effect of the behaviour of strategic agents on classifiers. Individuals strategically manipulate their features in order to gain a favourable outcome, as opposed to increasing the underlying variable being classified, for example ‘credit-worthiness’ in a credit scoring setting or practical skills relevant to a specific job in the hiring setting. Designing strategy-robust classifiers or classifiers that incentivise improvement requires a cost function of changing features from  $\mathbf{x}$  to  $\mathbf{x}'$ . Whilst the  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  norms are prevalent in the strategic classification literature, Bechavod et al. (2022) also consider the Mahalanobis distance. A Mahalanobis distance (or quadratic form) cost function is shown in equation 2.1.3, where  $\mathbf{M}$  is a positive semi-definite matrix.

$$\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') = (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')^T \mathbf{M} (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}') \quad (2.1.3)$$

As well as allowing for different relative costs of changing features independently (along the diagonal), a Mahalanobis-based cost function allows changing the value of one feature to change the cost of changing another feature. A worked example is shown below. Let  $\mathbf{x} = [2, 3, 4]^T$  and  $\mathbf{x}' = [1, 1, 1]^T$ . First, note that  $(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')^T \mathbf{M} (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}') = (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')^2$  if  $\mathbf{M}$  is the identity matrix. If the values along the diagonal of  $\mathbf{M}$  were different, this would encode different costs for changing each feature.

$$[1, 2, 3]^T \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} [1, 2, 3]^T = 1^2 + 2^2 + 3^2 = 14 \quad (2.1.4)$$

When the diagonals are non-zero, this results changing one feature affects the cost of changing another feature. See the below example, where changing  $\mathbf{x}_1$  leads to an decreased cost in changing  $\mathbf{x}_2$ .

$$[1, 2, 3]^T \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -0.5 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} [1, 2, 3]^T = 1^2 + 1.5(2) + 3^2 = 13 \quad (2.1.5)$$

The matrix  $\mathbf{M}$  must be manually specified, meaning that the principal (the provide of recourse) must estimate  $\mathbf{M}$  before providing recourse.

Note that using the Mahalanobis distance does not result in any downstream cost

**[TO CONSIDER WHICH OF THE BELOW ACTUALLY NEEDS TO GO IN THE LIT REVIEW]**



### 2.1.3 Recourse methods

Run through methods mentioned in survey paper (Karimi et al., [2022](#)) and also those implemented in [CARLA](#).

## 2.2 Learning from Revealed Preferences

A brief primer on axioms of revealed preferences, and on the literature of *learning from revealed preferences*. To briefly discuss:

- Original paper by Beigman and Vohra ([2006](#)), where principal issues a list of prices and the agent purchases different quantities of each good. Over time, the principal learns from the different purchase amounts (which are the revealed preferences).
- When prices are of goods and budget of the agent are drawn from an unknown distribution (Balcan et al., [2014](#); Zadimoghaddam and Roth, [2012](#)).
- Where the principal is maximising profit (Amin et al., [2015](#); Roth et al., [2016](#)).
- Move onto a more detailed discussion of Dong et al. ([2018](#)).

### 3 Causal Algorithmic Recourse

In the introduction, three problems with cost functions used in the literature were outlined. The first of these was that actions are typically enacted sequentially (e.g., you first increase your income, and then increase your savings). This is important within the *causal* algorithmic setting, where intervening on a variable (e.g, increasing income) has downstream (causal) effects on other variables such as savings. In this chapter, we first motivate *causal* algorithmic recourse, then explore causal algorithmic recourse with soft, as opposed to hard interventions and finally propose a solution to optimise for ordering of sequential interventions when generating recourse.

#### 3.1 Motivation

As discussed in section 2.1.2, the cost of changing features is typically modelled as an  $\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') = L_p(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')$  or the total log percentile shift (Ustun et al., 2019). These cost functions fail to take into account the downstream (causal) effects of changing one feature on other features.

In order to correctly measure the cost of changing from features  $\mathbf{x}$  to  $\mathbf{x}'$ , we need to be able to evaluate the causal effects of changing one variable on others. For example, if an individual decides not to inquire about a loan for a number of months (which will change the feature “number of inquiries in the last 6 months”, the cost of decreasing the feature “number of inquiries in the last 6 months, excluding the last 7 days” will be very low or zero. However, if a quadratic cost function (or any  $L_p$  norm cost function) is used, this will be interpreted as two separate feature changes and the costs of each will be summed. Whilst this simple case can likely be handled by domain expertise, more complex causal relations will exist. Consider an individual obtaining two more credit cards. Whilst this may reduce the cost of increasing “number of credit cards”, this may also increase the cost of “monthly credit card payments” and may have less clear effects (which need not be linear) on other features.

The Mahalanobis distance cost function  $\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') = (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')^T \mathbf{M} (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')$ , where  $\mathbf{M}$  is a fixed, known, positive semi-definite square matrix (Bechavod et al., 2022), does allow for changing one feature to affect the cost of changing other features through the off-diagonal elements in  $\mathbf{M}$  (see equation 2.1.5 for a worked example). However, the causal effects rely on the changes being made simultaneously. If we first apply a change to  $\mathbf{x}_1$  and then to  $\mathbf{x}_2$ , as shown below. In equations 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the changes are applied sequentially and there are no causal effects, leading to a total cost of 5. In equation 3.1.3, the changes are applied simultaneously and the effect of changing  $\mathbf{x}_1$  leads a lower cost of changing  $\mathbf{x}_2$ , with a total cost of 4. The importance of sequential changes as opposed to simultaneous changes are discussed in section 3.2.1.

$$[1, 0, 0]^T \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -0.5 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} [1, 0, 0]^T = 1^2 + 0^2 + 0^2 = 1 \quad (3.1.1)$$

$$[0, 2, 0]^T \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -0.5 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} [0, 2, 0]^T = 0^2 + 2^2 + 0^2 = 4 \quad (3.1.2)$$

$$[1, 2, 0]^T \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -0.5 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} [1, 2, 0]^T = 1^2 + 1.5(2) + 0^2 = 4 \quad (3.1.3)$$

### 3.2 Structural Causal Models

To incorporate changing one feature having a causal effect on the cost of changing another feature, we must model the effect of changing the feature  $\mathbf{x}_1$  to  $\mathbf{x}'_1$  has on changing the feature  $\mathbf{x}_2$  to  $\mathbf{x}'_2$ . Following Karimi et al. (2021), we can model the world using a structural causal model (SCM) to account for downstream effects. The SCM can be defined formally as  $\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathbb{U}, \mathbb{V}, \mathbb{F} \rangle$  capture all the causal relations in the world, where  $\mathbb{U}$  represents set of exogenous variables,  $\mathbb{V}$  represents the set of endogenous variables (all are a descendant of at least one of the variables in  $\mathbb{U}$ ) and  $\mathbb{F}$  represents the set of structural equations which describe how the endogenous variables can be determined from the exogenous variables (Pearl et al., 2016).

We can illustrate a simple SCM  $\mathcal{M}$  with  $\mathbb{U} = \{x_1\}$ ,  $\mathbb{V} = \{x_2, x_3, x_4\}$  and structural equations  $\mathbb{F}$  are defined in equation 3.2.1.

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= u_1 & u_1 &\sim N(30, 5) \\ x_2 &= u_2 + 0.5x_1 & u_2 &\sim N(20, 10) \\ x_3 &= u_3 - 0.25x_2 & u_3 &\sim \text{Uniform}(0, 20) \\ x_4 &= \frac{x_3}{x_1} \end{aligned} \quad (3.2.1)$$




Figure 3.1: Causal graph  $\mathcal{G}$  of SCM  $\mathcal{M}$ .

The SCM can also be presented with a causal graph  $\mathcal{G}$ , which is shown in Figure 3.1. Let  $x_1$  represent salary (in thousands of pounds),  $x_2$  represent savings (in thousands of pounds),  $x_3$  represent the debt (in thousands of pounds) and  $x_4$  represent debt-to-income ratio. If an individual for whom the SCM  $\mathcal{M}$  holds receives an increase in salary, this will lead to an increase in savings and a reduction the debt-to-income ratio. If the individual's initial features were  $[\text{£}30,000, \text{£}25,000, \text{£}10,000, 1/3]^T$  and their salary increases to  $\text{£}35,000$ , then it should then be easier to increase their savings and decrease their debt-to-income ratio than when their salary was  $\text{£}30,000$ . This toy example shows how the SCM  $\mathcal{M}$  encodes the downstream effect of increased salary on both savings and probability of mortgage approval.

## [DISCUSSION ON PEARL-STYLE DAGS/INBENS CRITIQUE]

We can use the Abduction-Action-Prediction steps (Pearl et al., 2016) to obtain a *structural counterfactual* of an increase in salary ( $x_1$ ) from £30,000 to £35,000, given that the existing features are  $[\text{£}30,000, \text{£}25,000, \text{£}10,000, 1/3]^T$

**1. Abduction.** Calculate the value of exogenous variables before intervention, given the evidence (the current values of the features).

go over this example again, should be such that the hard intervention actually leads to the severing of an edge to illustrate the point on hard interventions

$$\begin{aligned} u_1 = x_1 &= 30,000 & (3.2.2) \\ u_2 = x_2 - 0.5x_1 = 25,000 - 0.5(30,000) &= 10,000 \\ u_3 = x_3 + 0.25x_2 = 10,000 + 0.25(25,000) &= 16,250 \end{aligned}$$

**2. Action.** Modify the model  $\mathcal{M}$  by implementing the intervention on  $x_1$  (i.e;  $do(x_2 = 30,000)$ ). This leads to a new SCM  $\mathcal{M}_1$  where all incoming edges to the intervened upon variable  $x_2$  are severed and the value of the intervened upon variable  $x_2$  is set to the intervention value £30,000. The resulting SCM  $\mathcal{M}_1$  is shown in Figure 3.2, with structural equations  $\mathcal{F}_1$ .




Figure 3.2: Causal graph  $\mathcal{G}$  of SCM  $\mathcal{M}_1$ .

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= u_1 & (3.2.3) \\ x_2 &= 30,000 \\ x_3 &= u_3 - 0.25x_2 \\ x_4 &= \frac{x_3}{x_1} \end{aligned}$$

**3. Prediction.** Using the updated model  $\mathcal{M}_1$  and values of exogenous variables  $\mathbf{u}$ , calculate the values of the endogenous variables.

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^{\text{SCF}} &= u_1 &= 30,000 & (3.2.4) \\ x_2^{\text{SCF}} &= 30,000 &= 30,000 \\ x_3^{\text{SCF}} &= u_3 - 0.25x_2^{\text{SCF}} = 16,250 - 0.25(30,000) &= 8,750 \\ x_4^{\text{SCF}} &= \frac{x_3^{\text{SCF}}}{x_1^{\text{SCF}}} = \frac{8,750}{30,000} &= 0.292 \end{aligned}$$

Mathematically, we can denote the Action-Abduction-Prediction steps as shown in equation 3.2.5, where  $I$  is the set of indices of intervened on variables,  $\delta_i$  is the action on variable  $i$ ,

$f_i \in \mathbb{F}$  is structural equation of the variable  $i$ ,  $\text{pa}_i$  are the parents of variable  $i$ ,  $I$  is the set of variables that intervened upon (e.g, ) and  $\mathbb{I}$  is the indicator function.

$$x_i^{\text{SCF}} = \mathbb{I}_{i \in I}(x_i + \delta_i) + \mathbb{I}_{i \notin I}\left(x_i + f_i(\text{pa}_i^{\text{SCF}}) - f_i(\text{pa}_i)\right) \quad (3.2.5)$$

To calculate recourse  $\mathbf{x}^*$  with an SCM over all the features within  $\mathbf{x}$ , we need to reformulate the original algorithmic recourse optimisation problem presented in equation 2.1.1. Following Karimi et al. (2021), we replace the minimising the cost of changing features from  $\mathbf{x}$  to  $\mathbf{x}'$  with minimising the cost of *interventions*  $A = \text{do}\{\mathbf{x}_i := \mathbf{x}_i + \delta_i\}_{i=1,\dots,D}$  where  $D$  is the number of features. The updated recourse problem is shown in equation 3.2.6.

$$\begin{aligned} A^* &= \underset{A}{\text{argmin}} \text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, A) \\ \text{s.t. } h(\mathbf{x}^{\text{SCF}}) &= 1, \\ \mathbf{x}_i^{\text{SCF}} &= \mathbb{I}_{i \in I}(\mathbf{x}_i + \delta_i) + \mathbb{I}_{i \notin I}\left(x_i + f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i^{\text{SCF}}) - f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i)\right), \\ A &\in \mathcal{F} \end{aligned} \quad (3.2.6)$$

We define the cost of interventions  $A$  on original features  $\mathbf{x}$  as the sum of the cost of the individual actions. The cost of each individual action is left to be flexible, and can represent a variety of cost functions, such as the  $L_p$ -norm of  $\delta_i$  or a percentile shift based cost function such as that used by Ustun et al. (2019).

$$\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, A) = \sum_{i=1}^D c\left(\text{do}(\mathbf{x}_i := \mathbf{x}_i + \delta_i)\right) \quad (3.2.7)$$

This formulation relies on two key assumptions.

**Assumption 1.** The interventions are structural (hard) interventions, where after intervening on a variable, all incoming edges to its corresponding node in the causal graph are severed. If an individual were to intervene on savings ( $x_2$ ) (perhaps by selling their car or borrowing from family), then we assume that they then stop saving a proportion of their income (severing the edge between  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ ).

**Assumption 2.** Interventions on multiple variables are carried out simultaneously. Given an intervention  $A = [\text{£}32,000, \text{£}27,500, \text{£}10,000, 1/3]^T$ , it is assumed that salary as increased at the same time as savings, as opposed to taking place sequentially.

### 3.2.1 Soft (Parametric) Interventions

In many cases where recourse is provided, such as credit scoring, it is unlikely that intervening on a variable leads to all incoming edges to its corresponding node in the causal graph being severed - a violation of assumption 1. Intervening on savings is unlikely to lead to an individual stopping saving their salary. Likewise, intervening on body fat levels through liposuction does not lead to diet having no causal effect on body fat levels. Structural (hard) interventions are typically used in randomised control trials. For example, in a medical trial, patients are assigned to either to receive either a treatment or a placebo. Any other variables that may have caused the patient to receive a treatment or not now

have no causal effect, as in carrying out the trial we simply assign the patient to receive either the treatment or a placebo.

In the cases where assumption 1 is violated, we can then represent the interventions as soft (or parametric) interventions, which do not result in severing of incoming edges (Eberhardt and Scheines, 2007). After the soft (parametric) intervention, we denote the resulting value of  $\mathbf{x}$  after the intervention as  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}$ , the *parametric counterfactual*, which is defined below.

$$x_i^{\text{PCF}} = \mathbb{I}_{i \in I} \delta_i + \left( x_i + f_i(\text{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}}) - f_i(\text{pa}_i) \right) \quad (3.2.8)$$

As the majority of interventions which take place in the context of algorithmic recourse, such as increasing savings and re-taking an test such as the GMAT/GRE (in the case of recourse for postgraduate admissions) do not tend to result in the severing of incoming edges such as the proportion of income saved and the effect of additional revision on test scores, soft interventions are implemented in this thesis. Using soft interventions results in an updated causal recourse problem shown below in equation 3.2.9.

$$\begin{aligned} A^* &= \underset{A}{\operatorname{argmin}} \operatorname{cost}(\mathbf{x}, A) \\ \text{s.t. } h(\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}) &= 1, \\ \mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}} &= \mathbb{I}_{i \in I} \delta_i + \left( \mathbf{x}_i + f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}}) - f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i) \right), \\ A &\in \mathcal{F} \end{aligned} \quad (3.2.9)$$

### 3.2.2 Sequential Interventions

Assumption 2 of the causal recourse problem formulation in 3.2.5 is that all interventions occur simultaneously. Picture a scenario where an individual is rejected from a PhD program, and the recourse interventions are to gain more research experience (potentially through a pre-doctoral fellowship or research assistant position) and obtain a more favourable letter of recommendation. In the real world, it is likely that these actions will be carried out sequentially, where research experience is obtained first and the letter of recommendation is second (as the professor for whom the applicant is conducting their research under will likely be the author of the letter of recommendation), as opposed to occurring simultaneously.

Using equation 3.2.8, the order of the intervention does not affect the counterfactual values  $x_i^{\text{PCF}}$ , but can affect the cost of actions  $A$ .

**Proposition 1.** *In a sequential intervention setting with  $n$  separate interventions where  $x_i$  and  $x_j$  are intervened upon, if the cost of individual interventions  $c(\text{do}(x_i := x_i + \delta_i))$  depends on the value of  $x_i$  and  $x_i$  is a descendent of  $x_j$ , then the ordering of the sequential interventions affects the total cost of the  $n$  sequential interventions.*

Potentially worth showing how  $f_i(\text{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}})$  in one intervention is cancelled out by  $f_i(\text{pa}_i)$  in the next intervention

*Proof.* The values of  $x_i$  after an intervention on  $x_i$  and intervening on  $x_j$  are shown below.

$$x_i^{\text{PCF}_i} = x_i + \delta_i \quad (3.2.10)$$

$$x_i^{\text{PCF}_j} = x_i + f_i(\text{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}}) - f_i(\text{pa}_i) \quad (3.2.11)$$

As the cost of individual interventions depends on the value of  $x_i$  before intervention, the cost of intervening on  $x_i$  first depends on the value  $x_i$  whereas the cost of intervening on  $x_i$  second depends on the value  $x_i + f_i(\text{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}}) - f_i(\text{pa}_i)$  (the value after intervening on  $x_j$ ,

seen in equation 3.2.11). This results in different costs for the intervention on  $x_i$  for the different orderings.

As  $x_j$  is a descendant of  $x_i$ , the intervention on  $x_i$  has no effect on  $x_j^{\text{PCF}_i}$  and both intervening on  $x_j$  first or second leads to the same cost for the intervention on  $x_j$ .

As the total cost is the sum of the costs of each intervention and the costs for the interventions on  $x_i$  are different for each ordering and the intervention on  $x_j$  are the same for each ordering, then the total cost for the two orderings of sequential interventions are different.  $\square$

Make this more maths-y and potentially add a worked example

To take into account the potential effects of different orderings on the costs, we denote interventions as an ordered set  $A = \{(\mathbf{S}, \text{do}\{\mathbf{x}_i := \mathbf{x}_i + \delta_i\}_{i=1, \dots, D})\}$  where  $\mathbf{S}$  is a permutation of the set  $\{1, \dots, D\}^N$  and represents the ordering of the intervention. Given this updated definition of  $A$ , the causal recourse formulation stays the same as shown in 3.2.9.

To replace  $o_i$  with a permutation set?

### 3.3 Differentiable Sorting

In order to solve equation 3.2.9 with sequential interventions, we need to optimise for an ordering of interventions. With  $D$  features, there are  $D!$  different orderings (i.e. permutations of the set  $\{1, \dots, D\}$ ) and equation 3.2.9 becomes a combinatorial optimisation problem.

Is this NP-hard?

I think this is true, to check

In order to transform the combinatorial optimisation problem to a continuous optimisation problem, we can first define a vector  $O \in \mathbb{R}^D$ , which can be optimised using continuous heuristics such as gradient descent. From  $O$ , we can recover  $S$  through the transformation  $S = \text{argsort}(O)$ , where  $\text{argsort}(O)$  returns the indexes of  $O$  that sorts  $O$  in ascending order. By optimising for  $O$ , we indirectly optimise the ordering  $S$  as  $S$  is defined as  $S = \text{argsort}(O)$ .

However, the operation  $\text{argsort}$  (a piecewise-constant function) is not differentiable. As a solution, we replace the  $\text{argsort}$  operator with the **SoftSort** operator, a continuous relaxation of the  $\text{argsort}$  operator (Prillo and Eisenschlos, 2020).

For a given permutation (i.e., ordering)  $\pi \in \{1, \dots, D\}^D$ , we can also express the permutation  $\pi$  as a permutation matrix  $P_\pi \in \{0, 1\}^{D \times D}$ . We can represent  $P_\pi$  mathematically as a square matrix with values as shown in equation 3.3.1. For example, the permutation matrix of the permutation  $\pi = [3, 1, 2]^T$  is shown in equation 3.3.2.

$$P_\pi[i, j] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } j = \pi_i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.3.1)$$

$$\pi = [3, 1, 2]^T \implies P_\pi = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (3.3.2)$$

**SoftSort** defines a continuous relaxation for  $P_{\text{argsort}(O)}$ , defined in equation 3.3.3, where  $d$  is a differentiable (almost everywhere) semi-metric function and  $\tau > 0$  is a temperature parameter that controls the degree of approximation. For the experiments in this thesis,  $d(x, y) = |x - y|$  has been used.

$$\text{SoftSort}_\tau^d(O) = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{-d(\text{sort}(O)\mathbb{1}^T, \mathbb{1}O^T)}{\tau}\right) \quad (3.3.3)$$

The value of the semi-metric function  $d$  is larger when  $\text{sort}(O)[i]$  is close to  $O[j]$  and smaller when  $\text{sort}(O)[i]$  is far from  $O[j]$ . The **softmax** function is applied row-wise, meaning that the larger the value of semi-metric function  $d$  compared to other values, the larger the value of  $\text{SoftSort}[i, j]$ . A larger temperature parameter  $\tau > 0$  leads to the values of  $d$  moving closer together and, after the **softmax**, the values of  $\text{SoftSort}[i, j]$  become more evenly distributed, compared to the true  $P_{\text{argsort}(O)}$ , which is binary (i.e., very unevenly distributed). Therefore, the larger the value of  $\tau$ , the more approximate **SoftSort** becomes. As  $\tau \rightarrow 0$ ,  $\text{SoftSort}_\tau^d(O) \rightarrow P_{\text{argsort}(O)}$ .

A visual representation can be seen below of  $P_{\text{argsort}(O)}$  and  $\text{SoftSort}_1^{| \cdot |}(O)$  can be seen below for  $O = [2, 5, 4]^T$ .

$$O = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 5 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix} \implies P_{\text{argsort}(O)} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad (3.3.4)$$

$$\text{SoftSort}_1^{| \cdot |}(O) = \text{softmax}\left(- \begin{bmatrix} |5-2| & |5-5| & |5-4| \\ |4-2| & |4-5| & |4-4| \\ |2-2| & |2-5| & |2-4| \end{bmatrix}\right) = \begin{bmatrix} 0.04 & \mathbf{0.70} & 0.26 \\ 0.09 & 0.24 & \mathbf{0.67} \\ \mathbf{0.85} & 0.04 & 0.11 \end{bmatrix} \quad (3.3.5)$$

As **SoftSort** is the combination of the **softmax** function (which is differentiable), the semi-metric  $d$  (which is differentiable almost everywhere) and the **sort** function (which is differentiable almost everywhere), this leads to **SoftSort** being differentiable (almost everywhere).

The values of the matrix that **SoftSort** produces, such as in equation 3.3.5, can be interpreted *loosely* as the probability that the  $i^{\text{th}}$  element of  $\pi_{\text{argsort}(O)}$  is  $j$ .

When incorporating **SoftSort** into the the causal recourse problem defined in equation 3.2.9, we take the maximum ‘probability’ in each row as the ordering  $S$ , as opposed to weighting the costs of differing orderings by their ‘probabilities’.

### 3.4 Generating Recourse

To generate recourse, we need to solve the below constrained optimisation problem from equation 3.2.9, where  $A$  is the ordered set  $A = \{(\mathbf{S}, \text{do}\{\mathbf{x}_i := \mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\delta}_i\}_{i=1,\dots,D})\}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} A^* &= \underset{A}{\text{argmin}} \text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, A) \\ \text{s.t. } & h(\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}) = 1, \\ & \mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}} = \mathbb{I}_{i \in I} \boldsymbol{\delta}_i + \left( \mathbf{x}_i + f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}}) - f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i) \right), \\ & A \in \mathcal{F} \end{aligned} \quad (3.4.1)$$

To solve this problem, we convert the problem from a constrained optimisation problem to a unconstrained optimisation problem and solve using gradient descent. We make use



of Lagrange multipliers to reach the problem formulation as a min-max objective with constraint that the classifier scores the updated feature values  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}$  with a score of at least 0.5 (this can be changed for a given classifier score).

$$\min_{A \in \mathcal{F}} \max_{\lambda} \sum_{i=1}^D \text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, A) - \lambda \left( h(\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}) - 0.5 \right) \quad (3.4.2)$$

This expression is then optimised using gradient descent where in each epoch, a gradient descent step is taken for  $\lambda$  and then another gradient step is taken for  $A$ . The expression is optimised until  $h(\mathbf{x}^{\text{SCF}})$  converges to 0.5.

Once the optimisation has converged, we are left with optimal actions  $A^*$  for a given classifier  $h$ , cost function  $\text{cost}$  and structural causal model  $\mathcal{M}$ . From the optimal actions, we can obtain the structural counterfactual feature values  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}$ . It is these feature values that are presented to the negatively classified individuals, as opposed to the actions themselves.

We only present  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}$  because, whilst we know that  $h(\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}) = 1$ , we cannot guarantee that  $h(\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}) = 1$  unless there is perfect knowledge of the structural causal model. To demonstrate this, we will re-use the SCM from equation 3.2.1, which we denote as  $\mathcal{M}^{\text{TRUE}}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= u_1 & u_1 &\sim N(30, 5) \\ x_2 &= u_2 + 0.5x_1 & u_2 &\sim N(20, 10) \\ x_3 &= u_3 - 0.25x_2 & u_3 &\sim \text{Uniform}(0, 20) \\ x_4 &= \frac{x_3}{x_1} \end{aligned} \quad (3.4.3)$$

Suppose the true SCM was misspecified and we instead used  $\mathcal{M}^{\text{FALSE}}$ , which is the same as  $\mathcal{M}^{\text{TRUE}}$ , with the exception of the relationship between  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  (income and savings). In  $\mathcal{M}^{\text{FALSE}}$ , the relationship is shown below.

$$x_2 = u_2 + x_1 \quad (3.4.4)$$

For an individual with original features  $[30, 25, 10, 1/3]^T$ , where  $h$  is a linear classifier with bias  $b = 0$  and weights  $w = [0.2, 0.2, -1.25, -3]$ , they are initially negatively classified (8% of approval). Using  $\mathcal{M}^{\text{FALSE}}$ , they are provided actions  $\text{do}(\mathbf{x}_1 = 35)$ , which results in  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{SCF}} = [35, 30, 8.75, 0.25]^T$  and would result in a positive classification (79% chance of approval). However, as  $\mathcal{M}^{\text{FALSE}}$  is a misspecified SCM, the true structural counterfactual from  $\text{do}(\mathbf{x}_1 = 35)$  is  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{SCF}} = [35, 27.5, 9.375, 0.27]^T$ , which results in a negative classification (49% chance of approval). Karimi et al. (2020) provide a more formal proof that, that if the true SCM is not known, then recourse cannot be guaranteed when only providing interventions.

expand this explanation, is a bit too dense

## 4 Cost Learning

At the beginning of chapter 3, we noted that the cost function used in the literature is typically of the form  $c(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') = (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')^2$ . Chapter 3 dealt with one of the limitations of this cost function - that it does not take into account the downstream effects of changing one feature on other features. In this chapter, we deal with another limitation of cost functions of this form - they fail to take into account user preferences over how difficult to manipulate different features are. For example, picture a scenario where an individual is applying for a PhD and is provided with recourse. They are asked to increase their GRE<sup>1</sup> quantitative reasoning score and produce more academic work (i.e., published papers). It is likely that increasing your GRE quantitative score is more easily mutable than producing additional published papers, which take considerable time and effort.

There do exist standard cost functions which take into account user preference, for example a quadratic form cost function  $c(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') = (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')^T \mathbf{M} (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}')$  where  $\mathbf{M}$  is a fixed, known, positive semi-definite square matrix (Bechavod et al., 2022). However,  $\mathbf{M}$  must be selected in advance of generating recourse. In this chapter, we propose a methodology for *learning* user preferences.

Explain how  $\mathbf{M}$  encodes user preference

[TO RE-WRITE THE ABOVE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTRODUCTION]

### 4.1 Learning from Revealed Preferences

Revealed preference theory (Samuelson, 1938, 1948) is an economic theory that states that if a consumer is offered a bundle of goods  $x$  and a bundle of goods  $y$  both within a budget set  $B$  and the consumer chooses  $x$  over  $y$ , then  $x$  is preferred to  $y$ . From the consumer's decision to purchase bundle  $x$  over bundle  $y$ , the consumer *reveals* their (normative) *preferences* over  $x$  and  $y$ .

Rewrite this and expand, potentially state was WARP and SARP are.

We can use this idea to learn individuals' revealed preferences over feature mutability. Whilst humans are not able to describe their own preferences mathematically, they are able to express their preferences when given limited options to choose from. We propose to ask negatively classified individual a series of questions. In each question, individuals are asked to compare two sets of ordered actions  $A^1$  and  $A^2$  and responds with whichever one is least costly. If  $A^1$  is preferred to  $A^2$ . We can use this information to parameterise a cost function which takes into account user preference.

Whilst when recourse is finally provided after costs have been learned, it is provided in the form of an alternative vector of features  $\mathbf{x}^*$ , note that we propose to ask the individuals to compare two sets of ordered actions. This is because there are many combinations of different actions and orderings that would result in the same alternative vector of features  $\mathbf{x}'$ . The deployer of the model (i.e., the digital bank in the credit scoring setting) does not observe the which actions the individuals would take in order to change their feature values from  $\mathbf{x}$  to  $\mathbf{x}'$ . As the deployer of the model does not observe how much each feature would have been intervened upon, it becomes very difficult to learn how relatively mutable each feature

<sup>1</sup>The [Graduate Record Examination](#) (GRE) is a standardised test that is an admissions requirement for some Masters and PhD programmes.

is.

A demonstration of one of the pairwise comparisons that users are asked to evaluate are shown in Figure 4.1. We envision that users are asked to evaluate these comparisons in an online system, where they must answer the pairwise comparisons in order for recourse to be generated and presented to the users.

| Action Set 1                                    | Action Set 2                                    |
|---|---|
| 1. SALARY $\rightarrow$ £70,000<br><i>then</i>  | 1. SAVINGS $\rightarrow$ £45,000<br><i>then</i> |
| 2. SAVINGS $\rightarrow$ £52,000<br><i>then</i> | 2. DEBT $\rightarrow$ £5,000<br><i>then</i>     |
| 3. DEBT $\rightarrow$ £7,000                    | 3. SALARY $\rightarrow$ £65,000                 |

*Question for user:*

Which of the above sets of actions are easier to complete?

☐ Action Set 1

☐ Action Set 2

Figure 4.1: Hypothetical pairwise comparison a user is asked to respond to.

We assume that, *on average*, users have perfect knowledge of the SCM when evaluating which of the sets of actions they find least costly. Knowledge of the underlying structural causal model is crucial when evaluating actions, as actions may have causal effects of other variables and will affect the cost of other actions. For the same user preferences, the cost of the same actions could have different costs if there is a different underlying structural causal model. Consider a two variable SCM with income causing savings. In the first case, income has a very large positive effect on savings, and in the second case, income has a small positive effect on savings. In both cases the actions are to first increase income by £10,000 and then increase savings by £10,000. The cost of increasing income is the same in both cases, but the cost of increase savings is lower in the first case, as there is a large downstream effect of the increase in income on savings, meaning the additional amount to save is lower, and therefore, less costly in the first case.

justify this - feels a bit like an extension of rational choice theory except that it relates to the real world as opposed to their own preferences

## 4.2 Cost Learning Formulation

We now formulate the cost learning problem, where there are  $N$  individuals who are each presented with  $K$  pairwise comparisons. In each comparison, each individual compares two sets of ordered actions ( $A^1, A^2$ ). We record the response of the  $n^{\text{th}}$  individual to their  $k^{\text{th}}$  comparison as  $y_{kn}$ , which is defined below, where  $\mathbf{x}_n$  represents the  $n^{\text{th}}$  individuals' original features.

$$y_{kn} = \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } A_{kn}^1 \text{ preferred to } A_{kn}^2 \\ +1 & \text{if } A_{kn}^2 \text{ preferred to } A_{kn}^1 \end{cases} \quad (4.2.1)$$

### 4.2.1 Perfect Knowledge of the Structural Causal Model

Let us first consider the case where both the deployer of the model and the users have perfect knowledge of the underlying SCM  $\mathcal{M}$ . In this case, the individual  $k$  has a cost function  $\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, A | \beta_k, \mathcal{F})$ , parameterised by  $\mathcal{F}$ , the corresponding structural equations of the SCM  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\beta_k$ , a vector which represents how easily mutable each feature is. As

the model deployer has perfect knowledge of the SCM, they do not need to learn (or approximate)  $\mathcal{F}$ . The model deployer's task become to learn a  $\beta_i$  for each individual which represents each users' preferences (of how mutable each feature is) that explains as many of the individuals' responses as possible. We denote the model deployers' predicted response as  $\hat{y}_{kn}$ , which is defined below, where  $\lambda$  is a hyperparameter regularising for 'confidence' of the predictions. As true values  $y_{kn} \in \{-1, 1\}$ , the hyperbolic tangent function is used to squash the predicted values  $\hat{y}_{kn}$  into  $[-1, 1]$ .

$$\hat{y}_{kn} = \tanh \left( \lambda \left( \text{cost}(\mathbf{x}_n, A_{kn}^1 | \beta_k, \mathcal{F}) - \text{cost}(\mathbf{x}_n, A_{kn}^2 | \beta_k, \mathcal{F}) \right) \right) \quad (4.2.2)$$

The model deployer's task can be achieved through the below objective, where there are  $K$  individuals and  $N$  pairwise comparisons and  $\ell(y, \hat{y}) = \max[0, 1 - y\hat{y}]$  represents the hinge loss.

$$\beta^* = \underset{\beta}{\operatorname{argmin}} \frac{1}{KN} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{n=1}^N \ell(y_{kn}, \hat{y}_{kn}) + \underbrace{\lambda \|\beta_k\|_2}_{\text{L2 regularisation}} \quad (4.2.3)$$

This is an unconstrained optimised problem that can be optimised using gradient descent. In order to avoid overfitting to responses of the sample of the negatively classified individuals who answer the pairwise comparisons, L2 regularisation is also added to the objective function.

#### 4.2.2 Linear Approximation of the Structural Causal Model

Now we consider the (more realistic) case where the model deployer does not have perfect knowledge of the structural causal model. In this case, the model deployer learns both the user preferences  $\beta_k$  as well as an approximation of the structural equations  $\mathcal{F}$ .

In this case, model deployer knows neither the form of the structural equations  $\mathcal{F}$  nor the parameters of the equations. For example, the true structural equations could be linear, as shown below for a three variable SCM.

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= u_1 & u_1 &\sim N(\mu_1, \sigma_1^2) \\ x_2 &= ax_1 + u_2 & u_2 &\sim N(\mu_2, \sigma_2^2) \\ x_3 &= bx_1 + cx_2 + u_3 & u_3 &\sim N(\mu_3, \sigma_3^2) \end{aligned} \quad (4.2.4)$$

The structural equations could also be a more complex non-linear set of equations. An example is shown below.

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= u_1 & u_1 &\sim N(\mu_1, \sigma_1^2) \\ x_2 &= ax_1 + bx_1^2 + u_2 & u_2 &\sim N(\mu_2, \sigma_2^2) \\ x_3 &= \frac{cx_1}{1 + \exp(dx_2)} + u_3 & u_3 &\sim N(\mu_3, \sigma_3^2) \end{aligned} \quad (4.2.5)$$

The model deployer knows neither the form of the equations nor the parameters (e.g,  $a, b, c, d$  in the above example). As a solution to this problem, we learn a *linear approximation* of the SCM<sup>2</sup>.

In the linear approximation of the SCM, each variable is modelled as a linear combination of the other variable. We can represent the parameters of the linear approximation of the SCM as a square matrix  $W$ , where each element of the matrix represents  $\frac{\partial x_j}{\partial x_i}$ . As each variable  $x_j$  is a linear combination of the other variables  $x_{-j}$ ,  $\frac{\partial x_j}{\partial x_i}$  will be a scalar (and will be 0 if  $x_j$  has no causal effect on  $x_i$ ). For the linear SCM described in equation 4.2.4, the parameters  $W$  can be described as shown below. It can be thought of as a weighted adjacency matrix, where the weights are the marginal effects of  $x_j$  on  $x_i$ .

$$W = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & a & ab + c \\ 0 & 1 & c \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad (4.2.6)$$

With a linear approximation of the SCM, the model deployer's task is now to learn the parameters  $W$  and user preferences  $\beta_k$ . We add  $W$  in to the objective function as follows.

$$\beta^*, W^* = \underset{\beta, W}{\operatorname{argmin}} \frac{1}{KN} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{n=1}^N \ell(y_{kn}, \hat{y}_{kn}) + \underbrace{\lambda_1 \|\beta_k\|_2 + \lambda_2 \|W\|_2}_{\text{L2 regularisation}} \quad (4.2.7)$$

We additionally restrict  $W$  such that the diagonal is fixed at 1 - meaning that an intervention of size  $\delta_i$  on variable  $i$  has a causal effect of  $\delta_i$ . For example, if we increased salary from £30,000 to £35,000 ( $\delta_i = £5,000$ ), then income after the intervention is £35,000. It does not lead to downstream (causal) effects that result in salary changing to any value other than £35,000 ( $x_i + \delta_i$ ).

### 4.2.3 Noisy Responses

In the two previous set-ups the model deployer learns  $\beta_k$  (and  $W$ ) from the responses of the negatively classified individuals, who have perfect knowledge of their own preferences  $\beta_k$  and the true SCM  $\mathcal{M}$ . However, in reality, often responses to such questions can be noisy and it is highly unlikely that individuals actually have perfect knowledge of the SCM. We now relax these two assumptions. First, we assume that users only know the SCM up to some noise. This means that, when evaluating which of the sets of actions  $A^1$  and  $A^2$  they prefer, they assume that the downstream (causal) effect of each action within the set of actions is a noisy version of the true downstream effect. If we assume that this noise is drawn from a probability distribution with mean 0 then, *on average*, users have perfect knowledge of the true SCM. Secondly, we assume that individuals additionally evaluate their preferences with some noise (they are not able to perfectly evaluate which of the sets of actions they would prefer perfectly given their noisy belief of the SCM as some noise is added to the decision making process).

To add noise to the users' knowledge of the SCM, after an intervention on  $x_i$ , we add noise to the other variables  $x_{-i}$  after the prediction step in Abduction-Action-Prediction steps

<sup>2</sup>A linear approximation of the SCM is used in this thesis largely for its simplicity. However a more flexible specification of the approximation of the SCM, such as kernel ridge regression, could be used in future works.

(Pearl et al., 2016) (see section 3.2 for an explanation of the Abduction-Action-Prediction steps). We assume that the noise is drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation  $\sigma_F$ . We denote the SCM that the users evaluate the effects of interventions with as  $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$  with associated structural equations  $\tilde{\mathcal{F}}$ .

To add noise to the users' evaluation of their own preferences, we calculate the ratio of the costs of the sets of actions  $A^1$  and  $A^2$  and then add some noise. Again, we assume that this noise is Gaussian with mean 0 and with standard deviation  $\sigma_B$ . Now, the response of the users is defined as follows.

$$r = \frac{\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}_n, A_{kn}^1 | \beta_k, \tilde{\mathcal{F}})}{\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}_n, A_{kn}^2 | \beta_k, \tilde{\mathcal{F}})} + N(0, \sigma_B^2) \quad (4.2.8)$$

$$y_{kn} = \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } r \leq 1 \\ +1 & \text{if } r > 1 \end{cases}$$

With these updated noisy responses, the optimisation problem still remains the same from the point of the model deployer. However, given the added noise, the responses of users may not always reflect the true SCM and true preferences of the users. Therefore, the role of regularisation becomes more important.

### 4.3 Cost Function

The cost function of actions  $A$  and user preferences over feature mutability  $\beta_k$  for the individual  $k$  takes the below form, where  $\beta \in \mathbb{R}^D$  and  $D$  is the number of features<sup>3</sup>. Squaring the intervention  $\delta_i$  on variable  $i$  has several desirable properties. Notably that (a), the cost is always greater than or equal to 0, (b) an intervention of  $\delta_i = 0$  results in a cost of 0 (i.e., doing nothing has no associated cost) and (c) larger interventions result in (polynomially) increasing costs, meaning that an intervention of  $2a$  on variable  $x_i$  has more than twice the cost of  $a$ .

$$\text{cost}(A, \beta) = \sum_{i=1}^D \beta_i \delta_i^2 \quad (4.3.1)$$

---

<sup>3</sup>The order of the interventions in  $A$  does not matter in this case, as the cost function only depends on  $\delta$ , not  $\mathbf{x}$  (see Proposition 1)

## 5 Experiments

In this chapter, we evaluate how effective our learned cost function is, which is described below, where  $D$  is the number of features,  $A$  is the set of actions and the resulting value of  $\mathbf{x}$  after the interventions is  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cost}(A, \beta_k, \mathcal{F}) &= \sum_{i=1}^D \delta_i \beta_{ki}^2 \\ A &= \{(\mathbf{S}, \text{do}\{\mathbf{x}_i := \mathbf{x}_i + \delta_i\}_{i=1, \dots, D})\} \\ \mathbf{x}^{\text{PCF}} &= \mathbb{I}_{i \in I} \delta_i + \left( \mathbf{x}_i + f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}}) - f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i) \right) \end{aligned} \tag{5.0.1}$$

### 5.1 End-to-End Methodology

The end to end methodology for generating recourse with a learned cost is shown in Figure 5.1, and more details on each of the steps in the methodology are described below.




Figure 5.1: End-to-End Methodology

1. **Classify individuals.** Individuals with features  $\mathbf{X}$  are assessed by a classifier and are classified either positively (e.g., loan approved, admission acceptance) or negatively (e.g., loan rejected, admission rejected). In this thesis, logistic regression has been used, largely for simplicity. However, as an augmented Lagrangian gradient descent optimisation is used to generate recourse (see section 3.4), any differentiable classifier could be used instead of logistic regression.
2. **Generate ordered actions to evaluate.** We randomly generate actions for each negatively classified individual and associated randomly generated orderings. This is another area for future work, where an online or Bayesian approach could be used to generate recourse actions in order to maximise information gain, such as the approach used in De Toni et al. (2023).
3. **Users evaluate ordered actions.** Using the cost function described in equation 5.0.1 with noisy user preferences  $\tilde{\beta}_k$  and noisy SCM  $\tilde{\mathcal{F}}$ , users evaluate which of the ordered actions they are presented with they prefer.
4. **Learn preferences  $\hat{\beta}_k$  and SCM approximation parameters  $\hat{W}$ .** The model deployer then learns user preferences  $\hat{\beta}_k$  and a linear approximation of the true SCM  $\hat{W}$  using the optimisation presented in section 4.2.
5. **Generate recourse using  $\hat{\beta}_k$  and  $\hat{W}$ .** The model deployer then generates recourse  $\mathbf{X}^*$  for the negatively classified users.

## 5.2 Synthetic Data

We create synthetic SCMs, from which we sample our data  $\mathbf{X}$ . We simulate two different SCMs, the first being a linear SCM and the second a non-linear SCM. In both cases, we assign individuals to have the same randomly generated feature mutability  $\beta$  plus some noise. This means that individuals tend to have similar preferences, but do not have the same preferences.

### 5.2.1 Linear SCM

Shown below are the structural equations of the linear SCM  $\mathcal{M}_{\text{LIN}}$  as well as the associated causal graph.

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_1 &= u_1 & u_1 &\sim N(0, 1) \\
 x_2 &= u_2 + 0.5x_1 & u_2 &\sim N(0, 1) \\
 x_3 &= u_3 + 0.2x_1 + 0.3x_2 & u_3 &\sim N(0, 0.5) \\
 y &\sim \text{Bernoulli}(\sigma(0.1x_1 + 0.2x_2 + 0.3x_3))
 \end{aligned} \tag{5.2.1}$$




Figure 5.2: Linear SCM  $\mathcal{M}_{\text{LIN}}$

### 5.2.2 Non-Linear SCM


Shown below are the structural equations of the non-linear SCM  $\mathcal{M}_{\text{NL}}$  as well as the associated causal graph.

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_1 &= u_1 & u_1 &\sim N(0, 1) \\
 x_2 &= u_2 - \frac{2}{1 + x_1^2} & u_2 &\sim N(0, 1) \\
 x_3 &= u_3 + 0.2x_1 + 0.01x_2^2 & u_3 &\sim N(0, 0.5) \\
 x_4 &= u_4 + 2x_3 + 3x_1x_2 & u_4 &\sim N(0, 0.5) \\
 x_5 &= u_5 + 0.4x_1 & u_5 &\sim N(0, 0.5) \\
 y &\sim \text{Bernoulli}(\sigma(0.1x_1 + 0.2x_2 + 0.3x_3 + 0.4x_4 + 0.5x_5))
 \end{aligned} \tag{5.2.2}$$

## 5.3 Evaluation Criteria

To how useful the learned user preferences  $\hat{\beta}_k$  and SCM approximation parameters  $\hat{W}$  are, we need to be able to evaluate  $\text{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}^*)$ , where  $\mathbf{x}^*$  represents the recourse generated.



Figure 5.3: Non-Linear SCM  $\mathcal{M}_{\text{NL}}$ 

To do this, we propose simply minimise the squared distance between the recourse  $\mathbf{x}^*$  and  $\mathbf{x}'$ , which represents the parametric counterfactual from ordered actions  $A$  under the true SCM. The objective function that is optimised is shown below.

$$A^* = \underset{A}{\operatorname{argmin}} (\mathbf{x}^* - \mathbf{x}')^2 \quad (5.3.1)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} A &= \{(\mathbf{S}, \operatorname{do}\{\mathbf{x}'_i := \mathbf{x}_i + \boldsymbol{\delta}_i\}_{i=1,\dots,D})\} \\ \mathbf{x}'^{\text{PCF}} &= \mathbb{I}_{i \in I} \boldsymbol{\delta}_i + \left( \mathbf{x}'_i + f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i^{\text{PCF}}) - f_i(\mathbf{pa}_i) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (5.3.2)$$

This can be optimised using gradient descent. Once we have obtained ordered actions  $A^*$  that lead to our recourse  $\mathbf{x}^*$  under the true SCM, we can calculate  $\operatorname{cost}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}')$  as  $\operatorname{cost}(A^*, \beta_k, \mathcal{F})$  as defined in equation 5.0.1, where  $\beta_k$  represents the true user preferences and  $\mathcal{F}$  are the true structural equations.

## 5.4 Results

In this section, we present the results of our analysis.

=====

[TO CLEAN UP]

### 5.4.1 Noiseless responses with perfect knowledge of the causal graph

Ground truth  $\beta$ : [0.5, 0.333, 0.1667]

Learned  $\beta$  : [0.4965, 0.3355, 0.1681]

### 5.4.2 Noiseless responses with imperfect knowledge of the causal graph

Ground truth  $\beta$ : [0.5, 0.333, 0.1667]

Learned  $\beta$  : [0.4975, 0.3354, 0.1671]

Ground truth  $W$ :  $\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.5 & 0.2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.3 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$




Figure 5.4: Comparison of the average cost of recourse for learned costs functions compared to the ground truth cost function for the Simple SCM.

$$\text{Learned } W: \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.4864 & 0.2136 \\ 0.0033 & 0 & 0.3221 \\ 0.0008 & 0.0086 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

#### 5.4.3 Noisy responses

So far, only noisy responses have been added (not noise knowledge of the causal graph)

**With noise distribution  $N(0, 0.1)$ :**

Ground truth  $\beta$ : [0.5, 0.333, 0.1667]

Learned  $\beta$  : [0.4917, 0.3418, 0.1665]

$$\text{Ground truth } W: \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.5 & 0.2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.3 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{Learned } W: \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.5424 & 0.1683 \\ -0.0070 & 0 & 0.3950 \\ 0.0166 & -0.0007 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

**With noise distribution  $N(0, 0.5)$ :**

Ground truth  $\beta$ : [0.5, 0.333, 0.1667]

Learned  $\beta$  : [0.4224, 0.3686, 0.2090]

$$\text{Ground truth } W: \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.5 & 0.2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.3 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{Learned } W: \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.5772 & 0.3522 \\ -0.0062 & 0 & 0.1657 \\ 0.0974 & 0.0459 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

**With noise distribution  $N(0, 2)$ :**

Ground truth  $\beta$ : [0.5, 0.333, 0.1667]

Learned  $\beta$  : [0.4958, 0.2685, 0.2357]

Ground truth  $W$ : 
$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.5 & 0.2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.3 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Learned  $W$ : 
$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.5353 & 0.08712 \\ -0.1487 & 0 & 0.7206 \\ -0.2152 & 0.2409 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

## 6 Conclusion

Conclusion chapter.

# References

- Amin, Kareem, Rachel Cummings, Lili Dworkin, Michael J. Kearns, and Aaron Roth (2015). “Online Learning and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences”. In: *Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, January 25-30, 2015, Austin, Texas, USA*. AAAI Press, pp. 770–776. URL: <http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI15/paper/view/9984> (visited on 07/17/2023) (Cited on page 8).
- Angwin, Julia, Jeff Larson, Lauren Kirchner, and Surya Mattu (2016). *Machine Bias*. ProPublica. URL: <https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing> (visited on 08/28/2023) (Cited on page 3).
- Balcan, Maria-Florina, Amit Daniely, Ruta Mehta, Ruth Uner, and Vijay V. Vazirani (2014). “Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences”. In: *Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, WINE 2014, Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014. Proceedings*. Vol. 8877. Springer, pp. 338–353. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0\\_28](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_28). (Visited on 07/17/2023) (Cited on page 8).
- Bechavod, Yahav, Chara Podimata, Zhiwei Steven Wu, and Juba Ziani (2022). “Information Discrepancy in Strategic Learning”. In: *International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2022, 17-23 July 2022, Baltimore, Maryland, USA*. Vol. 162. PMLR, pp. 1691–1715. URL: <https://proceedings.mlr.press/v162/bechavod22a.html> (Cited on pages 7, 9, 17).
- Beigman, Eyal and Rakesh Vohra (2006). “Learning from Revealed Preference”. In: *Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce*. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 36–42. DOI: [10.1145/1134707.1134712](https://doi.org/10.1145/1134707.1134712). (Visited on 07/17/2023) (Cited on page 8).
- De Toni, Giovanni, Paolo Viappiani, Stefano Teso, Bruno Lepri, and Andrea Passerini (2023). *Personalized Algorithmic Recourse with Preference Elicitation*. DOI: [10.48550/arXiv.2205.13743](https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2205.13743). (Visited on 09/06/2023). preprint (Cited on page 22).
- Dong, Jinshuo, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner, and Zhiwei Steven Wu (2018). “Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences”. In: *Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation*. Ithaca, NY, USA, pp. 55–70. DOI: [10.1145/3219166.3219193](https://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219193) (Cited on page 8).
- Eberhardt, Frederick and Richard Scheines (2007). “Interventions and Causal Inference”. In: *Philosophy of Science* 74.5, pp. 981–995. DOI: [10.1086/525638](https://doi.org/10.1086/525638). (Visited on 08/18/2023) (Cited on page 13).
- Karimi, Amir-Hossein, Gilles Barthe, Bernhard Schölkopf, and Isabel Valera (2022). “A Survey of Algorithmic Recourse: Contrastive Explanations and Consequential Recommendations”. In: *ACM Comput. Surv.* 55.5. DOI: [10.1145/3527848](https://doi.org/10.1145/3527848) (Cited on pages 4, 6, 8).

- Karimi, Amir-Hossein, Bernhard Schölkopf, and Isabel Valera (2021). “Algorithmic Recourse: From Counterfactual Explanations to Interventions”. In: *Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency* (Virtual Event, Canada). New York, NY, USA, pp. 353–362. DOI: [10.1145/3442188.3445899](https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445899) (Cited on pages 10, 12).
- Karimi, Amir-Hossein, Julius von Kügelgen, Bernhard Schölkopf, and Isabel Valera (2020). “Algorithmic Recourse under Imperfect Causal Knowledge: A Probabilistic Approach”. In: *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*. Vol. 33. Curran Associates, Inc., pp. 265–277. URL: <https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2020/hash/02a3c7fb3f489288ae6942498498db20-Abstract.html> (visited on 08/30/2023) (Cited on page 16).
- Kramer, Anna (2022). *The Problems with AI Video Interviews*. Protocol. URL: <https://www.protocol.com/workplace/automated-video-interviews-hirevue-modernhire> (visited on 08/29/2023) (Cited on page 3).
- O’Dwyer, Rachel (2018). *Are You Creditworthy? The Algorithm Will Decide*. Undark Magazine. URL: <https://undark.org/2018/05/07/algorithmic-credit-scoring-machine-learning/> (visited on 08/28/2023) (Cited on page 3).
- Pearl, J., M. Glymour, and N.P. Jewell (2016). *Causal Inference in Statistics: A Primer*. Wiley (Cited on pages 10, 11, 21).
- Prillo, Sebastian and Julian Martin Eisenschlos (2020). “SoftSort: A Continuous Relaxation for the Argsort Operator”. In: *Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2020, 13-18 July 2020, Virtual Event*. Vol. 119. PMLR, pp. 7793–7802. URL: <http://proceedings.mlr.press/v119/prillo20a.html> (visited on 08/20/2023) (Cited on page 14).
- Ramakrishnan, Goutham, Yun Chan Lee, and Aws Albarghouthi (2020). “Synthesizing Action Sequences for Modifying Model Decisions”. In: *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence* 34.04 (04), pp. 5462–5469. DOI: [10.1609/aaai.v34i04.5996](https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i04.5996). (Visited on 08/29/2023) (Cited on page 6).
- Roth, Aaron, Jonathan R. Ullman, and Zhiwei Steven Wu (2016). “Watch and Learn: Optimizing from Revealed Preferences Feedback”. In: *Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2016, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 18-21, 2016*. ACM, pp. 949–962. DOI: [10.1145/2897518.2897579](https://doi.org/10.1145/2897518.2897579) (Cited on page 8).
- Samuelson, Paul (1938). “A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour”. In: *Economica* 5.17, pp. 61–71. DOI: [10.2307/2548836](https://doi.org/10.2307/2548836). (Visited on 08/23/2023) (Cited on page 17).
- Samuelson, Paul (1948). “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference”. In: *Economica* 15.60, pp. 243–253. DOI: [10.2307/2549561](https://doi.org/10.2307/2549561). (Visited on 08/23/2023) (Cited on page 17).
- Ustun, Berk, Alexander Spangher, and Yang Liu (2019). “Actionable Recourse in Linear Classification”. In: *Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Trans-*

- parency*. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 10–19. DOI: [10.1145/3287560.3287566](https://doi.org/10.1145/3287560.3287566). (Visited on 08/19/2023) (Cited on pages [6](#), [9](#), [12](#)).
- Venkatasubramanian, Suresh and Mark Alfano (2020). “The Philosophical Basis of Algorithmic Recourse”. In: *Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency*. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, pp. 284–293. DOI: [10.1145/3351095.3372876](https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372876). (Visited on 08/29/2023) (Cited on page [3](#)).
- Voigt, Paul and Axel von dem Bussche (2017). *The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Practical Guide*. 1st ed. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-319-57959-7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57959-7) (Cited on page [3](#)).
- Zadimoghaddam, Morteza and Aaron Roth (2012). “Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preference”. In: *Internet and Network Economics - 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Liverpool, UK, December 10-12, 2012. Proceedings*. Vol. 7695. Springer, pp. 114–127. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6\\_9](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_9). (Visited on 07/17/2023) (Cited on page [8](#)).