POLS 429: International Terrorism Lecture 27 (04.03.2020): Terrorism Financing

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Overview

- Quick review
- 2 Introduction
- Terrorism Financing Methods
- 4 Issues in Funding
- 5 Extra Material

What we covered last meeting?

- State sponsorship of terrorism: puzzling decisions by both states and terror groups.
- Types of sponsors; Modes of state sponsorship.
- Strategic: cost effective, power projection.
- Ideology: spread belief by nonstate actor.
- Psychological: leader or group.
- Structural: weak capacity (Pakistan), regime type.
- Policy: military action or sanctions (Libva 1980's).

Questions??



Introduction

- Research: how to generate income; and how to move money to support operations.
- Most financial support → raised in a different area than the actual location of the group/ proposed attack.
- Effective terror operations require capability to 'move' money.
- Money transfers → weak spot which states can target to more effectively disrupt the terrorist organization and its operations.

Transfer funds

• Why favor certain methods more than others?

Freeman and Ruehsen (2013)

How to assess methods to transfer funds?

- Volume
 - Electronic large amount in a single transaction.
 - Physical (bulk cash) limited by size and weight.
- Risks
 - Detection: wire transfers versus bulk cash across borders.
 - Anonymity: disclosure of private information.
 - Reliability: wire transfers or bulk cash?



- Convenience: geography/topography elements (tribal region of Afghanistan/Pakistan).
- 2 Simplicity: simple, quick and require minimum skill.
- Ocsts:
 - Official services: (1-10% fee depending on the amounts).
 - Hawalas: 0.2-0.5% on each transaction.
 - Bulk cash: side payments to guards or bribing custom officials.
- Speed: critical factor (ensure financing of ongoing operations).
 - Hawalas are faster than official banks.
 - Bulk cash: distance and number of border crossings.

- 1) Cash couriers.
 - Cash across borders: simplest and oldest way.
 - Usually concealed within the packing of individuals.
 - Limitations: speed, operational security (who 'moves' the money).
 - AQ: using couriers to bring money into Afghanistan or into the US to fund 9.11 attacks. •9.11Funding
 - AQ-Iraq: 70% of budget based on couriers (Europe or Saudi volunteers).
 - Jamaah Islamiya (JI Indonesia) finance attacks in Bali (2002, 2005).

- 2) Informal transfer systems: Hawalas.
 - Money transfer networks (mostly legal), based on traditional roots and ethnic ties.
 - Prevalent where formal banking is less established or if a large ethnic diaspora lives in the area.
 - How it works? → Financing2010
 - Benefits:
 - Speed: completed within 1-2 days.
 - 2 Anonymous: no record, money does not cross borders.
 - 3 Cost: low transaction fees and exchange rates.
 - Onvenient: operate where official banking is less common.



- 3) Money services businesses (MSB).
 - Subjected to the same laws as banks.
 - Less rigid in terms of customer identification details.
 - Feb. 2013: US arrest 4 Somali immigrants trying to fund al-Shabaab.
 - AQ: extensive use of method before and when preparing 9.11.
 - Hezballah money laundering case (Beirut MSBs).

 BeirutCase
 - Benefits:
 - 1 Fast: minutes to complete transaction.
 - Cost: low fees.
 - Low risk of detection.



- 4) Formal Banking.
 - Heavily regulated in most developed countries (especially the west).
 - Require identification and report suspicious money transfers.
 - Banks may be less regulated or heavily monitored (especially bank employees) outside of the western context.
 - ullet 9.11 o system failed to flag actions (legal, 'lost in the crowd').
 - Another version Correspondent accounts (linked to US banks).
 - HSBC US case (2005).

- 5) False trade invoices.
 - Complex laundering method (time-consuming): difficult to detect.
 - Over-invoicing of products and concealing money transfers between locations.
 - Used before 9.11: shipments to Yemen (honey).
 - Commerce Dept. study identify businesses who used this method to finance terrorism.
 - Trade transparency units (TTU): increasing port security and analyzing big data sources to identify suspicious transactions.
 - Benefits:
 - Detection risk is low
 - 2 Convenient.



- 6) High value commodities.
 - Trading of high commodities: gold and diamonds.
 - Easy to transfer and converted to cash.
 - Must be transferred by hand: risks of theft and seizure.
 - Gold: can be reshaped and moved with lower risk of detection.
 - Gold: important cultural value in Middle East and South Asia.
 Makes trades of gold into and from these regions less suspicious.

POLICY OPTIONS

- Increased efforts to monitor financial institutions and share information.
- In most cases → money transfers as part of the overall legitimate traffic of global funds.
- ullet To further tackle these issues o questions about civil liberties.
- How much are we willing to sacrifice our ability to conduct financial business in order to prevent terrorism?

Charities (Asia and Middle East)

- Local organizations → local donations.
- Transnational/regional groups also draw funds from larger charities.
- Common transnational feature: Islam, and collecting donations in Islamic and Arab countries.
- Zakat: Islamic cultural/social tradition to support those in need (social services and education).
- Charities linked to members of *JI* in SE Asia funded the attacks in Bali (2002,2005).

- Engage in criminal activities to finance operations.
- Main incentive: generate a stable stream of funds (compared to donations and charities).
- Benefit: access to multiple (illegal) sources of finances like the black market or illegal trafficking.
- Benefits to crime organizations:
 - Military capabilities to secure their illegal action (security for smuggling drugs, or other high value commodities).
 - ② Financing terrorism → more attacks that destabilize the country and keeps security forces occupied.

Jadoon and Milton (2019)

- Shadow economies: the state's informal economy, all activities that elude official government regulation and taxation.
- Result of illegal activities (drug and commodities trafficking) or tax evasion from legal activities.
- Both nonstate actors operate within these conditions which further incentivize cooperation for their mutual benefits.
- Findings: the greater the size of these shadow economies, more lethal attacks are likely.
- Crime organizations benefit: increasing capacity to consolidate their power and control.
- Terror groups benefit: secure a steady (and growing) source of funding for the long run.



Shadow economies

- A structural perspective: crime-terror cooperation is likely in weak capacity states. Why?
- Weak states are more likely to have informal (shadow) economy.
- 1993 → ELN (Colombia) hired by local drug cartels to attack rivals (using car bombs).
- ullet 1994 o Taliban gained support by securing smugglers and traders along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area.

Shadow economies: Jadoon and Milton (2019)

- Risk of crime-terror nexus: terrorists subject their ideological (and political) mission to cooperate with criminals.
- Argued by "pure ideologists" of terror groups.
- Empirical support for cooperation:
 - Prolong the group's survival.
 - 2 Provide resources that can be distributed to supporters, deflecting the ideological criticism.
- Example: Taliban profits from trafficking in the Afghan border area, and local support in Afghanistan.


Recommended readings

More studies on Terrorism financing:

- Katharine Petrich, "Cows, Charocal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab's Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, (2019), First View.
- Hutchinson, Steven, and Pat O'malley. "A crime—terror nexus? Thinking on some of the links between terrorism and criminality." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30, no. 12 (2007): 1095-1107.


Funding the 9.11 attack

Cash couriers



Funding the 2010 attack in Times Square (NY)

HAWALAS



Hezballah funding scheme

MSBs

