

Round5:
KEM and PKE based on GLWR
Draft Friday 30th November, 2018

Hayo Baan¹, Sauvik Bhattacharya¹, Scott Fluhrer⁵, Oscar Garcia-Morchon¹, Thijs
Laarhoven³, Ludo Tolhuizen¹, Ronald Rietman¹, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen², and
Zhenfei Zhang⁴

¹Philips (Netherlands)

²PQShield (UK)

³TU/e (Netherlands)

⁴Algorand (US)

⁵Cisco (US)

Contents

| | | |
|----------|--|----------|
| 1 | Algorithm Specifications | 4 |
| 1.1 | Design Rationale | 4 |
| 1.1.1 | A Unified Design | 4 |
| 1.1.2 | Parameter choices for optimized performance | 4 |
| 1.1.3 | The Choice of the Ring | 5 |
| 1.2 | Preliminaries | 7 |
| 1.3 | Underlying Problem | 8 |
| 1.4 | Round5 | 9 |
| 1.4.1 | Internal building block: error correction code | 9 |
| 1.4.2 | Internal building block: r5_cpa_pke | 11 |
| 1.4.3 | Submission proposal: r5_cpa_kem | 14 |
| 1.4.4 | Internal building block: r5_cca_kem | 15 |
| 1.4.5 | Submission proposal: r5_cca_pke | 15 |
| 1.4.6 | Proposed configurations | 17 |
| 1.5 | Known Answer Test Values | 19 |
| 1.6 | Expected Security Strength | 19 |
| 1.7 | Analysis with respect to known attacks | 21 |
| 1.7.1 | Preliminaries: SVP Complexities | 22 |
| 1.7.2 | Lattice basis reduction: the core model | 23 |
| 1.7.3 | Lattice-based attacks | 24 |
| 1.7.4 | Primal Attack | 25 |
| 1.7.5 | Dual Attack | 26 |
| 1.7.6 | Hybrid Attack | 27 |
| 1.7.7 | Attacks against Sparse Secrets | 29 |
| 1.7.8 | Pre-computation and Back-door Attacks | 30 |
| 1.8 | Correctness of Round5 | 31 |
| 1.8.1 | Decryption failure analysis | 32 |
| 1.8.2 | Failure probability computation: non-ring parameters | 33 |
| 1.8.3 | Failure probability computation: ring parameters with $\xi(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$ | 34 |
| 1.8.4 | Failure probability computation: ring parameters with $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$ | 34 |
| 1.8.5 | Experimental results | 35 |
| 1.9 | Round5: Configurations, Parameters and Performance | 36 |
| 1.9.1 | Main Configurations of Round5 | 37 |
| 1.9.2 | Round5 parameters for specific use-cases | 38 |
| 1.9.3 | Implementations | 38 |
| 1.9.4 | Development Environment | 39 |
| 1.9.5 | Round5 CPA_KEM: Parameters | 39 |
| 1.9.6 | Round5 CPA_KEM: CPU and Memory Requirements | 45 |
| 1.9.7 | Round5 CCA_PKE: Parameters | 51 |
| 1.9.8 | Round5 CCA_PKE: CPU and Memory Requirements | 56 |
| 1.10 | Advantages and limitations | 61 |

| | | |
|----------|---|-----------|
| A | Formal security of Round5 | 65 |
| A.1 | Deterministic generation of \mathbf{A} | 65 |
| A.2 | Security Definitions | 66 |
| A.3 | Hardness Assumption (Underlying Problem) | 68 |
| A.4 | IND-CPA Security of <code>r5_cpa_pke</code> | 69 |
| A.5 | IND-CPA Security for RLWE-based Round5 variant with different reduction polynomials | 74 |
| A.6 | IND-CPA Security of <code>r5_cpa_kem</code> | 79 |
| A.7 | IND-CCA security of <code>r5_cca_pke</code> | 80 |
| A.8 | Hardness of Sparse-Trinary LWR | 82 |

1 Algorithm Specifications

1.1 Design Rationale

This submission proposes Round5 that consists of algorithms for the key encapsulation mechanism `r5_cpa_kem` and the public-key encryption scheme `r5_cca_pke`. The proposed algorithms fall under the category of lattice-based cryptography, Round5 is a merger of the submissions Round2[11, 12] and HILA5[81, 82]. Like with Round2, the algorithms rely on the General Learning with Rounding (GLWR) problem. In some of its configurations, Round5 uses an error-correcting code based on the one from HILA5 to decrease decryption failure probability, and thus, achieve smaller keys and faster performance.

1.1.1 A Unified Design

A key feature of Round5 is that it has been designed to instantiate the Learning with Rounding (LWR) problem and the Ring LWR (RLWR) problem in a seamless and unified way. This is done by defining the General LWR problem, on which Round5 is based, that can instantiate LWR or RLWR depending on the input parameters. The reasons behind this choice are as follows:

Round5 is adaptive and can be applied to multiple environments. On the one hand, LWR-based algorithms are required by environments in which performance is less of an issue, but security is the priority. In those cases, it is often preferred to not have an additional ring structure (as in ideal lattices [66, 51]). On the other hand, RLWR-based algorithms achieve the best performance in terms of bandwidth and computation so they are better suited for constrained environments with stricter bandwidth requirements, e.g., due to the complexity of message fragmentation or small MTUs.

Round5 reduces code analysis and maintenance since the unified scheme definitions of `r5_cpa_kem` and `r5_cca_pke` instantiate different underlying problems, LWR and RLWR, with the same code.

The unified design enables a migration strategy from ring-based schemes to non-ring schemes from day one of deployment. This makes sure that if vulnerabilities in ring-based problems were found in future, then an alternative secure solution would already be available and could be deployed directly.

An additional advantage of a unified design is that it can be "parametrized" to address the needs of different types of applications. This brings an enormous flexibility. For instance, it is possible to derive specially small configurations applicable to IoT scenarios or it is also possible to derive non-ring configurations with balanced or unbalanced public-key and ciphertext sizes.

1.1.2 Parameter choices for optimized performance

Parameters in GLWR and Round5 are chosen to allow for optimized performance.

- The usage of GLWR, i.e., LWR and RLWR, rather than their LWE counterparts, leads to lower bandwidth requirements in Round5 since fewer bits need to be transmitted per coefficient.
- GLWR avoids sampling of noise, and thus requires the generation of less random data.
- Round5 relies on a definition of GLWR with sparse ternary secrets. This simplifies implementation and reduces the probability of decryption/de-capsulation errors.
- The ring configuration of Round5 relies on the RLWR problem over a cyclotomic ring $\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ with $n + 1$ prime. This problem is well studied: there exist reductions [16, 21] from the RLWE problem [66] to RLWR, and the former is well-studied for the ring in question. Operations over this ring can be mapped to an NTRU [51] ring $\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(x^{n+1} - 1)$ to improve performance.
- In some of its configurations, Round5 uses an f -bit error correcting block code XEf to decrease the failure rate, see Section 1.4.1. The code is built using the same strategy as codes used by TRUNC8 [82] (2-bit correction) and HILA5 [83] (5-bit correction). The main advantage of XEf codes is that they avoid table look-ups and conditions altogether and are therefore resistant to timing attacks. The usage of XEf requires performing the ciphertext computations in the NTRU ring and sparse ternary secrets that are balanced, i.e., contain equally many ones as minus ones. This leads to independent bit failures so that error correction can be applied (Section 1.4.1).
- Round5 allows for a single, *unified* implementation for a wide range of security levels, relying on either LWR or RLWR. The moduli q and p are powers of two. This simplifies the implementation of the rounding function. Similarly, the modular computations can be realized by ignoring the most significant bits.
- Preventing pre-computation attacks requires refreshing the master public parameter \mathbf{A} . However, this can be computationally costly, in particular in the case of LWR. Round5 provides several alternatives for efficiently refreshing \mathbf{A} that are applicable to different use cases.

1.1.3 The Choice of the Ring

In the literature, a common choice of the ring to instantiate an RLWE or RLWR problem is $\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\Phi_{2n}(x)$ where n is a power of 2, so that the $2n$ -th cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_{2n}(x) = x^n + 1$. Examples of RLWE/RLWR key exchange schemes based on the above ring are [26] and [6]. However, requiring that n be a power of 2 narrows the choice of n : it has to be at least 512 for the proper security level so that the underlying lattice problem is hard to solve in practice. While having

$n = 512$ sometimes does not deliver the target security level, the $n = 1024$ choice would be considered an overkill. A sweet spot is $n \approx 700$, which was a common choice made by many proposals, including Kyber [24], NTRUEncrypt [51], NTRU-KEM [55] and more.

The following observations can be made:

- Kyber [24] uses three RLWE instances, each of dimension 256, to achieve $n = 768$ in total. This still limits the choice of n as it has to be a multiple of 256.
- NTRUEncrypt uses the reduction polynomial $x^n - 1$ which is slightly different from a cyclotomic ring, and as suggested by [80], although the NTRU problem remains hard for this ring, the decisional RLWE problem over this ring seems to be easy.

This leads us to use as reduction polynomial the $n + 1$ -th cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_{n+1}(x) = x^n + \dots + x + 1$ with $n + 1$ a prime as in NTRU-KEM [55]. With the resulting ring, there is a wide range of n to choose from, for various security levels. In addition, as shown in [74], decisional RLWE over this ring remains hard for any modulus; this gives us confidence in the underlying design and security of Round5. Note that although operating over the same ring as the NTRU-KEM scheme, Round5 achieves better performance because its key generation algorithm is significantly faster than the NTRU key generation algorithm.

In addition, since decisional RLWE is hard over a prime cyclotomic ring with any modulus [74], we can use any modulus that optimizes our performances. Common choices of the modulus are

- A number theoretical transform (NTT) friendly prime number, such as 12289 in [6];
- A composite number that fits in a data type for modern computers, such as $2^{32} - 1$ in [26];
- A power of 2 that makes modulo operations and integer multiplications efficient, such as 2^{11} in NTRUEncrypt [51].

In our proposal, we consider a prime cyclotomic polynomial ring with a modulus q that is a power of two such that the Φ_{n+1} is irreducible modulo two. As Φ_{n+1} then is irreducible modulo q , the ring $\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ does not have any proper subrings. This choice allows for a smooth implementation of the ring and non-ring cases in the unified scheme. All coefficients of our polynomials and matrices are integers modulo q of less than 16 bits. That is, each coefficient fits in a `uint16_t` type. For intermediate values during computations, overflows can be ignored, as overflowed bits “*mod-ed out*” once the element is lifted back to \mathbb{Z}_q . In particular, when multiplying two `uint16_t` elements, only the lower 16 bits of the product need to be computed; the higher 16 bits have no effect on the final result.

We remark that the use of a composite modulus in [26], as well as the result from [74] suggest that the particular modulus does not have much effect on the hardness of the problem; the size of the modulus is more important from this point of view. Consequently, any modulus of similar size should deliver a similar security, and therefore we choose one that is most efficient depending on the use case.

1.2 Preliminaries

For each positive integer a , we denote the set $\{0, 1, \dots, a-1\}$ by \mathbb{Z}_a .

For a set A , we denote by $a \xleftarrow{\$} A$ that a is drawn uniformly from A . If χ is a probability distribution, then $a \leftarrow \chi$ means that a is drawn at random according to the probability distribution χ .

Logarithms are in base 2, unless specified otherwise.

Modular reductions. For a positive integer α and $x \in \mathbb{Q}$, we define $\{x\}_\alpha$ as the unique element x' in the interval $(-\alpha/2, \alpha/2]$ satisfying $x' \equiv x \pmod{\alpha}$. Moreover, we define $\langle x \rangle_\alpha$ as the unique element x' in the interval $[0, \alpha)$ for which $x \equiv x' \pmod{\alpha}$.

Rounding. For $x \in \mathbb{Q}$, we denote by $\lfloor x \rfloor$ and $\lceil x \rceil$ rounding downwards to the next smaller integer and rounding to the closest integer (with rounding up in case of a tie) respectively.

For positive integers a, b and $h \in \mathbb{Q}$, the rounding function $R_{a \rightarrow b, h}$ is defined as

$$R_{a \rightarrow b, h}(x) = \langle \lfloor \frac{b}{a}(x + h) \rfloor \rangle_b \quad (1)$$

If $h = \frac{a}{2b}$, then $R_{a \rightarrow b, h}(x) = \langle \lfloor \frac{b}{a}x \rceil \rangle_b$. This special case of rounding will be used in the underlying problem, so the following notation will come in handy: for positive integers a, b , the function $R_{a \rightarrow b}$ is defined as

$$R_{a \rightarrow b} = R_{a \rightarrow b, a/2b} \quad (2)$$

Ring choice. Let $n+1$ be prime. The $(n+1)$ -th cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ then equals $x^n + x^{n-1} + \dots + x + 1$. We denote the polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ by \mathcal{R}_n . When n equals 1, then $\mathcal{R}_n = \mathbb{Z}$. For each positive integer a , we write $\mathcal{R}_{n, a}$ for the set of polynomials of degree less than n with all coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_a . We call a polynomial in \mathcal{R}_n *ternary* if all its coefficients are 0, 1 or -1 . Throughout this document, regular font letters denote elements from \mathcal{R}_n , and bold lower case letters represent vectors with coefficients in \mathcal{R}_n . All vectors are column vectors. Bold upper case letters are matrices. The transpose of a vector \mathbf{v} or a matrix \mathbf{A} is denoted by \mathbf{v}^T or \mathbf{A}^T . A vector or matrix of polynomials, in which all polynomial entries are equal to 1 is denoted by \mathbf{j} or \mathbf{J} , respectively.

Distributions. For each $v \in \mathcal{R}_n$, the **Hamming weight** of v is defined as its number of non-zero coefficients. The Hamming weight of a vector in \mathcal{R}_n^k equals the sum of the Hamming weights of its components. We denote with $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}(h)$ the set of all vectors $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{R}_n^k$ of ternary polynomials of Hamming weight h , where $h \leq nk$. By considering the coefficients of a polynomial in \mathcal{R}_n as a vector of length n , a polynomial in $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}(h)$ corresponds to a ternary vector of length nk with non-zeros in h positions, so that $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}(h)$ has $\binom{nk}{h} 2^h$ elements. When $k = 1$, we omit it from the notation, and $\mathcal{H}_n(h)$ denotes the set of all ternary polynomials in \mathcal{R}_n of Hamming weight h , corresponding to the set of all vectors $\mathbf{v} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^n$ with Hamming weight h .

Secret keys consist of matrices that contain (column) vectors in $\mathcal{H}_{n,k}(h)$. Functions f_R and f_S are used to generate secrets from a seed in the encryption (Algorithm 2) and decryption (Algorithm 3), respectively.

1.3 Underlying Problem

The problem underlying the security of Round5 is the **General LWR Problem** formally defined as follows:

Definition 1.3.0.1 (General LWR (GLWR)). *Let d, n, p, q be positive integers such that $q \geq p \geq 2$, and $n \in \{1, d\}$. Let $\mathcal{R}_{n,q}$ be a polynomial ring, and let D_s be a probability distribution on $\mathcal{R}_n^{d/n}$.*

The search version of the GLWR problem $\mathbf{sGLWR}_{d,n,m,q,p}(D_s)$ is as follows: given m samples of the form $R_{q \rightarrow p}(\mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s})$ with $\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n}$ and a fixed $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow D_s$, recover \mathbf{s} .

The decision version of the GLWR problem $\mathbf{dGLWR}_{d,n,m,q,p}(D_s)$ is to distinguish between the uniform distribution on $\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n} \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}$ and the distribution $(\mathbf{a}_i, b_i = R_{q \rightarrow p}(\mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s}))$ with $\mathbf{a}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n}$ and a fixed $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow D_s$.

When $n = 1$, the GLWR problem is equivalent to the LWR problem [16] with dimension d , large modulus q and rounding modulus p . Setting the distribution $D_s = \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_{1,d}(h))$ further specializes the GLWR problem to the LWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets $\mathbf{LWR}_{\text{spt}}$. In [32] it is claimed that the hardness of $\mathbf{LWR}_{\text{spt}}$ can be obtained from that of LWE with similar secret distributions since the reduction from LWE to LWR is independent of the secret's distribution [21]. We extend this claim and make it explicit by proving that for appropriate parameters there exists a polynomial-time reduction from the (decision) Learning with Errors (LWE) problem with secrets chosen uniformly from \mathbb{Z}_q^d and errors chosen from a Gaussian distribution D_α , to the decision version of $\mathbf{LWR}_{\text{spt}}$. See Section A.8 and Theorem A.8.0.1 for more details.

When $n = d > 1$ is such that $n + 1$ is prime, and $\mathcal{R}_{n,q} = \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(\Phi_{n+1}(x))$ for the $n + 1$ -th cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_{n+1}(x) = 1 + x + \dots + x^n$, the GLWR problem is equivalent to the Ring LWR (RLWR) problem defined on $\Phi_{d+1}(x)$, dimension d , large modulus q and rounding modulus p . Setting $D_s = \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_{d,1}(h))$ further specializes it to the RLWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets $\mathbf{RLWR}_{\text{spt}}$. For brevity, when $D_s = \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h))$, we denote $\mathbf{GLWR}_{d,n,m,q,p}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h)))$

as GLWR_{spt} . When the secret distribution D_s is the uniform one over $\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n}$, it shall be omitted in the above problem notation.

1.4 Round5

Our proposal is called Round5. It includes an IND-CPA secure KEM called r5_cpa_kem and a IND-CCA secure PKE called r5_cca_pke . A public-key encryption scheme called r5_cpa_pke is used as a building block for r5_cpa_kem . A key-encapsulation mechanism called r5_cca_kem , is used as a building block for r5_cca_pke . All algorithms in these schemes use random choices, and scheme-specific mappings that are described in the following sections with each scheme.

In Section 1.4.1, the error-correcting codes applied in some configurations of Round5 are described. These codes are built using the same strategy as codes used by TRUNC8 [82] (2-bit correction) and HILA5 [83] (5-bit correction). r5_cpa_kem is described in Section 1.4.3, preceded by the description of its building block r5_cpa_pke in Section 1.4.2. r5_cca_pke is described in Section 1.4.5, preceded by its building block r5_cca_kem in Section 1.4.4. Figure 1 provides an overview of our proposal. It also shows the different configurations of the proposed schemes based on the underlying GLWR problem.




Figure 1: Submission overview

1.4.1 Internal building block: error correction code

In [43], it is analyzed how error-correcting codes can be used to enhance the error resilience of protocols like NewHope, Frodo and Kyber, and it is shown that the usage of error correcting codes can significantly increase the estimated bit-security and decrease the communication overhead. In some of its configurations, Round5 uses an f -bit error correcting block code XEf to decrease the failure rate. The code is built using the same strategy as codes used by TRUNC8 [82] (2-bit correction) and HILA5 [83] (5-bit correction).

XEf. The XEf code is described by $2f$ “registers” r_i of size $|r_i| = l_i$ with $i = 0, \dots, 2f - 1$. We view the κ -bits payload block m as a binary polynomial $m_{\kappa-1}x^{\kappa-1} + \dots + m_1x + m_0$ of length κ . Registers are defined via cyclic reduction

$$r_i = m \bmod x^{l_i} - 1, \quad (3)$$

or equivalently by

$$r_i[j] = \sum_{k \equiv j \bmod l_i} m_k \quad (4)$$

where $r_i[j]$ is bit j of register r_i . A transmitted message consists of the payload m concatenated with register set r (a total of $\mu = \kappa + xe$ bits, where $xe = \sum l_i$).

Upon receiving a message $(m' \mid r')$ one computes the register set r'' corresponding to m' and compares it to the received register set r' – that may also have errors. Errors are in coefficients m'_k where there are parity disagreements $r'_i[k \bmod l_i] \neq r''_i[k \bmod l_i]$ for multitude of registers r_i . We use a majority rule and flip bit m'_k if

$$\sum_{i=0}^{2f-1} ((r'_i[\langle k \rangle_{l_i}] - r''_i[\langle k \rangle_{l_i}]) \bmod 2) \geq f + 1 \quad (5)$$

where the sum is taken as the number of disagreeing register parity bits at k .

XEf codes can include a special register – that is marked with symbol $(*)$ such that $\ell^{(*)}$ divides κ , and the parity bits in register $r^{(*)}$ are computed as the sum of $\kappa/\ell^{(*)}$ consecutive bits. That is, for $0 \leq j \leq \ell^{(*)} - 1$, bit $r^{(*)}[j]$ is defined as

$$r^{(*)}[j] = \sum_{i=0}^{\frac{\kappa}{\ell^{(*)}} - 1} m_{j \cdot \frac{\kappa}{\ell^{(*)}} + i}.$$

In HILA5[83]’s XE5 code, r_0 is such a special register. When using this special register, decoding is done as explained above, but with the term corresponding to the special register $r^{(*)}$ replaced by $\left(r'^{(*)}[\lfloor \frac{k\ell^{(*)}}{\kappa} \rfloor] - r''^{(*)}[\lfloor \frac{k\ell^{(*)}}{\kappa} \rfloor] \right) \bmod 2$.

As shown in HILA5[83], if all length pairs satisfy $\text{lcm}(l_{i_1}, l_{i_2}) \geq \kappa$ when $i_1 \neq i_2$, then this code always corrects at least f errors. If the XEf code includes a special register $r^{(*)}$, assume it is $r^{(*)} = r_0$, then it is required that $\frac{\kappa}{\ell_0} \leq l_i$ for all $j \geq 1$ and $\text{lcm}(l_i, l_j) \geq \kappa$ for $i, j \geq 1$ and $i \neq j$.

The main advantage of XEf codes is that they avoid table look-ups and conditions altogether and are therefore resistant to timing attacks.

Requirements for using XEf in Round5. A basic requirement for using XEf error correction code is that the errors it aims to correct are independent. As explained in Section 1.4.2, Round5 can use two reduction polynomials $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x) = \frac{x^{n+1}-1}{x-1}$ or $\xi(x) = N_{n+1}(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$ in the computation of the ciphertext and in the decryption/decapsulation. As explained in more detail in Section 1.8, using $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$ leads to correlated errors. The basic reason is that the difference polynomial $d(x)$ governing the error behavior is obtained

as $d(x) = \langle \sum_{i=0}^n f_i x^i \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}(x)} = \sum_{i=0}^n f_i x^i - f_n \Phi_{n+1}(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} (f_i - f_n) x^i$. As a result, if f_n is large, then many coefficients of $d(x)$ are likely to be large, leading to errors in the corresponding bit positions. As a consequence of this correlation between errors, the XEf code cannot be directly employed with the reduction polynomial $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$ as used in Round2.

As detailed in Section 1.8, Round5 aims to obtain independent errors by imposing two requirements:

- Ciphertext computation and decryption use the reduction polynomial $\xi(x) = N_{n+1}(x)$.
- The secret ternary polynomials $s(x)$ and $r(x)$ are balanced, that is, both have as many coefficients equal to 1 as to -1.

The latter requirement implies that $(x-1)$ is a factor of both $s(x)$ and $r(x)$. As a consequence, for any polynomial $a(x)$, it holds that $\langle s(x)a(x) \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}(x)} r(x) \equiv s(x) \langle a(x)r(x) \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}(x)} \pmod{N_{n+1}(x)}$. This equivalence relation is essential for operational correctness, cf. Section 1.8.

These two requirements are aligned with features of the original Round2 submission [11] since (i) Round2 already internally performed all operations in $\xi(x) = N_{n+1}(x)$ and (ii) Round2's implementation used balanced secrets.

1.4.2 Internal building block: r5_cpa_pke

This section describes r5_cpa_pke, the CPA-secure public key encryption that is a building block in both r5_cpa_kem and r5_cca_pke. It consists of algorithms 1 (key-generation), 2 (encryption) and 3 (decryption), and various cryptosystem parameters, *viz* positive integers $n, d, h, p, q, t, b, \bar{n}, \bar{m}, \mu, f, \tau$, and a security parameter κ . The system parameters are listed in Table 1. In the proposed configurations, $n \in \{1, d\}$, and b, q, p, t are powers of 2, such that $b|t|p|q$. It is required that

$$\mu \leq \bar{n} \cdot \bar{m} \cdot n \text{ and } \mu * b_{\text{bits}} \geq \kappa \text{ where } b = 2^{b_{\text{bits}}}.$$

The function $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ generates a public matrix \mathbf{A} from a seed σ . Round5 has three options for $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$:

- $f_{d,n}^{(0)}$ generates \mathbf{A} by means of a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) from a seed σ specific for the protocol exchange. This is a standard approach followed by many other protocols such as Frodo, Kyber, or NewHope.
- $f_{d,n}^{(1)}$ generates \mathbf{A} by permuting a public and system-wide matrix $\mathbf{A}_{\text{master}}$. The permutation is random and derived from a seed σ . With this approach, it is possible to efficiently obtain a fresh \mathbf{A} that depends on a seed σ – so that backdoor and pre-computation attacks are avoided – without having to compute lots of pseudorandom data so that higher efficiency is achieved.

Table 1: List of symbols and their meaning

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| n | Indicates if ring ($n > 1$) or ring-configuration ($n = 1$) is used |
| d | Dimension of underlying lattice |
| h | Number of non-zero components per column of secret matrices |
| b, p, q, t | Rounding moduli, all powers of two, satisfying $b < t < p < q$ |
| $b.bits$ | Number of extracted bits per symbol in ciphertext component; $b = 2^{b.bits}$. |
| \bar{n} | Number of columns of the secret matrix of the initiator |
| \bar{m} | Number of columns of the secret matrix of the responder |
| κ | Security parameter; number of information bits in error-correcting code |
| xe | Number of parity bits of error correcting code |
| μ | Number of symbols in ciphertext component: $\mu * b.bits = \kappa + xe$. |
| Sample_μ | Function for picking up μ polynomial coefficients from a matrix |
| f | Number of bit errors correctable by error-correcting code |
| τ | Index for method of determining public matrix from a seed in $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$ |
| $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ | Method for determining public matrix from a seed in $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$ |
| f_S | Function for determining secret matrix for initiator from a seed in $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$ |
| f_R | Function for determining secret matrix for responder from a seed in $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$ |
| z | $z = \max(p, \frac{tq}{p})$. Relevant in reduction proofs and definition of rounding constants |
| h_1 | $h_1 = \frac{q}{2p}$ is a rounding constant |
| h_2 | $h_2 = \frac{q}{2z}$ is a rounding constant |
| h_3 | $h_3 = \frac{p}{2t} + \frac{p}{2b} - \frac{q}{2z}$ is a constant for reducing bias in decryption |
| h_4 | $h_4 = \frac{q}{2p} - \frac{q}{2z}$ is a constant for reducing bias in decryption |
| $\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ | $\Phi_{n+1}(x) = \frac{x^{n+1}-1}{x-1}$. Reduction polynomial for computation of public keys; $n+1$ a prime. |
| $\xi(x)$ | Reduction polynomial for computation of ciphertext. $\xi(x) \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$ |

- $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$ generates \mathbf{A} by first generating a vector \mathbf{a} from a seed σ and then permuting it. The permutation is also random and derived from seed σ as well. With this approach, it is possible to efficiently obtain a fresh \mathbf{A} that depends on a seed σ – so that backdoor and pre-computation attacks are avoided – without having to compute lots of pseudorandom data and without having to store a potentially large matrix \mathbf{A}_{master} .

In Round5 we also discuss performance trade-offs when AES and SHAKE are used as the underlying DRBG used in $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$. In the rest of this section, all this options are *hidden* under $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ and its specific implementation and performance trade-offs discussed in Sections 1.9 and ??.

The function $\text{Sample}_\mu : \mathbf{C} \in \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{\bar{n} \times \bar{m}} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu$ outputs μ polynomial coefficients

of the $\bar{n} \cdot \bar{m} \cdot n$ polynomial coefficients present in \mathbf{C} . These μ coefficients are used in the actual encryption algorithm. This function is fully specified in Section ??.

The integer f denotes the error-correction capability of a code $XE_{\kappa,f} \subset \mathbb{Z}_b^\mu$. We have an encoding function $xef_compute_{\kappa,f} : \{0,1\}^\kappa \rightarrow XE_{\kappa,f}$ and a decoding function $xef_decode_{\kappa,f} : \mathbb{Z}_b^\mu \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\kappa$ such that for each $m \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and each error $e = (e_0, \dots, e_{\mu-1})$ with at most f symbols e_i different from zero,

$$xef_decode_{\kappa,f}(xef_compute_{\kappa,f}(m) + e) = m. \quad (6)$$

The functions $xef_compute()$ and $xef_decode()$, based on Xef codes, are detailed from an implementation perspective in Section ??.

Algorithm `r5_cpa_pke_encrypt` employs a deterministic function f_R for generating a secret matrix $\mathbf{R} \in (\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h))^{1 \times \bar{m}}$ from an input ρ . Defining ρ as an explicit input to `r5_cpa_pke_encrypt` allows us to reuse this *same* algorithm as a building block for both IND-CPA and IND-CCA secure cryptographic constructions.

Furthermore, `r5_cpa_pke` uses four rounding constants, namely

$$h_1 = \frac{q}{2p}, h_2 = \frac{q}{2z}, h_3 = \frac{p}{2t} + \frac{p}{2b} - \frac{q}{2z} \text{ and } h_4 = \frac{q}{2p} - \frac{q}{2z}, \text{ with } z = \max(p, \frac{tq}{p}) \quad (7)$$

The constant h_1 leads to rounding to the closest integer. The choice of h_2 ensures that Round5's ciphertext (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}) is provably pseudorandom under the GLWR assumption. Details are provided in the proof of IND-CPA security for `r5_cpa_pke` and `r5_cpa_kem` (Section A.4). The choices of h_3 and h_4 are made to avoid bias in decryption, see Section 1.8.

Note that the rounding constants are added explicitly here for completeness, but with the specific parameter choices in the different Round5 configurations 1.4.6 some of them can be simplified: $h_1 = h_2 = q/2p$ leading to standard rounding as in Round2 [11, 12] implemented by means of flooring. Furthermore, $h_4 = 0$. Thus, the only difference with respect to Round2 is h_3 to avoid bias in

decryption.

Algorithm 1: r5_cpa_pke_keygen()

parameters: Integers $p, q, n, h, d, \bar{n}, \kappa, \tau$
input : -
output : $pk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}, sk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
1 $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
2 $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{f}_{d,n}^{(\tau)}(\sigma)$
3 $sk \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
4 $\mathbf{S} = f_S(sk)$
5 $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_1}(\langle \mathbf{AS} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$
6 $pk = (\sigma, \mathbf{B})$
7 **return** (pk, sk)

Algorithm 2: r5_cpa_pke_encrypt(pk, m, ρ)

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f, \tau$; $\xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $pk = (\sigma, \mathbf{B}) \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}, m, \rho \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
output : $ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu$
1 $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{f}_{d,n}^{(\tau)}(\sigma)$
2 $\mathbf{R} = f_R(\rho)$
3 $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$
4 $\mathbf{v} = \langle \text{R}_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\text{Sample}_\mu(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \text{xef_compute}_{\kappa, f}(m) \rangle_t$
5 $ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v})$
6 **return** ct

Algorithm 3: r5_cpa_pke_decrypt(sk, ct)

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f$; $\xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $sk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa, ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}) \in \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu$
output : $\hat{m} \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
1 $\mathbf{v}_p = \frac{p}{t} \mathbf{v}$
2 $\mathbf{S} = f_S(sk)$
3 $\mathbf{y} = \text{R}_{p \rightarrow b, h_3}(\mathbf{v}_p - \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle \mathbf{S}^T (\mathbf{U} + h_4 \mathbf{J}) \rangle_\xi))$
4 $\hat{m} = \text{xef_decode}_{\kappa, f}(\mathbf{y})$
5 **return** \hat{m}

1.4.3 Submission proposal: r5_cpa_kem

This section describes r5_cpa_kem, an IND-CPA-secure key encapsulation method. It builds on r5_cpa_pke (Section 1.4.2). In addition to the parameters and functions from r5_cpa_pke, it uses a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. In order to improve readability, in Algorithms 5 and 6 the conversion of the ciphertext ct

into a binary string before it is fed to H is not made explicit.

Algorithm 4: $\text{r5_cpa_kem_keygen}()$

parameters: Integers $p, q, n, h, d, \bar{n}, \kappa, \tau$
input : -
output : $pk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}, sk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
1 $(pk, sk) = \text{r5_cpa_pke_keygen}()$
2 **return** (pk, sk)

Algorithm 5: $\text{r5_cpa_kem_encapsulate}(pk)$

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f, \tau; \xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $pk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$
output : $(ct, K) \in (\mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu) \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
1 $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
2 $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
3 $ct = \text{r5_cpa_pke_encrypt}(pk, m, \rho)$
4 $K = H(m, ct)$
5 **return** (ct, K)

Algorithm 6: $\text{r5_cpa_kem_decapsulate}(sk, ct)$

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f; \xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $sk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa, ct \in \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu$
output : $K \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
1 $m = \text{r5_cpa_pke_decrypt}(sk, ct)$
2 $K = H(m, ct)$
3 **return** K

1.4.4 Internal building block: r5_cca_kem

This section describes r5_cca_kem that is a building block for r5_cca_pke . It consists of the algorithms 7, 8, 9, and several system parameters and functions in addition to those from r5_cpa_pke and r5_cpa_kem . In addition to the hash function H from r5_cpa_kem , it uses another hash function $G : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. To improve readability, conversion of data types to bitstrings before being fed to G and H is not made explicit.

r5_cca_kem is actively secure as it is obtained by application of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [53] to r5_cpa_pke , similarly as in [25, Sec. 4]. On decapsulation failure, i.e. if the condition in line 4 of Algorithm 9 is not satisfied, a pseudorandom key is returned, causing later protocol steps to fail implicitly. Explicit failure notification would complicate analysis, especially in the quantum random oracle (QROM) case.

1.4.5 Submission proposal: r5_cca_pke

The IND-CCA [78] public key encryption scheme r5_cca_pke consists of algorithms 10, 11 and 12. It combines r5_cca_kem with a data encapsulation

Algorithm 7: r5_cca_kem_keygen()

parameters: Integers $p, q, n, h, d, \bar{n}, \kappa, \tau$
input : -
output : $pk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}, sk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times (\{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}})$
1 $(pk, sk_{CPA-PKE}) = \text{r5_cpa_pke_keygen}()$
2 $y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
3 $sk = (sk_{CPA-PKE}, y, pk)$
4 **return** (pk, sk)

Algorithm 8: r5_cca_kem_encapsulate(pk)

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f, \tau; \xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $pk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$
output : $ct = (U, v, g) \in \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa, K \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
1 $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
2 $(L, g, \rho) = G(m, pk)$
3 $(U, v) = \text{r5_cpa_pke_encrypt}(pk, m, \rho)$
4 $ct = (U, v, g)$
5 $K = H(L, ct)$
6 **return** (ct, K)

Algorithm 9: r5_cca_kem_decapsulate(sk, ct)

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f, \tau; \xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $sk = (sk_{CPA-PKE}, y, pk) \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times (\{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}), ct = (U, v, g) \in \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
output : $K \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$
1 $m' = \text{r5_cpa_pke_decrypt}(sk_{CPA-PKE}, (U, v))$
2 $(L', g', \rho') = G(m', pk)$
3 $(U', v') = \text{r5_cpa_pke_encrypt}(pk, m', \rho')$
4 **if** $(U', v', g') = (U, v, g)$ **then**
5 **return** $K = H(L', U, v, g)$
6 **else**
7 **return** $K = H(y, U, v, g)$
8 **end if**

mechanism (DEM), in the canonical way proposed by Cramer and Shoup [35]. `r5.cca.kem` is used to encapsulate a key K that is then used by the DEM to encrypt an arbitrary-length plaintext, optionally adding integrity protection. In decryption, `r5.cca.kem` is used to decapsulate K , which is then used by the DEM to decrypt and authenticate the plaintext.

Algorithm 10: `r5.cca.pke_keygen()`

parameters: Integers $p, q, n, h, d, \bar{n}, \kappa, \tau$
input : -
output : $pk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}, sk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times (\{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}})$
1 $(pk, sk) = \text{r5_cca_kem_keygen}()$
2 **return** (pk, sk)

Algorithm 11: `r5.cca.pke_encrypt(pk, M)`

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f, \tau; \xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $pk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}, mlen \in \mathbb{Z}, M \in \mathbb{Z}_{256}^{mlen}$
output : $ct = (c1, clen, c2) \in (\mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa) \times \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}_{256}^{clen}$
1 $(c1, K) = \text{r5_cca_kem_encapsulate}(pk)$
2 $(clen, c2) = \text{DEM}(K, M)$
3 $ct = (c1, clen, c2)$
4 **return** ct

Algorithm 12: `r5.cca.pke_decrypt(sk, ct)`

parameters: Integers $p, t, q, n, d, \bar{m}, \bar{n}, \mu, b, \kappa, f, \tau; \xi \in \{\Phi_{n+1}(x), x^{n+1} - 1\}$
input : $sk \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \times (\{0, 1\}^\kappa \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}), ct = (c1, clen, c2) \in (\mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}} \times \mathbb{Z}_t^\mu \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa) \times \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}_{256}^{clen}$
output : $M \in \mathbb{Z}_{256}^{mlen}$
1 $K = \text{r5_cca_kem_decapsulate}(sk, c1)$
2 $(mlen, M) = \text{DEM}^{-1}(K, c2)$
3 **return** $(mlen, M)$

1.4.6 Proposed configurations

As illustrated by Table 1, Round5 has a large design space so that it can be easily configured to fit the needs of different applications. In particular, Round5 optimizes over the above design space to define the following configurations:

- Eleven configurations of the IND-CPA secure KEM `r5.cpa.kem`
 - Three ring configurations (for NIST levels I, III and V) without error correction, Table2
 - Three ring configurations (for NIST levels I, III and V) with a Xef error correction code, Table3
 - Three non-ring configurations (for NIST level I,III and V) without error correction code, Table 4

- Two application-tailored configurations
 - * A ring-based configuration with Xef code, addressing IoT. This configuration achieves very small bandwidth requirements at the price of lower security and higher failure probability by picking up smaller values of $n = d, p$, and t , see Table 5.
 - * A ring-based NIST level I configuration with Xef code in which the encapsulated key is 192-bit long instead of just 128-bit so that the difficulty of attacking the encapsulated key (by Grover) equals the difficulty of quantum lattice attack to Round5, see Table 5.
- Ten configurations of the IND-CCA secure PKE r5.cca.pke
 - Three ring configurations (for NIST levels I, III and V) without error correction, Table11
 - Three ring configurations (for NIST levels I, III and V) with a Xef error correction code, Table12
 - Three non-ring configurations (for NIST level I, III and V) without error correction, Table13
 - A non-ring-based PKE parameter set with a ciphertext size of only 988 Bytes, with very fast encryption and decryption, by taking $\overline{m} = 1$, at the cost of a larger public key, see Table 14. This configuration makes unstructured lattice configurations feasible in applications in which the public-key can remain static for a long period, e.g., a fixed VPN between two end points.

The configurations without error correction can be considered conservative, as they are only based on Round2 that has received public review since its submission. The configurations with an Xef error correction code are based on the merge of Round2 and HILA5 and lead to the smallest public key and ciphertext sizes.

In contrast to the original Round2 and HILA5 submissions, Round5 does not include parameter sets suitable for NTT. The reason is that non-NTT parameters allow achieving better CPU-performance, as the advantages of using modular arithmetic with powers of two outweigh the advantages of using an NTT.




Figure 2: Summary of reductions involved in the security proofs for Round5 algorithms. “SPT” refers to a variant of the problem in question where the secret is sparse-ternary, instead of uniform in \mathbb{Z}_q^d .

1.5 Known Answer Test Values

The Known Answer Test Values for all algorithm variants and NIST levels can be found on the digital media at the location described in Section ??.

Note that for generating intermediate output, the code needs to be compiled with `-DROUND5_INTERMEDIATE` (this option is enabled by default when making use of the provided `Makefiles`).

1.6 Expected Security Strength

This section presents results on the formal security of Round5 algorithms, its building blocks and underlying hard problem. A summary of the major results of this section supporting the expected security strength of Round5, is given below. An overview of these results is also given in Figure 2.

1. **r5_cpa_pke** is an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme if the decision General Learning with Rounding (GLWR) problem with sparse - ternary secrets is hard for the polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi_{n+1}(x)$. Theorem A.4.0.1 gives a tight, classical reduction against classical or quantum

adversaries in the standard model, a concise version of which is as follows:

Theorem 1.6.0.1. *For every adversary \mathcal{A} , there exist distinguishers \mathcal{B} , \mathcal{C} , \mathcal{D} , \mathcal{E} , \mathcal{F} such that*

$$\begin{aligned} Adv_{CPA-PKE}^{IND-CPA}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq Adv_{\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n})}^{f_{n,d}^{\tau}}(\mathcal{B}) + Adv_{\chi_S^{\overline{n}}}^{f_S^{(s)}}(\mathcal{C}) + \\ &Adv_{\chi_S^{\overline{n}}}^{f_R^{(\rho)}}(\mathcal{D}) + \overline{n} \cdot Adv_{d,n,d/n,q,p}^{dGLWR_{spt}}(\mathcal{E}) + Adv_{d,n,d/n+\overline{n},q,z}^{dGLWR_{spt}}(\mathcal{F}) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where $z = \max(p, tq/p)$.

The full proof of IND-CPA security, given in Appendix A.4, follows a similar approach as [37] to equalize the noise ratios q/p and p/t in the two ciphertext components \mathbf{U} and \mathbf{v} that allows their combination into a single GLWR sample with noise ratio q/z . This proof does not apply if the reduction polynomial $\xi(x)$ in Round5 is $N_{n+1}(x)$, since then \mathbf{U} and \mathbf{v} cannot be combined into a single GLWR sample.

2. Section A.5 in Appendix A presents a proof of IND-CPA security for a Ring LWE based variant of `r5_cpa_pke` with reduction polynomial $\xi(x) = N_{n+1}(x)$, if the decision Ring LWE problem for $\mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ is hard; this results gives confidence for the RLWR case. Theorem A.5.0.1 gives a tight, classical reduction against classical and quantum adversaries in the standard model, a concise version of which is as follows:

Theorem 1.6.0.2. *For every adversary \mathcal{A} , there exist distinguishers \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{E} such that*

$$Adv_{CPA-PKE, N_{n+1}(x)}^{IND-CPA}(\mathcal{A}) \leq Adv_{m=1}^{RLWE(\mathbb{Z}[x]/\phi(x))}(\mathcal{C}) + Adv_{m=2}^{RLWE(\mathbb{Z}[x]/\phi(x))}(\mathcal{E}). \quad (9)$$

where m denotes the number of available RLWE samples available.

This section also gives indications on sufficient conditions for the proof to work. One of them is replacing coordinate-wise rounding as done in Round5 by a more complicated form of rounding which ensures that the sum of the errors induced by rounding sum to zero. We chose not to use this form of rounding as it adds complexity and seems not to improve practical security. Moreover, the Sample_{μ} function in Round5 stops a well-known distinguishing attack against schemes based on $N_{n+1}(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$.

3. **r5_cpa_kem** is an IND-CPA secure KEM if `r5_cpa_pke` is an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme, and that H is a secure pseudo-random function. Theorem A.6.0.1 gives a tight, classical reduction against classical or quantum adversaries in the standard model; the construction and proof technique are standard.

4. **r5_cca_pke** is constructed from **r5_cca_kem** and a one-time data encapsulation mechanism in the canonical way proposed by Cramer and Shoup [36]. Therefore, if **r5_cca_kem** is IND-CCA secure, and the data encapsulation mechanism is (one-time) secure against chosen ciphertext attacks and has a keylength fitting the security level of **r5_cca_kem**, then **r5_cca_pke** is an IND-CCA secure PKE. Section A.7 contains details.
5. **r5_cca_kem** is constructed using a KEM variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [50] from **r5_cpa_pke**. Therefore, assuming that **r5_cpa_pke** is an IND-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme, and G and H are modeled as random oracles, **r5_cca_kem** is an IND-CCA secure KEM. Theorem A.7.0.1 gives a tight, classical reduction against classical adversaries in the classical random oracle model. Theorem A.7.0.2 gives a non-tight, classical reduction against quantum adversaries in the quantum random oracle model.
6. Section A.1 in Appendix A gives an overview of the security reduction when replacing the GLWR public parameter \mathbf{A} sampled from a truly uniform distribution with one generated in a pseudorandom fashion using the function $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$, for $\tau \in \{0, 1\}$. The reduction models AES(128 or 256) as an ideal cipher, and SHAKE(128 or 256) as a random oracle.
7. The decision Learning with Rounding (LWR) problem with sparse-ternary secrets is hard if the decision Learning with Errors (LWE) problem with uniform secrets and Gaussian errors is hard. Theorem A.8.0.1 gives a classical reduction against classical or quantum adversaries in the standard model, under the condition that the noise rate in the LWE problem decreases linearly in the security parameter n of the LWE and LWR problems. A concise version of this theorem is presented below:

Theorem 1.6.0.3. *Let p divide q , and $k \geq \frac{q}{p} \cdot m$. Let $\epsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, and $\alpha, \delta > 0$ such that*

$$\alpha \geq q^{-1} \sqrt{(2/\pi) \ln(2n(1 + \epsilon^{-1}))}, \quad \binom{n}{h} 2^h \geq q^{k+1} \cdot \delta^{-2}, \quad \text{and } m = O\left(\frac{\log n}{\alpha \sqrt{10h}}\right)$$

Then there is a reduction from $dLWE_{n, \frac{q}{p}, q, D_{\alpha \sqrt{10h}}}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$ to $dLWR_{n, m, q, p}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$.

1.7 Analysis with respect to known attacks

In this section, we analyze the concrete security of Round5. As the lattice-based attacks all rely on estimating the costs of solving certain lattice problems, we start with preliminaries on this topic in Sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.2

We begin by considering attacks using lattice basis reduction in Sections 1.7.3, 1.7.4 and 1.7.5, followed by specialized attacks that exploit sparse-ternary secrets used in Round5 in Sections 1.7.6 and 1.7.7. Finally, in Section 1.7.8 we consider precomputation and back-door attacks against the Round5 GLWR public parameter \mathbf{A} .

1.7.1 Preliminaries: SVP Complexities

On arbitrary lattices, we define the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) as the problem of finding a vector in a lattice whose Euclidean norm is minimal among all non-zero vectors in the lattice. This problem is known to be NP-hard for randomized reductions [2, 59], and we do not expect any polynomial time algorithms for solving this problem in the worst-case to be found any time soon.

Various algorithms have been studied for solving SVP both in the worst-case and for average-case instances. The algorithm with the current best worst-case (asymptotic) complexity for solving SVP is the discrete Gaussian sampling approach [1], with an asymptotic cost in dimension n of $2^{n+o(n)}$ time and space. For large dimensions, this beats other exponential time and space algorithms based on computing the Voronoi cell [88, 68] or running a lattice sieve [3, 77], and enumeration algorithms requiring superexponential time in the lattice dimension [76, 58, 87, 44, 9]. These worst-case analyses however seem to suffer heavily from the (potential) existence of exotic, highly dense lattices such as the Leech lattice [33], and for average-case instances one can often solve SVP much faster, as also shown by various experiments on random lattices [38].

By making heuristic assumptions on the expected average-case behavior of SVP algorithms on random lattices, various works have demonstrated that some algorithms can solve SVP much faster than the above worst-case bounds suggest. For a long time, lattice enumeration [44, 9] was considered the fastest method in practice for solving SVP in high dimensions, and the crossover point with sieving-based approaches appeared to be far out of reach, i.e. well beyond cryptographically relevant parameters [69]. Recently, improvements to lattice sieving have significantly weakened this view, and the current fastest implementation based on sieving [4] has surpassed the best previous enumeration implementation both in terms of speed and in terms of the highest dimension reachable in practice. Although sieving is hindered by its exponential memory footprint, sieving also scales better in high dimensions compared to enumeration in terms of the time complexity ($2^{\Theta(n)}$ for sieving versus $2^{\Theta(n \log n)}$ for enumeration).

Conservative estimates. To estimate the actual computational complexity of solving SVP, we will use the best asymptotics for sieving [17], which state that solving SVP in dimension n takes time $2^{0.292n+o(n)}$. Clearly the hidden order term in the exponent has a major impact on the actual costs of these methods, and one might therefore be tempted to choose this term according to the actual, experimental value. However, recent improvements have shown that although the leading term $0.292n$ in the exponent is unlikely to be improved upon any time soon [8, 49], the hidden order term may well still be improved with heuristic tweaks such as those discussed in [39, 63, 4]. A conservative and practical cost estimate is therefore to estimate the costs of solving SVP in dimension n as $2^{0.292n}$, ignoring the (positive) hidden order term which may still be reduced over the next decades. Observe that this estimate is also well below the lowest estimates for enumeration or any other SVP method in high

dimensions.

Note that some work has also suggested that SVP is slightly easier to solve on structured, ideal lattices when using lattice sieving [57, 27, 18, 90]. However, these are all improvements reducing the time and/or space complexities by a small polynomial factor in the lattice dimension. Moreover, in our cost estimates we will actually be using an SVP algorithm as a subroutine within a blockwise lattice reduction algorithm, and even if the original lattice on which we run this lattice basis reduction algorithm has additional structure, these low-dimensional sublattices do not. Therefore, even for ideal lattices we do not expect these polynomial speedups to play a role.

Quantum speedups. For making Round5 post-quantum secure, we also take into account any potential quantum speedups to attacks an adversary might run against our scheme. Concretely, for the hardness of SVP on arbitrary lattices this may reduce the cost of lattice sieving to only $2^{0.265n+o(n)}$, assuming the attacker can efficiently run a Grover search [45] on a dynamically changing, exponential-sized database of lattice vectors stored in quantum RAM [64, 62]. Although it may not be possible to ever carry out such an attack efficiently, a conservative estimate for the quantum hardness of SVP in dimension n is therefore to assume this takes the attacker at least $2^{0.265n}$ time [62].

Note that recent work has also indicated that enumeration may benefit from a quantum speedup when applying a Grover-like technique to improve the backtracking search of lattice enumeration [10]. Disregarding significant polynomial overhead as well as simply the overhead of having to do operations quantumly, a highly optimistic estimate for the time costs of quantum enumeration in dimension n is $2^{\frac{1}{2}(0.187n \log n - 1.019n + 16.1)}$ [56]. Even with this model, the attack costs for all our parameter sets are higher than $2^{0.265n}$.

1.7.2 Lattice basis reduction: the core model

The above discussion focused on algorithms for solving exact SVP in high dimensions. The concrete security of lattice-based cryptographic schemes like Round5 however relies on the hardness of unique/approximate SVP, where a break constitutes finding a vector not much longer than the actual shortest non-zero vector in the lattice. This problem has also been studied extensively, and the the fastest method known to date for approximate SVP is the BKZ algorithm [86, 84, 29, 70, 4]. Given an arbitrary basis of a lattice, this algorithm (a generalization of the LLL algorithm [65]) performs HKZ reduction [60] on (projected) parts of the basis of a certain block size b . To perform HKZ reduction, the algorithm makes calls to an exact SVP oracle on b -dimensional lattices, and uses the result to improve the basis. Both the quality and time complexity can be tuned by b : running BKZ with larger b gives better bases, but also takes longer to finish.

Although the exact overall time complexity of BKZ remains somewhat mysterious [29, 48, 70, 4], it is clear that the dominant cost of BKZ for large block sizes is running the SVP oracle on b -dimensional lattices. The BKZ algorithm

further makes tours through the entire basis on overlapping blocks of basis vectors, but the number of tours only contributes a small multiplicative term, and SVP calls on overlapping blocks do not necessarily add up to independent SVP calls - for multiple overlapping blocks, it may well be possible to solve SVP in almost the same time as solving only one instance of SVP when using a sieving-based SVP solver [4].

This all gives rise to the core SVP model, where the complexity of BKZ with block size b is modeled by just *one* call to an SVP oracle in a b -dimensional lattice. This is clearly a lower bound for the actual cost of BKZ, and as further advances may be made to sieving-based BKZ algorithms reusing information between blocks, this is also the largest lower bound we can use without risking that predicted future advances in cryptanalysis will reduce the security level of our scheme in the near future.

1.7.3 Lattice-based attacks

We consider lattice-reduction based attacks, namely, the *primal* or decoding attack [14] and the *dual* or distinguishing attack [5], and how they can be adapted to exploit the shortness of secrets in our schemes. We begin by detailing how an attack on Round5 can be formulated as a lattice-reduction based attack on the LWR problem. We then analyze the concrete security of Round5 against the primal attack in order to estimate secure parameters, in Section 1.7.4. We do the same for the dual attack in Section 1.7.5.

The attacker can use the public keys $\mathbf{B} = \langle \lfloor \frac{p}{q} \langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_q \rfloor \rangle_p$ of the public-key encryption scheme or the key-encapsulation scheme to obtain information on the secret key \mathbf{S} . We work out how this is done. For the non-ring case, $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times \bar{n}}$. Note also that since $q|p$ in this case, $\mathbf{B} = \langle \lfloor \frac{p}{q} \langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_q \rfloor \rangle_p$. Let $1 \leq i \leq d$ and $1 \leq j \leq \bar{n}$. If we denote the i -th row of \mathbf{A} by \mathbf{a}_i^T and the j -th column of \mathbf{S} by \mathbf{s}_j , then

$$\mathbf{B}_{i,j} = \langle \lfloor \frac{p}{q} \langle \mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s}_j \rangle_q \rfloor \rangle_p = \langle \lfloor \frac{p}{q} \langle \mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s}_j \rangle_q \rfloor \rangle_p.$$

By the definition of the rounding function $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$, we have that

$$\mathbf{B}_{i,j} \equiv \frac{p}{q} \langle \mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s}_j \rangle_q + e_{i,j} \pmod{p} \text{ with } e_{i,j} \in (-1/2, 1/2].$$

As $\langle \mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s}_j \rangle_q = \mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s}_j + \lambda q$ for some integer λ , we infer that

$$\frac{q}{p} \mathbf{B}_{i,j} \equiv \mathbf{a}_i^T \mathbf{s}_j + \frac{q}{p} e_{i,j} \pmod{q}. \quad (10)$$

So we have d equations involving \mathbf{s}_j . Unlike conventional LWE, the errors $\frac{q}{p} e_{i,j}$ reside in a bounded interval, namely $(-\frac{q}{2p}, \frac{q}{2p}]$. In what follows, we will only consider the case that p divides q .

1.7.4 Primal Attack

In (10), we write \mathbf{s} for \mathbf{s}_j , denote by \mathbf{b} the vector of length m with j -th component $\frac{q}{p}\mathbf{B}_{i,j}$, and with \mathbf{A}_m the matrix consisting of the m top rows of \mathbf{A} . We then have, for $\mathbf{e} \in (-\frac{q}{2p}, \frac{q}{2p}]^m$

$$\mathbf{b} \equiv \mathbf{A}_m \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \pmod{q} \quad (11)$$

so that $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{s}^T, \mathbf{e}^T, 1)^T$ is in the lattice Λ defined as

$$\Lambda = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^{d+m+1} : (\mathbf{A}_m | \mathbf{I}_m | -\mathbf{b})\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}\} \quad (12)$$

of dimension $d' = d + m + 1$ and volume q^m [23, 6]. The attacker then searches for a short vector in Λ which hopefully equals \mathbf{v} , thus enabling him to recover the secret \mathbf{s} .

Lattice Rescaling: The lattice vector $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}, 1)$ is unbalanced in that $\|\mathbf{s}\| \ll \|\mathbf{e}\|$. For exploiting this fact, a rescaling technique originally due to [14], and analyzed further in [32] and [5] is applied. Multiplying the first d columns of Λ 's basis (see Eq. 12) with an appropriate scaling factor ω yields the following weighted or rescaled lattice,

$$\Lambda_\omega = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^{d+m+1} : ((\omega \cdot \mathbf{A}_m^T | \mathbf{I}_m | -\mathbf{b})\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q})\} \quad (13)$$

in which the attacker then searches for the shortest vector, that he hopes to be equal to $\mathbf{v}_\omega = (\omega \cdot \mathbf{s}^T, \mathbf{e}^T, 1)^T$. This search is typically done by using a lattice reduction algorithm to obtain a reduced basis of the lattice, the first vector of which will be the shortest of that basis due to a common heuristic. We explain later in this section how to choose an appropriate value for ω in order to maximize the chances of the attack's success.

If the quality of the lattice reduction is good enough, the reduced basis will contain \mathbf{v}_ω . The attack success condition is as in [6] assuming that BKZ [30, 85] with block-size b is used as the lattice reduction algorithm. The vector \mathbf{v}_ω will be detected if its projection $\tilde{\mathbf{v}}_b$ onto the vector space of the last b Gram-Schmidt vectors of Λ is shorter than the expected norm of the $(d' - b)^{th}$ Gram-Schmidt vector $\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_{d'-b}$, where d' is the dimension of Λ [6, Sec. 6.3],[23]. The condition that must be satisfied for the primal attack to succeed is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \|\tilde{\mathbf{v}}_b\| &< \|\tilde{\mathbf{b}}_{d'-b}\| \\ \text{i.e.,} \quad \|\tilde{\mathbf{v}}_b\| &< \delta^{2b-d'-1} \cdot (\text{Vol}(\Lambda))^{\frac{1}{d'}} \\ \text{where,} \quad \delta &= ((\pi b)^{\frac{1}{b}} \cdot \frac{b}{2\pi e})^{\frac{1}{2(b-1)}} \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

The attack success condition (14) yields the following *security* condition that must be satisfied by the parameters of our public-key encryption and key-

encapsulation schemes to remain secure against the primal attack:

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{(\omega^2 \cdot h + \sigma'^2 m) \cdot \frac{b}{d+m}} &\geq \delta^{2b-d'-1} \cdot (q^m \omega^d)^{\frac{1}{d'}} \\ \text{where,} \quad \delta &= ((\pi b)^{\frac{1}{b}} \cdot \frac{b}{2\pi e})^{\frac{1}{2(b-1)}}, \\ \sigma' &= (q/2\sqrt{3}p), \\ \text{and} \quad d' &= d + m + 1. \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

For finding an appropriate value for ω , we rewrite (15) as

$$\delta^{2b-d'-1} b^{-1/2} \leq \sqrt{\omega^2 h + m\sigma'^2} \cdot \frac{1}{m+d} \omega^{-d/d'} q^{-(d-d'-1)/d}. \quad (16)$$

Given d, m, h and σ' , the attacker obtains the least stringent condition on the block size b by maximizing the right hand side 16 over ω , or equivalently, by maximizing

$$\frac{1}{2} \log(\omega^2 h + m\sigma'^2) - \frac{d}{d'} \log \omega.$$

By differentiating with respect to ω , we find that the optimizing value for ω satisfies

$$\omega^2 = \frac{dm\sigma'^2}{h(d'-d)} = \frac{dm\sigma'^2}{h(m+1)} \approx \frac{d}{h} \sigma'^2.$$

1.7.5 Dual Attack

The dual attack against LWE attempts to find a short vector $(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m \times \mathbb{Z}^d$ in the dual lattice

$$\Lambda^* = \{(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \in \mathbb{Z}^m \times \mathbb{Z}^d : \mathbf{A}_m^T \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y} \pmod{q}\}. \quad (17)$$

This vector is used to construct a distinguisher using $z = \{\mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{b}\}_q$. If $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A}_m \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \pmod{q}$, then $z = \{\mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{b}\}_q \equiv \{\mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{e}\}_q$, and z is therefore small.

For an LWR distribution with uniform rounding error \mathbf{e}' and corresponding variance $\sigma'^2 = q^2/12p^2$, the distinguisher checks whether $z = \{\mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{b}\}_q$ is small. For a non-LWR distribution, z is distributed uniformly modulo q . For an LWR distribution, z 's distribution approaches a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance $\|\mathbf{v}\|^2 \cdot \sigma'^2$ as the lengths of the vectors \mathbf{v} and \mathbf{e}' increase, due to the Central limit theorem. The maximal statistical distance between this Gaussian distribution and the uniform distribution modulo q is bounded by $\epsilon \approx (1/\sqrt{2}) \exp(-2\pi^2(\|\mathbf{v}\| \cdot \sigma'/q)^2)$, a more detailed derivation of this result can be found in [20, Appendix B]. The attacker uses the BKZ algorithm with block-size b that outputs a short vector of length $\delta^{d'-1} \cdot \text{Vol}(\Lambda^*)^{1/d'}$, where $d' = m + d$ is the dimension of the dual lattice Λ^* , and its volume is $\text{Vol}(\Lambda^*) = q^d$.

As the key is hashed, a small advantage ϵ is not sufficient. As explained in [6], assuming BKZ with block size b , the attack must be repeated at least $R =$

$\max(1, 1/2^{0.2075b} \cdot \epsilon^2)$ times. Consider an LWR distribution that is generated from an LWR problem instance of dimension d , large modulus q , rounding modulus p . The cost of using the dual attack to distinguish such an LWR distribution from uniform, employing BKZ with block size b and root-Hermite factor δ , using m samples is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cost}_{\text{Dual attack}} &= (b \cdot 2^{cb}) \cdot \max(1, 1/(\epsilon^2 \cdot 2^{0.2075 \cdot b})), \\ \text{where,} \quad \epsilon &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot \mathbf{e}^{-2\pi^2 \left(\frac{\|\mathbf{v}\| \cdot \sigma'}{q}\right)^2}, \\ \|\mathbf{v}\| &= \delta^{m+d-1} \cdot \left(\frac{q}{\sigma' \cdot \sqrt{d/h}}\right)^{1/(m+d)}, \\ \delta &= ((\pi b)^{\frac{1}{b}} \cdot \frac{b}{2\pi \mathbf{e}})^{\frac{1}{2(b-1)}} \\ \text{and} \quad \sigma' &= (q/2\sqrt{3}p). \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

The first term in the cost above, i.e., $(b \cdot 2^{cb})$ is the cost of running BKZ lattice reduction with block-size b , where c is the BKZ sieving exponent. Finally, note that the cost in Eq. 18 also accounts for the fact that the dual attack can be adapted against the sparse-ternary LWR problem by rescaling the dual lattice using an appropriate scaling factor $\omega = \sigma\sqrt{m/h}$ [5] (so as to equalize the contributions of both parts $\mathbf{w}^T \mathbf{s}$ and $\mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{e}$ in z), resulting in the following rescaled dual lattice:

$$\Lambda_{\omega}^* = \{(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}/\omega) \in \mathbb{Z}^m \times \left(\frac{1}{\omega} \cdot \mathbb{Z}^d\right) : \mathbf{A}_m^T \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y} \pmod{q}\} \tag{19}$$

This scales the volume of the dual lattice from q^d to $(q/\omega)^d$, which correspondingly scales the norm $\|\mathbf{v}\|$ of the short vector \mathbf{v} and hence the distinguishing advantage.

1.7.6 Hybrid Attack

In this section, we consider a hybrid lattice reduction and meet-in-the-middle attack (henceforth called *hybrid attack*) originally due to [54] that targeted the NTRU [51] cryptosystem. We first describe the hybrid attack, using notation similar to that of [89], in a general form. Subsequently, we specialize the attack to our scheme. Finally, we describe a scaling approach to make the hybrid attack exploit the fact that the secret is small and sparse.

The hybrid attack will be applied to the lattice

$$\Lambda' = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m+d+1} \mid (\mathbf{I}_m | \mathbf{A}_m | -\mathbf{b})\mathbf{x} \equiv 0 \pmod{q}\}$$

for some $m \in \{1, \dots, d\}$. We first find a basis \mathbf{B}' for Λ' of the form

$$\mathbf{B}' = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} & \mathbf{C} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{I}_r \end{pmatrix} \tag{20}$$

where $0 < r < d$ is the meet-in-the-middle dimension and \mathbf{I}_r is the r -dimensional identity matrix. We aim to find the short vector $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{e}^T, \mathbf{s}^T, 1)^T$ in Λ' . We write $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{v}_l^T \mathbf{v}_g^T)^T$ where \mathbf{v}_g has length r . We recover the vector \mathbf{v}_g of length $r < d$ consisting of the $(r-1)$ bottom entries of \mathbf{s} followed by a '1' by guessing. As the columns of \mathbf{B}' generate Λ' , there exists a $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^{d+m+1-r}$ such that

$$\mathbf{v} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{v}_l \\ \mathbf{v}_g \end{pmatrix} = \mathbf{B}' \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \mathbf{v}_g \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B} & \mathbf{C} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{I}_r \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \mathbf{v}_g \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{C}\mathbf{v}_g \\ \mathbf{v}_g \end{pmatrix} \quad (21)$$

As \mathbf{v}_l is short, $\mathbf{C}\mathbf{v}_g$ is close to $-\mathbf{B}\mathbf{x}$, a vector from the lattice $\Lambda(\mathbf{B})$. As explained in [89], the idea is that if we correctly guess \mathbf{v}_g , we can hope to find \mathbf{v}_l by using Babai's Nearest Plane (NP) algorithm [13]. This algorithm, given a basis $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$, finds for every target vector $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{R}^{d+m+1-r}$ a vector $\mathbf{e} = \text{NP}_{\tilde{\mathbf{B}}}(\mathbf{t})$ such that $\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{e} \in \Lambda(\tilde{\mathbf{B}})$.

The cost for the hybrid attack thus is the sum of two terms: the cost of finding a good basis $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ for $\Lambda(\mathbf{B})$, and the cost of generating $\text{NP}_{\tilde{\mathbf{B}}}(\mathbf{C}\mathbf{y})$ for all \mathbf{y} from a set of vectors of length r that (with high probability) contains \mathbf{v}_g . The latter cost may be reduced by using a Meet-in-the-middle approach [54] which reduces the number of calls to the Nearest Plane algorithm to the square root of the number of calls with a brute-force approach.

As $r < d$, the vector \mathbf{v}_g is a ternary. The attacker can benefit from the fact that \mathbf{s} has h non-zero entries in the generation of candidates for \mathbf{v}_g : candidates with high Hamming weight are not very likely. Also, as the $(d-r)$ bottom entries of \mathbf{v}_l , being the $(d-r)$ top elements of \mathbf{s} , are ternary and sparse. In order to benefit from this fact, the $d-r$ rightmost columns of the matrix \mathbf{B} are multiplied with an appropriate scaling factor ω . Calculated similarly to Section 1.7.3 by equalizing the *per-component* expected norms of the secret \mathbf{s} and LWR rounding error \mathbf{e} , we arrive at the same scaling factor $\omega = \frac{q^2}{12p^2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{d}{h}}$. This then scales up the volume of the $(d-r+m+1)$ dimensional lattice Λ generated by \mathbf{B} by a factor ω^{d-r} .

We analyze the hybrid attack similarly as in [51]. For each pair (r, m) with $1 \leq r, m < d$, we stipulate that the quality of the reduced basis $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ is so high that $\text{NP}_{\tilde{\mathbf{B}}}(\mathbf{v}_g) = \mathbf{v}_l$ with high probability. The condition, derived from [54, Lemma 1] is that the norm of the last Gram-Schmidt vector of $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ is at least twice $\|\mathbf{v}_l\|_\infty$, see also [51]. We use the Geometric Series Assumption to approximate the norms of these vectors in terms of the Hermite constant δ . The cost for obtaining a reduced basis with Hermite constant δ is estimated as $b2^{cb}$, where b is such that $\delta \left((\pi b)^{\frac{1}{b}} \cdot \frac{b}{2\pi e} \right)^{\frac{1}{2b-1}}$, and for the sieving constant c we take the value $\log_2 \sqrt{13/9} \approx 0.265$, [61, Sec. 14.2.10] corresponding to the quantum case. Moreover, we estimate the cost for the lattice decoding part to be equal to the number of invocations of the Nearest Plane Algorithm, which, following [51], we set to $2^{\frac{1}{2}r \cdot H}$, where H is the entropy of the distribution of each of the coordinates of the guessed vector \mathbf{v}_g . The number $2^{r \cdot H}$ approximates the number of typical vectors of length r ; the factor $\frac{1}{2}$ is due to either the usage

of the MITM technique, or the use of Grover’s algorithm in the quantum case. Finally, we minimize the cost over all feasible pairs (r, m) .

Our analysis of the hybrid attack allows us to obtain a rough estimate of its cost. With the goal of providing a more accurate estimate, Wunderer [89] gives an extensive runtime analysis of the hybrid attack. One of the aspects he takes into account is that the attacker chooses a larger value of δ . This leads to a smaller cost (running time) for lattice reduction to obtain $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$, but decreases the probability that $\text{NP}_{\tilde{\mathbf{B}}}(\mathbf{v}_g) = \mathbf{v}_l$, thereby increasing the expected cost (running time) of the part of the attack dealing with solving BDD problems. Also, he takes into account that the guesses for \mathbf{v}_g are generated such that the most likely candidates for \mathbf{v}_g occur early, thus reducing the expected number of calls to the nearest plane algorithm.

1.7.7 Attacks against Sparse Secrets

In Sections 1.7.4 and 1.7.5, we considered attacks [14, 5, 32] against LWE and/or LWR variants with unnaturally small secrets. In this section, we consider attacks against *sparse* secrets with the goal of choosing an appropriate Hamming weight providing both optimal performance and security. The best-known attacks against such sparse secrets are (to the best of our knowledge) the Hybrid attack described in Section 1.7.6, and another one due to Albrecht *et al* [5]. The Hybrid attack performs better than Albrecht’s attack against our schemes, it is therefore the primary attack considered in our analysis. Recall that the hybrid attack’s overall cost is the sum of two components: that of finding a good basis and that of solving Babai’s Nearest Planes for a large set of vectors using a Meet-in-the-middle approach. Recall also that this second cost component depends on the entropy H of the distribution of each secret coordinate (in our case), which in turn depends on the Hamming weight of the secret. We therefore optimize over the Hamming weight to choose the smallest value for which the overall hybrid attack cost is at least a targeted minimum (depending on the security level).

For completeness, we also describe Albrecht’s attack [5] against LWE/LWR variants with sparse secrets. Since most rows of the public matrix \mathbf{A} become irrelevant in the calculation of the product $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s}$ for such secrets, Albrecht’s attack ignores a random set of $k \leq d$ components of \mathbf{s} and brings down the lattice dimension (and hence attack cost) during lattice reduction. As \mathbf{s} has $d - h$ zeroes, there are $\binom{d-h}{k}$ choices (out of $\binom{d}{k}$) for the k ignored components such that these ignored components only contain zeroes. We therefore repeat the attack $\binom{d}{k} / \binom{d-h}{k}$ times. We estimate the cost (in bits) for a given Hamming weight $h \leq d$, as the number of repetitions each low cost attack is performed times the cost of the low-cost attack on a lattice of dimension $d - k$:

$$\frac{\binom{d}{k}}{\binom{d-h}{k}} \times \text{Cost}_{\text{Lattice Reduction}}(d, k, h)$$

Here $\text{Cost}_{\text{Lattice Reduction}}(d, k, h)$ is defined as

$$\min\{b \cdot 2^{cb} \mid b \in \mathbb{N}, \text{ there exists } m \in \mathbb{N} \text{ such that } m \leq d \text{ and (22) is satisfied.}\}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{(\omega^2 \cdot h + \sigma'^2 m) \cdot \frac{b}{d+m}} &< \delta^{2b-d'-1} \cdot (q^{d'-(d-k)-1} \omega^{d-k})^{\frac{1}{d'}} \\ \text{where,} \quad \delta &= ((\pi b)^{\frac{1}{b}} \cdot \frac{b}{2\pi e})^{\frac{1}{2(b-1)}}, \\ \omega &= \sigma' \cdot \sqrt{(d-k)/h}, \\ \sigma' &= (q/2\sqrt{3}p), \\ \text{and} \quad d' &= m + d - k + 1. \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

The term $b \cdot 2^{cb}$ represents the cost of running BKZ lattice reduction with block-size b . The attack runs on a LWE problem of dimension $d - k$ with $m \leq d$ samples. Condition 22, which is essentially Condition 14, ensures that such an attack has chances of succeeding. Note that although the above applies to the primal attack, a similar analysis is possible for the dual attack, in which case $\text{Cost}_{\text{Lattice Reduction}}(d, k, h)$ is calculated as in Eq. 18, with the parameter d replaced by $d - k$.

This specialized attack only gives an advantage if an attacker is able to choose a k for which the total attack cost is less than a standard lattice-reduction attack on a lattice of dimension d . Similar to the case of the hybrid attack (Section 1.7.6), we optimize over the Hamming weight to choose the smallest value such that Albrecht et al.'s attack results in at least a minimum targeted security level (both for the standard attack embodiment mentioned above and an adaptive embodiment described in [5]).

Furthermore, to ensure that an exhaustive, brute-force search of each secret-key vector in the secret-key using Grover's quantum search algorithm [46] has a cost of at least λ (in bits), the chosen Hamming weight should satisfy:

$$\sqrt{\binom{d}{h} \cdot 2^h} > 2^\lambda \tag{23}$$

Note that for a typical security level of $\lambda = 128$, a dimension of at least $d = 512$ would be secure against Grover's quantum search, for any Hamming weight h that is at least $0.1d$.

1.7.8 Pre-computation and Back-door Attacks

A pre-computation attack can happen if the GLWR public parameter \mathbf{A} is fixed and an attacker performs lattice reduction on it over a long period of time. A back-door attack can happen if there is any public value, e.g., \mathbf{A} is deliberately chosen so as to result in a lattice with weak security. For each $\tau \in \{0, 1, 2\}$, the function $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ (see Section 1.4.2) prevents both types of attacks.

For $\tau = 0$, a fresh \mathbf{A} is generated in each protocol instantiation, similar to [23] and [6]. This prevents both pre-computation attacks and backdoors.

For $\tau = 1$, the matrix \mathbf{A} is derived from a fixed long-term matrix $\mathbf{A}_{\text{master}}$ of dimension d^2 . This is done by applying a random, fresh permutation that is chosen by the initiator of the protocol at the start of each protocol exchange. This prevents any pre-computation attacks since the possible number of permuted \mathbf{A} obtained in this way equals n^n . Back-doors are avoided since $\mathbf{A}_{\text{master}}$ is derived by means of a pseudo-random function from a randomly generated seed. We note that for both $f_{d,n=1}^{(0)}$ and $f_{d=n=1}^{(1)}$, the entries of both $\mathbf{A}_{\text{master}}$ and the resulting \mathbf{A} cannot be differentiated from uniform, hence the results in Section A.8 hold.

For $\tau = 2$, \mathbf{A} is obtained from a vector $\mathbf{a}_{\text{master}}$ of length q , that is randomly generated by means of a DBRG from a seed determined by the initiator in each protocol interaction. Furthermore, each row in \mathbf{A} is obtained from this vector by means of a random permutation that is also determined by the initiator and is specific to each protocol interaction. Since only a few elements need to be generated and kept in memory, $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$ is efficient. Pre-computation and back-door attacks are avoided since the seed that determines \mathbf{A} is new in each protocol interaction. Furthermore, this approach destroys any structure in the resulting \mathbf{A} (as can be found in circulant or anti-circulant matrices for ideal lattices, for example) since it contains many more elements. This results clear from the following analysis. Suppose $a = \langle a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n-1} \rangle$ and $b = \langle b_0, b_1, \dots, b_{k-1}, a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n-k-1} \rangle$ are two rows of \mathbf{A} . They share $n-1-k$ elements due to our rotation strategy. Then, define $a(x) := a_0 + a_1x + a_2x^2 + \dots + a_{n-1}x^{n-1}$ and $b(x) := b_0 + b_1x + \dots + b_{k-1}x^{k-1} + a_0x^k + a_1x^{k+1} + \dots + a_{n-k-1}x^{n-1}$. We have $b(x) = a(x)x^k + (a_{n-k} + b_0) + (a_{n-k+1} + b_1)x + \dots + (a_{n-1} + b_{k-1})x^{k-1} \bmod x^n + 1$. Effectively, that is, each row can be seen as using the $x^n + 1$ ring with a random shifting (due to k) and additional random noises, those $(a_{n-k} + b_0) + (a_{n-k+1} + b_1)x + \dots + (a_{n-1} + b_{k-1})x^{k-1}$. From this point of view, generating \mathbf{A} with $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$ is at least as secure as using the pure ring version of Round5. Since the length of $\mathbf{a}_{\text{master}}$ is smaller than d^2 , the entries of the resulting \mathbf{A} can be differentiated from uniform. The security of Round5 can therefore not be based on the results in Section A.8 for $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$.

1.8 Correctness of Round5

The following subsections we first derive the condition for correct decryption in Round5. Subsequently, we work out this condition for non-ring parameters, ring parameters with reduction polynomial $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$, and ring parameters with $\xi(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$. The analysis for ring parameters with $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$ show that decryption errors (before error correction) are correlated. For this reason, error correction in combination with reduction polynomials $\xi(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$ is not effective. Finally, results from the decryption failure analysis are compared with simulations for scaled-down versions of Round5.

1.8.1 Decryption failure analysis

In this section, the decryption failure behavior of `r5_cpa_pke` is analyzed. In decryption, the vector $\mathbf{x}' = \lfloor \frac{b}{p} \zeta \rfloor_b$ is computed, where

$$\zeta = \left\langle \frac{p}{t} \mathbf{v} + h_3 \mathbf{j} - \text{Sample}_\mu \left(\left\langle \mathbf{S}^T (\mathbf{U} + h_4 \mathbf{J}) \right\rangle_\xi \right) \right\rangle_p.$$

First, a sufficient condition is derived so that \mathbf{x}' and $\mathbf{x} = \text{ref_compute}_{\kappa, f}(m)$ agree in a given position, where \mathbf{x} is considered as a vector of μ symbols, each consisting of b_bits bits. We have that

$$\mathbf{v} \equiv \left\langle \frac{t}{p} \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi + h_2 \mathbf{j}) - \frac{t}{p} \mathbf{I}_v \right\rangle_p + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{x} \pmod{t},$$

where $\frac{t}{p} \mathbf{I}_v$ is the error introduced by the rounding downwards, with each component of \mathbf{I}_v in $\mathbb{Z}_{p/t}$. As a result,

$$\zeta \equiv \frac{p}{b} \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{\Delta} \pmod{p} \text{ with } \mathbf{\Delta} = (h_2 + h_3) \mathbf{j} - \mathbf{I}_v + \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T (\mathbf{U} + h_4 \mathbf{J}) \rangle_\xi). \quad (24)$$

As $\mathbf{x}' = \lfloor \frac{b}{p} \zeta \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{b}{p} \zeta - \frac{1}{2} \rfloor$, we have that

$$\mathbf{x}' \equiv \mathbf{x} + \lfloor \frac{b}{p} \mathbf{\Delta} - \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{J} \rfloor \equiv \mathbf{x} + \lfloor \frac{b}{p} \{ \mathbf{\Delta} - \frac{p}{2b} \mathbf{J} \}_p \rfloor \pmod{b}.$$

Here $\{y\}_p$ denotes the integer in $(-p/2, p/2]$ that is equivalent to y modulo p . As a consequence, $x_i = x'_i$ whenever $|\{\frac{b}{p} \mathbf{\Delta}_i - \frac{p}{2b}\}_p| < \frac{p}{2b}$. We multiply both sides of the above inequality with $\frac{q}{p}$, and infer that $x_i = x'_i$ whenever

$$|\{\frac{q}{p} \mathbf{\Delta}_i - \frac{q}{2b}\}_q| < \frac{q}{2b}. \quad (25)$$

Equivalently, as $\frac{q}{p} \mathbf{\Delta}_i$ has integer components, if $x_i \neq x'_i$, then

$$\langle \frac{q}{p} \mathbf{\Delta}_i \rangle_q \in \left[\frac{q}{2b}, q - \frac{q}{2b} \right] \quad (26)$$

The probability that \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{x}' differ in position i thus is at most the probability that (26) is satisfied. In order to analyze this probability, we work out $\frac{q}{p} \mathbf{\Delta} - \frac{q}{2b} \mathbf{J}$, using (24).

We write $\mathbf{J}_v = \frac{q}{p} (h_2 \mathbf{j} + h_3 \mathbf{j} - \mathbf{I}_v - \frac{p}{2b} \mathbf{J})$. The definitions of h_2 and h_3 imply that $\mathbf{J}_v = \frac{q}{p} (\frac{p}{2t} - \mathbf{I}_v)$. Each component of \mathbf{I}_v is in $\mathbb{Z}_{p/t}$. The value of h_3 thus ensures that the absolute value of each coefficient of $\frac{p}{2t} - \mathbf{I}_v$ is at most $\frac{p}{2t}$.

We now analyse $\frac{q}{p} \langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T (\mathbf{U} + h_4 \mathbf{J}) \rangle_\xi$. Similarly to the expression for \mathbf{v} , we write

$$\mathbf{B} = \left\langle \frac{p}{q} (\langle \mathbf{A} \mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} + h_1 \mathbf{J}) - \frac{p}{q} \mathbf{I}_B \right\rangle_p \text{ and } \mathbf{U} = \left\langle \frac{p}{q} (\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} + h_2 \mathbf{J}) - \frac{p}{q} \mathbf{I}_U \right\rangle_p,$$

with all components of \mathbf{I}_B and \mathbf{I}_U in $\mathbb{Z}_{q/p}$. We thus can write

$$\frac{q}{p}(\mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T(\mathbf{U} + h_4 \mathbf{J}) \equiv \langle \mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{A}^T \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T \langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} + \mathbf{J}_B^T \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{J}_U \pmod{q} \quad (27)$$

where

$$\mathbf{J}_B = h_1 \mathbf{J} - \mathbf{I}_B, \text{ and } \mathbf{J}_U = (h_2 + h_4) \mathbf{J} - \mathbf{I}_U. \quad (28)$$

As $h_1 = h_2 + h_4 = \frac{q}{2p}$, all entries of \mathbf{J}_B and of \mathbf{J}_U are from the set $I := (-\frac{q}{2p}, \frac{q}{2p}] \cap \mathbb{Z}$. The value of h_4 thus ensures that the absolute value of the entries of \mathbf{J}_B and \mathbf{J}_U are at most $\frac{q}{2p}$.

Clearly, if $\xi = \Phi_{n+1}$, then $\langle \mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{A}^T \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} \mathbf{R} \equiv \mathbf{S}^T \langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}}$, so that

$$\frac{q}{p} \Delta \equiv \mathbf{J}_v + \text{Sample}_\mu \left(\langle \mathbf{J}_B^T \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{J}_U \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} \right) \pmod{q} \quad (29)$$

In Section 1.8.4, the special case $\xi(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$ will be analyzed.

The probability that (26) is satisfied will be analyzed under the following assumptions: the entries \mathbf{J}_v are drawn independently, and each such entry is distributed as $\frac{q}{p}y$ with y uniform on $(-\frac{p}{2t}, \frac{p}{2t}] \cap \mathbb{Z}$. The entries of \mathbf{J}_B and \mathbf{J}_U are drawn independently and uniformly from $I = (-\frac{q}{2p}, \frac{q}{2p}] \cap \mathbb{Z}$. In our analysis, we also assume that all columns of the secret matrices \mathbf{S} and \mathbf{R} have $h/2$ coefficients equal to 1 and $h/2$ coefficients equal to -1 . This is true for the implementations of f_S and f_R .

1.8.2 Failure probability computation: non-ring parameters

In the non-ring case, each entry of $\mathbf{J}_B^T \mathbf{R}$ and of $\mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{J}_U$ is the inner product of a row of \mathbf{J}_B^T (resp. a column of \mathbf{J}_U) and a ternary vector with $h/2$ entries equal to one and $h/2$ entries equal to minus one. Hence each entry of $\mathbf{J}_B^T \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{J}_U$ is distributed as the sum of h uniform variables on I minus the sum of h uniform variables on I . Assuming independence, the latter distribution (modulo q) can easily be computed explicitly (using repeated convolutions). Indeed, if c and d are two independent variables on $\{0, 1, \dots, q-1\}$ with probability distributions p_c and p_d , then the probability distribution p_e of $\langle c + d \rangle_q$ is given by

$$p_e(k) = \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} p_c(i) p_d(\langle k - i \rangle_q) \text{ for } 0 \leq k \leq q-1.$$

Assuming independence between the i -th components of \mathbf{J}_v and of $\text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{J}_B^T \mathbf{R} - \mathbf{S}^T \mathbf{J}_U)$, the probability that (26) is satisfied can be computed by using another convolution. By the union bound, the probability that at least one of the symbols of \mathbf{x} is not retrieved correctly is at most μ times the probability that (26) is satisfied.

1.8.3 Failure probability computation: ring parameters with $\xi(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$

Round5 parameters without error correction use $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$. As $N(x)$ is a multiple of $\Phi_{n+1}(x)$, we have that $\langle f \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} = \langle \langle f \rangle_N \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}}$. Moreover, if $g(x) = \sum_{i=0}^n g_i x^i$, then $\langle g \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} = g - g_n \Phi_{n+1}$. In particular, for all polynomials s, e ,

$$\text{if } \langle se \rangle_N = \sum_{k=0}^n c_k(s, e) x^k, \text{ then } \langle se \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} = \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} (c_k(s, e) - c_n(s, e)) x^k, \quad (30)$$

with $c_k(s, e)$ as defined in (33). If the k -th symbol is not retrieved correctly, then

$$\langle (j_v(x))_k + c_k(j_B, r) - c_n(j_B, r) + c_k(s, j_u) + c_n(s, j_u) \rangle_q \in \left[\frac{q}{2b}, q - \frac{q}{2b} \right] \quad (31)$$

Assuming independence, and taking into account that r and s contain $h/2$ ones and $h/2$ minus ones, $c_k(j_B, r) - c_n(j_B, r) + c_k(s, j_u)$ is distributed as the difference of $2h$ independent random variables on I , minus the sum of $2h$ independent random variables on I . The probability that (31) is satisfied thus can be computed explicitly. By the union bound, the probability that at least one of the μ symbols is not retrieved correctly is at most μ times the probability that (31) is satisfied.

Remark The condition in (31) for decryption error in position k shows the term $-c_n(j_B, r) + c_n(s, j_u)$ that is common to all positions k . This is the reason that using error correction in conjunction with $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$ is not effective. The union bound can be used as it also applies to dependent random variables.

1.8.4 Failure probability computation: ring parameters with $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$

Round5 parameters using error correction are restricted to the ring case. So in (27) we have

$$\langle S^T A^T \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} R - S^T \langle A^T R \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}} = \lambda_s(x) \Phi_{n+1}(x) r(x) - s(x) \lambda_r(x) \Phi_{n+1}(x)$$

for some $\lambda_s, \lambda_r \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$.

For the Round5 parameters with error correction, it is required that $\xi(x) = (x - 1)\Phi_{n+1}(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$, and that $s(x)$ and $r(x)$ both are balanced, that is, have $h/2$ coefficients equal to 1, $h/2$ coefficients equal to -1 , and the other coefficients equal to zero. Then $x - 1$ divides both $r(x)$ and $s(x)$, and so $\xi(x)$ divides both $\Phi_{n+1}(x)r(x)$ and $s(x)\Phi_{n+1}(x)$. As a result, (29) reads as

$$\frac{q}{p} \Delta(x) \equiv j_v(x) + \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle j_B(x)r(x) - s(x)j_U(x) \rangle_{x^{n+1}-1}) \pmod{q}. \quad (32)$$

For any two polynomials $e(x) = \sum_{i=0}^n e_i x^i$ and $s(x) = \sum_{i=0}^n s_i x^i$,

$$\langle s(x)e(x) \rangle_{x^{n+1}-1} = \sum_{k=0}^n c_k(s, e) x^k \text{ where } c_k(s, e) = \sum_{i=0}^n e_i s_{\langle k-i \rangle_{n+1}}. \quad (33)$$

If the k -th symbol is not retrieved correctly, then

$$\langle (j_v(x))_k + c_k(j_B, r) - c_k(s, j_u) \rangle_q \in \left[\frac{q}{2b}, q - \frac{q}{2b} \right]. \quad (34)$$

Assuming independence, using that r and s both contain $h/2$ and $h/2$ minus ones, $c_k(j_B, r) - c_k(s, j_u)$ is distributed as the sum of h independent uniform variables on I , minus the sum of h uniform variables on I . The probability p_n that (33) is satisfied thus can be computed explicitly.

Now let the error-correcting code be capable of correcting f symbol errors. Assuming that $c_k(s, e)$ and $c_\ell(s, e)$ are independent whenever $k \neq \ell$, the probability of not decoding correctly is at most $\sum_{e \geq f+1} \binom{\mu}{e} p_n^e (1 - p_n)^{\mu-e}$.

1.8.5 Experimental results

Figure 3 compares the estimated probabilities of at least one error occurring and that of at least two errors occurring, when $\xi = N_{n+1}$ (as in `r5.cpa_pke`) and when $\xi = \Phi_{n+1}$, respectively. These estimates are computed by explicitly convolving probability distributions. Parameters are simulated *without* error correction, and are $n = 800$, $q = 2^{11}$, $p = 2^7$, $t = 2^4$, $\mu = \kappa = 128$, while the Hamming weight varies between 100 and 750 in order to show its effect on both the bit failure rate and error correlation.

For $xi = \Phi_{n+1}$, the probabilities are computed as follows. For any a , (31) can be used to compute $p(k | a)$, the probability that bit k is not retrieved correctly, given that $-c_n(j_b, r) + c_n(s, j_u) \equiv a \pmod{q}$. We assume that having a bit error in position k , given that $c_n(s, j_u) - c_n(j_b, r) \equiv a$, is independent of having a bit error in another position j , given that $c_n(s, j_u) - c_n(j_b, r) \equiv a$. The probability of having exactly e bit errors, given that $c_n(s, j_u) - c_n(j_b, r) \equiv a$, then equals $\binom{\mu}{e} (p(0 | a)^e (1 - p(0 | a))^{\mu-e})$. By summing these probabilities over a , weighted with the probability that $c_n(s, j_u) - c_n(j_b, r) \equiv a$, the probability of having exactly e bit errors is obtained.

Clearly, the probability of at least two errors is much higher when multiplications are done modulo Φ_{n+1} instead of N_{n+1} , and in the latter case, this probability is significantly lower than the probability of at least one error. Figure 3 also shows corresponding probabilities of at least one and at least two errors, obtained from simulations of *actual*, *scaled-down* `r5.cpa_pke` parameters, showing that the actual behavior closely matches estimates.

To conclude, the effect of dependency introduced between polynomial coefficients in Round2 due to polynomial multiplication modulo Φ_{n+1} , is made negligible by the combined use of polynomial multiplication modulo N_{n+1} and balanced secrets in Round5, allowing the use of forward error correction, resulting in better security and performance.




Figure 3: Probabilities of at least one (continuous lines) and at least two errors (dotted lines) in Round5 ring parameters, plotted against the Hamming weight of secrets (X-axis). Red and green curves respectively represent predicted values for the above in parameters using $\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ and $N_{n+1}(x)$ as reduction polynomial, respectively. Diamonds represent corresponding probabilities computed from actual Round5 simulations for the same parameters. Scripts for analyzing and reproducing these results can be found at www.round5.org.

1.9 Round5: Configurations, Parameters and Performance

Round5 offers a large design space allowing for a unified and efficient implementation of Round5, independently of the fact that it instantiates LWR or RLWR. `r5_cpa_kem` and `r5_cca_pke` can be configured to instantiate the LWR and RLWR underlying problems depending on the input configuration parameter n . As described in detail later, the security level depends on the input value d and also the choice of q , p , and t are chosen to be powers-of-two. Usage of error correction to better deal with decryption failures can also be configured by setting up parameter f . If $f > 0$, then secrets must be balanced and reduction polynomial on the ciphertext component v must be $x^{n+1} - 1$. A final restriction is that $\Phi_{n+1}(x)$ is irreducible modulo two.

The Round5 configurations are described in Sections 1.9.1 and Section 1.9.2. Section 1.9.3 describes the implementations in the submission package. Section 1.9.5 details the configuration parameters for Round5.KEM. Section 1.9.6

summarizes the performance of Round5.KEM. Section 1.9.7 details the configuration parameters of Round5.PKE. Section 1.9.8 summarizes the performance of Round5.PKE. Section ?? reports performance on other platforms. **This section is missing**

1.9.1 Main Configurations of Round5

The Round5 cryptosystem includes a total of 18 main parameters sets: 6 ring configurations without error correction, 6 ring configurations without error correction, and 6 non-ring configurations. Each set of 6 configurations is for Round5.KEM and Round5.PKE, NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5.

A parameter set is denoted as $R5N\{1,D\}_{\{1,3,5\}}\{KEM,PKE\}_{\{0,5\}}\{version\}$ where:

- 1,D refers whether it is a non-ring (1) or ring (D) parameter set.
- 1,3,5 refers to the NIST security level that is strictly fulfilled.
- KEM,PKE refers to the cryptographic algorithm it instantiates.
- 0,1,2,3,4,5 identifies the amount of corrected bits, 0 means no-errors are corrected and this description is equivalent to the original Round2; 5 means that up to 5 errors can be corrected as in the original HILA5 submission.
- version is a letter to indicate the version of published parameters to account for potential differences in published parameters.

R5ND_{1,3,5}KEM_5c: Merged parameters for the ring variant ($n = d$) of Round5 key-encapsulation mechanism, for NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5, resulting from the merge of the NIST PQC first round candidate cryptosystems Round2 and HILA5. XE5 forward error correction is used to decrease decryption failure rates (hence the 5 at the end of the parameter designator), and improve bandwidth and security.

R5ND_{1,3,5}PKE_5c: Merged parameters for the ring variant ($n = d$) of Round5 public-key encryption, for NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5, resulting from the merge of the NIST PQC first round candidate cryptosystems Round2 and HILA5. XE5 forward error correction is used to decrease decryption failure rates (hence the 5 at the end of the parameter designator), and improve bandwidth and security.

R5ND_{1,3,5}KEM_0c: Parameters for the ring variant ($n = d$) of Round5 IND CPA key-encapsulation mechanism, for NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5. No forward error correction is used, hence the 0 at the end of the parameter designator. All polynomial multiplications are done modulo the prime-order cyclotomic polynomial. This choice is considered more conservative since it uses the same design principles as Round2.

R5ND_{1,3,5}PKE_0c: Parameters for the ring variant ($n = d$) of Round5 INDCCA public-key encryption, for NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5. No forward

error correction is used, hence the 0 at the end of the parameter designator. All polynomial multiplications are done modulo the prime-order cyclotomic polynomial. This choice is considered more conservative since it uses the same design principles as Round2.

R5N1_{1,3,5}KEM_0c: Parameters for the non-ring/unstructured variant ($n = 1$) of Round5 key-encapsulation mechanism, for NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5. No forward error correction is used, hence the 0 at the end of the parameter designator. Since the generation of the public-parameter \mathbf{A} is expensive, we include performance results for three alternative ways of generating it denoted as $T0, T1, T2$ and discuss performance trade-offs between the usage of SHAKE256 and AES128.

R5N1_{1,3,5}PKE_0c: Parameters for the non-ring/unstructured variant ($n = 1$) of Round5 public-key encryption, for NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5. No forward error correction is used, hence the 0 at the end of the parameter designator.

1.9.2 Round5 parameters for specific use-cases

Round5 further details 3 additional “specific use-case” parameters with the only purpose of demonstrate the flexibility of Round5 and applicability to 3 different specialised usage scenarios.

R5ND_0KEM_2iot: A small parameter set targeting the Internet of Things use-cases, with lower bandwidth and computational footprints, yet still providing 90 bits of (quantum) security. XE2 forward error correction is used to improve failure rate, bandwidth and security.

R5ND_1KEM_4longkey: An alternative to the NIST level 3, ring variant key-encapsulation parameter set R5ND_1KEM that encapsulates a 192-bit key despite targeting the NIST security level 1, to ensure that the (quantum) cost of attacking the encapsulated key (e.g., by using Grover’s quantum search algorithm) is as much as the (quantum) cost of attacking the underlying cryptosystem, i.e., Round5.

R5N1_3PKE_0smallCT: An alternative to the NIST level 3, non-ring variant public-key encryption parameter set R5N1_3PKE_0smallCT that has exceptionally small ciphertexts, targeting usage scenarios where the public-key is static and hence exchanged rarely, implying that bandwidth footprint depends on the size of the ciphertext. Hence this parameter set, despite enjoying the more conservative security assumption based on unstructured lattices, has a bandwidth requirement comparable to ring or structured variants.

1.9.3 Implementations

We include three implementations of Round5.

- **Reference:** This is a reference implementation of Round5 capable to run all configurations at run time. Matrix and polynomial operations are explicit so that it is simple to verify the correctness of the implementation.

- **Optimized:** This is an optimized implementation of Round5 capable to run all configurations at run time. This implementation shows the feasibility of an implementation running very different configurations with a common code base.
- **Tiny:** This is an optimized implementation of Round5 capable of running a single configuration, fixed at compiler time. This implementation can also fix – at compile time – the way to generate \mathbf{A} , i.e., $f_{d,n}^{(0)}$, $f_{d,n}^{(1)}$, or $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$ and whether to use SHAKE or AES. Trade-offs are discussed in the following sections.

1.9.4 Development Environment

The performance numbers of Round5 have been gathered on a MacBookPro10.1 with an Intel Core i7 2.6GHz, running macOS 10.14.1. The code has been compiled with `gcc -march=native -mtune=native -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -fwrapv`, using Apple LLVM version 10.0.0 (clang-1000.11.45.5).

All tests were run 10000 times, the measurements shown are the minimum values of all test runs and are for the tiny implementation of the algorithm. We use the minimum values as opposed to say the median or average since we believe the minimum is a better illustration of the time actually spent by the algorithm and not induced by e.g., system or multi-tasking overhead.

For the memory requirements, we have provided an indication based on a possible implementation. Note that the actual memory usage depends, of course, on the specifics of a particular implementation (e.g., an implementation might require matrices to exist (also) in transposed form, need room for storing intermediate results, etc.).

1.9.5 Round5 CPA_KEM: Parameters

This section contains specific parameter values for Round5.KEM fitting the Round5 configurations described at the beginning of this section.

Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the configurations for the Round5 parameter sets for the NIST security levels 1, 3, and 5. Table 5 presents the configurations for the parameter sets for specific use cases.

In all of the above tables, the values under *Security Levels* represent the cost of known attacks (discussed in Section 1.7) against the underlying LWR or RLWR problem.

The main conclusions from these tables are as follows:

- All parameter sets strictly fulfill NIST security levels and the hybrid attack is the one that has the highest impact on Round5.
- Parameter sets using XE5 (R5ND_1,3,5KEM_5c) have around 25% lower bandwidth requirements compared with those without error correction (R5ND_1,3,5KEM_5c). Since Round5 proposes a KEM that offers CPA security, no active attacks are applicable.

- The application specific IoT parameter set (R5ND.0KEM.2iot) only requires 736 bytes and it still offers a classical security level of 129 bits if an enumeration cost model is applied.
- Many security protocols that require a handshake to exchange a session key do not require active security and a relatively high failure probability is good enough. This allows finding parameters that offer smaller keys and ciphertext at the price of a slightly higher failure rate. For instance, for Internet of Things deployment the failure rate of a wireless communication link will be likely worse than the failure rate of R5ND.0KEM.2iot, and thus, a failure probability of 2^{-41} is sufficient. Alternatively, it is possible to further increase this failure probability so that the sizes of public-key and ciphertext further drop.

Table 2: R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM_0c parameters

| | Security Level | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| Parameters | | | |
| $d/n/h$ | 618/618/104 | 786/786/384 | 1018/1018/428 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{11}/2^8/2^4/2^1$ | $2^{13}/2^9/2^4/2^1$ | $2^{14}/2^9/2^4/2^1$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| $f/x\epsilon/\kappa/\mu$ | 0/0/128/128 | 0/0/192/192 | 0/0/256/256 |
| Performance | | | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 1316 | 1890 | 2452 |
| Public key (bytes) | 634 | 909 | 1178 |
| Ciphertext (bytes) | 682 | 981 | 1274 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-65} | 2^{-71} | 2^{-64} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 144/131 | 192/175 | 256/233 |
| Dual attack | 147/134 | 193/175 | 258/235 |
| Hybrid attack | 128/122 | 194/183 | 261/248 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 144/130 | 192/174 | 256/232 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 494/494 | 659/659 | 878/878 |
| Dual attack | 504/504 | 662/662 | 885/885 |
| Hybrid attack | 437/461 | 665/691 | 895/934 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 340/170 | 500/250 | 729/365 |
| Dual attack | 350/175 | 503/252 | 737/368 |
| Hybrid attack | 160/133 | 293/222 | 397/309 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 340/170 | 500/250 | 729/364 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 494/494 | 659/659 | 878/878 |
| Dual attack | 504/504 | 661/662 | 885/885 |
| Hybrid attack | 284/412 | 442/603 | 554/773 |

Table 3: R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM-5c parameters

| | Security Level | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| Parameters | | | |
| $d/n/h$ | 490/490/162 | 756/756/242 | 940/940/414 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{10}/2^7/2^3/2^1$ | $2^{12}/2^8/2^2/2^1$ | $2^{12}/2^8/2^2/2^1$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| $f/x\epsilon/\kappa/\mu$ | 5/190/128/318 | 5/218/192/410 | 5/234/256/490 |
| Performance | | | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 994 | 1639 | 2035 |
| Public key (bytes) | 445 | 780 | 972 |
| Ciphertext (bytes) | 549 | 859 | 1063 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-88} | 2^{-117} | 2^{-64} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 130/118 | 194/176 | 256/233 |
| Dual attack | 132/120 | 197/179 | 259/235 |
| Hybrid attack | 128/122 | 193/183 | 263/249 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 130/118 | 194/176 | 256/232 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 446/446 | 666/666 | 878/878 |
| Dual attack | 452/452 | 674/674 | 887/887 |
| Hybrid attack | 440/462 | 660/691 | 900/940 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 297/148 | 507/254 | 729/365 |
| Dual attack | 301/151 | 515/258 | 739/369 |
| Hybrid attack | 170/135 | 270/215 | 390/307 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 296/148 | 507/253 | 729/364 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 446/446 | 666/666 | 878/878 |
| Dual attack | 451/451 | 673/674 | 887/887 |
| Hybrid attack | 297/416 | 416/588 | 547/770 |

Table 4: R5N1- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM.0c parameters

| | Security Level | | |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| Parameters | | | |
| $d/n/h$ | 594/1/238 | 881/1/238 | 1186/1/712 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{13}/2^{10}/2^7/2^3$ | $2^{13}/2^{10}/2^7/2^3$ | $2^{15}/2^{12}/2^7/2^4$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 7/7 | 8/8 | 8/8 |
| $f/x\epsilon/\kappa/\mu$ | 0/0/128/43 | 0/0/192/64 | 0/0/256/64 |
| Performance | | | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 10450 | 17700 | 28552 |
| Public key (bytes) | 5214 | 8834 | 14264 |
| Ciphertext (bytes) | 5236 | 8866 | 14288 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-66} | 2^{-65} | 2^{-77} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 132/121 | 201/184 | 257/234 |
| Dual attack | 131/120 | 202/184 | 256/233 |
| Hybrid attack | 128/121 | 192/182 | 256/241 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 130/119 | 201/183 | 256/233 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 422/422 | 658/658 | 847/847 |
| Dual attack | 418/418 | 659/659 | 843/844 |
| Hybrid attack | 408/423 | 626/652 | 844/871 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 275/138 | 499/250 | 696/348 |
| Dual attack | 272/136 | 500/250 | 692/346 |
| Hybrid attack | 177/130 | 268/210 | 420/304 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 271/135 | 499/249 | 691/345 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 422/422 | 658/658 | 847/847 |
| Dual attack | 418/418 | 659/659 | 843/843 |
| Hybrid attack | 306/404 | 414/577 | 578/765 |

Table 5: Specific use case Round5 KEM parameters

| | Parameter Set | |
|--|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| | R5ND_0KEM_2iot | R5ND_1KEM_4longkey |
| Parameters | | |
| $d/n/h$ | 372/372/178 | 490/490/162 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{11}/2^7/2^3/2^1$ | $2^{10}/2^7/2^3/2^1$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| $f/x\epsilon/\kappa/\mu$ | 2/53/128/181 | 4/163/192/355 |
| Performance | | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 736 | 1016 |
| Public key (bytes) | 342 | 453 |
| Ciphertext (bytes) | 394 | 563 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-41} | 2^{-71} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | | |
| Primal attack | 98/89 | 130/118 |
| Dual attack | 98/89 | 132/120 |
| Hybrid attack | 96/90 | 128/122 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 97/88 | 130/118 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | | |
| Primal attack | 335/335 | 446/446 |
| Dual attack | 336/336 | 452/452 |
| Hybrid attack | 329/341 | 440/462 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | | |
| Primal attack | 201/100 | 297/148 |
| Dual attack | 202/101 | 301/151 |
| Hybrid attack | 129/96 | 170/135 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 200/100 | 296/148 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | | |
| Primal attack | 335/335 | 446/446 |
| Dual attack | 336/336 | 451/451 |
| Hybrid attack | 243/325 | 297/416 |

1.9.6 Round5 CPA_KEM: CPU and Memory Requirements

This section contains the CPU and memory requirements for Round5 CPA_KEM described in Section 1.9.5.

Table 6 shows the performance and memory usage figures for the tiny implementation of the R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM_0c algorithm. Table 7 shows the performance and memory usage figures for the tiny implementation of the R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM_5c algorithm. Table 8 shows the performance and memory usage figures for the tiny implementation of the R5N1- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM_0c $\tau = 2$ algorithm. Table 9 shows the performance of the parameter sets for specific use cases of the tiny implementation of the Round5 CPA_KEM algorithm. Table 10 compares the performance of the different variants of computing \mathbf{A} of the tiny implementation of the R5N1_1KEM_0c algorithm.

The main conclusions from these tables are as follows:

- CPU performance for ring configurations does not seem to be an issue for most applications since it requires fractions of a millisecond without using any type of hardware instructions.
- CPU performance for non-ring configurations can be sufficient for many applications, except those that require very high throughput.
- The performance of R5N1_1KEM_0c for different choices of $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ implemented using as DRBG either SHAKE128 or AES128 with hardware acceleration is illustrated. We observe that CPU performance of $f_{d,n}^{(0)}$ is worse than $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$ that is also worse than $f_{d,n}^{(1)}$. The reason is simple: $f_{d,n}^{(1)}$ requires the smallest amount of pseudorandom data to be obtained from the DRBG while $f_{d,n}^{(0)}$ requires the highest amount of pseudorandom data. $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$ is in between and has the lowest memory cost since the amount of data to be kept in memory is limited. Finally, we observe that if the CPU has hardware-enabled AES instructions, then AES-based generation of \mathbf{A} is competitive.

Table 6: Tiny R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM_0c performance and memory usage

| | Security Level | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------|---------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| API Parameters | | | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 16 | 24 | 32 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 634 | 909 | 1,178 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 16 | 24 | 32 |
| CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES | 682 | 981 | 1,274 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| KEM Encapsulate | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| KEM Decapsulate | 0.007 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Total | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.1 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 29.1K | 88.1K | 118.1K |
| KEM Encapsulate | 37.4K | 114.7K | 149.3K |
| KEM Decapsulate | 17.3K | 49.6K | 57.8K |
| Total | 83.8K | 252.3K | 325.1K |
| Memory usage indication | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 4,374B | 5,673B | 7,350B |
| KEM Encapsulate | 7,784B | 10,182B | 12.9KiB |
| KEM Decapsulate | 3,458B | 4,581B | 5,954B |

Table 7: Tiny R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM_5c performance and memory usage

| | Security Level | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|--------|---------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| API Parameters | | | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 16 | 24 | 32 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 445 | 780 | 972 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 16 | 24 | 32 |
| CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES | 549 | 859 | 1,063 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| KEM Encapsulate | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| KEM Decapsulate | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 |
| Total | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.1 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 32.8K | 56.7K | 100.7K |
| KEM Encapsulate | 56.0K | 80.7K | 136.8K |
| KEM Decapsulate | 32.5K | 38.6K | 69.5K |
| Total | 121.3K | 175.9K | 307.0K |
| Memory usage indication | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 3,417B | 5,364B | 6,676B |
| KEM Encapsulate | 6,182B | 9,631B | 11.7KiB |
| KEM Decapsulate | 2,813B | 4,339B | 5,431B |

Table 8: Tiny R5N1- $\{1,3,5\}$ KEM.0c $\tau = 2$ performance and memory usage

| | Security Level | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| API Parameters | | | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 16 | 24 | 32 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 5,214 | 8,834 | 14,264 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 16 | 24 | 32 |
| CRYPTO_CIPHertextBYTES | 5,236 | 8,866 | 14,288 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 0.6 | 1.0 | 3.8 |
| KEM Encapsulate | 0.8 | 1.3 | 5.2 |
| KEM Decapsulate | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.3 |
| Total | 1.5 | 2.4 | 9.2 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 1,631K | 2,643K | 9,826K |
| KEM Encapsulate | 2,097K | 3,432K | 13.4M |
| KEM Decapsulate | 171.8K | 228.7K | 686K |
| Total | 3,900K | 6,303K | 23.9M |
| Memory usage indication | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 38.5KiB | 53.9KiB | 117.4KiB |
| KEM Encapsulate | 51.9KiB | 76.6KiB | 150.1KiB |
| KEM Decapsulate | 21.5KiB | 36.4KiB | 51.2KiB |

Table 9: Tiny Round5 CPA_KEM specific use case parameters, performance and memory usage

| | Parameter Set | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | R5ND_0KEM_2iot | R5ND_1KEM_4longkey |
| API Parameters | | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 16 | 24 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 342 | 453 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 16 | 24 |
| CRYPTO_CIPHertextBYTES | 394 | 563 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| KEM Encapsulate | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| KEM Decapsulate | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Total | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 31.3K | 35.0K |
| KEM Encapsulate | 49.9K | 59.1K |
| KEM Decapsulate | 36.1K | 48.1K |
| Total | 117.3K | 142.1K |
| Memory usage indication | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 2,606B | 3,441B |
| KEM Encapsulate | 4,744B | 6,348B |
| KEM Decapsulate | 2,186B | 2,979B |

Table 10: Tiny R5N1.1KEM_0c – **A** generation variants

| | Variants | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | $\tau = 0$ (SHAKE128) | $\tau = 0$ (AES128-HW) | $\tau = 1$ (SHAKE128) | $\tau = 2$ (SHAKE128) |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 2.2 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| KEM Encapsulate | 2.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| KEM Decapsulate | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| Total | 4.8 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 5,829K | 1,590K | 1,412K | 1,631K |
| KEM Encapsulate | 6,364K | 2,129K | 2,021K | 2,097K |
| KEM Decapsulate | 171.7K | 176.5K | 171.7K | 171.8K |
| Total | 12.4M | 3,896K | 3,605K | 3,900K |
| Memory usage indication | | | | |
| KEM Generate Key Pair | 710.5KiB | | 2,088.8KiB | 38.5KiB |
| KEM Encapsulate | 723.9KiB | | 2,102.2KiB | 51.9KiB |
| KEM Decapsulate | 21.5KiB | | 21.5KiB | 21.5KiB |

1.9.7 Round5 CCA_PKE: Parameters

This section contains specific parameter values for Round5.PKE fitting the Round5 configurations described at the beginning of this section.

Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the configurations for the Round5 parameter sets for the NIST security levels 1, 3, and 5. Table 5 present the configurations for the parameter sets for specific use cases.

In all of the above tables, the values under *Security Levels* represent the cost of known attacks (discussed in Section 1.7) against the underlying LWR or RLWR problem.

The main conclusions from these tables are as follows:

- As for r5_cpa_kem parameters, all parameter sets strictly fulfil NIST security levels and the hybrid attack is the one that has the highest impact on Round5.
- Parameter sets using XE5 (R5ND_1,3,5PKE_5c) have around 25% lower bandwidth requirements compared with those parameters without error correction (R5ND_1,3,5KEM_5c). For instance, R5ND_5PKE_5c requires 730 Bytes less than R5ND_5PKE_0c.
- r5_cca_pke, targeting IND-CCA security, requires lower failure probability compared with r5_cpa_kem; this leads to parameters that require slightly longer public-keys and ciphertexts. When no error correction is used, this difference is larger and can mean up to 400 Bytes.
- The application specific R5N1_3PKE_0smallCT, i.e., the parameter set for a non-ring configuration with short ciphertext is a desirable alternative in use cases in which the public-key remains static for a long period of time since the ciphertext is small and comparable in size with ring configurations, minimizing the overall bandwidth requirement.

Table 11: R5ND-_{1,3,5}PKE_0c parameters

| | Security Level | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| Parameters | | | |
| $d/n/h$ | 586/586/182 | 852/852/212 | 1170/1170/222 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{13}/2^9/2^4/2^1$ | $2^{12}/2^9/2^5/2^1$ | $2^{13}/2^9/2^5/2^1$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| $f/x\epsilon/\kappa/\mu$ | 0/0/128/128 | 0/0/192/192 | 0/0/256/256 |
| Performance | | | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 1432 | 2102 | 2874 |
| Public key (bytes) | 676 | 983 | 1349 |
| Encryption overhead (bytes) | 756 | 1119 | 1525 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-155} | 2^{-147} | 2^{-143} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 131/119 | 199/181 | 281/255 |
| Dual attack | 132/120 | 202/183 | 286/260 |
| Hybrid attack | 128/121 | 192/182 | 257/246 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 130/118 | 199/180 | 281/255 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 448/448 | 683/683 | 963/963 |
| Dual attack | 451/451 | 692/692 | 981/981 |
| Hybrid attack | 439/457 | 657/688 | 880/929 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 298/149 | 524/262 | 822/411 |
| Dual attack | 301/151 | 534/267 | 842/421 |
| Hybrid attack | 177/135 | 266/213 | 346/289 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 298/149 | 524/262 | 822/411 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 448/448 | 683/683 | 963/963 |
| Dual attack | 451/451 | 692/692 | 981/981 |
| Hybrid attack | 306/417 | 412/584 | 500/736 |

Table 12: R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ PKE-5c parameters

| | Security Level | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| Parameters | | | |
| $d/n/h$ | 508/508/136 | 756/756/242 | 940/940/414 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{10}/2^7/2^4/2^1$ | $2^{12}/2^8/2^3/2^1$ | $2^{12}/2^8/2^3/2^1$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 1/1 | 1/1 | 1/1 |
| $f/x\epsilon/\kappa/\mu$ | 5/190/128/318 | 5/218/192/410 | 5/234/256/490 |
| Performance | | | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 1097 | 1730 | 2144 |
| Public key (bytes) | 461 | 780 | 972 |
| Encryption overhead (bytes) | 636 | 950 | 1172 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-142} | 2^{-256} | 2^{-144} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 133/121 | 194/176 | 256/233 |
| Dual attack | 135/122 | 197/179 | 259/235 |
| Hybrid attack | 128/122 | 193/183 | 263/249 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 132/120 | 194/176 | 256/232 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 455/455 | 666/666 | 878/878 |
| Dual attack | 462/462 | 674/674 | 887/887 |
| Hybrid attack | 437/462 | 660/691 | 900/940 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 305/152 | 507/254 | 729/365 |
| Dual attack | 311/156 | 515/258 | 739/369 |
| Hybrid attack | 166/134 | 270/215 | 390/307 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 304/152 | 507/253 | 729/364 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 455/455 | 666/666 | 878/878 |
| Dual attack | 462/462 | 673/674 | 887/887 |
| Hybrid attack | 292/413 | 416/588 | 547/770 |

Table 13: R5N1_{1,3,5}PKE_0c parameters

| | Security Level | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| Parameters | | | |
| $d/n/h$ | 636/1/114 | 876/1/446 | 1217/1/462 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{12}/2^9/2^6/2^2$ | $2^{15}/2^{11}/2^7/2^3$ | $2^{15}/2^{12}/2^9/2^4$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 8/8 | 8/8 | 8/8 |
| $f/x\epsilon/\kappa/\mu$ | 0/0/128/64 | 0/0/192/64 | 0/0/256/64 |
| Performance | | | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 11544 | 19392 | 29360 |
| Public key (bytes) | 5740 | 9660 | 14636 |
| Encryption overhead (bytes) | 5804 | 9732 | 14724 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-146} | 2^{-144} | 2^{-144} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 146/133 | 194/177 | 257/234 |
| Dual attack | 146/134 | 193/176 | 257/234 |
| Hybrid attack | 128/122 | 192/181 | 256/241 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 145/133 | 192/175 | 257/234 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | | | |
| Primal attack | 469/469 | 632/632 | 848/848 |
| Dual attack | 471/471 | 628/628 | 847/847 |
| Hybrid attack | 407/428 | 626/646 | 844/874 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 317/159 | 473/237 | 697/348 |
| Dual attack | 319/160 | 469/235 | 696/348 |
| Hybrid attack | 159/130 | 296/214 | 402/300 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 317/158 | 469/234 | 695/347 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | | | |
| Primal attack | 469/469 | 632/632 | 848/848 |
| Dual attack | 470/471 | 628/628 | 847/847 |
| Hybrid attack | 283/404 | 445/586 | 559/756 |

Table 14: Specific use case Round5 PKE parameters

| | Parameter Set R5N1_3PKE_0smallCT |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| Parameters | |
| $d/n/h$ | 757/1/378 |
| $q/p/t/b$ | $2^{14}/2^9/2^4/2^1$ |
| \bar{n}/\bar{m} | 192/1 |
| $f/x/\kappa/\mu$ | 0/0/192/192 |
| Performance | |
| Total bandwidth (bytes) | 164524 |
| Public key (bytes) | 163536 |
| Encryption overhead (bytes) | 988 |
| Failure rate | 2^{-149} |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Core Sieving | |
| Primal attack | 194/177 |
| Dual attack | 193/176 |
| Hybrid attack | 191/181 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 192/175 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Core Sieving | |
| Primal attack | 632/632 |
| Dual attack | 628/628 |
| Hybrid attack | 624/648 |
| Classical/Quantum security (bits) – Enumeration | |
| Primal attack | 473/237 |
| Dual attack | 469/235 |
| Hybrid attack | 281/211 |
| Sparse-secrets attack | 469/234 |
| Classical/Quantum optimal block size BKZ – Enumeration | |
| Primal attack | 632/632 |
| Dual attack | 628/628 |
| Hybrid attack | 428/580 |

1.9.8 Round5 CCA_PKE: CPU and Memory Requirements

This section contains the CPU and memory requirements for Round5 CCA_PKE described in Section 1.9.7.

Table 15 shows the performance and memory usage figures for the tiny implementation of the R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ PKE_0c algorithm. Table 16 shows the performance and memory usage figures for the tiny implementation of the R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ PKE_5c algorithm. Table 17 shows the performance and memory usage figures for the tiny implementation of the R5N1- $\{1,3,5\}$ PKE_0c $\tau = 2$ algorithm. Table 18 shows the performance of the parameter sets for specific use cases of the tiny implementation of the Round5 CCA_PKE algorithm. Some conclusions from these tables are as follows:

- Due to the asymmetry of \bar{n} and \bar{m} , the key generation time of R5N1_3PKE_0smallCT is relatively high; however, this is only a one-time cost since public-keys remain static for a long period of time. On the other hand, the benefit of the asymmetry is that the encryption time decreases.
- Ring versions of Round5 perform currently around 70 times faster than its non-ring versions.

Table 15: Tiny R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ PKE.0c performance and memory usage

| | Security Level | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------|---------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| API Parameters | | | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 708 | 1,031 | 1,413 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 676 | 983 | 1,349 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 756 | 1,119 | 1,525 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| PKE Encrypt | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| PKE Decrypt | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| Total | 0.07 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 41.9K | 59.8K | 80.7K |
| PKE Encrypt | 63.6K | 95.5K | 124.6K |
| PKE Decrypt | 81.5K | 118.5K | 151.8K |
| Total | 187.1K | 273.8K | 357.1K |
| Memory usage indication | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 4,916B | 7,150B | 9,814B |
| PKE Encrypt | 7,596B | 10.8KiB | 14.8KiB |
| PKE Decrypt | 4,112B | 6,014B | 8,226B |

Table 16: Tiny R5ND- $\{1,3,5\}$ PKE.5c performance and memory usage

| | Security Level | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|--------|---------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| API Parameters | | | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 493 | 828 | 1,036 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 461 | 780 | 972 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 636 | 950 | 1,172 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| PKE Encrypt | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| PKE Decrypt | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.08 |
| Total | 0.07 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 32.9K | 57.3K | 101.1K |
| PKE Encrypt | 60.7K | 95.1K | 156.1K |
| PKE Decrypt | 83.3K | 124.5K | 215.8K |
| Total | 176.8K | 276.9K | 473.0K |
| Memory usage indication | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 4,018B | 6,168B | 7,680B |
| PKE Encrypt | 6,481B | 9,746B | 11.9KiB |
| PKE Decrypt | 3,465B | 5,258B | 6,576B |

Table 17: Tiny R5N1- $\{1,3,5\}$ PKE_0c $\tau = 2$ performance and memory usage

| | Security Level | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|----------|----------|
| | NIST1 | NIST3 | NIST5 |
| API Parameters | | | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 5,772 | 9,708 | 14,700 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 5,740 | 9,660 | 14,636 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 5,804 | 9,732 | 14,724 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 0.4 | 2.0 | 2.7 |
| PKE Encrypt | 0.5 | 2.6 | 3.6 |
| PKE Decrypt | 0.5 | 2.7 | 3.7 |
| Total | 1.4 | 7.3 | 10.0 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 930K | 5,139K | 7,036K |
| PKE Encrypt | 1,307K | 6,684K | 9,230K |
| PKE Decrypt | 1,385K | 7,005K | 9,541K |
| Total | 3,622K | 18.8M | 25.8M |
| Memory usage indication | | | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 40.4KiB | 112.0KiB | 133.1KiB |
| PKE Encrypt | 50.6KiB | 126.0KiB | 152.4KiB |
| PKE Decrypt | 31.4KiB | 46.6KiB | 67.0KiB |

Table 18: Tiny Round5 CCA_PKE specific use case parameters, performance and memory usage

| | Parameter Set R5N1_3PKE_0smallCT $\tau = 2$ |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| API Parameters | |
| CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES | 163,584 |
| CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES | 163,536 |
| CRYPTO_BYTES | 988 |
| Performance: Elapsed time (ms) | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 30.9 |
| PKE Encrypt | 1.2 |
| PKE Decrypt | 3.2 |
| Total | 35.2 |
| Performance: CPU Clock Cycles | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 80.0M |
| PKE Encrypt | 2,993K |
| PKE Decrypt | 8,192K |
| Total | 91.2M |
| Memory usage indication | |
| PKE Generate Key Pair | 920.7KiB |
| PKE Encrypt | 481.8KiB |
| PKE Decrypt | 446.5KiB |

1.10 Advantages and limitations

Flexibility in the underlying problem’s choice Round5 can be configured to rely on the Learning with Rounding (LWR) or Ring-Learning with Rounding (RLWR) problems, by controlling the input parameters n and d . This allows the user to flexibly choose the configuration (and underlying problem instantiation) that fits best his application and security requirements, even while Round5 is already in deployment. For instance, a user dealing with strictly confidential information might only trust a public-key encryption (PKE) algorithm with a construction having no additional (e.g., ring) structure, while another user operating a wireless network for a less critical application would prioritize low bandwidth and/or energy requirements and thus might prefer a (more efficient) ring-based construction. The unified approach provides from day one a contingency and smooth transition path, should vulnerabilities in ring-based constructions be discovered, since the non-ring based construction is already deployed. Finally, as the Round5 implementation and code remains unified independent of the underlying problem instantiated, the amount of code in devices and effort required for code-review is reduced.

Small public-keys and ciphertexts Round5 relies on rounding (specifically, the GLWR problem, see Section 1.3), leading to public-keys and ciphertexts with coefficients that have only $\lceil \log p \rceil$ and $\lceil \log t \rceil$ bits. Furthermore, Round5 relies on prime cyclotomic polynomials that provide a large pool of (q, n) values to choose from, allowing the selection of parameters that satisfy security requirements while minimizing bandwidth requirements. The usage of constant-time XEf error correction allows dealing with multiple errors so that even smaller parameters ($n = d, p$), and thus, messages are feasible. Round5 thus is suited for bandwidth-constrained applications, and Internet protocols that only allow limited packet sizes. Comparing with other submissions, Round5 shows a very good trade-off between security and the sizes of public keys and ciphertexts, as reported in [47] (with "Performance" as label for the X-axis).

Common building blocks for KEM and PKE By design, `r5_cpa_kem` and `r5_cca_pke` are constructed using common building blocks. This allows for a common security and correctness analysis for both schemes. Furthermore, it reduces the amount of code in devices, and the effort required for code-review of `r5_cpa_kem` and `r5_cca_pke`.

Flexibility in achieving security levels The design choices in Round5, especially the choice for prime cyclotomic polynomials, allowed the fine-tuning of parameters to each NIST level. Round5 thus enables the user to choose parameters that tightly fit the required security level.

Flexibility for bandwidth Different applications can have different security needs and operational constraints. Round5 enables the flexible choice of parameters so that it is possible to adjust bandwidth requirements and

security level according to the application needs. Round5 achieves this by using prime cyclotomic polynomials and rounding. For instance, configuration R5ND_1KEM_5c for NIST security level 1 requires the exchange of 994 Bytes so that it can be used by an application with communication constraints; configuration R5N1_5PKE_0c offers a much higher security level and does not rely on any ring structure so that it might be a preferred option for the exchange of highly confidential information. The amount of data to be exchanged for the latter configuration (29360 Bytes) is larger than for the former, but is smaller than in another existing non-ring proposal for an equivalent security level [23].

Flexibility for CPU Different applications can have different security needs and operational constraints. Round5 allows for flexibility in the choice of parameters so that it is possible to adjust CPU needs and security requirements according to the application needs. Furthermore, the parameters in Round5 are chosen such that a unified implementation performs well for any input value (n, d) . If necessary, optimized implementations for specific parameters can be realized, leading to even faster operation than with the unified implementation. For instance, configuration R5N1_5KEM_5c for NIST security level 5, intended for a high security level and not relying on a ring structure, requires around 9.2 milliseconds for key generation, encapsulation and decapsulation in our testing platform. Another application, requiring faster operation and with less security needs, can use configuration R5ND_1KEM_5c for NIST security level 1 that performs a factor 70 faster.

Flexibility for cryptographic primitives Round5 and its building blocks can be used to create cryptographic primitives such as authenticated key-exchange schemes in a modular way, e.g., as in [24].

Flexibility for integration into real-world security protocols The Internet relies on security protocols such as TLS, IKE, SSH, IPsec, DNSSEC etc. Round5 can be easily integrated into them because it has relatively small messages and is computationally efficient. For instance, the public-key and ciphertext in R5ND_5KEM_5c for NIST security level 5 require a total of 2035 Bytes. This is smaller than other lattice-based proposals such as [24] or [6], making sure that it fits in the protocols without requiring changes or additional complexity such as packet fragmentation. At the same time, all Round5 configurations can be realized by means of a single library minimizing the amount of work to extend and maintain them.

Prevention of pre-computation and back-door attacks Round5 offers different alternatives to refresh \mathbf{A} in a way that is efficient but also secure against pre-computation and back-door attacks. In the ring setting, this is achieved by computing a new \mathbf{A} . In the non-ring setting, three options are provided: $(f_{d,n}^{(0)})$ randomly generating \mathbf{A} in each protocol exchange,

$(f_{d,n}^{(1)})$ permuting a fixed and system-wide public parameter \mathbf{A}_{master} in each protocol exchange, or $(f_{d,n}^{(2)})$ deriving \mathbf{A} from a large pool of values – determined in each protocol exchange – by means of a permutation. Permutation-based approaches show a performance advantage compared with generating \mathbf{A} randomly— for instance, in settings in which a server has to process many connections. This is because the server can keep a fixed \mathbf{A} in memory and just permute it according to the client request. If keeping a fixed \mathbf{A} in memory in the client is an issue, then $f_{d,n}^{(2)}$ has a clear advantage compared with $f_{d,n}^{(1)}$ due to its lower memory needs.

Post-deployment flexibility A single implementation can be used for all Round5 configuration parameters, without the need to recompile the code. This approach reduces the amount of code in the devices and makes code review easier. Furthermore, it enables a unified Round5 deployment that can be customized to fit non-ring or ring-based use cases, and a smooth transition to non ring usage, should vulnerabilities in ring-based constructions be discovered.

Efficiency in constrained platforms The implementation of Round5 uses up to 16 bit long integers to represent the Round5 data. This enables good performance even in architectures with constrained processors. In particular, all parameter sets using error correction have parameter $p \leq 2^8$ so that this parameter set is specially suitable for resource constrained platforms. Round5 incorporates the special parameter set R5ND.0KEM_2iot that has a total bandwidth requirement of just 736 Bytes, while providing a reasonable security level (129-bits classical enumeration). This is feasible due to the usage of prime cyclotomic rings that allows configuring Round5 with a $n = d$ parameter between 256 and 512, the only two options available with power-of-two cyclotomic rings.

Parallelization Operations in Round5, for instance matrix multiplications, can be parallelized allowing for faster performance. This type of optimization has not been applied yet.

Resistance against side channel attacks The design of Round5 allows for efficient constant-time implementations, since by design all secrets are ternary and have a fixed number of ones and minus ones. The XEf error correction codes avoid conditions altogether and table look-ups and are therefore resistant against timing attacks.

Low failure probability The failure probability for all proposals for r5_cpa_kem (except the one for the IoT use case) is at most 2^{-64} . The failure probability for all proposals for r5_cca_pke is at most 2^{-142} . These failure probabilities can be achieved because of the usage of sparse, ternary secrets and the large pool of parameter sets. The usage of XEf error correction codes in some Round5 parameter sets plays a fundamental role to deal with multiple errors and decrease the overall failure probability.

Known underlying mathematical problems Round5 builds on the well-known Learning with Rounding and Ring Learning with Rounding problems.

Provable security We provide security reductions from the sparse ternary LWR and RLWR problems to `r5_cpa_kem` and `r5_cca_pke`, and from the standard Learning with Errors (LWE) problem to the sparse ternary LWR problem. Even though the latter reduction is not tight, this gives confidence in the Round5 design. As the parameters using error correction require performing certain operations modulo $x^{n+1} - 1$, the above security reductions do not apply to them. We describe an RLWE-based analogon of Round5 with error correction, and present a reduction for such a scheme to RLWE. This give confidence in Round5 with error correction. We discuss why this reduction does not directly translate to the RLWR case, and argue that it does not have any impact on the concrete security estimates.

Easy adoption A device that supports Round5 can handle a wide range of configuration parameters, for both the ring and the non-ring versions, without re-compilation. This flexibility will ease a smooth adoption.

Perfect forward secrecy Round5's key generation algorithm is fast, which makes it suitable for scenarios in which it is necessary to refresh a public/private key pair in order to maintain forward secrecy.

Application-specific configurations The flexibility of Round5 allows addressing the needs of a very different range of applications. Round5 includes a ring-based KEM configuration addressing *Internet of Things* that achieves very small bandwidth requirements at the price of lower security, still providing 129-bit security (classical enumeration). Another special configuration is a ring-based KEM NIST level 1 configuration in which the encapsulated key is 192-bit long instead of just 128-bit, so that the difficulty of attacking the encapsulated key (by Grover) is approximately equal to the difficulty of quantum lattice attack to Round5. This configuration can be very practical for many applications and has a total bandwidth requirement of just 1016 Bytes. Finally, Round5 includes a non-ring-based PKE parameter set with small encryption overhead (988 Bytes) at the cost of a larger public key. The latter configuration makes unstructured lattice configurations more efficient in applications in which the public-key remains static, e.g., email security.

A Formal security of Round5

This section contains details on the formal security of Round5, its algorithms and building blocks. It is organized as follows: Section A.2 introduces notions of security based on indistinguishability of ciphertexts or encapsulated keys. Section A.3 gives results (existing and new) on the hardness of our underlying problem, or rather its two specific instances we use – the Learning with Rounding problem with sparse ternary secrets (LWR_{spt}) and the Ring Learning with Rounding problem with sparse ternary secrets (RLWR_{spt}). Sections A.6 and A.7 contain the first main result of this section – a proof of IND-CPA security for r5_cpa_kem (Theorem A.6.0.1), and a proof of IND-CCA security of r5_cca_pke (Theorems A.7.0.1 and A.7.0.2), assuming the hardness of the above problems. Finally, Section A.8 and Theorem A.8.0.1 contain the second main result of this reduction: a proof of the hardness for LWR_{spt} , the underlying problem of our schemes for the non-ring case (i.e., for $n = 1$) in the form of a polynomial-time reduction to it from the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem with secrets uniformly chosen from \mathbb{Z}_q^d and errors drawn according to a Gaussian distribution.

A.1 Deterministic generation of \mathbf{A}

The General Learning with Rounding (GLWR) public parameter \mathbf{A} in Round5 is generated using the function $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ from a short random seed (see Section 1.4.2). The core component in $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ responsible for deterministically expanding this short random seed into a longer random sequence is either AES(128 or 256) [41] or SHAKE(128 or 256) [42]. In order to relate Round5’s security to the hardness of the GLWR problem, we reuse Naehrig *et al.*’s argument in [71] to argue that we can replace a uniformly sampled matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ with matrices sampled according to Round5’s key-generation algorithm, for both of the above two algorithms, while considering a realistic adversary with access to the seed. The proof for both the cases of AES and SHAKE proceeds by using the notion of indistinguishability [67, 34, Def. 3], in exactly the same manner as in [71, Sec. 5.1.4].

In case of AES, the proof holds directly for the instantiation $f_{d,n}^{(0)}$, and also for $f_{d,n}^{(1)}$ when the function permutes complete AES blocks. We explain the intuition behind the proof. Let \mathcal{F} denote an “ideal domain expansion” primitive that expands a short random seed, block-wise, into a larger sequence, such that each block is unique and also sampled uniformly at random. In our security reductions, the GLWR public parameter \mathbf{A} is generated by querying the GLWR oracle. It can be shown that marginally increasing the number of calls to the GLWR oracle makes it possible to construct a GLWR matrix \mathbf{A} that fits (with high probability) the output distribution of \mathcal{F} , without deteriorating the problem’s hardness [71, Sec. 5.1.4]. Next, we consider a construction $\mathcal{C}^{\mathcal{G}}$ in the Ideal Cipher model implementing \mathcal{F} as AES (as in Round5). It can be shown that $\mathcal{C}^{\mathcal{G}}$ is indistinguishable from \mathcal{F} [71, Sec. 5.1.4]. This therefore allows us to replace

the uniformly random sampling of \mathbf{A} in the GLWR problem with one generated as in Round5's $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ without affecting security. By definition, this is directly possible if $\tau = 0$; it also holds for $\tau = 1$ if $f_{d,n}^{(1)}$ permutes complete AES blocks.

Next, we explain the intuition behind the proof when SHAKE is used in $f_n^{(0)}$ or $f_n^{(1)}$. In the random oracle model, SHAKE is an ideal XOF [40]. It can be shown that [71, Sec. 5.1.4] SHAKE can be modeled as an ideal hash function used to expand a seed into each row of the matrix \mathbf{A} , each step being independent, thereby expanding the uniformly random seed into a larger uniformly random matrix. This construction implements the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} perfectly, completing the proof. We refer to [71, Sec. 5.1.4] for details.

A.2 Security Definitions

Security requirements for public-key encryption and key-encapsulation schemes are based on whether static or ephemeral keys are used. (Static) public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, and nominally ephemeral key-encapsulation mechanisms that allow key caching that provide security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (corresponding to IND-CCA2 security) are considered to be sufficiently secure [72, Section 4.A.2]. On the other hand, a purely ephemeral key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that provides semantic security against chosen plaintext attack, i.e., IND-CPA security, is considered to be sufficiently secure [72, Section 4.A.3].

Definition A.2.0.1 (Distinguishing advantage). *Let \mathcal{A} be a randomized algorithm that takes as input elements from a set X with output in $\{0, 1\}$. Let D_1 and D_2 two probability distributions on X . The advantage of \mathcal{A} for distinguishing between D_1 and D_2 , denoted by $\text{Adv}_{D_1, D_2}(\mathcal{A})$, is defined as*

$$\text{Adv}_{D_1, D_2}(\mathcal{A}) = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(x) = 1 \mid x \leftarrow D_1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(x) = 1 \mid x \leftarrow D_2]|$$

Table 19: IND-CPA game for PKE

-
1. $(pk, sk) = \text{KeyGen}(\lambda)$.
 2. $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$
 3. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(pk)$ such that $|m_0| = |m_1|$.
 4. $c = \text{Enc}(pk, m_b)$
 5. $b' = \mathcal{A}(pk, c, st)$
 6. **return** $[b' = b]$

Definition A.2.0.2 (IND-CPA Secure PKE). *Let $\text{PKE} = (\text{Keygen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a public key encryption scheme with message space \mathcal{M} . Let λ be a security parameter. The IND-CPA game is defined in Table 19, and the IND-CPA*

advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} against PKE is defined as

$$Adv_{PKE}^{IND-CPA}(\mathcal{A}) = | Pr[IND-CPA^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} | .$$

Definition A.2.0.3 (IND-CCA Secure PKE). *Let $PKE=(Keygen, Enc, Dec)$ be a public key encryption scheme with message space \mathcal{M} . Let λ be a security parameter. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against PKE. The IND-CCA game is defined as Table 19, with the addition that \mathcal{A} has access to a decryption oracle $Dec(\cdot) = Dec(sk, \cdot)$ that returns $m' = Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m'))$, and the restriction that \mathcal{A} cannot query $Dec(\cdot)$ with the challenge c . The IND-CCA advantage of \mathcal{A} against PKE is defined as*

$$Adv_{PKE}^{IND-CCA}(\mathcal{A}^{Dec(\cdot)}) = | Pr[IND-CCA^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} | .$$

Table 20: IND-CPA game for KEM

-
1. $(pk, sk) = \text{KeyGen}(\lambda)$.
 2. $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$
 3. $(c, K_0) = \text{Encaps}(pk)$
 4. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$
 5. $b' = \mathcal{A}(pk, c, K_b)$
 6. **return** $[b' = b]$

Definition A.2.0.4 (IND-CPA Secure KEM). *Let $KEM = (\text{Keygen}, \text{Encaps}, \text{Decaps})$ be a key encapsulation mechanism with key space \mathcal{K} . Let λ be a security parameter. The IND-CPA game is defined in Table 20, and the IND-CPA advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} against KEM is defined as*

$$\text{Adv}_{KEM}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) = | \Pr[\text{IND-CPA}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} |.$$

Definition A.2.0.5 (IND-CCA Secure KEM). *Let $KEM = (\text{Keygen}, \text{Encaps}, \text{Decaps})$ be a key encapsulation mechanism with key space \mathcal{K} . Let λ be a security parameter. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against KEM . The IND-CCA game is defined in Table 20, with the addition that \mathcal{A} has access to a decapsulation oracle $\text{Decaps}(\cdot) = \text{Decaps}(sk, \cdot)$ that returns $K' = \text{Decaps}(sk, c')$ where $(c', K') = \text{Encaps}(pk)$, and the restriction that \mathcal{A} cannot query $\text{Decaps}(\cdot)$ with the challenge c . The IND-CCA advantage of \mathcal{A} against KEM is defined as*

$$\text{Adv}_{KEM}^{\text{IND-CCA}}(\mathcal{A}^{\text{Decaps}(\cdot)}) = | \Pr[\text{IND-CCA}^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} |.$$

In the random oracle model [19] (both for IND-CPA and IND-CCA games), the adversary is given access to a random oracle H that it can query up to a polynomial number q_H of times. In a post-quantum setting, it can be assumed that the adversary has access to a quantum accessible random oracle H_Q [22] that can be queried up to q_{H_Q} times on arbitrary superpositions of input strings.

A.3 Hardness Assumption (Underlying Problem)

In this section, we detail the underlying problem on whose hardness the security of our schemes are established. Depending on whether the system parameter n is chosen to be 1 or d (see Section 1.4.2), the proposed public-key encryption and key-encapsulation mechanism are instantiated either as non-ring (LWR) based or ring (RLWR) based schemes. The security of the proposals are therefore based on the hardness of the Decision-General Learning with Rounding problem with sparse-ternary secrets, i.e., $\text{dGLWR}_{\text{spt}}$ (see Section 1.3). We first recall hardness results for LWR before introducing our own results on the hardness of dLWR_{spt} . We then recall hardness results of RLWR.

Provable Security in the non-ring case: The hardness of the LWR problem has been studied in [16, 7, 21, 15] and established based on the hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [79]. The most recent work are two independent reductions to LWR from LWE: the first, due to Bai et al. [15, Theorem 6.4] preserves the dimension n between the two problems but decreases the number of LWR samples that may be queried by an attacker by a factor (p/q) ; the second due to Bogdanov et al. [21, Theorem 3] preserves the number of samples between the two problems but increases the LWR dimension by a factor $\log q$. We follow the approach of Bai since it results in a smaller LWR dimension, leading to smaller bandwidth requirements and better performance.

Bai et al.'s reduction [15, Theorem 6.4] is an essential component that we use in Section A.8 to prove a reduction from $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m',q,D_\alpha}(\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q))$ to $\mathbf{dLWR}_{n,m,q,p}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$, i.e., to $\mathbf{dLWR}_{\text{spt}}$.

Provable Security in the ring case: Next, we recall hardness results for the ring case, i.e., for Decision-RLWR [16]. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing result on the hardness of Decision-RLWR is due to [16, Theorem 3.2], who show that Decision-RLWR is at least as hard as Decision-RLWE as long as the underlying ring and secret distribution remain the *same* for the two problems, the RLWE noise is sampled from *any* (balanced) distribution in $\{-B, \dots, B\}$, and q is super-polynomial in n , i.e., $q \geq pBn^{\omega(1)}$. The last condition may be too restrictive for practical schemes. Hence, although [16, Theorem 3.2] is relevant for the provable (IND) security of our schemes' ring-based instantiations, it remains to be seen whether the above reduction can be improved to be made practical.

A.4 IND-CPA Security of `r5_cpa_pke`

In this section it is shown that the public-key encryption scheme `r5_cpa_pke` is IND-CPA secure, based on the hardness of the decision GLWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets. In Section A.7 this result will be used to show that `r5_cca_pke` is IND-CCA Secure. The proof is restricted to the case that $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$. Referring to Table 19, we take for `KeyGen` the function `r5_cpa_pke_keygen`, and for `Enc` the function `r5_cpa_pke_encrypt(pk, m, ρ)` with uniform choice for ρ . That is,

$$\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa; \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m) = \text{r5_cpa_pke_encrypt}(pk, m, \rho).$$

Let n, m, p, q, d, h be positive integers with $n \in \{1, d\}$. The hard problem underlying the security of our schemes is decision-GLWR with sparse-ternary secrets (see Section 1.3). For the above parameters, we define the GLWR oracle $O_{m, \chi_S, \mathbf{s}}$ for a secret distribution χ_S that returns m GLWR samples as follows:

$$O_{m, \chi_S, \mathbf{s}} : \mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{m \times d/n}, \mathbf{s} \leftarrow \chi_S; \text{return } (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s})) \quad (35)$$

The decision-GLWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets is to distinguish between the distributions $\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{m \times d/n}) \times \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,p})$ and $O_{m, \chi_S, \mathbf{s}}$, with \mathbf{s} common to

all samples and $\chi_S := \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h))$. For an adversary \mathcal{A} , we define

$$\text{Adv}_{d,n,m,q,p}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{sppt}}}(\mathcal{A}) = \left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) = 1 \mid (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) \xleftarrow{\$} O_{m,\chi_S,s} \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) = 1 \mid \mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{m \times d/n}, \mathbf{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^m \right] \right|$$

For an extended form of the decision-GLWR problem with the secret in form of a matrix consisting of \bar{n} independent secret vectors, we define a similar oracle $O_{m,\chi_S,\bar{n},S}$ as follows:

$$O_{m,\chi_S,\bar{n},S} : \mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{m \times d/n}), \mathbf{S} \leftarrow (\chi_S)^{\bar{n}}; \text{ return } (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\mathbf{AS})) \quad (36)$$

The advantage of an adversary for this extended form of the decision-GLWR problem is defined in a similar manner as above.

The following theorem shows that `r5.cpa.pke` is IND-CPA secure assuming the hardness of decision-GLWR with sparse-ternary secrets.

Theorem A.4.0.1. *Let p, q, t be integers such that $t|p|q$, and let $z = \max(p, tq/p)$. Furthermore, assume that $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$. If $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$, f_S and f_R induce distributions indistinguishable from uniform, then `r5.cpa.pke` is IND-CPA secure under the hardness assumption of the Decision-GLWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets. More precisely, for every IND-CPA adversary \mathcal{A} , if $\text{Adv}_{\text{CPA-PKE}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A})$ is the advantage in winning the IND-CPA game, then there exist distinguishers $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}$ such that*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{CPA-PKE}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}), F_\tau}(\mathcal{B}) + \text{Adv}_{G_S, \chi_S^{\bar{n}}}(\mathcal{C}) + \text{Adv}_{G_R, \chi_S^{\bar{n}}}(\mathcal{D}) \\ &\quad + \bar{n} \cdot \text{Adv}_{d,n,d/n,q,p}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{sppt}}}(\mathcal{E}) + \text{Adv}_{d,n,d/n+\bar{n},q,z}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{sppt}}}(\mathcal{F}) \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

In this equation, F_τ is the distribution of $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ with $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$, G_S is the distribution of $f_S(s)$ with $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and G_R is the distribution of $f_R(\rho)$ with $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$. Moreover, $\text{Adv}_{d,n,m,q_1,q_2}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{sppt}}}(\mathcal{Z})$ is the advantage of adversary \mathcal{Z} in distinguishing m GLWR samples (with sparse-ternary secrets) from uniform, with the GLWR problem defined for the parameters d, n, q_1, q_2 .

Theorem A.4.0.1 via a sequence of IND-CPA games shown in Tables 21 to 24, following the methodology of Peikert et al. in [73, Lemma 4.1] and that of [24, Theorem 3.3]. Steps for combining samples using rounding from q to p and samples using rounding from p to t are due to [37]. Game G_0 is the actual CPA-PKE game. For convenience, the steps of `r5.cpa.pke.encrypt(pk, m, ρ)` are written out explicitly. Moreover, we write χ_S for the uniform distribution on $\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h)$.

In Game G_1 , \mathbf{M}_β is the matrix that has zero coefficients in all positions not picked up by Sample_μ and satisfies $\text{ECC_Enc}_{\kappa,f}(m_\beta) = \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{M}_\beta)$. Clearly,

$$\Pr(S_0) = \Pr(S_1) \quad (38)$$

Table 21: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_pke: games G_0 and G_1

| Game G_0 | Game G_1 |
|--|---|
| 1. $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{A} = f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}(\sigma)$ | 1. $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{A} = f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}(\sigma)$ |
| 2. $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{S} = f_S(s)$ | 2. $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{S} = f_S(s)$ |
| 3. $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 3. $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ |
| 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. |
| 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$ | 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$ |
| 6. $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{R} = f_R(\rho)$ | 6. $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{R} = f_R(\rho)$ |
| 7. $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 7. $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ |
| 8. $\mathbf{v} = \langle \text{Sample}_\mu(\text{R}_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \text{ECC_Enc}_{\kappa, f}(m_\beta) \rangle_t$ | 8. $\mathbf{V} = \langle (\text{R}_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_\beta \rangle_t$ |
| 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}), st)$ | 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), (\mathbf{U}, \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{V})), st)$ |
| 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. | 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. |

Games G_1 and G_2 only differ in the generation of \mathbf{A} . A distinguisher between $\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n})$ and F_τ , defined as the distribution of $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}(\sigma)$ with $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$, can be constructed as follows. On input $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$, perform steps 2-10 of game G_1 . The output β' is distributed as in game G_1 if \mathbf{A} is distributed according to F_τ , and is distributed as in game G_2 if \mathbf{A} is distributed uniformly. We conclude that there is a distinguisher \mathcal{B} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}), F_\tau}(\mathcal{B}) = |\Pr(S_1) - \Pr(S_2)|. \quad (39)$$

Games G_2 and G_3 only differ in the generation of the secret matrix \mathbf{S} . We denote the distribution of $f_S(s)$ with $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ by G_S . Similarly to the reasoning for Games G_1 and G_2 , there is a distinguisher \mathcal{C} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{G_S, \chi_S^\pi}(\mathcal{C}) = |\Pr(S_2) - \Pr(S_3)|. \quad (40)$$

Games G_3 and G_4 only differ in the generation of \mathbf{B} . Consider the following algorithm. On input $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}) \in \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n} \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$, run steps 3-10 from game G_3 . As (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}) is distributed like $O_{m, \chi_S, \bar{n}, \mathbf{S}}$ in game G_3 and uniformly in game G_4 , we conclude that there is a distinguisher \mathcal{X} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{O_{m, \chi_S, \bar{n}, \mathbf{S}}, \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n} \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}})}(\mathcal{X}) = |\Pr(S_3) - \Pr(S_4)| \quad (41)$$

By using a standard hybrid argument, we infer that there is a distinguisher \mathcal{E} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{O_{m, \chi_S, \bar{n}, \mathbf{S}}, \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n} \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}})}(\mathcal{X}) \leq \bar{n} \cdot \text{Adv}_{O_{m, \chi_S, \bar{1}, \mathbf{S}}, \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n} \times \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times 1})}(\mathcal{E}) \quad (42)$$

Table 22: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_pke: games G_2 and G_3

| Game G_2 | Game G_3 |
|---|---|
| 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ |
| 2. $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{S} = f_S(s)$ | 2. $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{\$} \chi_{\overline{\mathbf{S}}}$ |
| 3. $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 3. $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ |
| 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. |
| 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$. | 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$. |
| 6. $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{R} = f_R(\rho)$ | 6. $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{R} = f_R(\rho)$ |
| 7. $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\phi_{n+1}})$ | 7. $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\phi_{n+1}})$ |
| 8. $\mathbf{V} = \langle (\text{R}_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_b \rangle_t$ | 8. $\mathbf{V} = \langle (\text{R}_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_b \rangle_t$ |
| 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), (\mathbf{U}, \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{V})), st)$ | 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), (\mathbf{U}, \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{V})), st)$ |
| 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. | 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. |

Games G_4 and G_5 only differ in the generation of the secret matrix \mathbf{R} . We denote the distribution of $f_R(\rho)$ with $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ by G_R . Similarly to the reasoning for games G_1 and G_2 , there is a distinguisher \mathcal{D} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{G_R, \chi_{\overline{\mathbf{S}}}^m}(\mathcal{D}) = |\Pr(S_4) - \Pr(S_5)|. \quad (43)$$

Now consider Games G_5 and G_6 . As p divides q , $\langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p$ is uniformly distributed. By definition of the rounding function,

$$\mathbf{V}' \equiv \lfloor \frac{t}{p} (\langle \mathbf{B}_q^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi + h_2 \mathbf{J}) \rfloor + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_b \pmod{\frac{tq}{p}}.$$

As p divides q and $\mathbf{B}_q \equiv \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p \pmod{p}$,

$$\mathbf{V}'' \equiv \lfloor \frac{t}{p} (\langle \mathbf{B}_q^T \rangle_p \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi + h_2 \mathbf{J}) \rfloor + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_b \pmod{t}.$$

As a result, the pairs (\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{v}) in Game G_5 and $(\langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p, \langle \mathbf{v}' \rangle_t)$ in Game G_6 have the same distribution, and so

$$\Pr(S_5) = \Pr(S_6). \quad (44)$$

We now consider games G_6 and G_7 . We will use the following lemma.

Lemma A.4.0.1. *Let a, b, c be positive integers such that $a|b|c$. Then for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$*

$$\lfloor \frac{a}{c} x \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{a}{b} \lfloor \frac{b}{c} x \rfloor \rfloor$$

Proof Write $m = \frac{c}{b}$ and $n = \frac{b}{a}$. It is sufficient that to show that

$$\lfloor \frac{x}{mn} \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{1}{n} \lfloor \frac{x}{m} \rfloor \rfloor.$$

Table 23: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_pke: games G_4 and G_5

| Game G_4 | Game G_5 |
|---|---|
| 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ |
| 2. - | 2. - |
| 3. $\mathbf{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$ | 3. $\mathbf{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$ |
| 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. |
| 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$. | 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p)$. |
| 6. $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{R} = f_R(\rho)$ | 6. $\mathbf{R} \xleftarrow{\$} \chi_S^{\bar{m}}$ |
| 7. $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 7. $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ |
| 8. $\mathbf{V} = \langle (\text{R}_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_b \rangle_t$ | 8. $\mathbf{V} = \langle (\text{R}_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_b \rangle_t$ |
| 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), (\mathbf{U}, \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{V})), st)$ | 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), (\mathbf{U}, \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{V})), st)$ |
| 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. | 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. |

We write $x = mn \lfloor \frac{x}{mn} \rfloor + y$ with $0 \leq y < mn$. Obviously, $\frac{1}{n} \lfloor \frac{x}{m} \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{x}{mn} \rfloor + \frac{1}{n} \lfloor \frac{y}{m} \rfloor$. As $0 \leq y < mn$, it holds that $0 \leq \frac{y}{m} < n$ and so $0 \leq \lfloor \frac{y}{m} \rfloor \leq n - 1$. \square

Applying the above lemma, we infer that $(\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{V}')$ in Game G_6 and $(\mathbf{U}', \mathbf{V}'')$ in Game G_7 are related as $\mathbf{U} = \lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}' \rfloor$ and $\mathbf{V}' \equiv \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{V}'' \rfloor \pmod{\frac{tq}{p}}$. As a result,

$$\Pr(S_6) = \Pr(S_7). \quad (45)$$

In Game G_8 , the variable $\begin{bmatrix} \text{R}_{q \rightarrow z, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\phi_{n+1}}) \\ \text{R}_{q \rightarrow z, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi) \end{bmatrix}$ from Game G_7 is replaced by the $(d/n + \bar{n}) \times \bar{m}$ matrix $\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{U}'' \\ \mathbf{W}' \end{bmatrix}$ with entries uniformly drawn from $\mathcal{R}_{n,z}$. As $h_2 = \frac{q}{2z}$, $\text{R}_{q \rightarrow z, h_2} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow z}$. Moreover, if $\xi = \Phi_{n+1}$, the first variable in fact equals $\text{R}_{q \rightarrow z}(\langle \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{A}^T \\ \mathbf{B}^T \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{R} \rangle_\phi)$. We infer that there exists a distinguisher \mathcal{E} such that

$$\text{Adv}_{d,n,d/n+\bar{n},q,z}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{spt}}}(\mathcal{A} \circ \mathcal{Z}) = |\Pr(S_7) - \Pr(S_8)| \quad (46)$$

As all inputs to \mathcal{A} in Game G_8 are uniform, $\Pr(S_8) = \frac{1}{2}$, and so

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{CPA-PKE}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) = |\Pr(S_0) - \Pr(S_8)| = \left| \sum_{i=0}^7 \Pr(S_i) - \Pr(S_{i+1}) \right| \leq \sum_{i=0}^7 |\Pr(S_i) - \Pr(S_{i+1})|. \quad (47)$$

By combining (38)-(47), the theorem follows.

Table 24: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_pke: games G_6 , G_7 and G_8

| Game G_6 | Game G_7 | Game G_8 |
|--|---|---|
| 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ |
| 2. - | 2. - | |
| 3. $\mathbf{B}_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$ | 3. $\mathbf{B}_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$ | 3. $\mathbf{B}_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{n}}$ |
| 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 4. Choose $\beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. |
| 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p)$. | 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p)$. | 5. $(m_0, m_1, st) = \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p)$. |
| 6. $\mathbf{R} \xleftarrow{\$} \chi_S^{\bar{m}}$ | 6. $\mathbf{R} \xleftarrow{\$} \chi_S^{\bar{m}}$ | |
| 7. $\mathbf{U} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 7. $\mathbf{U}' = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow z, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}}) \quad z = \max(p, tq/p)$ | 7. $\mathbf{U}'' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,z}^{d/n \times \bar{m}}$ |
| 8. $\mathbf{V}' = \langle (\text{R}_{q \rightarrow tq/p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}_q^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{t}{b} \mathbf{M}_b \rangle_{tq/p}$ | 8. $\mathbf{V}'' = \langle (\text{R}_{q \rightarrow z, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}_q^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)) + \frac{pz}{qb} \mathbf{M}_b \rangle_z$ | 8. $\mathbf{W} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,z}^{\bar{n} \times \bar{m}}, \mathbf{V}''' = \langle \mathbf{W} + \frac{pz}{qb} \mathbf{M}_b \rangle_z$ |
| 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p), (\mathbf{U}, \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle \mathbf{V}' \rangle_t), st))$ | 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p), (\langle \lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}' \rfloor \rangle_p, \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{V}'' \rfloor \rangle_t), st))$ | 9. $\beta' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p), (\langle \lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}'' \rfloor \rangle_p, \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{V}''' \rfloor \rangle_t), st))$ |
| 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. | 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. | 10. return $[(\beta' = \beta)]$. |

A.5 IND-CPA Security for RLWE-based Round5 variant with different reduction polynomials

As described in Section 1.4.1, the merged parameters of Round5 require that the reduction polynomial $\xi(x)$ used in the computation of the ciphertext component \mathbf{v} and in decryption equals $x^{n+1} - 1$. The proof of the IND-CPA security of r5_cpa_pke presented in Section A.4, however, only applies if $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$. The reason is that otherwise the replacement of $(\mathbf{U}', \mathbf{V}'')$ by random matrices in the transition from game G_7 to game G_8 cannot be directly related to the difficulty of GLWR with one single reduction polynomial.

Next we argue why this construction is secure: First, Round5 uses function Sample_μ that selects μ coefficients out of $n + 1$. We show how it prevents known distinguishing attacks such as the “Evaluate at 1” attack [52]. Second, we discuss an extension of the IND-CPA security proof in Section A.4 for a RLWE-variant of Round5. The existence of this proof for the RLWE case gives strong confidence in the Round5 parameters using error correction. Finally, we discuss why this proof does not directly translate to an RLWR based design and a simple design change in Round5 that would make it work, but that we have not introduced since it does not bring major benefits from a concrete security viewpoint.

Distinguishing attack at $x = 1$. In this section, the well-known “Evaluate at $x = 1$ ” distinguishing attack [52] is described that can be applied if $\xi(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$ and $\mu = n + 1$. Next, it is argued that this attack cannot be applied in Round5 if $\mu \leq n$. As a shorthand, $N(x)$ is written instead of $x^{n+1} - 1$.

Consider a pair of polynomials $(b(x), v(x))$ with $b(x)$ uniformly distributed on $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]/(x^{n+1} - 1)$ and $v(x) = \langle \text{Sample}_\mu(\lfloor \frac{t}{p}(\langle b(x)r(x) \rangle_{N(x)} + h_2) \rfloor) + \frac{t}{b}m(x) \rangle_t$ with $r(x)$ drawn independently and uniformly from the ternary polynomials of degree at most $n-1$ satisfying $r(1) = 0$, and $m(x)$ drawn according to some distribution on $\mathbb{Z}_b[x]/(x^\mu - 1)$. We then have that $v(x) \equiv \lfloor \text{Sample}_\mu(\frac{t}{p}(\langle b(x)r(x) \rangle_{N(x)} + h_2)) \rfloor + \frac{t}{b}m(x) \pmod{t}$, and so $w(x) = \frac{p}{t}v(x)$ satisfies

$$w(x) \equiv \text{Sample}_\mu(\langle b(x)r(x) \rangle_{N(x)}) + \frac{p}{t} \cdot h_2 \sum_{i=0}^{\mu-1} x^i - \frac{p}{t} \epsilon(x) + \frac{p}{b} m(x) \pmod{p}.$$

where $\epsilon(x)$ is the result of rounding downwards, so all components of $\frac{p}{t}\epsilon(x)$ are in $[0, \frac{p}{t}) \cap \mathbb{Z}$. As $(x-1)$ divides both $r(x)$ and $N(x)$, it follows that $x-1$ divides $\langle b(x)r(x) \rangle_{N(x)}$, and so if $\mu = n+1$, then

$$w(1) \equiv \frac{p}{t} \cdot h_2 \cdot (n+1) - \frac{p}{t} \sum_{i=0}^n \epsilon_i + \frac{p}{b} m(1) \pmod{p}.$$

For large n , the value of $\frac{p}{t} \sum_{i=0}^n \epsilon_i$ is close to its average, i.e., close to $n \frac{p}{2t}$. As a result, has maxima at values $\frac{p}{t} h_2(n+1) - n \frac{p}{2t} + \frac{p}{b} k$ for $0 \leq k \leq b-1$. So $w(1)$ can serve as a distinguisher between the above distribution and the uniform one. Now assume that $\mu < n+1$. We take $\mu = n$, which is the case giving most information to the attacker. Writing $f(x) = \langle b(x)r(x) \rangle_{N(x)} = \sum_{i=0}^n f_i x^i$, it holds that

$$w(1) \equiv \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i + \frac{p}{t} \cdot h_2 \cdot n - \frac{p}{t} \epsilon(1) + \frac{p}{b} m(1) \pmod{p}.$$

As shown above, $f(1) = 0$, and so $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i = -f_n$. Hence, under the assumption that f_n is distributed uniformly modulo p , also $w(1)$ is distributed uniformly modulo p . The latter assumption is supported by [75].

Requirements for IND-CPA Security – Design rationale. An IND-CPA Security proof is feasible for a RLWE variant of `r5_cpa_pke`, i.e., a Round5 variant where the noise is independently generated. This proof is presented below and gives confidence in Round5's design and choices made.

The proof requires the secrets to be a multiple of $(x-1)$ and also the noise polynomial for the ciphertext component v to be a multiple of $(x-1)$ (this is used in an essential step of the proof, specifically in the map Ψ in (56)) This last requirement is the reason why this proof does not apply to Round5 with $\xi(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$ using RLWR defined as *component-wise rounding*. This deterministic component-wise rounding does not allow enforcing that the noisy “rounding” polynomials are multiples of $(x-1)$.

Round5's design can be adapted to use a slightly different type of rounding informally named as “rounding to the root lattice”¹ - that allows the IND-CPA

¹We thank Léo Ducas for helpful discussions on this topic.

proof to work. This “rounding to the root lattice” would work in three steps: (1) perform component-wise rounding as currently done by rounding (down) from a higher modulus q to a smaller one p ; (2) compute the difference k between the sum of the rounded coefficients and the next multiple of p ; and (3) add 1 to the k rounded smallest coefficients. The components of the rounding noise computed in this way adds up to “0” so that the IND-CPA proof works.

However, this modification – going from component-wise rounding to rounding to the root lattice – would introduce additional complexity and changes in Round5’s design with no clear concrete security benefits. First, Sample_μ gets rid of $n + 1 - \mu$ coefficients so that knowing k is irrelevant. Second, concrete security attacks use the norm of the noise that hardly changes if rounding to the root lattice is employed. Because of these two reasons, we argue that the current Round5 design (and the rounding used in it) is sound and secure, and further modifications are not required.

IND-CPA Proof for RLWE-based variant of Round5. We now present the proof of IND-CPA security for the RLWE variant of `r5_cpa_pke`. We restrict ourselves to the case $B = 1$, that is, one single bit is extracted from each symbol.

The following notation will be used. We write $\phi(x) = 1 + x + \dots + x^n$, and $N(x) = x^{n+1} - 1$, where $n + 1$ is prime. Moreover, $R_\phi = \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\phi(x)$, and

$$R_0 = \{f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^n f_i x^i \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x] \mid \sum_{i=0}^n f_i \equiv 0 \pmod{q}\} \quad (48)$$

As $N(x) = (x - 1)\phi(x)$, it holds that $\langle (x - 1)f(x) \rangle_{N(x)} = (x - 1)\langle f(x) \rangle_{\phi(x)}$ for any $f \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$. As a result, $f(x) \mapsto (x - 1)f(x)$ is a bijection from R_ϕ to R_0 .

In the proof, the following lemma will be used.

Lemma A.5.0.1. *Let q and $n + 1$ be relatively prime, and let $(n + 1)^{-1}$ be the multiplicative inverse of $n + 1$ in \mathbb{Z}_q . The mapping \mathcal{F} defined as*

$$\mathcal{F} : \left(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i x^i \right) \mapsto \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i x^i - (n + 1)^{-1} \cdot \left(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i \right) \cdot \phi(x)$$

is a bijection from R_ϕ to R_0 .

Proof. It is easy to see that \mathcal{F} maps R_ϕ to R_0 . To show that \mathcal{F} is a bijection, let $g(x) = \sum_{i=0}^n g_i x^i \in R_0$, and let $f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^n \langle g_i - g_n \rangle_q x^i$. Clearly, $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$ has degree at most $n - 1$, and by direct computation, $\mathcal{F}(f(x)) = g(x)$. \square

In the description below, \mathcal{S} denotes a set of secrets such that

$$\mathcal{S} \subset \{f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i x^i \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x] \mid \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i \equiv 0 \pmod{q}\}, \quad (49)$$

Moreover, \mathcal{M} denotes a message space, and ECC_Enc and ECC_Dec are error correcting encoding and decoding algorithms such that

$$\{ECC_Enc(m) \mid m \in \mathcal{M}\} \subset \{f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^n f_i x^i \in \mathbb{Z}_2[x] \mid \sum_{i=0}^n f_i \equiv 0 \pmod{2}\}. \quad (50)$$

Moreover, χ denotes a probability distribution on R_ϕ .

For understanding Algorithm 15 below, note that as $(x-1)|s(x)$, we have that $su' \equiv sa'r + se_1 \pmod{N}$, and, as $(x-1)|r(x)$, that $rb' \equiv ra's + re_0 \pmod{N}$. As a consequence,

$$\zeta \equiv v - su' \equiv \frac{q}{2} ECC_Enc(m) + (x-1)e_2 + re_0 - se_1 \pmod{N}, \text{ whence}$$

$$\lfloor \frac{2}{q} \zeta \rfloor \equiv ECC_Enc(m) + \lfloor \frac{2}{q} ((x-1)e_2 + re_0 - se_1) \rfloor \pmod{N}.$$

Algorithm 13: CPA-PKE.Keygen()

```

1  $a' \xleftarrow{\$} R_\phi, s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}, e_0 \leftarrow \chi$ 
2  $b' = \langle a's + e_0 \rangle_\phi$ 
3  $pk = (a', b')$ 
4  $sk = s$ 
5 return  $(pk, sk)$ 
```

Algorithm 14: CPA-PKE.Enc($pk = (a', b'), m \in \mathcal{M}$)

```

1  $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}, e_1, e_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \chi$ 
2  $u' = \langle a'r + e_1 \rangle_\phi$ 
3  $v = \langle \frac{q}{2} ECC\_Enc(m) + b'r + (x-1)e_2 \rangle_N$ 
4  $ct = (u', v)$ 
5 return  $ct$ 
```

Algorithm 15: CPA-PKE.Dec(sk, ct)

```

1  $\zeta = \langle v - su' \rangle_N$ 
2  $\hat{m} = ECC\_Dec(\lfloor \frac{2\zeta}{q} \rfloor_2)$ 
3 return  $\hat{m}$ 
```

We are now in a position to prove the following result.

Theorem A.5.0.1. *For every IND-CPA adversary \mathcal{A} with advantage A , there exist algorithms C and E such that*

$$A \leq \text{Adv}_1(C) + \text{Adv}_3(E). \quad (51)$$

Here Adv_1 refers to the advantage of distinguishing between the uniform distribution on $(\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\phi(x))^2$ and the R-LWE distribution

$$(a', b' = \langle a's + e_0 \rangle_\phi) \text{ with } a' \xleftarrow{\$} R_\phi, s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}, e_0 \leftarrow \chi \quad (52)$$

Similarly, Adv_3 refers to the advantage of distinguishing between the uniform distribution on $(\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\phi(x))^4$ and the distribution of two R-LWE samples with a common secret, given by

$$(a', b'', u', v') \text{ with } a', b'' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\phi(x), u = \langle a'r + e_1 \rangle_\phi, \quad (53)$$

$$v = \langle b''r + e_2 \rangle_\phi \text{ with } r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}, e_1, e_2 \leftarrow \chi \quad (54)$$

Proof. We prove the theorem using a sequence of IND-CPA games. We denote by S_i the event that the output of game i equals 1.

Game G_0 is the original IND-CPA game. In Game G_1 , the public key (a', b') is replaced by a pair (a', b') uniformly drawn from R_ϕ^2 . It can be shown that there exists an algorithm C for distinguishing between the uniform distribution on R_ϕ^2 and the R-LWE distribution of pairs (a', b') with $a' \xleftarrow{\$} R_\phi, b' = \langle as' + e_0 \rangle_\phi$ with $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}$ and $e_0 \leftarrow \chi$ such that

$$\text{Adv}_1(C) = |\Pr(S_0) - \Pr(S_1)|.$$

In Game G_2 , the values $u' = \langle a'r + e_1 \rangle_\phi$ and $\hat{v} = \langle b'r + (x-1)e_2 \rangle_N$ used in the generation of v are simultaneously substituted with uniform random variables from R_ϕ and R_0 , respectively. it can be shown that there exists an adversary \mathcal{D} with the same running time as that of \mathcal{A} such that

$$\text{Adv}_2(\mathcal{D}) = |\Pr(S_1) - \Pr(S_2)|.$$

Here Adv_2 refers to the advantage of distinguishing between the uniform distribution on $R_\phi^3 \times R_0$ and the distribution

$$(a', b', u', v) = (a', b', \langle a'r + e_1 \rangle_\phi, \langle b'r + (x-1)e_2 \rangle_N) \text{ with } a', b' \xleftarrow{\$} R_\phi, r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}, e_1, e_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \chi. \quad (55)$$

Because of (50), the value of the ciphertext v in Game G_2 is independent of bit b , and therefore $\Pr(S_2) = 1/2$. As a final step, we define $\Psi : R_\phi^3 \times R_0 \rightarrow R_\phi^4$ as

$$\Psi(a'(x), b'(x), u'(x), v(x)) = (a'(x), b''(x), u'(x), v'(x)) \text{ with} \quad (56)$$

$$b''(x) = \frac{\mathcal{F}(b'(x))}{x-1}, v'(x) = \frac{v(x)}{x-1} \quad (57)$$

As \mathcal{F} is a bijection from R_ϕ to R_0 (see Lemma A.5.0.1) and $f(x) \mapsto \frac{f(x)}{x-1}$ is a bijection from R_0 to R_ϕ , it follows that Ψ is a bijection. Writing $b(x) = \mathcal{F}(b'(x))$, we infer that

$$b(x)r(x) = b'(x)r(x) - (n+1)^{-1}b'(1)\phi(x)r(x) \equiv b'(x)r(x) \pmod{N(x)},$$

where the latter equivalence holds as $r(x)$ is a multiple of $(x-1)$, and so

$$v(x) = \langle b'(x)r(x) + (x-1)e_2(x) \rangle_N = \langle b(x)r(x) + (x-1)e_2(x) \rangle_N.$$

As $r(x)$ is a multiple of $x-1$, it follows that $v(x) \in R_0$ and that

$$v'(x) = \frac{v(x)}{x-1} \equiv \langle b''(x)r(x) + e_2(x) \rangle_\phi \text{ where } b''(x) = \frac{b(x)}{x-1}.$$

As a result, the advantage of $\mathcal{E} = \Psi \circ \mathcal{D}$ in distinguishing between the uniform distribution on R_ϕ^4 and the distribution

$$(a', b'', u', v') \text{ with } a, b'' \xleftarrow{\$} R_\phi, u'(x) = \langle a'r + e_1 \rangle_\phi \text{ and } v' = \langle b''r + e_2 \rangle_\phi$$

is equal to $\text{Adv}_2(D)$. Note that (a, u') and (b'', v') are two R-LWE samples with common secret $r(x) \in \mathcal{S}$, with a', b'' chosen uniformly in \mathcal{R}_ϕ and independent noise polynomials $e_1(x)$ and $e_2(x)$.

As $\Pr(S_2) = \frac{1}{2}$, we conclude that

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) = |\Pr(S_0) - \Pr(S_2)| \leq \sum_{i=0}^1 |\Pr(S_i) - \Pr(S_{i+1})| = \text{Adv}_1(\mathcal{C}) + \text{Adv}_2(\mathcal{E}).$$

□

A.6 IND-CPA Security of `r5_cpa_kem`

This section presents a proof that `r5_cpa_kem` is IND-CPA secure, based on the hardness of the decision GLWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets. In the proof, instead of using $pk = (\sigma, \mathbf{B})$, we use $pk = (\mathbf{A} = f_{d,n}^\tau(\sigma), \mathbf{B})$. The distribution of $f_{d,n}^\tau(\sigma)$ with $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$ is denoted by F_τ . Moreover, the uniform distribution $\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h)$ is denoted by χ_S . The proof is restricted to the case $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$.

Theorem A.6.0.1. *Let b, p, q, t be powers of two such that $b|t|p|q$, and let $z = \max(p, tq/p)$. Furthermore, assume that $\xi(x) = \Phi_{n+1}(x)$. If $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$, f_S and f_R induce distributions indistinguishable from uniform, and H is a secure pseudo-random function, then `r5_cpa_kem` is IND-CPA secure under the hardness assumption of the Decision-GLWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets. More precisely, if $\text{Adv}_{\text{r5_cpa_kem}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A})$ is the advantage of adversary \mathcal{A} in distinguishing a key encapsulated using `r5_cpa_kem` from random, then there exist distinguishers $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}$ such that*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{r5_cpa_kem}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}), F_\tau}(\mathcal{B}) + \text{Adv}_{G_S, \chi_S^\pi}(\mathcal{C}) + \text{Adv}_{G_R, \chi_S^\pi}(\mathcal{D}) \\ &\quad + \bar{n} \cdot \text{Adv}_{d,n,d/n,q,p}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{spt}}}(\mathcal{E}) + \text{Adv}_{d,n,d/n+\bar{n},q,z}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{spt}}}(\mathcal{F}) + \text{Adv}_{G_H, \mathcal{U}(\{0,1\}^\kappa)}(\mathcal{G}) \end{aligned} \quad (58)$$

In this equation, F_τ is the distribution of $f_{d,n}^{(\tau)}$ with $\sigma \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$, G_S is the distribution of $f_S(s)$ with $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and G_R is the distribution of $f_R(\rho)$ with $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$. Moreover, $\text{Adv}_{d,n,m,q_1,q_2}^{\text{dGLWR}_{\text{sp}}(\mathcal{Z})}$ is the advantage of adversary \mathcal{Z} in distinguishing m GLWR samples (with sparse-ternary secrets) from uniform, with the GLWR problem defined for the parameters d, n, q_1, q_2 . Finally, G_H is the distribution of $H(x)$ with $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{\kappa+\lambda_1}$ with $\lambda_1 = d \cdot \bar{n} \log_2(p) + \mu \log_2(t)$.

Proof. The proof for Theorem A.6.0.1, proceeds via a similar sequence of games as in the proof of Theorem A.4.0.1, shown in Tables 25 to 28. Again, S_i denotes the event that the output in game G_i equals 1. As the sequence of games is essentially the same as for the proof of Theorem A.4.0.1, we focus on the essential difference, which is game G_8 . Game G_8 differs from game G_7 only in the generation of K_0 . As p, q, t all are powers of two and $z = \max(\frac{tq}{p}, p)$, p divides z and tq divides pz . As a result, in games G_7 and G_8 , $\lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}'' \rfloor$ is uniformly distributed on $\mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \bar{m}}$. Also, as \mathbf{W}''' in games G_7 and G_8 is uniformly distributed on $\mathcal{R}_{n,z}^{\bar{n} \times \bar{m}}$, the vector $\lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{v}''' \rfloor$ is uniformly distributed on $\mathbb{Z}_{\frac{tq}{p}}$. As t divides $\frac{tq}{p}$, the vector $\langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{v}''' \rfloor \rangle_t$ is uniformly distributed on \mathbb{Z}_t . We conclude that the input to H in game G_7 is uniform. Therefore, there exists a distinguisher between the uniform distribution on $\{0,1\}^\kappa$ and the distribution of $H(x)$ with $x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{\kappa+\lambda_1}$ (where $\lambda_1 = d \cdot \bar{n} \log_2(p) + \mu \log_2(t)$) with advantage equal to $|\Pr(S_7) - \Pr(S_8)|$. As the input to \mathcal{A} in game G_8 is uniform, $\Pr(S_8) = \frac{1}{2}$. \square

Table 25: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_kem: Games G_0 and G_1

| Game G_0 | Game G_1 |
|--|--|
| 1. $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow F_\tau$ | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ |
| 2. $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{S} = f_S(s)$ | 2. $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$; $\mathbf{S} = f_S(s)$; |
| 3. $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 3. $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ |
| 4. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$. | 4. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$. |
| 5. $(ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}), K_0) = \text{r5_cpa_kem_encapsulate}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$. | 5. $(ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}), K_0) = \text{r5_cpa_kem_encapsulate}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$. |
| 6. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$. | 6. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$. |
| 7. $b' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), ct, K_b)$. | 7. $b' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), ct, K_b)$. |
| 8. Output $[(b' = b)]$. | 8. Output $[(b' = b)]$. |

A.7 IND-CCA security of r5_cca_pke

In this section, it is shown that r5_cca_pke is IND-CCA secure. As r5_cca_pke is constructed from r5_cca_kem and a secure data-encapsulation mechanism as proposed by Cramer and Shoup [36], it is sufficient to show the IND-CCA security of r5_cca_kem. Indeed, as stated in Theorem A.7.0.1, when the hash

Table 26: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_kem: Games G_2 and G_3

| Game G_2 | Game G_3 |
|--|--|
| 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$ |
| 2. $\mathbf{S} \leftarrow \chi_{\overline{\mathbf{S}}}$ | 2. - |
| 3. $\mathbf{B} = \text{R}_{q \rightarrow p}(\langle \mathbf{A}\mathbf{S} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 3. $\mathbf{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \overline{n}}$ |
| 4. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 4. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. |
| 5. $(ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}), K_0) = \text{r5_cca_kem_encapsulate}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$. | 5. $(ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}), K_0) = \text{r5_cca_kem_encapsulate}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$. |
| 6. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. | 6. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. |
| 7. $b' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), ct, K_b)$. | 7. $b' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), ct, K_b)$. |
| 8. Output $[(b' = b)]$. | 8. Output $[(b' = b)]$. |

functions G and H in Algorithms 8 and 9 are modeled as random oracles, the key-encapsulation mechanism `r5_cca_kem` defined in Section 1.4.4 is IND-CCA secure, assuming the hardness of the decision GLWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets.

Theorem A.7.0.1. *For any adversary \mathcal{A} that makes at most q_H queries to the random oracle H , at most q_G queries to the random oracle G , and at most q_D queries to the decryption oracle, there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{CCA-KEM}^{IND-CCA}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{CPA-PKE}^{IND-CPA}(\mathcal{B}) + q_G \cdot \delta + \frac{2q_G + q_H + 1}{2^{\mu B}} \quad (59)$$

when `r5_cpa_pke` and `r5_cca_kem` both have a probability of decryption/decapsulation failure that is at most δ .

Proof. The proof of Theorem A.7.0.1 proceeds via two transformation reductions due to [50]. First, Lemma A.7.0.1 establishes that the OW-PCA² security of the deterministic public-key encryption scheme PKE_1 obtained from the public-key encryption scheme PKE via transformation T [50], tightly reduces to IND-CPA security of PKE_1 . This lemma is a special case of [50, Theorem 3.2] with $q_v = 0$, since by definition OW-PCA security is OW-PCVA³ security where the attacker is not allowed to query the ciphertext validity checking oracle.

Lemma A.7.0.1 (Adapted from [50, Theorem 3.2]). *Assume PKE to be δ correct. Then, for any OW-PCA adversary \mathcal{B} that issues at most q_G queries to the random oracle G , q_P queries to a plaintext checking oracle PCO , there exists an IND-CPA adversary \mathcal{C} such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{PKE_1}^{\text{OW-PCA}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq q_G \cdot \delta + \frac{2q_G + 1}{|\mathcal{M}|} + 3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{PKE}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{C}) \quad (60)$$

²The security notion of One-Way against Plaintext Checking Attacks.

³The security notion of OW-PCA, with access to a ciphertext Validity checking oracle.

Table 27: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_kem: Games G_4 and G_5

| Game G_4 | Game G_5 |
|---|---|
| 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}, \mathbf{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,p}^{d/n \times \overline{n}}.$ | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}, \mathbf{B}_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times \overline{n}}.$ |
| 2. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}.$ | 2. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}.$ |
| 3. $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa, \zeta = ECC_Enc_{\kappa,f}(m)$ | 3. $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa, \zeta = ECC_Enc_{\kappa,f}(m)$ |
| 4. $\mathbf{R} \xleftarrow{\$} (\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h))^{1 \times \overline{m}}.$ | 4. $\mathbf{R} \xleftarrow{\$} (\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h))^{1 \times \overline{m}}$ |
| 5. $\mathbf{U} = R_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ | 5. $\mathbf{U} = R_{q \rightarrow p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$ |
| 6. $\mathbf{W} = R_{p \rightarrow t, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)$ | 6. $\mathbf{W}' = R_{q \rightarrow tq/p, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}_q^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)$ |
| 7. $\mathbf{v} = \langle \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{W}) + \frac{t}{b} \zeta \rangle_t$ | 7. $\mathbf{v}' = \langle \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{W}') + \frac{t}{b} \zeta \rangle_{tq/p}$ |
| 8. $K_0 = H(m, \text{bin}_1(ct = (\mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v}))).$ | 8. $K_0 = H(m, \text{bin}_1(ct = (\mathbf{U}, \langle \mathbf{v}' \rangle_t))).$ |
| 9. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa.$ | 9. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa.$ |
| 10. $b' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}), ct, K_b).$ | 10. $b' = \mathcal{A}((\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p), ct, K_b).$ |
| 11. Output $[(b' = b)].$ | 11. Output $[(b' = b)].$ |

where \mathcal{M} is the message/plaintext space of the public-key encryption schemes PKE and PKE_1 .

Next, combination of Lemma A.7.0.1 and the reduction in [50, Theorem 3.4] shows that the IND-CCA security of a KEM with implicit rejection that is constructed using a non-deterministic PKE (like r5_cca_kem), tightly reduces to the IND-CPA security of said PKE. \square

Direct application of [50, Theorem 4.6], similarly as in [24, Theorem 4.2], shows that r5_cca_kem is IND-CCA secure in the quantum random oracle model. The resulting security bound however is not tight.

Theorem A.7.0.2. *For any quantum adversary \mathcal{A} that makes at most q_H queries to the quantum random oracle H , at most q_G queries to the quantum random oracle G , and at most q_D (classical) queries to the decapsulation oracle, there exists a quantum adversary \mathcal{B} such that*

$$Adv_{CCA-KEM}^{IND-CCA}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 4q_H \sqrt{q_D \cdot q_H \cdot \delta + q_G \cdot \sqrt{Adv_{CPA-PKE}^{IND-CPA}(\mathcal{B})}} \quad (61)$$

A.8 Hardness of Sparse-Trinary LWR

In this section, we prove the hardness of the Decision-LWR problem with sparse-ternary secrets assuming that the small modulus p divides the large modulus q . Figure 4 provides an overview of the reductions involved in the proof of the main result, Theorem A.8.0.1.

Table 28: IND-CPA games for r5_cpa_kem: Games G_6 , G_7 and G_8

| Game G_6 | Game G_7 | Game G_8 |
|--|--|--|
| 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$, $\mathbf{B}_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times \overline{n}}$. | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$, $\mathbf{B}_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times \overline{n}}$. | 1. $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times d/n}$, $\mathbf{B}_q \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,q}^{d/n \times \overline{n}}$. |
| 2. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 2. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. | 2. Choose $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. |
| 3. $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$, $\zeta = ECC_Enc_{\kappa,f}(m)$ | 3. $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$, $\zeta = ECC_Enc_{\kappa,f}(m)$ | 3. $m \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$, $\zeta = ECC_Enc_{\kappa,f}(m)$ |
| 4. $\mathbf{R} \xleftarrow{\$} (\mathcal{H}_{n,d/n}(h))^{1 \times \overline{m}}$. | 4. - | 4. - |
| 5. $\mathbf{U}' = R_{q \rightarrow z, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{A}^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_{\Phi_{n+1}})$, $z = \max(p, tq/p)$ | 5. $\mathbf{U}'' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,z}^{d/n \times \overline{m}}$ | 5. $\mathbf{U}'' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{n,z}^{d/n \times \overline{m}}$ |
| 6. $\mathbf{W}'' = R_{q \rightarrow z, h_2}(\langle \mathbf{B}_q^T \mathbf{R} \rangle_\xi)$ | 6. $\mathbf{W}''' \xleftarrow{\$} R_{n,z}^{\overline{n} \times \overline{m}}$ | 6. $\mathbf{W}''' \xleftarrow{\$} R_{n,z}^{\overline{n} \times \overline{m}}$ |
| 7. $\mathbf{v}'' = \langle \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{W}'') + \frac{pz}{qb} \zeta \rangle_z$ | 7. $\mathbf{v}''' = \langle \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{W}''') + \frac{pz}{qb} \zeta \rangle_z$ | 7. $\mathbf{v}''' = \langle \text{Sample}_\mu(\mathbf{W}''') + \frac{pz}{qb} \zeta \rangle_z$ |
| 8. $H\left(m, \text{bin}_1\left(ct = \left(\lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}' \rfloor, \langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{v}'' \rfloor \rangle_t\right)\right)\right) =$ | 8. $H\left(m, \text{bin}_1\left(ct = \left(\lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}'' \rfloor, \langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{v}''' \rfloor \rangle_t\right)\right)\right) =$ | 8. $K_0 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ |
| 9. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. | 9. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. | 9. $K_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. |
| 10. $\mathcal{A}\left(\left(\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p\right), \left(\lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}' \rfloor, \langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{v}'' \rfloor \rangle_t\right), K_b\right) =$ | 10. $\mathcal{A}\left(\left(\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p\right), \left(\lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}'' \rfloor, \langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{v}''' \rfloor \rangle_t\right), K_b\right) =$ | 10. $\mathcal{A}\left(\left(\mathbf{A}, \langle \mathbf{B}_q \rangle_p\right), \left(\lfloor \frac{p}{z} \mathbf{U}'' \rfloor, \langle \lfloor \frac{tq}{pz} \mathbf{v}''' \rfloor \rangle_t\right), K_b\right) =$ |
| 11. Output $[b' = b]$. | 11. Output $[(b' = b)]$. | 10. Output $[(b' = b)]$. |

Theorem A.8.0.1. Let $k, p, q \geq 1$ and $m \geq n \geq h \geq 1$ be integers such that p divides q , and $k \geq m' = \frac{q}{p} \cdot m$. Let $\epsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, and $\alpha, \delta > 0$ such that

$$\alpha \geq q^{-1} \sqrt{(2/\pi) \ln(2n(1 + \epsilon^{-1}))}, \quad \binom{n}{h} 2^h \geq q^{k+1} \cdot \delta^{-2}, \quad \text{and } m = O\left(\frac{\log n}{\alpha \sqrt{10h}}\right)$$

There exist three (transformation) reductions from $\mathbf{dLWE}_{k,m',q,D_\alpha}$ to $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m',q,D_{\alpha\sqrt{10h}}}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$ such that for any algorithm for the latter problem with advantage ζ , at least one of the reductions produces an algorithm for the former with advantage at least

$$(\zeta - \delta)/(3m') - 41\epsilon/2 - \sum_{s|q, s \text{ prime}} s^{-k-1}.$$

Moreover, there is a reduction from $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m',q,D_{\alpha\sqrt{10h}}}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$ to $\mathbf{dLWR}_{n,m,q,p}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$.

Proof. Combination of Lemma A.8.0.1 and Lemma A.8.0.4 with $\alpha' = \alpha\sqrt{10h}$. \square

Theorem A.8.0.1 implies the hardness of the sparse-ternary LWR problem $\mathbf{LWR}_{\text{spt}}$ based on the hardness of the LWE problem with uniformly random secrets in \mathbb{Z}_q and Gaussian errors.




Figure 4: Summary of reductions used in Theorem A.8.0.1. “SPT” refers to a variant of the problem in question where the secret is sparse-ternary, instead of uniform in \mathbb{Z}_q^d .

Step 1: Reduction from LWE with secrets in \mathbb{Z}_q and Gaussian errors to Sparse-ternary LWE: In [32, Theorem 1], specializing [31, Theorem 4], it is shown that if $\binom{n}{h} 2^h > q^{k+1}$ and $\omega > \alpha \sqrt{10h}$, then the $\text{dLWE}_{n, m, q, D_\omega}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$ problem is at least as hard as the $\text{dLWE}_{k, m, q, D_\alpha}$ problem. More formally, generalizing [28, Theorem 4.1], the following holds.

Lemma A.8.0.1. *Let $k, q \geq 1$ and $m \geq n \geq h \geq 1$ be integers, and let $\epsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$, and $\alpha, \delta > 0$ such that*

$$\alpha \geq q^{-1} \sqrt{(2/\pi) \ln(2n(1 + \epsilon^{-1}))}, \text{ and } \binom{n}{h} 2^h \geq q^{k+1} \cdot \delta^{-2}$$

There exist three (transformation) reductions from $\text{dLWE}_{k, m, q, D_\alpha}$ to $\text{dLWE}_{n, m, q, D_{\alpha \sqrt{10h}}}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$ such that for any algorithm for the latter problem with advantage ζ , at least one of the reductions produces an algorithm for the former with advantage at least

$$(\zeta - \delta)/(3m) - 41\epsilon/2 - \sum_{s|q, s \text{ prime}} s^{-k-1}.$$

Step 2: Reduction from Sparse-ternary LWE to Sparse-ternary LWR: Bai et al. provide in [15, Theorem 6.4] a reduction from LWE with Gaussian

noise to LWR, that is based on two independent reductions It can readily be seen that one of these reductions [15, Theorem 6.3] holds for any secret distribution with support on $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n*} = \{(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \mid \gcd(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, q) = 1\}$, and therefore can be applied to the case when the secret is chosen from $\{-1, 0, 1\}^n$. The other reduction [15, Theorem 5.1] however, implicitly assumes the secret to be chosen uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^n . Below, we describe an extension of [15, Theorem 5.1] that describes a reduction from LWE with Gaussian noise and sparse ternary secrets reduces to LWR with sparse-ternary secrets. Below, we will describe such an extension. U_B denotes the continuous uniform distribution in $[-B, \dots, B]$.

Lemma A.8.0.2 (Adapted from [15, Theorem 5.1]). *Let n, m, q be positive integers. Let $\alpha, B > 0$ be real numbers with $B = \Omega(m\alpha/\log n)$ and $Bq \in \mathbb{Z}$. Let $m > \log \binom{n}{h} 2^h / \log(\alpha + B)^{-1} \geq 1$. Then there is a polynomial time reduction from $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,D_\alpha}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$ to $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\phi}(\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{H}_n(h)))$ with $\phi = \frac{1}{q} \lfloor qU_B \rfloor$.*

Proof. The reduction proceeds similar to that of [15, Theorem 5.1], relying on five steps. Steps 1, 3, 4 below proceed exactly as in [15, Theorem 5.1]. For steps 2 and 5, we mention our adaptations in order to prove the reduction for the case of sparse-ternary secrets, and the resulting conditions. We omit details for brevity.

1. A reduction from $\text{dLWE}_{n,m,q,D_\alpha}$ to $\text{dLWE}_{n,m,q,\psi}$, with $\psi = D_\alpha + U_B$.
2. A reduction from $\text{dLWE}_{n,m,q,\psi}$ to $\text{sLWE}_{n,m,q,\psi}$. We adapt the corresponding step in [15, Theorem 5.1] to work for the uniform distribution on $\mathcal{H}_n(h)$ instead of the uniform distribution on \mathbb{Z}_q^n . This results in the bound on m as stated in the lemma.
3. A reduction from $\text{sLWE}_{n,m,q,\psi}$ to sLWE_{n,m,q,U_B} .
4. A reduction from sLWE_{n,m,q,U_B} to $\text{sLWE}_{n,m,q,\phi}$, with $\phi = \frac{1}{q} \lfloor qU_B \rfloor$.
5. A reduction from $\text{sLWE}_{n,m,q,\phi}$ to $\text{dLWE}_{n,m,q,\phi}$. Since the modulus q is not a prime, the argument from [15, Theorem 5.1] cannot be applied. Instead, we extend an argument due to Regev (see, e.g., [79]) to prove the search-to-decision reduction, which requires that Bq is an integer. We first state an easy lemma.

Lemma A.8.0.3. *Let $a > 1$, and let ϕ be the discrete probability distribution obtained by rounding the continuous uniform probability on $[-a, a]$ to the closest integer. If a is an integer, then $\sum_{k \text{ even}} \phi(k) = \sum_{k \text{ odd}} \phi(k) = \frac{1}{2}$.*

Proof. For $|k| \leq \lfloor a \rfloor - 1$, the interval $[k - \frac{1}{2}, k + \frac{1}{2}]$ is a subset of $[-a, a]$, so that $\sum_{k \equiv 1 - \lfloor a \rfloor \pmod{2}} \phi(k) = \sum_{j=0}^{\lfloor a \rfloor - 1} \phi(2j - \lfloor a \rfloor + 1) = \frac{\lfloor a \rfloor}{2a}$. \square

We are now in a position to extend Regev's reduction. Let ϕ be a probability distribution on \mathbb{Z}_q such that $\sum_k \phi(2k) = \sum_k \phi(2k+1) = \frac{1}{2}$. For each $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, the probability distribution $A_{\mathbf{s},\phi}$ on $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ is obtained by choosing $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ uniformly, choosing e according to ϕ , and outputting $(\mathbf{a}, (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}) + e)$ where the additions are modulo q . If qB is integer, then a distinguisher for $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m,q,\phi}(D_s)$ can be used to construct a solver for $\mathbf{sLWE}_{n,m,q,\phi}(D_s)$ for any secret distribution D_s supported on $\{-1, 0, 1\}^n$, where ϕ is the discrete noise $\frac{1}{q} \lfloor qU_B \rfloor$. Note that if Bq is integer, the noise ϕ is distributed as $\phi(k) = \frac{1}{2B}$ for $|k| \leq B-1$, and $\phi(B) = \phi(-B) = \frac{1}{4B}$.

We now show that if Bq is integer, then a distinguisher for deciding between uniform samples $(\mathbf{a}, u) \in U(\mathbb{Z}_q^n) \times U(\mathbb{Z}_q)$ and samples (\mathbf{a}, b) from $A_{\mathbf{s},\phi}$ for some unknown $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S} \subset \{-1, 0, 1\}^n$ can be used for solving. We show how to find s_1 , the first coordinate of a secret. For each $k \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, we consider the following transformation. For each pair (\mathbf{a}, b) , we choose a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and output $(\mathbf{a}', b') = (\mathbf{a} + (r, 0, \dots, 0), b + rk)$. Clearly, this transformation takes the uniform distribution to itself. So let us now assume that $b = (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}) + e$ for some $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{S}$ and some error e . Then $b' = (\mathbf{a}', \mathbf{s}) + r(k - s_1) + e$. If $k = s_1$, then (\mathbf{a}', b') is from $A_{\mathbf{s},\phi}$. If $|k - s_1| = 1$, then $r(k - s_1)$ is uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q , and so (\mathbf{a}', b') follows the uniform distribution. Finally, we can have that $|k - s_1| = 2$. We consider $k - s_1 = 2$, the other case being similar. We then have that $b' = (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}) + 2r + e \pmod{q}$. If q is odd, then $2r$ is uniformly distributed on \mathbb{Z}_q , so that (\mathbf{a}', b') is uniformly distributed. If q is even, then $2r$ is distributed uniformly on the even elements of \mathbb{Z}_q . With our specific error distribution, e is even with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, so that $2r + e$ is distributed uniformly on \mathbb{Z}_q . So also in this case, (\mathbf{a}', b) is distributed uniformly. □

Finally, we state the reduction from $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m,q,D_\alpha}$ to $\mathbf{dLWR}_{n,m,q,p}$, for the sparse-ternary secret distribution.

Lemma A.8.0.4. *Let p, q be positive integers such that p divides q . Let $\alpha' > 0$. Let $m' = m \cdot (q/p)$ with $m = O(\log n / \alpha')$ for $m' \geq m \geq n \geq 1$. There is a polynomial time reduction from $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m',q,D_{\alpha'}}$ to $\mathbf{dLWR}_{n,m,q,p}$, both defined for the sparse-ternary secret distribution.*

Proof. Let $B = q/2p$. The reduction has two steps:

1. A reduction from $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m',q,D_{\alpha'}}$ to $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m',q,\phi}$, where $B = \Omega(m'\alpha' / \log n)$. due to Lemma A.8.0.2.
2. A reduction from $\mathbf{dLWE}_{n,m',q,\phi}$ to $\mathbf{dLWR}_{n,m,q,p}$, due to [15, Theorem 6.3].

As $m' = m \cdot (q/p) = (q/p)O(\frac{\log n}{\alpha'})$, it follows that $B = q/2p = \Omega(m'\alpha' / \log n)$, so that Lemma A.8.0.2 indeed is applicable. □

Note that the conditions imposed by Lemma A.8.0.2 imply that $1/\alpha$ must at least grow linearly in n . This is a common bottleneck in all known LWE to LWR reductions [15, 21, 16].

References

- [1] Divesh Aggarwal, Daniel Dadush, Oded Regev, and Noah Stephens-Davidowitz. Solving the shortest vector problem in 2^n time via discrete Gaussian sampling. In *STOC*, pages 733–742, 2015.
- [2] Miklós Ajtai. The shortest vector problem in L_2 is NP-hard for randomized reductions. In *STOC*, pages 10–19, 1998.
- [3] Miklós Ajtai, Ravi Kumar, and Dandapani Sivakumar. A sieve algorithm for the shortest lattice vector problem. In *STOC*, pages 601–610, 2001.
- [4] Martin Albrecht, Léo Ducas, Gottfried Herold, Elena Kirshanova, Eamonn Postlethwaite, and Marc Stevens. The general sieve kernel and new records in lattice reduction. *Preprint*, 2018.
- [5] Martin R. Albrecht. On dual lattice attacks against small-secret LWE and parameter choices in HELib and SEAL. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/047, 2017. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/047>.
- [6] Erdem Alkim, Léo Ducas, Thomas Pöppelmann, and Peter Schwabe. Post-quantum key exchange - a new hope. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/1092, 2015. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1092>.
- [7] Joel Alwen, Stephan Krenn, Krzysztof Pietrzak, and Daniel Wichs. Learning with rounding, revisited: New reduction, properties and applications. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/098, 2013. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/098>.
- [8] Alexandr Andoni, Thijs Laarhoven, Ilya Razenshteyn, and Erik Waingarten. Optimal hashing-based time-space trade-offs for approximate near neighbors. In *SODA*, pages 47–66, 2017.
- [9] Yoshinori Aono and Phong Q. Nguyen. Random sampling revisited: lattice enumeration with discrete pruning. In *EUROCRYPT*, 2017.
- [10] Yoshinori Aono, Phong Q. Nguyen, and Yixin Shen. Quantum lattice enumeration and tweaking discrete pruning. In *ASIACRYPT*, 2018.
- [11] Hayo Baan, Sauvik Bhattacharya, Oscar Garcia-Morchon, Ronald Rietman, Ludo Tolhuizen, Jose-Luis Torre-Arce, and Zhenfei Zhang. Round2: KEM and PKE based on GLWR, November 2017.
- [12] Hayo Baan, Sauvik Bhattacharya, Oscar Garcia-Morchon, Ronald Rietman, Ludo Tolhuizen, Jose-Luis Torre-Arce, and Zhenfei Zhang. Round2: KEM and PKE based on GLWR. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/1183, 2017.
- [13] L. Babai. On Lovász’ lattice reduction and the nearest lattice point problem. *Combinatorica*, 6(1):1–13, 1986.

- [14] Shi Bai and Steven D. Galbraith. Lattice Decoding Attacks on Binary LWE. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/839, 2013. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/839>.
- [15] Shi Bai, Adeline Langlois, Tancrede Lepoint, Amin Sakzad, Damien Stehle, and Ron Steinfeld. Improved security proofs in lattice-based cryptography: using the Rényi divergence rather than the statistical distance. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/483, 2015. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/483>.
- [16] Abhishek Banerjee, Chris Peikert, and Alon Rosen. Pseudorandom functions and lattices. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/401, 2011. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/401>.
- [17] Anja Becker, Léo Ducas, Nicolas Gama, and Thijs Laarhoven. New directions in nearest neighbor searching with applications to lattice sieving. In *SODA*, pages 10–24, 2016.
- [18] Anja Becker and Thijs Laarhoven. Efficient (ideal) lattice sieving using cross-polytope LSH. In *AFRICACRYPT*, pages 3–23, 2016.
- [19] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In *Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS '93*, pages 62–73, New York, NY, USA, 1993. ACM.
- [20] Sauvik Bhattacharya, Oscar Garcia-Morchon, Ronald Rietman, and Ludo Tolhuizen. spKEX: An optimized lattice-based key exchange. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/709, 2017. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/709>.
- [21] Andrej Bogdanov, Siyao Guo, Daniel Masny, Silas Richelson, and Alon Rosen. On the Hardness of Learning with Rounding over Small Modulus. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/769, 2015. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/769>.
- [22] Dan Boneh, Özgür Dagdelen, Marc Fischlin, Anja Lehmann, Christian Schaffner, and Mark Zhandry. Random oracles in a quantum world. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/428, 2010. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/428>.
- [23] Joppe Bos, Craig Costello, Léo Ducas, Ilya Mironov, Michael Naehrig, Valeria Nikolaenko, Ananth Raghunathan, and Douglas Stebila. Frodo: Take off the ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/659, 2016. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/659>.
- [24] Joppe Bos, Léo Ducas, Eike Kiltz, Tancrede Lepoint, Vadim Lyubashevsky, John M. Schanck, Peter Schwabe, and Damien Stehlé. CRYSTALS – Kyber: a CCA-secure module-lattice-based KEM. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/634, 2017. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/634>.

- [25] Joppe Bos, Léo Ducas, Eike Kiltz, Tancrede Lepoint, Vadim Lyubashevsky, John M. Schanck, Peter Schwabe, and Damien Stehlé. CRYSTALS – Kyber: a CCA-secure module-lattice-based KEM. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/634, 2017.
- [26] Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, Michael Naehrig, and Douglas Stebila. Post-Quantum Key Exchange for the TLS Protocol from the Ring Learning with Errors Problem. In *2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2015, San Jose, CA, USA, May 17-21, 2015*, pages 553–570, 2015.
- [27] Joppe W. Bos, Michael Naehrig, and Joop van de Pol. Sieving for shortest vectors in ideal lattices: a practical perspective. *International Journal of Applied Cryptography*, pages 1–23, 2016.
- [28] Zvika Brakerski, Adeline Langlois, Chris Peikert, Oded Regev, and Damien Stehlé. Classical Hardness of Learning with Errors. In *Proceedings of the Forty-fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC '13*, pages 575–584, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
- [29] Yuanmi Chen and Phong Q. Nguyen. BKZ 2.0: Better lattice security estimates. In Dong Hoon Lee and Xiaoyun Wang, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2011*, volume 7073 of *LNCS*, pages 1–20. Springer, 2011.
- [30] Yuanmi Chen and Phong Q. Nguyen. BKZ 2.0: Better Lattice Security Estimates. In *Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT'11*, pages 1–20, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-Verlag.
- [31] Jung Hee Cheon, Kyoo Hyung Han, Jinsu Kim, Changmin Lee, and Yongha Son. A Practical Post-Quantum Public-Key Cryptosystem Based on sPLWE. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/1055, 2016. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1055>.
- [32] Jung Hee Cheon, Duhyeong Kim, Joohee Lee, and Yongsoo Song. Lizard: Cut off the Tail! Practical Post-Quantum Public-Key Encryption from LWE and LWR. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/1126, 2016. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1126>.
- [33] John H. Conway and Neil J.A. Sloane. *Sphere packings, lattices and groups*. Springer, 1999.
- [34] Jean-Sébastien Coron, Yevgeniy Dodis, Cécile Malinaud, and Prashant Puniya. Merkle-Damgård Revisited: How to Construct a Hash Function. In Victor Shoup, editor, *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2005*, pages 430–448. Springer, 2005.
- [35] Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup. Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2001/108, 2001.

- [36] Ronald Cramer and Victor Shoup. Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2001/108, 2001. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/108>.
- [37] Jan-Pieter D’Anvers, Angshuman Karmakar, Sujoy Sinha Roy, and Frederik Vercauteren. Saber: Module-LWR based key exchange, CPA-secure encryption and CCA-secure KEM. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/230, 2018.
- [38] TU Darmstadt. SVP challenge, 2018.
- [39] Léoucas. Shortest vector from lattice sieving: a few dimensions for free. In *EUROCRYPT*, 2018.
- [40] Morris J Dworkin. Sha-3 standard: Permutation-based hash and extendable-output functions. Technical report, National Institute for Standards and Technology, 2015.
- [41] FIPS. Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 2001.
- [42] FIPS. SHA-3 standard: Permutation-based hash and extendable-output functions. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 202, August 2015.
- [43] Tim Fritzmann, Thomas Pöppelmann, and Johanna Sepulveda. Analysis of error-correcting codes for lattice-based key exchange. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/150, 2018.
- [44] Nicolas Gama, Phong Q. Nguyễn, and Oded Regev. Lattice enumeration using extreme pruning. In *EUROCRYPT*, pages 257–278, 2010.
- [45] Lov K. Grover. A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search. In *Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, STOC ’96, pages 212–219. ACM, 1996.
- [46] Lov K. Grover. A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search. In *Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, STOC ’96, pages 212–219, New York, NY, USA, 1996. ACM.
- [47] Mike Hamburg. Graphs of “estimate all the LWE, NTRU schemes!” indexed to the “pqc lounge” data., 2017.
- [48] Guillaume Hanrot, Xavier Pujol, and Damien Stehlé. Analyzing blockwise lattice algorithms using dynamical systems. In *CRYPTO*, pages 447–464, 2011.
- [49] Gottfried Herold, Elena Kirshanova, and Thijs Laarhoven. Speed-ups and time-memory trade-offs for tuple lattice sieving. In *PKC*, pages 407–436, 2018.

- [50] Dennis Hoffheinz, Kathrin Hövelmanns, and Eike Kiltz. A Modular Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/604, 2017. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/604>.
- [51] Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, John M. Schanck, Joseph H. Silverman, William Whyte, and Zhenfei Zhang. Choosing Parameters for NTRUEncrypt, 2017.
- [52] Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph H. Silverman. NTRU: A ring-based public key cryptosystem. In Joe P. Buhler, editor, *Algorithmic Number Theory, Third International Symposium, ANTS-III, Portland, Oregon, USA, June 21-25, 1998, Proceedings*, pages 267–288. Springer, 1998.
- [53] Dennis Hofheinz, Kathrin Hövelmanns, and Eike Kiltz. A modular analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/604, 2017.
- [54] Nick Howgrave-Graham. A Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and Meet-in-the-Middle Attack Against NTRU. In Alfred Menezes, editor, *Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2007: 27th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19-23, 2007. Proceedings*, pages 150–169. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007.
- [55] Andreas Hülsing, Joost Rijneveld, John M. Schanck, and Peter Schwabe. High-speed key encapsulation from NTRU. In *Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2017 - 19th International Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, September 25-28, 2017, Proceedings*, pages 232–252, 2017.
- [56] Andreas Hülsing, Joost Rijneveld, John M. Schanck, and Peter Schwabe. High-speed key encapsulation from NTRU. In *Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2017 - 19th International Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, September 25-28, 2017, Proceedings*, pages 232–252, 2017.
- [57] Tsukasa Ishiguro, Shinsaku Kiyomoto, Yutaka Miyake, and Tsuyoshi Takagi. Parallel Gauss Sieve algorithm: Solving the SVP challenge over a 128-dimensional ideal lattice. In *PKC*, pages 411–428, 2014.
- [58] Ravi Kannan. Improved algorithms for integer programming and related lattice problems. In *STOC*, pages 193–206, 1983.
- [59] Subhash Khot. Hardness of approximating the shortest vector problem in lattices. In *FOCS*, pages 126–135, 2004.
- [60] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Korkin and Yegor Ivanovich Zolotarev. Sur les formes quadratiques. *Mathematische Annalen*, 6(3):366–389, 1873.
- [61] Thijs Laarhoven. *Search problems in cryptography*. PhD thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology, 2015.

- [62] Thijs Laarhoven. *Search problems in cryptography, From fingerprinting to lattice sieving*. PhD thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology, 2016.
- [63] Thijs Laarhoven and Artur Mariano. Progressive lattice sieving. In *PQCrypto*, 2018.
- [64] Thijs Laarhoven, Michele Mosca, and Joop van de Pol. Finding shortest lattice vectors faster using quantum search. *Designs, Codes and Cryptography*, 77(2):375–400, 2015.
- [65] Arjen Klaas Lenstra, Hendrik Willem Lenstra, and László Lovász. Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients. *Mathematische Annalen*, 261(4):515–534, 1982.
- [66] Vadim Lyubashevsky, Chris Peikert, and Oded Regev. On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors Over Rings. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/230, 2012. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/230>.
- [67] Ueli Maurer, Renato Renner, and Clemens Holenstein. Indifferentiability, impossibility results on reductions, and applications to the random oracle methodology. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/161, 2003.
- [68] Daniele Micciancio and Panagiotis Voulgaris. A deterministic single exponential time algorithm for most lattice problems based on Voronoi cell computations. In *STOC*, pages 351–358, 2010.
- [69] Daniele Micciancio and Michael Walter. Fast lattice point enumeration with minimal overhead. In *SODA*, pages 276–294, 2015.
- [70] Daniele Micciancio and Michael Walter. Practical, predictable lattice basis reduction. In *EUROCRYPT*, pages 820–849, 2016.
- [71] Michael Naehrig, Erdem Alkim, Joppe Bos, Leo Ducas, Karen Easlerbrook, Brian LaMacchia, Patrick Longa, Ilya Mironov, Valeria Nikolaenko, Christopher Peikert, Ananth Raghunathan, and Douglas Stebila. FrodoKEM. Technical report, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017. Available at <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-1-submissions>.
- [72] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Submission Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process. POST-QUANTUM CRYPTO STANDARDIZATION. Call For Proposals Announcement, 2016. <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-crypto/documents/call-for-proposals-final-dec-2016.pdf>.
- [73] Chris Peikert. Lattice cryptography for the internet. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/070, 2014. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/070>.

- [74] Chris Peikert, Oded Regev, and Noah Stephens-Davidowitz. Pseudorandomness of ring-LWE for any ring and modulus. In *Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2017, Montreal, QC, Canada, June 19-23, 2017*, pages 461–473, 2017.
- [75] Chris Peikert, Oded Regev, and Noah Stephens-Davidowitz. Pseudorandomness of Ring-LWE for Any Ring and Modulus, 2017.
- [76] Michael E. Pohst. On the computation of lattice vectors of minimal length, successive minima and reduced bases with applications. *ACM SIGSAM Bulletin*, 15(1):37–44, 1981.
- [77] Xavier Pujol and Damien Stehlé. Solving the shortest lattice vector problem in time $2^{2.465n}$. *Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/605*, pages 1–7, 2009.
- [78] Charles Rackoff and Daniel R. Simon. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack. In Joan Feigenbaum, editor, *Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '91: Proceedings*, pages 433–444. Springer, 1992.
- [79] Oded Regev. On Lattices, Learning with Errors, Random Linear Codes, and Cryptography. In *Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC '05*, pages 84–93, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
- [80] Oded Regev. The Learning with Errors Problem (Invited Survey). In *Proceedings of the 25th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, CCC 2010, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 9-12, 2010*, pages 191–204, 2010.
- [81] Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen. HILA5: Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Public Key Encryption Algorithm, November 2017.
- [82] Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen. Ring-LWE ciphertext compression and error correction: Tools for lightweight post-quantum cryptography. In *Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Workshop on IoT Privacy, Trust, and Security, IoTPTS '17*, pages 15–22. ACM, April 2017.
- [83] Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen. HILA5: On reliability, reconciliation, and error correction for Ring-LWE encryption. In Carlisle Adams and Jan Camenisch, editors, *SAC 2017*, volume 10719 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 192–212. Springer, 2018.
- [84] C. P. Schnorr and M. Euchner. Lattice Basis Reduction: Improved Practical Algorithms and Solving Subset Sum Problems. *Math. Program.*, 66(2):181–199, September 1994.

- [85] C. P. Schnorr and M. Euchner. Lattice basis reduction: Improved practical algorithms and solving subset sum problems. *Math. Program.*, 66(2):181–199, September 1994.
- [86] Claus-Peter Schnorr. A hierarchy of polynomial time lattice basis reduction algorithms. *Theoretical Computer Science*, 53(2–3):201–224, 1987.
- [87] Claus-Peter Schnorr and Horst Helmut Hörner. Attacking the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem by improved lattice reduction. In *EUROCRYPT*, pages 1–12, 1995.
- [88] Naftali Sommer, Meir Feder, and Ofir Shalvi. Finding the closest lattice point by iterative slicing. *SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics*, 23(2):715–731, 2009.
- [89] Thomas Wunderer. Revisiting the hybrid attack: Improved analysis and refined security estimates. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/733, 2016. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/733>.
- [90] Shang-Yi Yang, Po-Chun Kuo, Bo-Yin Yang, and Chen-Mou Cheng. Gauss sieve algorithm on GPUs. In *CT-RSA*, pages 39–57, 2017.