

OpTC Red Team Ground Truth

Day 1

Day 1 "Plain PowerShell Empire"

Summary:

Manually connected to Sysclient0201 and downloaded malicious PowerShell Empire stager stored in a batch file. Used priv escalation methods to obtain elevated agent. Used Mimikatz to collect credentials. Attempted to inject into LSASS but it failed. Used registry edits to establish persistence. Collected screenshot of desktop. Attempted network scanning methods. Created port scan script, imported into memory and ran against /24 network. Pivoted to Sysclient0402 with WMI.

On Sysclient0402, conducted ping sweep of /24 network. Pivoted to Sysclient0660 via WMI.

On Sysclient0660, used ipconfig through powershell to obtain ip. Used mimikatz in attempt to gather logged in user's password. Attempted process migration, failed. Attempted to inject shellcode, failed. Ran scripts to get information on Domain Controller. Downloaded file from C:/. Used WMI to pivot to DC1.

Killed all other agents.

On DC1, ran mimikatz. Obtained user hashes with lsadump. Pivoted to 14 stations. Killed all agents. End of day1.

C2:

server -- news.com:80

ip -- 132.197.158.98

delay -- 5 seconds

profile -- /admin/get.php,/news.php,/login/process.php|Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko

Client,AgentID, ReportedIP, PID

Sysclient0201 VL8B5T3U 142.20.56.202 5452
Sysclient0201 LUAVR71T 142.20.56.202 2952
Sysclient0402 NEK5H8GX 142.20.57.147 3168
Sysclient0660 DS29HY41 142.20.58.149 880
SYSCIENT0104 K9SW73AF 142.20.56.105 3160
SYSCIENT0205 MX9LTPSF 142.20.56.206 5012
SYSCIENT0321 AC5BVNRP 142.20.57.66 2980
SYSCIENT0255 HR3PK2ZF 142.20.57.0 3472
SYSCIENT0355 A83TU4KL 142.20.57.100 1884
SYSCIENT0503 872METCN 142.20.57.248 1472
SYSCIENT0462 FNP6XK89 142.20.57.207 2536
SYSCIENT0559 ANP2E69T 142.20.58.48 1400
SYSCIENT0419 XS3AWFB9 142.20.57.164 1700
SYSCIENT0609 325T9FEN 142.20.58.98 3460
SYSCIENT0771 75HYXEL3 142.20.59.4 4244
SYSCIENT0955 98GKNAFX 142.20.59.188 4760
SYSCIENT0874 LZFHNCES 142.20.59.107 5224
SYSCIENT0170 UD9R6S7T 142.20.56.171 644
DC1 XH32VTK5 142.20.61.130 1852

Log:

09/23/19 11:23:29 -- Manually accessed console on Sysclient0201 and navigated to news.com:8000 to download runme.bat, a malicious Powershell empire stager

09/23/19 11:24:19 -- Sysclient0201, closed firefox tab and deleted runme.bat

09/23/19 11:24:54 -- Successful checkin for Agent VL8B5T3U on Sysclient0201 ip 142.20.56.202

09/23/19 11:26:02 -- On Sysclient0201 agent VL8B5T3U, Used PowershellEmpire Module Bypasses UAC, which performs a registry modification of the "windir" value in "Environment" to bypass UAC.

09/23/19 11:26:38 -- On sysclient0201, successful checkin of elevated agent LUAVR71T

09/23/19 11:26:56 -- On Sysclient0201, killing agent VL8B5T3U

09/23/19 11:33:14 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, ran mimikatz to collect clear text passwords in memory

09/23/19 11:35:26 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, obtained password for user systemia.com\zleazer via mimikatz

09/23/19 11:37:15 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, used psinject to inject into the LSASS process

09/23/19 11:38:09 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, Process injection seems to have failed.

09/23/19 11:39:25 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, established persistence by modifying

HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Debug registry entry

09/23/19 11:40:41 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, obtained process listing by running ps through powershell

09/23/19 11:41:50 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, retried psinject into lsass

09/23/19 12:51:59 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, collected data collection by obtaining a screenshot of the desktop.

09/23/19 12:58:20 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, conducted ARP scan on /22 of 142.20.56.202

09/23/19 13:07:11 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, ARP scan failed. Attempting to use SMB on 142.20.56.204 with credentials from Sysclient0201

09/23/19 13:08:28 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, re-attempted ARP scan without setting any values.

09/23/19 13:15:48 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, executed ping sweep against 142.20.56.0/24
 09/23/19 13:24:36 -- On Sysclient0201 agent LUAVR71T, pivoted to Sysclient0402 using invoke_wmi
 09/23/19 13:25:41 -- On sysclient0402 agent NEK5H8GX checked in as an elevated agent
 09/23/19 13:29:47 -- On Sysclient0402 agent NEK5H8GX, imported and ran ping sweep script to run against 142.20.57.0/24
 09/23/19 13:35:22 -- On Sysclient0402 agent NEK5H8GX, pivoted to Sysclient0660 using invoke_wmi. Agent DS29HY41 checks in.
 09/23/19 13:38:31 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, used ipconfig to obtain IP
 09/23/19 13:40:38 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, used mimikatz to obtain cleartext passwords from memory
 09/23/19 13:44:23 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, attempted to migrate to local user process with psinject. Failed to inject.
 09/23/19 13:49:00 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, obtained list of processes with ps
 09/23/19 13:50:56 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, attempted to inject shellcode into process 4480. Injection failed.
 09/23/19 13:54:11 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, executed script to return domain controller information.
 09/23/19 13:56:48 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, imported and ran powershell script to find domain controllers
 09/23/19 14:02:12 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, downloaded file zipfldr.dll
 09/23/19 14:04:45 -- On Sysclient0660 agent DS29HY41, used invoke_wmi to pivot to domain controller 1. XH32VTK5 checks in on ip 142.20.58.149
 09/23/19 14:06:01 -- Killed agents Sysclient0201 LUAVR71T, Sysclient0402 NEK5H8GX and Sysclient0660 DS29HY41
 09/23/19 14:07:21 -- On DC1 agent XH32VTK5, ran mimikatz
 09/23/19 14:09:21 -- On DC1 agent XH32VTK5, gathered user hdorka's hashes using mimikatz's lsadump capability
 09/23/19 14:45:13 -- On DC1 agent XH32VTK5, used Invoke_wmi to spread to:
 SYSCLIENT0104,SYSCLIENT0170,SYSCLIENT0205,SYSCLIENT0255,SYSCLIENT0321,SYSCLIENT0355,SYSCLIENT0419,SYSCLIENT0462
 ,SYSCLIENT0503,SYSCLIENT0559,SYSCLIENT0609,SYSCLIENT0771,SYSCLIENT0874,SYSCLIENT0955
 09/23/19 15:24:33 -- On DC1 agent XH32VTK5, kill agents on:
 SYSCLIENT0104,SYSCLIENT0170,SYSCLIENT0205,SYSCLIENT0255,SYSCLIENT0321,SYSCLIENT0355,SYSCLIENT0419,SYSCLIENT0462
 ,SYSCLIENT0503,SYSCLIENT0559,SYSCLIENT0609,SYSCLIENT0771,SYSCLIENT0874,SYSCLIENT0955
 09/23/19 15:30:00 -- On Sysclient0201, removed registry persistence at HKCU:Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Debug

Day 2

Day 2 "Custom Powershell Empire"

Summary:

Sent phishing emails to two clients containing malicious macroless_word PowerShell empire stagers. Once checked in, the agents were used to switch to a separate PowerShell Empire server with configurations that were modified from default settings and were sent over https/443. Deathstar was used to automate enumerating the domain and obtaining an elevated shell on the domain controller.

The DC agent was used to pivot back to original target to obtain an elevated agent. Persistence was established using WMI subscriptions to call back at 10:00 or within 5 minutes of boot. Ran modules to enumerate the local system looking for vulnerabilities or important files.

Uploaded plink and created completed local port forwarding with ssh to the attacker server. Forwarded port 3389 to allow RDP into systemia through any network security devices. RDPed into target and used netcat to exfiltrate data. Used RDP to tunnel through two other hosts. On the final host, connected network share and exfiltrated a majority of files via netcat.

Cleaned up files and shut down RDP sessions. Used existing agent on DC to re infect five workstations for overnight C2.

Listener information:

Powershell launcher string -- "powershell -NoProfile -Sta -WindowStyle 1 -EncodedCommand"
 DefaultProfile -- "/news/current.php,/login/default.php,/admin/process.jsp|Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.167 Safari/537.36"
 DefaultDelay Between connections -- 30 seconds
 ServerVersion -- Apache
 IP: 202.6.172.98

Client, Agent, IP, PID

Sysclient0501 4BW2MKUF 142.20.57.246 648
 Sysclient0501 9HUGDCRL 142.20.57.246 5076
 Sysclient0501 6H8SZPCW 142.20.57.246 1748
 Sysclient0811 DS8V3RNH 142.20.59.44 3780
 DC1.systemia.com VUBW3KYE 142.20.61.130 3880
 Sysclient0010 6FEZ8L4N 142.20.56.11 3584
 Sysclient0069 EMK3VW7F 142.20.56.70 4152
 Sysclient0203 UXCSTKZ9 142.20.56.204 5388
 Sysclient0358 PE54DBYX 142.20.57.103 2984
 Sysclient0618 73FCWS1G 142.20.58.107 4060
 Sysclient0851 5BUEZALX 142.20.59.84 4652

Log:

09/24/19 10:28:56 -- Sent email with malicious word document to bantonio@systemia.com on Sysclient0501 and rsantilli@systemia.com on Sysclient0811 from sgerard@ameblo.jp
 09/24/19 10:36:51 -- On Sysclient0501, opened malicious attachment named payroll.docx. Agent K3G1U8DN checks in.
 09/24/19 10:40:14 -- On Sysclient0811, opened malicious attachment named payroll.docx. Agent DS8V3RNH checks in.

09/24/19 10:46:02 -- On Sysclient0501 agent K3G1U8DN, injected powershell script to pivot to PowerShell Empire on sports.com 202.6.172.98 port 443, Agent 4BW2MKUF checks in.

09/24/19 10:51:49 -- Killed agent K3G1U8DN on Sysclient0501

09/24/19 11:03:36 -- Started DeathStar to auto find and obtain access to domain controller

09/24/19 11:04:12 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, obtains domain SID

09/24/19 11:04:35 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, obtains list of 43 Domain Admins

09/24/19 11:05:39 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, queried to find domain controllers

09/24/19 11:09:08 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, started lateral movement

09/24/19 11:09:22 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, started domain privesc

09/24/19 11:09:44 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, attempting to elevate using bypassuac_eventvwr

09/24/19 11:10:32 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, searched for GPOs containing credentials using GPP SYSVOL privesc

09/24/19 11:13:32 -- Deathstar via Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, discovered current security context has admint o 1025 hosts.

09/24/19 11:20:19 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, obtained elevated agent on domain controller. Agent VUBW3KYE on DC1.systemia.com checks in.

09/24/19 11:23:27 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, attempted to bypassed UAC with module privesc/bypassuac_env which modifies registry entry of windir value in environment

09/24/19 11:23:45 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, privesc failed.

09/24/19 11:25:06 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, attempted bypassuac with privesc/bypassuac_fodhelper. Failed.

09/24/19 11:26:34 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 4BW2MKUF, used invoke wmi on localhost to obtain elevated Agent. Failed to elevated, normal agent 9HUGDCRL checked in.

09/24/19 11:31:17 -- On DC1.systemia.com agent VUBW3KYE, attempted to pivot to obtain elevated agent using WMI. Got access denied for Sysclient0501 and 0502

09/24/19 11:33:15 -- On DC1.systemia.com agent VUBW3KYE, pivoted to Sysclient0501 with an elevated agent by usign administrator credentials. Agent 6H8SZPCW checks in.

09/24/19 11:34:56 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 6H8SZPCW, set persistence using WMI subscription. Set to reach back at 10:00 everyday or within 5 minutes of boot.

09/24/19 11:35:53 -- Killed agents Sysclient0501 4BW2MKUF and Sysclient0501 9HUGDCRL

09/24/19 11:37:35 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 6H8SZPCW, used findtrusteddocuments to enumerate registry to determine any trusted documents and trusted locations.

09/24/19 11:39:38 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 6H8SZPCW, used winenum script with keywords "important,secret,classified" to search files and obtain host information

09/24/19 11:41:53 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 6H8SZPCW, ran script to check for windows privesc vectors.

09/24/19 11:45:13 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 6H8SZPCW, uploaded plink.exe

09/24/19 13:05:03 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 6H8SZPCW, validated upload worked with ls command

09/24/19 13:11:23 -- On Sysclient0501 agent 6H8SZPCW, started reverse ssh connection to port forward RDP port to attacker system. Lost contact with agent 6H8SZPCW.

09/24/19 13:19:38 -- On Sysclient0501, connected via RDP to host via forwarded port using sysadmin account.

09/24/19 13:25:46 -- Agent DS8V3RNH lost contact.

09/24/19 13:26:57 -- On Sysclient0501 via RDP session, downloaded fileTransfer1000.exe (nc.exe) from news.com:8080 via chrome.

09/24/19 13:31:29 -- On Sysclient0501 via RDP session, compressed documents in C:\documents for exfiltration.

09/24/19 13:44:34 -- On Sysclient0501 via RDP session, exfiltrated export.zip to news.com port 9999 using fileTransfer1000.exe (nc.exe)

09/24/19 13:45:12 -- On Sysclient0501 via RDP session, cleaned up fileTransfer1000.exe and export.zip

09/24/19 13:46:58 -- On Sysclient0501 via RDP session, RDPed to Sysclient0974

09/24/19 13:51:45 -- On Sysclient0974 via RDP session, browsed files in C:\documents

09/24/19 13:54:43 -- On Sysclient0974 via RDP session, RDPed to Sysclient0005

09/24/19 14:06:06 -- On Sysclient0005 via RDP session, mounted network share \\142.20.61.135\share

09/24/19 14:34:31 -- On Sysclient0005 via RDP session, added majority of share drive files to compressed folder name allgone.zip and moved to user Download folder.

09/24/19 14:37:02 -- On Sysclient0005 via RDP session, navigated to news.com:4445 and downloaded movingonup.exe (nc.exe)

09/24/19 15:04:14 -- On Sysclient0005 via RDP session, exported 3.5 gb exfil file allgona.zip

09/24/19 15:22:48 -- On Sysclient0005 via RDP session, cleaned up files in downloads folder

09/24/19 15:23:26 -- On Sysclient0005 closed RDP session.

09/24/19 15:27:32 -- On Sysclient0974 closed RDP session.

09/24/19 15:28:36 -- On Sysclient0501 closed RDP session.

09/24/19 15:42:36 -- On DC1.systemia.com agent VUBW3KYE, used invoke_wmi to spread to Sysclient0010,Sysclient0069,Sysclient0203,Sysclient0358,Sysclient0618,Sysclient0851

09/25/19 09:00:00 -- Agents ran overnight on: DC1.systemia.com VUBW3KYE, Sysclient0010 6FEZ8L4N, Sysclient0069 EMK3VW7F, Sysclient0203 UXCSTKZ9, Sysclient0358 PE54DBYX, Sysclient0618 73FCWS1G, Sysclient0851 5BUEZALX

09/25/19 10:00:00 -- Sysclinet0501 WMI Subcription persistence method activates, agent XVGHS45M checks in.

Day 3

Day 3 "Malicious Upgrade"

Summary:

Notepad plus was installed on hosts within Systemia but was susceptible to a malicious upgrade process. When updated, the software reached out to malicous server and downloads a binary named update.exe. The malicious binary contianed a reverse tcp meterpreter payload. It connected back to the server on port 8080. Software update was executed on two systems.

Once a connection was established, system level access was obtained. A shell was used to find local information and a network arp scan was used to identify potential targets. Built in meterpreter modules were used to enumerate local software and any shares.

The meterpreter agent was migrated from the initial one to lsass and mimikatz was used to collect clear text password and hashes. Persistence was established via an autorun registry entry. Timestomper was used to black the MAC times for files created by the persistence process. Added new admin user to attempt RDP connection.

On one client meterpreter was used to migrate to the lwabear process.

Attacker Server DNS Names:

[notepadplusplus-sourceforge.net](https://notepadplusplus.sourceforge.net)

microsoft.com

IP: 53.192.68.50

Meterpreter process on Sysclient0051

PID 2712 ckfGW.exe

Migrated to lsass

Meterpreter process on Sysclient0351

PID 1932 f.exe

migrated to lwabeats

09/25/19 10:29:42 -- On Sysclient0051, updated notepad++ which download malicious binary "update.exe" which is a meterpreter payload.

09/25/19 10:31:08 -- On Sysclient0051, obtained system via meterpreters get system module. Used named pipe impersonation in memory.

09/25/19 10:32:11 -- On Sysclient0051, used meterpreter to get cmd shell. Ran commands to find out information about local system.

09/25/19 10:33:55 -- On Sysclient0051, used arp scanner on 142.20.56.0/22

09/25/19 10:36:28 -- On Sysclient0051, used meterpreter enum modules to discover all installed applications

09/25/19 10:37:52 -- On Sysclient0051 used meterpreter enum_domain modules to identify domain controller

09/25/19 10:38:35 -- On Sysclient 0051, used meterpreter enum_shares to identify any shares on host

09/25/19 10:40:39 -- On Sysclient 0051, migrated from process 2712 ckfGW.exe to lsass 568

09/25/19 10:44:56 -- On Sysclient0051, ran mimikatz to collect cleartext passwords and hashes

09/25/19 10:48:43 -- On Sysclient0051, established persistence via meterpreter. Script written to C:\Windows\TEMP\myHbYXTPviwX.vbx. Installed Autorun at HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\RTqWvEHv

09/25/19 10:53:06 -- On Sysclient0051, used timestomp to edit MAC times of created files in C:\Windows\TEMP

09/25/19 11:07:41 -- On Sysclient0051, used get_gui to add administrator "admin" to administrators and RDP group

09/25/19 11:23:31 -- On Sysclient0351, conducted update to notepad++, which downloaded malicious update.exe binary which made connection back to attacker server

09/25/19 11:24:30 -- On Sysclient0351, migrated from process 1932 to 1256 lwabeat.

09/25/19 13:42:05 -- On Sysclient0051, RDPed to machine from attacker server.

09/25/19 14:24:03 -- Reran updated.exe on Sysclient0051