

- Who am I?
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- Overview
 - Introduction
 - Hardware
 - Software
 - Attacks



- NFC Introduction
 - What is NFC?
 - Near Field Communication
 - Set of standards for mobile devices for communicating between two devices, or a device and a tag in close proximity to one another.
 - Short range. 1-4cm typical
 - Frequency is 13.56MHz
 - » Also used by NXP MIFARE, PayPass, ePassports, HID iClass
 - Data rates are 106kbps, 212kbps, and 424kbp/s.
 - NFC Forum maintains NFC standards

- NFC Introduction
 - NFC Uses
 - Contactless Payment Systems
 - Google Wallet, ISIS,
 - » Provides the ability to make credit card payments over NFC
 - Data transfer between devices
 - Android Beam
 - » Uses NFC to bootstrap Bluetooth connection between devices
 - Samsung S Beam
 - » Uses NFC to bootstrap Wi-Fi Direct connection between devices
 - NFC tags
 - Similar to other RFID tags, but can be programmed to perform actions on the device reading them
 - > NFC door locks
 - Samsung EZon, Yale, Schlage, etc.

NFC Introduction

- Mobile devices with NFC chipsets (partial list)
 - Samsung Galaxy Nexus
 - Google Nexus 7 and 10
 - Google Nexus 4
 - Samsung Nexus S
 - Samsung Galaxy S series (2-4) (Note + Note II)
 - Motorola Droid Razr HD, M, and I
 - Blackberry Curve, Z10, Q10, Bold 9790, 9900/9930
 - HTC One SV, X, X+, XL, VX, Incredible S, Amaze 4G
 - HTC Windows Phone 8X
 - Nokia Lumia 610, 620, 810, 820, 822, 920 (Win Phone 8)
 - IPhone 5s?

- NFC Introduction
 - Standards
 - ISO/IEC 14443 A/B
 - Type A and Type B proximity cards
 - » Modulation and bit encoding different between A/B
 - > JIS X 6319-4
 - FeliCa
 - > ISO/IEC 18092
 - Covers P2P communication between NFC devices
 - Uses parts of ISO 14443 and JIS 6319-4
 - > ISO/IEC 15693
 - ISO standard for vicinity cards
 - Some NFC readers can read these cards as well
 - » Known as NFC-V

- NFC Introduction
 - 14443-1 Physical characteristics
 - 14443-2 Radio Frequency power and signal
 - 14443-3 Initialization and Anti-Collision
 - 14443-4 Transmission protocol


- NFC Introduction
 - Inductive Coupling
 - Initiator generates field / target modulates
 - Frequency = 13.56MHz (HF)
 - ASK modulation
 - PCD to PICC uses Modified Miller encoding and modulates at 100%.
 - PCD transmitting at 106 kbps, uses Modified Miller, 100%, ASK
 - PICC to PCD uses Manchester encoding and modulates at 10%.

- NFC Introduction
 - 3 modes of operation
 - Reader\Writer
 - Device behaves as a Proximity Coupling Device (PCD)
 - Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
 - Two devices exchange data, such as Android Beam
 - Card Emulation
 - Mobile device behaves as a PICC (Proximity Inductive Coupling Card)

NFC Introduction

- NDEF
 - NFC Data Exchange Format
 - Used to encapsulate data sent between two devices or a reader/writer and a card
 - NDEF Message
 - Contains one or more NDEF records (no limit on how many)
 - NDEF Record
 - Encapsulates an NDEF payload
 - Can be URI, Text, MIME Types, Handover Parameters, etc.
 - NDEF Payload
 - Application data carried in an NDEF record
 - Can be up to 2^31 1 octets in size (4096MB)
 - NDEF does not care about payload content

- NFC Introduction
 - NDEF Structure



NFC Introduction

NDEF Record Types

Record Type	Description	Full URI Reference	Specification Reference
Sp	Smart Poster	urn:nfc:wkt:Sp	NFC Forum Smart Poster RTD
Т	Text	urn:nfc:wkt:T	NFC Forum Text RTD
U	URI	urn:nfc:wkt:U	NFC Forum URI RTD
Gc	Generic Control	urn:nfc:wkt:Gc	NFC Forum Generic Control RTD**
Hr	Handover Request	urn:nfc:wkt:Hr	NFC Forum Connection Handover Specification
Hs	Handover Select	urn:nfc:wkt:Hs	NFC Forum Connection Handover Specification
Нс	Handover Carrier	urn:nfc:wkt:Hc	NFC Forum Connection Handover Specification
Sig	Signature	urn:nfc:wkt:Sig	NFC Forum Signature RTD

- NFC Introduction
 - URI Identifier Codes (partial list)

Value	Protocol
0x00	No Prepend
0x01	http://www.
0x02	https://www
0x03	http://
0x04	https://
0x05	tel:
0x06	mailto:
0x08	ftp://ftp.
0x09	ftps://

Value	Protocol
0x0A	sftp://
0x0B	smb://
0x0C	nfs://
0x0D	ftp://
0x0E	dav://
0x010	telnet://
0x011	map:
0x012	rtsp://
0x014	pop:

Value	Protocol	
0x15	sip:	
0x16	sips:	
0x17	tftp:	
0x18	btspp://	
0x19	btl2cap://	
0x1A	btgoep://	
0x1B	tcpobex://	
0x1C	irdaobex://	
0x1D	file://	

- NFC Introduction
 - NFC in Android
 - Mandatory on Android NFC devices
 - NfcA (ISO 14443-3A)
 - NfcB (ISO 14443-3B)
 - NfcF (JIS 6319-4)
 - NfcV (ISO 15693)
 - ISO-DEP (ISO 14443-4)
 - Ndef on Type 1-4
 - Optional
 - MIFARE
 - NfcBarcode
 - NdefFormatable

- NFC Introduction
 - NFC in Android
 - 1. Tag object created when tag is discovered
 - 2. Passed to an activity encapsulated in an intent
 - 3. Selects best activity to handle it
 - 1. Foreground Activity Dispatch
 - NDEF Data Dispatch
 - 3. Technology Dispatch
 - 4. Tag Dispatch
 - 4. Apps register intent filter in AndroidManifest.xml
 - Android 4.0 introduced Android Application Records
 - Embed package name of app in NDEF record and Android will launch that app when tag is scanned

- NFC Introduction
 - Reader\Writer mode
 - Device behaves as a Proximity Coupling Device (PCD)
 - PCD
 - » A card reader which reads tags based on IS014443 (PICC)
 - » Emits EMF to power the tag via induction
 - PICC
 - » Proximity Inductive Coupling Card
 - » A tag based on ISO14443
 - » Powered by the EMF created by the reader (PCD)
 - Provides compatibility with existing 13.56MHz RFID cards

- Reader\Writer mode
 - NFC Tag Types
 - > Type 1
 - Memory capacity is 96 bytes, expandable to 2KB
 - Read and re-write capable, user can configure as read-only
 - > Type 2
 - Memory capacity is 48 bytes, expandable to 2KB
 - Read and re-write capable, user can configure as read-only
 - > Type 3
 - Theoretical memory limit of 1MByte per service
 - Configured by manufacturer as read + re-write, or RO
 - > Type 4
 - Memory capacity varies, up to 32 KB per service
 - Configured by manufacturer as read + re-write, or RO

NFC Tags (partial list)

Name	Туре	Memory
Innovision Topaz	Type 1	96 bytes
NXP MIFARE Ultralight	Type 2	48 bytes
NXP MIFARE Ultralight C	Type 2	144 bytes
NXP NTAG203	Type 2	144 bytes
Sony FeliCa 4K	Type 3	4096 bytes
NXP DESFire EV1 2k	Type 4	2048 bytes
NXP DESFire EV1 4k	Type 4	4096 bytes
NXP DESFire EV1 8k	Type 4	8192 bytes
NXP SmartMX	Type 4	32 kBytes
NXP MIFARE Classic 1k	NXP Specific	768 bytes
NXP MIFARE Classic 4k	NXP Specific	3584 bytes

- Reader\Writer mode
 - NFC-V
 - Tags defined in ISO15693
 - ISO standard for vicinity cards
 - Communicates over 13.56MHz, same frequency as NFC
 - Not yet standardized in NFC forum specs
 - Code support exists in Android
 - android.nfc.tech.NfcV
 - > Tags:
 - HID ICLASS
 - TI Tag-it (TRF796x and TRF797x), and HF-I tags
 - STMicroelectronics
 - » Dual Interface EEPROM (M24LRxx).
 - » LRIxx family (LRI1K, LRI2K, LRIS2K and LRIS64K)

- NFC Introduction
 - Peer to Peer Mode (P2P)
 - Defined in ISO 18092 (NFCIP-1)
 - Two devices
 - Initiator = PCD
 - Target = PICC
 - Two modes:
 - Passive Mode Initiator generates field, target modulates
 - Active Mode Both initiator and target alternately generate fields
 - Frames: Polling Request, Polling Response, Transport

Preamble (48 bits)	SYNC (16 bits)	Payload	CRC

- Peer to Peer Mode (P2P)
 - Protocol Stack

SNEP

LLCP

ISO18092 (NFC)

- Peer to Peer Mode (P2P)
 - Protocols
 - LLCP (Logical Link Control Protocol)
 - Layer-2 protocol which supports P2P communication between two NFC enabled devices
 - Necessary for bi-directional communications
 - Two service types
 - » Connectionless (minimal setup)
 - » Connection-oriented (provides reliable delivery and flow control)
 - Three link services classes:
 - » Connectionless only
 - » Connection-oriented only
 - » Both connectionless and connection-oriented
 - Other protocols ride on top of it
 - » OBEX, IP, NPP, SNEP

- Peer to Peer Mode (P2P)
 - Protocols (cont.)
 - NPP (NDEF Push Protocol)
 - Built on top of LLCP and designed to push an NDEF message from one device to another.
 - Non standards based Android protocol (com.android.npp)
 - Used by default on Android from v2.3 v3.2
 - SNEP (Simple NDEF Exchange Protocol)
 - Allows two NFC-enabled devices to exchange NDEF messages while in P2P mode.
 - Uses LLCP connection-oriented transport to provide reliable data exchange.
 - Used by default on Android 4.0 (ICS) and later.

NFC Introduction

- Card Emulation
 - NFC-enabled device emulates a card, communicates with reader.
 - Secure Element communicates using ISO 7816-4 APDUs
 - Application Protocol Data Units
 - Provides compatibility with existing 13.56.MHz RFID readers
 - Reader (payment terminal, for example) generates magnetic field, and mobile device modulates it.

- NFC Introduction
 - Host Card Emulation (HCE)
 - Delivers commands received by the NFC controller to the Application Processor, instead of to the Secure Element
 - Supported in CyanogenMod 10
 - Can emulate ISO 14443-4
 - » EMV and JavaCard Apps

- Hardware
 - NFC Readers/Writers
 - Requirements:
 - » Libnfc compatibility
 - » Be able to do card emulation
 - » Be able to perform P2P
 - » Communicate with NFC-A, NFC-B, NFC-F and DEP targets
 - » Need to be able to abort commands, and cancel polling or acting as a target.
 - Readers/Writer Reference:
 - » http://nfc-tools.org/index.php?title=Devices_compatibility_matrix

- Hardware
 - NFC Readers/Writers
 - PN532 NFC/RFID Controller Breakout Board
 - Can read/write NFC tags
 - Interfaces: UART, SPI and I2C (two-wire)
 - Supports ISO14443 type A & B, FeliCa, and MIFARE tags
 - Supports Card Emulation Mode
 - Price: \$39.95
 - » https://www.adafruit.com/products/364
 - Great with a Raspberry Pi
 - » http://learn.adafruit.com/adafruit-nfc-rfid-on-raspberry-pi/overview

PN532 Breakout Board

- Hardware
 - NFC Readers/Writers
 - SCM SCL3711 Contactless Mobile Reader and Writer
 - Interfaces: USB
 - Chipset: PN533
 - Supports ISO14443 type A & B, FeliCa, and MIFARE tags
 - Supports Card Emulation Mode
 - Price: \$39.00



- Hardware
 - NFC Readers/Writers
 - OpenPCD2
 - » Open Source Hardware\Firmware for NFC/RFID hacking
 - » http://www.openpcd.org/OpenPCD_2_RFID_Reader_for_13.56MHz
 - Interfaces: HSU, SPI and I2C (two-wire)
 - NXP reader ASIC (can do MIFARE Crypto1)
 - Supports Card Emulation, reading and writing tags.
 - Chipset: PN532
 - Price: \$60.00
 - » Or build your own! ☺
 - Webstore closed atm ☺



- Hardware
 - NFC Readers/Writers
 - ACR122U (Read Only)
 - Frequency: HF 13.56MHz
 - Interface: <u>USB</u>
 - Chipset: PN53X
 - Price: \$40.00
 - Standards: PC/SC, CCID
 - Cards Supported:
 - MIFARE, ISO 14443 A\B, FeliCa, ISO/IEC 18092 NFC
 - Has issues being able to abort commands and deal with timeouts.
 - » acr122_usb driver corrects this to a degree




- Toolkit
 - Readers/Writers Popular Equipment
 - Proxmark3 (Read/Write/Playback)
 - Frequency: HF 13.56MHz, and LF 125kHz
 - Interface: USB
 - Other: Open/Programmable firmware
 - Price: \$399.00 (\$229 'naked')
 - » \$59 for HF antenna
 - Site: www.proxmark3.com



- Hardware
 - NFC Chipsets
 - NXP PN65N
 - PN512 NFC radio
 - 80C51 MCU running the firmware for the PN512
 - The combination of the 80C51 MCU and the PN512 NFC radio is known as the PN531
 - Interface to use SIM card as the Secure Element over SWP (Single Wire Protocol)
 - Embedded P5CN072 Secure Dual Interface PKI Smart Card Controller (SmartMX)
 - NXP PN544 chip is identical except it lacks the embedded Secure Element (P5CN072)



- Hardware
 - NFC Chipsets
 - NXP PN65N



- Hardware
 - Secure Element (SE)
 - Tamper resistant secure microcontroller
 - Will self-destruct if tampered with (sometimes accidently)
 - Can't utilize it without knowing the keys
 - Keys are controlled by TSM's
 - Used primarily for mobile payments or access control systems
 - No public API on Android
 - Three Form Factors
 - UICC (SIM Card)
 - Embedded in Device
 - SD Card

- Hardware
 - Communicating with the embedded Secure Element
 - NFC-WI (S2C) used to talk to NFC RF interface
 - Three modes of communication
 - Off
 - Wired
 - » Secure Element is visible to NFC controller as a smartcard
 - » Used by apps to communicate with the Secure Element
 - Virtual
 - » Secure Element is visible to external readers as a smartcard
 - » Used by readers to communicate with the Secure Element through the NFC contactless interface

Hardware

- Communicating with the UICC Secure Element
 - UICC is connected only to the baseband processor, so all communications must go through the Radio Interface Layer (RIL)
 - AT Commands
 - Proprietary IPC interface
 - Support needs to be added to proprietary library for access
 - > SWP (Single Wire Protocol)
 - Used by UICC Secure Element to communicate with NFC RF frontend
 - NFC controller must support it
 - SEEK for Android provides patches that allow for both.

- Hardware
 - Secure Element in Mobile Devices
 - > PN65N
 - Supports both UICC and Embedded Secure Elements
 - » Galaxy Nexus
 - » Galaxy S III
 - » Nexus S
 - Integrated SmartMX chip
 - » JavaCard OS
 - » Global Platform Card Manager Provides interface to install remove, and access applications on the secure element
 - > PN544
 - No built-in Secure Element
 - Supports UICC SE
 - » Galaxy S
 - » Galaxy S II

- Software
 - libnfc
 - Open Source C library for NFC
 - Supports:
 - ISO 14443 A/B
 - MIFARE
 - FeliCa
 - Card Emulation
 - Lots of useful utilities (nfc-*)
 - libfreefare
 - Provides API to manipulate MIFARE cards
 - Many tools require libnfc
 - http://nfc-tools.org



- Software
 - RFIDIOt
 - Collection of Python tools and libraries for working with RFID
 - Has scripts for interacting with:
 - Mifare Classic 1k, 4k
 - Mifare Ultralight
 - ISO 14443a /b
 - Works with libnfc and PC/SC
 - https://github.com/AdamLaurie/RFIDIOt

- NFC Attacks
 - Prior Work
 - Charlie Miller Fuzzing NFC
 - MWR Labs Delivering exploits over NFC
 - Collin Mulliner All kinds of stuff
 - http://www.mulliner.org/nfc/
 - Dan Rosenberg Multiple buffer overflows in in Linux NFC stack.
 - http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=134030878917784
 - Attacks against MIFARE encryption
 - Nicolas T. Courtois Darkside Attack
 - Corey Benninger and Max Sobell Cloning Mifare Ultralight cards used in transit systems
 - Bughardy and Eagle Locking OTP in Ultralight cards

NFC Attacks

- Sniffing
 - NFC does not provide encryption
 - Apps must provide their own encryption, such as SSL/TLS
 - While effective range for NFC is 1-4cm, the signal can be sniffed from a few meters away
 - Proxmark3 can intercept NFC communications using HF antenna

NFC Sniffing

- Wireshark Dissectors
 - FeliCa dissector
 - http://anonsvn.wireshark.org/viewvc/trunk/epan/dissectors/packet-rfid-felica.c
 - MIFARE dissector
 - http://anonsvn.wireshark.org/viewvc/trunk/epan/dissectors/packet-rfid-MIFARE.c
 - > NXP PN532 dissector
 - http://anonsvn.wireshark.org/viewvc/trunk/epan/dissectors/packet-rfid-pn532.c
 - wireshark-nfc
 - Wireshark plugin for the LLCP libpcap file format
 - http://code.google.com/p/wireshark-nfc/

Attacking NFC

- Rewriting tags
 - If tag marked as writable, it can be rewritten with any mobile device with NFC capabilities.
 - Change a 'smart poster' to point to a malicious URL.
 - Erase trips from an Ultralight transit ticket
- Zero Click Sharing
 - Introduced in Android 4.0 (ICS)
 - Possible to cause a web page to open on a device simply by getting near it with another device.

- Attacking NFC
 - Rewriting tags
 - Mifare Ultralight
 - Used by a number of transit systems
 - 32 bit OTP (One-Time-Pad) gets set to '1' after each trip.
 - Some transit systems never used the OTP
 - OTP broken at Defcon 21 by leveraging lock bytes to lock the OTP, making it impossible to write.

- Attacking NFC
 - Card Reading
 - EMV chip on MasterCard Paypass and Visa PayWave stores same info as magstripe.
 - Can be read just by following the spec
 - » http://www.freepatentsonline.com/y2010/0108758.htm
 - » http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx
 - Can use Pwnpass.py and Vivopay reader or nfcpaycardreader app.
 - Can read:
 - » Card Number
 - » Name (first, last)
 - » Expiration Date
 - Write your own code to do it
 - http://blog.saush.com/2006/09/08/getting-informationfrom-an-emv-chip-card/

- Attacking NFC
 - Breaking Encryption
 - > MIFARE
 - Developed by NXP (formally Philips)
 - Most widely installed contactless smartcard
 - A number of different variants exist for different purposes:
 - » MIFARE Classic
 - » Ultralight
 - » Ultralight C
 - » MIFARE Plus
 - » DESFire
 - » DESFire EV1
 - » SmartMX


- Attacking NFC
 - Breaking Encryption
 - MIFARE Classic
 - Popular with public transit systems
 - Operates at 13.56MHz
 - ISO 14443-3 compliant
 - » ISO 14443-4 defines high level protocol, NXP did this themselves
 - Crypto-1 (NXP proprietary crypto algorithm)

- Breaking Encryption
 - MIFARE Classic
 - Memory Structure
 - Blocks: 16-bytes of memory, can be either:
 - » <u>Data block</u> arbitrary data, usually used in access control systems
 - » <u>Value block</u> stores signed value of credit used, used in electronic wallet systems
 - Sectors: 4 Blocks
 - Sector Trailer: Last block of the sector, contains keys and access conditions for sector
 - » Each sector is encrypted with its own key
 - Protocol Commands for Memory
 - Read, Write, Decrement, Increment, Restore, or Transfer

- Breaking Encryption
 - MIFARE Classic
 - Memory Structure

Block												3													
Sector	Block	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	3	3 (9	10	1	1	12	13	3	14	15	5				
0	0	Manufacturer Block																							
0	1	Data/Value Blocks																							
0	2	Data/Value Blocks																							
0	3	Key A					Access Bits							Key B								Sector Trailer 0			
1	0	Data/Value Blocks																							
1	1	Data/Value Blocks																							
1	2	Data/Value Blocks																							
1	3	Key A					Access Bits								Key B							>	Secto Fraile		
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- Breaking Encryption
 - MIFARE Classic
 - Authentication



- Breaking Encryption
 - MIFARE Classic
 - Crypto -1 Flaws
 - Low entropy in PRNG (16 bits)
 - Timing Attack on the 16b Tag/Reader Nonce
 - » Nonce is created ONLY between the time it takes for the reader to power the tag and ask for challenge
 - Parity Keystream Leakage
 - » Known parity error messages are returned encrypted
 - » Parity bit and first bit of next plaintext byte encrypted with same keystream bit
 - Cryptographic Cipher Weaknesses
 - » Only Odd Bits Used to Generate Keystream
 - » The Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) can be rolled back to deduce the key if valid keystream is known

- MIFARE Classic
 - Attack Tools
 - MFOC (MIFARE Classic Offline Cracker)
 - Implements the 'offline nested' attack
 - Built on libnfc
 - Can recover keys from MIFARE Classic cards
 - Requires one known key
 - » Many cards have a least one block encrypted with default keys
 - » http://code.google.com/p/mfcuk/wiki/MifareClassicDefaultKeys
 eys
 - http://code.google.com/p/mfoc/
 - # ./mfoc -O output.mfd

- MIFARE Classic
 - Attack Tools
 - > MFCUK
 - Implements the 'dark side' attack
 - Does not need to know any keys
 - Built on libnfc and Crapto1 libraries
 - » http://code.google.com/p/crapto1/
 - Integrated into the Proxmark3 firmware
 - http://code.google.com/p/mfcuk/

```
# ./mfcuk -R 1 -C -v 1
```

- R 1 (Request first sector_
- -C (Connect to card reader)
- -v (Verbosity level one)

- Reference
 - Recommended Reading
 - BlackBerry® Developer Resource Center
 - http://supportforums.blackberry.com/t5/Java Development/NFC-Article-and-Code-Index/ta-p/1538775
 - Android Developer Guides
 - https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/nf c/index.html
 - NFC Forum Specifications
 - http://www.nfc-forum.org/specs/spec_license
 - » Requires agreeing to license
 - Android Explorations
 - http://nelenkov.blogspot.com/2012/08/accessingembedded-secure-element-in.html

