Southeast European and Black Sea Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20

Ethnic mobilization and the impact of proportional and majoritarian electoral rules on voting behaviour: the 1990 elections to two chambers of parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Boriša Mraović Independent Researcher[a]

[a] 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Published online: 19 Nov 2014.

To cite this article: Boriša Mraović Independent Researcher (2014): Ethnic mobilization and the impact of proportional and majoritarian electoral rules on voting behaviour: the 1990 elections to two chambers of parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2014.974372

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.974372

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2014
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.974372

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Ethnic mobilization and the impact of proportional and majoritarian electoral rules on voting behaviour: the 1990 elections to two chambers of parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Boriša Mraović*

71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

(*Received 7 October 2014; accepted 20 October 2014*)

The aftermath of the first multi-party elections in 1990 in Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was the violent dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. Elections for different levels of government deployed different electoral rules and formulas. A newly collected data-set on the 1990 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina is used to test if and how incentives integral to two electoral models – proportional and majoritarian – influenced voting behaviour and shaped electoral outcomes at the level of municipalities. The effects of electoral rules are estimated within the framework of ethnic mobilization, which is seen as an opposing force that downplays the effect of electoral incentives. Results indicate that under different levels of ethnic mobilization, incentives will exert some influence under majoritarian rule, but this will be conditioned by the ethnic structure of the population and will decline under the run-off system, leading instead to radicalizing effects.

Keywords: divided polities; electoral incentives; ethnic mobilization; Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1990 elections

1. Introduction

Countries deploy a variety of different electoral systems which fit into large families usually classified as majoritarian, proportional and combined or hybrid systems. Depending on the way the electoral system translates votes into seats, a population of the same size and structure – in terms of age, gender, class, ethnicity, culture and so on – will yield different electoral results. Choosing an electoral formula may affect the way existing social cleavages perceive their relative position in the sharing of political power which may have consequences for the stability of the polity in question. For the past several decades, this insight has driven the debates on the best way to devise electoral models and institutions for managing divided polities (Fraenkel and Grofman 2006; Horowitz 1985, 1991, 2003; Lijphart 1977, 2008; Norris 2004; Reilly 2004).[1] Electoral outcomes will certainly be strongly influenced by other factors which underline and follow the electoral process – ideologies, political and historical momentum, the level of mobilization and the axis of mobilization, party structure, campaigns and so forth – but the internal logic of the electoral model and its 'biases' will in the end decide the winners and losers.

*Email: borisa.mraovic@gmail.com

Two major lines of thinking on how power-sharing ought to be instituted in politically divided societies are often represented as an opposition between *centrifugal* (*consociational*) and *centripetal* (or *integrative*) systems. According to Lijphart (1977, 2008), consociational institutions include grand coalitions, cultural autonomy, proportionality and minority veto rights, and these should help in delivering stabile power-sharing arrangements in ethnically complex states. These arrangements put the accent on guaranteeing a relatively stable proportion of powers distributed among opposing groups, and their effects are not assumed to be straightforward but dependent on the number of groups and their share of power. Horowitz (1985, 1991, 2003) and others develop an integrative critique of this view and an opposing perspective. Horowitz writes that the aim of the electoral model is 'the provision of incentives, usually electoral incentives, that accord an advantage to ethnically based parties that are willing to appeal, at the margin and usually through coalition partners of other ethnic groups, to voters other than their own' (Horowitz 2008, 1217) and not the regime of ethnic guarantees. The argument is that they only deepen the divisions which they aim to moderate by treating ethnic groups as homogenous and essentialist entities instead of putting forward 'electoral systems which encourage cooperation and accommodation between rival groups' (Reilly 2004, 21). Horowitz proposes versions of majoritarian institutions as suitable for building cross-cutting loyalties which are seen as de-attenuating societal divisions.

The elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (and in other Yugoslavia Federal Republics) in 1990 offer a chance to test once again some of the competing hypotheses. These were the first multiparty elections, following the onset of a political and institutional crisis and transformation of Yugoslavia.[2] For the first time in more than 50 years, BiH citizens were called upon to vote for different political parties– including both *reformed* and ad hoc transformed Communist parties and newly formed political organizations– but only after the Yugoslav Communist Party was defunct. Newly formed parties emerged as exponents of the three principal peoples that have, in one way or another, long constituted the large majority of BiH's population: Serbs, Croats and Muslims.[3] Elections were held simultaneously for all levels of the government: the state presidency, the two houses of the state parliament and local parliaments, but under a variety of different electoral rules. State presidency members (seven members) were elected under a specific majoritarian system (combining elements of electoral models known as the 'plurality block vote' and 'alternative vote'), and state parliamentary seats were populated using different models for each of the houses: party list proportional representation (PR) in multimember districts for the lower house (the Citizens Council) and a majority two-round majority run-off in single-member districts for the upper house (the Council of Municipalities).

These circumstances provide an opportunity for examining if and how incentives assumed to be integral to a particular electoral model influence voting process and what are their relation is to the ethnic structure of the population and the assumption of strong political mobilization over ethnic difference. More precisely, building on theoretical assumptions about electoral incentives, this paper will compare voting patterns and electoral outcomes in BiH municipalities for each of the houses of the parliament, using recently developed data-set on the BiH 1990 elections (upon the recent compiling and processing of the entire electoral record for the first time) and ask whether the presumed effects of the moderation of the

majority-based system, as argued by the centripetalist school, can be observed. When looked upon within the context of the afore-mentioned theoretical debates on the effects of different electoral designs, the results of the analysis may shed additional light on the power of electoral incentives, and serve as a basis for revisiting the discussion regarding other factors which might either sustain or downplay expected incentive *vectors*, considered here under the label ethnic mobilization.

We look at the way electoral institutions affect voting behaviour in multi-ethnic and divided societies (or those experiencing progressive social division), and hope to contribute to a debate over the power of an electoral model to either aggravate or moderate ethnic (or other relations. Using this data, this paper engages in the discussion about the extent to which mobilization explains voting behaviour against the assumed effect of electoral incentives in different electoral models deployed during the elections.

Section 2 first explains in more detail the so-called institutional effect and the idea of electoral incentives and the way they are thought to influence electoral behaviour. Section 3 introduces the concept of ethnic mobilization and discusses ways in which ethnic mobilization may interact with electoral rules and thus either attenuate or increase the effect of electoral rules. In Section 4, we sketch a short historical picture of the ethnic mobilization processes in Yugoslavia and BiH, after which we briefly explain the electoral system which was introduced for the 1990 elections. Then we turn to an analysis of the electoral results and discuss the ways in which mobilization and electoral incentives (in proportional and majoritarian electoral systems) influenced the electoral results. Finally, the paper concludes by revisiting some of the arguments in regard to the debate on electoral design in divided polities and their relevance to BiH.

2. Institutions, incentives and voting behaviour

Norris (2004) defines the common elements of all electoral systems that one has to consider when attempting to predict the way a system affects voting behaviour and the strategic positioning of political parties. These elements are: the *ballot structure*, determining how voters can express their choices; the *electoral threshold*, or the minimum votes needed by a party to secure representation; the *electoral formula*, determining how votes are counted to allocate seats; and the *district magnitude*, referring to the number of seats per district (Norris 2004). Incentives can be understood as rational maps which are integral elements of the electoral system and which structure the behaviour of political actors (both parties and voters) entering the particular electoral system. In other words, incentives are rules which determine relative outcomes of certain patterns of voters' electoral behaviour as well as the reactions of political parties to these rules (Bawn and Thies 2003). Cox (1990) divides incentives into two broad categories: (1) centripetal incentives which lead political parties and candidates to advocate for centrist policies, and (2) centrifugal incentives which will favour more extremist political positions. Different electoral models provide different incentives. Consider, for example, PR and majoritarian single member district (SMD) elections. The PR model will in principle produce *fragmentation* incentives (which will also depend on the electoral threshold) while SMD will favour big parties (Bawn and Thies 2003). The incentives will also correlate with other factors including the number of competing parties (a larger number is likely to produce a stronger centrifugal effect), ballot structure, district magnitude, etc.

Although incentives are sometimes analysed as separate institutional mechanisms, in conflict-prone societies, they have to be considered as only one of mechanisms that work toward reducing conflict potential (Horowitz 2008). Horowitz, among others, argues that institutional design in conflict-prone societies is to be considered carefully because of the institutions' power to influence behaviour and in 'maintaining interethnic moderation' by working against centrifugal incentives championed by political parties' (Horowitz 1998, 32). In his view, majoritarian or alternative voting models can reduce the salience of ethnic identities and favour parties advocating integrative or centrist policies, and in that way reduce the possibility of conflict. These assumptions are generally held as lacking definitive empirical proof, although Horowitz's work provides many evidences while carefully discussing and acknowledging how power of electoral institutions and other power-sharing mechanisms is only one part in a broader interplay of forces that shape relations among ethnic, religious and other groups. Early research by Key (1949) suggests that a majority-based system may instead induce radicalization of the political spectrum. Similarly, contrary to Horowitz's assertion, recent examination of the Serbian elections, which compared the effects of PR and a version of the majority system, reports radicalization effects of the majority-based electoral model (Bochsler 2013). On another point which plays a strong part in the centripetalist argument, Kapidžić (this special section) analysed presidential elections happening at the same time, in 1990, and convincingly showed that a specific majoritarian system (combining the elements of plurality block vote and majoritarian alternative vote) led to some instances of *cross-ethnic* voting and thus resulted in some moderating effects. Nevertheless, some outlier cases he examines might point to strategic coalitions of ethnic parties and a joint agitation to their voters to vote for candidates from another ethnic party against ex-communist parties and thus corrupting the result. Incentives are often studied in regard to incumbent parties. Formulating electoral rules that should favour incumbent political actors will depend on the incumbent party's perceptions about the distribution of popular support. When these perceptions do not correspond to the actual state of affairs in regard to the distribution of popular support or if these abruptly change, prearranged rules may work against the incumbent's goals.[4] While the strategic behaviour of political parties in regard to electoral incentives also plays a significant role in determining electoral outcomes, we are primarily interested in the way they affect the population's voting behaviour. In this context, the idea of incentives rests on two basic assumptions: that people aim at outcomes maximizing individual benefits and that average voters are capable of rationally calculating how these are best achieved through behaviour within the delimited system of choices and rules – in our case, electoral choices and rules, which, if rational, should produce rational behaviour.

3. Ethnic mobilization hypothesis

Ethnic conflicts in the last decade of the twentieth century deeply changed views on ethnic mobilization and brought attention on the need to think about the relationship between ethnicity and politics. Explanations of hostility in inter-ethnic relations involve those which look at the process as elite-centred, those that stress resource explanations which stress relations and competition among groups, and hold that ethnic identification and actions emerging from this identification are

situational and fluid, and thus are dependent on relations between groups (Nagel and Olzak 1982; Vermeersch 2011) to more structurally embedded explanations that will hold that 'hostile ideas arise out of interethnic juxtapositions that make it difficult for political leaders to transcend those ideas' (Horowitz 1998, 9). Ethnic mobilization builds on a simplistic 'we–they' discourse and toward the group action directed not only in favour of one's group but also explicitly against some other group (Brubaker 1996; Varshney 2003).

Instrumentally, ethnic mobilization denotes a process whose fundamental aim is to make ethnic belonging and ties dominant factor structuring the political behaviour in a certain society. It rests on two assumptions: that there is a group of persons identifying primarily on the basis of ethnic belonging and that this identification can be shown to induce behaviour (Zuber 2013).[5] The issue of mobilization seems especially pertinent in times of massive and far-reaching political and social transformation. In such instances, in ethnically mixed societies, an appeal to ethnic attachments and issues of group insecurity and fear is often the first and most obvious choice for mobilizing efforts (Reilly 2006). In such a context, ethnic belonging 'can serve as a focal point, facilitating convergence of individual expectations, and hence can be useful as a mobilization strategy' (Varshney 2003, 88).

The mobilization expresses itself in different forms of political action, from electoral competition to peaceful protest and civil actions and violent revolutions. This is why it has to be understood as a broad and revolving process of political action on the basis of ethnicity, where electoral politics is only one form of its articulation (Vermeersch 2011). It involves building up and fortifying ethnic borders, and devising mobilization signs and messages around the idea of domination and danger from another group or a state as an apparatus over which this group dominates. It also involves numbers, ratios and majority–minority relationship, and is expected to show different effects in situations where there is, for example, no clear majority population or in cases where large and geographically concentrated minorities exist. In explaining mobilization effects, one should also look for microfoundations and historically inherited and transmitted attitudes and power relations among groups in which individuals are embedded and which determine and induce behaviour (Varshney 2003; Vermeersch 2011).

In political competition, ethnic mobilization gives rise to the question of outbidding i.e. creating and adopting party strategies that most effectively capture, and give political frame and expression to emotions of fear and distrust, irrespective of whether they are reality or just conscious projections. Indeed, empirical investigations leave little room for doubt that ethnic belonging influences voting behaviour (Chandra 2005; Horowitz 1985; Norris 2004). Rational explanation suggests that the principal dynamic emerges from the sense of insecurity and the resulting fears that arise because actors cannot be sure of the intentions of other actors (Lake and Rothchild 1996). This places individuals in front of choices to which there is no easy decision or a ready-made calculation and where different patterns of rational behaviour can be expected that involve both, value-centred and instrumentally driven rationality (Varshney 2003). Once this potential for politically mobilizing ethnic belonging is realized, emotions become 'a strategic site' (Bell 1975 in Horowitz 1998, 22–3) and the objective and focus of party competition. Mobilization then transforms 'electoral politics into a contest between sectarian parties on identity issues' (Reilly 2006, 813).

3.1. Ethnic mobilization in Yugoslavia and BiH

There is no agreement on when, in the history of Yugoslavia, one should start looking for signs and clues of cracks in the complex ethnic fibre of the country. Ethnic belonging was never declared or adopted as irrelevant. Second Yugoslavia was founded on a narrative of old ethnic ties, thou with a revolutionary content. If we start here, national relations were in the very basis of the constitution of the country and characterized their constitutional development. A fundamental way of managing 'national question' in Yugoslavia consisted in creating federal state structure which provided territorial autonomy for each of the titular nations under the multinational communists rule over the federation. The only exemption was BiH which was created as a republic without the titular nation but whose popular sovereignty was shared between three groups: Muslims, Croats and Serbs. It was only in 1961 that Muslims were granted right to officially declare themselves as 'Muslims in the ethnic sense' and as 'Muslims in the national sense' in 1971 census. Another was the question of Albanians. Albanians got their full territorial autonomy in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija in 1963. Up to that point, it was an autonomous District with lower level of autonomous competencies. New Federal constitution from 1974 changed the fundamental definition of the Federal state, brought progressive decentralization and devolution of powers to federal units and allowed national question to emerge once again to the forefront of political debates in the Federation. It also granted additional competences for the provinces and the increasing influence in the federal government. In the late 60s and early 70s Croatian question emerged. The 'mass movement' (a movement also known as Croatian spring), with the support of Croatian communists put forward a public demands over the economic exploitation of Croatia and for the end of language discrimination and the official separation of Croatian and Serbian languages. It ended with the public dismissal of number of Croatian Party officials and student leaders (Matkovic 2008; Ramet 2002; Rusinow 1976).

Often, the breakup of Yugoslavia is seen as starting fundamentally to unravel from the death of Tito in 1980 (Meier 2005; Ramet 2002). In this period, Yugoslavia experienced significant economic downturn in parts caused by the increasing foreign debt and trade deficits and the increasing unemployment (Petak 2005; Woodward 1995). What also characterized this period is the mobilization among the working class, the dissolution of ties between workers and the Communist Party, creation of independent workers unions, and the series of workers' strikes and mass protests throughout the 80s (Lowinger 2009; Musić 2013). This was coupled by the increasing prominence of interstate and inter-ethnic issues within the Federation (Ramet 2002; Rusinow 1991).

Despite these processes, until the early 80s recurring national issues remained relatively under the control of the regime, according to some, mostly because of the Tito's undisputed authority and the continual growth in production and private consumption (Rusinow 1991, 146). After his death, the subtle conflict began gaining power. In 1981, there were deadly unrests in Kosovo over the request for the full status of the republic which ended up in declaring the state of emergency. Few years afterwards, alleged sexual assault on a Serbian man by Albanians in Kosovo caused a great alarm over the national relations between Serbs and Albanians. In 1986, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences compiled an infamous Memorandum, listing themes that would soon come to dominate public discourse: domination, oppression, unjust

distribution of wealth and powers among states, etc. which, in the words of some authors, was the opening of 'Pandora's box of nationalism' (Ramet 2002, 19).

Another event of great importance is the rise of Slobodan Milošević to power in Communist party in Serbia in 1986. In 1987, he will take full charge over the party by using his newly acquired power to stage a real coup within the Serbian party structures by removing several highly ranked persons (Ramet 2002, Meier 2005). This caused a great concern among Party leaders in other republics. In 1988, Milošević would lead the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution against the old and corrupt Party establishment and begin the rehabilitation of the Serbian Orthodox Church as a building block of his increasingly nationalist politics aimed at reducing powers of autonomous provinces (Ramet 2002). By mass demonstrations, known as 'happening of the people', Milošević and his supporters toppled the party organization in Montenegro and planned on taking this revolution across the state. In September 1989, Slovenia adopted a new constitution and was faced with the strong pressure from Serbia and the Yugoslav Army over Slovenian Party nomenclature. This revealed widening cracks within the Party structure which was confirmed by the failed attempt of Milošević and his supporters to organize mass demonstrations in Slovenia. It also deeply affected relations in other republics, most notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina which saw a rise of concern over the political development in the country. Soon, 'the national question became an existential one, dominating and subsuming all others' (Rusinow 1991, 146).

Newly adopted centralist constitution of Serbia in January 1989 lead to demonstrations in Kosovo. Serbia declared the state of emergency and arrested Kosovo Party leaders. In few months, Serbia would place in power new constitution which further abrogated the autonomous status of provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Soon to follow was the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle at Gazimestan where Milošević gave a speech which became the emblem of the whole period where he talked about new arm struggle. All this would serve as a prelude for the breakup of the League of the Communist of Yugoslavia at the Fourteenth Congress in January 1990 (Pauković 2008).

Many authors analysed the appearance and the manipulation of fear of national communities over being dominated by other groups. In 1988, in Slovenia, a quarter of Slovenians felt scared over the future of the country. Only few months later, party leader Janša was arrested and this fear rose to 36%. The dominant cause for concern was the development in the country and especially in the Republic of Serbia. Similarly, in Serbia concerns over the future of the country were wide spread. All this made a ground fertile for the appearance of authoritarian tendencies and the fear as a factor in political relations (Jović 2002). Other sources however indicated that the effects of mobilization did not appear as explicit as one might expect. In a Yugoslavia-wide survey from 1988, there was no sign that ethnic relations were dramatically worsening (Biro 2006; Oberschall 2000, 988).[6] Nevertheless, the effects gained more prominence across entire country. This 'resurrection of the crisis frame' epitomized by the events in Kosovo is widely held as reflecting the nature of the socio-political processes which lead to the emergence of the emotions of fear and hate (Oberschall 2000).[7] Very soon, together with the changing status of religious organizations and the relations between these organizations and republics (Ramet 2002), national belonging and difference became 'the value against which all others are measured' and 'rational discourse and political and economic cost-benefit calculations take second place or vanish altogether' (Rusinow 1991, 146).

What is important to note is that ethnic mobilization in BiH, although with many peculiarities, was not a separate process but revolved in the spectrum of polarizations in the Federation especially among Serbia and Croatia. Mujkić (2010) analysed ethnic mobilization in Bosnia in the late 80s over three dimensions. The first dimension consists of the fortification of ethnic belonging, which serves as a precondition for future action. The second dimension involves the mechanism of 'framing', i.e. the elaboration of certain events and conflicts in simplistic black and white terms; all of which serve the particular function of *calling upon* ethnic groups and building legitimization for actions. And finally, mobilization entails parallel processes of demobilizing alternatives and de-legitimizing contending actors and discourses (Mujkić 2010, 10–7). All these processes were clearly visible in the late 80s in BiH. It is important to note how the outburst ethnic mobilization in BiH in 1990, did not proceed along the lines of competing ethnic interests – indeed ethnic parties were openly supporting each other – but primarily against the Communist establishment, aiming to delegitimize its multi-ethnic agenda (Anđelić 2003).[8]

If we begin in the 80s an event that surely remains well remembered by the Muslim nationalist movement was the Sarajevo Trial in 1983. Eleven Muslim intellectuals, including Alija Izetbegović, were sentenced to prison for crimes against the state. Among points of the case was a book *Islamska Deklaracija* (Islamic Declaration) about the creation of Islamic state written by Izetbegović. All of them would be released in 1988. In May 1990, many of these persons would become a core of a first Muslim political party. During the electoral campaign in the 1990, promotional materials consisted of copies of Islamic Declaration. Serbs and Croats also formed their parties and cheered each other over finally being granted rights to organize, as it is only right, around national community.

3.2. Parties and systems

In the politico-legal realm, a series of constitutional amendments, beside legalizing political plurality, also allowed for the extension of private property rights and the establishment of free markets. The amendments defined popular sovereignty as resting on equal citizens and peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Muslims, Serbs, Croats and members of other peoples and nationalities that live on its territory. The amendments were followed by an attempt by the communist establishment of BiH, which was still in power, to put a ban on registering ethnic parties (Arnautović 1996, 11). This can be seen as part of the broader agenda of softening the ethnic cleavages which came to dominate the public and political discourse before the elections, as well as downplaying their potential electoral performance. Nonetheless, after the Constitutional Court dismissed this decision as unconstitutional, three major political parties rose to prominence as representing the political interests of the three dominant ethnic groups. These were HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – the Croat Democratic Community), SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije – the Party for Democratic Action) and SDS (Srpska Demokratska Stranka – the Serb Democratic Party), championing the interests of Croats, Muslims and Serbs, respectively. Soon after, other parties emerged, amounting to 42 parties overall. The non-ethnic *block* was represented by the reformed communist party, Savez Komunista Bosne i Hercegovine (SKBIH-SDP) and Savez Socijalističke Omladine (SSO) and newly established parties such as Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno Demokratska Stranka) and Union of Reform Forces (Savez reformskih snaga) under the leadership

of the Federal (Yugoslav) Prime Minister Ante Marković. Despite the large number of competing parties, the actual plurality of political programmes was limited, since the majority of them came to act as extensions of the three ethnic parties; indeed, only 15 parties (including coalitions) would actually compete in the elections including major three ethnic parties, few other smaller ethnic parties and a number of civic parties and coalitions. The ethnic *troika* offered very limited and underdeveloped political platforms and programmes, with hardly any differences apart from ethnic reference (Anđelić 2003, 166; Arnautović 1996).

The elections in 1990 were held simultaneously on all levels and for all elective bodies: the seven member state presidency, the two houses of the state parliament and local parliaments. As we noted earlier on, the presidential elections were held under a particular variant of a majoritarian system. The elections for the lower house of the state parliament and municipal parliaments were held under different versions of the PR system. More precisely, the lower house was elected on the basis of seven multi-member districts using a PR model based on an electoral quota (a minimum number of voters required for one seat in the house; the quota was determined as the final number of votes divided by the number of seats for each of the districts) and the d'Hondt formula. The upper house was populated using the two-round run-off majority model in SMDs (Arnautović 1996, 20–2).

4. Analytic framework

Mujkić (2010) and Stojanović (in this special section) argued that it is useful to see the developments in BiH from the '90s onwards through the lenses of the 'prisoner's dilemma' framework. We take this proposal and map it against the empirical situation of the 1990 elections. The *dilemma* may be observed in situations in which (1) people's interests are affected not only by what they do but by what other people do as well and in which, (2) paradoxically, everyone will end up worse off if they individually pursue their own interests than if they simultaneously do what is not in their own individual interests (Rachels 2003). Both electoral design and varying ethnic structure as indicative of varying levels of ethnic mobilization are taken as independent variables influencing the dependent variable – voting patterns, i.e. ethnic and non-ethnic votings. We assume that the level of mobilization will rise as the ethnic heterogeneity of the unit increases and will be the highest in units where no clear majorities exist while in ethnically homogenous municipalities the mobilization effects will be less expressed. Additionally, within this framework, we incorporate Key's (1949) concept of the *ethnically oriented voter* which suggests that irrespective of the ethnic structure of the population, voters belonging to a particular group will be inclined to predominantly support corresponding ethnic parties with radical programme. This will be especially visible in situations where choice is between only two candidates or parties. This would not happen in ethnically homogeneous situations, where ethnic candidates would be supported by the same ethnic group, and ethnically oriented voters might choose moderate candidates. This effect is likely to be absent under PR system, because a large range of parties allows voters to choose according to a larger spectre of political preferences. Also in the two-round majority run-off systems the radicalization effect of ethnically oriented voters should not express until the second round.

The mobilization hypothesis rests on the *threat factor* (Key 1949), It assumes that the effects of the electoral system will be negatively influenced by the political

salience of social cleavages, thus producing interaction between electoral rules and social structure and downplaying the effect of electoral incentives (see also Norris 2004, 82). This hypothetic proposition is based on two further assumptions about the nature of the process of ethnic mobilization. First, if ethnic mobilization has actual behavioural effects, it might be presumed that the mobilizing effect will be greatest in multi-ethnic units where ethnic groups may experience the fear of being politically overpowered and dominated by other groups. Second, we assume that in highly ethnically homogenous municipalities, the effect of mobilization will be lowest and thus incentivize voters to vote following the multiplicity of preferences which would enable incentives to take effect. The assumption is that under the majority system ethnic parties will be less successful in homogenous environments provided that there are competing candidates from *non-radical* parties (Bochsler 2013).

Under the proportional model, in heterogeneous municipalities we expect a large majority of votes for ethnic parties. In homogenous units, we expect either (1) *ethnic parties winning the majority* of votes, under the assumption of strongly ethnically oriented vote or (2) *non-ethnic parties winning a significant share* of votes, i.e. the popular vote distributed in accordance with the plurality of preferences. Under majoritarian models, we may expect three outcomes. In heterogeneous units, we expect *non-ethnic candidates to win a considerable share* of votes. This would indicate the moderating effect. On the other hand, in homogenous units we expect the same outcomes as assumed under proportional rule, again depending on the ethnically-oriented vote (Table 1).

Aggregated results of the elections reveal ethnic parties as absolute electoral winners in both houses; over 95% of seats in the upper house and close to 80% in the lower house, which is contrary to the hypothesis of the moderating effects of majoritarian rule (cf. Norris 2004, 101). This surely might be an argument providing strong support for the ethnic mobilization hypothesis. Still, the accumulated outcome might conceal differences of patterns across municipalities with diverging mobilization levels, but also conceal possible differences of effect across different ethnic groups.

Our sample consisted of 109 municipalities that we divided into four groups in accordance with ethnic structure (Table 2). Group 1 consists of 26 municipalities which in 1991 had no majority ethnic groups. However, these municipalities also showed significant variance in regard to ethnic distribution of the population. In most of the cases, a large majority of the population identified as belonging to one of two major and similarly sized ethnic groups with a third major ethnic group in

Table 1. Hypothetic outcomes.

Population	Proportional model	Majoritarian model
Heterogeneous	Ethnic parties winning the majority of votes	Non-ethnic parties winning a considerable share of votes
Homogenous	(1) Ethnic parties winning the majority of votes (2) Non-ethnic parties winning a considerable share of votes	(1) Ethnic parties winning the majority of votes (2) Non-ethnic parties winning a considerable share of votes

Table 2. Sample groups: municipalities according to ethnic structure and majority group.

Ethnic structure	Group 1 Less than 50%	Group 2 50–70%	Group 3 70–90%	Group 4 Over 90%	Total
Number of municipalities	26	42	26	15	109
Majority					
Muslims	–	21	15	2	38
Croats	–	4	2	7	13
Serbs	–	17	9	6	32
Others	–	0	0	0	0

Source: Data-set.

significantly smaller numbers: Busovača, Brod, Bugojno, Derventa, Doboj, Fojnica, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Ključ, Novi Travnik, Sanski most, Šamac, Travnik, Bareš, Vitez and Žepče. In a few municipalities, such as Mostar, Kotor Varoš, Jajce and Brčko, each of three ethnic groups comprises a significant portion of the population (close to or over 20%) with no majority. In Tuzla and Novo Sarajevo, significant portions of the population identified as Yugoslavs. The majority of municipalities (42) fall into Group 2 with a majority ethnic group comprising from 50 to 70% of the population. Most of these municipalities had either a Muslim or Serb majority, while only four were municipalities with a Croat majority. In Group 3, with majorities comprising 70–90% of the population, we find similar situation; most of the municipalities had either a Serb (9) or Muslim (15) majority, while only two had a Croatian majority. On the contrary, in Group 4 with a majority of over 90%, the largest number of municipalites had a Croatian majority (7), a little fewer with Serbs in the majority (6) and only two municipalities with Muslims as the majority ethnic group.

Ethnic structure is taken as a proxy measure for ethnic mobilization. In cases with no clear majority, we expect to find the highest levels of mobilization and assume that this will decline as the numerical dominance of one ethnic group rises. While four groups might seem insufficient to catch the variance of the mobilization factor, we opted for this number as a more or less appropriate way to distinguish between different levels of mobilization. Finally, we posit that voting for ethnic parties in all cases expresses radicalizing effects, while non-ethnic voting coincides with moderating effects.

5. Discussion and findings

In addressing hypothetical relations between electoral incentives and ethnic mobilization as a factor, we examine a number of connections:

(1) What are the electoral outcomes for each sample group (Table 2) and to what extent do they differ in relation to electoral rules?
(2) Are there differences in patterns depending on the particular group (i.e. Serbs, Croats or Muslims) constituting a majority in a given municipality?
(3) What are the relative contributions of incentives and mobilization to voting behaviour in cases where upper house elections went into a second round?
(4) Are there differences in ethnic and non-ethnic voting among ethnic groups in relation to (2)?

5.1. Comparing systems

First, we compare the electoral results for the upper house under majoritarian rule (Table 3) and the lower house elected under proportional rule (Table 4) in the four groups of municipalities with varying ethnic makeups.

Among ethnically homogenous municipalities, the share of votes that ethnic parties won in the first round of elections for the upper house is above 85% while in the rest of the groups this share does not reach 80% overall. This share is even higher for the same group under the PR model where ethnic parties receive more than 90% overall.

In all cases in municipalities with an ethnically homogenous population, upper house candidates were elected in the first round. They were all candidates of ethnic parties. When examined in detail, some differences emerge in regard to voting behaviour depending on the dominant ethnic group, which might indicate the different level of mobilization among different ethnic groups. We return to this observation later.

Further on, when comparing the majority and PR systems, the significantly higher share of votes that went to candidates from unidentifiable parties is noticeable. Although a deficiency of the data does not allow for examining this share of the vote in more detail, this difference is most likely an effect of the electoral system. The majority system allowed voters to elect representatives directly from their municipality while the PR model for the lower house was based on larger electoral districts, which likely explains this bias towards candidates put forward by other parties. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to clearly discern these other parties along the ethnic/non-ethnic dimension.[9]

Table 3. Upper house voting patterns in the first round, all groups: majoritarian rule.

Ethnic structure	Number of municipalities	Parties share of votes (%)			
		Ethnic parties' share	Non-ethnic parties' share	Others	Total
~90	15	86.79	9.92	3.29	100
>70 < 90	26	70.51	19.97	9.52	100
>50 < 70	42	77.63	14.87	7.51	100
50<	26	70.05	21.70	8.25	100
Total	109	76.25	16.62	7.14	100

Source: Data-set and author's calculations.

Table 4. Lower house voting patterns, all groups: proportional rule.

Ethnic structure	Number of municipalities	Parties' share of votes (%)			
		Ethnic parties' share	Non-ethnic parties' share	Others	Total
>~90	15	90.52	8.85	0.63	100
>70 < 90	26	77.71	20.77	1.51	100
>50 < 70	42	80.34	18.00	1.67	100
50<	26	71.92	26.32	1.76	100
Total	109	80.12	18.49	1.39	100

Source: Data-set and author's calculations.

In addition, when comparing the two electoral models, there is only a very small difference in regard to the number of votes that ethnic parties received. On average, ethnic parties received more votes under the PR system than under the majority system in all four groups, but non-ethnic parties also scored better. While this might seem strange, the explanation is in the share of votes won by other parties. Under a majoritarian system, this share was close to 10% in Group 2, while under the PR system nowhere did it exceed 2%. Smaller electoral districts under the majority system (municipalities compared to regions under the PR system) might explain this difference. Instead of voting for a party, some portion of votes might have been influenced by 'micro-factors' such as personal relations with candidates or direct lobbying by candidates. In sum, under both systems, non-ethnic parties received the highest share of votes on average in municipalities with no absolute ethnic majority, which is in contrast to the expectation that heterogeneity would lead to increased radicalization. Instead, it may suggest that a 'no majority situation' influenced the electoral choice of a portion of the population who saw non-ethnic parties as the best choice for ameliorating potential ethnic tension.

5.2. Systems and groups

In the sample Group 4 with large majorities, non-ethnic parties, under both electoral systems, received the largest percentage of votes in Serb dominated municipalities with an overall average of 20%, and sometimes winning, as in the case of the municipality of Šeković, over 35% of the votes. In two municipalities with a Muslim majority population, ethnic parties received 91% of votes, while in municipalities with a dominant Croatian population (seven municipalities) within this group the overall average of votes for Croat ethnic parties is 94.43, the only significant exemption being Tomislavgrad where a significant portion of votes went to another party. If, however, we assume that the candidate is from another Croat party, this number rises to nearly 99% of votes. Indeed in four out of seven cases, HDZ was the only party to offer a candidate for the upper house elections.

This pattern might suggest that Croats exhibited a higher inclination to vote for ethnic parties. In that case, the presumed effect of incentives is completely downplayed by intensive mobilization along ethnic lines. Further support for this claim is found if we observe the way ethnic structures coincide with voting patterns.

Table 5 shows the distribution of votes to ethnic and non-ethnic parties for sample Group 2. The results are disaggregated according to the majority group and the percentage of votes received by each ethnic party and non-ethnic parties. The percentage of Croats in all cases roughly corresponds to the share of votes for Croat parties in all cases, irrespective of whether they were in the majority or minority. It has to be noted that when compared with the two other ethnicities, when in the minority, Croats represent less than 10%, making them the smallest minority, and the observed instances of ethnic voting seems to further support the threat hypothesis on the level of an individual unit of analysis.

Where the two other ethnicities are concerned, when in the majority, there is an observable discrepancy between the percentage of the population and the share of the vote for ethnic parties. There are, however, noticeable differences between Serbs and Muslims. The difference between the share of votes won by Muslim parties and the percentage of Muslims in the population when in the minority are slightly larger under the proportional system. On the other hand, this difference for

Table 5. Group 2 population structure and the distribution of ethnic and non-ethnic votes; proportional and majoritarian models.

		Average percentage of population						Average share of votes (%)				
Majority	*N*	Mus	Cro	Serb	Yu	Oth		Bos ethnic party	Cro ethnic party	Ser ethnic party	Non-ethnic party	Others
Muslim	21	58.79	8.52	26.37	4.24	2.08	PR	47.27	7.31	22.88	20.24	2.31
							MAJ	50.27	4.1	20.68	15.3	9.66
Croatian	4	31.31	55.51	8.90	2.64	1.64	PR	25.18	54.16	6.93	13.18	0.46
							MAJ	26.08	54.22	2.99	9.38	7.33
Serb	17	26.70	8.14	60.10	3.12	1.94	PR	20.9	7.27	54.4	16.15	1.28
							MAJ	22.72	7.13	51.37	15.07	3.71

Source: Data-set and author's calculations.

Serbian parties is larger under majoritarian rule and significantly larger when the population share of Serbs is less than 10% (in Croat-dominated municipalities). Note that on average Muslims in a minority status still make up a rather large minority (over 25%). This suggests that outcomes are likely to be influenced not only by the general minority status but also by the relative share.

5.3. Second-round results

When looking at second-round results, nowhere in homogenous municipalities did the upper house elections go to a second round, and ethnic parties won all mandates. In Group 2, out of 26 units, upper house elections went to a second round in five cases. Only in one instance was an ethnic party competing with a non-ethnic party. In all other cases, second-round elections brought competition between two ethnic party candidates. The third group shows a similar dynamic but across more cases. Still, as with Group 2, nowhere did the non-ethnic party candidate win. It was only in Group 1 (with no absolute majority) that non-ethnic party candidates won any seats whatsoever. In fact, they won mandates in five out of six cases where they appeared as contestants in the second round.

The distribution of seats in the second round (Table 6) suggests that the majority system strongly favoured ethnic party candidates. However, in a few heterogeneous municipalities, non-ethnic parties did perform better and won several seats, which might indicate that when confronted with the choice between an ethnic and a non-ethnic party in an ethnically heterogeneous environment, voters prefer non-ethnic party candidates. Thus, some moderating effect might be expected under majority rule but only if non-ethnic candidates succeed in reaching a second round. Otherwise, under the conditions of high-ethnic mobilization, it seems that voters prefer voting for candidates from ethnic parties. In sample Groups 2 and 3, when voters were confronted with the choice between ethnic and non-ethnic parties, ethnic parties won all the mandates. Results also indicate that in cases with a hypothetically low-level mobilization environment, i.e. in ethnically homogenous environments, voters rarely vote for non-ethnic parties. Two cyclical explanations seem to be applicable. Either voters exhibited what Key (1949) has called an ethnic orientation in voting, in which case they prefer the candidate from the corresponding party, or else non-ethnic parties refrained themselves from putting forward candidates under the assumption of the ethnic voting preference of voters.

Next, we take a look at what happened in the second round in Group 2 in two cases where the second round contest was between an ethnic and a non-ethnic party (Table 7). Notice that both units are Muslim-dominated municipalities and that Serbs are the largest non-dominant group.

In the first round, in both municipalities, non-ethnic parties received a significant share of votes, and, in Lukavac, surpassed the share of votes received by Muslim parties. In both cases, Serb parties received a share of votes smaller than the population share, which suggests – assuming of course similar turnout rates across all groups – that both Muslims and Serbs gave their support to non-ethnic parties to a significant extent. This may be especially true for Muslims, especially considering the fact they formed a majority. However, in the second round, Muslim-party candidates won over 60% (closing the gap between the vote share and population share) which may indicate the radicalization effect of the second-round majority rule upon the majority ethnic group.

Table 6. Upper house, second round; all groups.

Ethnic structure	Number of municipalities	Second-round contestants					Second-round winner		
		Second round	Ethnic vs. ethnic	Ethnic vs. non-ethnic	Ethnic vs. *other*	Non-ethnic vs. *other*	Ethnic	Non-ethnic	Other
>~90	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
>70 < 90	26	4	0	3	1	0	3	0	1
>50 < 70	42	14	11	2	1	0	14	0	0
50<	26	24	18	5	0	1	19	5	0
Total	109	42	29	12	2	1	37	4	1

Source: 1990 BiH elections data-set and author's calculations.

Table 7. Second round: selected cases.

	Population (%)					First-round vote (%)			Second-round vote (%)	
	Mus	Cro	Serb	Yu	Oth	Bos parties	Serb parties	Non-ethnic parties	Bos party	Non-ethnic party
Hadžići	63.6	3.08	26.28	3.48	3.55	45.10	21.19	27.81	62	38
Lukavac	66.73	3.78	21.32	6.00	2.17	39.52	16.29	42.30	60	40

Source: 1990 BiH elections data-set and author's calculations.

While the definite explanation is out of reach, the particularities of the nation-building process among Muslims might be among the factors explaining this. However, the interpretation of relative influences of mobilization and incentives in the second-round elections must be taken with great caution because a closer look at the turnout numbers reveals many invalid votes. Over 35% of votes in the second round were declared invalid, which is highly unlikely since the second round was a simple choice between two candidates only. Unless this was some sort of spontaneous expression of angst and dissatisfaction among voters, which is not very likely, this high percentage of invalid votes might suggest instances of conscious manipulation or electoral fraud. Therefore, in this case the definitive incentives effects are hard to discern.

6. Conclusion

The elections in 1990 in Yugoslavia and BiH stand, in a sense, in an historical void since their aftermath was the violent dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, and the democratic elections that followed were under new territorial and symbolic realities of independent successor states. Apart from occasional passing references, these elections have so far received fairly limited scholarly attention. One reason is the fact that, until recently, detailed data on the electoral results was unavailable. Still, their displaced position in the political and electoral history of BiH and beyond makes these elections an interesting case for at least two reasons. First, the spectrum of different electoral systems deployed simultaneously provides the opportunity to study the effects of different electoral systems upon emerging power arrangements in the tripartite polity. Second, it can further inform the debate on the importance and moderating power of electoral institutions in divided polities. Certainly, an analysis that would go beyond descriptive statistics or a comparison with other federal states may reveal further inferences and provide further material for examining the effect that different models have in the context of larger political processes. At the time, several results seem to be informative in relation to issues regarding the power of electoral institutions to exert a moderating effect on the behaviour of voters in the context of high political salience of ethnic belonging and may inform some new questions.

First, under both the proportional and majoritarian systems, non-ethnic parties received the highest share of votes on average in heterogeneous municipalities, which does not support the assumption that ethnic radicalization, would be most prominent in heterogeneous environments. Instead, it seems that to some extent, a

rationale for such behaviour is voters' calculation that non-ethnic choice might best accommodate a perceived threat of inter-ethnic conflict. Among maximally homogenous municipalities the share of votes that ethnic parties won in the first round of elections for the upper house is above 85%, while in the rest of the groups this share does not reach 80% overall. This share is even higher for the same ethnic group under the PR model, where ethnic parties received more than 90% overall, which suggests a proclivity to vote for ethnic parties and likely demonstrates an ethnically oriented vote that does not incorporate the calculation of another ethnic groups' behaviour.

Further on, a small minority (Croats) exhibited a higher inclination to vote for ethnic parties which is a type of behaviour found among minority groups. In that case, the presumed effect of incentives is completely downplayed by the intensive mobilization along ethnic lines. The difference between the share of votes won by ethnic parties and the population share of the corresponding ethnic group for minority groups is slightly larger under the proportional system. The difference between the percentage of the population and the vote share is larger under majoritarian rule, and was significantly larger when the size of the minority population was below 10%. At the same time, this difference was smaller in cases where a de facto minority actually comprises a significant part of the local population. This suggests that incentives effects are likely to be influenced not only by the general minority status but also by the relative share in population which corroborates the argument for the 'fear of small numbers.'[10]

Choices in ethnically heterogeneous units where non-ethnic parties won several seats might indicate that when confronted with the choice between an ethnic and a non-ethnic party, voters prefer non-ethnic party candidates. In this way, some moderating effect might be expected under the majority rule but only if non-ethnic candidates succeed in reaching a second round. Otherwise, in heterogeneous units, it seems that voters prefer voting for candidates from ethnic parties. In cases of declining heterogeneity, when voters were confronted with the choice between an ethnic and a non-ethnic party, ethnic parties won all mandates. In general, majoritarian rule favoured ethnic party candidates. In ethnically homogenous environments, voters rarely voted for non-ethnic parties, which again might be attributed to the ethnic orientation in voting.

Finally, some limited moderating effects of the majoritarian run-off system were observed in the first round in cases with *smaller* majorities (around 60%) where non-ethnic parties received a significant share of votes, sometimes beating ethnic parties. Nevertheless in the second round this effect disappeared, giving way to the ethnic vote and seemingly radicalizing the majority. However, more thorough investigation of the second-round effects proved problematic because of the large percentage of invalid votes.

The open questions remain. Whether different arrangements would yield different results? Was it just that Communist made a mistake and designed institutions to work against them? Ethnic forerunners as ethnic democrats were absolute winners over communists and others close to the centre. They had no programmes, no particular plan except of ethnic democracy and it seems that this taking over of the whole of political by ethnic sense was not made possible by any particular rule but in important part by the plain democratic fact of free elections. Once you experienced the dissolution of one frame and saw something constructed as fundamental to your life-world being at stake in a political arena, talks of war and the whole of

propaganda, and the state socialism and the party is being declared obsolete, voting ethnically may well be the only thing that made sense to many.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Analitika for the opportunity to be part of this project (for the second time), and for their support and mentorship. I would like to express my special gratitude to Nenad Stojanović and Daniel Bochsler for their support, comments and suggestions at different phases of the writing and also for a great opportunity to work toward its first version at the ZDA premises in Aarau during October 2013. I also thank Florian Bieber and anonymous reviewers for their critical comments on the last version of the article and Julianne Funk for her careful editing of the text. All errors are mine.

Funding

This paper is a result of the research project 'Ethnic Quotas and Representation of Minorities in Local Politics in BiH' implemented by the ZDA (Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau) and Analitika – Center for Social Research.

Supplemental data

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2014.974372

Notes

1. This term has been suggested as a way to circumscribe some of the conceptual issues surrounding the term 'divided society' which has been used en masse in the literature on ethnic relationships, ethnic conflict and electoral engineering. A 'divided polity' suggests that divisions which are fundamentally non-political persist primarily in the political space. Issues regarding the adequacy of the term have been debated for a long time. One attempt to overcome the issue of the accuracy of the conceptual apparatus is found in adding the adjective 'deeply'. An alternative to 'deeply divided societies' would be 'conflict-prone societies'. I thank Adis Merdžanović for drawing my attention to this issue.
2. One of the moments that strongly marked the historical memory of this process is the dissolution of the Yugoslav communist party at the 14th *early* Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990. A detailed overview has been given by Pauković (2008).
3. Before the war which started in 1992, and for a year thereafter, Muslims were officially identified as Muslims. It was in 1993 that the Congress of Bosniak intellectuals publically announced the adoption of the *new* name Bošnjaci (Bosniaks), which was the name used during the medieval Bosnian Kingdom (it was also used by the Austro-Hungarians for all residents). Since 1995 and the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) the name Bosniak has been officially codified in the Constitution of BiH which was drafted as an integral part of DPA. Muslims will be used in this text.
4. False perceptions of the support among the voters led the incumbent party (the reformed Communists) in Croatia in 1990 to formulate electoral rules that would actually disfavour their own position. By choosing the SMD model over PR, based on the belief that they would lead the polls in the majority of electoral districts, the incumbent party effectively enabled the opposition (the Croatian Democratic Community HDZ) to win close to 58% of the seats in the entire Croatian parliament (356 seats in the tricameral parliament), and a two-thirds majority in the most important house, by winning slightly over 40% of the entire popular vote (Klemenčić 1991, 101–2).
5. Zuber (2013) denotes these two elements as *ethnic identification* and *ethnic behaviour*, which revolves around identifiable ethnically-framed interests.

6. Oberschall (2000, 988) reports the Yugoslav Survey results, noting that '[s]urvey research on ethnic relations in the mid-1980 found that in a national sample of 4232 Yugoslavs, only 7% believed that the country would break up into separate states, and 62% reported that the "Yugoslav affiliation was very or quite important for them". On ethnonational relations, in workplaces, 36% characterized them as "good", 28% as "satisfactory", and only 6% said "bad" and "very bad". For ethnonational relations in neighbourhoods, 57% answered "good", 28% "satisfactory", and only 12% chose "bad" and "very bad"'.
7. Oberschall (2000, 983) writes: 'After fear comes hate. The threatening others are demonized and dehumanized. The means of awakening and spreading such fears in Yugoslavia were through the news media, politics, education, popular culture, literature, history and the arts. The crisis frame in Yugoslavia was resurrected by Serb intellectuals over the plight of the Kosovo Serbs. Because of a higher Albanian birth-rate and higher Serb out-migration, Kosovo changed from 23% Serb in 1971 to 10% in 1989. Serb nationalists alleged that Albanians were threatening Serbs into leaving, and that the police and judiciary were not protecting Serbs against Albanian violence. Charges in the news media of sexual assault and rape by Albanians against Serbs were widely believed by Serbs'.
8. Anđelić (2003, 100–53) provides a very detailed overview of mobilization processes in BiH and Yugoslavia and describes the role and tactics of emerging nationalist organizations. To illustrate how nationalists saw each other as allies rather than adversaries he reports that the founding session of the SDS, the Serb ethnic party, was attended by the founders of the SDA, the Muslim ethnic party.
9. This was possible in only a few cases where another Serb party – SPO (the Serbian Renewal Movement) – won a small portion of votes. Due to very low frequency, we conflate SPO results into the 'Other' category.
10. This phrase is from Appadurai (2006). Others have also argued that 'small nations' emerging in ethnically mixed environments tend to constitute their national communities in a particularly antagonistic fashion where the antagonistic objects are other small ethnic groups or, more often, competing nation-building groups that share or have competing claims over the territory they occupy. Not only does the share, but also the absolute size of a majority may come to influence the political dynamics and provide incentives and justify violence. See for example Jović (2002).

Notes on contributor

Boriša Mraović is a freelance researcher and writer working in Sarajevo. He is author and co-author of several chapters in collected volumes on the number of issues concerning electoral politics, political theory, post-communist political transformation and migration. His main research interests are in electoral institutions and politics, political sociology and World-systems theory.

References

Anđelić, N. 2003. *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The end of a legacy*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
Appadurai, A. 2006. *Fear of small numbers*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Arnautović, S. 1996. *Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini '90: Analiza izbornog procesa* [Election in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 90s: The analysis of electoral process]. Sarajevo: Promocult.
Bawn, K., and M.F. Thies. 2003. A comparative theory of electoral incentives: Representing the unorganized under PR, plurality and mixed-member electoral systems. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15, no. 1: 5–32.
Biro, M. 2006. *Homo Postcommunisticus* [Postcommunist man]. Beograd: Biblioteka XX Vek.
Bochsler, D. 2013. Radicalizing electoral system effects on support for nationalist hardliners in Serbia. *Nations and Nationalism* 19, no. 1: 21–43.
Brubaker, R. 1996. *Nationalism reframed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chandra, K. 2005. Ethnic parties and democratic stability. *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 2: 235–52.
Cox, G.W. 1990. Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 4: 903–35.
Fraenkel, J., and B. Grofman. 2006. Does the alternative vote foster moderation in ethnically divided societies? The case of Fiji. *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 5: 623–51.
Horowitz, D.L. 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Horowitz, D.L. 1991. Electoral systems for a divided society. In *A democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a divided society*, ed. D.L. Horowitz, 163–203. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Horowitz, D.L. 1998. Structure and strategy in ethnic conflict. Paper prepared for the annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 20–21, Washington, DC. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-1251813753820/6415739-1251813951236/horowitz.pdf.
Horowitz, D.L. 2003. Electoral systems: A primer for decision makers. *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4: 115–27.
Horowitz, D.L. 2008. Conciliatory institutions and constitutional processes in post-conflict states. *William and Mary Law Review* 49, no. 4: 1213–48.
Jović, D. 2002. *Strah od postajanja manjinom i sukob u prethodnoj Jugoslaviji* (Reč no. 65) [The fear of becoming a minority and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Word no. 65)]. 113–30.
Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern politics in state and nation*. New York: Vintage.
Klemenčić, M. 1991. Izbori u Hrvatskoj 1990 – elektoralno geografska analiza odabranih primjera [Elections in Croatia in 1990 – electoral and geographic analysis of selected case]. *Geografski glasnik* 53: 95–108.
Lake, D.A., and D. Rothchild. 1996. Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict. *International Security* 21, no. 2: 41–75.
Lijphart, A. 1977. *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lijphart, A. 2008. *Thinking about democracy: Power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice*. New York: Routledge.
Lowinger, J. 2009. Economic reform and the 'double movement' in Yugoslavia: An analysis of labor unrest and ethno-nationalism in the1980s. Doctoral diss., John Hopkins University.
Matković, H. 2008. Memoarska literature o hrvatskom nacionalnom pokretu [Biographical literature on Croatian national movement]. *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 3: 1143–53.
Meier, V. 2005. *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise*. Trans. Sabrina P. Ramet. London: Routledge.
Mujkić, A. 2010. *Pravda i etnonacionalizam* [Justice and ethnonationalism]. Sarajevo: Centar za ljudska prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu.
Musić, G. 2013. *Serbia's working class in transition 1988–2013*. Beograd: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
Nagel, J., and S. Olzak. 1982. Ethnic mobilization in new and old states: An extension of the competition model. *Social Problems* 30, no. 2: 127–43.
Norris, P. 2004. *Electoral engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oberschall, A. 2000. The manipulation of ethnicity: From ethnic cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 6: 982–1001.
Pauković, D. 2008. Posljednji kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: uzroci, tijek i posljedice raspada [The last Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia: Causes, development and consequences of the dissolution]. *Suvremene Teme* 1, no. 1: 21–33.
Petak, Z. 2005. Ekonomska pozadina raspada socijalističke Jugoslavije [Economic background to the dissolution of Yugoslavia]. In *Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara 9* [The dialogue of historians 9], ed. H.G. Fleck and I. Graovac, 57–77. Zagreb: Zaklada Franz Naumann.
Rachels, J. 2003. *The elements of moral philosophy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ramet, S.P. 2002. *Balkan Babel – The disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the fall of Milošević*. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview Press.

Reilly, B. 2004. *Democracy in divided societies: Electoral engineering for conflict management*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reilly, B. 2006. Political engineering and party politics in conflict-prone societies. *Democratization* 13, no. 5: 811–27.
Rusinow, D. 1976. *The Yugoslav experiment 1948–1974*. Barkley: University of California Press.
Rusinow, D. 1991. Yugoslavia: Balkan breakup? *Foreign Policy* 83: 143–59.
Varshney, A. 2003. Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and rationality. *Perspective on Politics* 1, no. 1: 85–99.
Vermeersch, P. 2011. *Theories of ethnic mobilization: Overview and recent trends*. Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) Working Paper No. 3.
Woodward, S.L. 1995. *Socialist Unemployment: The political economy of Yugoslavia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zuber, C.I. 2013. Whose mobilization? An ontological primer on the mobilization of national minorities. In *New nation states and national minorities*, eds. J.D. Iglesias, N. Stojanovic, and S. Weinblum, 191–207. Colchester: ECPR Press.