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Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes

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This study focuses on the varying effectiveness of three mediation styles—facilitation, formulation, and manipulation—on international crises. Effectiveness is assessed in terms of three outcome variables: formal agreement, post-crisis tension reduction, and contribution to crisis abatement. The authors analyze new data on the mediation process from the International Crisis Behavior project (1918-2001). Manipulation has the strongest effect on the likelihood of both reaching a formal agreement and contributing to crisis abatement. Facilitation has the greatest influence on increasing the prospects for lasting tension reduction. The authors explore how the different styles affect the strategic bargaining environment to explain these differences in impact. The findings suggest that mediators should use a balance of styles if they are to maximize their overall effectiveness.

IVs
DVs

Keywords: *mediation; crisis; international conflict; conflict; ICB; conflict resolution; rational bargaining*

International crises pose serious challenges to the stability of individual states and to the entire international system. While the twentieth century had been beset with violent conflicts and crises as a whole, the last two decades witnessed a marked decrease in the frequency of international crises. Moreover, an influential tool of conflict resolution, mediation, saw an increase in relevance toward the end of the century. Scholars and policy makers have focused a great deal of attention on how mediators can best contribute to crisis management and conflict resolution. In this study, we focus on the impact of specific mediation styles and their underlying strategies on the outcomes of crises.

According to International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data, of the 434 international crises that occurred between 1918 and 2001, 128 experienced some form of mediation. While this is only a 30 percent rate of incidence during the entire period, when we nar-

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more mediation after cold-war

row our focus to the post–cold war era, we find that 46 percent of all crises were mediated. Thus, not only are there fewer instances of crises, but there is a greater propensity on the part of the international community to engage in third-party mediation. Figure 1 illustrates the number of international crises that occurred per year from 1918 to 2001, along with the number of crises that were mediated. Figure 2 presents five-year moving averages for each indicator, with convergence occurring toward the end of the twentieth century. With the rise in the use of mediation, it has become increasingly important to understand if and how mediation is actually contributing to crisis outcomes. By focusing on mediation styles, it is possible to gain a better understanding of the microfoundations of mediation and, in the process, to discover implications for more effective mediation.

The study is structured as follows. First, we discuss some important work in the field and highlight areas that could benefit from further investigation. We then present an empirical model and a set of hypotheses on the relationship between mediation styles and crisis outcomes. After testing the hypotheses using the ICB data set, we conclude with a discussion of the results and directions for future research.

MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES

Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991, 8) define mediation as "a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law." While the present study focuses on mediation in international crises, many of the implications from this research project should be applicable to a general set of bargaining situations.

In this study, we employ the definition of crisis as developed by the ICB project. There are two defining conditions of an international crisis: (1) a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive (i.e., hostile verbal or physical) interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system—global, dominant, or subsystem (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 4-5).

The theoretical literature on the topic of mediation in international relations is robust (see especially Touval and Zartman 1985, 2001; Bercovitch 1997; Kleiboer 1996, 1998; Wall, Stark, and Standifer 2001) and includes a number of systematic tests of mediation theories regarding international *conflict* (see, e.g., Bercovitch 1996; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Princen 1992; Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Dixon 1996; Bercovitch and Houston 1996, 2000; Regan and Stam 2000; Schrodt and Gerner 2004). However, existing research has argued that mediation is much more likely to occur during intense international events, such as *crises* (Dixon 1996; Zartman and Touval 1996; Bercovitch and Jackson 2001). Furthermore, for mediation to be successful, parties need to reevaluate their policies; such reevaluation has a higher than normal likelihood of occurring during crisis or crisis-like conditions (Druckman 1993, 1994; Touval and Zartman 2001).

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

Figure 1: Crisis and Mediation Counts

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

Figure 2: Crisis and Mediation Moving Averages

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Cross-national empirical research that focuses specifically on international crisis mediation, particularly in the context of the effects of different mediation styles, is sparse. A few studies have systematically and empirically analyzed the effects of mediation on crises. Morgan (1994) and Dixon (1996) both find that mediation helps to diffuse crises. Wilkenfeld et al. (2003) find that mediated crises are more typically characterized by compromise among crisis actors, agreements, and long-term tension reduction. While these studies highlight the importance of mediation in a general sense, they do not fully address the relationship between specific mediation styles and crisis outcomes. Nor do they attempt to address the issue of how the use of different styles might operate by affecting the bargaining environment.

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: MEDIATION STYLES, STRATEGIES, AND MECHANISMS

Drawing on recent work that treats international conflict in the context of rational bargaining (Fearon 1995; Powell 1999), we contend that in any bargaining situation actors' preference orderings should overlap such that some alternatives (i.e., agreements) exist that are preferable to conflict for all involved. This area of overlap is termed the *zone of agreement* (ZOA), and it consists of all possible outcomes that would allow *each* disputant to achieve his or her respective reservation levels (i.e., "bottom" lines; see Fisher and Ury 1981 and Hopmann 2001) or better.[1] Another way of thinking about the ZOA is in terms of what Fisher and Ury (1981) call the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). In the standard rational conflict models of Fearon (1995) and Powell (1999), the alternative to settlement is some form of continued conflict or war because the status quo is simply not acceptable to one of the sides. Thus, it is possible to think of each crisis actor's BATNA value as the expected net value of conflict; consequently, the ZOA consists of the set of outcomes that provide all crisis actors with more benefit than their BATNAs. This underscores the idea that peace in a crisis can only be achieved if it is mutually preferable to continuing the crisis. We develop a framework for mediation as an attempt to allow the crisis actors to identify and commit to alternatives within the ZOA through three distinct styles: facilitation, formulation, and manipulation (Touval and Zartman 1985; Princen 1992; Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Wilkenfeld et al. 2005).[2] Ultimately, our concern is with how these different styles affect crisis outcomes.

"natural settlement"

mediation typology

The *mediator as facilitator* (Burton 1984; Bercovitch 1992; Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Hopmann 1996) or *communicator* (Touval and Zartman 1985; Zartman and

1. We borrow the terminology of *zone of agreement* from Raiffa (1982), who defines it as the space between the disputants' "redlines" (i.e., minimal acceptable outcomes).

2. Several other typologies have been discussed in the mediation literature. Hopmann (1996) disaggregates the facilitation style into three separate roles: providing good offices; helping with communication, compromise, and convergence; and encouraging cognitive change. Keashly and Fisher (1996) and Bloomfield, Nupen, and Harris (1998) distinguish mediator activities on the basis of whether leverage is used. Mitchell (1993) presents seventeen different roles that a mediator can play, ranging from carrying messages between the parties to helping the disputants improve their long-term relationship with each other. Finally, in the legal literature, Riskin (2003) offers a typology of mediation strategies that is worthwhile to consider but not directly applicable to this article.

Lit on mediation typology

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Touval 1996; Bercovitch 1997) serves as a channel of communication among disputing parties (Keashly and Fisher 1996), focusing on ensuring continued discussion and dialogue. Facilitative mediation is closely associated with an integrative strategy (see Kressel 1972; Carnevale 1986), that is, a set of techniques that help the actors correctly identify agreements within the overlapping range of possible nonviolent outcomes (i.e., the ZOA). If actors had complete information regarding their opponent's capabilities and intentions, the actors would likely be able to identify mutually acceptable alternatives to violent conflict (Blainey 1973; Fearon 1995; Kraus, Wilkenfeld, and Zlotkin 1995; Powell 1999). Under incomplete information, actors may overestimate their own capabilities and likelihood of winning a conflict and make an offer below the opponent's reservation point. Consequently, facilitative mediators ensure that the actors have access to all necessary information to best estimate the range of mutually preferable outcomes. Facilitation can range from providing good offices to more complex roles, such as helping to communicate messages. In addition, mediators can reveal information that they have gathered independently and thereby clarify misconceptions. For example, in a 1990 crisis between India and Pakistan, the U.S. delegation to Pakistan made sure that Pakistan was aware of its military inferiority and that the United States had no intention of helping Pakistan in the event of a full-scale war. Regardless of the specific tactics that facilitators use, however, they make no substantive contribution to the negotiation process.

Some scholars maintain that facilitation is distinct from mediation (Dixon 1996), an especially common position among those who treat facilitation solely as a conflict resolution–promoting endeavor, labeled as third-party consultation (Fisher 1972; Fisher and Keashly 1988) or interactive problem solving (Burton 1969; Kelman 1992). We agree with Bercovitch and Langley (1993), however, that a broad definition of mediation—one that includes facilitation—is more useful when trying to gain a holistic understanding of the dynamics of international mediation. We adopt Bercovitch's (1992) term of *facilitation* since it encapsulates a broad range of low-level mediation activity better than Touval and Zartman's (1985) *communication*.

The second commonly identified mediation style is *mediation as formulation*. Unlike facilitation, formulation involves a substantive contribution to negotiations by the mediator. When mediators act as formulators, they conceive and propose new solutions to the disputants (Touval and Zartman 1985; Hopmann 1996; Zartman and Touval 1996). In doing so, they are employing a second mechanism by which mediation contributes to more efficient bargaining—coordination. Since formulation primarily helps the actors to more easily select an existing mutually acceptable alternative, it should, like facilitation, be considered as part of what Carnevale (1986) terms an *integration strategy.*

Many possible outcomes preferable to conflict may exist within the ZOA, and the actors have to agree on one specific outcome. Since actors often perceive negotiations in violent international conflicts in zero-sum terms, they are likely to adopt hard-line bargaining stances. In this case, settling on one outcome is likely to take considerable time, and conflict may still occur if the actors fail to coordinate. When such impasses are reached, mediators will often adopt the role of formulator by redefining the issues at hand and/or proposing specific alternatives, thereby creating focal points (Carne-

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vale 1986). Formulators may be especially effective at overcoming stalemated negotiations by causing parties to consider, and perhaps even accept, new possible resolutions to the dispute (Schelling 1960).

In addition, formulation often involves what Bercovitch and Houston (2000) call procedural tactics. By establishing how negotiations will be structured, formulators can focus attention on the important issues at hand and influence which of a number of possible agreements will ultimately be reached in equilibrium. They will also try to convince each party that there are temporal constraints that necessitate immediate progress or that unilateral action is less beneficial than negotiation (Touval and Zartman 2001). An example of mediation by formulation occurred during the 1992 crisis between Liberia and Sierra Leone, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) successfully structured the bargaining process and proposed the outcome to which the parties ultimately agreed.

Manipulative mediation is the final mediation style in our framework. Like formulation, it also provides a substantive contribution to negotiations. Unlike formulation, though, this mediator uses its position and its leverage to influence the crisis bargaining process (Touval and Zartman 1985).[3] In terms of the rationalist bargaining framework, manipulation involves attempting to shift the reservation points of each actor, thereby increasing the probability that the actors will be able to identify some alternative within the expanding ZOA.

Manipulative mediators can increase both the immediate costs of continuing conflict and the future costs of reneging on an agreement. With regard to altering the immediate costs, mediators do so via two principal mechanisms. First, mediators can offer carrots—what Carnevale (1986) calls "compensation"—to actors for achieving peace. By adding benefits to their proposed solution, manipulative mediators are augmenting the appeal of this solution (Morgan 1994; Zartman and Touval 1996). Carrots may include direct compensation, the enactment of favorable economic policies toward the actor(s), or other diplomatic concessions. Mediators can also employ sticks—what Carnevale (1986) terms "pressing"—to increase the costs of nonagreement. Sticks might include economic and/or diplomatic sanctions, as well as the threat of direct military intervention.

impact on today's and tomorrow's costs

compensation

pressing

A prime example of a mediator attempting to expand the zone of agreement by changing the immediate costs and benefits of violent conflict occurred during a 1972 crisis between North and South Yemen. The mediator—Colonel Qaddhafi of Libya—reportedly threatened to hold captive the delegation leaders of both sides if they did not reach an agreement. He also offered both sides close to $50 million in annual aid if they did reach an agreement. Qaddhafi clearly attempted to use both carrots and sticks as a cost maximization mediation strategy.

Turning to future costs, manipulation might also entail a commitment to enforcement that alters the incentives for reneging on any agreements that are reached. Rational actors who expect their opponents to not comply with agreements will likely not agree to a resolution. Actors may expect that the costs of conflict, capabilities of both

3. This style of mediation is also sometimes referred to as "directive" (Kressel 1972; Carnevale and Pegnetter 1985; Bercovitch and Houston 1996, 2000; Bercovitch 2003) or "power" mediation (Keashly and Fisher 1996; Bloomfield, Nupen, and Harris 1998).

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sides, and other circumstances will change at a future time. They may calculate that an agreement that is above an opponent's reservation point now may not be so in the future. To prevent such a scenario from occurring, a mediator might promise to continue providing incentives such that the utility of peace does not fall below each actor's reservation point. Manipulative mediators can threaten future sanctions for failed compliance or guarantee a continuation of economic or diplomatic benefits if peace is maintained. A mediator may also offer to monitor the postcrisis situation, which increases the costs of renewing conflict by preventing noncompliance from going undetected. In this way, mediators can serve as third-party enforcers and help resolve commitment problems between the crisis actors (see Walter 2002). As part of the U.S.-mediated Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Egypt following the 1973 October Yom Kippur War, the United States committed to the stationing of U.S. observer forces in the Sinai to monitor the cease-fire.

It should be noted that to be able to make promises and threats as a manipulator, mediators will need to bring the parties together with a facilitative strategy, and they typically help structure proposals as a formulator. Thus, in keeping with the typical understanding of mediation style as a spectrum of substantive involvement, it is important to note that mediators always use facilitation in some fashion and rarely use manipulation without also engaging in formulation. This, however, does not mean that comparisons among the different styles and strategies are not worthwhile. Many mediators will be limited to formulation and/or facilitation due to a lack of resources, their own strategic decisions, or the context of the crisis. Crises that experience manipulation should exhibit different patterns than those that only use formulation and/or facilitation, and this will be tested in the empirical analyses below.

mediation styles use different mechanics/instruments

Table 1 places the mediation styles in the context of their mechanisms and actual observed tactics. Facilitation and formulation are separate means of allowing actors to locate an existing alternative that is mutually preferable to conflict. Facilitators do this primarily through information revelation and formulators through coordination. On the other hand, manipulators use compensation, pressing, and enforcement mechanisms to increase the perceived costs of conflict, thereby enlarging the range of alternatives that are mutually preferable to conflict and/or reneging. Mediation styles are also an aggregation of the more specific tactical moves that mediators use. Drawing from the work of Bercovitch (1997) and Touval and Zartman (1985), the right-hand column in Table 1 lists the tactical moves that mediators can make during mediation. These tactics match well to the mechanisms and styles proposed.[4] Mediation styles are aggregations of many types of mediator behavior but are essential and logical heuristic devices for tracing how mediators generally try to affect the bargaining environment.

4. Of course, some tactics will naturally not correspond nicely to the strategies and mechanisms that we discuss. However, those are few in number, and their exclusion should not systematically affect the expectations of this study are worth noting for future research. It is also important to note here that the "information provision and filtering" tactic discussed by Bercovitch (1997) as a component of manipulative mediation should not really be thought of as information *revelation*. Rather, it is the strategic management of information flows meant to increase the perception that peace is a better option, often using deception.

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TABLE 1
Styles in the Context of Mechanisms and Tactics

how was each agreement reached

Mechanism	*Style*	*Tactics*
Information revelation	Facilitation	Make contact with parties
		Gain the trust and confidence of the parties
		Arrange for interactions between the parties
		Identify underlying issues and interests
		Clarify the situation
		Supply missing information
		Transmit messages between parties
		Fact finding
		Offer positive evaluations
		Allow the interests of all parties to be discussed
Coordination	Formulation	Control the pace and formality of the meetings
		Control the physical environment
		Ensure the privacy of mediation
		Highlight common interests
		Control timing
		Help devise a framework for an acceptable outcome
		Help parties save face
		Keep the process focused on the issues
		Make substantive suggestions and proposals
		Suggest concessions parties could make
Carrots/compensation	Manipulation	Keep parties at the table
Sticks/pressing		Change parties' expectations
Enforcement		Take responsibility for concessions
		Make parties aware of the costs of nonagreement
		Supply and filter information
		Help negotiators to undo a commitment
		Reward concessions made by the parties
		Press the parties to show flexibility
		Promise resources
		Threaten withdrawal of resources
		Offer to verify compliance with the agreement
		Add incentives
		Threaten punishments
		Threaten to withdraw mediation

MEDIATION STYLES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CRISIS OUTCOMES

There is a pressing need for studies linking specific mediation techniques with clearly defined outcomes (Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Dixon 1996; Wall, Stark, and Standifer 2001; Smith and Stam 2003). To this end, we develop a series of hypotheses that predict the effects of different mediation styles on the likelihood of the crisis terminating in various outcomes. We focus on three outcomes that are relevant to international crisis resolution: the achievement of a formal agreement, a postcrisis reduction of tensions between crisis actors, and whether or not mediation influenced crisis abatement.[5]

Dependent variables

5. We also explored the effects of mediation on the extent of actor satisfaction with the outcome, but consistent with the findings of Wilkenfeld et al. (2005), these analyses did not yield significant results and are not reported here.

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1st DV

FORMAL AGREEMENT

Crises that terminate in formal agreements are more sustainable because they require a commitment of resources for creation and implementation, and they may contain specific punishment provisions for noncompliance. Therefore, they are costly to renege on. Formal agreements are more likely to be reached if each side knows that the agreement in question resides unambiguously in their overlapping range of mutually beneficial outcomes. Less formal agreements often result from bargains clearly outside the ZOA. A challenger remains, but the crisis fades because the use of force is no longer threatened. Such outcomes on the periphery or outside the ZOA are unstable and will lead to noncompliance when the new status quo later becomes undesirable to one of the actors. Due to this perceived instability, the crisis actors will be less willing to formalize a costly and potentially binding agreement.

Mediation by any style should increase the chance that a formal agreement will be reached (Wilkenfeld et al. 2003). Building on our earlier discussion of ZOA, facilitation and formulation can help the actors identify an existing alternative that is mutually preferable to fighting, while manipulation can expand the set of alternatives that are mutually preferable.

Hypothesis 1a: Crises in which mediation is used will be more likely to end in a formal agreement than crises without mediation.

We further posit that manipulative mediation will have a stronger influence on the likelihood of agreement being reached (see also Bercovitch 1996, 1997; Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003). Changing the actors' cost-benefit ratios and decreasing their reservation points maximize the number of alternatives preferable to fighting. With more alternatives to choose from, there should be a higher likelihood that the actors would be able to identify one and reach a formal agreement. This is not necessarily the case when facilitation or formulation is used. As the set of alternatives within the ZOA is clarified via coordination or information revelation, the actors may perceive that some of the options that were previously considered as preferable to fighting in actuality are not.

An additional potential benefit of manipulative mediation is that such mediators often commit to a postcrisis monitoring and agreement enforcing role. This increases each party's willingness to sign a potentially restrictive formal agreement because they understand that the costs of noncompliance are high for all parties, including themselves.

Hypothesis 1b: Crises in which mediators use a manipulative style will be more likely to end in a formal agreement than all other crises.

Even though formulation and facilitation do not involve enforcement provisions and cannot directly expand the perceived set of acceptable alternatives, these styles should still increase the probability of a formal agreement relative to no mediation. The information revelation and coordination mechanisms should allow the crisis

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actors to better identify which demands will be acceptable to the other side and thereby increase the actors' confidence in finding an unambiguous mutually acceptable agreement. Therefore, we further posit that these styles of mediation are likely to be more effective in achieving formal agreements than negotiations in which the parties are left to their own devices.

Hypothesis 1c: Crises in which mediators use formulation and/or facilitation will be more likely to end in a formal agreement than crises without mediation.

Since formal agreements are more permanent and the stakes are subsequently higher, actors will engage in hard-line bargaining over which of several alternatives to choose within the zone of agreement. A mediator's use of coordination tactics may have heightened importance because strong coordination creates a focal point that bypasses haggling over small gains.

Hypothesis 1d: Crises in which formulative mediation is used will be more likely to end in a formal agreement than crises with facilitative mediation and crises without mediation.

TENSION REDUCTION

2nd DV

One of the goals of intervention in crisis is to create an atmosphere in which there is a sustained reduction in tensions between the parties. Tensions are most likely reduced when an agreement aligns the distribution of benefits with the actual distribution of capabilities (Powell 1999). Since it is possible that, after the crisis terminates, the actors' capabilities will change slightly and/or they will learn more about the true distribution of capabilities, such agreements are less likely to lead to a situation in which an actor will be aggrieved over its share of the distribution of benefits in the future.

To reach a formal agreement, it must simply be perceived as preferable to fighting. Tension reduction implies that the outcome is actually well above each side's reservation point (and remains so over time). For tension reduction to be realized, the outcome should also lie near the center of the overlapping bargaining space, where the distribution of benefits approximates the distribution of capabilities. Under these conditions, there is a higher likelihood that the outcome will actually persist and that tensions will be reduced.

Each mediation style should help contribute to tension reduction (Wilkenfeld et al. 2003). As will be argued more thoroughly below, facilitation and formulation styles should help the actors establish an agreement that is located within a more permanent ZOA. Manipulative mediators can also encourage lasting settlements by increasing the costs of reneging directly (through a continued presence) or indirectly (through encouraging formal agreements).

Hypothesis 2a: Crises in which mediation is used will be more likely to have reduced tensions after crisis termination than crises without mediation.

really? why - because mediation decreases information asymmetries and allows party to strike the mutually best deal?

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since 'natural' settlement

Facilitation and formulation lend themselves best to reducing long-term tensions among crisis actors. Information revelation helps bring the perceived set of options that are preferable to fighting in line with the actual set of options that would be realized under complete information. Moreover, mediator coordination can focus the negotiations on an alternative that might be mutually perceived as fair given the distributions of capabilities, resolve, and costs of fighting. This decreases the chance that the status quo would become undesirable if the actors learn more about the true distribution of capabilities or if the capabilities gradually fluctuate after the crisis is over.

By contrast, manipulation only alters the relative costs of conflict and deflates each party's reservation point. Such a strategy is likely to have a lesser effect on tension reduction because it does not necessarily lead to an outcome that is in line with the true distribution of capabilities. Werner and Yuen (2005) find that conflicts in which the disputants are pressured into an agreement will be less stable after settlement than other conflicts. In addition, since monitoring missions often do not last longer than a few years, we should observe many cases where manipulation as enforcement does not reduce tensions because the mediator eventually fails to commit to ensuring that peaceful relations continue between the adversaries.

manipulation leads to commitment problem

The proposed logic that links facilitation and formulation to tension reduction also contributes to a deeper understanding of commitment problems. Commitment and informational problems are not mutually exclusive, and we expect that uncertainty will make agreements difficult to both reach and implement. Under uncertainty, there is a higher chance that an agreement will be reached that would not have been reached under complete information—that is, at least one actor underestimates its true relative capabilities. This increases the likelihood that an actor will update its preferences and become dissatisfied with a recent agreement. Such a commitment problem may be preempted through better information flows and coordination over focal points.

how to deal with selection effect? maybe the very difficult crises are either not mediated at all or require forceful manipulative mediation?

Hypothesis 2b: Crises in which formulation and/or facilitation are used will be more likely to have reduced tensions after termination than unmediated crises or those in which manipulation is used.

In addition, a mediator's use of coordination to encourage an agreement consistent with the actual distribution of capabilities would likely increase the prospects for a lasting settlement even further than just information revelation. If a mediator makes a substantive suggestion or reframes the issues in terms of what a "fair" outcome might be, the chance of an agreement being in the center of the ZOA is maximized. Facilitative mediation only brings the perceived set of mutually acceptable alternatives in line with the actual ZOA; an actor will still have an incentive to advocate an alternative within the ZOA that is closer to its ideal point. A formulative mediator can potentially counteract those incentives and advocate an agreement more central to the ZOA, similar to what Young (1967, 41) terms building "saliency."

Hypothesis 2c: Crises in which formulative mediation is used will be more likely to have reduced tensions after crisis termination than all other crises.

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Manipulative mediation also affects tension reduction. The expanded bargaining range is not necessarily temporary. This is particularly the case if the manipulative mediator maintains an implicit threat to intervene in future conflicts or maintains a third-party presence in the current conflict due to its continued interests in the dispute. In addition, tensions may be reduced simply because a manipulative mediation style is particularly effective at securing formal agreements that are relatively more costly to renege on.

Hypothesis 2d: Crises in which mediators use manipulation will be more likely to have reduced tensions after crisis termination than crises without mediation.

CONTRIBUTION TO CRISIS ABATEMENT

crisis abatement = reduction of tension btw crisi actors

tension reduction = post-crisis diminution of tensions btw actors

Finally, we will analyze the effect of mediation styles on general crisis abatement. Crisis abatement refers to a reduction in tensions between the crisis actors. It is distinct from the tension reduction outcome discussed earlier, which is a measure of the postcrisis diminution of tensions between actors. It should be noted that this outcome variable is specific to the cases in which there was mediation.

The likelihood of mediation positively affecting crisis abatement is partially a function of its likelihood of spurring disputants to sign a formal agreement. As proposed in hypothesis 1b, we should expect a manipulative style to be most influential in bringing about agreements. However, crisis abatement is broader then than simply reaching an agreement. Many crises either fade away or otherwise end without an agreement when there is no longer a threat of violence. As a result, we expect that a strategy that increases the relative costs of conflict will decrease the willingness of the actors to resort to violence and increase the probability of abatement, regardless of whether an agreement is reached.

Hypothesis 3a: Mediation will be more likely to contribute to crisis abatement when a manipulative style is used than when any other style is employed.

As proposed in hypothesis 1c, formulation and facilitation can also help achieve an agreement between crisis actors. Furthermore, in hypothesis 1d, we postulated that a mediator's use of coordination tactics toward a formal settlement would be even more effective at producing agreements than a purely facilitative style. Similarly, coordinating on specific alternatives to fighting within the ZOA should also have more of a pacifying effect than just allowing the actors to better identify the ZOA boundaries.

Hypothesis 3b: Mediation will be more likely to contribute to crisis abatement when formulation is used than when facilitation is employed.

6. For the complete International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data sets, case summaries, and codebooks, see ICBOnline at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/.

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METHOD

DATA SET

We use data from the ICB project to test the validity of these hypotheses.[6] As part of the latest update of ICB, a suite of twenty mediation variables was added to the data set. A checklist was developed for the coders so that they could determine whether mediation had occurred in a crisis and to distinguish mediation from other forms of third-party intervention. If a coder determined that mediation had in fact occurred, he or she was then asked to determine the primary mediator in the crisis by identifying which mediator was most active. Additional variables included indicators of the style of mediation used, the types of actors that served as mediators, and the effectiveness of mediation.[7]

With minor exceptions, the coding procedures for the mediation variables were the same as those developed for the ICB project in general (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 39-64). Two coders were assigned to each case, working independently. Upon completion of the coding, the authors debriefed each pair of coders on the cases to which they were jointly assigned. Final coding decisions were based on the consensus of the two coders, with discrepancies resolved by senior staff (see Wilkenfeld et al. 2005).[8]

The data we use cover 434 international crises from 1918 to 2001, 128 of which were mediated. The ICB data have the unique benefit of containing crises of many different levels of escalation, from simple threats of force to full-scale war. For this study, we use the system-level data produced by the ICB project, where the unit of observation is each individual crisis.

imporant re: self-selection; no selection on DV?

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The ICB data code for the presence of seven mutually exclusive forms of outcome. One of these outcomes is formal agreement, which includes treaties, armistices, and cease-fires. This variable, FORMAL, was then recoded into a 0-1 dichotomous variable, with only those observations that experienced a formal outcome receiving a value of 1.[9]

Def Crisis Escalation

? tension is a recurring crisis?

Tension escalation is indicated by a crisis recurring between the principal actors within the five-year period following crisis termination, while a reduction in tension

7. The coder checklist for determining whether mediation occurred was culled both from prominent definitions of mediation in the pertinent literature and some of the criteria established in the relatively few quantitative studies of mediation (see especially Bercovitch 1997). For a description of this checklist and a complete discussion of all ICB mediation variables, see chapter 2 of Wilkenfeld et al. (2005).

8. Standard intercoder reliability measures are not appropriate in this instance since disagreements over the coding of certain key variables, such as the identification of the mediator or the timing of mediation, can then have the effect of producing divergent coding for all subsequent mediation variables. Therefore, when serious discrepancies in these key variables occurred, ICB always assigned a third coder to attempt to resolve the discrepancies.

9. For the purposes of this study, we do not disaggregate the different types of possible outcomes under the rubric of formal agreement (e.g., cease-fires, treaties, etc.). We recognize that such a disaggregation might reveal interesting findings in later studies.

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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of the Dependent Variables

	Descriptive Statistics			*Correlations*		
	Events	*Possible*	*Percentage*	*Formal Agreement*	*Tension Reduction*	*Effective Mediation*
Formal agreement	93	434	21.43	1.000	0.083	0.357
Tension reduction	226	420	53.81	0.083	1.000	0.102
Effective mediation	87	123	70.73	0.357	0.102	1.000

NOTE: Fourteen crises were too recent for tension reduction to be coded. In addition, of the 128 mediated crises, 5 did not have sufficient information to code mediation effectiveness.

signifies no such recurrence. This variable, REDUCE, was rescaled to a 0-1 dichotomous variable, with 1 indicating tension reduction.

Finally, those crises in which mediation was determined to be an important or the most important factor in decreasing tensions between the crisis actors (while the crisis was still occurring) were coded as a 1 for our new EFFECTIVE variable, signifying positive contribution to crisis abatement. All other mediation cases were coded as 0, and all nonmediation cases were excluded from the analysis.

Table 2 provides a description of the dependent variables, including their degree of correlation with each other. The correlation coefficients indicate that no pair of dependent variables is correlated at a level higher than 0.357. These summary statistics indicate that there are real differences between the dependent variables and rule out potential arguments that the paths to each dependent variable are caused by the nonindependence of these variables.

would require a test, no?

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Since multiple styles of mediation are often used in the same crises, ICB coders were also asked to code two variables that characterize the primary style of mediation. The first variable simply identifies the highest level of mediation employed during the course of the crisis, defined according to the intensity of the substantive contribution to the negotiation process. The ordering of this variable starts with facilitation and then increases incrementally to formulation and then manipulation. For the analyses, we coded four dummy variables, with the three styles and no mediation as separate variables. For example, if manipulation was the highest form of mediation for a given crisis, then that observation was coded as 1 for the manipulation variable and 0 for the other three dummies. The resulting variables are HIGHMANIP, HIGHFORM, HIGHFACIL, and NOMED. It should be noted that the cumulative nature of these highest form variables (i.e., higher forms of mediation are rarely used without lower forms) will have some implications for how the results of the models are interpreted.

4 dummies? what's the control group?

see model - one dummy dropped

Limiting analysis to only the *highest* form does not tell one enough about which styles of mediation are the prime movers. For example, if a mediator manipulated and formulated but the latter is really what moved the parties to agreement, the *highest*

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TABLE 3
The Independent Variables

	Events	*Possible*	*Total Percentage*	*Mediation Percentage*
MEDIATION	128	430	29.77	100.0
HIGHFACI	14	412	3.40	12.73
HIGHFORM	53	412	12.86	48.18
HIGHMANIP	43	412	10.44	39.09
MOSTFACI	38	405	9.38	36.89
MOSTFORM	47	405	11.60	45.63
MOSTMANIP	18	405	4.44	17.48

NOTE: Four of the crises did not have enough information for the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) coders to identify whether mediation occurred. In addition, eighteen of the mediated crises did not have sufficient information to identify the highest mediation style used, and a determination of the most crucial style could not be made in seven more of the mediated crises.

important distinction btw highest vs most crucial mediation

form variable would give one an inaccurate picture of which mediation styles were really most salient in this case. ICB also codes the most *crucial* form of mediation in a crisis. We again recoded this variable into four dummy variables with the three styles and no mediation as separate variables: MOSTMANIP, MOSTFORM, MOSTFACIL, and NOMED. Regardless of whether a mediator has any effect on crisis resolution, one style will always have a greater effect on crisis behavior than others. Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics of these independent variables.

THE CONTROL VARIABLES

Selection Effect / Endogeneity

Mediation takes place in a strategic environment in which mediators may endogenously choose whether to mediate and what style of mediation to use (Bercovitch 1997; Greig 2005; Beardsley 2004).[10] Following this logic, a mediator may also choose specific styles when the crisis is, say, less difficult to resolve, so one might expect to observe a lower incidence of failure associated with those styles. However, this expectation would be misleading because the conflicts in which those styles are used may be predisposed to succeed. We do not know what would happen if those same mediation styles were used in conflicts that were ex ante more difficult to resolve. Thus, if the decision to mediate and the choice of style are both influenced by the ex ante likelihood of a specific outcome, we must hold constant those factors that both influence the outcome and inform mediation choice, or the results of our analyses will be biased.

2 things to control for

Control variables

The three variables that are most likely to be related to choice of style mediation and the ex ante probability of mediation failure are the violence level associated with a crisis, whether the crisis occurs within a protracted conflict, and the polarity of the inter-

10. Although we do not systematically analyze mediator motives for intervening in this study, much has been written on this subject (see especially Touval and Zartman 1985; Bercovitch 1992, 1997; Princen 1992; Zartman and Touval 1996). Most scholars argue that mediator motives for intervening are important to investigate because in addition to humanitarian goals, all mediators have less altruistic "interests" at stake when they choose to mediate.

mediators' motives may be difficult to control for since unknown

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national system in which the crisis takes place. Crises in which violence occurs and those that are part of a protracted conflict may be more likely to experience mediation of a certain type, as there is greater threat of damage to the actors involved and the international community if outside intervention does not occur. At the same time, such complexities might contribute to a higher than average probability of mediation failure, as measured by less agreement, lower rate of reduction in tensions, and diminished crisis abatement. We thus include in our analyses a 4-point ordinal scale of violence (VIOL) and a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a crisis is considered to be part of a protracted conflict (PC), according to ICB.

The likelihood of mediation occurrence and its probability of success may also be tied to the polarity of the international system. The United Nations (UN) and major powers are the most common mediators, and they each have significant influence within the international system. As Touval and Zartman (1985) point out, being involved in mediation is one way for the major powers to exert international influence. The level of influence of certain actors is likely to change with the structure of the international system, so the role of mediation might therefore vary with polarity. At the very least, if the institutional and normative structures for conflict resolution change over time, controlling for polarity is one way to hold those changes constant. For these reasons, we include a 5-point categorical variable for polarity time period that includes the following categories: 1918-1939 (multipolarity), 1939-1945 (World War II), 1945-1962 (bipolarity), 1963-1988 (polycentrism), and 1989-2001 (unipolarity). We recoded this variable into five dummy variables, with each type of polarity as a separate variable.

In addition to the three variables that likely influence the selection of mediation, we also control for the type of crisis resolution goals that a mediator professes. ICB coders were asked to make a distinction between *crisis management*—attempting to control events during a crisis to prevent significant and systematic violence from occurring or escalating, including cease-fires—and *conflict resolution*—attempting to get the parties in conflict to redefine their relationship in such a way as to perceive either that they can realize their goals without conflict or that they can redefine their relationship so that their goals no longer conflict. In the former case, we expect that mediation will not have a strong effect on achieving a lasting peace because that is not its explicit goal. We recoded the ICB indicator of the mediator goal as a 0-1 dichotomous variable, with 1 indicating that the mediator only had a goal of crisis management (CMGOAL). We assume that mediators whose goal is conflict resolution will also engage in crisis management, while the opposite is not necessarily the case.

THE MODELS

To test the hypotheses, we use multivariate logit models. In the analyses of the final dependent variable, the mediator's effect on crisis abatement, the universe of cases only includes those in which mediation actually occurred. Selection bias may result

11. Rho is the correlation in the error term of a model of mediation selection and the error term of a model of mediation outcomes.

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TABLE 4
Logit Models of the Effect of Mediation

	Formal Agreements: Model 1		*Tension Reduction: Model 2*	
MEDIATION	2.257***	(0.343)	1.050***	(0.345)
VIOL	0.165	(0.123)	–0.156	(0.103)
PC	–0.095	(0.279)	–1.355***	(0.236)
PERIOD1	0.812	(0.500)	0.528	(0.480)
PERIOD2	–0.261	(0.769)	0.381	(0.589)
PERIOD3	–0.060	(0.513)	1.466***	(0.477)
PERIOD4	0.091	(0.443)	0.560	(0.434)
CMGOAL	–0.581	(0.371)	–0.424	(0.409)
Constant	–2.604***	(0.537)	0.437	(0.475)
n	427		413	
Pseudo-R^2	0.158		0.116	
Likelihood ratio chi-square	70.49***		66.03***	

***$p < .001$.

unless the models of crisis abatement take into account the nonrandom assignment of mediation (see Achen 1986 and Lemke and Reed 2001 for different overviews of selection bias in political science research). Hence, a Heckman probit or censored probit model was first employed for the analyses with this dependent variable. For each censored probit model, the rho parameters that indicate the potential for selection bias were statistically insignificant.[11] Thus, the censored probit models are unnecessary, and ordinary multivariate logit models are used instead.

endogeneity

To avoid perfect multicollinearity in our explanatory variables, it was necessary to exclude one dummy variable related to mediation style (in both its highest and most crucial forms) and polarity for each model. These excluded variables serve as the reference categories by which we interpret the coefficients of all other mediation style and polarity time period dummy variables. We chose to use the following as our reference categories: for mediation style, "no mediation," and for polarity time period, the "post–cold war/unipolar" period.

dropp dummy

RESULTS

Table 4 illustrates the overall effects of mediation, regardless of style, on the first two dependent variables. Table 5 presents the effects of the mediation style variables—both highest form (models 3, 5, and 7) and most crucial form (models 4, 6, and 8) of mediation—on all three dependent variables. For ease of interpretation, the results are discussed in terms of the frequently used method of calculating the predicted probabilities of observing a "1" on the dependent variable, given a specific value of one or more independent variables and holding all other variables constant. As is standard with this method of interpretation, we first calculated the baseline probability of observing a "1" on the dependent variable by holding all dichotomous vari-

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manipulation leads to formal agreement

TABLE 5
Logit Models of the Effects of Mediation Styles

manipulation is good in ending crisis

	Formal Agreements		*Tension Reduction*		*Mediation Effectiveness*	
	Model 3	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
HIGHFACI	0.695 (0.845)	—	1.584**(0.736)	—	—	—
HIGHFORM	1.956*** (0.421)	—	1.041** (0.429)	—	0.354 (0.665)	—
HIGHMANIP	3.187*** (0.462)	—	1.292** (0.453)	—	1.532** (0.734)	—
MOSTFACI	—	1.576***(0.490)	—	1.571**(0.516)	—	—
MOSTFORM	—	2.600***(0.430)	—	1.211**(0.446)	—	1.320**(0.564)
MOSTMANIP	—	3.375***(0.637)	—	1.195* (0.642)	—	2.798**(1.118)
VIOL	0.046 (0.132)	0.104 (0.133)	–0.145 (0.106)	–0.141 (0.108)	–0.369* (0.224)	–0.259 (0.241)
PC	–0.292 (0.297)	–0.293 (0.302)	–1.381*** (0.242)	–1.398*** (0.246)	0.842 (0.515)	1.285** (0.593)
PERIOD1	0.883* (0.516)	0.996* (0.537)	0.503 (0.486)	0.519 (0.491)	—	—
PERIOD2	–0.161 (0.799)	0.178 (0.787)	0.374 (0.595)	0.379 (0.599)	—	—
PERIOD3	0.009 (0.531)	0.186 (0.546)	1.446** (0.482)	1.470** (0.487)	–1.081 (0.914)	–1.138 (0.922)
PERIOD4	0.054 (0.469)	0.422 (0.486)	0.593 (0.442)	0.607 (0.446)	–1.102 (0.773)	–0.501 (0.798)
PERIOD5	—	—	—	—	–0.446 (0.886)	–0.436 (0.905)
CMGOAL	–0.469 (0.424)	–0.404 (0.432)	–0.609 (0.449)	–0.877* (0.471)	–0.679 (0.477)	–0.444 (0.507)
Constant	–2.237*** (0.551)	–2.608*** (0.572)	0.422 (0.484)	0.408 (0.486)	1.945* (1.112)	0.798 (1.007)
n	411	404	397	390	108	101
Pseudo-R^2	0.196	0.195	0.119	0.122	0.1132	0.152
Likelihood ratio chi-square	82.75***	81.02***	65.40***	65.98***	14.65*	17.81**

but weaker re: tensions

*$p < .1$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .001$.

facilitation is stronger related to tension reduction than manipulation;
would the difference become larger if DV is no crisis recurence within 5 years, but eg 10 years?

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ables at their modal values and all interval and ordinal variables at their mean values. For easy reference, the predicted probabilities associated with all statistically significant independent (i.e., mediation) variables in this analysis are displayed in Table 6.

FORMAL AGREEMENT

All three formal agreement models—model 1 in Table 4 and models 3 and 4 in Table 5—are statistically significant ($p < .001$). The results of model 1 support hypothesis 1a, as the MEDIATION coefficient is statistically significant and positive. The probability of formal agreement is more than five times greater when a crisis is mediated (48.35 percent) than when it is not (9.97 percent).

Turning to mediation styles, we examine how both the highest and the most crucial style of mediation affect the probability that agreement will be achieved. The results of models 3 and 4 lend support to hypothesis 1b. The probability of formal agreement increases from 8.93 percent for unmediated crises to 67.15 percent for manipulated crises. When formulation is the highest style of mediation employed, however, the probability of crises ending in agreement is only 39.47 percent. (The indicator of facilitation as the highest style is not statistically significant and has no discernible relationship with formal agreement.)

Manipulation performs equally as well when it is the most crucial form of mediation used in a crisis. The likelihood of formal agreement is more than nine times higher for a case in which manipulation is the most crucial form of mediation (65.75 percent), compared to an unmediated crisis (7.25 percent). When a mediator's most crucial tactics are formulative in nature, the crisis has a significant, but smaller, chance of ending in a formal agreement (48.28 percent). When facilitation has the largest impact on a crisis, the probability of formal agreement is only 26.88 percent.

These results also lend some support to hypothesis 1d since crises in which formulation is the highest or most crucial form of mediation used are more likely to end in a formal agreement than unmediated crises and those in which facilitation is the highest or most crucial form of mediation. Finally, our findings provide some evidence in favor of hypothesis 1c, given that the coefficients related to MOSTFACI, HIGHFORM, and MOSTFORM are all statistically significant and in the expected direction—facilitation and formulation contribute more to reaching formal agreements relative to no mediation.

In sum, mediated crises are more likely to result in formal agreements than unmediated crises. The results also indicate that formulative and manipulative forms of mediation are strongly associated with the achievement of formal agreements. Manipulation is consistently the most effective style of mediation at securing a formal agreement. Crises in which formulation is either the highest or most crucial mediation style are more likely to terminate in formal agreements than crises that are either unmediated or that exhibit facilitation as the highest or most crucial style.

Facilitation only has a statistically significant effect on formal agreement when it is the most crucial mediation style. We must recall that formulation and manipulation are almost always used in conjunction with other, less intrusive mediation styles, so the HIGHFACI variable is also an indicator of those instances in which only one media-

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TABLE 6
Predicted Probabilities of Independent Variables

		Dependent Variables							
		Formal Agreement			*Tension Reduction*			*Mediation Effectiveness*	
Independent Variable	*Values*	*Model 1*	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 2*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*	*Model 9*
MEDIATION	No	0.0997	0.0893	0.0725	0.2219	0.2190	0.2207	—	—
	Yes	0.4835	—	—	0.4428	—	—	—	—
HIGHFACI	Yes	—	—	—	—	0.5666	—	0.7130	—
HIGHFORM	Yes	—	0.3947	—	—	0.4323	—	—	—
HIGHMANIP	Yes	—	0.6715	—	—	0.5004	—	0.9160	—
MOSTFACI	Yes	—	—	0.2688	—	—	0.5551	—	0.6989
MOSTFORM	Yes	—	—	0.4828	—	—	0.4760	—	0.8789
MOSTMANIP	Yes	—	—	0.6575	—	—	—	—	0.9533
Baseline	—	0.0997	0.0893	0.0725	0.2219	0.2190	0.2207	0.7130	0.6989

NOTE: The baseline percentages reported here are the predicted probabilities of the dependent variable being realized (i.e., the dependent variable having a value of 1) when all binary control and independent variables are set to their modal values and ordinal and continuous variables are set to their mean values. These baseline percentages are equal to the predicted probabilities associated with "no mediation" in models 1 to 2 and 4 to 7 and "facilitation" in models 8 to 9. All other percentages are the predicted probabilities of the dependent variable being realized when the respective independent variable has a value of 1 and all other control and independent variables are held at their baseline values. Predicted probabilities were only calculated for statistically significant independent variables.

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tion style was used. As a result, the weak effect of HIGHFACI on achieving a formal agreement may not actually be a result of facilitative mediation being ineffective at securing formal agreements. Rather, it may indicate that mediation is not as effective when only one style is used.

TENSION REDUCTION

We turn now to a discussion of the effect of mediation on the outcome variable measuring whether tensions were reduced between the actors. Each tension reduction model—model 2 in Table 4 and models 5 and 6 in Table 5—is statistically significant ($p < .001$). The MEDIATION coefficient in model 2 is statistically significant and positive, which demonstrates support for hypothesis 2a. For model 2, the baseline probability of crises being followed by tension reduction—that is, when mediation does not occur—is 22.19 percent. When mediation does occur, the probability rises to 44.28 percent. formulation with strongest impact on tension

We find mixed support for hypothesis 2b. In support of this hypothesis, the indicators of facilitation and formulation in models 5 and 6 are both statistically significant and positive. When mediation does not occur, the probability of a reduction in tensions following crisis termination is 21.90 percent in model 5. When mediation does occur and formulation or facilitation is the highest form of mediation style used, the probability of tension reduction jumps to 43.23 percent and 56.66 percent, respectively. Similarly, in model 6, the probability of a reduction in tensions increases by 25.53 percent when formulation is the most crucial style and 33.44 percent when it is facilitation, from a baseline probability of 22.07 percent when there is no mediation. Contrary to hypothesis 2b, however, crises involving manipulation have a 50.04 percent likelihood of being succeeded by a reduction in tensions between actors. Thus, even though the differences are slight, when mediation style is conceived in terms of "highest form," manipulation has roughly a 7 percent greater chance of bringing about tension reduction than formulation.

These results also demonstrate support for hypothesis 2d—when manipulation is used, a postcrisis reduction in tensions is almost 30 percent more likely to occur than if mediation had not been used at all. However, the indicator of manipulation as the most crucial form of mediation used in a crisis is only approaching statistical significance ($p < .063$). Nevertheless, the direction and relative size of the MOSTMANIP coefficient—significantly positive and smaller in magnitude than the coefficients on MOSTFACI and MOSTFORM—in model 6 tend to support hypotheses 2b and 2d.

Finally, although we can say with confidence that formulation has a larger positive effect on tension reduction than no mediation at all, our results demonstrate that formulation is between 8 and 13 percent less likely than facilitation and 7 percent less likely than manipulation to bring about this crisis outcome. Hence, we do not find support for hypothesis 2c.

What are these results telling us? As we hypothesized, postcrisis tension reduction is more likely to follow from mediated than unmediated crises. We had also hypothesized that formulation would be the most effective style of mediation at bringing about a reduction in tensions, followed by facilitation, then manipulation, and finally no

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mediation. Contrary to this proposition, facilitation consistently performs best at preventing another crisis from occurring among the principal actors, at least in the short term. While formulation has a significant impact, it appears to be less important than facilitation in both models and less so than manipulation in model 6. We also find little gain in tension reduction by including manipulation in mediation attempts that are already using facilitation and formulation.

Several of the control variables are also statistically significant and offer some indication of other processes that affect tension reduction. Not surprisingly, crises that are part of a protracted conflict between parties are significantly less likely to be followed by a reduction in tensions than crises occurring outside of such conflicts. Consistent with the findings of Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), we also find that postcrisis tension *escalation* is rarer under bipolarity than unipolarity. Finally, from model 6, there is evidence approaching significance ($p < .063$) that postcrisis tension reduction between crisis actors is less likely to occur when mediators intervene and are driven primarily to manage the crisis (i.e., when CMGOAL = 1) than when they also aim to resolve the underlying issues of the conflict or when there is no mediation at all (i.e., when CMGOAL = 0).

CRISIS ABATEMENT

For the logit analyses of the effects of different mediation styles on crisis abatement, the universe of analysis consists only of those crises in which mediation occurred. Mediation style is operationalized as "highest form" in model 7 and "most crucial form" in model 8. Model 8 is statistically significant ($p < .05$), while model 7 is approaching significance ($p = .07$). Facilitation is the reference category in both models.

The findings generally provide support for hypothesis 3a. Mediators are 20.30 percent more likely to have a positive effect on crisis abatement when manipulation is the highest form than if they limit their activities to facilitation. It should also be noted that the coefficient magnitude is larger for HIGHMANIP than HIGHFORM, even though the latter fails to achieve statistical significance. Similarly, when facilitation is the most crucial mediation form, the probability of mediation significantly and positively affecting crisis abatement is 69.89 percent. This probability is higher (87.89 percent) when formulation is the most crucial form used and higher still (95.33 percent) when a mediator's manipulative tactics are most crucial.

We find mixed evidence for hypothesis 3b. When the effect of mediation is measured in terms of the most crucial form, formulation has an 18 percent greater likelihood of bringing about crisis abatement than facilitation (69.89 vs. 87.89 percent, respectively), and that difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$). While this finding supports hypothesis 3b, we must reiterate that the indicator of formulation as the highest mediation form is not significant in model 7. Thus, we cannot be certain that when mediators employ formulation (but not manipulation), they will have a greater positive effect on crisis abatement than if they only adopted a facilitative style.

In sum, it is evident that regardless of how mediation style is conceptualized, manipulation clearly seems to be linked to crisis abatement. We also find evidence that

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crises with formulation as the most crucial style of mediation are more likely to lead to crisis abatement than a mediation style centered on facilitation. We also see some evidence of other contributing factors to the crisis abatement process. When mediation style is operationalized as the most crucial form, the results indicate that mediators will be more likely to have a significant and positive effect on crisis abatement if the crisis is part of a protracted conflict than if it is not. In addition, there is some evidence, approaching statistical significance, that more violent crises detract from the mediator's ability to bring about crisis abatement.

DISCUSSION

With a few exceptions, the results of our analyses are largely in line with the analytic framework and hypotheses presented. In general, mediation has a strong effect on whether formal agreements and tension reduction are achieved in crises. The different styles of mediation seem to have unique comparative advantages, depending on the outcome being considered. It appears that facilitative mediation is best able to secure a reduction in postcrisis tensions. This is largely due to the fact that facilitation enables the actors to voluntarily recognize the true set of agreements that are mutually preferable to conflict and thereby settle on a distribution of benefits that is close to the distribution of capabilities (see Powell 1999). This should, in turn, minimize the likelihood of an actor challenging the status quo in the near future when capabilities, interests, and information availability change. Unlike manipulation, facilitation does not involve a temporary reduction of reservation points.

facilitation best to reduce tensions

We find that manipulation performs best at securing formal agreements and achieving overall crisis abatement, precisely because such outcomes are not directly dependent on future events. Formal agreements and overall abatement can be achieved by the mere perception that an alternative is preferable to conflict in the midst of a crisis, while tension reduction often requires that this actually hold in the long run. Moreover, achieving both a formal agreement and crisis abatement requires that the actors possess a sufficiently large joint bargaining space and a small amount of expected utility from violent conflict. A mediator adopting a manipulative strategy facilitates both of those requirements.

strengths and weaknesses of manipulation
- short term strength
- long term problems

Our findings also suggest that mediators should use a balance of strategies if they are to maximize their effectiveness. Since there are almost no instances in which manipulation is employed without both facilitation and formulation, mediators already frequently combine their mediation strategies to achieve conflict resolution or crisis management. The key, it seems, is to increase the incentives of agreement by structuring the costs of conflict with a manipulative style while using the more integrative styles of facilitation and formulation to reach an agreement as consistent with the true distribution of capabilities as possible.

However, the overall muted effect of formulation on tension reduction is contrary to our hypotheses, especially when compared to the strong effect that facilitation seems to have. We expected that formulation would have the strongest effect on tension reduction due to its ability to coordinate on specific alternatives, but the results do not

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support this argument. Perhaps the interests of the mediators—either for peace or for a particular side—make it unreasonable to expect that mediators would often propose "fair" outcomes that are at the center of the ZOA. The results are also an indication that the most durable agreements are those that are achieved with as little help as possible. The more substantively intrusive styles of mediation—formulation and manipulation—may actually encourage a more passive stance regarding peace on the part of the adversaries. They need not commit as much individual effort to finding the appropriate compromise, and hence they have less individual investment in that particular outcome. After a few years have passed, when it is likely that the mediator is no longer actively involved in ensuring peaceful relations between the parties, the parties may again find themselves challenging the status quo. A facilitator's focus on merely creating an opportunity for constructive negotiations to occur seems to have powerful effects in enabling the adversaries to exchange information and reach a resolution more independently. This makes it more likely that the adversaries will still gain long-term benefits from the agreement. These results corroborate recent findings by Werner and Yuen (2005).

Our findings represent counterpoints to the positions of Smith and Stam (2003), who argue that mediators cannot effectively contribute to conflict resolution, with the exception of offering enforcement services. Since facilitative mediation seems to have such strong explanatory power in predicting tension reduction, it appears that mediators are actually effective in more realms than simply agreement enforcement. This is not to say that commitment problems are not important. Instead, the results suggest that increasing the ability for actors to find an agreement that is in line with the true distribution of capabilities will decrease the likelihood of a challenge to the new agreement in the future. This, in turn, will reduce the need for sustained enforcement. External guarantees simply move the problem of commitments to third parties (Saideman 2002), who usually have more limited interest in the conflict. Intervention that helps enable the actors themselves to secure and maintain peace is more likely to be sustainable in the long run.

Caveat

A final note of caution on interpreting the results is necessary here. If mediators tailor their tactics based on the chance of reaching a particular outcome, then there may be some feedback effects that could influence the interpretation of the results. We attempted to control for some of the factors that might affect both mediation outcomes and choice of mediation style, but these are likely to be imperfect without a full understanding of how and why the mediators choose to implement their tactics. Thus, more research is needed to uncover additional factors affecting crisis outcomes and mediators' intentions/choices in this regard.

Despite these issues, we are confident of the conclusions reached here for several reasons. First, our findings are robust, even when controlling for a mediator's goals and the severity and complexity of a conflict. Second, all instances of tension reduction and many instances of formal agreements occur after mediation has been terminated, making it difficult for mediators to condition their styles to the outcomes. Finally, we used selection equations in the tests of crisis abatement to check if there was a potential for selection bias and found none.

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CONCLUSION

This study investigated the links between mediation styles and crisis outcomes. We find that facilitative mediation is best able to resolve commitment problems and secure a reduction in postcrisis tensions. By increasing the information flows in a crisis, facilitation appears to enable the actors to reach an agreement that is closest to the true distribution of capabilities. Thus, while facilitation is used in all mediated crises, it is particularly useful for mediators to stress or limit their activities to this role when trying to secure a more lasting resolution to the underlying conflict. The limited effect of formulation and manipulation on tension reduction seems to indicate that the most durable agreements are those that are achieved with less external intrusion. More intrusive or coercive forms of third-party intervention are apparently not necessary to manage or resolve conflicts. That being said, manipulative mediation often makes a positive contribution by more effectively securing formal agreements and achieving overall crisis abatement than all other mediation styles. A manipulator's ability to expand the set of alternatives that are preferable to fighting, through promising carrots, threatening sticks, and offering postcrisis monitoring, can play a strong role in avoiding bargaining failures.

Our findings challenge the notion that mediation is effective only when it enforces peace settlements (Smith and Stam 2003). The significant influence of facilitation demonstrates that mediators can achieve positive results without engaging in enforcement-related activities. In the context of the emerging literature on the role of mediation in communicating private information, our evidence suggests that mediators can and do play a role in preventing bargaining failures and enabling commitments to be ex post credible by enabling the transmission of information and facilitating coordination. From a policy perspective, the findings suggest that international mediation is a useful strategy in defusing crises and that low-key intervention may be more beneficial than has been conventionally believed.

Our study also suggests some interesting directions for future research. A promising area of inquiry would be the relative role of different mediation styles in different types of crises. For example, would formulation and facilitation be particularly effective in ethnicity-driven crises because they help adversaries recognize their underlying differences and better understand the "other"? Second, how different types of mediators choose to implement their strategies would add to our understanding of how positive outcomes can be achieved. The choices of when to initiate or accept mediation, which actor(s) will mediate, and what styles to employ are the product of complex processes involving both the combatants and the third parties. Finally, an assessment of mediator goals and the sequencing of mediator activity might help us better understand a mediator's decision calculus in implementing styles to affect crisis outcomes. Timing and sequencing are likely to play a strong role in determining the efficacy of mediation styles, so an understanding of how mediators choose when to implement specific tactics will be worth pursuing in future research.

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