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STABILITY IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES: Consociationalism versus Control

By IAN LUSTICK

THE rise of communal assertiveness in scores of “national” political arenas, from Britain and Canada to Lebanon and Malaysia, must certainly be seen as one of the broadest, strongest, and most interesting social-political trends to have developed since World War II. Regardless of what elements—racial, linguistic, religious, ethnic, or otherwise—are used in the formulation of group identity, the restless discontent of many such groups with the conditions of their existence has led to the articulation of powerful demands for change.¹ Also associated with this phenomenon has been a fascination, by social scientists, with the dynamics of ethnic differentiation, accompanied by a generalized desire on their part to discover how rival communal groups can relate to one another without conflict, chaos, and the disintegration of large political units. Abhorring violence and oppression, interested academics have devoted a great deal of attention to compromise, bargaining, and accommodation as methods for achieving stability in deeply divided societies.

For the purposes of this article, “stability” or “political stability” will refer to the continued operation of specific patterns of political behavior, apart from the illegal use of violence, accompanied by a general expectation among the attentive public that such patterns are likely to remain intact in the foreseeable future. “Deeply divided,” a term used by Eric Nordlinger in *Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies*, will be used as a synonym for “plural,” “vertically segmented,” “communally divided,” and so forth. I shall consider a society as deeply divided if ascriptive ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period of time and a wide variety of issues. As a minimum condition, boundaries between rival groups must be sharp enough so that membership is clear and, with few exceptions, unchangeable.²

¹ I find Milton J. Esman’s definition of “communalism” as “competitive group solidarities within the same political system based on ethnic, linguistic, racial, or religious identities” to be satisfactory for my purposes. See “The Management of Communal Conflict,” *Public Policy*, xxi (Winter 1973), 49. Because I shall make no assertions concerning the possible political implications of various modes of group identification, I shall use such terms as “ethnic” and “communal” interchangeably.

² The phrase “terminal identity” is derived from Rupert Emerson’s discussion of

The purpose of this paper is to distinguish between the prevailing “compromise” or “consociational” approach alluded to above and an alternative approach to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies—one that would focus on effective group control over rival group(s). After arguing that consociational models can be deployed effectively only if an alternative typological category of “control” (or domination) is available, I shall evaluate the work that has been done to develop such a category. I shall conclude by specifying some of the important questions that might be raised by sustained study of “control” in deeply divided societies, and by suggesting the conceptual requirements for any serious comparative attempt to answer these questions.

First, however, it will be useful to identify the intellectual location of the general problem of explaining stability in deeply divided societies. It will then be possible to discard as inappropriate most clusters of theory that might otherwise seem to bear upon this problem.

DISTINGUISHING “CONSOCIATIONALISM” FROM “CONTROL”

If one begins with a vision of a society as a cohesive, integrated unit, one is not then likely to be puzzled by the stable operation of that society. What demands explanation is not the persistence of that socio-political system; rather, conflicts among various elements within it, sustained attempts to alter its internal dynamics, and the various manifestations of disorder—all of which are likely to accompany conflict and attempted change—are the conditions that puzzle, and that attract analytical attention. As a general approach to the study of social systems, this vision has an illustrious intellectual genealogy. From Hegel through Weber and Parsons, theorists have analyzed social-political units as coherent and stable systems which, when subjected to various technological, social, and/or ideological forces, respond and develop in characteristic patterns.

An equally respectable intellectual tradition is based on an opposing vision of society. From Hobbes through Durkheim, Dahrendorf, and Samuel Huntington, societies have been analyzed as agglomerations of individuals and/or groups whose interests and desires conflict. According to such a vision of society, competition and disorder are to be ex-

“terminal communities.” See *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press 1960) 95-96. The exclusion of class segmentation from the population of deeply divided societies is in a strict sense somewhat arbitrary. It constitutes, however, a useful narrowing of focus, given the theoretical tasks undertaken in this paper. For a discussion of the relevance of studies of ethnic segmentation for problems of interclass control, see Peter Flynn, “Class, Clientelism, and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, xii (July 1974). See also fn. 13.

pected and are, in themselves, neither puzzling nor in need of explanation. What is puzzling, in the context of such a general approach, is the persistence of social-political systems over time—especially the stable continuation of particular patterns of political relations.

To be sure, the works of “consensus” theorists contain analyses of conflict, while concepts developed by “conflict” theorists contain, and can be used for, the analysis of system maintenance. Still, the central focus of a theory stemming from one or the other approach typically remains consistent with its intellectual origins. Whether a particular analyst chooses to gain theoretical entry into his material by employing a conflict-oriented or a consensus-oriented approach will depend not only on his training and sensibility, but also on the nature of the problem that is puzzling him. For students of deeply divided societies, conflict and disorder are expected; stability and persistence are puzzling; and theories that attempt to explain why unlike and antagonistic social units remain in a stable political relationship are analytically attractive. The problem, the puzzle, is *how to explain political stability over time in societies that continue to be characterized by deep vertical cleavages*.

Theories that take as their starting point the problem of the *persistence* of sociopolitical systems are thus all candidates for analytical application. Upon examination, however, it becomes clear that most such theoretical approaches are inappropriate. The pluralist approach, exemplified by such theorists as Truman, Simmel, and Coser, cannot be used since it requires criss-crossing conflicts and multiple loyalties to produce stability. Neither do theories of mass society and totalitarianism suggest themselves, since they explain political stability by an atomization of society which obliterates vertical divisions of any kind except those between individuals. Nor can a melting-pot model, focusing on processes of acculturation, socialization, and assimilation, be of assistance since it, too, explains political stability and system persistence as the consequence of the disappearance of intergroup differentiation.

There are, however, two theoretical approaches that do focus directly on the problem at hand: “consociationalism” and “control.” Both consociational and control models take as their point of departure the continuation of deep divisions or vertical segmentation in the societies under consideration, as well as the presence of intense rivalry between those segments for important social, economic, and/or political resources.³ Consociationalism and control can thus be seen as alternative explanations for stability in such societies. But, whereas consociation-

³ For an in-depth discussion of the conditions under which ascriptive identities become politically important, see Nelson Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California 1976), 28-85.

alism focuses on the mutual cooperation of subnational elites as decisive in this regard, a control approach would focus on the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments.

Ever since 1968, when Arend Lijphart published *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, the literature dealing with accommodationist techniques for achieving and preserving stability in deeply divided societies has expanded rapidly. Lijphart's book was soon followed by a spate of articles and papers in which he elaborates his consociational model and experiments with its theoretical and empirical application. Concentrating mainly on Canada, pre-civil war Lebanon, and the smaller European democracies (Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland), scholars such as Gerhard Lembruch, Jurg Steiner, Val R. Lorwin, and S.F.R. Noel have deployed models very similar to that developed by Lijphart. Articles by these and nine other scholars appear in a volume edited by Kenneth McRae, entitled *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (1974). Each author, according to his view, attempts to evaluate the contribution that "accommodative," "consociational," "proportional," or "concordant" techniques have made to the stability of particular segmented societies.

Eric Nordlinger's *Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies* (1972), is a serious and sustained effort to elaborate a theory of stability in segmented political systems by identifying conditions that conduce toward the successful operation of one or more of six possible "conflict-regulatory" practices. But the best definition of consociationalism as an explanation of political stability is that provided by Lijphart himself. Consociational models are applicable, according to Lijphart, to the extent that stability is the result of the "co-operative efforts" of subculture elites "to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation."⁴ Indeed, at the core of almost all consociational approaches is an image of an elite cartel whose members share an overarching commitment to the survival of the arena within which their groups compete, and who seek to negotiate among themselves and enforce, within their groups, the terms of mutually acceptable compromises.⁵

⁴ Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, iv (March 1971), 9.

⁵ That most consociational theorists limit their hypotheses to what they call "open" or "democratic" societies is an important point; but since, as I shall argue below, the nature of consociationalism itself makes the democratic character of such regimes problematical, I prefer now to consider consociational hypotheses as bearing upon the general problem of stability in deeply divided societies.

Several important review articles have heralded the consociational approach and urged that even more effort be put into the development of kindred theories and their empirical application. Criticizing the conflictual bias of several books on pluralism, Donald Rothchild suggests that greater attention be paid to interethnic bargaining, compromise, balancing, reciprocity, and cooperation as techniques for maintaining the stability and integrity of plural societies in Africa.⁶ According to Hans Daalder,

The typological coining of the model of consociational democracy constitutes a major contribution to the literature. It widens our understanding of the variegated possibilities of effective democratic rule, and undermines the assumptions of dichotomous models based implicitly on the contrast between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Weimar Germany, the French Third and Fourth Republics, and Italy on the other.⁷

Brian Barry describes the consociational democracy theme "as part of the movement among political scientists in recent years towards a re-assertion of politics as the 'master science' in relation to the socio-economic reductionism implicit in the explanatory claims of political sociology."⁸

Barry, though accepting the basic integrity and utility of the consociational model, has launched several well-aimed criticisms at the tendency to apply consociational categories with more enthusiasm than care. Barry indicates that, when policy prescription is involved, this practice can lead to consociational remedies that may aggravate rather than rehabilitate.⁹ From an analytic standpoint, Barry criticizes consociational theorists for a disposition to emphasize cooperative, formalistic behavior by sub-unit elites at the expense of power relations and manipulative devices which may be more relevant, for the explanation of stability in the societies considered, than various consociational or conflict-regulative practices. Barry also points out that, although many writers on the consociational theme stress the democratic nature of the segmented societies which they study, the analytical implications of the

⁶ Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," *World Politics*, xxii (July 1970), 615. For a study of ethnic politics in Africa that closely follows Rothchild's advice, see James Lawler, "Conflict Avoidance in Africa," *Peace Research Reviews*, vii (June 1976).

⁷ Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," *World Politics*, xxvi (July 1974). See also Esman (fn. 1), 51.

⁸ Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science*, v, part 4 (October 1975), 494.

⁹ Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers," *European Journal of Political Research*, iii (December 1975), 393-411.

antidemocratic, manipulative nature of many consociational "techniques" are generally ignored.¹⁰

Barry's argument leads to consideration of the other group of theories that could conceivably assist in the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies: theories of intergroup control or domination. A "control" model is appropriate to the extent that stability in a vertically segmented society is the result of the sustained manipulation of subordinate segment(s) by a superordinate segment. Although no deeply divided society is likely to present itself as a pure example of either consociationalism or control, and although some societies may contain both kinds of relationships between different sets of groups,¹¹ it is necessary that, as conceptual approaches, the two be sharply distinguished. From an empirical standpoint, there are at least as many deeply divided societies whose stability is accounted for by the effective exertion of the superior power of one sub-unit as by the "cooperative efforts" of rival sub-unit elites. Examples would include South Africa; black-white relations in the American South before WW II; Mestizo-Indian relations in Bolivia; Jews and Arabs in Israel; Transjordanians and Palestinians in post-civil war Jordan; Arabs and Kurds in Iraq since 1975; Russians and other nationalities in the Soviet Union; Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi; Amharic and Rommo, Eritrean, Somali, and Galla in prerevolutionary Ethiopia; and mainlanders and native Formosans on Taiwan.

In order to establish as clear a conceptual distinction as possible between consociationalism and control, two deeply divided, hypothetical political systems may be considered, each of which contains two rival segments. Consociationalism can then be contrasted with control in at least *seven* important respects.

(1) *The criterion that effectively governs the authoritative allocation of resources* is, in the consociational system, the common denominator of the interests of the two segments as perceived and articulated by their respective elites. In the control system, it is the interest of the superordinate segment as perceived and articulated by *its* elite.

(2) *Linkages between the two sub-units or segments* in the consociational system take the form of political or material exchanges: negotiations, bargains, trades, and compromises. In the control system, the linkage is penetrative in character: the superordinate segment extracts what it needs from the subordinate segment (property, political support, labor, and/or information) and delivers what it sees fit.

(3) *The significance of bargaining*, then, is very different in the two systems. In the consociational system, hard bargaining between sub-unit

¹⁰ Barry (fn. 8), 483-86, 500.

¹¹ See fn. 23.

elites is a necessary fact of political life; bargains—haggled, struck, and kept—are concrete signs that consociationalism is operating successfully. In the control system, however, hard bargaining between elites of the superordinate and subordinate sub-units would signal the breakdown of control as the means by which the political stability of the system is being maintained.

(4) *The role of the official regime*, represented by the civil service bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies, the courts, the public educational system, and the armed forces, is different substantively (though not necessarily formally). Consociational societies exhibit regimes that, in F. G. Bailey's suggestive terminology, are in the nature of "umpires." Bailey distinguishes umpires from "leaders." A leader, according to Bailey, acts on behalf of his group or his "team." He strives to exploit or modify the rules that govern competition with other groups, in order to achieve advantages for his group and for his position as group leader. "An umpire," says Bailey, "does not do this."

In the first place, insofar as he is an umpire, he has no group to maintain. What he must preserve is the structure of rules which regulate political competition. His concern is not a team, but an arena. This does not mean, of course, that the umpire's role is wholly conservative. In practice, most of an umpire's time is spent in seeing that the existing rules are obeyed and that deviant competitors are brought back into line. But the role also includes modifying the existing rules and even making new rules to cope with unanticipated disorders which may break out in the arena. But his goal is always the preservation of that arena. . . .¹²

In its role as umpire, the official regime in the consociational system must translate the compromises reached between sub-unit elites (or leaders) into appropriate legislation and effective administrative procedure, and enforce these rules without discriminating. The role of the official regime in the control system, on the other hand, is that of the legal and administrative instrument of the superordinate segment or group. The bureaucratic apparatus of the state, staffed overwhelmingly by personnel from the superordinate segment, uses what discretion is available in the interpretation and implementation of official regulations to benefit the sub-unit which it represents at the expense of the subordinate segment.¹³

¹² F. G. Bailey, *Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics* (New York: Schocken Books 1969), 135.

¹³ Suggestive here is Leo Kuper's description of the role of the central political system in white settler societies. Referring to the central political system as the basis of settler domination, Kuper remarks that "Marx's concept of the state as the executive of the ruling class exactly describes its role in independent white settler societies." See "Some Aspects of Violent and Nonviolent Political Change in Plural Societies," in Leo Kuper

(5) *The type of normative justification for the continuation of the political order likely to be espoused publicly—but more importantly, privately—by the regime's officials* is closely linked to the differential role of the official regime. In the consociational society, the political status quo is likely to be legitimized by vague and general references to the common welfare of both sub-units, and by specific and detailed warnings of the chaotic consequences, for each segment, of consociational breakdown. By contrast, the control system is likely to be endowed with legitimacy by an elaborate and well-articulated group-specific ideology; specific, that is, to the history and perceived interests of the superordinate sub-unit.

(6) *The character of the central strategic problem that faces sub-unit elites* is another distinguishing feature. In the consociational system, the problem is symmetrical for each sub-unit: elites must strike bargains that do not jeopardize the integrity of the system as a whole, on terms that can be enforced within the respective sub-units which they represent. For elites in both sub-units, then, internal group discipline is a crucial and constant political challenge. The character of the central strategic problem facing sub-unit elites in the control system, though, is first of all *asymmetric* with respect to the superordinate and subordinate segments. For superordinate sub-unit elites, the main strategic problem is to devise cost-effective techniques for manipulating the subordinate group. For subordinate sub-unit elites (if they exist), the central strategic problem is to devise responses to the policies of superordinate groups which cope as satisfactorily as possible with the consequences of subordination, and to evaluate opportunities for bargaining or resistance which may appear. In spite of this asymmetry, however, the strategic concern of elites of *both* sub-units in the control system is much more externally focused than that of sub-unit elites in the consociational system.

(7) Finally, *the visual metaphor* appropriate for a “perfect” consociational system is a delicately but securely balanced scale, while that appropriate for a control system is a puppeteer manipulating his stringed puppet. Though reflective of the basic differences between the two sorts of relationships, both images contain a suggestion of the separateness of sub-units, of the specificity of the linkages that join them, and of their overall stability.

and M. G. Smith, eds., *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1969), 186. See also the discussion of the “capture” of the state apparatus by a dominant segment, in Kasfir (fn. 3), 156-58.

THE NECESSITY OF DEVELOPING "CONTROL"
AS AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH

Thus, "control" as a model for the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies can be distinguished, conceptually at least, from the consociational approach. But before evaluating attempts that have been made to articulate usable models of control, it is reasonable to ask what, specifically, is to be gained from an elaboration of control as an alternative model and from the implicit task of differentiating and investigating various types of control systems.

There is much to be gained. First, the development of control as a typological category would provide analysts of stable, heterogeneous societies with an opportunity to explain the absence of effective politicization on the part of subnational groups other than by questioning the genuineness of the group's cultural, ethnic, or racial differentiation.¹⁴ Hans Daalder's criticism of the tendency to assume "without detailed political analysis that social divisions are automatically translated into political conflicts" is relevant here.¹⁵ Daalder is particularly critical of Nordlinger who, he says, lapses into tautology by arguing that, "if segments take on a high degree of political salience, as they invariably do in deeply divided societies, they will form the basis of *conflict groups*."¹⁶ A superordinate sub-unit, however, may well be directly responsible for the failure of subordinate sub-units to produce effective political organization.

Another reason for developing a control approach is connected to the general recognition that coercion, in and of itself, is highly unlikely to serve as the basis for a stable pattern of intergroup relations. Thus, frequent use of "violence" or "repression" as labels for the residual category into which all non-consociational, though stable, deeply divided societies are placed, seems unnecessarily vague and probably wrong.¹⁷ There are likely to be many different kinds of control systems; they may involve different mixes of coercive and noncoercive tech-

¹⁴ See, for example, Cynthia Enloe's remarks on the failure of a Formosan nationalist movement to emerge in Taiwan. No mention is made of constraints that may exist against political activity of this sort, other than the difficulty of distinguishing native Formosans from mainland-Chinese immigrants. *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973), 20-21. On this point, see also fn. 22.

¹⁵ Daalder (fn. 7), 614.

¹⁶ Quoted *ibid.*, 615. Enloe's *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (fn. 14) and Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle's *Politics in Plural Societies* (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill 1972), are based on the proposition that ethnic identity is inevitably and effectively politicized. For an extended critique of this presumption, see Kasfir (fn. 3), 28-85.

¹⁷ See, for example, Robert Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 358.

niques; emerge under particular social-structural, ideological, economic, or political conditions; have different implications for the political and social evolution of their societies; and be more or less attractive as prescriptive models.

Many consociational theorists attempt to deal with the problem of stable, nonconsociational, deeply divided societies by explicitly limiting their concern to democratic, or open, regimes or systems. Nordlinger is most definite in this regard: "The present theoretical statement is not intended to apply to all deeply divided societies; it is limited to those with open regimes."¹⁸ His central hypothesis is that, in the absence of at least one of "six conflict-regulating practices" (the stable coalition, the proportionality principle, depoliticization, the mutual veto, compromise, and concessions), deeply divided "open" societies will experience intense and destabilizing conflicts. But Nordlinger's theoretical exercise is less satisfying than it might be, because of his failure to provide operational distinctions between closed and open regimes. As a result, it becomes difficult to imagine evidence that might disconfirm his hypothesis. There is a great temptation to categorize any stable, deeply divided society in which none of the "conflict-regulating practices" is employed as "closed." On the other hand, constraints on free participation in public decision-making processes and suppression of dissent are required by several conflict-regulatory techniques. In light of the unavoidably elitist character of consociational regimes, certain consociational societies may in fact be more closed for more citizens than societies in which a certain measure of control is exercised by, for example, a dominant majority over the free political behavior of a subordinate minority.¹⁹ Recognizing the difficulty, Nordlinger suggests that a regime should be classified as "closed" only if it is seen as occupying an extreme position on an open-closed continuum.²⁰

However, in expanding his theoretical universe to include what he terms "partly open" regimes, Nordlinger runs into another problem which a well-developed alternative "control model" might help him to avoid. All consociational models contain the assumption that sub-unit elites share an overarching commitment to the perpetuation of the political arena within which they operate. Nordlinger, like other theorists, lays great stress on the "purposeful behavior of political elites" in accounting for the successful regulation of an intense conflict.

An analysis of the six conflict-regulating practices brings into strong

¹⁸ Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Occasional Papers No. 29 (Cambridge 1972), 10.

¹⁹ Barry (fn. 8), 483, 500.

²⁰ Nordlinger (fn. 18), 13.

relief the critical role of conflict group leaders. In each case of conflict regulation it was the conflict group leaders who took the initiative in working out the various conflict-regulating practices, who put them into operation, and who did so at least partly with the goal in mind of arriving at a conflict-regulating outcome.²¹

But, as one moves along Nordlinger's open-closed continuum, away from a pure type of consociational system where sub-unit elites and officials of the regime act vigorously and systematically to "regulate" conflict, one encounters partly open regimes in which the political behavior of sub-unit elites is much more likely to be determined by the competitive interests of their sub-units than by desires for system maintenance or the achievement of a conflict-regulating outcome. In other words, Nordlinger—operating without a clearly articulated alternative control model according to which conflict would be absent (not "regulated") because of the successful manipulation of subordinate groups—tends to reify an "umpire" regime and consociationally oriented elites where there are merely competitors for political goods and for the administrative apparatus that can effectively distribute them. Thus, for example, conflict regulation is said to have "failed" even in the absence of the elite's attempts to engage in it.²²

Not only would a well-articulated typological category of control help to establish the conceptual boundaries of the consociational approach, but the study of various mechanisms or systems of control also would result in direct contributions to the elaboration of consociational models. Given the importance of elite control over sub-unit behavior in such models, it would be surprising if explicit studies of how control is exercised by superordinate sub-units over subordinate sub-units in deeply divided societies did not result in ideas and empirical analyses of use to students of consociational systems.

Furthermore, it is conceivable and in fact empirically demonstrable that one society can contain both kinds of relationships between different sets of groups. For example, two groups which relate to one another in the consociational mode, might, in their joint relationship to a third group, adopt and enforce a relationship of the control type. In such

²¹ *Ibid.*, 40.

²² *Ibid.*, 12. One can imagine a "hybrid" political system in which stability in a deeply divided society is the result of controls exerted over each segment by an "umpire regime" with independent access to sufficient political, military, or political resources to support its stabilizing objectives. Yugoslavia might be such a case. The continued stability of such a society could not be explained within either a consociational or a control approach (as those approaches are understood in this paper). That is to say, consideration of such a society from either of these perspectives would probably result in predictions of serious instability or in a reexamination of that society's classification as "deeply divided."

cases, it would be highly distortive to use "consociational" or "control" as labels to characterize the political system as a whole.²³

Much of the energy invested in consociational approaches is drawn from a normative concern for the amelioration of the consequences of communally based conflicts.²⁴ But it is perfectly reasonable to presume that, in some deeply divided societies, the effective subordination of a segment or segments by a superordinate segment may be preferable to the chaos and disorder that might accompany the failure of consociationalism. The horrors of the recent civil war in Lebanon provide a case in point. In deeply divided societies where consociational techniques have not been, or cannot be, successfully employed, control may represent a model for the organization of intergroup relations that is substantially preferable to other conceivable solutions: civil war, extermination, or deportation.²⁵ Moreover, with the development of control as an approach to the explanation of political stability in deeply divided societies, the foundation is laid for a comparative study of various types of systems of control. The residual category of "violent and repressive" regimes can then be seen as including a variety of manipulative relationships; some are more, and some less, desirable or "civilized" as prescriptions for the integration of deeply divided societies where accommodationist models, for political or ideological reasons, seem inappropriate.²⁶

"CONTROL" AS AN UNDERDEVELOPED CONCEPT

Thus far I have demonstrated:

(1) how "control" can be distinguished from consociational approaches to the explanation of stability in deeply divided societies; and

²³ Israel is an example of such a case. Consociational techniques have been used to maintain political stability among Jewish political and clerical subcultures, while the absence of conflict and instability in the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel is best explained in terms of control. For an example of the need to exclude consideration of the Arab minority from consociational analysis of the Israeli political system, see K. Z. Paltiel, "The Israeli Coalition System," *Government and Opposition*, x (Autumn 1975), 3397-3414. For analysis of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel in terms of "control," see Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: A Study in the Control of a Minority Population* (Austin: University of Texas Press, forthcoming).

²⁴ See, for instance, Kenneth McRae, *Consociational Democracy* (Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart 1974), 300-302.

²⁵ Brian Barry argues that, in societies deeply divided along *ethnic* lines, consociational solutions to problems of conflict and instability are very unlikely to emerge. Barry (fn. 8), 502-5.

²⁶ The suggestion of integration through control or domination is consistent with the argument of writers such as Enloe, Rabushka and Shepsle, and Walker Connor who stress the need—in a world of proliferating subnational units—to consider modes of political integration other than the democratic nation-state as legitimate.

(2) what benefits are to be derived from the systematic conceptual and empirical elaboration of control models.

These arguments have been necessitated by the limited amount of attention that has been given to the systematic development and application of "control" or "domination" models regarding the integration of deeply divided societies. Nonetheless, though underdeveloped, a literature of sorts does exist.

In 1958 Manning Nash, based on his investigation of Guatemala's "multiple society," counseled students of comparative ethnic relations to analyze, systematically and in detail, "how the multiple society operates, the mechanisms of political control, and the social and cultural circumstances which are amenable to, or inimical to, the perpetuation and continuity of such a political structure."²⁷ In 1966, in discussing the prospects for system change in plural societies, Leo Kuper speculated that "the system of domination" may be "the crucial factor affecting the possibility of evolutionary change. Different types of domination may have their own somewhat specific laws of change, with varying potentialities for evolutionary transformation."²⁸

A significant number of writers have included control or domination categories within typologies describing the integration of segmented societies. M. G. Smith has characterized "structural pluralism," or "differential incorporation," as one "mode of collective accommodation." Such societies, according to Smith, "owe their maintenance to a central regulative organization which is prescriptively reserved for the dominant corporate group."²⁹ But Smith's primary concern is in relating the mode of collective accommodation (equivalent, universalistic, differential) to the depth and extent of diversity within societies. The category of differential incorporation is itself left undeveloped.³⁰ Concerning the emergence, operation, and variable impact of different types of control systems or mechanisms, all we are told is that,

however variable the system may be in its specific conditions and properties, the collective character, and the scope of its substantive differentiations, must be sufficiently rigorous and pervasive to establish an effective order of corporate inequalities and subordination by the

²⁷ M. G. Smith, "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism," in *Pluralism in Africa* (fn. 13), 418.

²⁸ Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," *ibid.*, 21.

²⁹ Smith, "Pluralism in Precolonial African Societies," and "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism," both *ibid.*, 96 and 445, respectively.

³⁰ See Ira Katznelson, "Comparative Studies of Race and Ethnicity," *Comparative Politics*, v (October 1972), 143.

differential distribution of civil and political rights and the economic, social, and other opportunities that these permit or enjoin.³¹

Pierre van den Berghe, using a four-box matrix that crosses a homogeneous/heterogeneous variable with a democratic/despotic variable, generates a category (Type III) of “pluralistic-despotic” societies in which stability and equilibrium are explained by

a combination of political coercion and economic interdependence. . . . Debt peonage, slavery, contract labor, indenture, and other forms of economic dependence serve at once to reinforce political subjection, to make the latter profitable, and to sustain the ruling group and its repressive apparatus.

However, Van den Berghe’s analysis does not go beyond this list of typical economic techniques of control, except to offer the subcategory of “Herrenvolk democracies,” i.e., those Type-III societies “wherein power is relatively diffusely and equally distributed among the members of an ascriptively defined group which, in turn, rules despotically over other such groups.”³²

The general argument made by Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle is that plural (deeply divided) societies cannot develop as stable democracies. One way of resolving the tension between the plural character of a society and a democratic political ethos is by what they call “the dominant majority configuration.” This is characterized by

infrequent ethnic cooperation, immoderate ethnic politics at the expense of minority groups at the constitutional as well as the policy level, and eventual repression of minority political activity. Majoritarianism is the cause of the dominant community and electoral machination is its method of preserving its dominance. Violence is often fostered. . . . The symbols of democracy remain; the substance atrophies.³³

In a similar vein, Milton Esman has suggested “institutionalized dominance” as one of four paths to the “management of communal conflict.” The other three are “induced assimilation, syncretic integration, and balanced pluralism.” Esman asserts that regimes committed to the dominance of one communal group at the expense of another (or others) will “always use three methods of conflict management”:

1) proscribe or closely control the political expression of collective interest among dominated groups, 2) prohibit entry by members of

³¹ Smith, “Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism,” and Kuper, “Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of Polarization and Depolarization,” both in *Pluralism in Africa* (fn. 13), 430 and 473, respectively.

³² Pierre van den Berghe, “Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration,” *ibid.*, 81n.

³³ Rabushka and Shepsle (fn. 16), 90.

dominated groups into the dominant community, and 3) provide monopoly or preferential access for members of the dominant group to political participation, advanced education, economic opportunities, and symbols of status such as official language, the flag, national heroes, and holidays, which reinforce the political, economic, and psychic control of the dominant group.³⁴

Esman emphasizes that, though “basically coercive . . . , a network of controls for maintaining hegemony is often highly sophisticated and deeply institutionalized.”³⁵ However, although he provides several historical and contemporary examples of the variation that this category contains, he—like Smith, Rabushka and Shepsle, and van den Berghe—does not go beyond the generation of a “control” category and provision of historical and praxeological illustration.

Leo Kuper does go beyond the listing of “typical” methods of subordination by employing the concept of a “system of domination”—a system that may or may not be “self-sustaining” and that, accordingly, may to a greater or lesser degree depend on “force and repression.”³⁶ In his analysis of white settler regimes in Africa, Kuper uses this concept to focus on domination resulting from the calculated re-creation and strengthening of diversity among subordinate groups (divide and rule), combined with the establishment of “intercalary structures, functioning between dominant and subordinate sections, and serving both to maintain separation and to provide contact and control.”³⁷ For Kuper, it is the exploitation of existing social structural and cultural circumstances by a battery of complementary regime policies that gives domination its systemic character in white settler societies. Kuper goes on to argue that, in fact, the system of control sponsored by the white settler regime in South Africa “is far from self-sustaining; on the contrary, it is increasingly sustained by force and repression.”³⁸ To be able to see the overt use of coercion as a sign of the breakdown of domination or control, and not merely as evidence of its presence, is an important insight occasioned by Kuper’s conceptual advance.

Heribert Adam, in his study of South Africa, uses an approach quite similar to Kuper’s, but comes to a different conclusion. Adam, like Kuper, is interested in investigating “what apart from naked coercion enables a society ridden with such deep-seated conflicts to continue to

³⁴ Esman (fn. 1), 56.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

³⁶ Kuper, “Political Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful Democratization,” in *Pluralism in Africa* (fn. 13), 177–82.

³⁷ Kuper, “Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some Aspects of Polarization and Depluralization,” *ibid.*, 475.

³⁸ Kuper, “Political Change in White Settler Societies: The Possibility of Peaceful Democratization,” *ibid.*, 182.

function?" Adam's answer to this central question is contained in his analysis of apartheid as a "pragmatic race oligarchy" and as "an increasingly streamlined and expanding system of sophisticated dominance."³⁹ He goes on to discuss a variety of mechanisms that the regime has adopted to maintain white supremacy and effective control over the non-white population in South Africa. These mechanisms have included exclusion of non-whites from even a qualified franchise; elaborate legislation erecting and enforcing social barriers between whites and non-whites; government-sponsored programs to rejuvenate and maintain tribal identities and traditional social structures; energetic propagation of the concept of separate development; use of local and regional non-white self-governing bodies to deflect mass dissatisfaction among non-whites; and explicit state intervention in the private sector of the economy on behalf of the white minority. Adam uses his framework to highlight the adaptiveness and success of South African apartheid as new policies are designed and implemented by a regime anxious to maintain effective control, at bearable cost, while faced with gradual social and economic change.

Unfortunately, Adam's treatment is somewhat haphazard. For example, he fails to establish systematic linkages among these policies, which would perhaps justify his characterization of domination in South Africa as a "system." Nevertheless, there is immense value in Adam's study. It is especially instructive in regard to (1) the fundamental way in which he poses and answers the central question of the stability of the South African political system; (2) his emphasis on the *peculiar* characteristics of the South African system of domination; (3) the sensitivity that he demonstrates for the manner in which specific techniques of domination were tailored to suit particular social and historical circumstances; and (4) his willingness to formulate conceptual categories appropriate to the South African case without insisting that they fit into a generally applicable or preconceived category such as, for instance, fascism.

In the development of any new analytical approach, there is the possibility of borrowing frameworks and models from cognate fields. The value of such theoretical poaching is dependent on the coherence of the borrowed models themselves, and on the extent of isomorphism, or fit, between the problem at hand and the problem toward which the borrowed models apply. Control is a concept that plays a central role in the study of many political phenomena, but only one body of theory

³⁹ Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971), 15.

and empirical evidence has significantly influenced the study of control relations in deeply divided societies, namely, that associated with the study of overseas European imperialism.

As many scholars have observed, the geographical separation of metropolis and colony is difficult to justify as a necessary condition for the emergence of "imperialist" or "colonialist" patterns of relations. Based on this insight, the concept of "internal colonialism" and the vocabulary associated with the study of (especially) 19th-century European imperialism have been used to describe superordinate/subordinate group relations within "national" political units. Those who have taken this approach and applied it to specific societies have generally succeeded in matching patterns of superordinate/subordinate group interaction within societies with those commonly thought of as characteristic of "blue water" imperialism. The economic dependence of colonies on the imperial mother country, erection of jurisdictional and administrative barriers between colonists and natives, systematic extraction of primary products from the colony and their transfer to the metropolis, emergence of "comprador" groups within the colony, limitations placed on free political activity by natives, attempts to impose the values and doctrines of the metropolis on the colonial populations, development of a "slave mentality" by colonized peoples, and conservation of traditional forms of social organization in close association with the limited introduction of modern means of production and administration—all these have their counterparts in the relations between superordinate and subordinate groups *within* various societies.⁴⁰

The problem with internal colonialism as an approach to the study of control in deeply divided societies is, then, not a lack of fit between the phenomena under consideration and those that served as the empirical referents for classical theories of imperialism. Rather, the study of internal colonialism has been obstructed by a failure to elicit, from the rich diversity of European imperial expansion and from the full range of theories describing it, a set of defining characteristics.⁴¹ It becomes tedious rather than interesting to notice again and again that

⁴⁰ See James D. Cockcroft and others, eds., *Dependence and Underdevelopment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books 1972), esp. chaps. 1 and 10. For an interesting critique of this material, see Harold Wolpe, "The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case," in Ivar Oxaal and others, eds., *Beyond the Sociology of Development* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975), 229-50.

⁴¹ Several proponents of the "internal colonialism" approach have indicated their awareness of this difficulty. See Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1975), 33n., 349-50; and Dale Johnson, "On Oppressed Classes," in Cockcroft (fn. 40), 279n.

superordinate/subordinate relationships within societies have some features that resemble development patterns, social formations, psychological reactions, or motivations characteristic of one or another example or theory of European overseas colonialism. If the instances of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, of blacks in the pre-World War II American South, of Chicanos in the barrios of large American cities in the 1970s, and of Indian populations in rural Brazil are all accepted as examples of internal colonialism, then that category has become coextensive with inequality. One could conceivably go on to differentiate various forms of internal colonialism. However, the concept is so weighted down with historical and rhetorical freight that the analytical process is likely to be more impeded than assisted by the use of the term in such a highly abstract fashion.

Harold Wolpe has adopted another approach. By drawing explicitly on Marx and Lenin for what he deems to be a coherent theory of imperialism, Wolpe attempts to distinguish "internal colonialism" from other superordinate/subordinate relations. Regardless of whether Marxist-Leninist theories of European overseas imperialism are correct, and regardless of the success of Wolpe's attempt to use these theories to analyze white/non-white relations in South Africa, the explicit elaboration of internal colonialism according to a particular and well-developed theory of overseas imperialism is legitimate and promising.⁴²

CONCLUSION:

ANALYTIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF "CONTROL" IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES

Though unimpressive in number when compared with the amount of research devoted to consociationalism, studies of control as an explanation for stability in deeply divided societies have yielded some results. Primarily, they have demonstrated that in addition to coercion or the threat of coercion, effective control can be based on a wide range of political and economic mechanisms, institutional arrangements, legal frameworks, and sociocultural circumstances. A number of authors have attempted to introduce a measure of coherence into the field by differentiating among various syndromatic mixes of control techniques. The notion of internal colonialism, even if used only as a suggestive metaphor, has helped to develop sensitivity to circumstantial factors that permit the systematic and sustained subordination of one group by another.

⁴² Wolpe (fn. 40), 244-50.

However, such efforts have not and cannot provide answers to the really interesting questions suggested by a study of control as an explanation for, or as a means of achieving, stability in deeply divided societies. These questions include the following:

1. In what ways do particular social, cultural, or economic circumstances support certain types of control techniques, while making others more difficult or costly to implement?
2. In what ways might the content of superordinate group ideology or the organizing principles of superordinate group institutions affect the type of control techniques adopted or rejected?
3. Do different mixes of control techniques contain different possibilities for evolutionary or revolutionary change?
4. Specifically, do different mixes of control techniques contain different strategic opportunities to subordinate group members desirous of breaking the control relationship? If so, what can analysis of these opportunities reveal about the costs and benefits associated with different modes of resistance in the context of different types of control relationships?

Though these questions cannot be answered in this short article, the manner in which they might be addressed can be illustrated. In connection with the second question, for example, one might hypothesize that superordinate group ideologies that emphasize the value implications of inherited characteristics (such as Afrikaaner ideology or Nazism) are more likely to generate control techniques that are explicitly promulgated through legal codes and enforced by judicial systems; in the case of superordinate group ideologies (such as Zionism or Marxism), whose substance is less centrally concerned with inherited characteristics as rationales for differential treatment of individuals, control techniques are more likely to operate in a *sub rosa* fashion.

To test this hypothesis (or others that might be offered in response to the above questions), an analytic framework is necessary within which the great variety of control techniques employed can be plotted. For any control relationship, such a framework should specify two conditions:

- (1) the kinds of factors that will require investigation; and
- (2) the functional requisites for the achievement of effective control in any deeply divided society.

The first condition will require a multilevel analysis that systematically distinguishes pertinent cultural, geographical, ecological, or social-structural givens from institutional or ideological factors, and from the calculated policies designed and implemented by superordinate groups

in order to achieve control or to reinforce the circumstances that make maintenance of control possible. The second injunction will require an abstract analysis of control between communal groups, which specifies necessary and sufficient conditions. Without expanding on this idea, I shall only suggest that a functional understanding of control should focus on how subordinate group members are deprived of facilities for united political action; how the subordinate group is denied access to independent sources of economic support; and how (for purposes of surveillance and resource extraction) effective superordinate penetration of the subordinate group is achieved.

A final comment is perhaps in order with regard to the value implications of elaborating more powerful theories of how effective control can be achieved and maintained. In particular situations and for limited periods of time, certain forms of control may be preferable to the chaos and bloodshed that might be the only alternatives. Those who would resist the notion that control or domination could ever serve as a prescriptive model might consider that the empirical and conceptual analysis of systems of control makes it possible to identify typical weaknesses, patterns of breakdown, and appropriate strategies for resistance. Such analysis thus represents a necessary part of any struggle to dismantle systems of control that now exist or those that may emerge in the future.