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Not all good things go together: conflicting objectives in democracy promotion

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Conflicting objectives are often problematized as challenges to the effectiveness of international democracy promotion. However, systematic research about their emergence and effects is still missing. This special issue addresses this research gap and seeks to provide conceptual and empirical answers in the field of conflicting objectives in international democracy promotion. The authors represented in this special issue investigate (post-) conflict societies, developing countries, and authoritarian regimes, attempting to identify the patterns of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion, the reasons for their emergence, and their consequences. This introduction presents a conceptual framework that pursues four aims: first, it differentiates between two types of conflicting objectives (intrinsic and extrinsic); second, it offers an approach for identification of their phases of emergence; third, it proposes reasons for their emergence; and fourth, it discusses how political actors deal with these conflicting objectives. The empirical findings of the contributions to this special issue illustrate and substantiate the theoretical and conceptual reflections.

Keywords: democracy promotion; conflicting objectives; democratization; post-conflict society; developing country; peace-building; security; state-building; regime stabilization; empowerment

Introduction

This special issue of *Democratization* studies the emergence and consequences of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion. It pursues two aims: (1) to systematize significant conflicts of objectives in democracy promotion (conceptual dimension), and (2) to analyse these conflicts of objectives in order to explore their origins and their consequences for the effectiveness of democracy promotion (empirical dimension). To this end, the authors in this special issue have investigated selected

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African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American processes of political change, seeking to clarify the patterns and consequences of democracy promotion policies. They focus their analyses on possible *intrinsic* trade-offs between various factors in democracy promotion, as well as on *extrinsic* trade-offs between democracy promotion and other relevant areas of external support, such as peace-building, state-building, stabilization, security, and capacity-building.[1]

Conflicting objectives are inherent in any kind of policy-making and cooperation between two or more actors. Scholars and practitioners widely acknowledge that conflicting objectives challenge the effectiveness of democracy promotion.[2] Any target country of democracy promotion will find itself facing a multitude of international actors pursuing divergent interests and goals. Consequently, the objective of democratization is likely to compete with alternative objectives of foreign policy of the various international actors. At times, the same actor can simultaneously attempt to pursue competing objectives. The individual nature of the paths that democratization can follow aggravates this complex situation further. In general, democratization does not follow a universal pattern that could serve as a guideline for facilitation of external support. Accordingly, there is no blueprint for successful democracy promotion. In each individual case, democracy promoters must rethink how, when, and by what means democratization can be supported.

Faced with such complex realities, since the end of the Cold War international actors have often pursued democratization from the point of view that 'all good things go together'.[3] They have integrated into their democracy promotion portfolio a mixture of objectives including peace, stability, freedom, prosperity, good governance, and the rule of law – objectives that, in their perspectives, could all be conducive to democratization. In other cases, international actors have indirectly assumed that policies such as economic assistance or peace- and security-building will positively complement measures to support democratization. Over time, international actors and scholars of democratization and international relations have become increasingly aware of the fact that 'not all good things do necessarily go together', learning from experience that 'good things go together only under certain favourable conditions'.[4] In order to promote democracy effectively, the conditions and time spans in which good things such as peace, security, and development do indeed go together must be investigated in a detailed and systematic fashion. This special issue seeks to explore this topic and to enrich the empirical foundations of the current debate on the challenges of democracy promotion.

The contributions to this special issue cover a representative range of conflicting objectives, in particular trade-offs between security, stability, peace, and democratization, as well as between the diverging norms, concepts, and instruments applied in democracy promotion. The authors study nine countries and a variety of international actors; the latter range from international and regional organizations (such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) to multilateral peace missions like

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in Kosovo or United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in Timor-Leste, to actors exerting influence in bilateral development cooperation (such as the governments of the United States of America (USA) and Germany). Authors describe typical country contexts in which conflicting objectives are likely to emerge: unstable environments and post-conflict settings are the most vulnerable to divergent objectives. One of the countries examined is currently embroiled in a war situation (Afghanistan), another one trapped in a violent conflict (Palestine), and five of the cases are post-conflict countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and Timor-Leste). The case studies of Bolivia, Morocco, and Zambia illustrate that trade-offs in democracy promotion can also arise in generally peaceful, stable settings.

In this introduction, we establish a conceptual framework for the analysis of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion; we substantiate our theory-driven concepts using evidence from the contributions included in this special issue. Accordingly, each section in this introduction starts with a conceptual outline, followed by empirical findings. In the first section, we briefly review the literature. Given the lack of previous theoretical contributions on conflicting objectives in foreign policy-making we focus on identifying research gaps. In view of these gaps, we formulate four guiding research questions that will be addressed by the contributions to this special issue. In the second section, we present our concept of conflicts of objectives and highlight which are covered in the following contributions. In the third section, we argue that conflicts may equally evolve during the norm-building, strategy-building, and implementation phases of democracy promotion. In the same section, we explore the conditions under which conflicts of objectives may evolve and identify which of these are addressed in this special issue. In the fourth section, we propose a scheme for how the actors involved could theoretically deal with conflicts of objectives and illustrate how domestic and international actors have handled trade-offs in real-world situations. In the fifth section, we theoretically explore the effects of conflicting objectives on democratization and present whether the empirical findings of this issue confirm this correlation. We conclude by summarizing the main challenges of democracy promotion derived from the special issue's contributions.

Setting the stage: what are the most pressing questions, in light of existing research gaps?

Until now, two branches of research have addressed the question of whether 'all good things go together' in a more or less explicit fashion. The 'older' branch focuses on the relationship between democracy and development, asking whether socio-economic development is best suited for democratization, and vice versa. The 'newer' branch is founded in peace and security studies and

researchers ask to what extent and under what conditions processes of democratization complement, support, or undermine stabilization and peace in a post-conflict society. Both research strands have also served to inform policy-makers in international democracy promotion. In what follows, we briefly summarize the two extant research fields and identify research gaps.

S.M. Lipset (1960) was one of the first to argue that democracy is related to a country's socio-economic development or level of modernization. With a quantitative large-*N* study measuring wealth, extent of industrialization, degree of urbanization, and level of education in selected countries using various indicators, Lipset found that the more democratic countries consistently had higher levels of socio-economic development than the more authoritarian countries.[5] His concise conclusion – 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy'[6] – inspired the international development community by presenting the prospect of the uncomplicated democratization of developing countries by socio-economic modernization.[7] However, Lipset did not reflect about possible conflicting objectives for international support to democratization.

Since the early 1990s, in reflecting on the scholarly debate on the causes of democratization, the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) have begun to consider democratic rule not as a logical outcome of development, but as a necessary requisite for it.[8] In consequence, strengthening socio-economic development has evolved into an important objective of democracy promotion. However, democracy promotion and support of socio-economic development have historically belonged to two parallel worlds that have rarely intersected. Only recently have donor countries like the USA and Germany begun to conceptualize programmes that pursue both objectives, seeking to mainstream sectoral programmes and to ensure that they are supportive of democratic governance.[9] However, to date there has been little evidence that democratization and consequently democracy promotion actually work as a motor of socio-economic development.[10] Given the limited resources of development cooperation, new policy choices are likely to be made at the expense of democracy support.[11]

Meanwhile, in search of strategies to handle the challenging post-war and post-conflict regime changes in south-eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and sub-Saharan Africa, peace-builders seem to have resurrected the idea that 'all good things shall go together' from the development debate.[12] For the sake of stability- and peace-building, they aspire to support domestic actors in removing the root causes of violent conflict and create a pacific atmosphere (1) by reforming the security sector in order to secure public life and provide legitimate means to control the use of force, (2) by developing the rule of law in order to reduce human rights violations, (3) by investing in a market economy free from corruption in order to discourage individuals from believing that the surest path to fortune is by capturing the state, and – last but not least – (4) by supporting democracy in order to reduce the tendency toward arbitrary power and give a voice to all segments of society.[13] Their conflict-management tools are intended to support the replacement of a

culture of war and violent conflict with a culture of tolerance and respect. However, seldom do peace-builders achieve this comprehensive aim successfully.[14]

In fact, the expectations of supporters of development policies, peace-builders, and democracy promoters that the implementation of democratic institutions and practices necessarily strengthens positive characteristics such as peace, stability, prosperity, freedom, good governance, and the rule of law, and vice versa, have not been met in the last two decades.[15] International actors and researchers in the field have acknowledged the potential tension between these objectives in several official concept documents.[16] However, the assessment of their activities leads to the conclusion that conflicting objectives remain inadequately addressed in democracy support.[17]

It remains an open question in the literature whether these 'conflicting objectives' or in other words 'challenges', 'tensions', 'dilemmas', or 'paradoxes' influence the effectiveness of democracy promotion.[18] Some authors argue that divergent goals are always 'conflicting'; others suggest that diverging objectives might be complementary and are therefore a strength, not a weakness of democracy promotion.[19] However, neither side has systematically investigated the underlying factors that can lead to or prevent conflicts between objectives, or examined how these conflicting objectives may under certain conditions hinder or support effective democracy promotion. Although individual research results are of importance in the understanding and explanation of the effectiveness of democracy promotion policy, no major efforts have hitherto been made to investigate conflicting objectives as an interdisciplinary topic or to draw conclusions on the broader basis of comparative case studies. There is still an overwhelming lack of conceptualization based on theoretical reasoning and systematic empirical research that clarifies the relationship between democratization processes and conflicting objectives in international democracy support.[20]

In examination of the state-of-the-art, the following research gaps become apparent. First, there is a need for fine-tuning and expansion of the understanding of how other objectives (for instance, stability, security, and socio-economic development) work together with the aim of promoting democracy. Moreover, we need to understand to what extent locally-driven political processes, and externally-driven democracy promotion can come into conflict. Second, we still lack empirically-based evidence of whether objectives actually 'go together' in democracy promotion and, if they do, under what conditions which specific objectives can go together. Thus far, research has provided only limited systematic evidence regarding the interplay between different elements of democracy support in certain political contexts. Third, there is a need to learn more about how international actors deal with conflicting objectives, especially the extent to which diverging goals become compromised and what kinds of solutions would be suitable for the resolution of conflicts of objectives. Finally, given the lack of research on conflicting objectives, we still have much to learn about their effects on processes of democratization.

Acknowledging the accomplishments of previous research, we now take the gaps in research as the starting point for our special issue. Accordingly, we

recognize the need to identify conflicting objectives and to capture the characteristics of this phenomenon on a conceptual level; such a conceptualization can then be used for empirical analysis. Our intended aim is to contribute a conceptualization of conflicting objectives to current democracy promotion research that will facilitate the understanding and explanation of the output side of democracy promotion – in other words, its effectiveness. Furthermore, we seek to enrich the 'Do all good things go together?' debate with systematic empirical evidence drawn from carefully selected case studies. Specifically, we will answer the following questions:

(1) What are the conflicting objectives in democracy promotion?
(2) When and under what conditions do they emerge?
(3) How do internal and external actors deal with these conflicting objectives?
(4) What are the effects of conflicting objectives on democratization?

The following sections address the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of these research questions and seek to provide answers based on the empirical findings of this special issue.

Constructing concepts and facing realities: what are the 'conflicting objectives' in democracy promotion?

If we want to get an idea of the possible conflicting objectives in democracy promotion, we must first clarify what we mean by the terms 'democracy', 'democracy promotion', and 'conflicting objectives'. Following Dahl's lean 'polyarchy' concept, we define *democracy* as a political regime in which representatives are periodically selected in free and fair elections and in which political actors regularly participate in peaceful public contestation for voter support.[21] To ensure political competition and participation, a democratic system should guarantee a catalogue of political rights and civil liberties, as well as institutional checks and balances for horizontal and vertical accountability. As a result, democracy is closely connected to the rule of law.[22] *Democratization* means the transition from 'no' or 'less' to 'more' democracy, or, in other words, from autocratic to democratic rule.[23]

Democracy promotion entails activities by external actors that seek to support democratization; that is, to enable internal actors to establish and develop democratic institutions that play according to democratic rules. We differentiate between direct and indirect democracy promotion. Direct democracy promotion targets the development of democratic core institutions and the capacity-building of political and social actors; indirect democracy promotion seeks to improve basic conditions to create a favourable context for the transition to and the survival of democracy. Indirect democracy support might also entail measures integrated into forms of technical and financial cooperation.

In practice, democracy promoters do not often base their work on such clear-cut definitions as we have proposed above; on the contrary, some practitioners avoid

the term 'democracy promotion', preferring to refer to 'good governance' (for example, World Bank), while others have a broader agenda in mind (for example, European Union); for example, they might include what we would call socio-economic development under the umbrella of 'democracy promotion'. Since the definition of democratization and other policy goals determines whether one can identify conflicting objectives or not, we prefer to use parsimonious concepts. This facilitates the careful identification of conflicts of objectives, the discovery of their origins, and the determination of how actors deal with them; in addition, it simplifies the analysis of their consequences. Equally, not all scholars do follow Dahl's lean concept. Where authors of the special issue use a different understanding of what democracy is this is clearly indicated in their texts.

Neither in political science nor in democracy promotion research, is there a common definition of the term *conflicting objectives*.[24] Thus, to develop a definition, we borrow the concept of conflicting objectives from macroeconomics. Scholars in this discipline agree on the fact that not all macroeconomic objectives – what they would call 'goals' – can be simultaneously achieved by an actor. Take, for example, the macroeconomic goal of a low inflation rate and the goal of a high employment rate. In theory, these two objectives have an inverse relationship. If a government tries to reduce unemployment through reflationary measures such as lower interest rates or increased public spending, the resulting reduction in unemployment will push wages and consequently prices higher. On the other hand, when the government tries to control high inflation with higher interest rates and reduced spending, the resultant reduction in consumer spending and lower investment will create job losses. This conflict of objectives thus has undesired consequences, whichever decision the government takes. Among the different schools of economic theory, it is an unresolved question whether unemployment is a price worth paying for achieving lower inflation.[25]

In accordance with this idea, we define *conflicting objectives* as the clash of two competing goals, whereby the achievement of one goal is impaired by the achievement of the other goal. In the case of democracy promotion, for example, the goal to support the selection of certain political leaders by free and fair elections may clash with the goal of integrating all relevant groups into an all-inclusive government, which would require a negotiated agreement that would trump democratic elections. In a broader sense, the support of democratization may clash with alternative policy goals, such as security, stability, peace, or socio-economic development.

Following Spanger and Wolff,[26] we identify two types of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion (see also Table 1):

(1) *Intrinsic* conflicting objectives emerge when different elements of democracy promotion clash;
(2) *Extrinsic* conflicting objectives emerge when the goal of democracy promotion – that is, democratization – interferes with other objectives of foreign policies and development cooperation.

Table 1. Intrinsic and extrinsic conflicting objectives in democracy promotion.

Conflict	Intrinsic conflicts of objectives	Extrinsic conflicts of objectives
Definition	Conflict of objectives that are inherent in democracy promotion	Conflicts of objectives of democracy promotion with other relevant policy goals
Examples	Free and fair elections vs. negotiated power-sharing	Democratization vs. peace-building (security, monopoly of force)
	Institution-building vs. empowerment	Democratization vs. state-building (state authority, administrative capacity)
	Inclusion vs. exclusion	Democratization vs. regime stability
	Ownership vs. donor control	Democratization vs. socio-economic development

Source: Based on Spanger and Wolff, 'Universales Ziel – partikulare Wege?', and adapted by the authors.

Intrinsic conflicting objectives emerge foremost if direct democracy promotion is used; extrinsic conflicting objectives rather appear if indirect democracy promotion comes into play.

Table 1 presents examples of the intrinsic and extrinsic conflicts of objectives discussed in this special issue. We list typical objectives that the authors of this special issue have found in their empirical research. *Intrinsic* conflicts of objectives in democracy promotion emerge when different dimensions or sub-goals of democracy promotion come into conflict with one another. As Jung's analysis of the peace-building intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows (in this issue),[27] free and fair elections can conflict with negotiated power-sharing mechanisms. As defined above, free and fair elections are the institutional core of a democracy and therefore a priority in democracy promotion. In post-conflict societies, however, it is often impossible to have free and fair elections immediately following hostilities, as elections might under-represent already-threatened minorities and return to power those political elites who had plunged the country into civil unrest. Here, power-sharing instruments trump pure democratic selection by the establishment of consensually pre-arranged representation of conflict parties in the government. This allows for short-term stability, but may in the long run also entrench pre-war conflicts in the political system.[28] Even in the core definition of democracy, there is a conflict between the concepts of 'institution-building and the empowerment' of actors. As outlined in the case studies of Bolivia (Wolff), Kosovo and Timor-Leste (Lemay-Hébert), empowerment of local actors in some circumstances is achieved at the expense of Western-style democratic institution-building. As actors become more empowered to follow democratic rules, they may become less content with the institutions supported by international democracy promoters. The 'inclusion vs. exclusion' conflict deals with the problem of whom to include or exclude in the transition process. In the case of Afghanistan, it has become clear that the exclusion of relevant actors in the early stages of democratization may create spoilers for democratization in the long run, although inclusion in the

early stages could have hindered the initiation of the democratization process (Quie). Finally, the 'ownership vs. donor control' conflict refers to the problem of who is in the driver's seat of democratization: the actors in the recipient country of democracy promotion or the democracy promoters themselves. 'Ownership' has recently been highlighted as a basic principle of development cooperation in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris agenda prescribes that recipient countries should be in charge of defining development plans and policies. Their norms, strategies, and priorities, however, might not coincide with those of international actors, which could, in turn, provoke a conflict of objectives. As the analysis of multi-donor budget support in Zambia reveals, conflicts between domestic and international actors' norms, strategies, and priorities can easily undermine democracy promotion (Faust et al.).[29]

Extrinsic conflicting objectives emerge when the goal of achieving democratization interferes with other objectives of foreign policy and development cooperation. In all transitional settings, one very important objective is security, understood as the development of a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Richter addresses this trade-off in her research on the EU's goals in the Western Balkans, in which the Union prioritized security issues over democratization. Although this strategy turned out to be successful in avoiding a further escalation of the conflict in the short and middle term, it came at a high cost for democratic consolidation in the long term. Especially in post-conflict societies, an additional goal is peace-building; like the majority of the literature since the 1992 UN 'Agenda for Peace', we define peace-building as those post-conflict activities that seek to avoid a 'relapse into conflict' (see also Lemay-Hébert and Jung).[30] According to Call, the policy objective of state-building is 'to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society'.[31] This includes institutions that provide the monopoly of power and the legitimacy and administrative capacity to govern. All these activities may contribute to the stabilization of a political regime, whether it is democratic or authoritarian. This becomes evident in the case of Morocco, where capacity-building in the water sector might contribute to democratization on the local level and stabilization of the autocratic regime on the macro-level at the same time (Freyburg). Jung, Lemay-Hébert, and Pogodda analyse the conflict between building a state and aiding democracy in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Palestine, showing that delaying either state-building or democratization has negative effects on each other goal. Finally, socio-economic development focuses on economic and human progress, which includes the access of individuals and groups to certain rights and basic services.[32] A conflict with the support of democratization can emerge if this access is not open to everybody, but only to privileged groups and elites, as Wolff shows in his case study on Bolivia.

These conflicts seldom emerge alone. We assume that external actors who support democracy face not one, but several conflicts between objectives. Accordingly, this special issue presents empirical research that traces not only individual conflicts of objectives in democracy promotion, but that also highlights the co-existence of and

interconnections between several conflicts of objectives in the process of democracy promotion (see especially Faust et al., Quie, and Wolff). The empirical investigations demonstrate that at times the emergence of extrinsic and intrinsic conflicts of objectives goes hand-in-hand; it is unlikely that one of these intertwined conflicts could be solved completely independently of the others. As Quie notes, in the Afghan peace process that began after the 2001 external military intervention, the extrinsic conflict between democratization and peace-building was closely connected with the intrinsic conflict over the inclusion or exclusion of Taliban combatants in the demobilization and reintegration programme. The extrinsic conflict hindered effective democracy promotion as long as the intrinsic conflict remained unsolved. Wolff's analysis of democracy promotion in Bolivia reveals that the empowerment of the populace during democratization has two conflicting dimensions. As an intrinsic conflict, this empowerment endangers the survival of existing democratic institutions; as an extrinsic conflict, it interferes with the maintenance of intra-state peace. These two conflicts are affiliated in the course of democratization and thereby present a challenge to the effectiveness of democracy promotion.

Identifying phases and causes: when and under what conditions do conflicting objectives emerge?

Although the existence of conflicting objectives is known, we lack systematic understanding of their origins. As an initial step, we propose an analytical systematization that individuates the phases of the policy process and the conditions that foster the emergence of conflicting objectives.

Phases of emergence of conflicting objectives

As in any other policy process, conflicting objectives emerge at different stages and at different times in the course of democracy promotion. Thus, our conceptualization of conflicts between objectives is process-oriented. We base our process-understanding on a policy cycle that is divided into three phases: During the *normative* phase, norm- and value-building takes place; during the *strategic* phase, actors decide upon their goals and select the adequate instruments to achieve them; and during the *operative* phase, policies are implemented.[33] In each of these phases, conflicts of objectives may emerge as a consequence of pre-existing concepts, as a consequence of decisions that have been taken during the preceding phase, or as a consequence of a widening of the available concepts and strategies (for example, because new actors have entered the scene).

Concerning the *normative* phase, there may be intrinsic conflicts between various norms in democracy promotion. Different democracy promoters may rely upon different and frequently incompatible democracy concepts – for example, liberal individualistic approaches would be at odds with collective approaches, ideas about individual rights would clash with group rights, and the goal of majority rule could threaten minority protection. Different norms may result in different priorities and interests for strategies and instruments, thus

leading to inconsistent strategy-building and implementation. The same is true for the emergence of extrinsic conflicts between the goal of democratization and other relevant policy goals (see also Table 1 above).

In the *strategic* phase, intrinsic and extrinsic conflicts of appropriate timing, sequencing, and systemic interdependencies may occur. There is also a risk of unintended side-effects, as well as the need to consider the effects of policies in other areas (security, development, etc.) and to devise coherent democracy promotion policies accordingly.[34] Furthermore, the interaction between international and national actors may bear conflict potential if the two groups diverge on adequate reform strategies.

With regard to the *operative* phase, once again intrinsic and extrinsic conflicts can occur during the implementation of democracy promotion. During this phase, the interactions between the different agencies of one donor, between agencies of different donors, and particularly between donors and recipients can result in conflicts. For example, donors and recipients may disagree over priorities for the implementation of policy goals. Variations in prioritization will subsequently influence the results of democracy promotion (for an overview, see Figure 1).

As Jung describes in his case study, in the normative phase (here, the creation of the peace agreement in Dayton that was designed to end the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995), the three conflict fractions (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) could not accept anything other than a strict system of institutionalized power-sharing. However, during the implementation phase, this system – combining a weak central state with strong entities, reserved seats in the parliament encouraging voting along strict ethnic lines, strong veto rights that are almost impossible to override, and a lack of incentives for cooperation across ethnic borders – has created immense challenges for both peace-building and democratization. The initial agreement on norms was undermined by its lack of effectiveness during implementation. War-time cleavages were enshrined in the institutional setting; today, the governmental system in Bosnia and Herzegovina can only very loosely be regarded as democratic.

It is important to note that the phases of the democracy promotion process are not isolated from one another. In fact, it is possible for a trickle-down effect to occur: the decision to pursue diverging norms might trigger conflicts in strategy-building, for example. The Afghan case mentioned above sheds light on this interdependence between norms and strategies. Once international actors had decided that they would seek to build peace and democracy simultaneously (in the normative phase), they then had to determine whether to exclude the Taliban from the process for the sake of stability or include them to guarantee democratic procedures (part of the strategic phase).

Conditions for the emergence of conflicting objectives

Scholars addressing the challenges of democracy promotion point to three interacting types of factors that might create tension between policy goals in general and in democracy promotion in particular.[35] These are:



Figure 1. The emergence of conflicting objectives in the policy process.

(1) the socio-economic and political conditions in the recipient country (in particular, the level of conflict, the level of development, and the type of political regime);
(2) the interaction between international and local actors; and
(3) the capacity of international and local actors (for example, human and institutional resources and management skills).

In the following, we will define these factors that have all been investigated by the authors of this special issue in greater detail and present our findings on their role.

With regard to factor (1) specific socio-economic and political conditions in the recipient country are presumed to increase the likelihood of the emergence of conflicting objectives. The authors of the special issue attribute explanatory power to three particular factors in the recipient country:

(a) Level of conflict (for example, ongoing conflict, post-conflict). Democracy promotion is particularly difficult in the context of an ongoing conflict (as in Afghanistan, Palestine, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)) and in post-conflict settings (as in Kosovo and Timor-Leste). The legacies of war and violent conflict, including security dilemmas (Jung, Richter, Quie) and state failure (Lemay-Hébert, Quie) contribute to the emergence of extrinsic and intrinsic conflicts of objectives. We assume that international actors and recipients are overwhelmed by the number of tasks that must be accomplished to organize conflict management and post-conflict recovery, including state-building and advancements in democratization.
(b) Level of development (for example, developing, least developed). In societies with low levels of socio-economic and human development, existential problems such as hunger, disease, and unemployment require urgent political answers. Under such conditions, international actors face the challenge of balancing the fulfilment of humanitarian and social needs with democracy support. Although supporting efficient and effective governance to facilitate access to basic services and public goods has become a mainstay of international development cooperation, socio-economic development is likely to outrank democracy support in these contexts. For instance, Wolff found evidence that defining the fight against socio-economic inequalities as one attribute of democracy, has contributed to the emergence of conflicting objectives in Bolivia. In addition, well-developed countries which attract economic interests of OECD states might also cause conflicting objectives in foreign policies. For instance, the United States' trade relations might undermine their efforts to protect human rights and promote democracy in the Arab world.
(c) Type of political regime (for example, democratic, non-democratic). Conflicting objectives are more likely to emerge when international actors target authoritarian regimes or regimes in which authoritarian elements prevail. Although the aim of democracy promoters is regime change, at the same time they seek security and stability through development cooperation. In doing so, they foster regime survival and might actually undermine change. Freyburg's analysis of Morocco shows that the EU fosters the authoritarian regime on the macro-level but attempts democracy support on the micro-level.

Regarding factor (2), the mode of interaction between international and domestic actors can also determine the emergence of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion.[36] Various constellations of international actors and recipients can be placed on an inclusion-exclusion continuum, where one pole represents the inclusion of recipients in democracy promotion policies and the other pole, their exclusion. Dialogue and cooperation-oriented democracy promotion policies can be found

near the inclusion pole; in such cases, recipients are in the driver's seat of democratization and international actors support ongoing democratization with caution, leaving the outcomes of democratization open (Wolff on Bolivia). Highly intrusive forms of democracy promotion can be found near the exclusion pole of the continuum; here, international trusteeship administrations plan in detail democratic institutions, determining which political fractions will be represented at the regime level (Jung on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lemay-Hébert on Kosovo and Timor-Leste). In between the two poles, varying forms of temporary inclusion and exclusion of actors in the process of democratization can be found (for example, Quie on Afghanistan and Pogodda on Palestine). The more intrusive democracy promotion policies are, the higher the risk that conflicts of objectives will emerge as a consequence of diverging interests between donors and recipients.

Intra-organizational disputes can also cause conflicting objectives. External actors (such as the EU or the USA) that pursue a multitude of diverse interests are more likely to 'produce' conflicting objectives than more unified actors who have limited interests and follow a narrowly defined democracy promotion agenda (Richter, Wolff).[37] Multilateral coalitions and organizations are also vulnerable to conflicting objectives, as their norms and strategies are very often the result of negotiated policies and compromises between their member states, or they reflect the interests of the most powerful members of the group. For instance, the case of Zambia in this special issue reveals that a high fragmentation of the donor organizations in small developing countries can instigate the emergence of conflicting objectives if the recipient countries lack the capacity to coordinate different donor interests or if donors fail to harmonize their incentive systems (see Faust et al.).[38] It is also possible, of course, that actors within recipient countries could have conflicting ideas about what their country's priorities should be. Mixed signals to donors caused by unresolved internal conflict can further contribute to the emergence of conflicting objectives.

Against the backdrop of the empirical findings of this special issue, we find the following factors in the relationship between actors particularly significant in explaining conflicting objectives in democracy promotion:[39] (a) a clash between (security, political, commercial, or cultural) interests, norms, and values; (b) a mismatch of incentives; (c) a lack of ownership; and (d) a lack of coordination between international and domestic actors or between international donors.

As stated in factor (3) above, the lack of capacity of international and local actors can create conflicting objectives in democracy promotion. Resource scarcity, time pressure, and the lack of information on the actual needs of the populace and on the consequences of decisions can all limit an actor's capacity. Developing countries very often lack the human and institutional resources and management skills to negotiate their own agendas of political change and to respond to donor demands (Faust et al.). If external actors do not adequately manage resources and foreign aid and are not willing or able to overcome such problems, the emergence of conflicting objectives becomes more likely (Jung, Lemay-Hébert, Pogodda, Quie, and Richter).

In summary, the analyses in this special issue especially highlight (post-) conflict settings with a generally low level of socio-economic development, diverging interests between donors and recipients, and capacity deficits on both sides as factors that explain the formation of conflicts between objectives in democracy promotion.

Facing conflicting objectives: how do internal and external actors deal with conflicting objectives?

Under certain conditions, conflicts between foreign policy goals may be inseparably intertwined with democratization, but not affect democracy promotion. However, we presume that the contradictions and hindering effects of conflicting objectives outweigh any consequences that are conducive to democracy.[40] Thus, if local and international actors fail to address these conflicts constructively, they are likely to hinder the effectiveness of democracy promotion in transitional, post-war, and developmental contexts. If a conflict of objectives emerges and the actors involved – international and local – perceive it to be a conflict that might impact on the effectiveness of democracy promotion, theoretically, they have four options for dealing with it (see Figure 2).

The first option is 'no action'; that is, actors simply ignore the conflict and continue policy-making without making any changes at the norm-building, the strategy-building, or the implementation phase. In a best-case scenario, the conflict will simply disappear over time; however, in most cases, a policy of resolution by inaction seems unlikely to succeed.

The second option is 'prioritization', which refers to the individual objectives within in a policy. In this case, actors give one goal precedence over another. In the extreme case, a goal that is seen as less relevant could be completely abandoned.

The third option is 'sequencing', whereby actors first prioritize goals and subsequently rank these goals in a successive order.[41] One objective will be addressed, before focus turns to another. This order should be based on a functional logic of preconditions. For instance, the rule of law should be established or stability guaranteed before elections can take place.



Figure 2. Impact of conflicting objectives on the effectiveness of democracy promotion.

The fourth option is 'compromise'. Here, actors balance two or more objectives and combine them in their policy. Compromise can be the result of decision-making processes within the organization of one actor or a consequence of negations between two or more actors. In either case, the expectations of what can be achieved are often reduced due to limited resources or other context restrictions.

The authors featured in this issue have found evidence in their case studies and case comparisons of the use of three of these four options for dealing with the emergence of conflicting objectives. In some cases, donors are aware of conflicts of objectives, but they prefer not to engage actively in addressing them in a sustainable fashion (*no action*). Either the actors sit the problems out using a 'wait-and-see' approach (for example, Wolff's description of US actions in the first phase after government change in Bolivia) or they engage in emergency dialogue, but without the creation of a consistent fall-back scenario (as donors did in the Zambian case, see Faust et al.).

In other cases, donors prioritized their goals (*prioritization*). They put security (Richter, Jung), state-building (Lemay-Hébert), or development (Wolff) first; in none of these cases was democracy promotion prioritized right from the beginning (for example, in the form of actively supporting empowerment or by local participation and consultation). A shift towards giving higher priority to democracy promotion has taken place only when it has become apparent that improvements in democracy were necessary to serve other objectives.

Interesting examples of *compromise* can be found in the cases of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, where local consultation and participation has only recently been considered to be constructive for post-conflict recovery (Lemay-Hébert), and in the case of Bolivia, where donors adapted their policies only after they had grudgingly accepted the changed political situation (Wolff).Where donors have started by negotiating compromises among donors collectively or with recipients, they have for the most part failed due to the complexity of the conditions, as seen in the case of diverging interests between donors and recipients in Afghanistan on the question of inclusion vs. exclusion of Taliban combatants (Quie).

None of the authors found evidence of a clear-cut *sequencing* strategy. No donor included in our investigations made a strategic decision before policy implementation to delay the promotion of one objective until a prioritized objective had been completely achieved. At this stage of research we can only speculate on the reasons for this behaviour. Either donors are unwilling or unable to develop long-term strategies, or, due to the interconnected nature of objectives, they may fear to temporarily abandon one objective, as a lack of progress could have negative spill-over effects on the achievement of other objectives in the short, middle, and long terms.

These empirical examples do not necessarily mean that any of the aforementioned strategies of action or inaction contributes to the resolution of existing conflicts of objectives. Convincing strategies for dealing with such conflicts still need to be devised. In our case studies, donors were driven by situations, meaning that they were obliged to react, but appeared to not pro-actively strategize or manage conflicts between objectives in a controlled fashion.

Observing the consequences: what are the effects of conflicting objectives on democratization?

In democracy promotion research, conflicting objectives are of special interest because their existence, emergence, and how actors deal with them might be explanatory factors for the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of democracy promotion. We hypothesize that the management of conflicting objectives could influence the effectiveness of democracy promotion in three main ways (see Figure 2).

Conflicting objectives may have *no impact at all* on the effectiveness of democracy promotion and thereby on democratization. For instance, in a post-conflict society, an actor could support civil society participation and at the same time foster state-building without interference between goals. Although democratization is likely to hinder stabilization, the two goals do not necessarily contradict each other in the practice of democracy promotion.

Conflicting objectives may have *a negative impact* on the effectiveness of democracy promotion. In the worst case, they will hinder democratization in a recipient country instead of fostering it. For instance, if a donor seeks to stabilize a post-conflict society but at the same time supports the transformation of power structures, stabilization can be endangered. Should violent conflict break out, democratization would be at risk.

Conflicting objectives can *strengthen* the effectiveness of democracy promotion if a democracy promoter openly considers the conflict in the decision-making process. Resources can be allocated in a prioritized, sequenced, or balanced manner, leading to a positive trade-off or complementarity between various policy goals. For instance, investment in the rule of law in the short run can also support stabilization and thereby democratization in the long run.

Evidence for the second (negative) hindering mechanism outweighed the other options in most of the case studies in this special issue. Inadequate methods of dealing with conflicting objectives has contributed to a lack of progress in democratization (Faust et al., Quie, Jung, Pogodda) and to the entrenchment of semi-democratic institutions (Lemay-Hébert). Richter even found evidence of the enforcement of a few forms of inner-ethnic conflict. In all these cases, the external actors have failed to exert a consistent democratizing pressure or to set the right incentives for domestic actors to continue democratic reform.

Only in the case of the EU's functional cooperation with Morocco was it shown that the conflict of objectives between regime stabilization and democracy promotion turned out to be less crucial than originally expected (Freyburg). Although the cooperation supported regime stability on the macro-level, the awareness and acceptance of democratic participation was raised, at least on the micro- and meso-levels. However, it remains difficult to predict how effects on the micro- and meso-levels will contribute to regime change on the macro-level in the medium or long term.

Thus, depending on what actors do in a certain context, they can either constructively address conflicting objectives and might thereby strengthen the effectiveness of democracy promotion, or they could fail to find an adequate strategy to treat

conflicting objectives, thus hindering the effectiveness of democracy promotion. The analysis of conflicting objectives can help actors to identify conflicts of interests and preferences, misperceptions, and undesirable developments, opening a window of opportunity for changes in norms, priorities, and/or objectives. Once conflicting objectives have been acknowledged, actors can assess whether they are complementary in the short and long terms, either in terms of content or in the order they should be pursued. It is therefore important to learn more about the factors that influence the different origins and effects of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion in cases beyond those presented in this issue.

Conclusions: coming to terms with conflicts of objectives in democracy promotion

At the beginning of our research, we set out to investigate whether conflicting objectives matter in democracy promotion. Although their importance is commonly acknowledged in the literature, almost no systematic research has been done on this topic. We therefore sought to conceptualize and systematize conflicting objectives in order to learn more about their origins, how international actors deal with them, and how conflicting objectives influence democratization. Our empirical findings provide evidence that conflicting objectives impact the effectiveness of democracy promotion.

For the success of democracy support, it makes a difference whether actors openly address conflicting objectives or ignore them. In our case studies, however, we have primarily observed 'wait and see' approaches and uncoordinated activism instead of the systematic integration of conflicting objectives into the formulation of norms and strategies in democracy promotion. In particular, post-conflict settings in which international actors have a comprehensive mandate are prone to mismanagement of conflicting objectives. The studies of military and civil interventions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste in this special issue demonstrate that democracy promoters and peace-builders generally set overly broad agendas at the beginning of a mission. Although different goals may seem compatible during norm-building and strategy formulation, they often clash during implementation. As a result of 'learning by doing' in the implementation process, most actors then narrow their agendas, prioritizing certain goals over others. When the divergent foreign-policy goals of donors interfere with the objective of promoting democracy, the former is likely to be prioritized at the expense of the latter (Faust et al., Pogodda, Quie).

We recommend that practitioners seeking to improve their democracy promotion policies acknowledge the relevance of conflicting objectives and consider how intrinsic and extrinsic conflicts could develop as a part of their strategy-building. Our empirical investigations demonstrate the overall lack of strategies for addressing intrinsic conflicts and also for embedding democracy promotion efficiently in the framework of other foreign policies, such as development policies (Faust et al., Freyburg) or post-conflict state-building (Lemay-Hébert, Pogodda).

It is not only practitioners who should be occupied with conflicting objectives in democracy promotion. There is also a great deal to be done in research. If reliable patterns for the origins of conflicting objectives and for their explanatory factors are to be identified, further research is required in three directions: the scope of conditions, the conceptual framework, and methods to effectively deal with conflicting objectives. With regard to the scope of conditions in the recipient countries, the case studies in this special issue focus primarily on (post-)conflict settings in developing countries and political regimes with democratic features. To obtain systematic data on the emergence of conflicts, further research on this topic should focus not only on these settings, but should also include more cases of stable developing countries and of authoritarian regimes. We suspect that other conflicts may emerge in these situations that will need careful treatment in order to render democracy promotion more effective.

With regard to the conceptual framework, we suggest further investigation tracing the emergence of conflicting objectives and their consequences, not only in the three phases of the democracy promotion process (norm-building, strategy-building, and implementation) but also on the different levels of political regimes (the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels). As Freyburg has illustrated in this issue, there may be substantial differences regarding the importance of conflicting objectives on these three levels. If this is true, the logical conclusion would be that different strategies for the management of conflicting objectives would be required at the different levels. Such an empirical analysis would shed further light on how conflicting objectives can affect the success or failure of democratization.

Finally, it would be intriguing to identify those patterns of inaction, prioritization, sequencing, and compromise in democracy promotion that lead to a positive trade-off and complementarity between different policy goals. Our sample of cases leads us to conclude that conflicting objectives primarily negatively affect democratization, whatever actions actors take. However, we doubt that this is the case in all circumstances. To allow for substantive theory-building on the influence of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion on transition outcomes, further systematic and comparative examination of additional cases and expansion of the time period under investigation would be worthwhile. Perhaps, in the long run, it might turn out that at least some good things do indeed go together, even when that appears not to be the case at individual snapshot points in time.

In this special issue, we provide a conceptual framework for researching conflicting objectives, and we illustrate how one can address this issue in comparative empirical research. We hope that the reader will find this fruitful and take it as a starting point for further research on this topic along the proposed lines.

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Notes

1. We use the terms 'trade-off' and 'conflicting objectives' simultaneously. The differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic conflicts of objectives and their respective definitions are adapted from Spanger and Wolff, 'Universales Ziel – partikulare Wege?', 267.
2. Burnell, 'The Elusive Quest'.
3. Robert Packenham in 1973 was to our knowledge the first to express the idea that 'all good things go together' in Liberal America: Packenham, *Liberal America in the Third World*. See also Paris, 'Saving Liberal Peace', 341.
4. See Grävingholt, Leininger, and von Haldenwang, 'Effective Statebuilding'.
5. Lipset, *Political Man*. Other authors who follow a similar line of argument are Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*; Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*.
6. Lipset, *Political Man*, 31.
7. Further methodological and theoretical advancements of this argument can be found in Przeworski and Limongi, 'Modernization'; Acemoglu et al., 'Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis'; Levitsky and Way, 'Competitive Authoritarianism'.
8. Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*.
9. Carothers, 'Democracy Support and Development Aid'.
10. Faust, 'Democracy's Dividend'.
11. This development has been reinforced by the role that China has recently been playing in global politics. Autocratic China's extraordinary economic growth offers a new and successful model for development that seems to be attractive for some governments in developing regions. Based on the Chinese model, authoritarian regimes stress the importance of stability – rather than uncertain democratization – as a precondition for successful economic development. See Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, 'Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy?'; Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus*.
12. See Call and Cook, 'On Democratization and Peacebuilding', 237, for a similar assessment.
13. Grimm, 'External Democratization after War'; Paris, *At War's End*; Paris, 'International Peacebuilding and the "Mission Civilisatrice"'; Wesley, 'The State of the Art on the Art of State Building'.
14. Barnett and Zürcher, The Peacebuilder's Contract', 2.
15. Given the experiences of unsuccessful democracy promotion in recent years, democracy promoters have come to recognize the problems that emerge from an 'all good things go together' approach. Nevertheless, this is rarely reflected in their policies.
16. Grävingholt, Leininger, and von Haldenwang, 'Effective Statebuilding', chapter 4.
17. OECD, *Monitoring the Principles for Good*.

18. Call and Cook, 'On Democratization and Peacebuilding'; Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy*; Rothchild and Roeder, 'Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies'; Suhrke, 'Peacekeepers as Nation-builders'; Zaum, *The Sovereignty Paradox*.
19. Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance'.
20. A concept is the 'basic unit of thinking' which constructs the political phenomena that lead up to theory-building. In order to be a sharp and functional instrument of analysis, a concept should be parsimonious and built in an unambiguous way while adequately reflecting the level of complexity of the subject of inquiry. See Sartori, 'Guidelines for Concept Analysis', 17; Leininger, 'Bringing the Outside in', 66–7.
21. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 6.
22. Merkel, 'Defective Democracies'.
23. O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*.
24. In accordance with the mainstream literature, we use the terms 'dilemma' and 'conflicting objectives' synonymously.
25. Abel, Bernanke, and Croushore, *Macroeconomics*; Mankiw, *Principles of Economics*, 783–90.
26. Spanger and Wolff, 'Universales Ziel – partikulare Wege?', 267.
27. References in the text and in parentheses always refer to contributions in this special issue.
28. Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, 'Predicament of Elections'; Jarstad and Nilsson, 'From Words to Deeds'.
29. High Level Forum, *Paris Declaration*.
30. Call and Cook, 'On Democratization and Peacebuilding', 235; United Nations, *Agenda for Peace*, para. 55.
31. Call, 'Ending Wars', 5.
32. Sen, *Development as Freedom*.
33. We have adapted the policy cycle from David Easton's five-step cycle proposed in *A Framework for Political Analysis*. In our abbreviated model, norm-building corresponds to Easton's preference formation and interest aggregation, our strategy-building corresponds to Easton's agenda-setting and decision-making, and implementation remains the same.
34. Grävingholt, Leininger, and Schlumberger, *The Three Cs of Democracy Promotion Policy.*
35. There is no literature that refers systematically to the emergence of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion as such. The conflict and peace literature hints at individual factors that can create conflicting objectives in peace- and state-building. See, for example, Gleditsch and Ward, 'War and Peace'; Jarstad and Sisk, *From War to Democracy*; Ottaway, 'Rebuilding State Institutions'; Ottaway, *Democracy Promotion*. Moreover, recent analyses and evaluations of the structures and effectiveness of development cooperation have shed light on various factors that lead to conflicting objectives. We therefore trace our explaining factors for the emergence of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion from this branch of the literature. See, e.g., Faust and Messner, 'Organizational Challenges'; Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work*.
36. For a similar argument with regard to peace-building, see Barnett and Zürcher, 'The Peacebuilder's Contract'.
37. Carothers, 'Promoting Democracy'; Diamond, *Promoting Democracy.*
38. Fraser and Whitfield, 'Understanding Contemporary'; Gibson et al., *The Samaritan's Dilemma*.
39. Empirical evidence from the study of interactions in development cooperation supports the relevance of these explanatory factors. See, e.g., Whitfield, *The Politics of Aid*.

40. Compare the first section on the status quo of research.
41. 'Sequencing' goes one step further than 'prioritization' because it combines several elements and implies strategic thinking. There is no sequencing without prioritization, but priorities without sequencing are possible.

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