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With the collapse of the Cold War and the associated changes in the social, economic, and political environments, much has been made of the nature of conflict in the new post-Cold War environment. The traditional bipolar international system changed into a very different system: East-West security and alignment tensions decreased, and with it came the expectation that a prolonged period of stability would characterize the new system. The great powers, acting through, and for, the international community, would effectively prevent any conflict from breaking out. The end of the Cold War, so we were led to believe, marked the end of conflict, the "end of history" even. An era of long peace was what we all expected at the dawn of the 1990s.

What we have seen since 1991 is not a decrease, but an *increase* in the number and intensity of conflicts. The post-Cold War period is characterized by an explosion of nationalism, the accentuation of national

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identity, and the eruption of violent conflicts in places as diverse as Angola, Myanmar (formerly Burma), Sudan, Iraq, Russia, Turkey, Kashmir, Ethiopia, Bosnia, and many other places. These conflicts, largely generated within state boundaries, have become known as *ethnic conflicts*. By one account, only seven out of 111 militarized conflicts in the twelve years after 1989 were of the traditional interstate kind, and even these may have had a strong internal or communal dimension.[1] Clearly, it behooves us to understand these conflicts and to develop policies designed to deal with them or ameliorate their destructive manifestations.

Ethnic Conflict

The term *ethnic conflict* is broadly used to describe a wide range of internal conflicts. More specifically, we should note that if we wish to describe a group of people as an ethnic group, and thus parties in an ethnic conflict, the group must have a sense of collective and separate identity, common ancestry, a shared culture and history, and an attachment to a specific piece of territory.[2] An ethnic conflict is thus a conflict that involves two or more groups who perceive themselves to be different, and are seen by others as different. Peoples, nations, communities, or minorities can all be seen as ethnic groups. They may all find themselves involved in various conflicts (over resources, territory, ideology, etc.). Ethnicity as one of the distinguishing characteristics between groups is one of the features that produces differences and difficulties, and ultimately may produce a conflict. Despite its higher prominence, we must recognize that ethnicity is but one of the possible causes of conflict.

Ethnic conflicts arise when groups with a separate sense of identity perceive their governing structure to be incapable of addressing their basic needs. When such needs are denied, or are not met, various grievances are formed, and demands that the situation be redressed become more and more voluble. Perceived need deprivation is a basic condition of ethnic conflict. The desire to remove such unjustified deprivation is characteristic of the development and conduct of ethnic conflict.

Although the structure of ethnic conflict is often described as unique, we must recognize that ethnic conflicts are not a totally new phenomenon, notwithstanding the proliferation of papers and monographs focusing on ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era. An examination of ethnic conflicts in the six years after 1991 reveals that many of the so-called new ethnic conflicts in the 1991–1996 period had, in fact, been going on for fifteen or more years.[3] A large number of ethnic conflicts underway in the 1980s remained active during the 1990s. Conflicts over ethnicity have

been with us for a long time indeed, and will remain with us as long as political boundaries do not coincide with ethnic groups. It is not quite the new phenomenon that some would have us believe.

Ethnicity, identity, and national attachments play significant roles in most conflicts, internal or interstate. One should thus be cautious in disaggregating a category of conflicts (i.e., ethnic conflicts) and identifying this as separate from any other form of conflict. Ethnic identity is a social construction that is formed, changed, and re-formed by different circumstances and contextual conditions. Sometimes ethnic identity is given much prominence; at other times it is all but neglected. Just why this feature—rather than, say, ideological differences or territorial differences—should be the one feature that distinguishes between conflicts and receives so much attention remains to be discussed.

If ethnic conflict is viewed as a new wave sweeping across different regions of the world, engulfing them in convulsive fits of violence in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, then explanations of their causes and proposals for their management are likely to be quite different than if we view them over a much longer term. We have relied too much on end of the Cold War elements in our analysis of ethnic conflicts. Ethnic groups and ethnic conflicts have been around for centuries; hence their occurrence, or their management, cannot be explained merely in terms of some structural readjustment that took place fourteen years ago.[4] Ethnicity is not a new phenomenon; it may play a more salient role in some conflicts, but that does not mean its role is a sufficient one. It takes a substantial effort to have issues of ethnicity and identity transformed into violent conflicts (not all, or even most, conflicts of identity become violent). One should be mindful of this transformation.

Most of the conflicts here referred to as ethnic conflicts do not usually remain confined to a single state, nor are they purely ethnic conflicts. Most of these conflicts transform themselves into international conflicts. This transformation creates what we call an *internationalized* ethnic conflict. Thus there exists a set of internationalized conflicts that had their origins in some domestic disputes over identity, or discriminatory structures or practices, but through a variety of mechanisms, these quickly metamorphose into the more familiar picture of an international conflict.[5]

Many of the conflicts that occupy a prominent place on the international agenda today, such as Sri Lanka, Iraq (vis-à-vis the Kurds), Kashmir, Israel, or Afghanistan, began as ethnic conflicts but quickly spilled over to involve more than one state. In a globalized age, state boundaries become increasingly more porous; thus conflicts that started within a state's borders will have consequences that affect the international sys-

tem, or the international community may take measures that affect domestic conflicts. Either way, such conflicts rarely remain an internal phenomenon only.

There are a number of processes that may transform an ethnic conflict into an internationalized conflict.[6] Ethnic conflicts can become internationalized through the spread of refugees across borders, or when one ethnic group is spread across several states, or when ethnic leaders in one state seek sanctuary in another. They can become internationalized through terrorist activities or partisan interventions on behalf of one of the groups. Finally, there are a number of conflicts with significant ethnic components that become internationalized through international diplomatic activity (such as United Nations intervention, diplomatic efforts of various statesmen, etc.).

Characteristics of Internationalized Ethnic Conflict

Internationalized ethnic conflicts are both very violent and protracted. Carment's[7] examination of international conflicts from 1945–1981 found that internationalized ethnic conflicts were characterized by a high level of violence in 40 percent of conflicts compared with 30 percent of non-ethnic conflicts. Miall's findings from the 1945–1985 period reinforce this, with internal conflicts being fourfold more likely to be categorized as "major violent" than international conflicts during the same period.[8] According to Sivard, 1994 saw the highest number of conflict-related deaths since 1971, with a total of over one million for the year, many of them civilian. Today, more than 90 percent of all casualties are noncombatants, with violence directed against civilian populations evident in conflicts such as Chechnya, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.[9] Contrary to conventional wisdom, internationalized ethnic conflicts have taken place mostly in Africa and the Middle East (seventy-three out of 131).

Internationalized ethnic conflicts are characterized by a high level of perceived cultural differences. In internationalized ethnic conflict, the cultural, linguistic, or religious distinctions play a vital role in shaping the disputants' ways of thinking and influencing their perceptions of themselves and others. The first fact of ethnicity is the application of systematic distinction between insiders and outsiders in a process of inclusion and exclusion that defines the "group." The ability of a protest group to develop and sustain a dispute with a government depends on that group's perceiving both a distributional element and an identification element. Without distributional deprivation, identification remains a positive factor and not a motivation for conflict; without an identification element, distri-

butional inequalities remain unfocused and non-mobilizing. Ethnicity provides a focus around which individuals can unite and a basis upon which to construct and maintain a community based on certain features that are perceived and shared within the group. Internal unity and cohesiveness is dependent on a group's ability to clearly define itself as an entity, an in-group, and to distinguish itself from the out-group(s).

Another feature of internationalized ethnic conflicts is that they are rarely dyadic. Internationalized ethnic conflicts usually spawn a multiplicity of groups, alliances, and subgroups. Often these groups spill over to other countries and cause them to become involved in the conflict. It is also very difficult to establish proper leadership or control channels in such conflicts where so many diffuse and ill-defined groups coexist. This clearly compounds the problems policy-makers or conflict managers face.

Internationalized ethnic conflicts are characterized by specific issues over which the conflict is typically fought. These are predicated upon value-related issues and fundamental beliefs such as identification, loyalties, individual beliefs, group identities, ethnic relations, and perceptions of separateness and discriminations. Like other value-related issues, ethnic issues are intangible, intractable, and do not lend themselves easily to political compromise or a negotiated settlement.

Unlike traditional interstate conflicts, which usually end up in negotiation and a settlement of sorts, internationalized ethnic conflicts often end with expulsion, surrender, or extermination. Most internationalized ethnic conflicts either continue for a long time or re-emerge within twenty-four months. William Zartman[10] found that less than a third of ethnic conflicts in the twentieth century led to negotiations. In a much-discussed paper, Kaufman[11] argued that there was only one possible outcome to violent ethnic conflict, and that is permanent separation of the parties. Paul Pillar's[12] study shows that about two-thirds of interstate wars terminated through negotiation, compared to about one-third of internal conflicts. Stedman[13] (see also Walter[14]), after eliminating colonial wars and other "special" cases, found that the incidence of ethnic conflicts terminating by negotiation declined to approximately 15 percent.

Parties and Issues in Internationalized Ethnic Conflict

Gurr's project[15] provides a useful classification of political actors in internationalized ethnic conflict. The actors in question are defined as ethnopolitical actors. Two criteria must be met for an actor to be defined as such: the actor must collectively suffer, or benefit from, discriminatory policies; and collective action, mobilization, and defense of their own

interest(s) are undertaken by such actors. However, many shared attributes—of which ethnicity is one—may lead to collective actions.

Gurr makes a basic distinction between two broad categories of ethnopolitical groups: *national peoples* and *minority peoples*. National peoples include ethnonationalists (regionally concentrated people who pursue autonomy), national minorities, and indigenous peoples. Minority peoples include ethnoclasses (ethnically distinct people occupying a distinct social status), communal contenders (culturally distinct people who seek a share in state power), and religious sects. On the basis of these criteria, Gurr identifies 275 ethnopolitical groups, the majority of which are communal contenders (sixty-eight) or indigenous peoples (sixty-six). How then are these conflicts managed in the contemporary environment?

Managing Internationalized Ethnic Conflicts

Managing internationalized ethnic conflict is a difficult and complex process, but it is not much different from managing any other kinds of conflict. Like other intractable conflicts, internationalized ethnic conflicts are not unmanageable. Rather than devise a variety of constitutional accommodative arrangements (ranging from autonomy to federalism), this article argues there are in fact three basic methods of conflict management that apply to all conflicts. Parties in any conflict may resort to different levels of coercion (physical and psychological) to manage their conflict. They may settle the conflict through peaceful means such as bargaining and negotiation on their own initiative, or the conflict may be managed through the intervention (binding or otherwise) of some third party. The particular focus of this paper is on the peaceful intervention of third parties.

Intractable and complex conflicts are not particularly amenable to negotiation or arbitration. As seen above, they tend to be dealt with by violence. A useful mechanism in this context of inflamed feelings, hostility, and violence is the third-party mechanism. Third parties can play a number of important roles in internationalized ethnic conflicts. These roles may be distinguished in terms of the degree of involvement by a third party in the conflict management process.[16] Fisher and Keashly[17] provide a useful framework for describing the different roles. Using their terminology, one could say that some third parties engage in *conciliation.* Conciliation involves a trusted third party who provides an informal communication link between the parties with the purposes of identifying the issues, reducing tensions, and encouraging the parties to shift their negotiating positions. *Arbitration* and *adjudication* involve a legitimate and

authoritative third party that renders a binding judgment to the parties (a very unlikely scenario in the context of internationalized ethnic conflicts). *Consultation,* or *problem-solving*, involves a third party facilitating analysis of the conflict and the development of alternatives through communication and diagnosis based on an analysis and understanding of conflict processes. Another form of intervention is *peacekeeping*, which involves the provision of military personnel by a third party (or parties) to supervise and monitor a cease-fire, to undertake humanitarian activities, or attempt to prevent open hostilities between the parties. The final form of third-party intervention, *mediation*, involves the intervention of a third party that attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the substantive issues in the conflict. Here the focus is on the role and relevance of mediation in internationalized ethnic conflicts.

Mediation: A Review

Mediation is often a favored form of peaceful third-party intervention. Unlike conciliation, mediation allows a mediator to take a more active formal role in the process. Unlike arbitration, it is voluntary and ad hoc in nature. Mediation may also include more informal forms of third-party intervention such as the provision of good offices, inquiry, or fact-finding. At its best, mediation can help the parties address the substantive issues in a conflict. A mediator is able to steer the parties toward agreement through communication and diagnosis, and may press and reward the parties so as to have a degree of control over the context of the conflict and its process.

Mediation, in comparison with arbitration and adjudication, is a voluntary process in which a third party offers nonbinding assistance (in various forms) to the disputants to help them move towards a mutually acceptable agreement. Given the voluntary, noncoercive nature of mediation, and the polarized and entrenched nature of internationalized ethnic conflict, mediation provides, on the face of it, a nonthreatening form of transforming, deescalating, or settling such conflicts.

Mediation is best viewed as a process that is used worldwide in numerous kinds of conflicts and can be systematically studied within the broader context of negotiation and conflict management. Definitions of mediation may focus on mediation behavior, mediator identity, or mediator resources.[18] Given the immense scope of mediation, the following broad definition seems appropriate. Mediation is “a process of conflict management where the disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle

their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical violence or invoking the authority of the law."[19]

Parties in conflict, whether domestic or international, have alternatives other than mediation. They choose it *voluntarily* because mediation embodies some international norms they wish to uphold, or because they expect greater payoffs from mediation than from other conflict management methods. Either way, mediation is an adaptive form of conflict management; the context of each conflict situation is highly variable in terms of the nature of the parties, the issues, the dispute, and the mediator. Mediation must develop and respond to the context of a conflict if it is to be effective. In order to examine the relationships between internationalized ethnic conflict and mediation outcomes, the specific characteristics associated with ethnic conflict and their relationship with mediation outcomes are discussed below.

A number of approaches to the study of mediation have dominated the literature.[20] Broadly speaking, these approaches represent the single case study tradition;[21] experimental studies, interviews, and observations;[22] and the systematic, empirical tradition.[23] The systematic, empirical tradition examines a large number of mediation cases and tries to relate mediation outcomes to a wide array of independent variables describing the context and process of any conflict situation. Wall et al.[24] refer to this aspect of the literature as *aggregate outcome determinants*.

Various factors impact on the effectiveness of mediation. This article evaluates the impact of timing of mediation, mediation strategies, and mediator experience within the context of ethnic conflicts. Although other factors may have an impact on mediation effectiveness, these three factors received considerable attention in the literature.[25] Thus, the next section of the paper introduces the theoretical discussions on these factors. That text is followed by presentation of the data and empirical analysis of their impact in ethnic conflicts.

Timing and Duration of Mediation

The notion of mediation timing is used by many as a predictor of a successful outcome.[26] To be effective, mediation must take place at a propitious moment in the life cycle of a conflict. But how exactly can this moment be recognized? Some argue that it occurs early in a conflict; others suggest that this moment occurs much later in a conflict.[27] Timing certainly affects mediation effectiveness, but in which way? International mediation is most likely to be successful when it is undertaken within the

"right" context, when the proper strategy has been adopted, and when the timing is "ripe," or perceived by the parties to be so.[28]

There is broad agreement with Touval[29] that "mediation should take place at a propitious moment," but that, alas, is where the agreement ends. Some theorists, such as Edmead,[30] have suggested that mediation efforts should be initiated as early as possible in a dispute, certainly long before positions become fixed, attitudes harden, and an escalating cycle becomes entrenched. This argument is based on the assumption that once the positions are fixed and the parties invested in the conflict with the belief that conflict will end up in their favor, it becomes harder for them to make concessions and reach an agreement. Zartman, on the other hand, argues that ripeness usually results from a *mutually hurting stalemate.*[31] The notion of "hurting stalemate" refers to the parties' realization that they have reached "the point where they can no longer escalate their way to victory and the sunk costs plus the countering efforts of the other side make for a costly deadlock."[32] Northedge and Donelan also note that mediation attempts can be successful "when there exists a concatenation of circumstances already tending toward an improvement of the situation."[33]

Others, such as Kriesberg and Thorson,[34] believe that conflicts have to go through some phases, moves, and countermoves before a serious attempt to mediate it should be made. These scholars[35] suggest that mediation will be more successful if it is initiated well into a conflict, when costs have become intolerable and both parties accept that they may loose too much by continuing their dispute.[36] This perspective holds that mediation is more likely to be successful when disputants think that they can gain a better settlement through mediation than through unilateral action. This usually happens when parties perceive a hurting stalemate or an impending catastrophe; when all unilateral actions are blocked; or when a powerful mediator can, through the usage of leverage, create a perception that mediation timing is right. This perspective receives considerable empirical support.[37] This notion of right or ripe moment is expanded below and applied in the context of ethnic conflicts.

Once involved in a conflict, a mediator may perform a variety of functions. Carrying out these functions may take some time. It is interesting to examine just how much time mediators may need before they decide to exit the conflict. In some ethnic conflicts, those involved may argue for more time, hoping to achieve a better outcome if they work harder. In other conflicts, a mediator may reach such an outcome within a reasonably short period of mediation. At what stage should a mediator

withdraw from a conflict? How long should an outsider be involved in this process? Prolonged mediation may well signify inflexibility, unwillingness to yield, and a possible failure. The duration of a mediation effort, as well as the moment of entry, are worth examining for their impact on mediation outcomes. This aspect of the process is examined in hypothesis 1 below.

Mediation Strategies

Another important aspect of mediation success is the strategies adopted by the mediators. Mediation strategy is an overall plan of mediators to resolve and manage conflicts.[38] "It is the way the mediator intends to manage the case, the parties, and the issue. Consistent patterns emerge and are observable with respect to the overall strategy, or plan of action employed."[39] Differences in the implementation of various mediation strategies may be attributed to how the mediator chooses to handle the mediation process, and the specific context of the dispute that is being mediated. The most useful taxonomy of mediator behavior that can be applied to mediation analysis is based on the identification of three strategies along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention. These are communication-facilitation, procedural, and directive strategies.[40] These strategies are based on notions derived from Sheppard's taxonomy of mediator behavior that focuses on the content (i.e., directive), process (communicative), and procedures of conflict management.[41] These, and any other strategy, are predicated on the assumption that mediation operates in a dynamic, social environment and is a process that transforms negotiation into a bargaining triad. The strategies mediators employ are designed to change, affect, or modify aspects of the dispute or parties' interactions.

In their analysis of mediation behavior, Touval and Zartman[42] focus mainly on specific mediator functions which highlight the need to facilitate communication between the parties, engage in substantive-directive agreements, and provide procedural efficacy to the mediation environment. Bercovitch's conceptualization of mediator behavior describes specific behavioral tactics that are associated with these strategies. These strategies and their associated tactics are listed below.[43]

1. *Communication-facilitation strategies.* These strategies describe mediator behavior at the low end of the intervention spectrum. Here a mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role, channeling information to the parties, facilitating cooperation but exhibiting little

control over the more formal process or substance of mediation. Tactics associated with this strategy include making contact with the parties, gaining the trust and confidence of the parties, arranging for interactions between the parties, identifying issues and interests, clarifying the situation, avoiding taking sides, developing a rapport with the parties, supplying missing information, developing a framework for understanding, encouraging meaningful communication, offering positive evaluations, and allowing the interests of the parties to be discussed. These are the most passive strategies, wherein a mediator plays the role of "go-between" and opens channels of unbiased information.[44] Communication-facilitation strategies are strongly supported by some scholars, who claim that all disputes are products of misunderstanding, and that clear communication among disputants through mediators is the key to a successful resolution.[45]

2. *Procedural-formulative strategies.* These strategies enable a mediator to exert a more formal control over the mediation process with respect to the environment of the mediation. Here a mediator may determine structural aspects of the meetings and control constituency influences, media publicity, the distribution of information, the situational powers of the parties, and communication processes. Tactics associated with this strategy include choosing the site of meetings, control of the pace and formality of meetings, control of the physical environment, establishing protocols, suggesting procedures, highlighting common interests, reducing tensions, controlling timing, dealing with the simple issues first, structuring the agenda, keeping parties at the table, helping parties to save face, and keeping the process focused on issues. Procedural strategies are designed to create a favorable environment for conflict management.
3. *Directive strategies.* These strategies are the most powerful form of intervention. Here a mediator affects the content and substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives for the parties and changing their motivational calculus. Directive strategies deal directly with—and aim to change—the attitudes and/or behavior of the parties in dispute. The tactics associated with this strategy include changing the parties' expectations, taking responsibility for concessions, making substantive suggestions and proposals, making the parties aware of the costs of non-agreement, supplying and filtering information, suggesting concessions that parties can

> make, helping the negotiators to undo a commitment, rewarding party concession, helping devise a framework for acceptable outcomes, changing perceptions, pressing the parties to show flexibility, promising resources or threatening withdrawal, and offering to verify compliance with agreement. Directive strategies are all about changing perceptions of cost, benefit, and consequences. In any policy arena, this is achieved through a judicious use of information and social influence.

This conceptualization specifies a clear distinction between various types of mediator behaviors and provides an extensive descriptive account of exactly what these behaviors entail. This provides the basis for a logical and systematic explanation of mediation behavior that can be applied to the empirical analysis of mediation in international conflicts. One is able to test whether a given profile fits a specific mediator role and how to enact it. It also provides a basis for exploring what influences and determines these behaviors.

In our analysis, communication and formulation strategies are considered to be nondirective, in contrast to directive strategies. Nondirective strategies may be criticized as time-consuming since they involve a lot of learning, communication, and repeated interactions. They will clearly not work when the parties in conflict have little motivation or willingness to settle a dispute.

In turn, directive strategies have their own advantages and disadvantages. When mediators use directive strategies, their control over the process as well as the substance of a dispute becomes extensive at the expense of the disputants. Thus, this strategy may actually antagonize disputants or make them determined to sort out their own problems, lest they cede too much control to a mediator.[46] Parties may also reject a mediator's proposal or mediation itself when mediators put too much pressure on disputants.[47]

Previous research suggests that directive strategies have a higher rate of success in international conflicts.[48] Bercovitch's analysis shows that such strategies are the most effective in settling international disputes.[49] In his later study, he further states that communication strategies are most likely to be employed, but less likely to lead to a successful outcome. Does the same pattern hold true in internationalized ethnic conflicts? Which strategy works better in this context? This article attempts to answer that question.

Mediator Experience

An important dimension in mediation success is mediator experience. The conflict management experience of mediators has been suggested as an important factor in influencing the style and effectiveness of their mediation. Carnevale and Pegnetter[50] and Kochan and Jick[51] found that more experienced mediators obtained more settlements; and Pearson, Thoennes, and Vanderkooi found that more experienced mediators achieved higher quality settlements.[52] This outcome could perhaps be attributed to the degree of trust, credibility, and legitimacy parties place in the ability of the mediator to fulfill their role, as well as the rapport built between the mediator and the parties over successive mediation efforts, enabling the mediator to manage the process effectively.

A mediator's experience and record may provide information on their ability to manage a given conflict. Recognition of a mediator's experience, ability, familiarity, commitment to, and understanding of a specific situation will also influence the parties' expectations and acceptance of different mediator roles. Mediation behavior may be seen as adaptive, responding in part to whether the strategy achieves its expectations. Mediators also acquire a reputation for possessing skill and experience that may influence their choice of strategy. For example, mediation may involve some degree of trial and error, whereby the enactment of a particular strategy may not be part of a long-term plan but the result of expediency or innovation by the mediator in attempting to get a desired outcome.[53]

In an environment of uncertainty and risk, mediators must determine how best to gain control of potentially volatile situations and how to manage the parties' interactions effectively. Clearly, background information from previous mediation efforts (and an understanding of mediation practice in general) is an integral part of this decision process. The feedback from previous events includes information gathered, experience, and learning and understanding gained by the mediator and the parties. These factors can be examined empirically by looking at the number of previous mediation attempts, their duration, the outcome and durability of mediation events, mediators' experiences, and history of mediation in a specific dispute.

Some aspects that merit an examination relate to the relationship between current mediation behavior and previous mediations efforts. Are certain strategies associated with prolonged mediation? Do past mediator behavior and the duration of a mediation event affect current choices of a strategy? What sort of outcomes have been achieved through different types of mediation strategies? Trying to answer these questions may pro-

vide us with guidelines for more effective mediation in internationalized ethnic conflicts.

The expected duration or efficacy of mediation efforts may be attributed to a number of concurrent factors such as the presence or absence of time pressures, the relative experience of the parties and their familiarity with the mediation progress, the complexity of the issues under negotiation, and the effectiveness of the strategy employed to deal with the current problems in the parties' conflict management relationship. It has been established that a mediation strategy is a goal or a means to the overall objective of managing a conflict constructively and effectively. By employing a strategy that has proven successful in the past, mediators may expect to greatly improve their chances of success in current efforts.[54] When a specific type of mediation strategy has proven to be effective in getting the parties to reach an acceptable agreement in the past, logic dictates that continuing in the same style might be helpful in similar conflicts.[55] The parties' evaluation of the effectiveness of different types of mediator strategies and the degree of compromise achieved in previous mediation efforts may directly influence the nature of the parties' relationships during certain types of intervention.[56]

Based on the above discussions, three general hypotheses stand out:

H1: *Mediation is more likely to be successful when it is undertaken at the ripe time, and when it lasts less than a year.*

H2: *Mediation is more likely to be successful when a directive strategy is used.*

H3: *Mediation is more likely to be successful when the mediator is experienced.*

Research Design

Now that the theoretical dimensions of mediation in the context of internationalized ethnic conflicts have been presented, an empirical test of conflict management success can be undertaken. The focus is on the effect of mediation and the impact of mediation strategies, timing, and experience.

First, an original data set of all conflicts from 1945 to 1995 was compiled. An international conflict was operationalized as a continuous dispute involving at least one state, and resulting in a show of force and/

or some fatalities. Three hundred nine conflicts meet these criteria. The conflicts were of three kinds: internationalized ethnic conflicts, internal conflicts, and interstate wars. This paper focuses on internationalized ethnic conflicts only.

Next, all nonroutine mediation attempts that were mentioned in public sources were identified and coded. Informal institutionalized mediations, which are carried out behind closed doors and on which there is no public information, were not included in this study. The public sources examined to develop the data were *The Times* (London), *The New York Times*, *Keesing's Archives*, *Lexis Nexis,* and various Internet sites, in particular those provided by the United Nations, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Minorities at Risk, and the Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE). Historical accounts were also examined when data were not available. This research revealed a total of 3,452 mediation events, of which 1,040 mediation attempts took place in the context of internationalized ethnic conflicts.[57] These cases of mediation constitute our units of analysis.

The dependent variable is based on the outcome of the conflict management. Specifically, the dependent variable was coded as "1" if there was a cease-fire, a partial agreement, or a full settlement. It was coded as "0" if mediation had made no difference to the conflict. Unsuccessful cases are marked by no noticeable difference in behavior of the parties to the dispute and the parties maintain dysfunctional relations. This is a strict behavioral criterion for success and failure based on the work of Ernst Haas.[58] It does not take into account the durability of the outcome, the motives behind the parties' agreement, or any positive perceptual effects mediation may have produced.

Mediation timing is often linked to effectiveness. Fisher suggests that timing is more important than mediator identity or behavior. Two views characterize the discussion on mediation timing. One view states that mediation is more likely to be effective if it is attempted early on in a conflict, and certainly well before the parties experience increasing costs and their positions become entrenched.[59] Another view contends that mediation is more likely to be successful if it is attempted later on in the conflict, once the parties have gone through some "hurting behavior" and are then prepared to revise their motivations and expectations. A variable called TIME that measures how much time has elapsed in months in the life cycle of a conflict before mediation begins was specified.

A variable that captures directive mediation (DIRECT) was also specified. This type of mediation is considered to be more powerful and intru-

sive: a mediator provides incentives and/or issues ultimatums. Directive strategies deal directly with the dispute issues and the behavior associated with them.

Several important control variables based on the nature of the conflict were created. Conflict duration was measured in months (DUR). This variable ranges from a low of two months to a high of 540 months. Intensity of the dispute was measured based on the number of fatalities at the time mediation begins (INTENS). This variable ranges from zero to over 10,000 fatalities.

Several factors related to the nature of the mediation effort were captured. First, we specify the number of previous mediation attempts by the same mediator in the dispute (PREV). This variable ranges from zero to six or more. Length of time the mediation effort endures (MEDDUR) was measured with a range from one day to over three months. Experience of the mediator (MEDEXP) was measured with a range from no experience to more than nine previous efforts. UN mediation (UN) is coded as "1" in presence of UN mediator and "0" otherwise. These data are from the same sources that we use for the mediation attempts.

A probit model specified with mediation outcome as the dependent variable is tested. The model is estimated using Stata 7.0. Because there are many mediation efforts within each conflict, the cluster option in Stata was used to calculate the robust standard errors. This is necessary because the observations are not completely independent. The results can be seen in Table 1.

The model fit is strong and is highly significant. Directive strategies have a positive impact on the probability of successful conflict management outcome. As expected, more experienced mediators (MEDEXP) also increase the chances of success (hypothesis 3). MEDDUR has a negative impact on success. In other words, the longer a particular mediation effort endures, the lower the chances for its success. In a similar fashion, we find that previous attempts at mediation by the same mediator (PREV) have a negative impact on successful management. This finding should be taken with caution as it could be due to a selection effect. That is, mediators may be intervening repeatedly simply because the conflict in question is exceptionally complex and difficult. The coefficient from TIME is positive and approaches significance. Our key finding is that directive mediation by an experienced mediator increases the chances for ceasefire, partial agreement, or full settlement during an internationalized ethnic conflict (hypothesis 2). In terms of the first hypothesis, the findings for timing are not significant—but the finding on duration of mediation supports the hypothesis.

Table 1

Probit Estimates: Probability of Successful Outcome in Mediated Ethnic Disputes, 1945–1994

Variable	Coef.	Robust SE	P> |z|
INTENS	-.0910	.0941	0.333
TIME	.0031	.0019	0.111
PREV	-.0682	.0256	0.008
DUR	-.0025	.0019	0.191
MEDEXP	.0537	.0180	0.003
MEDDUR	-.0877	.0417	0.036
DIRECT	.2585	.1417	0.068
UN	-.0311	.1104	0.778
constant	.0270	.2600	0.917
N	= 869		
Wald chi2(8)	= 40.25		
Prob > chi2	= 0.0000		
Log likelihood	= -561.6418		

NOTE: Dependent variable is outcome of mediation effort; robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on conflict; two-tailed tests.

Calculation of marginal effects can help provide a clearer picture of the dynamics at work here. The marginals and three simulations are contained in Table 2.

There are three different scenarios depicted: baseline, directive mediation, and best case. The table also contains marginal effects for the significant variables (based on the baseline model). The baseline model with all variables set at their mean generates a probability of successful management of 38 percent. This means that, on average, conflict management by mediation has roughly one chance in three of succeeding.

The probability of success goes up in the presence of directive mediation. The success rate in this instance is 45 percent, up from 38 percent.

Table 2

Marginal Effects and Predicted Success

Variable	ME	Baseline Scenario	Directive Mediation Scenario	Best-Case Scenario
MEDDUR	-.0326			
EXPER	+.0199			
PREV	-.0254			
DIRECT	+.0997			
Prob. of successful mgmt.:		38%	45%	60%

NOTE: Marginal effects (ME) reported based on change of dummy variables from 0 to 1; other marginals based on raising variable one S.D.; only significant marginal effects reported. Baseline scenario = probability of successful management with all independent variables set to mean. Directive mediation scenario = all variables set to mean except DIRECT set to 1; Best-case scenario = DIRECT and MEDEXP set to 1; PREV and MEDDUR set to minimum; all others at mean.

Figure 1

Probability of Successful Conflict Management Over Time: Impact of Directive Mediation



Figure 2

Probability of Successful Management of Ethnic Conflict Over Time: Best- and Worst-Case Scenarios



The final simulation is a best-case scenario comprised of directive mediation, mediator experience, and a shorter mediation time. When these ingredients are in place, the probability of success goes up to a healthy 60 percent. An experienced mediator using directive methods increases the likelihood of successful mediation by over 50 percent from the baseline.

Figures 1 and 2 provide graphic representation of the results. The figures depict the relationships between probability of successful management, conflict duration, and two different management scenarios. These graphs are created from the estimated parameters in the probit model.[60] Figure 1 shows how the probability of success increases with directive mediation. It is also worth noting that the probability of successful outcome declines fairly dramatically as a conflict endures. Prolonged conflicts do not lend themselves easily to conflict management.

Figure 2 describes the dramatic difference in probability of success between the best- and worst-case scenarios. As mentioned above, the best-case scenario depicts mediation by an experienced mediator, short mediation time, and no previous mediation attempts; the worst case is the exact opposite. It is interesting to note that the effect of time is much more dramatic in the best case than in the worst case. In other words, in the absence of an experienced mediator and directive mediation, probability of successful management does not diminish much over time.

Conclusion

There are several interesting policy implications to be gained from these results. These findings can help guide mediation efforts. Mediators should be experienced and should employ directives strategies. Policymakers should be wary of multiple mediation attempts by the same person. Mediation efforts that go on for an inordinate length of time (e.g., more than a year) are less likely to succeed. The policy implications are quite clear: mediation as a voluntary process of conflict management should be initiated, suggested, offered, or requested along these lines. Failure to do so will merely compound the difficulties of conflict management.

Internationalized ethnic conflicts are generally acknowledged as the most difficult and complex conflicts to manage. Yet these conflicts too can be deescalated, or be made less violent, especially if the right form of conflict management is chosen. This paper suggests that mediation is one of the most appropriate methods to deal with internationalized ethnic conflicts. Mediation is a dynamic and reciprocal form of social interaction. It is affected by numerous factors and conditions. Here we have tried to identify some of these variables and gauge their impact on the process and consequences of mediation.

This empirical analysis, using an original data set on conflicts and their mediation, demonstrates the conditions under which mediation may be effective in internationalized ethnic conflicts. The results suggest that both scholars and practitioners should pay more attention to a traditional instrument of diplomacy that has worked well for many years—the practice of mediation. In particular, mediators who employ directive strategies, have the requisite international experience and standing, and have the opportunity to initiate mediation fairly early in the process, stand a much higher chance of producing a successful outcome. This is sound policy advice that all those engaged in conflict resolution would do well to heed.

Notes

1. See M. Sollenberg and P. Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, 4 (2001): 629–644.

2. For this approach, see A. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," in M. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

3. This is reported in T. Quinn, *The Nature and Management of Ethnic Conflict* (master's thesis, University of Canterbury, 1999).

4. See D. Lake and D. Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflicts," *International Security* 21, 1 (1999): 41–75.

5. On this line of thought, see K. Rupesinghe, "The Disappearing Boundaries between Internal and External Conflicts," in K. Rupesinghe (ed.), *Internal Conflict and Governance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

6. On some of these processes, see R. Ganguly and R. Taras, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict*. (New York: Longman, 1988). Also T.R. Gurr, *People versus States* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000).

7. D. Carment, "The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflicts: Concepts, Indicators and Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, 2 (1993): 137–150.

8. See H. Miall, *The Peacemakers* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

9. R.L. Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditure 1996,* 6th ed. (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996).

10. See I.S. Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Conflicts* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).

11. C. Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20, 1 (1996): 136–175.

12. P. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

13. See S.J. Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

14. See B. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51, 3 (1997): 335–364.

15. See T.R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993); and T.R. Gurr, *People versus States.*

16. For a broader discussion of third-party roles, see S. Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982); and J. Bercovitch, *Serial Conflicts and Third Parties* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984).

17. See R.J. Fisher and L. Keashly, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, 1 (1991): 29–42.

18. For a useful review, see R.J. Fisher, "Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: A Review and an Analysis," in J.A. Vasquez et al., eds., *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

19. J. Bercovitch, J.T. Anagnoson, and D.L. Willie, "Some Contextual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, 1 (1991): 7.

20. Some of these are discussed in J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, "The Study of International Mediation" in J. Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

21. For example, see C.M. Ott, "Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases," *International Organization* 26, 4 (1972): 595–618.

22. See D. Kolb, *The Mediators* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).

23. See J. Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of Incidence, Strategies and Conditions for Successful Outcomes," *Co-operation and Conflict* 21, 2 (1986): 155–169.

24. J.A. Wall, J.B. Stark, and R.L. Standifer, "Mediation: Current Review and Theory Development," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, 3 (2001): 370–391.

25. For a discussion of these, see William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemate and Ripe Moments," *The Global Reviews of Ethnopolitics* 1, 1 (2001): 8–18.

26. For example, F. Edmead, *Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation* (London: UNITAR, 1971); and D.G. Pruitt, *Negotiation Behaviour* (New York: Academic Press, 1981).

27. F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, *International Disputes* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1971).

28. Jacob Bercovitch, "Assessing the Success of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking," *International Negotiation* 2, 2 (1997): 217–235.

29. S. Touval, *The Peace Brokers*.

30. See F. Edmead, *Analysis and Prediction.*

31. See William I. Zartman, "Explaining Oslo," in *International Negotiation* 2, 2 (1997): 57–71.

32. Ibid., page 59.

33. See Northedge and Donelan, *International Disputes,* page 146.

34. See L. Kriesberg and S. Thorson, eds. *Timing the Deescalation of International Conflicts* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991).

35. e.g., C.M. Ott, *Mediation as a Method*; J.Z. Rubin, ed., *Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1981); C.W. Moore, *The Mediation Process* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1986); and D.G. Pruitt, *Negotiation Behaviour*.

36. J. Bercovitch and P. Diehl, "Conflict Management of Enduring Rivalries," *International Interaction* 22, 3 (1997): 299–320.

37. J. Bercovitch and J. Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, 4 (1993): 670–691.

38. For a discussion of strategies, see J. Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," in J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin, eds., *Mediation*

in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

39. D. Kolb, *The Mediators,* p. 249.

40. See J. Bercovitch, *The Structure and Diversity of Mediation*.

41. See B. Sheppard, "Third Party Conflict Intervention," in B.M. Staw and L. Cummings, eds., *Research in Organizational Behavior* (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1984).

42. See S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, "Mediation in Theory," in S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985).

43. See J. Bercovitch, *The Structure and Diversity of Mediation*, pgs. 17–18. See also J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, "Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behavior on the Success of Mediation in International Relations," *International Journal of Conflict Management* 4, 3 (1993): 297–321.

44. See O. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).

45. See, for example, J. Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).

46. See Brian Muldoon, *The Heart of Conflict* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,1996).

47. S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, "Mediation in Theory."

48. See the results in J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, "Influence of Mediator Characteristics."

49. J. Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of Incidence, Strategies and Conditions for Successful Outcomes," *Co-operation and Conflict* 21, 2 (1986): 155–169.

50. See P. Carnevale and R. Pegnetter, "The Selection of Mediation Tactics in Public Sector Disputes: A Contingency Analysis," *Journal of Social Issues* 41, 1 (1985): 65–81.

51. See T.A. Kochan and T. Jick, "A Theory of Public Sector Mediation Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, 2 (1978): 209–240.

52. J. Pearson, N. Thoennes, and L. Vanderkooi, "The Decision to Mediate: Profiles of Individuals Who Accept and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues," *Journal of Divorce* 6, 1 (1982): 17–34.

53. J. Burton and F. Dukes, *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

54. See S. Grebe, "Building on Structured Mediation: An Integrated Model for Global Mediation of Separation and Divorce," *Mediation Quarterly* 12, 1 (1990): 15–35.

55. See L. G. Stenelo, *Mediation in International Negotiations* (Malmo, Sweden: Studentlitteratur, 1972).

56. For support of this, see J. Pearson and N. Thoennes, "A Preliminary Portrait of Client

Reactions to Three Court Mediation Programs," *Mediation Quarterly* 1, 1 (1984): 21–40; J.A. Roehl and R.F. Cook, "Issues in Mediation: Rhetoric and Reality Revisited," *Journal of Social Issues* 41, 2 (1985): 161–178; N.A. Thoennes and J. Pearson, "Predicting Outcomes in Divorce Mediation: The Influence of People and Processes," *Journal of Social Issues* 41, 1 (1985): 115–126.

57. Missing data on several variables reduces our sample size to 869. DUR and TIME are highly correlated (r =.79). Dropping TIME from the model changes the results very little. A variable coded as 1, which denoted conflicts involving enduring rivalries, is negative and significant but changes little else in the results.

58. See E.B. Haas, *Why We Still Need the United Nations.* Policy paper no. 26 (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1986).

59. See F. Edmead, *Analysis and Prediction*.

60. See M. Doyle and N. Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94, 4 (2000): 779–802.