Jóhanna Kristín Birnir

ETHNICITY *and* ELECTORAL POLITICS

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Ethnicity and Electoral Politics

This book asks what distinguishes peaceful plural democracies from violent ones and what distinguishes violent ethnic groups from peaceful ones within the same democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it suggests that ethnic groups and their political demands are not inherently intransigent and that violence is not a necessary corollary of ethnic politics. The book posits that ethnic identity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for political choices, influencing party formation and development in new and maturing democracies. It furthermore argues that political intransigence and violence expressed by some ethnic groups stem from circumstances exogenous to ethnic affiliations. In particular, absolute restrictions on ethnic access to the executive produce conditions under which ethnic group incentive to participate in peaceful electoral politics is eliminated. A number of case studies and statistical analysis of all electoral democracies since 1945 are used to test and support the formal argument.

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Ethnicity and Electoral Politics

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To my boys

Contents

Tables and Figures

TABLES

FIGURES

Acknowledgments

I can trace the genesis of this book back to the Hungarians and Romanians I met while residing in a small village in Covasna, Romania, in 1992, or perhaps even further to the Catalans I befriended and my Basque teacher in Spain in the late 1980s. This work has been a great journey of discovery, and the highlights are the people I met in the process who helped shape and enhance this project. I owe my greatest intellectual debt to my mentor and good friend Barbara Geddes. Carrying on the tradition, she taught me to discern the "attractors" in the chaotic system of electoral politics. Long after her mentoring responsibilities have ceased I still rely on her sage insights about politics, professional and personal.

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1

Introduction

The Ethnic Effect

Strange Attractors

And ourselves, fluttering toward and away in a pattern that,
given enough
Dimensions and point-of-view,
Anyone living there could plainly see –
Dance and story, advance, retreat,
A human chaos that some slight
Early difference altered irretrievably?

Chapman and Sprott, *Images of a Complex World: The Art and Poetry of Chaos*

After completing field research in Ecuador in 1998 I traveled around the country sightseeing. Returning one afternoon from a visit to the beautiful Presidential Palace in the old part of Quito, I narrowly escaped indigenous demonstrations turned violent. The protests in the summer of 1998 marked the culmination of events that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when indigenous communities throughout Ecuador were organizing strikes, roadblocks, land seizures, occupation of buildings, and other demonstrations. Autochthonous protests led to the ousting of two Ecuadorian presidents, Jamil Mahuad in January 2000 and Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005. The relationship between the state and indigenous groups remains strained, although some improvements are notable (Birnir, 2004-a).

Two years later in Bolivia I observed a similar, if more strained, relationship between indigenous leaders and the political elite of the country. My interviewees were uniformly concerned, with good reason, about

deteriorating ethnic relations in the country. Recent reports of ethnic violence in Bolivia include the lynching of a mayor associated with a nonethnic party in the town of Ayo Ayo by several members of indigenous groups. The Indians allegedly were incited by a political speech made by recently elected president Evo Morales, the leader of Movimiento al Socialismo, an indigenous party that finished second in the 2002 legislative elections (United Press International, 2004, June 16; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007). This violence followed years of unrest involving, for instance, indigenous blockades and the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003.

My experiences in Ecuador and Bolivia resonate with the common image of ethnic politics, which has been influenced by the recent ethnic violence in Bosnia and communal violence in India.[1] These observations reinforce the conventional wisdom that ethnic politics cause serious problems for aspiring and maturing democracies. The academic literature also generally supports the notion of ethnicity as a destabilizing influence, such that ethnic political expression is considered intransigent and not conducive to the political compromise necessary for the healthy development of stable political systems.[2]

There are many countries, however, where the conventional view that ethnicity is destabilizing is rebutted. In parts of 1992, 1996, and 1997 I lived in Romania and spent some time in Covasna, which has the second largest Hungarian population of all Romanian counties. My interviews with political activists as well as other Romanians clearly revealed tension, and abundant stereotyping, between the Romanian and Hungarian communities. These two communities split on many fundamental issues, such as language and religion. At times this disagreement resulted in violence. Nevertheless, my overwhelming impression was that on a day-to-day basis, contrary to being an explosive mixture, these two communities

[1] Clearly the problems differ in terms of both the ethnic violence and the effects on the political system. In Bosnia, intransigent ethnic postures are not thought to be conducive to the democratic nation building currently under way. India, in turn, is a long-standing democracy. Nevertheless, ethnic violence is considered by many to be potentially detrimental to that system. For example, in their summary of the findings about India of the Fundamentalist Project, Almond and associates (2003) note, "In contemporary India the [then] governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), dominated by militant Hindu ethnoreligious movements, has been accused of seeking to eliminate secular pluralism" (p. 131). The authors also point out that because the BJP has been forced to appeal to secular and non-Hindu groups, the language and actions of party leaders are a curious mixture of conciliation toward secular groups and other religious groups and Hindu nationalism/religious fundamentalism (p. 136–140).

[2] See, for example, Rustow, 1970; Dahl, 1971; Geertz, 1973; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985, 1994; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Reilly, 2001.

did a remarkably good job of coexisting and interacting. In fact, I left Romania with the thought that perhaps ethnic political mobilization aided democratic development. Ethnic party constituencies were committed to democratic values but flexible about the political expressions of their parties. Neither the party of the Hungarian minority in Romania nor the party of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria has engaged in sustained organized violence. Rather, both parties are integral to peaceful political life in their respective countries, participating in both government coalitions and opposition alliances.

These observations about the different recent histories of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Romania naturally raise the question of why some ethnic parties are successfully incorporated into stable political life while others engage in escalating violence with other groups in society. One seemingly obvious answer is racism toward indigenous groups. Ethnic groups in Ecuador and Bolivia are racially distinct from the ruling elite (though there is also significant racial mixing in both countries). One would, however, be hard pressed to distinguish ethnic Hungarians from ethnic Romanians and ethnic Turks from ethnic Bulgarians on features alone.

The case of Spain, and the markedly different histories of the Basques and Catalans, would suggest that the answer is not that simple. In the late 1980s I spent two summers in Spain studying, with the second summer paid for by a foreign student grant from the Spanish government. While the whole experience was wonderful, I later wondered whether the grants were intended to counteract the negative image of Spain as a less-than-safe destination, as the early 1980s marked the height of Basque terrorism. Studying and later traveling around Europe I met many Basques whom I could not distinguish from ethnic Spaniards. Furthermore, a larger ethnic group, the Catalans, are peacefully integrated into Spanish national politics.

What then do ethnic groups in Ecuador and Bolivia and Basques in Spain have in common that distinguishes them from ethnic groups in Romania and Bulgaria and Catalans in Spain? According to the present understanding of ethnicity, race is only one of the features around which ethnic groups coalesce. Building on the current understanding of ethnicity as constructed and fluid,[3] the definition used in this book is deduced from social identity theory, which stipulates that any group is defined in relation

[3] See, for instance, Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 1992; Laitin, 1998; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005. Some cite Horowitz's definition of ethnicity as primordial. My reading of Horowitz, however, is that while he considers ethnicity to contain primordial elements, he also considers it to contain constructed elements. Therefore, I believe he belongs in the latter category rather than the former.

to other groups. In contrast to organization by voluntary associations such as unions of blue-collar workers, I argue along the lines of Posner (2005) that ethnicity is organized around characteristics that are either impossible to change, such as color of skin, or very difficult to change, such as primary language. Thus, a group of people sharing a characteristic that is difficult or impossible to change define themselves as *ethnic* in contrast to other ethnic groups in society, or in contrast to a dominant group that does not define itself in ethnic terms.[4] This identification is fluid, as it may change over time or the importance of the ethnic group identification may become secondary to some other group identification in a person's repertoire of identities.

The political conditions under which ethnic groups conduct their affairs vary greatly. The most basic distinction is that between authoritarian and democratic regimes. By definition, in democracies ethnic groups ideally participate along with other social groups in producing the inputs that direct the governance of the country. The involvement of ethnic groups in authoritarian politics theoretically is less predictable. Ethnic groups may hold the reins of power to the exclusion of other groups, they may be excluded completely from governance, or they may share in the governance of the country with other social groups. For a systematic comparison of expected ethnic involvement in politics and possible deviations therefrom, democracies therefore provide the more straightforward domain for the study of ethnic politics in this book.

Normatively, democracies also are preferred political structures in contemporary migratory societies because democracies allow for a greater variety of interest representation than do authoritarian regimes.[5] Furthermore, recent democratic transitions strongly suggest that democracy is arguably the political wave of the future. If these impressions are correct, it is increasingly important to understand the true effect of ethnicity on democratic sustainability. Consequently, the politics that are the subject of this book are democratic politics. By *democracy*, I refer to a political

[4] Throughout the book I refer to the majority group as nonethnic. I do not mean to imply that majorities have no ethnicity, only that ethnicity is generally not the primary or even one of the principal identities around which organization takes place. Even in countries such as South Africa where prior to democratization the majority black identity consolidated in face of apartheid, this racially based identity is now cross cut by multiple identities some of which are ethnic but organized around characteristics other than race.

[5] As Kymlicka (2001) points out, democracies differ greatly in their "liberalism" with respect to minority rights. Nonetheless, it seems safe to assume that minority rights are better protected in democracies because they allow minority groups on average greater input in governance than do authoritarian regimes, where no particular groups are necessarily involved in governance.

system where all members of society are allowed to participate freely and where elections are considered free and fair.[6]

Political identities such as ethnic identities that influence the functions of democracies do not, however, emerge from thin air. Indeed, consolidating ethnic identity has often become a form of resistance to the dominant authoritarian regime. Evidence from Western Europe since before the development of contemporary democracies certainly suggests that distinct ethnic identities develop despite institutional incentives to assimilate.[7] Current history supports this idea as well. For instance, Franco's attempts to suppress the national characteristics of both the Basque and the Catalan nations backfired and fomented ethnic nationalism in Spain. Similarly, young Turks in Bulgaria paid little attention to their cultural heritage until the community was confronted with communist state policies of assimilation.

Since Franco and communism, however, both Spain and Bulgaria have re-democratized, providing ethnic groups in both countries with the option of participating in electoral politics. But while Spain has experienced sustained ethnic violence perpetrated by Basque nationalists, in Bulgaria, the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) has been in and out of government and even cooperated with the successor party of the communist regime. The same holds true in neighboring Romania, where the Hungarian Democratic Forum (UDMR) was an integral part of the coalition government from 1996 to 2000, struck a deal with the Social Democratic Party (PSD) to support the government in return for political concessions following the 2000 election,[8] and joined the governing coalition following the 2004 election. The question I ask, therefore, is, What distinguishes peaceful plural democracies from violent ones?

To complicate matters further, not all ethnic groups in Spain are violent. Whereas the Basques have engaged in violence, the Catalans are a model

[6] In addition, the country must have universal suffrage without significant restrictions such as literacy requirements. The reason for this last criterion is that the very ethnic populations that are the subject of interest here often have been excluded from democratic participation through a variety of suffrage requirements. For a more detailed definition of democracy, see Appendix B.

[7] In fact, these identities may become stronger when faced with attempted assimilation. According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the center-periphery (ethnic) cleavage developed in opposition to nation building by the center before the extension of suffrage.

[8] See Chapter Six for further discussion of the UDMR in government. The concessions concern the appointment of ethnic Hungarian deputy prefects in counties with large Hungarian minorities, and a new local public administration law that grants minorities the right to use their mother tongue in contacts with authorities and to post bilingual street signs.

of peaceful political maneuverability, moving in and out of government coalitions. What, then, distinguishes violent ethnic groups from peaceful ones within the same democracy?

In attempting to answer these questions, it becomes evident that while cleavage has received considerable attention in the ethnic conflict literature, the role of ethnicity is largely absent from studies of parties, voting behavior, and legislative behavior. We know very little about how members of ethnic groups vote and why and how their votes shape democratic party systems. Nor do we know much about ethnic legislative politics in the aftermath of elections. For instance, under what conditions are ethnic groups included in governments, and what are the effects of inclusion or exclusion in the legislature?

No single account can comprehensively explain the outcome of ethnic politics.[9] I do not attempt such a comprehensive explanation. Rather, my objective is to theorize about the nature of ethnic political participation once democracies have been established procedurally and to highlight some incentive structures that systematically influence this participation. Under the right circumstances, these incentive structures contribute to the peaceful integration of ethnic groups into national politics. Indeed, my research reveals that ethnic politics have the potential to help stabilize new democracies by jump-starting party system stabilization. Whether ethnic groups become a stabilizing or a destabilizing influence in maturing democracies is in part, I suggest, a function of ethnic group access to government. Thus, circumstances unfavorable to democratic development may push all political participants toward intransigence that subsequently spirals into violence. The auxiliary components that contribute to peaceful or violent ethnic participation are numerous. Here is one example: Before they can gain political access, ethnic groups must either mobilize and field political parties that receive significant support within the ethnic population or support a mainstream party that represents their interests.[10] Therefore, lack of mobilization among ethnic groups may

[9] For instance, Yashar (1999) and Van Cott (2005) point out that in any analysis of institutional effects on ethnic party formation, Latin America must be embedded in a contextual analysis of indigenous politicization. Yashar (1999) argues that in Latin America, ethnic identity historically has been weakly politicized, and that expecting democratic consolidation simply as a result of institutional developments is naïve.

[10] Mobilization itself is a complex issue. The social movement literature holds that political mobilization, or organization of groups for political ends, depends on internal characteristics of the group, such as ability to mobilize resources and elite cohesion (Kitschelt, 1986). Other determinants include the structure of political opportunity that affects people's expectations about success, including such variables as state capacity

temporarily insulate party systems from ethnic unrest despite lack of access to government by those groups. Ethnic groups in many parts of the world, such as the former Soviet republics, are currently undergoing a demographic transformation,[11] and many still live under authoritarian regimes.[12] However, my research indicates that once these groups consolidate their minority group identity and are able to mobilize under increasingly democratic conditions, the best way to ensure they operate peacefully is to promote their access to government.

THE ARGUMENT AND IMPLICATIONS

This book does not, however, address the conditions for ethnic mobilization mentioned or the question of why countries adopt particular democratic institutional structures. While these are fascinating topics of inquiry, they are outside the scope of this study.[13] The purpose of this project is to cast some light on the effect of ethnic politics once democracy is established procedurally. The first task is to examine the foundations of current assumptions of ethnicity in politics and to construct some arguments about ethnic groups' electoral participation that allow for the flexible expression of ethnic group affiliation in electoral and legislative politics demonstrated by many of the ethnic groups mentioned. Further, and contrary to conventional wisdom, I suggest that ethnic groups and their political demands are not inherently intransigent and that violence is

for repression and political access points (Brockett, 1991; Tarrow, 1994) and permissive electoral institutions. In addition, the literature that speaks exclusively to ethnic mobilization holds that ethnic cleavages are not automatically politicized, but rather that ethnic groups overcome their collective action problem and mobilize strategically in response to exogenous conditions (Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 1992).

[11] For example, though migration of ethnic Russians to Russia has slowed since its peak in 1994, the numbers returning each year are still significant (Heleniak, 2003).

[12] According to Roeder (1994), most governments of the former Soviet Union had by 1994 reverted to authoritarian forms. Authoritarian governments by definition exclude other groups from access to politics. It is also possible that the system promoted in the Soviet Union, where in addition to the Russian minority local ethnic majorities were favored in administration and other state enterprises (Roeder, 1991; Laitin, 1998), hampers current Russian minority access to government in the republics. In other words, the local ethnic majority might not be willing to share power with the Russian minority any longer now that it is not centrally obliged to do so. Furthermore, because the local majority is already entrenched in all principal administrative positions, the Russian minority may have little recourse.

[13] The question of how groups mobilize is an interesting topic that is the subject of s other recent studies, for example, Van Cott (2005).

not a necessary corollary of ethnic politics.[14] Instead, I will show that ethnic groups and other factions become intransigent in response to political situations where access to government is limited. Consequently, it is possible that in Spain and Sri Lanka, for instance, the political intransigence and violence expressed by some ethnic groups stem from circumstances exogenous to ethnic affiliations.

My argument is based on the premise that all voters use information available to them to make vote choices. Socialization theory, rational choice theory, political psychology, and game theory all lead one to believe that ethnicity is a particularly salient cue. Moreover, ethnic group affiliation generally persists despite authoritarian efforts to assimilate the minority. Ethnic identities are passed on through families via language and culture, which are difficult to regulate. Therefore, under authoritarian regimes ethnic minorities already have a developed form of group loyalty.

Furthermore, while minority identity and dominant identity sometimes crystallize in contrast to each other under authoritarian regimes, democratic political competition deemphasizes majority ethnic identity by taking it as a given and subjecting the dominant group to a multitude of cross pressures. Cleavages that commonly cross cut[15] the majority population include, for example, nationalistic or global identifications, and conservative or liberal economic and social identities. Dominant group identity in many contemporary East European democracies, for example, also developed in response to external repression, for which the dominant group rightly or wrongly believed the minority was partially responsible.[16] During democratization, however, the dominant groups were subject to a multitude of cross-pressures in political competition, whereas general dominant identity rights were a given in the construction of the nation. Thus, dominant groups did not have a single issue on which to unite. This is true even in countries such as Romania where nationalism is a stable political expression. Nationalism was less prominent politically during democratization than it is now, and even now the majority of the dominant

[14] According to Glazer and Moynihan (1975), the ethnic group is defined in terms of interest as an interest group implying no inherent intransigence.

[15] For a definition and discussion of the effects of cross-cutting cleavages see, for instance, Lijphart (1977).

[16] According to Kymlicka (2002), "Dominant groups throughout [Eastern Europe] feel they have been victimized by their minorities acting in collaboration with foreign enemies" (p. 20).

group does not identify with or support nationalistic political parties. In contrast, during democratic transition ethnic minorities operated under political conditions that did not take their minority identity–related objectives as given (while these groups also may have been subjected to a multitude of cross-pressures).[17] As countries have democratized, it consequently has been easier to translate ethnic group loyalties into stable party loyalties than to create new party loyalties among the uncommitted majority of voters.

The central proposition in this book is therefore that *ethnic identity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for political choices*, influencing party formation and development in new and maturing democracies. This is a novel argument in the literature on ethnic politics and serves as a unifying element that systematically explains disparate empirical observations of ethnic politics in democracies.[18] Where ethnic groups are numerous and mobilized and are allowed full participation in democratic electoral politics, they can be expected to field or support parties that represent ethnic interests from the very first election. Furthermore, because of the informational function of the group, ethnic group members are expected to vote consistently for the party that they know represents their policy interests. Consequently, under conditions of limited information in new democracies, one would expect unrestricted ethnic party formation and voting to stabilize party system development in the short term. This prediction is particularly significant in the context of current theories, as it suggests that ethnic diversity mediates some of the expected political turbulence associated with the transition to democracy (Przeworski, 1991).

If ethnic groups are allowed continued participation in electoral politics and are, over time, able to access all levels of government to represent the interests of their ethnic constituency in negotiations over policy, the overall effect on democratic regime development in the long term also is expected to be stabilizing. The mechanism by which access to governing

[17] As Kymlicka (2001) points out, the extent of ethnic minority rights differs between states. Nowhere, however, in the governance of the central state are minority rights at all times equal to the majority right; nor are all plurality rights equal at any one time. This is even true of consociational democracies (Lijphart, 1999), where minority groups may rotate the executive systematically between groups. In cases where all groups are plurality groups rather than minorities it is also likely that maintaining the rights of each ethnicity serves as a unifying cause for the group.

[18] This includes observations made by Fearon and Laitin (1996), Rothchild (1997), and Wilkinson (2004).

coalitions may have a moderating effect on ethnic groups, while exclusion may contribute to increasing intransigence, is straightforward: Political actors pursue political goals. In legislative politics, the ultimate goal for both politicians and their constituencies is access to government.[19] In government, groups can bargain over office-related goods and policies proposed by their coalition partners and get some of their own policy objectives passed. Therefore, groups are best able to influence policy within a governing coalition, when aligned[20] with the government,or through sufficient representation in the legislature such that their demands cannot be ignored.

For convenient shorthand, this argument of *stable but flexible ethnic information shortcuts* will be referred to as the argument of *Ethnic Attractors* in the remainder of the book. The reason for the choice of terminology is the image it conjures of ethnicity as the *Strange Attractor* in the "chaotic system" of electoral choice in new and maturing democracies. Thus the Ethnic Attractor produces a long-term pattern through the association of ethnic voters who are enticed to rely on fellow group members for electoral cues. Even so, such shortcuts do not imply any particular political predisposition of any group member or the group as a whole. For this reason, ethnic groups are cohesive or stable but inherently flexible electorates. In the short term, cohesion dominates ethnic group behavior. In the long term, flexibility becomes the norm, as the group responds cohesively to exogenous influences.

Notably nothing in the argument of Ethnic Attractors would predict the ethnic electoral instability and violence that frequently capture our attention in such places as Bolivia and India. Rather, operating under the assumption that democracies provide widespread representation to groups, Ethnic Attractors leads to the belief that electoral instability and violence in ethnic politics are curious anomalies that bear further scrutiny. This is a significant departure from previous scholarship, which scrutinizes the characteristics of the group to discern kernels of violence within the ethnic makeup. To the contrary, the argument of Ethnic Attractors prompts an examination of the conditions that prevent ethnic groups from fulfilling their peaceful political potential.

[19] For further discussion of why politicians and constituencies prefer access to government rather than simple reelection to the legislature see Chapter Two. In short, this argument follows the lead of Cox (1997).

[20] Chapter Six discusses how formal participation in a government coalition is not a necessary condition as political bargaining may take place informally.

I argue that absolute restrictions on ethnic access to the executive produce conditions under which ethnic group incentive to participate in peaceful electoral politics is eliminated. If an ethnic group permanently occupies a position of opposition so that its demands are never up for discussion, members of the group have less incentive to moderate their demands. Similarly, if the ruling group is never forced to cooperate with the ethnic group, members of the ruling group also have little reason to moderate their opposition to the demands of the ethnic group. In turn, a perpetually adversarial political relationship between the ethnic group and the ruling group is more likely to spiral into intransigence and even violence than when there is cooperation.

Furthermore, I argue that as long as ethnic political factions are represented in legislatures, it is size relative to other parties in the legislature that matters more to their inclusion in government coalitions than the level of violence with which they are associated.[21] For instance, the sustained violence carried out by the Spanish terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA or Basque Homeland and Liberty) did not prevent the conservative and historically nationalist Partido Popular (PP) from appealing to the Partido Nacional Vasco (PNV) to join it in a coalition government from 1996 to 2000. The reason the PP appealed to the PNV in 1996 was simple – it needed a few additional seats for an absolute majority in the legislature, and the PNV was one of only two remaining potential partners.[22]

If these hypotheses that stable but flexible ethnic participation in politics lead to stability in the party system and the accompanying suggestions about the importance of political access are correct, then the implications for assessing the effect of ethnicity on democratic politics are significant. Because of the traditional emphasis on ethnic intransigence and its destabilizing influence on democracy, scholars have thus far focused on remedies

[21] As Chapter Six discusses, size is not the only component of a party's calculations when choosing coalition partners. For instance, parties generally sidestep potential coalition partners whose platform and ideology are very different in favor of parties whose platform and ideology resemble their own. The point here is that if the opposing party is the correct size for the completion of a minimum winning coalition, the government party may not be able to sidestep the party even if it would like to do so. In that case, violence is less important than fit in that the governing party will overlook a history of violence to obtain the support of the violent party in parliament. Furthermore, as I discuss in Chapter Six, external influences may be important to the choice of coalition partners, particularly in new democracies that seek membership in transnational organizations such as NATO and the EU.

[22] Eventually, the PNV declined to create a formal coalition but did support the PP throughout its tenure in the legislature in exchange for some significant concessions, including increased fiscal autonomy.

that depoliticize ethnicity. To this end, Horowitz (1990-a) suggests electoral reform that forces politicians to appeal to all ethnic groups in a district in order to be elected. I argue that deemphasizing ethnicity is not necessary for the peaceful inclusion of ethnic groups in national politics. Lijphart (1977), in turn, suggests removing the source of ethnic conflict through elite bargaining about the power sharing mechanism of consociationalism. These are grand coalitions, which include political leaders of all significant segments of a plural society, mutual vetoes, proportionality, and a high degree of autonomy. While the grand coalition idea is highly compatible with the propositions about the importance of access to government that are made here, I argue that resolving political conflict through elite bargaining is not a necessary condition for the peaceful inclusion of ethnic groups in national politics. Furthermore, it is not clear that a "grand coalition" must necessarily comprise distinct parties. Perhaps the objective of ethnic access is as well served in broad based parties that represent a variety of ethnic interests.

While this project does not attempt to resolve the issue of what types of institutional structures would best allow political access to ethnic groups, certain speculations emerge from the analysis. For instance, Lijphart himself does not specify which parts of consociationalism are essential or whether all are necessary for cooperation in a plural society. Numerous anecdotes, however, suggest that some parts of this mechanism are indeed significantly more important than others. For example, Lijphart considers autonomy particularly useful in depoliticizing ethnic conflict. More specifically, if distinct groups are given significant autonomy to run their own affairs in the areas that formerly caused conflict, the source of the conflict is removed. Examples of this are the desire of the Hungarian minority in Romania to establish schools in which Hungarian is the language of instruction and the government's first concession of a Hungarian university.[23] However, the case of the Basque nation shows that autonomy by itself does not sufficiently pacify disgruntled ethnic minorities.[24]

[23] On September 11, 1999, the Reformed Church bishop Laszló Tökés inaugurated the Partium Christian University for ethnic Hungarians in Oradea. Private donations and the Hungarian government fund the university. The Romanian government was not officially involved in the opening (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1999).

[24] Alemán and Treisman (2005) do in fact suggest that federalism is not a particularly good remedy for ethnic violence. It is also important to note that while the majority of Basques do not engage in violence, members of ETA are not the only Basques who desire extended autonomy. For instance, in October 2003 the Basque regional premier, Juan

The existence of a multitude of ethnic groups living peacefully in countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia without mutual vetoes seems to indicate that these are not a necessary condition for peaceful coexistence either. It does, however, appear that in every country where large, politically salient ethnic groups peacefully coexist, these ethnic groups have at one point or another been included in government coalitions. While democratic electoral rules in Spain and other countries plagued by ethnic violence, such as Sri Lanka, formally provide electoral access for all groups in society, closer examination reveals that these nations do not provide full political access to all of their ethnic groups in the legislature. One of the principal differences between the nonviolent ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Romania, and Catalans in Spain, versus the violent Basques in Spain and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, is political access. Therefore, perhaps a variant of the grand coalition is indeed helpful in maintaining democratic peace.

Because these and other theories of ethnic politics so far simply have assumed that ethnic groups are intransigent, the impact of flexible ethnic participation in politics is mostly uncharted.[25] If ethnic groups in and of themselves are not inherently intransigent and access to government promotes political moderation, the implications are considerable, as this would decrease incentives for governments to attempt to depoliticize ethnic national identity. Thus, the value of finding an institutional structure where ethnic minorities are incorporated into the central government becomes increasingly clear.

In challenging assumptions of ethnic intransigence, this book develops systematic hypotheses about ethnic groups as flexible political actors and their effect on democratic party system development as constrained by

José Ibarretxe, formally proposed converting the Basque region into a "free associate" of Spain (Tremlett, 2003).

[25] Literature that does not assume ethnic intransigence is beginning to emerge. For instance, Chandra (2004) discusses the determinants of ethnic party success. In short, she argues that access to patronage as limited by the electoral system determines successful ethnic recruitment. Rather than predicting a deterministic pattern of electoral competition, however, she holds that ethnic groups redefine themselves in response to access barriers. Similarly, Wilkinson (2004) argues that where local electoral competition is significant, elite parties within ethnic groups use polarizing antiminority events to encourage members of their wider ethnic category to identify with their party and the majority ethnicity rather than a party identified with economic redistribution or some ideological agenda. Posner (2005), in turn, shows how ethnic groups flexibly redefine themselves in electoral competition in response to institutional structures.

institutions. Parties are important because they provide legislative representation at all stages of the game, policy expertise, and accessible political information to their constituencies in democracies.[26] In turn, voters voice their political preferences through support for parties, votes, and other means. As long as party system development facilitates such representation of the electorate without barring emerging interests from entry into the system or barring their access to government over time, increasing stabilization of parties supports peaceful democratic development. However, a fixed party system[27] that prevents ethnic or other group political access

[26] Beginning with Tocqueville, a number of scholars have argued that parties contribute to the proper functioning of democracy and that a decline in voters' trust in parties is detrimental to democratic development. See, for instance, Schattschneider, 1960; Duverger, 1954; Crozier and colleagues, 1975; Sartori, 1976; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; and Lipset, 2000. For a discussion of dealignment and studies of dealignment in industrial democracies see Pharr and associates (2000). Others disagree that parties matter because, for instance, dealignment in industrial democracies has not had much effect on governance. For an overview of the debate regarding the importance of modern American political parties see, for example, Aldrich (1995) and Milkis (1999). Some even argue that parties are the root of evil. Michels (1958), for instance, declared that the nature of party organizations foreordains their oligarchy, and others since have decried parties as the source of intransigence and even repression. Scholars who examine countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America also note that in these regions parties were for a long time synonymous with political repression; see, for instance, Power (1997) and Rose and Mishler (1998). Parties in democratic settings are also debated extensively. Contributing to the debate on dealignment, along the lines of Katz and Mair (1995), the *Economist* asks whether we should worry about the fact that, despite their supposed decline, parties still "retain an iron grip on politics? If they [are unanchored], will they not fall prey to special-interest groups? If they rely on state funding instead of member contributions, will they not turn into creatures of the state?" ("The role of political parties," 1999). Similarly, many proponents of direct democracy do not hold party representation in high esteem. For a good overview of this debate, particularly the early American and current debates, see Scarrow (1999-a) and Scarrow (1999-b).

[27] A fixed system implies a party system where the barriers to the entry of new parties are sufficiently high that new parties cannot enter the system despite the support of emerging societal interests such as newly mobilizing ethnic groups. Such barriers may result, for instance, from Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) "freezing" of societal cleavages into highly stable relationships between particular parties and dominant segments of society that preclude emerging interests from amassing enough voter support for separate representation in the legislature (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). An alternative explanation for this type of excessive party stability (which may be accompanied by voting instability) is simply that the institutional barriers to the entry of new parties into the system are sufficiently high that they effectively keep out new parties (Birnir, 2004-a, 2005). Whether frozen cleavages or high institutional barriers explain the excessive stability, it is troubling because of its potentially destabilizing effects on democracy in the long run, if emerging interests either continually migrate from one existing unresponsive party to another (Madrid, 2005) or seek extralegal means for representation. Before its recent party system disintegration, Venezuela, for instance, was frequently criticized for party

through routine democratic means contributes to party system instability, deterioration of democracy, and even ethnic violence. The precise degree of party system stability that is most beneficial to democracy, and the point at which voter allegiances to parties become detrimentally fixed, is an empirical question that no one has yet answered. The following analysis accepts that moderately stable relationships between voters and parties are beneficial to the healthy development of democracy, while fixed relationships are detrimental.

Institutional structures that fix party developments around the smallest of cleavages are not necessarily any more conducive to regime survival in the long term than structures that support larger, more inclusive parties. To the contrary, effective governance in party systems that develop around minor cleavages and do not respond to changing aggregation of interests is likely hampered. Thus, it is possible that promoting fragmentation in the party system early on through permissive institutional structures is detrimental to regime stability in the long term.

Moreover, it is not evident that ethnic representation must occur through explicitly ethnic parties. Indeed, channeling the ethnic vote through small ethnic parties may in the long term be a "second best" solution for two reasons. First, excessive legislative fractionalization may impede successful coalition building and hamper governance. Furthermore, larger parties may on average have greater access to democratic government. In the long run, therefore, ethnic representation might be better ensured through larger, nonethnic parties.

If early fractionalization of the party system in the short term is a second best option for long-term democratic stability because the probability of access increases along with group size, institutions that encourage parties to reach across ethnic boundaries might better support long-term peace. The electoral system has received considerable attention as a tool to deemphasize ethnic politicization (Horowitz, 1990-a; Reilly, 2001). But other options become evident when the assumption of intransigence is removed, such as institutions that allow group expression of group interests within a programmatic context where ethnic demands are only one of the relevant policy issues. The standing orders of the Romanian legislature are a good example of minority party support as they allow the unification of

rigidity. In that system the growing public concerns over unemployment, rising consumer prices, and rampant corruption were barred from entering the legislative dialogue. This may have contributed to the election of a populist who promised to destabilize the party system fundamentally by circumventing the legislature to address these concerns (Ellner, 2000).

different minority groups into a single parliamentary group. Parliamentary groups, in turn, are the organizational unit for allocation of funds for logistical support and are important for legislative purposes.[28] In short, once the assumption of inherent ethnic intransigence is eliminated, a multitude of institutional alternatives become clear, as does importance of the nuanced interaction between institutions and the demographic attributes of the group relative to the rest of the country.[29]

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The methodological approach used here is what David Laitin has called tripartite (2002, 2003), combining formal theory, statistical analysis, and analytic narratives. By combining multiple approaches and a variety of data, one obtains a fuller picture than any single approach or data source could provide. The central theory in the book is deductive in form but relies on the empirical insights I gained through many months of field research in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Building on the most basic inductive contention of this book, that ethnic voters are not inherently intransigent political actors and that modeling ethnic electoral behavior does not necessitate any special assumptions about the motivations of ethnic groups, Chapter Two develops a voting model that explains ethnic

[28] The standing orders of the Romanian chamber distinguish between minority groups and other parties (including the Hungarian party) in that other parties are not allowed to coalesce in a parliamentary group. There is no reason, however, that the idea of constructing interethnic parliamentary groups cannot be extended to multiethnic parties.

[29] For example, according to Posner (2004), group size determines both the adversarial relationship between Chewas and Tumbukas in Malawi and peaceful relations between the same two ethnic groups in Zambia. Posner argues that in Malawi the Chewas and Tumbukas are relatively large groups and thus the cleavage serves as a base for political coalition building. This, in turn, accounts for the adversarial relationship between the groups. In Zambia, however, the Chewas and Tumbukas are small groups relative to the rest of the population. Consequently, the ethnic differences are not politicized in Zambia and relations between the groups are more amicable. I would argue that a corollary of Posner's theory is that institutional design to accommodate the concerns of both groups in the two countries would have to differ. In Malawi, the objective of the institutional design would be to mediate the tension between these two groups. This could be accomplished by an institutional design that would mandate cooperation between the groups, such as Horowitz's ethnic gerrymandering or Lijphart's grand coalition. Conversely, the institutional objective in Zambia would be to ensure access to government for the Chewas and Tumbukas vis-a-vis other major groups in society. This might be accomplished with Lijphart's high district magnitude or by a combination of Horowitz's gerrymandering with ethnic quotas. In short, a single institutional solution is unlikely to serve the needs of ethnic groups everywhere.

electoral behavior in new democracies. (For a formal version of the generalized argument, see Appendix A.) The principal proposition offered is that *as a result of political socialization, membership in an ethnic group functions as a stable but flexible information cue for political choices in democracies*.

Given the frequency of ethnic political violence, the prediction of Ethnic Attractors that ethnic groups are stable and peaceful political actors is seemingly counterintuitive. Consequently, Chapter Three considers the exogenous constraints on ethnic political action under democratic conditions that may interfere with an ethnic group's ability to fulfill its peaceful potential. Assuming that representation is the principal objective of electoral politics, this discussion results in the following three testable implications: First, in new democracies, ethnic politics have a stabilizing effect on electoral politics. Second, in maturing democracies, ethnic political behavior depends on the exogenous conditions restricting representation of the group. Finally, in maturing democracies, members of *represented* ethnic groups stabilize electoral politics. Members of *unrepresented* ethnic groups, in turn, exit electoral politics, and if exit alone is not sufficient to remedy the lack of representation, they may look for alternative means to voice their political demands, including protest and violence.

The remaining chapters test these implications. In-depth case studies are layered between the aggregate statistical tests of the theory and serve to validate the aggregate inferences and further refine the testable hypotheses. Chapters Four and Five test the implication about the effect of ethnicity on short-term party system stability. Specifically, Chapter Four examines ethnic voting at the subnational level in a case study of Romania, while Chapter Five addresses the problem of inferring from a single case by analyzing electoral data from over sixty new democratic party systems in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe, Africa, and Asia since World War II to test the implications of the ethnic stability hypothesis at the national level.

Chapter Six presents three case studies, two from Eastern Europe and one from Western Europe, in order to refine the argument about the long-term effects of ethnic political participation on democratic politics. The nature of the subject, namely, ethnic political behavior in democracies, dictates the selection and form of the case studies in the book, which are national and subnational studies of European electoral and legislative behavior. The case studies in Chapter Six elaborate the mechanism for the long-term implications of the theory. Thus, the cases of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and ethnic Hungarians in Romania and the critical case of Spain

explore the causal direction between legislative access and ethnic violence. The case of Spain is critical because it holds a multitude of alternative explanations constant, such as national economics and culture, while examining why only one of two principal ethnic minorities has resorted to violence. My conclusion is that ethnic group access to government promotes moderation of all pertinent political actors, thereby supporting peaceful ethnic politics. By access to government, I mean that either the ethnic party is included as one of the parties that constitute a coalition government, the ethnic party exerts influence on a minority government, or the ethnic group is represented in government in a nonethnic party. As discussed further in Chapter Six, such access to government is important to the ethnic group primarily because it translates into influence over policymaking and government resources.

The book then goes on to conduct a unique systematic multination study of the long-term electoral effects of ethnic voting on party system stability and the effect of exclusion from government on regime stability. Chapter Seven tests the stabilizing effect of ethnic voting in the long term and the corollary implication that lack of access leads to violence. For the aggregate test of the long-term effect of access on violence, I merge the latest version of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) protest and violence indicators with original data on minority participation in government coalitions. These data include nearly seventy electorally active ethnic groups in close to forty democracies worldwide. Finally, the concluding chapter draws out the implications of the arguments and evidence presented in the book and outlines directions for future extensions of this research.

2

Ethnic Attractors

In the 2000 parliamentary election Romanian voters decimated the umbrella party that had governed the country since 1996. Many Romanian scholars considered the result a protest vote against a party bloc that had failed to carry out the reforms deemed necessary to get the country back on track.[1] In that same election, however, a partner of the coalition in the government, the Hungarian minority party, retained most of its support when returns were compared to those in the 1996 election. According to the currently popular ethnic conflict literature, the loyalties of Hungarian voters are no surprise. This literature generally holds that ethnic violence stems from the type of intransigent loyalty that motivates members of an ethnic group to support the group doggedly hrough trials and tribulations that often are far more devastating than economic decline.

In fact, however, members of ethnic groups frequently withdraw their electoral support from one political party in favor of another. For instance, German, Italian, British, and French ethnic constituencies underwent a significant realignment in the 1940 U.S. presidential election. As a result of its prewar policies, the Roosevelt administration lost much of the German and Italian constituency that had supported it strongly in the presidential election of 1936 to the Republican Party, while gaining considerable support among voters of British and French origin (Key, 1964; Gamm, 1989). More recently, and contrary to most expectations, Francophone voters in Quebec, Canada, withdrew support from Parti Québécois

[1] For a debate on this topic with contributions by many prominent Romania scholars see Tismaneanu and Kligman, eds. (2001).

in 2001, despite that party's 1998 success promoting the "ethnic issue" of secession.[2]

The assumption of ethnic intransigence renders the ethnic conflict literature unable to explain changes in ethnic electoral behavior (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Geertz, 1973; Horowitz, 1985). The machine politics literature, in turn, deals explicitly with ethnic electoral behavior and discusses change in ethnic voting. Unfortunately, however, lack of theoretical clarity regarding the processes of ethnic socialization in this literature produces expectations of vote stability that contradict empirical observations of flexible behavior of ethnic groups in electoral politics. Recently a few scholars, most notably Chandra (2004), Posner (2005), and Wilkinson (2004), have begun to question the assumption of intransigent ethnic identities and the concomitant political implications for democratic regimes, arguing instead that both the salience of ethnic identity and the actions of the ethnic leaders and members of the group are shaped by incentives created by divergent institutional structures.

The principal task of the theory of ethnic electoral behavior in this book is to contribute to the foundations of our understanding of ethnic politics by developing a more general account of ethnic group member motivations in democratic electoral politics across institutional regimes. To this end, the theory builds on the concept of ethnic socialization articulated in the machine politics literature but clarifies this idea as a process that builds individual loyalties to the group rather than a political party. I call this socialized individual ethnic identity with a focus on the group *Ethnic Attractors*, for reasons explained in the Introduction. The theory in this chapter then goes on to consider what effect the Ethnic Attractors have on democratic politics. In sum, I argue that Ethnic Attractors are information shortcuts for politics. In new democracies, Ethnic Attractors supply ethnic voters with information about political parties. As democracies mature, they contribute to stable and flexible ethnic politics as long as the group members are provided the exogenous incentive of representation.

[2] Since the 1970s, Parti Québécois, which wants the province of Quebec to secede from Canada, and the Liberals, who do not, have alternated in power in Quebec. The last referendum on secession, held in 1995, was defeated by 50,000 votes. When speaking only of Francophones, some argue that the sovereigntists would have won by a 60-40 margin (Minority Rights Group International, 1997). When the Parti Québécois retained power in the regional parliament in 1998, many predicted yet another referendum, but in 2001 the party lost all four seats contested in the by-election despite the fact that all seats were in French-speaking, largely rural areas of the province. Perhaps consequently, a recent "action plan" of the PQ then premier Landry focused on jobs, health care, and poverty, with minimal reference to the "national question" ("Quebec's troubled separatist government," 2002).

ETHNIC GROUP IDENTITY

Theories of ethnic identity have moved away from an understanding of ethnicity as primordial (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Geertz, 1973) to one of ethnicity as a more or less constructed category (Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 1992; Laitin, 1998; Chandra 2004; Posner, 2005) that is highly influenced by contextual factors and political strategies adopted by the group leaders. If this new understanding of ethnic identity is correct, why then does the development of ethnic identities transcend contextual differences to manifest strongly under as divergent political conditions as Franco's authoritarian Spain and Ceauşescu's Romania, as well as democratic Spain, Romania, Bulgaria, India, and Zambia?

One answer is that ethnic identity everywhere capitalizes on a basic human tendency to differentiate into groups to provide order and meaning to situations. Furthermore, ethnic identity is exceptionally salient for group identification because it is generally built around a characteristic such as language, location, or a physical attribute that is difficult to change. For this reason it is also easy to organize individuals into opposing groups around ethnic characteristics and very difficult to repress this form of identity, even under authoritarian political conditions. Furthermore, when liberal political conditions allow or even foster the development and sustenance of ethnic identity, ethnicity will emerge wherever this organizational principle is useful. Hence, we can expect strong ethnic identity to emerge across many different types of authoritarian and democratic institutions.

The interdisciplinary idea that people in all societies differentiate themselves into groups and that organized mobilization by group leaders draws on the underlying social groups is well established. According to social identity theory,[3] by differentiating, people seek to provide order, meaning, and social identity to situations, even where real group differences do not exist (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Once the identity has been established, individuals within the group then tend to favor their own group members and discriminate against out-group members. Similarly, though in a different field, network theory holds that social networks form the foundation for organizational activity ranging from the political to the entrepreneurial (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Hedin, 2001).

[3] For an overview of many of the important developments of social identity theory, see, for example, Robinson (1996).

There is slightly less accord regarding the core of ethnic identity. According to Chandra (2004), ethnicity is one of the many ascriptive characteristics with which one is born (p.3). If ethnic identity is only biologically inherited, however, adopted children are not members of their chosen parents' ethnic group, nor are converts to Islam or Judaism really Muslims or Jews. Posner (2005), in turn, classifies ethnicity as one of many characteristics that are very difficult and in some cases impossible to change. This seems a more appropriate anchor for the definition of ethnicity used here. Thus, I follow the lead of Posner (2005) to argue that ethnicity is organized around characteristics that are either impossible to change, such as color of skin, or very difficult to change, such as primary language, in contrast to voluntary associations such as unions of blue-collar workers.[4]

As the tendency to favor one's own in-group and discriminate against an out-group is sufficiently strong to extend to situations where the perceived differences are wholly constructed rather than real (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel and Turner, 1986),[5] it is plausible to assume that some group differentiation occurs regardless of repressive political institutions and other historical factors. According to social identity theories, we can, therefore, expect ethnic communities to develop even when formal association is restricted by the state, whenever groups perceive a common identity around which they can organize. Ethnicity is passed on through, for example, language and culture, which are difficult to regulate, and in some instances maintaining ethnic identity is even a form of resistance to the dominant regime. Evidence from Western Europe since before the development of contemporary democracies certainly suggests that separate ethnic identities develop despite institutional incentives for ethnic groups to assimilate.[6] The same can be said about contemporary Eastern Europe.

[4] Note that this definition includes racial, linguistic, and other characteristics that are often thought to be the foundation of ethnic distinction. At the same time, however, it allows for ethnic distinction in societies that, for example, are too racially mixed to distinguish groups through this criterion.

[5] I do not mean to imply that all group differences are "wholly constructed." To the contrary, the definition of ethnicity used in this analysis assumes that groups coalesce around real distinctions. The point here is simply that the tendency to differentiate is very strong, so strong, indeed, that differentiation occurs even in circumstances where group differences are constructed.

[6] According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the center-periphery (ethnic) cleavage developed in opposition to nation building by the center before the extension of suffrage. In fact, these identities may become stronger when faced with attempted assimilation, as discussed in Chapter Six.

Under Ceauşescu's authoritarian regime in Romania, for instance, associations at all levels, from boy scouts to political parties, were suppressed. Despite such attempts at forced assimilation, the regime was never able to strip people of their ethnic identity. Language and culture were passed on within families. In public settings, group identity was maintained through preferential treatment of members of the ethnic group by other members of that same group.[7] Under authoritarian conditions, in the absence of wholly voluntary associations, it is therefore likely that ethnicity will emerge as a strong organizing principle around which group members will coalesce.

Under democratic conditions, in turn, ethnic identification can be expected to emerge whenever this organizational principle is useful. For instance, Chandra (2004) argues that in patronage democracies individuals belonging to ethnic groups coalesce to support political parties on the basis of the relative size of their ethnic group. When the ethnic group is sufficiently large with respect to institutional barriers, the ethnic party succeeds. Similarly, Posner (2005) posits that people emphasize different identities within their repertoire depending on the institutional barriers that affect which type of ethnic party is most likely to succeed. More generally, the expectation in this book is that during democratic transition, ethnic group identity emerges as a practical organizing principle and persists as democracies mature wherever political competition promotes group cohesion as a means to achieve ethnic group objectives.

Identity formation is not exclusive to members of ethnic groups. Members of dominant groups may also forge a strong communal identity under exceptional circumstances, such as external threat. The difference between ethnic and dominant identity during democratization, however, is that the external impetus unifying the dominant group is eliminated or significantly reduced[8] while the ethnic group member's incentive to define herself in ethnic terms remains unchanged. Consequently, Crawford's (1996) conclusion that ethnicity was the only cleavage that was salient enough

[7] Vedery (1996) gives a "trivial" but very illustrative example of the preferential treatment given at all levels to the in-group in the Hungarian community in Transilvania during the reign of Ceauşescu. In Transilvania, shortage of hair coloring seemed particularly dire for Romanian women as Hungarian beauticians first served their "closest associates," who tended to be Hungarian (pp. 86–87).

[8] Theories of democratic peace hold that democracies rarely fight each other for normative reasons (Russett and Oneal, 2001) or for structural reasons (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). Thus, democratization likely reduces external threat.

to be mobilized early on in the new democracies of Eastern Europe is not surprising.[9]

In sum, therefore, an ethnic group is defined by members of the group who consider themselves ethnically distinct from other groups in society. Furthermore, this identification centers on a characteristic that is difficult to suppress, such as language, location, or race. This definition is minimalist in contrast to more elaborate definitions that, for the purposes of the theory building undertaken here, do not encompass sufficiently divergent groups. For instance, Young (1971) defines an ethnic group as a political and demographic minority in relation to a dominant group. In some of the countries studied in this book, however, the ethnic group is actually a demographic majority, while the politically dominant group is a minority. For example, the distinct indigenous people in Bolivia constitute a demographic majority but were until recently politically subordinate.[10] Another example is the black population in South Africa, which currently is a politically dominant demographic majority. But such cases are few.[11] Furthermore, consistently with social identity theory, ethnic distinctions among South African blacks, into groups such as the Xhosa and Zulu, have become increasingly important in national politics since the unifying element of apartheid was eliminated.[12]

[9] Crawford (1996) adapts and then applies Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) analysis of West European cleavage structure to East Europe. He examines class, rural-urban, religious, and ethnic cleavages and their development from the interwar period through the Communist era, the revolts and coups of 1989, and the first few years of democracy. He posits that rather than the traditional cleavages discussed by Lipset and Rokkan, the principal division lines in Eastern Europe today that are manifested in the party systems involve issues. As examples he mentions rapid versus slow economic reform, Eastern versus Western international outlook, communization, and personal differences among elites.

[10] Bolivian indigenous peoples are divided into several groups themselves, but are for specific political analysis treated as one group in reference to nonindigenous groups (Birnir and Van Cott, 2007).

[11] In other countries the ethnic group in question could also constitute a demographic minority but be in a politically dominant position, as is the case with the Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi and the Allawite in Syria. Of course neither Rwanda or Syria are currently democratic. The point is simply that the definition of ethnic group here encompasses groups that may be dominant or dominated, demographic majorities or minorities. Were Rwanda or Syria to democratize but maintain the current power structure (perhaps not a very likely scenario under democratic conditions as majorities tend to move into positions of power once mobilized) the minority group in power might still define itself in "ethnic" terms.

[12] Thus the empirical analysis of "ethnic groups" among the black population in South Africa in following chapters refers to the minority subgroups rather than the majority black population as a whole. In general, I make a distinction between a majority group

Furthermore, the classification used here allows for the inherent fluidity of ethnic identity that is the hallmark of current writings about ethnicity. Examples include young urban Kenyans. Tribalism is a hallmark of Kenyan society but in urban settings the second generation since colonial rule ended in 1963 has developed a common dialect, Sheng, based on a mixture of Swahili and English. These young urbanites dance to the same hip-hop beat and question tribal loyalties in favor of a national identity (Wax, 2005). Examples also include identities that have changed because of alterations of external circumstances. For instance, Estonians in Estonia before 1990 were arguably members of an "ethnic" group that defined themselves in opposition to the then dominant Russian group; today, however, most analysts would classify these two groups in Estonia in reverse. The Russians now constitute the "ethnic" group while Estonians belong to the dominant group, which politically is internally divided along several nonethnic fault lines.

ETHNICITY IN THE LITERATURE

Given the observation from social identity theory that people can be expected to differentiate into ethnic groups, the question then becomes, What effect does ethnic diversity have on democratic electoral politics? Do electoral politics in heterogeneous countries differ from those in homogeneous ones? Drawing on social identity theory, I propose that members of ethnic groups are not inherently intransigent but instead flexible political actors. This flexible political identity develops through socialization, as suggested by the machine politics literature. In contrast to the machine politics literature, however, I argue that the individual socialization that takes place aims to build loyalty to the group rather than the party.

While the machine politics literature deals with the United States at the turn of the twentieth century,[13] it is extremely relevant to new

that is internally divided into ethnic groups (such as the black Xhosa and Zulu in South Africa or the indigenous Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia) and majority groups that internally are more unified (such as the Serbs in Serbia or the Hindu in India). The former I consider ethnic groups and the latter nationalist groups if a part of their platform is opposition to ethnic groups. The reason I make this distinction is that theoretically the reasons for ethnic appeals and nationalism differ. For example, in Serbia Albanian ethnic politics is arguably about preservation of a minority while Serbian nationalism is more likely about assimilation of ethnic minorities and incorporation of Serbian minorities in neighbouring countries.

[13] As the history of American politics demonstrates, race is a very salient information category, and the African American vote was considered decisive from the very time the

democracies. For instance, new democratic party systems such as those of Russia, Ecuador, and Romania are to a greater or lesser extent patronage based and not very programmatic. In all of these, divergent ethnic groups play an important role in politics.[14]

The machine politics literature examines the period from the midnineteenth century through the first two decades of the twentieth century, when large groups of Europeans immigrated to the United States. Many of these people settled on the East Coast and in the Midwest, where by the 1920s they constituted as much as a third of the population in cities such as New York and Chicago (Anderson, 1925). New immigrants were quickly incorporated into local political machines.[15] In the 1930s, however, the Depression and accompanying decline in government jobs and other forms of patronage changed the face of machine politics in most places (Gosnell, 1937). Furthermore, while some machine politics is still active in the United States (Mollenkopf, 1992), the increasing integration of divergent European nationalities has caused ethnicity to give way to the generally broader category of race in national and local politics.[16]

constituency was extended suffrage. Consequently, the ruling white majority passed a number of complicated laws, such as literacy requirements with grandfather clauses, benefiting illiterate whites and excluding blacks. The literacy requirements were repealed in 1915 (Key, 1964); other laws, however, such as a ban on the sale of property to African Americans that resulted in overcrowded black districts, were not repealed until the middle of the twentieth century (Banfield and Wilson, 1965). As a result, African Americans were incorporated into the political system much later and at a much slower rate than European immigrants. Therefore, when referring to the ethnic vote in discussions of machine politics, I will be referring to ethnic Europeans. Additionally, in terms of the general hypothesis of this chapter, race may have to be treated as a different category from ethnicity because one racial group may contain many ethnic groups.

[14] Indeed, Chandra (2004) argues that there exists a current category of "patronage democracies" that include India.

[15] According to Allswang (1971), naturalized immigrants voted at much the same rate as other citizens. The Irish, however, were naturalized faster and, therefore, voted sooner after arrival than other immigrants, as they already spoke the language (Erie, 1988). While first-generation immigrants did not often run for office, they and their children were incorporated from early on into their respective city political machines through patronage and mutually beneficial appointments to bureaucratic public office (Dahl, 1961; Key, 1964; Lowi, 1964). According to V. O. Key, other resources utilized by the political machine included certain judicial appointments, contract awards, real estate speculation based on confidential information of pending public work leaked to party members, and a variety of other smaller-scale "services" provided to party members. Election of second-generation minority children then further reaffirmed the group's identity and made it politically more cohesive (Lowi, 1964; Kahn and Majors, 1984).

[16] For instance, ethnic political heritage had little to do with presidential voting patterns in the six national elections from 1972 to 1992 (Jeffres, 1999). Instead, race appears to

Of the arguments made in the machine politics literature regarding the incorporation mechanism, the one emphasizing political socialization of and by the ethnic group is most significant.[17] This line of reasoning holds that immigrants[18] generally moved into neighborhoods where their ethnic counterparts lived. They read their respective language newspapers, which often delivered the party line of whichever political party the group generally accepted. They were then incorporated into local ethnic and religious clubs. Finally, with the aid of district political clubs, they became citizens and voters and often remained loyal to that club (Lowi, 1964; Allswang, 1971).[19] Over time, certain ethnic groups became closely associated with one party or another; for instance, the Irish and Italians were generally thought to vote Democratic while the Germans and Swedes mostly voted for the Republican Party (Anderson, 1925), at least in legislative elections.

have become the pertinent divider, particularly in local politics. For example, the 1983 Chicago mayoral election demonstrates well the dwindling importance of ethnicity as opposed to race (Holli and Green, 1984). On the role of race in contemporary politics see also Kahn and Majors (1984), Ferman (1996), and Kaufmann (1998).

17 Also prominent in this literature is a cultural argument along the lines of Weber's Protestant ethic (1930). According to cultural explanations, the political ethos of the immigrant communities was different from, and incompatible with, that of the dominant Protestant Anglo population. The native Protestants supposedly emphasized individual, virtuous participation that benefited the community as a whole. The immigrants, however, placed primary emphasis on the family, hierarchy, authority, and personal loyalties as opposed to abstract codes of law and morals. As a consequence, there was a political rift between dominant Protestant and minority immigrant groups, and the former retreated into the domain of community service organizations rather than run for elected offices. The immigrant groups then fought among themselves for recognition of their own group members, and for the accompanying prestige through party machines (Banfield and Wilson, 1965, pp. 40–41). For a critique of the machine ethnocultural argument, see Bridges (1984) and Finegold (1995).

18 Several authors characterize certain ethnic groups as particularly suited for machine politics. For instance, according to Lowi (1964), "urban politics was well suited to the Irish temperament and style." He then goes on to describe the burly style of Hughey McLaughlin as an example of an Irishman who became a party boss. While the description of McLaughlin could just as well be set in class terms, ethnic stereotypes have often been associated with the ethnic group's early political endeavors; see also Anderson (1925) and Banfield and Wilson (1965). A cultural argument to explain ethnic politics is, however, not particular to the machine political literature. Most recently a cultural argument to explain disparity was proposed by Huntington, who posits that an explanation of the differences in economic growth from the early 1960s to the 1990s between Korea and Ghana had much to do with the fact that "South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, education, organization, and discipline. Ghanaians had different values. In short, culture counts" (Harrison and Huntington, 2000, foreword).

19 Dahl (1961) emphasizes the role of politicians in helping the ethnic group assimilate in order to mobilize their vote. Erie (1988) lends support to the idea of political assimilation of the group but points out that economic assimilation was less successful.

The process of ethnic political socialization is also addressed specifically in studies of political socializations[20] (Greeley, 1975). Furthermore, although machine politics literature focuses on the United States, political socialization, or the creation of political attitudes and beliefs through learning, is also attributed to voters outside the United States (Almond and Verba, 1965; Brader and Tucker, 2001).[21]

The socialization argument explicitly outlines why and how members of groups can be expected to line up along ethnic divides and maintain long-term loyalties to a party in electoral politics. However, when it comes to explaining change such as the ethnic party realignment between the 1936 and 1940 U.S. presidential elections, the machine politics literature becomes mired in contradiction. Long-term socialized party loyalty implies consistency. Therefore, socialization should, for instance, have retained a Democratic Party allegiance of German and Italian voters in the 1940 election regardless of their short-term opposition to the prewar policies of the Roosevelt administration. Thus the question remains, What explains change in ethnic electoral politics?

The answer put forth here is that the object of ethnic socialization is misspecified in the machine politics literature. I argue that rather than fostering loyalty to a particular party, ethnic socialization fosters individual loyalty to the ethnic group. If socialized attitudes cultivate loyalty to the group rather than a party, we should expect members of the group

[20] Derived from psychology (Hyman, 1959), political socialization demonstrates how political orientation is learned. According to Hyman's review, the socialization of children begins at an early age and differs according to group affiliation, such as gender and class. Adopting Allport's (1955) theories, Hyman (p. 39–40) suggests that political attitudes are adopted from parents and teachers and refined through gradual experience and abrupt trauma. The strongest correlation of political attitudes between children and parents is party loyalty, which individuals use later in life to react to new political issues, rather than reacting to the issues themselves. Subsequent research has confirmed, expanded on, and refined these older findings. For instance, Campbell and associates (1960) show the relationship between parental party identification and strength of party identification of the offspring. They also demonstrate that there is a "life cycle" to party identification, increasing with age but retaining the potential to change throughout an individual's life depending on social circumstances. This effect has been demonstrated to hold true through long-term studies by Alwin and associates (1991), who demonstrate the persistence of attitudes over a fifty-year period.

[21] In political science, *political socialization* refers both to instances where the state has a hand in creating attitudes among the citizenry, as discussed by Barnes and associates (1985) and Barnes (2001), and socialization of the individual by her group. The discussion here refers to the latter type of socialization only.

to support a party in a stable manner as long as the party represents the group's interests. However, when the group's leadership, or the members themselves, determine that the interests of the group and the party have diverged, we should also expect a rapid change in the group members' party support.

Social identity theory and the literature about individual political behavior help flesh out the mechanism of how socialized ethnic group member loyalty affects ethnic electoral politics. One of the more influential theorists of voting behavior, Downs (1957), posits that in order to vote, every citizen must engage in a complex process of information gathering.[22] Unfortunately, gathering political information is costly to the voter.[23] Consequently, the rational choice for the average voter is to make the most possible use of "free" sources of information. By "free," Downs simply means that the information is not costly in terms of time and energy spent gathering it. Downs articulates seven sources of free information, the most important of which is information provided by other citizens "in the form of letters, conversations, discussion groups, speeches, etc."[24] In addition, or alternatively, voters can delegate vote decision making to experts. These agents include people with whom the voter has face-to-face contact, such as leaders of interest groups and professional experts. Combining social identity theory, which stipulates that group members favor other group members; theories of political learning, which hold that the individual learns political attitudes from her group

[22] This process involves several steps: "1) Gathering information relevant to each issue upon which important political decisions have been (or will be) made. 2) For each issue, selecting from all the information gathered that which will be used in the voting decision. 3) For each issue, analyzing the facts selected to arrive at specific factual conclusion about possible alternative policies and their consequences. 4) For each issue, appraising the consequences of every likely policy in light of relevant goals. This is a value appraisal not a strictly factual one. 5) Coordinating the appraisal of each issue into a net evaluation of each party running in the election. This is also a value judgement personally tailored to the goals of the voter himself. 6) Making the voting decisions by comparing the net evaluations of each party and weighting them for future contingencies. 7) Actually voting or abstaining" (Downs, 1957, p. 209).

[23] Downs defines *cost* as "deflection of scarce resources from utility-producing use." Therefore, to a voter who normally does not pay much attention to politics, taking the time to gather all the necessary information at the time of voting is costly.

[24] The other sources are publications of the governing party, partisan information from all political parties, information distributed by professional publishers such as television, information distributed by interest groups, information provided by entertainment sources, and information acquired accidentally in the course of gathering relevant political information (Downs, 1957, pp. 222–223).

(Campbell et al., 1960;[25] Zaller, 1992);[26] and Downs's version of political information shortcuts, the most important source of political information for the ethnic individual will be other members of that ethnic group. Thus, it is also reasonable to expect ethnic group members to delegate some of their voting decisions to the experts within their group, namely, the leaders of the ethnic group.

Notably, there is nothing about ethnicity as an information shortcut that suggests intransigence in ethnic politics in the short term or over time, in stark contrast to the implications of the currently prominent and rich ethnic conflict literature. Ever since Dahl (1971) discussed the perils of polarization, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have focused on the effects of ethnic heterogeneity. The two principal organizing frameworks in this literature are mobilization theory (Rhabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Powell, 1982)[27] and collective action (Olzak, 1992,

[25] According to Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) experimental study, even when a subject is not normatively influenced, he may be influenced informationally by others in the sense that the judgments of others are taken to be a trustworthy source of information about reality. The difference between normative and informational acceptance of information is that in the first case the subject conforms, but in the latter he accepts. Generally, however, the two go together. A real world example of such information is provided in Campbell and colleagues (1960), through the example of "Sam Hodder," a laborer who belongs to a union and receives his political information almost wholly through channels of conversation and union membership.

[26] The line of reasoning in this chapter draws heavily on Zaller (1992), who argues that voters differ in their receptiveness to information disseminated by political parties. He differentiates voters into highly aware, middle aware, and lowly aware and argues that highly aware voters are most receptive to "their own" party's messages and resistant to messages from other parties. Originally when I wrote this chapter I conceptualized ethnic voters as the "highly aware." The theory has developed since then but the inspiration remains the same.

[27] In the mobilization literature, Powell (1982) argues that national cleavages provide a natural base for political leaders who seek to mobilize support. The nature of group affiliation, however, hinders the compromises necessary for successful political coexistence. He contends that on ethnic or religious issues common ground is difficult to discover because the benefits are indivisible or because compromise would involve intense costs to one or the other party. For example, conflicts regarding language of instruction in schools, conflicts over religious education, parades, and other cultural manifestations all represent a zero-sum game. Furthermore, subcultural differences create a sense of distinction between factions. Where such differences exist, grievances readily become exaggerated and distance is transformed into fear, distrust, and hostility. Rhabushka and Shepsle (1972) make the same argument but more forcefully as they contend that in ethnically diverse societies, politics is necessarily based on ethnic subcommunities. They argue that when these subcommunities are organized into a single political entity the local politician will use his community as a base of operations. They also claim that "ethnic preferences are intense and not negotiable" (p. 66). Such intensity, they argue, "profoundly shapes and ultimately undermines democratic politics in the plural

Lichbach, 1995).[28] Both camps also incorporate a hypothesis of resource scarcity to explain why ethnic mobilization occurs and how collective action problems are overcome. Some theorists even combine mobilization theory and collective action (Horowitz, 1985).[29]

Both mobilization and collective action explain why people may line up according to ethnic divisions in electoral politics, but neither theory can explain peaceful ethnic politics or change in ethnic politics. The most recent contribution to the ethnic conflict literature, that of Wilkinson (2004), does address the former issue directly. Wilkinson argues that the level of party competition is accountable for the degree of ethnic violence and that differing levels of party competition derive from divergent institutional structures. The question remains, however, why ethnic electoral behavior sometimes changes when institutions do not.

It is suggested here that ethnic socialization itself is by definition a dynamic, fluid process. Similarly, the mechanism of information flow within the group suggests a facility of change. Therefore, the principal proposition of this chapter is that *because of political socialization,*

society" (p. 74). The deterioration of democratic politics occurs because of the salience of the internal rules of distribution in a society, as scarcity of resources implies that some group preferences are satisfied at the expense of others. The other reason democracy is endangered, according to Rhabuskha and Shepsle (1972), is the oversized character of the initial multiethnic coalitions that are left as a colonial power departs. Along the lines of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Rhabuskha and Shepsle argue that because these coalitions were defined in opposition to the colonial power, they include all the competing ethnic groups. The incentives post independence are to expel some members on a communal criterion and secure the resources for the dominant group.

[28] Olzak (1992) explains how conflict results as ethnic groups overcome their collective action problems in the face of competition over finite resources. She combines resource mobilization theory and competition theory to explain why ethnic boundaries become salient in competition with other potential boundaries or loyalties. She argues that where ethnic populations attempt to exploit the same "niche" of finite resources, competition will occur. As a result, ethnic groups overcome their collective action problems and engage in political protest and even violence. Olzak also argues that in the short term, conflict is not the only possible outcome. In systems with highly skewed power relations, accommodation may occur through subjugation and repression of the less powerful group. Nevertheless, she also speculates that such asymmetric power balances may not be stable in the long run. Lichbach, in turn, argues that under conditions of deprivation rebels have to overcome not only the context-dependent collective action problems internal to the group but also the state's attempts to thwart rebellion. Consequently, rebellion is rare despite abundant deprivation and multiple solutions to the problem of collective action none of which are individually necessary or sufficient.

[29] According to Horowitz, ethnic parties derive from "the internal imperatives of the ethnic group as a community and the external imperatives of the ethnic group, in relation to others, as the incipient whole community" (1985, p. 294). These ethnically based parties are then cemented by politicians' incentives to organize along cleavage lines.

membership in an ethnic group functions as a stable but flexible information cue for political choices. That ethnic identity supplies a stable information cue implies steadiness in channels. Flexibility, in turn, implies that the content of the information responds to exogenous influences.

ETHNIC ELECTORAL POLITICS

Precisely how does the cohesion dominating ethnic group behavior early on become manifested in electoral politics in new democracies? What are the exogenous influences that shape ethnic group member participation in electoral politics in the long term and how do they influence the group members' behavior? The remainder of this chapter elaborates the electoral components of the proposition regarding the *stable but flexible ethnic information shortcut* of Ethnic Attractors. Because the idea of flexible information-based socialization is very simple, there exist multiple possibilities for fleshing out the nuances of the argument. The form selected here, decision theory, follows a common tradition in models of voting (for the formal version of the argument, see Appendix A).[30]

The aim of this section is to provide a more detailed mechanism for how ethnic socialization is turned into stable but flexible ethnic voting in the short term, and how this flexibility is manifested over time. The model highlights the attributes that distinguish ethnic voters in new democracies and the exogenous determinants of continued ethnic electoral participation in maturing democracies. Furthermore, the argument crystallizes the most basic contention of this book, that ethnic voters are not inherently intransigent and that modeling ethnic electoral behavior does not necessitate any special assumptions about the motivations of ethnic group members. As a result, one of the principal benefits of the argument is that the ethnic information-based socialization argument fits well within a general theory of voting in new democracies, which in turn belongs to a class of theoretical frameworks of voting.[31] Thus far, however, none of the previous models has specifically addressed ethnic voting in new or maturing democracies.

[30] For an overview of how decision theory has been used in modeling social choice and voting see, for example, Hinich and Munger (1997). The argument is developed here as a model to predict the electoral behavior of ethnic groups. The model can, however, easily be generalized to other voters. Indeed, I first developed the model as a general voting model, which I then applied to ethnic voters. One benefit of the formalization is that it provides a parsimonious form of the theory that can easily be generalized to members of other groups. I will return to this subject in the Conclusion, where I will discuss some possible extensions.

[31] See, for example, Hinich and Munger (1997).

THE UTILITY OF ETHNIC VOTING

I argue that utility in voting determines ethnic political behavior. The utility in voting for a party in a new democracy is determined by the ethnic voter's policy preference with respect to the party's policy preferences and the ability of that party to enact policy. Utility refers to a cost-benefit calculation. If the cost is lower than the benefit, there is positive utility in voting for a particular party. I assume the ethnic voter's policy preference package is composed of several issues that include the ethnic issue, some of greater importance than others. Similarly, any party's policy preference package contains many issues, sometimes including the ethnic issue, and some policy issues may be more important than others. The enactment capability of the party denotes the party's ability to enter the government and enact the policy.

The cost to the voter decreases, and the benefit increases, as the policy preferences of the voter and the party converge. Thus, when the party's policy preferences are closer to those of the voter than are any other party's, there are no policy costs to the voter in voting for the first party. In new democracies, when there is great uncertainty about a party's policy preferences, there are potentially high policy costs involved in voting for that party. As democracies mature, however, and the policy preferences of a party become known, costs to a voter associated with uncertainty about policy preferences of the party are negligible.

In turn, the cost associated with the enactment capabilities of a party decreases, and the benefit increases, as those capabilities increase. When the party is better able to enact the voter's preferred policies than is any other party, there are no enactment costs associated with voting for the party. In turn, when the party is unable to enact the policies that the voter wants represented, the voter incurs high enactment costs if she votes for the party.

In the following discussion of this argument I will assume a two-party system. Thus, I call the spatial policy locations of the two parties ethnic and nonethnic. In the next chapter, I relax the assumption of two parties and examine the model's more general implications.

Policy Proximity and Uncertainty in New Democracies

A basic assumption of Ethnic Attractors is that voters seek representation of their policy preferences. In other words, I assume that voters seek representation of a policy package by casting their vote for a party that promotes the policy that is closest to their own preferred policy package.

On average, an ethnic voter's policy preferences will be closer to those of the ethnic party than of the nonethnic party. Furthermore, I argue that because other information shortcuts are underdeveloped in new democracies, ethnic voters generally will have more information about their party than nonethnic voters have about the many parties that appeal to them.

Most people of voting age in established democracies spend little time researching their voting choice. Most do not read all the literature put out by competing parties, nor listen to all debates or engage in other types of time-consuming information gathering. In fact, most people do none of this even the first time they are allowed to vote, when the activity is still novel. Instead, they use information shortcuts to make voting decisions (Downs, 1957, Popkin 1991).

Readily available information shortcuts contain sufficient information for a voter to make up her mind about how to vote without investing much time or energy in researching the divergent options. Information shortcuts are provided, for instance, by people we trust as authorities on political subjects and social groups to which we belong. Rather than read the party literature every year, a voter in the United States might, for example, follow the suggestions of her union leadership, whom she considers an authority on the subject of politics. Another person who knows nothing about the policies of the party might vote Republican because her family always has. A third person who is Irish Catholic might vote Democratic because that party historically has represented her ethnic group.[32]

The types of information shortcuts found in a political system are not restricted to interpersonal networks but also depend on the history and institutions in that system.[33] For instance, while religion undoubtedly is an information shortcut in the United States, the church generally was not politicized during democratization in Eastern Europe.[34] Similarly, party

[32] According to cleavage theorists such as Lipset and Rokkan (1967), people support the party that best represents the interest of the cleavage to which they belong. The particular cleavages they discuss are the interelite cleavages of landed versus industrial elites and religious cleavages that pit either one denomination against another or the religious elite against a secular state or vice versa. In addition, they discuss a cleavage caused by a conflict between the center versus the periphery (also called an ethnic cleavage) and a class cleavage.

[33] According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), for instance, West European political cleavages were the result of sociocultural conflicts that formed before the extension of suffrage. Only when that threshold to participation had been eliminated did these cleavages manifest themselves as party systems. Therefore, they also point out that the particular cleavage structures they discuss may be specific to Western Europe.

[34] Several authors have begun the systematic study of East European cleavage structures and their manifestations in the political systems of the countries. The general conclusion is that the only social cleavage that was politically salient and immediately translated into

identification remains constant through generations most often in systems where party labels have been meaningful for a long time. Therefore, a person in the United States might vote for the Democratic Party in every election because the label signals a general set of policies (Campbell et al., 1960; Zaller, 1992).[35] Many of the information shortcuts we take for granted in established democracies, including party identification and religion, may, however, be either underdeveloped or nonexistent in new democracies. This is because their expression depends to a great extent on the existing political system, and under nondemocratic conditions, the expression of such organized groups often is suppressed or simply not useful.

Furthermore, in new democracies parties do not have established legislative track records, and the parties themselves do not know exactly who their constituency is and to what promises this constituency will respond. In addition, the parties themselves lack the experience of ruling that might guide them as to which policy promises are urgent and reasonable. Therefore, while politicians seeking election (Mayhew, 1974; Geddes, 1994) make policy promises in the name of parties, in new democracies, these initial campaign promises often are quite vague. Consequently, most voters' access to information about the party's policies is very limited, and as a consequence they can, at best, only roughly place the parties in a multidimensional issue space before the first election. It is thus likely that there is often considerable difference between what many voters perceive as the party's policy preferences before the first, and even the first few, elections and the actual policies that the party will pursue over time. Given the lack of information that determines the voter's initial beliefs about party policy preferences, I adopt the simple assumption that all voters' initial beliefs about any party's policy preferences are normally distributed around the true party policy preferences. Furthermore, I expect this uncertainty to decrease over time as parties establish reputations.

In new democracies, ethnic parties differ from nonethnic parties in one important respect: the ethnic voter already has a strongly established group affiliation by the time of the first democratic election. Presumably

particular party platforms during re-democratization in Eastern Europe was ethnicity. Even in Poland, where religious cleavages have become politically salient, they were not noticeable in electoral politics until 1997. According to Weydenthal (1997), the contenders in the Polish parliamentary election held in September that year were divided on a few main issues, one of which was the Roman Catholic Church, its mission, and its teachings.

[35] In addition to party labels, others have shown the informational value of other political activity such as incumbency (Cain et al., 1987).

any party that claims to represent the ethnic group will, therefore, immediately propose specific policies that benefit that group. Because of inexperience with governance shared among all parties, the ethnic party may be as vague as other parties on many of the other aspects of its program. However, the party leaders know precisely who their constituency is and can therefore make specific promises that appeal to that population. Thus, during democratization, campaign promises of ethnic parties will be, *on average,* less vague in the minds of voters than those of other parties. Given the established group membership and greater policy concreteness of the ethnic party, the ethnic voter does not face the same uncertainty in his beliefs about political parties that other voters do. In short, ethnic voters have more information about the ethnic party than nonethnic voters have about any of the parties that appeal to them.

There are of course exceptions in that some nonethnic voters in new democracies already have established loyalties that they may use as information shortcuts for early voting. For instance, Communist parties in many new East European democracies commanded the continued loyalties of sizable groups after democratization. Similarly, demagogues, such as Peron in Argentina, sometimes retain the loyalties of many voters after authoritarian periods. The difference between those types of loyalties and ethnic loyalties, however, is that ethnic loyalties are to the group, whereas political identification with Communist parties or demagogues are to a particular political party or leader. Consequently, while the idea of Ethnic Attractors as information shortcuts transcends particular historical circumstances and is generalizable to all new democracies, explanations of voter information based on Communist parties or demagogues are path dependent and not generalizable. Therefore, *on average,* ethnic voters have more political information than their nonethnic counterparts in all new democracies. Thus, the working assumption in this book is that in general nonethnic voters do not have a group identity that rivals ethnicity and directs their vote behavior in early elections. While I believe this assumption is well justified, it is worth examining further in a study of nonethnic vote behavior in new democracies. That line of inquiry is, however, outside the scope of this study.

In sum, a voter's expected utility in voting for a party is determined by the policy proximity of the party to the voter's policy preferences and how closely the voter's beliefs about the party's policy position approximate its true position. High uncertainty in beliefs about a party's policy preferences is potentially very costly to the voter, because if she is wrong about a party's policy preferences, she could inadvertently vote for a party that

does not represent her policy preferences. In this respect, ethnic voters have an informational advantage over other voters in new democracies.

Policy Enactment in Maturing Democracies

As party representatives are elected and participate in government, true party policy preferences and a party's ability to advocate and enact the voter's preferences at all stages of the legislative game become increasingly clear. Over time, therefore, the uncertainty in all ethnic and nonethnic voters' beliefs about the parties converges. The question that remains is, What is the effect of Ethnic Attractors over time? The reader will recall that the very definition of ethnic socialization implies flexibility over time. Therefore, members of the ethnic group have a continued incentive to support electorally the party that represents the group only so long as that party provides them with an exogenous incentive to do so. I argue that this incentive is policy enactment.

Contrary to the expectation of stable ethnic voting proposed by Ethnic Attractors, Downs's (1957) paradox of voting holds that because no one person's vote is likely to decide which candidate wins, each person will find the cost of voting to be greater than his expected benefit and therefore should not vote. Later extensions of this work have shown that voting may indeed be quite rational for reasons ranging from benefits that are not associated with the outcome of elections (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968)[36] to voting to minimize potential loss rather than maximize utility (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974).

According to Riker and Ordeshook (1968), "the differential benefit in utilities that an individual voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one" is negligible because "the probability that the citizen will, by voting, bring about the benefit" is insignificant (p. 25). Nevertheless, if the cost to the individual of voting (such as time spent on the activity) is less than or equal to the benefits from voting (such as the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting) that are exogenous to the utility of his candidate's winning, an individual will vote. Paradoxically, therefore, Riker and Ordeshook's argument is that, all else equal, the utility of one's preferred candidate's winning does

[36] A different take on this argument is the literature that argues that voters vote "expressively," and that the act of voting actually has no relation to the outcome of the election. See, for instance, Glazer (1995). I do not, however, believe that these have to be incompatible, so I simply assume that voting can be expressive and utility maximizing in terms of policy representation.

matter for voting. In fact, the probability that a preferred candidate will win and the utility of that victory are the only characteristics that distinguish between the incentives of two individuals to vote whose exogenous benefits of voting offset their cost of voting.[37] Therefore, a more accurate description of a voter's utility calculation in voting over time accounts for the policy benefit associated with policy enactment,[38] as well as the exogenous cost-benefit calculation[39] suggested by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) that is shared by all voters and not related to policy.

In turn, the emphasis on enactment in this chapter follows the lead of Cox (1997), who notes that policy representation is typically defined in terms of policy advocacy, which is the "distance between that voter's preferred package of policies and the package advocated by the elected representative whose views are most consonant with that voter's"(p. 226). Cox then goes on to say that advocated policy needs to be distinguished from policy enacted by the government and that voters who "have their views advocated but never acted upon may not feel very well represented" (p. 227).

A party that cannot enact policy is less representative than one that can. Thus, the voter's utility in choosing a particular party is also influenced by the policy costs associated with enactment (Cox, 1997) and costs and benefits associated with voting that are not related to policy (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968).[40] The utility to the voter in voting for a party changes according to whether the chosen party is able to enact the policies the ethnic voter cares about. If the party is unable to enact any of the policies the voter cares about, the costs associated with voting for that party are

[37] Riker and Ordeshook (1968) call "the differential benefit in utilities that an individual voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate" B, and the "probability that the citizen will, by voting, bring about the benefit B," P. They call the cost to the individual of voting such as time spent on the activity C, and the benefits from voting D. Therefore, (P^*B) is the only characteristic that distinguishes between the incentives to vote of two individuals whose $D = C$.

[38] This is the B^*P terms articulated by Riker and Ordeshook.

[39] This is the C-D term articulated by Riker and Ordeshook.

[40] As shown in the formal version of the argument, the party's policy position, of course, affects the party's enactment capabilities. The ability to enact policy is to an extent a function of the party's policy choices, and the party's policy choices change as a result of its enactment capabilities. For instance, the representational utility in voting for a mainstream party is greater than the representational utility in voting for a fringe party because the fringe party is less likely to access government. (Note that the policy utility in voting for a fringe party may at the same time be greater if the fringe party represents the voter's sincere policy preferences.) Therefore, a party's policies cannot be separated from the party's ability to promise, advocate, and enact those policies.

high, even if the party policy is identical to the voter's policy. To the contrary, if the ethnic party attains regular access to government and is thus able to enact the ethnic policy, group members will continue supporting the ethnic party in a stable and flexible manner.

CONCLUSION

According to some of the more influential political scientists writing on party systems, stable political parties are necessary to the functioning of a democracy.[41] Theoretically and empirically, therefore, the relationship between ethnicity and party system development is a serious issue. Particularly significant is the fact that much of the conflict theory approach inevitably leads scholars down an analytical and policy road that necessarily deemphasizes ethnic cleavages in politics. Horowitz (1990-a), for instance, suggests electoral reform that forces politicians to appeal to members of all ethnic groups in a district to get elected. Unless, however, we are able to determine that the manifestation of ethnic cleavages in electoral politics is inevitably detrimental to democratic development, we cannot exclude the possibility that the opposite approach might be the better way to ensure party development in new democracies.

Notably, nothing in the theory of Ethnic Attractors indicates that ethnic politics is inherently detrimental to democratic politics either in the short term or over time. To the contrary, Ethnic Attractors are hypothesized as stable and flexible information shortcuts in new democracies that contribute to stability in ethnic political behavior over time, provided that ethnic policy is enacted.

Ethnic politics is not that simple, however. Members of ethnic groups do not always support ethnic parties and frequently perpetrate political violence with serious ramifications for democratic development. For example, no indigenous party was fielded by Ecuadorian Indians from democratization in 1979 until 1995, despite the fact that the group accounts for a sizable portion of the population by any account.[42]

[41] To name but a few, Duverger, 1954; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Sartori, 1976; and Bartolini and Mair, 1990.

[42] Estimates of the size of the indigenous population in Ecuador vary greatly. According to Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas de Ecuador (CONAIE, 2002) indigenous peoples make up about 45 percent of the total population. According to Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador (SIISE, 1999) the rural indigenous population accounts for about 12 percent of the rural population, which numbers around half of the national population. See also Birnir and Van Cott (2007).

Furthermore, members of ethnic groups in Ecuador have engaged in substantial protest and even violence to make their policy objectives heard (Birnir, 2004-a). This unrest has had serious consequences for the state. Similarly, in Bolivia ethnic violence has escalated in recent years.

The pertinent question, then, is why members of some ethnic groups appear to follow the course predicted by my argument and peacefully support their group in electoral politics from democratization on, while others do not support their group, exit electoral politics, and even engage in protest and violence over time. The answer supplied by Ethnic Attractors is that electorally unstable and even violent members of ethnic groups are not provided the proper incentives for peaceful electoral participation. Operating under the assumption that democracies by definition provide representation to a wide variety of groups, Ethnic Attractors leads to the belief that electoral instability and violence in ethnic politics are curious anomalies that bear further scrutiny. This idea is supported by recent scholarship arguing that "the standard view in political science [that] violence is assumed to follow ethnic tension as night follows day . . . seems to be based on a biased selection of cases" (Fearon and Laitin, 1996, p. 3). To illustrate their point, the authors show that in the post-Soviet world and in Africa, both of which are viewed as especially subject to ethnic strife, cases of actual ethnic violence were far fewer than cases of potential ethnic violence that were in fact averted.

Consequently, the objective of the following chapter is to examine the exogenous constraints that interfere with ethnic group members' ability to fulfill their peaceful potential, and to generate testable implications about ethnic political behavior in new and maturing democracies. Chapters Four through Seven go on to test these implications through national and cross-national statistical studies, and through in-depth case studies.

3

Ethnic Attractors and Exogenous Constraints

According to the argument of Ethnic Attractors, members of all ethnic groups have an incentive to support their group and are potentially peaceful participants in electoral politics as long as the group is represented in national decision making. This chapter explores the idea that the reason members of some ethnic groups fulfill the potential of stable but flexible participation and others do not is that ethnic groups in electoral politics are subject to barriers that aid or interfere with the group member's ability and willingness to fulfill this potential. The most significant of these barriers, according to the literature, are institutions. A further objective of this chapter is to generate testable implications about ethnic individual political behavior under a variety of exogenous constraints in both new and maturing democracies.

The principal determinants of the relative salience of the ethnic component of a voter's preferred policy package are the cohesion and importance of the ethnic cleavage. In other words, is the ethnic identification salient during democratization and does it remain relevant over time or lose importance when other aspects of the voter's identity take on increased importance, as the fluidity of ethnic identity implies may occur? Consequently, do ethnic voters have an initial incentive to vote for an ethnic party, and do they remain loyal to the ethnic party or migrate to other parties?

The preceding chapter argued that ethnic identity will emerge under divergent authoritarian and democratic conditions alike, wherever this organizational principle is useful. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, the ethnic identity remains the single or the most salient policy

issue for all members of the group over time. Those are groups that, for example, are not cross-cut but reinforced by other politicized cleavages, such as ethnic groups in which most members belong to the same economic class. This also includes groups in which reinforcing cleavages work against potentially cross-cutting cleavages to retain ethnic identity as the single most salient policy determinant of the group. An example may be an ethnic group that is cross-cut by an economic cleavage but is regionally very concentrated. Another example is an ethnic group that may be cross-cut by other cleavages, but in which members perceive themselves under siege from members of other ethnic groups, thereby promoting the ethnic cleavage to the status of the single most salient political cleavage. A fourth example includes groups whose member identity is reinforced by institutional structures that facilitate representation of the identity in its present form (Posner, 2005). In all of these cases, the ethnic cleavage remains salient, and ethnic voters have an incentive to continue to support the ethnic party.

If, however, the group is cross-cut by politicized cleavages other than ethnicity that are equally salient to members of the ethnic group, some members are likely to defect to nonethnic parties. For example, if an economic cleavage cross-cuts the ethnic cleavage, some ethnic voters may decide that voting along the economic cleavage serves their interests better than voting along the ethnic cleavage. In such cases, the salience of the ethnic cleavage is decreased, as is the ethnic voter's incentive to support the ethnic party. In addition, the ethnic group may split over issues such as ways that ethnic concerns should be advocated. For instance, if a part of the group insists on a more radical agenda such as full autonomy or even secession and another part wants to integrate with the mainstream, the group will likely split. On average such splits likely decrease the salience of the ethnic party as it comes to represent one of the factions to a greater extent than the other.

Assuming that the ethnic cleavage remains cohesive and salient during and after democratization, the pursuit of representation is, according to Ethnic Attractors, a significant determinant of ethnic political behavior. According to the literature, institutions shape ethnic representation (Lijphart 1977, 1999; Horowitz, 1985, 1990-a; Cohen, 1997; Saideman et al., 2002; Chandra, 2004; Wilkinson, 2004; Posner, 2005). This chapter posits that the way in which institutions affect ethnic group members' expectations of access to representation is not, however, as clear as previously thought.

One goal of politicians and their constituency participating in electoral politics is to obtain office-related goods (Riker, 1962; Dodd, 1976; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Sened, 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Cox, 1997).[1] Office-related goods are obtained either in government or as a party aligned with the government. In or aligned with government, group representatives can bargain over policy proposed by their coalition partners and have some of their own policy objectives realized.[2]

The underlying assumption of this "policy as the objective" argument is that members of mobilized groups have a reasonable expectation of at least intermittent access to positions where they can influence policy. If institutional structures create barriers to access, expectations about access are likely influenced by these structures. The particular access points of interest in this analysis are the legislature and the executive. Using the theory of minimum winning coalition (Riker, 1962;[3] Dodd, 1976; Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973), the objective of this chapter is to show that while ethnic group member expectations about the facility of access to the executive may differ under divergent institutional structures, systems that prevent such expectations from developing are theoretically rare and empirically almost nonexistent, as discussed in Chapter Seven. First the discussion follows the literature, which most generally implicitly assumes that ethnic representation is achieved through ethnic parties. I

[1] Another goal may be related to ideology (Schofield and Laver, 1985; Sened, 1996) or a simple desire to put the issues championed by the party on the map (Hug, 2001). The discussion here is restricted to office-related payoffs, including policy, because of their tangibility. The objective of obtaining office-related goods does not, however, preclude ideological and/or agenda setting objectives.

[2] Chapters Six and Seven discuss how formal participation in a government coalition is not a necessary condition, as political bargaining can take place informally. Kaare Strom (1990) discusses the relative costs and benefits of being part of the coalition as opposed to being a party in the legislature. He argues that parties do make a cost-benefit calculation in deciding whether to accept an invitation to join a coalition. When an insufficient number of parties choose to join up, the result is a minority government. For the purpose of this study there is no theoretical difference between being formally in the government or informally aligned with the government. It is assumed that the benefits party leaders are able to gain for their constituency sufficiently convey the importance of the politician to the constituency to satisfy his desire for reelection: a basic assumption of this chapter. There is, however, a practical difference between being formally in government or informally aligned with the government in terms of operationalization, as discussed in Chapter Seven.

[3] This idea was originally developed by von Neuman and Morgenstern (1953) and applied to government formation by Gamson (1961). It is, however, the revision done by Riker (1962) that is better known in political science.

then relax this assumption and discuss the implications of ethnic representation through nonethnic parties.

INSTITUTIONS AND REPRESENTATION

The literature sets up separate dichotomies of barriers to access to the legislature. The first is the proportional/plurality electoral system dichotomy (Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Horowitz, 1990-a; Cohen, 1997; Reilly, 2001; Saideman et al., 2002), where the theoretical and empirical notion is that members of ethnic groups mobilized through separate ethnic parties have greater access to the legislature under systems of proportional representation than under rules of plurality.[4] The second dichotomy, the parliamentary/presidential, centers on the executive. There is no agreement in this literature on the relationship between system type and ethnic group member access (Horowitz, 1990-b; Linz, 1990).

There are two principal problems with analyses that take as their foundation either dichotomy. The first is the empirical fact that neither the outcomes of electoral systems nor system types (presidential/parliamentary) can be neatly classified as binary. Rather, electoral systems and system types are both more appropriately classified as a continuum. Furthermore, the theoretical concern as articulated by Tsebelis (1995) is that analyzing these two dichotomies separately is misleading because both influence access to the executive, which is the end point of full political access if policy influence is the objective. Following Tsebelis's example, this chapter therefore outlines how the restrictions of these two dichotomies jointly affect ethnic expectations about influences on the executive. The principal conclusion is that, using minimum winning coalition theory (Riker, 1962; Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973; Dodd, 1976), only in true two-party parliamentary systems where the ethnic group is a demographic minority and in true two-party presidential systems where the president's party holds a majority in the legislature and the ethnic group is a demographic minority is ethnic group member expectation of access to the executive through an ethnic party eliminated. Furthermore, in those systems representatives of ethnic groups can still achieve representation through nonethnic parties, albeit at some policy cost. If this is correct, then none of these institutional structures eliminate ethnic expectations of access.

[4] It is worth emphasizing that this is not considered a benefit by all. In particular, Horowitz (1985) and Reilly (2001) argue that by emphasizing ethnic cleavages, proportional systems foment ethnic violence to a greater extent than plurality systems do.

System Types, Electoral Rules, and Access

Merging the two dichotomies of system type and electoral systems, four possible institutional combinations may affect ethnic group member expectations of access. These are plurality parliamentary systems, proportionally elected parliamentary systems, presidential systems where the legislature is elected through plurality, and presidential systems where the legislature is elected proportionally. In parliamentary democracies, the executive consists of a cabinet that is headed by the prime minister and generally draws members from the legislature. Ethnic group member expectation of access to the executive depends on the composition of the legislature, which in turn depends on the electoral system. If a nonethnic majority party controls the legislature as a result of a plurality election and is consequently the sole party in the executive, an ethnic minority does not have a reasonable expectation of access. This is only true, however, in two-party systems where a single party consistently receives the majority of seats in the legislature. As explained by Riker's (1986) refinement of Duverger's law, plurality electoral systems do not necessarily produce two-party systems in the national legislature, although they may promote a two-party system at the district level. India, for instance, is an excellent example of a parliamentary system that uses a plurality electoral system but consistently produces coalition governments because the legislature is quite fragmented as different parties win seats at the district level.

If the parliamentary executive is a composite of many parties, either as a result of different parties' winning elections in different districts or because the election is conducted under rules of increasing proportionality, theories of minimum winning coalitions lead us to believe that ethnic expectation of access is at least equal to that of members of any other group in the legislature. According to the theory, when a coalition forms in a decision-making body, the winning coalition will tend to be as small as possible (Riker, 1962; Dodd, 1976). Because the most appropriate alliance party, in terms of size, for a minimum coalition is just as likely to be an ethnic party as any other party, a corollary of the theory is that ethnic parties in the legislature are as likely to be included in government or aligned with government as any other party.[5] Riker assumes parties are

[5] Others substantiate the idea that minor parties may be important for coalitions. For instance, Sartori (1976) concludes that any small party is politically relevant if it is ever needed for coalition building, assuming small parties can be relevant for coalition building. "A minor party can be discounted as irrelevant whenever it remains over time superfluous, in the sense that it is never needed or put to use for any feasible coalition majority. Con-

"pure office seekers" and do not care about the policy of their coalition partners. However, even if we take into consideration the idea that parties also pursue policy (Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973), ethnic policy preferences as defined in Chapter Two are no less likely to be congruent with the aggregate policy preferences of a majority party than the policy package of any other minor party. The reason is twofold: First, ethnic policy is only one of many policy objectives of the group members, and where other policy objectives fall depends on the attributes of the individuals that constitute the group. Second, even if the ethnic policy were the ethnic party's sole policy issue, major parties may be indifferent to that policy and/or willing to grant concessions in that area in return for support on other policy. Therefore, it is safe to assume that minimum winning coalition theory applies equally to ethnic and other parties.[6]

In presidential systems, plurality and proportional rules have the same effect on the composition of the legislature as they do in parliamentary systems. To establish the constraints on ethnic expectations of access to the executive, defined broadly as the presidential cabinet, it is necessary to examine the selection method for the cabinet in presidential systems. According to Shugart and Carey (1992), there are three principal types of "presidential systems," classified according to the relative power of each branch. First is the pure presidential system, where the cabinet is appointed by the president. Examples include Brazil and the United States. A midlevel type is president-parliamentarism, where the president appoints the ministers but the cabinet is subject to the confidence of the legislature. In addition, the president has the power to dissolve parliament, legislative powers, or both (p. 24). Examples include Chile and Peru. The third type is premier-presidentialism, characterized by the coexistence of a president and a premier. Examples include France and Romania, where the council of ministers is appointed by the president on the suggestion of the prime minister or by the prime minister, respectively.

In the latter two types, the president clearly must at least consider the composition of the legislature when appointing the cabinet. Therefore,

versely, a minor party must be counted, no matter how small it is, if it finds itself in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at least one of the governmental majorities" (p. 122). Sartori goes on to argue that "a party qualifies for relevance whenever its existence or appearance affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition – by determining a switch from centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward or in both directions – of the governing-oriented parties" (p. 123).

[6] As discussed in Chapter Six, even nationalistic parties tend to compromise on ethnic issues when the ethnic group is pivotal to the formation of a minimum winning coalition.

if the legislature is not a true two-party system where the president's party holds the majority of seats, minimum coalition theory extends ethnic minority expectations for access to the cabinet, at least to systems classified as president-parliamentarian and premier-presidential. It is, however, theoretically not clear that members of ethnic groups should expect to be barred from the cabinet in all pure presidential systems either. Indeed, it is equally plausible that, for instance, a president who faces a majority opposition in the legislature may specifically reach out to ethnic minority parties in order to tip the legislative balance in her favor.[7]

In sum, therefore, only in plurality parliamentary systems that consistently produce a two-party system where a nonethnic party holds a majority of the seats, and in presidential systems when the president's nonethnic party holds a majority of seats in the legislature, would we expect to quell ethnic expectations of access to government through an ethnic party when the ethnic group constitutes a demographic minority. As discussed further in Chapter Seven, currently there are not many democratic systems with electorally active ethnic groups and true two-party systems, and no such presidential systems.

Representation through Nonethnic Parties

An additional assumption in much of the ethnic literature discussed is that of ethnic electoral mobilization through explicitly ethnic parties.[8] There is nothing about Ethnic Attractors, however, that precludes ethnic group members from being represented through nonethnic parties. The tradeoff for the members of the ethnic group may be some policy cost in the realm of ethnicity issues, but, as suggested in the Introduction, the group may gain more frequent representation of its issues as part of a larger party.

This is not to say that institutions have no effect on expectations of access. Rather, the principal ideas that emerge from this discussion are that rarely should ethnic group members expect complete exclusion from

[7] While legislators in Latin America, for instance, are in most cases formally barred from holding cabinet posts, many simply resign their legislative seats to accept positions in the cabinet. In other cases cabinet members have prior legislative experience or experience in other elected offices such as being governors. For a more thorough treatment of the issue of presidential cabinet composition in multiparty systems, see Amorim Neto (1998, 2002, 2006) and Martinez Gallardo (2006).

[8] There are of course exceptions; for instance, Horowitz (1985, 1990-a) and Reilly (2001) specifically discuss institutional structures that oblige ethnic groups to join multiethnic parties.

the executive for institutional reasons.[9] Furthermore, the strength of the ethnic expectation of access will depend on the interaction between the ethnic cleavage and the institutional structure, rather than the institutional feature alone. For instance, members of ethnic groups likely seek representation through nonethnic parties at a greater rate in plurality systems than in proportional systems and where members of the group are dispersed rather than regionally concentrated. Hence, the empirical expectations of ethnic political behavior associated with institutional features are considerably less clear than is argued in the literature to date.

CONSTRAINING ETHNIC ATTRACTORS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

As discussed in the case studies in Chapter Six, ethnic identity often consolidates in response to authoritarian attempts to eliminate that identity. Furthermore, ethnic identity is difficult to suppress under authoritarian rule as it is passed on through language and culture, which are hard to eradicate. Consequently, there is reason to believe that during democratization, ethnic political identification will emerge wherever the ethnic cleavage is cohesive and ethnic policy interests are politically salient.

The next consideration is what effect institutions have on early ethnic electoral behavior. According to the preceding analysis, members of all ethnic groups have some expectation of representation irrespective of system type and electoral institutions. This is not to say, however, that these institutions have no effect on early ethnic electoral participation. According to Duverger (1954), the effects of electoral institutions on voting include the mechanical and the psychological. The mechanical effects are manifested immediately as a reduction in the number and types of viable parties, because only two parties can win seats in any one district under plurality rules (Riker, 1986). It is therefore likely that under restrictive electoral rules the initial number of contenders is more limited than the number of contenders under liberal electoral rules, even in the very first election.

Nevertheless, the number of contenders under restrictive electoral rules is probably higher in first elections than in subsequent elections because of the uncertainty about the outcome. Duverger (1954) explains this as the psychological effect, or the effect of sincere voting's being gradually supplanted by strategic voting, as voters generally take some time to learn

[9] This is true for mobilized ethnic groups that are not restricted from fielding ethnic parties or are represented through nonethnic parties. In some cases, however, institutions prevent ethnic groups from fielding parties (Birnir, 2004-a).

how a new electoral system works. Consequently, it is safe to assume that even under the most stringent electoral rules, most voters will vote for their sincerely preferred parties in new democracies.[10] The concern then becomes, how does the sincere ethnic vote differ from the sincere vote of the electorate at large in new democracies?

In a new democracy where representative capabilities of parties are generally unknown, a voter who because of lack of information is ignorant of the true policy differences between two parties should vote for the party about which there is less uncertainty. The reason is that the greater the uncertainty about a party's policy the greater the risk of supporting a party whose policy does not remotely resemble one's preferred policy. The greater the policy divergence between the voter and the party, the lower the utility in voting for that party and the greater the policy costs. According to Ethnic Attractors, ethnic voters will know more about the true policy preferences of the party they initially vote for than will voters at large, who on average do not have developed political information shortcuts about the various parties they must choose among in new democracies.

The important conclusion, therefore, is that in the very first election ethnic voters everywhere will likely vote with their group for sincerely preferred ethnic or nonethnic parties that represent the group. Nonethnic voters will likely also vote sincerely in the first election. However, because of the ethnic information advantage, the parties incorporating ethnic issues will more likely accurately reflect the ethnic voter policy preferences, while nonethnic parties will be less likely to accurately reflect those of nonethnic voters. Consequently, in subsequent elections ethnic voters will, *on average*, be more likely to remain loyal to the party they voted for than will nonethnic voters.

Two of the many possible testable implications that emerge are that *within new democracies where there are regional differences in ethnic demographics, voting behavior is more stable in ethnically diverse regions*. Furthermore, I expect that *voting behavior in new, ethnically heterogeneous democracies is initially more stable than in new, ethnically homogeneous democracies*.

[10] This assumption is itself predicated on an assumption, that voters have sincerely preferred parties for which to vote. This is, however, probable as party representatives who do not know much about the party's ability to enter the legislature are more likely to run in elections when information is scarce than later, when the effects of the electoral system are well understood. The large number of electoral parties that functioned immediately after democratization in many East European countries certainly supports this assumption. Furthermore, I do not assume voters in new democracies are naively sincere and vote for parties that have no probability of electoral success. My assumption is simply that of relative sincerity compared to later elections.

The type of sincerely preferred party (ethnic or multiethnic) that solicits the ethnic group members' support is immaterial with respect to stabilizing the vote as long as the party makes it abundantly clear that it represents the ethnic group's interests. The type of party representing the ethnic group will, nonetheless, probably vary somewhat, depending on the electoral system and attributes of the group. For instance, members of ethnic groups that are regionally concentrated will likely sincerely prefer ethnic parties. Members of regionally dispersed ethnic groups, in turn, may prefer broader nonethnic parties that represent the ethnic issue. The preference for a broader nonethnic party representing the group is likely strengthened in plurality electoral systems. Nevertheless, because of uncertainties about all parties in first elections, it is also likely that the party that sends the strongest signal to ethnic groups, or the explicitly ethnic party, will be disproportionately sincerely preferred by ethnic voters in early elections.

These implications are particularly interesting in light of theories about cleavage voting that predict that the ethnic vote will stabilize choices (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), because none, so far, distinguishes the effect of ethnic cleavages from that of other cleavages. The idea here, however, is that cleavages contribute unequally to vote choices in new democracies, as ethnicity stabilizes the vote immediately, whereas the effects of other cleavages may take time to materialize. Furthermore, despite the impression left by the ethnic conflict literature, we would expect ethnic politics to be a fundamentally stabilizing factor in new party systems, at least in the short term.

CONSTRAINING ETHNIC ATTRACTORS IN MATURING DEMOCRACIES

The questions that remain unanswered concern the long-term effects of Ethnic Attractors. Over time, as party representatives are elected and begin to participate in government, the true policy preferences of parties and their ability to represent the voter at all stages of the legislative game become increasingly clear, and so uncertainty in voters' beliefs about the parties decreases. Given the fact that none of the institutions (system type and electoral institutions) clearly prevents enactment of the ethnic issue, the electoral choices facing the ethnic voter in the long term are determined by ethnic issue salience and representation.

The choices facing the ethnic voter in maturing democracies are summed in Table 3.1. I first assume a two-party system, then relax this

TABLE 3.1. *Testable implications: Costs associated with the ethnic voter's electoral choice as determined by ethnic issue salience and representative capabilities of parties*

Representative capabilities of party (Is it able to enact policy?)	**Ethnic issue salient (Ethnic party on average closer to the ethnic voter's policy preferences)**	**Ethnic issue decreasing or no salience (Nonethnic parties on average closer to the ethnic voter's average policy preferences)**
Ethnic party is representative and Nonethnic party is not representative	None High	Moderate High
Ethnic party is representative and Nonethnic party is representative	None Moderate	Moderate None
Ethnic party is not representative and Nonethnic party is representative	High Moderate	High None
Ethnic party is not representative and Nonethnic party is not representative	High High	High High

Note: None: No costs. Moderate: Policy costs (policy divergence of voter and party). High: Representational costs. Party is unable to represent the voter.

assumption to examine the more general implications of the model. Each cell contains the results of two utility calculations (see Appendix A for the formal version). The first represents the costs associated with continuing voting for the ethnic party and the second represents costs of switching and voting for an alternative nonethnic party that over time may incorporate some of the ethnic issues when they are salient. It is assumed that when the ethnic issues are salient, the ethnic party policy package is on average closer to the preferences of the ethnic voter than is the policy package of any other party. Conversely, when the ethnic issues lose salience, the nonethnic party's policy package is closer to the ethnic voter policy preferences than the policy package proposed by the ethnic party.

Furthermore, the costs of voting associated with representation are judged with respect to both the policy proximity of the party to the voter

and a party's ability to represent the group. Therefore, representativeness refers both to the ability of the party to enact policy and to whether the party has picked up the relevant policy issue. Accordingly, Table 3.1 reflects the fact that when the ethnic party is not representative but other parties are, the voter's utility expectation changes from greater utility (lower costs) in voting for the ethnic party to greater utility in voting for the nonethnic party. This is because costs associated with voting for a nonrepresentative ethnic party are higher than costs of voting for a representative nonethnic party as long as the nonethnic party includes the ethnic policy issue when the ethnic issue is salient.

Table 3.1 offers some interesting insights. First, because uncertainty about policy preferences of parties in maturing democracies is negligible and does not differ among voters, it is dropped from the interpretation. The first cell shows that when ethnic issues remain salient and the ethnic party is able to enact ethnic policy, the ethnic voter will continue voting for the ethnic party as long as her policy preferences remain closer to those of the ethnic party than to those of the nonethnic party. Voting for the nonethnic party in this case would impose high costs on the ethnic voter and provide no benefits in terms of policy proximity or representation.

Cell two offers a bit of a surprise as it suggests that as long as an ethnic party holds power, it may be kept alive well past the point when its fundamental organizing principle becomes irrelevant. Because the nonethnic party does not have access to government (is not representative), voting for that party would be considerably more costly than continued voting for the ethnic party, even if the voter's policy preferences might on average be closer to the policies of the nonethnic party than to the policies of the ethnic party.

Cells three and four show that when both the ethnic party and the nonethnic party include the ethnic issue in their policy platform, policy proximity of the voter to these parties respectively determines how she should vote. When the ethnic issues are salient, we expect the voter to continue to vote for the ethnic party but defect to other representative parties when the ethnic issues lose salience. In a two-party system, both parties can be representative over time if they alternate in government.

According to cell five, as long as the nonethnic party has incorporated the salient ethnic issues into its policy platform, when the ethnic party is unable to access government, we would expect ethnic voters to migrate from the ethnic party to the nonethnic party despite incurring some policy costs. The sixth cell simply shows the obvious, that when the ethnic issues are not salient and the ethnic party is not representative, there is no reason to expect anyone to vote for the ethnic party any more.

The seventh and eighth cells articulate the instances in which we should expect electoral politics to break down and members of ethnic groups to pursue other venues of representation because they have no incentive to participate in elections. In cell seven, the ethnic issues remain salient but the ethnic party is unable to represent the group interests and no other parties that have access to government pick up the ethnic policy demands. In that case, the ethnic voter is left with no one for whom to vote. The eighth cell generalizes this idea to all voters. Without representation of her preferred policy in government, a voter's incentive to participate in electoral politics decreases significantly.

Relaxing the Assumption of a Two-Party System

The utility calculations presented thus far have assumed a two-party system where the ethnic party is either in or out of government and the ethnic issues are enacted by the ethnic party in government, by a nonethnic party in government, not represented, or alternately by the two parties.

In a multiparty system the options for representation are similar to those in a two-party system. In some instances the ethnic party may constitute the government and represent the group. In other cases, nonethnic parties may incorporate the ethnic issues and represent the ethnic group. Alternatively, the ethnic party and other parties may alternate in representing the ethnic issues in government. Furthermore, it is possible that in a multiparty system, the ethnic party is unable to advocate or enact ethnic policy issues in the legislature and that none of the other parties picks up and enact the ethnic policy issue. All of these possibilities are represented in the preceding table, and the explanations for when the ethnic voter should continue supporting the ethnic party or defect to other parties apply.

Multiparty systems do, however, offer three additional possibilities: simultaneous representation, strategic voting, and additional party options at the extremes of the party spectrum. I will address each in turn.

Coalition theory, in particular the logic of the minimum winning coalition (Riker, 1962; Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973; Dodd, 1976), teaches us that even very small groups in legislatures that are elected proportionally have a reasonable expectation of getting into a coalition government and having their policy and/or particularistic preferences advocated and enacted by their own representatives. Thus, it is possible that over time in a multiparty system both the ethnic party and nonethnic parties will

represent the ethnic issues simultaneously in a coalition government. Cell three accounts for this additional possible outcome.

Strategic voting, or voting for a second-choice party to prevent the victory of a least preferred third party, is only a consideration in multiparty systems (or plurality systems where more than two parties run in a district). Here it is assumed that enactment trumps purity of identity politics. Thus, in terms of expected utility, in the long run voters are strategic in that they prefer a representative nonethnic party to a nonrepresentative ethnic party. Naturally, if the ethnic issues remain salient, the representativeness of nonethnic parties depends on their incorporation of some or all of the ethnic policy demands. Cells five and six can account for strategic voting if, instead of understanding the nonethnic party as a single party, we define the nonethnic party as all nonethnic parties. In cell five, then, the ethnic voter would be expected to migrate to the nonethnic party that most closely simulates the ethnic voter's preferred policy, because marginal representation is better than no representation at all.

Finally, if a two-party system encourages policy moderation (Downs, 1957), multiparty systems offer a greater variety of options at the policy extremes. Thus, cells seven and eight still inform us when the ethnic voter should be expected to drop out of electoral politics, that is, when no party represents her interests.

The basic conclusions derived from the Table 3.1 are that if ethnic parties successfully represent the ethnic group in that the ethnic parties gain at least intermittent access to government, the ethnic constituencies will stably and flexibly support ethnic parties. Furthermore, if the ethnic parties are unable to represent the group members and/or if the ethnic issue loses salience, ethnic voters will migrate to representative nonethnic parties. The testable implications for ethnic electoral behavior are that *in the long term, represented ethnic constituencies are stable constituencies.* However, *in the intermediate term, as ethnic group members evolve from sincere to strategic voters, their voting behavior may destabilize temporarily.*

Conversely, *if the ethnic issue remains salient but the ethnic group is continually barred from representation, members of the ethnic group will exit electoral competition.* A corollary of the assumption that members of ethnic groups seek representation is that ethnic group members who exit electoral politics will seek to voice their policy objectives through alternate means. These implications pinpoint two uncertainties: First, how does ethnic electoral behavior develop from democratization until a significant number of group members believe they have exhausted the possibility of

ethnic policy enactment through electoral channels? Second, what are the alternatives to electoral means, to the end of ethnic policy enactment?

If learning how electoral rules restrict representation takes time (Duverger, 1954), it seems safe to assume that the realization that one's ethnic group is unable to access the government is a significant learning process. Institutions undoubtedly affect this learning. As mentioned, the strength of the ethnic expectation of access will depend on the interaction between the ethnic cleavage and the institutional structure. For example, it is likely that members of ethnic groups in a proportional system hold out hope for access to coalition governments through ethnic parties longer than ethnic group members in plurality systems, where coalition governments are less common. This realization will be particularly expedient if the group in the plurality system is not regionally concentrated and therefore is unable to field an ethnic party. However, members of ethnic groups that are not regionally concentrated and live under plurality rules are more likely to seek access through nonethnic parties than members of ethnic groups that are regionally concentrated or live under proportional rules. Thus, learning whether nonethnic parties are venues for ethnic policy access through government may also take time under plurality rules where ethnic groups are regionally dispersed. Similarly, size and other attributes of the group, the types of grievances, and external support will likely affect the duration of the group's hope for access.

According to the literature, after exit, protest and violence are two of the alternative political means available to members of ethnic groups[11] (Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Varshney, 2002; Petersen, 2002; Saideman et al., 2002; Wilkinson, 2004). The target of excluded ethnic group member desires is in most cases still the state, because the state executive controls resources. It is probable, therefore, that members of groups that are continually excluded increasingly resort to political protest and violence against the state to make their demands heard. Examples from Latin American indigenous groups abound (Birnir, 2004-a; Madrid, 2005-a, 2005-b; Van Cott 2005). Similarly, Russians in Latvia recently have engaged in a number of demonstrations against the state to

[11] These are, of course, only two of the alternatives available after individuals belonging to the group have exited electoral politics. Alternatively, the group may mobilize through peaceful nongovernmental organizations. This type of alternate organization is common, for example, among indigenous voters in Andean countries (see, for example, Van Cott, 2005.) For groups that exit electoral politics but remain mobilized (such as the indigenous groups mentioned), protest and violence frequently are utilized alongside other strategies.

protest education reform passed in early 2004 limiting the use of Russian in schools. This wave of protests follows a period of uneasy relations between the state and the Russian minority since Latvia became independent in 1991, when the state instituted stringent language requirements for citizenship, effectively excluding much of the minority from gaining citizenship. Basques in Spain and Tamils in Sri Lanka are two other minority groups whose members have resorted to violence against the state to voice political demands.

CONCLUSION

At this point it is important to note that I do not assume that all ethnic preferences are endogenous to the electoral process, nor that the impetus for ethnic vote stability and/or ethnic protest and violence can always be resolved with concessions. All groups have preferences that are not subject to legislative bargaining because they conflict with the construct of the nation state or are in part exogenously determined. Such issues include demands for secession that are highly influenced by external support (Jenne, 2006) and demands for improvements in the economy of the group that are restricted by the level of development of the country (Lipset, 1959; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Similarly, collective group demands are shaped by group characteristics such as geographic concentration (Toft, 2003). These issues are mostly or even entirely exogenous to the electoral process and likely influence group members' ability to seek venues other than electoral participation to achieve their goals. Thus, I do not mean to imply that electoral concessions are a magic solution to all ethnic political conflict, only that representation contributes to peaceful ethnic political behavior and exclusion contributes to increasing ethnic intransigence.

The argument about ethnic access in this book differs from the principal arguments regarding ethnicity and access in the literature. According to Lijphart (1977, 1999), a "primary characteristic of consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country" (1977, p. 25) to ensure peaceful ethnic politics. Horowitz (1985), in turn, believes that while the moderating effect of ethnic access to a governing coalition is "not necessarily misplaced" (p. 365), it is too simplistic. He argues that there are qualitative differences among coalitions of convenience or commitment, and alliances. In short, he believes that the brittleness of coalitions of convenience makes them less conducive to mitigation of

conflict than the other two types. Finally, Wilkinson (2004) makes an argument about the behavior of politicians when ethnic groups constitute their parties' support base or the support base of their coalition partners, or when politicians face the prospect of coalition partnership with the minority as the result of a competitive electoral system. In such cases, Wilkinson argues that politicians will increase protection of minorities (p. 6).

In contrast to Lijphart, I argue that elite cooperation in governance is not a precondition to access for members of minority groups. Nor is such an arrangement necessarily essential for peaceful governance. Furthermore, I argue that reasonable expectations of access to the executive by minority group members exist in many more systems than those employing a consociational power-sharing mechanism. Contrary to Horowitz, the logic of the argument presented here also presupposes that there is no difference between the effect of access to a coalition of convenience as opposed to one of commitment or alliance. I argue that once an ethnic party becomes a coalition partner or is courted for a coalition, that party gains leverage in that it is able to negotiate concessions regardless of other coalition partners' truthfulness in their commitment to the ethnic issue or temporary time horizon. Consequently, if the ethnic party occasionally enters government, members of the ethnic group will consider continued peaceful participation in electoral politics valuable even though true commitment to ethnic equality may not be reflected in the society at large or consistently reflected in major party rhetoric. Wilkinson, in turn, focuses on politicians' actions to protect the minority as a result of minority access to coalition. The argument here, however, centers on ethnic group member action as a result of prospects for access to a governing coalition and fulfillment of that expectation.

The testable implications of Ethnic Attractors with respect to the constraints of ethnic group cohesion and representation as elaborated in this chapter are multiple. Members of ethnic groups are expected to use their group affiliation as an information shortcut for political choices. In the short term, this information function is an advantage enjoyed by the ethnic group members that nonethnic voters on average do not have in new democracies. Consequently, I expect that initial vote choice of ethnically heterogeneous populations will stabilize faster than vote choice of homogeneous populations.

As democracy matures, members of ethnic groups continue to use their group affiliation as an information source for political choices, provided the cleavage remains salient and the group finds access to government.

If the ethnic party is unable to represent the ethnic voters, I expect these voters will migrate to nonethnic parties that do represent the ethnic policy issue. Furthermore, if the cleavage becomes less salient, I expect ethnic group members will migrate to nonethnic parties that better represent their interests. Finally, if the ethnic issue remains salient but the ethnic party is unable to represent the group, and if none of the nonethnic parties that have access to government takes up the ethnic issue, members of the ethnic group likely will exit electoral competition and explore other means of achieving their political objectives, including political protest and even violence.

In the following chapters, I will test the principal implications generated by the argument of Ethnic Attractors in this chapter. In Chapter Four, I test the hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity in new democracies stabilizes electoral preferences through analysis of subnational level voting data from Romania. To address the problem of generalization from a single case, I test this hypothesis in Chapter Five through comparative statistical analysis of first elections in all new democracies since World War II.

The stabilizing influence of ethnicity is especially important if some of the more influential political scientists writing on party systems are correct in concluding that stable political parties are necessary to the functioning of a democracy.[12] The significance of the stabilizing influence of ethnic voting increases further if we consider that it occurs under the particularly fragile political conditions of regime transition (Przeworski, 1991).

Chapter Six begins exploring the additional circumstances that contribute to or hinder the effective stable integration of ethnic parties in new democracies in the longer term. Through case studies of Romania, Bulgaria, and Spain, I propose that access to government coalitions promotes flexible political behavior of ethnic group members, whereas exclusion pushes members of the groups and their leaders to increasing intransigence.

Chapter Seven explores the long-term electoral behavior of ethnic group members, then moves on to examine whether the probability that members of ethnic groups will engage in protest and violence really is a function of the duration of the group's exclusion from government. This chapter pays special attention to long-term effects on regime stability as affected by the types of parties through which ethnic interests are

[12] To name but a few, Duverger, 1954; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Sartori, 1976; and Bartolini and Mair, 1990.

channeled and tests a variety of complementary institutional and economic hypotheses.

Ethnic protest and violence have been the subject of extensive research,[13] but to date, no empirical studies involving a large number of ethnic groups have analyzed the effects of access systematically. If the testable implication that members of ethnic groups who do not achieve representation eventually exit electoral politics and pursue other means to achieve policy and particularistic demands, including protest and violence, holds true, the implications for our understanding of ethnic politics are considerable.

[13] See, for example, Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Cohen, 1997; Varshney, 2002; Petersen, 2002; Saideman et al., 2002; Wilkinson, 2004.

4

Ethnic Voting in Romania

Parties are at the center of political life for new voters in the diverse democracies of such nations as Romania, Hungary, Ecuador, and Chile.[1] For parties' democratic functions to develop, party systems must stabilize over time. If parties are to benefit their constituencies by providing representation, policy expertise, and accessible political information, they must survive and establish a reputation.[2] If the parties exist only for a short period or change frequently in other fundamental ways, they cannot credibly claim to represent the interests of a constituency in the legislature; nor can a fly-by-night party efficiently serve an information function for voters. In order to accept the party as representative and believe the information the party provides, voters must trust the party leadership. Such

[1] Real parties and voters do not always live up to democratic ideals, but, at their best, elected party representatives present the interests of their constituency in the national legislature. The party elite usually possesses the expertise necessary to participate in the complicated policy process, and the parties then provide their constituency with accessible information regarding this process. In turn, many of the voters in all these countries voice their preferences through support for parties, votes, and other means.

[2] According to Przeworski, Kitschelt and associates, and Mainwaring and Scully, stabilization of the party system requires stability in the rules of interparty competition and in the existence of individual parties. Second, major parties must have somewhat stable roots in society. Third, political actors must accord legitimacy to the electoral process through peaceful transfers of power; finally, party organizations must acquire value of their own rather than being subordinated to the will of their leaders (Przeworski, 1991; Kitschelt et al., 1995; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). In the democracies examined in this book, the procedural conditions of institutionalization have all been satisfied. Therefore, in subsequent discussions of party system stabilization, the focus is on stability in the relationship between voters and on the parties and institutions that affect this stability.

trust only develops in stable relationships. This stabilization of the party system is an integral component of party system institutionalization.

As noted in Chapter One, the development of stable relationships between parties and voters is particularly important in new democracies in order to counteract the destabilizing mobilization that results from economic deterioration immediately after democratization. According to Przeworski (1991), voters in new democracies hold incumbents accountable for deteriorating economic conditions associated with transition and vote them out of office. This change of government, in turn, derails any economic reform initiated by the incumbent and sends the country into a vicious circle of depression and political mobilization.

While implementation of electoral rules and free and fair voting may occur immediately after democratization, institutionalization,[3] marked by party system stability, compliance with rules, and stable relationships between parties and voters, only develops over time. As discussed earlier, ethnic heterogeneity is commonly thought to obstruct the successful

[3] *Institutionalization* and c*onsolidation* generally are poorly defined in the literature and often are used interchangeably. Some authors such as Przeworski and Kitschelt use *consolidation* to mean early implementation of the rules of democratic conduct and initial participation of voters in elections. This chapter will follow the example of Huntington and later Mainwaring and Scully. Huntington defines *institutionalization* as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (1968); Mainwaring and Scully add that institutionalization is "a process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted. Actors develop expectations, orientations and behavior on the basis of the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future." Institutionalization of the party system, thus, occurs through learning of democratic behavior over time, exemplified by the development of relationships between parties and voters, and general systemic stability. Mainwaring and Scully also imply that institutionalization is distinct from consolidation. They point out that "in countries where democracy is not consolidated or where parties and other institutions are weak, the case for studying parties is less obvious. . . . Yet parties still matter, for they shape the political system in a variety of ways even when they are not well institutionalized"(1995, p. 3). Thus a party system theoretically can be inchoate or not institutionalized in a consolidated democracy, but in a democracy institutionalized parties do not exist without consolidation of the regime. In other words, *institutionalization* refers specifically to the stabilization of the party system over time in a democracy, while *consolidation* more broadly incorporates early phases of democratization. Although it is impossible to determine exactly when a country's party system has become institutionalized, it is possible to point out examples at either end of the spectrum. For instance, West European democracies such as Germany are commonly considered institutionalized while many Latin American democracies such as Brazil remain "weakly institutionalized" despite having held and adhered to the results of many democratic elections (Mainwaring, 1999). Other countries, such as Romania, are still institutionalizing, but insufficient time has passed to determine whether these countries will remain weakly institutionalized or become strongly institutionalized.

consolidation of new democracies. The primary objective of this book is to demonstrate that in electoral politics, the opposite is actually true.

One of the principal implications of the argument of Ethnic Attractors as laid out in Chapter Three is that once democracy is established procedurally, ethnic heterogeneity will jump-start institutionalization of the party system by inducing stability in the pattern of voting. Within a country, one of the testable implications of this argument is that ethnic diversity induces stability in the pattern of regional voting behavior where ethnic groups are concentrated. The principal objective of this chapter is to test this claim empirically.

Ideally I would like to test this implication at the individual level through analysis of exit polls recording continuity and change in voting behavior in all new democracies. Unfortunately, such polls are not readily available. Similarly, public opinion polls in new democracies are rare and not often reliable.[4] Therefore, it is difficult to test the predicted voting stability resulting from ethnic membership directly. However, some of the implications of the ethnicity hypotheses are directly testable. For instance, if ethnicity truly induces vote stability, party systems will stabilize more rapidly in ethnically heterogeneous locations than in homogeneous locations. In the following pages I therefore test the strength of the relationship between ethnic diversity and volatility of electoral preferences at the subnational level through comparisons of regions that diverge in their ethnic composition. Other implications are refined and tested using these data as well.

This analysis begins with a discussion of case selection criteria and measurement issues, then proceeds to test the effect of ethnic diversity on vote stability at the subnational level. The test is followed by presentation of auxiliary evidence that corroborates the causal inference. The principal conclusion of this chapter is that ethnic diversity stabilizes voting in ethnically diverse regions.

CASE SELECTION AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES

One of the principal methodological concerns in the assessment of party system stability when using more aggregate than individual level data is the problem of ecological inference. The question is whether inferences

[4] For further discussion of the problems with public opinion polls see, for example, King (1997). Recent efforts through the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) have begun to fill the gap in comparative election studies. Though impressive, the first module of this study included only current elections in seventeen new democracies and only one or two elections for each country.

made about the role of individual behavior in party system stabilization are accurate, or whether aggregate data mask the true individual behavior of interest. One example is hidden vote volatility. That is to say, a party could conceivably lose its entire previous constituency and gain all new voters so that its volatility in the aggregate would measure 0 while real volatility would actually be 100 percent.

While hidden volatility is not a grave problem in multination panel studies where there is no reason to believe that it is systematically hidden,[5] it is still a great enough concern to warrant the attempt to remedy it. Thus, the question asked in this chapter is whether ethnicity produces vote stability at the subnational level. While county-level results are still aggregate, it is less likely that votes will move between parties, hiding real volatility in many counties at the same time. Therefore, this chapter examines the testable implication that ethnic heterogeneity jump-starts institutionalization of the party system at the subnational level.

The implications of the argument of Ethnic Attractors are that, in the short term, in the low-information environment of new democracies, ethnic group members are provided with stronger voting cues than nonethnics. These cues, in turn, have a stabilizing influence on the ethnic vote. One testable implication is that this stabilizing influence of ethnicity should be evident in subnational comparisons of regions with divergent levels of ethnic heterogeneity.

The selection of a case in order to examine whether the prediction of ethnic vote stability holds at the subnational level is methodologically simple. The country must be relatively ethnically heterogeneous so that the voting behavior of the ethnic populations can be compared to that of the nonethnic group. Second, the populations compared must be spatially located in a manner that makes comparison of their vote possible. In other words, heterogeneity must vary between subnational units.

Several new democracies fit these criteria. I chose Romania because, compared to other new democracies in Europe, Romania is relatively ethnically heterogeneous. Furthermore, the ethnic Hungarian minority in Romania is regionally concentrated, ensuring some variation in heterogeneity between counties.

Measuring Vote Stability

Electoral volatility is the common indicator of vote stability (Pedersen, 1979; Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck, 1984; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989;

[5] I discuss the problem of hidden volatility further in Chapter Five.

Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Shvetsova and Filippov, 1995; Rose, 1995; Mair, 1997; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Madrid, 2005-a; Birnir, 2005;). Electoral volatility denotes the percentage of votes gained by any one party and lost by any other party in each election. The greater the volatility, the more voters have switched between parties from one election to the next. The standard measure of electoral volatility is Przeworski's, which accounts for change in votes for parties between elections (Przeworski 1975).[6] The formal definition of electoral volatility is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| \frac{P_{it} - P_{i(t+1)}}{2} \right|$$

This means that electoral volatility in the party system between elections at t and $t + 1$ is measured as half the sum of the absolute difference between vote shares (P) of all parties in each election. Because a party can either gain or lose votes in an election, the shares are taken without their sign in the aggregate. Because the vote shares are counted twice, once when a party loses a portion of the vote share and once when another party gains that vote share, only half of the observed difference is used. Finally, n indicates that all parties are counted in the measure, even if they participate in only one election. As discussed by Mair (2000), the measure is a useful indicator where aggregate comparative survey data may not be available.

Application of the volatility measure is fairly straightforward in established democracies where party systems are either well or somewhat consolidated. However, in new democracies where party systems are considerably more fluid, the measure has encountered certain problems. The most serious concern is determining how to assess the amount of change in a system where parties are merging and splitting and/or changing names and leaders. Thus far, most studies implicitly or explicitly[7] have employed the easy solution of simply tracing party names or major factions between elections. Because most mergers, splits, or name changes are thus considered new parties, apparent volatility increases.

[6] This measure is alternatively called the *Mogen Pedersen measure*. According to Mair (2000), the reason for this is that the measure was originally published in an article by Przeworski in 1975 but popularized in Pedersen's article, published in 1979.

[7] The notable exceptions are, for instance, Bartolini and Mair (1990) and Toka (1997). In addition, Bartolini and Mair (1990) discuss the importance of examining what they call "Block Volatility" and "Within Block Volatility" or vote changes between and within blocks of parties, determined by certain "relevant characteristics," as well as between individual parties (pp. 20–23). Kitschelt and co-workers (1999) also pick up on the need to "distinguish between volatility within blocks of parties that have similar programmatic appeals and volatility across party blocks"(p. 400).

For instance, Rose (1995) argues that Romania's volatility between the 1990 and 1992 elections was 63 percent (indicating that up to 63 percent of those who voted changed their party allegiance between elections). He explains that the Frontul Salvarii Nationale (FSN) won 66 percent in the first parliamentary election. "It subsequently split; the remnant of that coalition took only 10 percent of the vote at the second election"(1995, p. 26).[8] The article does not explain, however, that the remnant discussed is the faction led by Petre Roman, which kept a part of the old name in the second election,[9] but that a much larger faction of the original FSN, led by Ion Iliescu, also competed in the second, third, fourth and fifth national elections. Iliescu's faction won a plurality in the second election, finished second in the third election, won a plurality in the fourth election, and plurality as a member of a coalition in the fifth election. All of this is common knowledge in Romania. Consequently, one cannot argue that votes for Iliescu's party[10] in the second election were votes for a new party. The original FSN voters simply split between Roman's party and Iliescu's party in the second election.

Unfortunately, this practice of tracing party names confounds three different types of volatilities: electoral volatility, party system volatility, and volatility in the legislature. *Electoral volatility* denotes the change in constituency votes from one party to another. *Party volatility* refers to the stability of a party's existence, and *volatility in the legislature* depends on the stability of parties in the legislature. Theoretically, if a party splits and each faction retains the votes of loyal electors, while party system instability will have increased (and instability in the legislature may also

[8] According to Rose, the sum of changes in the vote for parties amounted to 126 percent, out of a maximum of 200 percent. According to Przeworski's index, 126 is divided in half. Rose includes all parties that received over 1 percent as well as "others." My volatility calculations include only parties with seats. Nonetheless, because there was no threshold in the 1990 elections in Romania, I include parties that received well below 1 percent of the vote share. Thus, my calculations are not biased toward obtaining a lower volatility number when compared to Rose's calculations because I count as volatility the loss of votes from parties that in the second election did not pass the 3 percent threshold or merge with other parties. Rose's count, however, still includes all parties that obtained above 1 percent of the vote.

[9] Petre Roman was the first prime minister of the FSN-led government. He later split with the party because of a dispute with the party's leader, Ion Iliescu. The name of Roman's party was Frontul Democratic Salvarii Nationale; the name was changed later to Partidul Democrat–Frontul Salvarii Nationale, and the party subsequently joined a coalition called the Uniunea Social Democrata.

[10] The name of Iliescu's party was changed first to Frontul Democratic al Salvarii Nationale, then to Partidul Democratiei Sociale din Romania, and finally to Partidul Social Democrat.

have increased if the party is represented in the legislature), no change of voter preferences will have taken place. Similarly, votes for a new coalition will not necessarily increase electoral volatility, but in fact will increase party and even legislature volatility. For the sake of ensuring party survival and of retaining party patronage, parties in a coalition usually make sure to distinguish themselves within the coalition. Furthermore, the coalition platform is usually some mixture of the cooperating parties' platforms. Thus, a voter selecting a party according to platform is likely to vote for the coalition in the absence of the possibility of voting for her old party by itself. If she does vote for the coalition, no change in electoral preferences has occurred. If, however, she decides that she does not like the coalition partners of her old party and gives her vote to an entirely new party, her vote does show a change in electoral preferences.

In short, volatility of electoral preferences does not occur unless the voter changes her vote between elections from one party to another party that previously was not associated, as part of a larger party, with the party for whom she originally voted. Party system and legislature volatility can, however, occur without any electoral volatility if parties merge or split between elections. The focus of this chapter and the next is electoral volatility, but I will return to the subject of party system and legislature volatility in Chapter Seven. For a detailed discussion of the calculation of the measure in this book, see Appendix B.

Measuring Ethnicity

In Chapter Two *ethnicity* is defined as group self-identification around a characteristic that is very difficult or even impossible to change, such as language, race, or location. Precisely how ethnicity should be measured is a matter of debate (Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003; Posner, 2004-a; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007). If the question of interest involves the effect of ethnicity on policy outcomes, for example, then it might make sense to count the number of ethnic groups represented in the legislature rather than those in society as a whole, because only those groups that have access to the legislature would be expected to be influential (Laitin and Posner, 2001; Posner, 2004-a). The question under investigation here, however, requires a measure that captures not only the number of ethnic groups in society, but also the way the population is distributed among them. The reason distribution is important is that an ethnic minority of half a million is more likely to reduce overall electoral volatility by voting as a bloc in a country where the total population numbers 2 million people

than in a country that numbers 23 million people. In other words, any measure used must weigh the relative importance of each ethnic group within each country.

The common measure of ethnic fractionalization in the literature is one minus the Herfindahl concentration index (Taylor and Hudson, 1972; Mauro, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Birnir, 2001; Alesina et al., 2003; Posner 2004-a; Birnir and Van Cott, 2007) The index calculates the probability that two individuals picked at random from the population will belong to different groups and varies from 0 in a perfectly homogeneous country to 1 when every individual belongs to a different group. The formal definition of the Herfindahl concentration index (subtracted from 1) is

$$1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2$$

where s_i is the ith share of group I ($i = 1 \ldots n$).

How does this measure work in practice? Imagine, for instance, that the population on the fictitious continent Ethnica, in country A, is divided into five equally large ethnic groups. In that case, the probability that any two people picked at random from the sample of the whole population will belong to different ethnic groups is very high, or as Table 4.1 shows, 0.8 on a scale that ranges from 0 to 1. As Table 4.1 also shows, the fewer the groups in society and the greater the inequalities between the numbers in each group, the lower the relative fractionalization.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND VOTE STABILITY IN ROMANIA

The Herfindahl concentration index can also be used to calculate the probability that two individuals picked at random from the population will belong to different groups, which will vary by region within a single country. Romania is an ethnically heterogeneous country. According to the 2002 census, the population of nearly 22 million people is divided among at least twenty-three ethnic groups, in addition to ethnic Romanians. These groups range from close to 1.5 million Hungarians to only forty-five self-reported as Ghaghauzians. Nonethnic Romanians live all over the country but are most numerous in the center and northwest, where much of the ethnic Hungarian population is concentrated (Romania Census, 2002).

The ethnic fractionalization measure is an imperfect measure of ethnicity, as it does not distinguish between groups that think of themselves in

TABLE 4.1. *Ethnic fractionalization on the fictitious continent Ethnica*

	Number of people who belong to each ethnic group					
Country group	**Titular**	**Southerners**	**Northerners**	**Easterners**	**Westerners**	**Fractionalization index**
A	20	20	20	20	20	0.8
B	40	25	25	10		0.72
C	40	40	20			0.6
D	60	20	20			0.57
E	80	10	9	1		0.35
F	90	4	2	2	2	0.19
G	95	2	1	1	1	0.09

Note: Population total in each country = 100.



FIGURE 4.1. Percentage of minority Romanians and the ethnic fractionalization index by county

ethnic terms and dominant groups, which often do not. Ideally, the measure would only account for the number of people who identify themselves as belonging to an ethnic group different from the dominant group. It is likely, however, that the two are correlated, because only one group can be dominant, and the index generally returns a higher number when there are more groups that are large enough to be politically salient, making the measure useful when comparing the general ethnic heterogeneity of one country to that of another. Similarly, when comparing the fractionalization index among counties in Romania, the measure should return a higher number when the minority population in a county is larger. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between the proportions of national minorities in a county as counted in the 2002 census and the index of fractionalization by region calculated with 2002 census figures. The table shows a curvilinear relationship between the proportion of minority Romanians in a county and the number returned by the fractionalization index. Once the national minority passes a threshold and becomes the majority in a county, the fractionalization index returns decreasing numbers. Nonetheless, I expect populations in counties where the ethnic minority constitutes a majority to be more electorally stable than populations in other counties because the elections I look at are national. In national elections I expect the ethnic minority to vote with the group in opposition to parties that represent the majority. Consequently, I account separately with a dummy variable for the two regions where the ethnic national minority is a regional majority.

To estimate the effect of ethnic voting on volatility among counties in Romania, I use ordinary least squares regression to calculate county level volatilities of all parties between the 1992 and 1996 national elections. I also trace parties through name changes, splits, and mergers using the methods described in Appendix B.[11] I chose to use the 1992 and 1996 elections instead of the founding elections in 1990 and the second election in 1992 because more allegations have arisen regarding election irregularities in the 1990 election than in the 1992 election.[12] Furthermore, the availability of data from the 1992 and 1996 elections is greater than the availability of data from the 1990 election.

I also calculate a fractionalization index for each county. Romanian demographics changed somewhat after democratization, so to capture the most accurate level of fractionalization for this period I average two indexes that I calculated from 1992 and 2002 census data. I also include control variables that in the literature have been associated with voting for particular parties in Romania (Datculescu, 1999; Birnir, 2001; Roper, 2003; Roper and Fesnic, 2003). These include the percentages of people employed in agriculture and education.[13]

Table 4.2 shows that ethnic fractionalization is very significantly associated with decreased volatility at the subnational level in Romania. The variable accounting for voting in the counties of Covasna and Harghita, where the Hungarian minority constitutes a majority of the population, is also highly statistically significant as expected. The controls accounting for agricultural employment and higher education are not significant.

Figure 4.2 shows the substantive effect of increasing diversity on volatility at the subnational level in counties other than Covasna and Harghita, holding other variables constant at their average values. Going from Vaslui, the most homogeneous county (0.012), to Mures, the most heterogeneous one (0.554), decreases volatility over 7 percent. The vote is even more stable in Covasna and Harghita.

Average aggregate volatility of just above 7 percent is considered stable for an institutionalized democracy; volatility above 10 percent is considered unusually high, and anything above 30 percent is indicative of an inchoate system (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Therefore, a reduction

[11] In the calculations of volatility in Romania I "blocked" on ethnicity (see Bartolini and Mair, 1990) because I wanted to get an idea of the number of votes cast for each ethnic group between years. Blocking affected only very small ethnic groups and the Roma.

[12] For a discussion of alleged irregularities in both the 1990 and 1992 elections, see Carey (1995).

[13] All of these data are from Romanian census statistics (1996) collected in 1995.

TABLE 4.2. *Regression results: The relationship between county level volatility and ethnic fractionalization in Romania between the 1992 and 1996 elections*

	Percentage volatility by county, 1992–96, all parties
Ethnic fractionalization by county	−13.76
	(4.15)**
Percentage of people with higher education	−0.45
	(0.50)
Percentage of people employed in agriculture	0.03
	(0.07)
Covasna and Harghita	−18.36
	(0.00)**
Constant	31.64
	(1.32)**
Observations	41
R^2	0.59

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. **Significant at 1%.



FIGURE 4.2. The substantive effect of ethnic fractionalization on county level vote stability in Romania between the 1992 and 1996 elections, excluding Covasna and Harghita

in volatility of at least 7 percent as a result of increasing ethnic diversity between regions is substantively very significant.

The Vote for Ethnic Parties

The obvious question that emerges from the previous analysis is, how do we know that ethnic voting is responsible for stabilizing the vote behavior in these counties, and not alternative variables that covary with

fractionalization? Thus, in the remainder of this chapter I examine the ethnic vote in Romania in greater detail.

The particular features of the party system, including whether the parties that emerge are ethnic parties, are influenced by the institutional structures (Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Horowitz, 1985, 1990-a; Chandra, 2004; Birnir, 2004-a; Posner 2005). The Romanian electoral design favors small ethnic parties. Since democratization in 1990, Romanian deputies have been elected in county constituencies by a closed list system or independent candidature on the principle of proportional representation. The relatively permissive average district magnitude, ranging from 9.4 in 1990 to 7.8 legislators elected per district in 1992 and thereafter, allowed for a high number of parties to enter the legislature. However, a general threshold that increased from 3 percent when first instituted in 1992 to 5 percent before the 2000 national election decreased party fragmentation in the legislature after the last election (Birnir, 2004-b).

Counteracting the effects of the threshold and promoting the emergence of ethnic parties, Romanian institutions exempt ethnic parties from the restrictions of the threshold. According to the 1991 Constitution, organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities that obtain less than 5 percent of the vote nationally have the right to one deputy seat each under the terms of the electoral law.[14] Furthermore, the standing orders of the Romanian legislature differentiate between the exempted minority groups and other parties in that they allow the unification of minorities into a single parliamentary group, whereas other parties (including the Hungarian party)[15] are not allowed to coalesce in a single parliamentary group. Parliamentary groups, in turn, are the organizational unit for allocation of funds for logistical support in the legislature and are important for legislative purposes. In light of the hypothesis that membership in an ethnic group functions as a strong information cue for political choices, and the implications of the model that predict no policy costs if the group is represented through an ethnic party as long as that party is effective in its representation, one would expect these institutional features to encourage

[14] The electoral law stipulates the exact percentage of votes the group must win (Muraru, 1995).

[15] While Romanian electoral law stipulates that only political parties can contest elections, the law also states that organizations of national minorities participating in elections shall be considered judicially equivalent to political parties. Consequently, the Hungarian Alliance, which does not define itself as a political party but as an "alliance of associated members" (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, 1994), is allowed to contest elections (Birnir, 2001).



FIGURE 4.3. Numbers of votes and minority group members in Romania in 1992

continued ethnic voting for ethnic parties in Romania, although some of these parties are quite small.

Indeed, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show that the absolute numbers of votes in the 1992 election and 2000 election for ethnic minority parties generally follow the absolute numbers of minority group members in the 1992 and 2002 censuses, respectively, with the exception of the Roma, who are significantly more numerous than their ethnic party vote would indicate.[16] Naturally, most of the population figures tend to be more numerous than the absolute numbers of votes, as the latter can only account for people of voting age who turn out.

If census figures accurately predict the vote for the ethnic party in the year that the vote takes place (or in the nearest year, as in the 2000 vote figures and 2002 census figures), one would also expect changes in demographics to predict changes in the absolute numbers of votes for each group accurately. To test this implication I examine the change in demographics as recorded in the 1992 and 2002 censuses and compare them to change in absolute votes between the 1992 and 1996 election. I examine

[16] Possible explanations for this include a disproportionately young population and lack of mobilization.



FIGURE 4.4. Numbers of votes in 2000 and minority group members in 2002 in Romania

the 1996 election despite the fact that the second population census was not taken until 2002, because the principal demographic changes likely took place immediately after the democratization of the whole region, or between the 1992 and 1996 elections. These changes included migration to and from Romania in response to increasingly porous borders, while allowing for some bureaucratic delays. Thus, it is likely that the 2002 census reflects demographic changes that took place some years earlier and were reflected as early as the 1996 vote. Figure 4.5 substantiates this idea. For most groups, the changes in absolute numbers belonging to the group, as well as votes for the minority parties, are around 0. This reflects the fact that even after democratization, Romanian minorities, as well as ethnic Romanians from Romania, have continued to face considerable restrictions from abroad on travel and international migration, and those who have remained have continued to vote for the ethnic party.[17] Furthermore, few minorities have migrated to Romania.

The figure also shows the exceptions. These include ethnic Germans who emigrated en masse from Romania to Germany after democratization as a result of German immigration laws that liberally granted citizenship

[17] For instance, when young Romanian friends wished to visit me in the United States, we had to go through a lengthy process that included my issuing an invitation and their proving that they had property and stable employment in Romania. Only then were they deemed not at risk for nonreturn and given visas.



FIGURE 4.5. Change in numbers of votes (1992–1996) and minority group members (1992–2002) in Romania

according to *ius sanguinis* or ancestry, at least until the new immigration law was passed in 2002 (Frick and Wagner, 2000; Oezcan, 2002). As expected, votes for the German party declined in tandem with emigration. To the contrary, the Roma population surged between 1992 and 2002. It is not very likely, however, that the Roma migrated in large numbers to Romania between 1992 and 2002. A more likely explanation is simply better accounting by the state; better accounting by the state in the census was likely accompanied by better accounting by the state in voter registration, enabling more Roma to vote. Consequently, the increased numbers of Roma accounted for in the census are mirrored in the increased numbers of votes for Roma parties.

The one clear exception to the expected trend of the vote following demographic changes is a significant increase in the number of votes for the Hungarian minority party despite the emigration of large numbers of ethnic Hungarians from Romania to Hungary. The explanation for this is simple. The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) emerged as a significant opposition party in the 1992 election. Before the subsequent legislative election in 1996, it became clear that opposition parties would win in a landslide. It is likely that the prospect of coalition

access through their own ethnic party mobilized the remaining Hungarians who might not have voted in the 1992 election to cast their vote for the UDMR in 1996. This increased vote instability seemingly counters the prediction of a stable ethnic vote. I will return to this subject in Chapter Seven, where I examine developments of the ethnic vote as democracies mature.

Other Testable Implications

The previous analysis demonstrates some of the testable implications derived from the hypothesis that ethnic groups provide their members with stable political cues for voting. Another implication is that if a governing coalition of parties were held responsible and punished by voters for a country's economic and other troubles, we would expect ethnic parties within that coalition to suffer less vote loss than their coalition partners. This is exactly the result produced by the Romanian legislative election in 2000.

Because of a variety of problems, including the sluggish economy and failed hopes for speedy integration into NATO and the European Union, the group of parties that ruled Romania from 1996 was decimated in the legislative elections that were held in November 2000. The largest force in the government coalition between 1996 and 2000 was the Democratic Convention (CDR), an alliance of the National Peasant Party-Christian Democratic (PNT-CD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), and other smaller parties.[18] In addition, the governing coalition included the Social-Democratic Union (USD), which itself included the Democratic Party (PD) and the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR). The third force in the governing coalition was the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR). Before the 2000 elections the CDR split up and the PNL ran separately.[19]

As Table 4.3 shows, the Hungarian UDMR was much less affected by voter defections than other parties in the governing coalition. While the ruling coalition was blamed for everything that went wrong in Romanian politics between 1996 and 2000, ethnic Hungarian voters were more reluctant to abandon the UDMR than other voters were to abandon the other coalition partners.

[18] For a more detailed account of Romanian political parties since the return to democracy, see (Birnir, 2004-b).

[19] Furthermore, the PSDR jumped the USD ship to run with the victorious Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) in 2000. This may explain some of the vote loss of the PD, which in 1996 was the main party in the USD coalition but ran alone in 2000.

TABLE 4.3. *Change in vote share of selected Romanian political parties after the 2000 parliamentary elections*

	1996 vote (%)	2000 vote (%)	Change in vote share
CDR/PNL	37.19	11.9	−25.29 (66.72%)
UDMR	7.62	6.8	−0.82 (10.76%)
PD	16.15	7	−9.15 (56.65%)

As I discuss further in Chapter Six, the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR, later called Social Democratic Party PSD) won a plurality in both the 2000 and 2004 national elections. The Hungarian party, in turn, maintained its vote share nearly unchanged in 2004, receiving 6.2 percent of the vote. Even more interesting is that in 2004 a full 5.1 percent of the population, presumably mostly Hungarians, cast their vote in the national presidential election for the UDMR president Béla Markó despite a negligible chance of victory.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the subnational ethnic vote in Romania, national vote results and demographic analysis, and the loyalty of the Hungarian minority to their party, all indicate that ethnic minorities in Romania are quite stable in their voting behavior. Substantively the effect is also quite impressive as it reduces volatility 7 percent in the most diverse county when compared to the least diverse one and even more in counties where an ethnic minority population constitutes the majority.

According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), one solution to the many methodological concerns in designing tests for theories through a case study is to break up the case into discrete units of analysis, such as the regional comparisons conducted here. Geddes (2003) concurs but raises the concern that the effect observed in a single country may still be idiosyncratic to that country. The concern is whether the argument of ethnic vote stability is generalizeable to countries other than Romania. This is not empirically apparent, as shown in Figure 4.6. Indeed, using Alesina and associates' (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization (measured as linguistic and racial fractionalization), the figure shows no significant relationship between ethnic diversity and stability of vote choice between the first and second elections in all new democracies from 1945 until 1999, when the last country in the sample democratized.



FIGURE 4.6. The relationship between volatility and ethnic diversity in democratizing countries since 1945 (first election period)

TABLE 4.4. *Volatility and fractionalization in selected countries*

Country	Year of democratization	Ethnic fractionalization score	Volatility between first two elections
Japan	1946	0.012	8
Italy	1946	0.115	15
Romania	1990	0.3069	31.65
Lithuania	1992	0.3223	33.65

Moreover, Table 4.4. shows that comparing some of the individual countries, such as Italy, Japan, and Lithuania, in Figure 4.6 to Romania, we might even conclude that there is a positive relationship between fractionalization and volatility.

It is important to remember, however, that ethnicity is only one of many factors affecting vote decisions. Voters consider myriad issues when deciding for whom to vote. How their vote is cast is also likely to be influenced by institutions. In addition, changes of which voters may not even be aware affect relationships between the parties and voters and thereby the stability of voter preferences. Going back to the examples of Japan and

TABLE 4.5. *Average volatilities in new democracies over time*

Second election in each pair	Average volatilities[a] in the first three election periods
1947–1959	13
1960–1979	15
1980–2004	19

[a]Volatilities without independents. See Appendix B.

Romania, one such change is the shift in predominant party system types between 1946 and 1994. In the 1940s the relationships between voters and parties in all democracies tended toward the mass party type, where parties aimed to cultivate a loyal constituency of card-carrying members (Duverger, 1954). According to Kircheimer (1966), individual party membership was deemphasized in subsequent years as mass media evolved and parties attempted to appeal to larger segments of society and maximize vote share, leading to the creation of catchall parties. Finally, Katz and Mair (1995) argue that the advent of state funding created the cartel party type, [20] which further decreased party incentives to build relationships with voters, as parties were no longer reliant on members for financial support.[21] The expectation relating to these party system developments is that voter-party relationships in first elections have become increasingly volatile over time.[22] Indeed, as shown in Table 4.5, average volatilities in the first three election periods in democratizing countries have increased steadily since the 1940s. Consequently, all voters today are on average much more volatile in their vote behavior than voters were fifty years ago. Moreover, this observation is true for ethnic and nonethnic voters alike.

Furthermore, the countries democratizing in each decade differ. As shown in Figure 4.7, one of the most important differences for the

[20] Of course, Koole's (1996) point that these are only some of the many types of parties that exist and have evolved in democracies, and Katz and Mair's (1996) rejoinder agreeing to this point, apply here as well. Mass, catchall, and cartel are only some of the party types that have evolved in democracies. However, these three types illustrate nicely a general tendency toward weakening ties between voters and parties over time.

[21] It is important to note that the change in party relationship with voters caused by the initiation of state funding depends on the reference point of comparison. For a further discussion of this issue see Birnir (2005).

[22] It is important to note, as Katz and Mair (1995, p. 6) argue, that a change in the party system does not indicate a linear development of mass-party decay. Rather these party types simply differ as one would expect in response to evolving social conditions.



FIGURE 4.7. Ethnic diversity in democratizing countries at the time of first election

purposes of this book is that the countries democratizing in the 1980s and 1990s are on average significantly more ethnically diverse than countries that democratized earlier in the twentieth century. If elections in all countries are more volatile than they were in the middle of the twentieth century, and countries currently democratizing are significantly more diverse than countries democratizing in the middle of the twentieth century, it stands to reason that there are many more volatile ethnic (and other) voters voting today than there were fifty years ago. Furthermore, it is likely that some of the current ethnic vote (and other voter) instability is simply caused by the changing times and not characteristics of the voter such as ethnic identity.

Because both volatilities and fractionalization in democratizing countries have increased over time, the simple bivariate relationship between volatilities and fractionalization of countries democratizing from 1945 to today shows at best no relationship, and at worst a spurious positive relationship, between diversity and vote instability. Thus, the only way to discern accurately the true relationship between volatility and fractionalization is to hold constant the maximum possible number of other variables that impinge on this relationship. There are many ways



FIGURE 4.8. Relationship between ethnic diversity and volatility in Eastern Europe (first election period)

to accomplish this. One is to study only a single country, as I did in this chapter. Another is to study a single region where all the countries democratized during roughly the same time and where the countries share similar economic conditions, histories, and cultures, so that other determinants of vote choice are comparable. For instance, while many differences exist among countries in Eastern Europe, these nations also share significant characteristics, including having democratized around the same time and having undergone the transition from a command economy around the time of democratization. Therefore, when we look only at the depiction of the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and volatilities in East European countries in Figure 4.8, a strong negative relationship emerges between ethnic fractionalization and volatility.

The question thus remains whether the finding of ethnic vote stability can be generalized to all new democracies, or whether ethnic vote stability is simply a peculiar feature of East European politics. According to the argument of Ethnic Attractors, ethnic groups in all new democracies have more developed information shortcuts for vote choices than other voters at democratization. Consequently, all else equal in all other new democracies, vote stability should be greater in diverse regions than homogeneous ones. An additional implication of the argument is that in cross-country comparisons, vote stability should be greater in ethnically

diverse countries than in ethnically homogeneous ones. This is the subject of Chapter Five, which examines the relationship between vote stability and ethnic fractionalization in a statistical study of voting patterns in all democracies worldwide since 1945, controlling for other variables that impinge on this association.

5

Ethnic Voting and Party System Stability

Is ethnic vote stability a peculiar feature of Romanian or East European electoral politics, or do Ethnic Attractors distinguish ethnic voting in new democracies everywhere? This chapter seeks to elucidate the answer through a statistical study of new democracies since 1945 worldwide. I find that ethnic diversity stabilizes initial vote behavior in heterogeneous new democracies everywhere above and beyond that of homogeneous countries. This finding is particularly interesting in the context of social cleavage theories that argue cleavages are associated with vote stability (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). While previous studies show a general relationship between the existence of a multitude of social cleavages and vote stability, this is the first study to differentiate the effects of ethnic cleavages from other types.

First, I outline the case selection criteria for the national level test and highlight some of the methodological issues surrounding the cross-national comparison of volatility and ethnic diversity. Second, I talk about other variables that might impinge on the relationship between ethnic diversity and vote preferences that are controlled for in the statistical analysis. Third, I discuss at length the data and methodology used. Finally, I present the regression results in support of the claim that ethnic heterogeneity induces stability of voting behavior at the national level in all new party systems.

The universe of cases examined in this chapter consists of new democracies that have held at least two elections. *New* refers to any

newly established democracy, whether the previous authoritarian regime resulted from domestic events or foreign control.[1]

Thus far, most studies within the literatures on ethnic conflict and machine politics that examine the effect of ethnicity on party systems have focused on one region or even one country. Similarly, studies of electoral volatility generally focus on one region with some minimal comparisons to other regions. Methodologically, this approach presents some problems, the most important of which is the difficulty of isolating the effect of any single variable in a study of one country or one region because of lack of controls. The more limited the study, the greater the danger of overemphasizing and/or overlooking country- or region-specific effects.[2] Consequently, the generalizability of a theory is limited when it is tested in one country or in one region only, making the study of multiple countries in multiple regions preferable.

The calculation of the dependent variable in this chapter, volatility of electoral preferences, follows the conventions outlined in Chapter Four and Appendix B. Table 5.1 lists all new democracies included in the study, their volatility between the first and second elections, and linguistic fractionalization.[3]

[1] For a more detailed definition of democracy, operationalization (concept definition and measurement) of the term, and a list of excluded countries see Appendix B.

[2] For a further discussion and examples of the importance of case selection, see Geddes (2003).

[3] I had to rely on secondary sources for tracing volatility in many of the countries where I have not done field research. In some cases I had to make informed judgment calls in my volatility calculations. In such cases, there is always the possibility of inadvertently introducing bias. To counteract any empirical bias I might be introducing by, for instance, always making judgment calls that lower volatility in ethnically heterogeneous countries, my research assistants and I calculated volatility three times. In the first round I completed all calculations myself. In the second round I asked a research assistant to redo the entire tracing without informing her what hypothesis I was testing. The correlation between her volatility index and mine was very high, at over 0.8. The principal differences between the two indicators stem from the fact that in the second round of calculations (completed four years after the first round) there were significantly more data available. Finally, I had a second research assistant check all of the volatility calculations – again without knowledge of the theory. Because these are most up to date, I use the volatility indexes my research assistants collected in this analysis, and I am confident that any subjectivity in data collection does not systematically favor the hypothesis of ethnic electoral stability. To maintain consistency in calculation of volatilities (there are presently comparable sources available for vote figures in nearly all democracies), I even used the volatility index calculated by my research assistants for the countries where I have done significant field research. Consequently, there are differences in my calculations of volatility for Romania (Birnir, 2001, 2004-b) and Ecuador (Birnir, 1999, 2001), for instance, and the volatility figures reported for these countries. What I gained by this procedure is the knowledge that there is no

To capture the effect of ethnicity in this chapter, I use different indexes and sources to estimate the effect of diversity on vote stability. These include Alesina and colleagues' (2003) indexes of linguistic fractionalization exclusively, religious fractionalization exclusively, and a measure that involves a mixture of linguistic and racial characteristics. All of the indexes are calculated by the Herfindahl formula discussed in Chapter Four.[4]

The reason I use many different indexes to get at the effect of ethnicity lies in the definition of the term. As the reader will recall from Chapter Two, ethnicity is self-identification around a characteristic that is difficult or impossible to change, such as language, race, or location. Other characteristics such as religion and culture qualify as well. The measure of ethnicity of interest here is the one that best captures the most disaggregate ethnic grouping around which people identify. This is to allow for the information function through which small ethnic groups coalesce to support small ethnic parties that may or may not be elected to the legislature in first elections when voting is hypothetically sincere. In the study of Romania, I use ethnic self-identification. Unfortunately this information is not always available, but in many cases information regarding language, race, or religion is.

systematic bias across calculations in the countries where I have done field research and that I know best (which happen to be quite ethnically heterogeneous). Furthermore, I am confident that the countries where I have done field research are not driving the results with volatility calculations that are more comprehensive and thus yielding lower numbers. An additional complication in calculations of electoral volatilities from new democracies everywhere is data scarcity. Ideally I would include vote percentages for all parties that compete in elections. These data are not, however, readily available. Thus I include here only vote percentages for parties that obtained seats in at least one election in each pair of elections. Including only vote percentages for parties with seats likely underestimates the level of volatility. There is, however, no reason to believe that this creates a systematic bias between countries. For the same reason (lack of reliable data) volatilities that are used in the analysis are calculated without accounting for votes for independents. I also calculated volatilities that account for votes for independent candidates as one group and ran the regressions with this alternative dependent variable. The results were substantively the same. Finally, any votes and/or seats classified as "other" are excluded from the calculations because of missing information.

[4] Following convention, the concentration index is subtracted from 1. I also experimented with alternative indexes, including Roeder's (2001) indexes, which account for linguistic, racial, and cultural fractionalization; linguistic and cultural fractionalization only; and linguistic and racial fractionalization only, and Annett's (2001) measure, which includes racial and linguistic characteristics. None performed better than Alesina and colleagues' (2003) linguistic measure; thus, they are not discussed further here. In previous versions of this analysis I used Taylor and Hudson's (1970) ethnic fractionalization index and found substantively comparable results.

TABLE 5.1. *List of new democracies and their volatilities in the first election period*

Country	First democratic election	Vote stability	Linguistic fractionalization
Albania	1991	30.9	0.0399
Argentina	1983	MD	0.0618
Austria	1945	11.85	0.1522
Bangladesh	1991	10	0.0925
Benin	1991	26	0.6303
Bolivia	1985	27.825	0.224
Bosnia	1996	MD	0.6751
Brazil	1982	13.785	0.0468
Bulgaria	1990	9.2	0.3031
Chile	1989	4.795	0.1871
Costa Rica	1953	33.7	0.0489
Croatia	1990	25.29	0.0763
Czech	1990	13.35	0.3233
Dominican Republic	1978	5.6	0.0395
Ecuador	1979	30.785	0.1308
El Salvador	1985	21.65	MD
Estonia	1992	17.95	0.4944
France	1945	3.45	0.1221
Georgia	1990	MD	0.4749
Germany	1949	17.85	0.1642
Ghana	1992	MD	0.6731
Greece	1946	37.8	0.03
Greece	1974	13.7	0.03
Guatemala	1984	21.605	0.4586
Guinea-Bissau	1994	MD	0.8141
Honduras	1981	4.1	0.0553
Hungary	1990	21.6	0.0297
India	1950	7.04	0.8069
Indonesia	1999	MD	0.768
Israel	1949	21.45	0.5525
Italy	1946	15	0.1147
Jamaica	1944	10.65	0.1098
Japan	1946	8	0.0178
Latvia	1993	30.15	0.5795
Lithuania	1992	33.65	0.3219
Macedonia	1990	11.9	0.5021
Madagascar	1993	MD	0.0204
Malawi	1994	4.72	0.6023
Mauritius	1967	41.7	0.4547
Moldova	1994	CPI	0.5533

Country	First democratic election	Vote stability	Linguistic fractionalization
Mongolia	1990	8.45	0.3734
Mozambique	1994	6.03	0.8125
Namibia	1989	17.75	0.7005
Nepal	1991	10.65	0.7167
Nicaragua	1984	24.65	0.0473
Nigeria	1999	5.395	0.8503
Pakistan	1988	11.4	0.719
Panama	1994	23.05	0.3873
Papua New Guinea	1964	MD	0.3526
Paraguay	1993	11.175	0.5975
Peru	1980	31.18	0.3358
Philippines	1992	MD	0.8366
Poland	1991	25.9	0.0468
Portugal	1975	9.6	0.0198
Romania	1990	31.65	0.1723
Russia	1993	27.33	0.2485
Slovakia	1990	16.3	0.2551
Slovenia	1990	24.55	0.2201
South Africa	1994	10.52	0.8652
South Korea	1988	32.65	0.0021
Spain	1977	7.8	0.4132
Sri Lanka	1947	15.45	0.4645
Thailand	1992	17.15	0.6344
Turkey	1950	6.25	0.2216
Turkey	1983	9.34	0.2216
Ukraine	1994	25.27	0.4741
Uruguay	1946	5.8	0.0817
Uruguay	1984	10.655	0.0817
Venezuela	1958	19.55	0.0686

Note: MD = missing data; see Appendix B for further explanation. CPI = Communist Party illegal; see note 3 to Chapter Seven on why Greece is included despite its ban of CP.

Table 5.2 shows the simple correlations between Alesina and co-workers' (2003) indexes and the measure of volatility between first and second elections in all democratizing countries between 1945 and the present. None of the bivariate correlations is statistically significant, but given the low number of cases (fifty-nine)[5] and lack of controls, this is not surprising. What is interesting is how poorly the measure that includes

[5] Volatility scores for ten countries are missing. For further information see Appendix B. Furthermore, Alesina and co-workers do not report a linguistic fractionalization score for El Salvador, reducing the number of cases to fifty-nine in this correlation.

TABLE 5.2. *Bivariate correlations between volatility and linguistic, volatility linguistic and racial, and volatility and religious fractionalization indexes in new democracies*

	Index of racial and linguistic diversity	Index of linguistic diversity	Index of religious diversity
Volatility of electoral preferences	0.020	−0.174	0.010
P values	(0.880)	(0.192)	(0.944)

racial characteristics and the religious measure perform when compared to the gauge of linguistic fractionalization. Furthermore, contrary to the expectation of Ethnic Attractors, religious fractionalization and the measure that includes racial distinctions are positively related to vote instability between the first two elections in a bivariate correlation. Because none of these measures clearly stands out as the best measure of group identity, I will use them all to explore the relationship between ethnicity and vote stability.

OTHER DETERMINANTS OF PARTY SYSTEM STABILITY

As discussed in Chapter Four, divergence in the ethnic diversity and concomitant change in relationships between voters and parties are among the many determinants of the decision voters make at election time about which party to support. There is also, for example, a theoretical reason to believe that volatilities of democratizing countries have risen because party system types have changed over time from mass parties to catchall and even cartel parties. In different party systems, relationships between parties and voters likely differ, as does the probability that the voter remains loyal to a particular party between elections. To determine the true relationship between volatility and diversity it is, therefore, important to control for the party system type. The reader will recall that party system types theoretically change over time. Presumably, for example, in the 1940s parties tended more toward the mass party type, whereas in the 1960s the catchall party type was increasingly predominant. To capture this rough division I use an ordinal variable that I call decade, which breaks time since the 1940s into three periods. First are the 1940s and 1950s, second are the 1960s and 1970s, and third the 1980s on, assuming that the midrange value is more likely to capture catchall party types than mass or cartel parties. In addition, I control for a number of other

variables that impinge on the relationship between parties and voters as outlined later.

Institutions

The first of these influences are institutions. To my knowledge there is little explicit research on the effects of system type on electoral volatility. By *system type* I am referring to parliamentary and presidential systems. The likely reason is that most studies of electoral volatility that include a large number of countries focus on one region or another where a single system type predominates (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Madrid, 2005-a).

There is, however, reason to believe that system type may affect vote preferences; the literature is replete with discussions of how the timing of the election of the president and the legislature does this. While Shugart and Carey (1992) distinguish among several possibilities in timing, the general idea is that nonconcurrent election cycles to the presidency and legislature can affect vote choice. For instance, elections to the legislature that occur within a year after the president is elected may sway more voters to vote for the president's party than otherwise would. Conversely, midterm elections may convince a greater number of voters to "punish" the incumbent party of the president. On average, therefore, we should expect higher volatilities in presidential than in parliamentary systems. Currently, the literature about system type distinguishes among three principal system types: presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary systems (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Roper, 2002). Therefore, to test the idea of the effect of system type, I have included three dummy variables, one for each type.

Electoral rules also have been shown to affect electoral volatility. This relationship is not strictly linear, however. According to Bartolini and Mair (1990), in Western Europe "proportional systems which are characterized by a large number of competing parties offer a potential for vote switching which appears to outweigh that induced by the constraining effects of majority systems" (p.158). More specifically, high barriers (majoritarian systems) induce greater volatility when party fragmentation is low, but liberal barriers (proportional electoral systems) induce greater volatility when party fragmentation is high. Furthermore, they show that a change in electoral institutions increases volatility. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) confirm the finding that change in institutions increases electoral volatility in Latin America.

Many scholars have documented the relationship between social cleavages such as ethnic fractionalization and party fractionalization (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Powell, 1982; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Cox, 1997), which according to Bartolini and Mair mediates how institutions affect volatility.

Scholars agree that of the numerous electoral rules, district structure, and threshold have the greatest effect on how permissive a political system is to the entry of new parties.[6] Measuring the effect of these institutions is not straightforward. The basic types of district structures, for instance, are plurality systems, where a single candidate is elected in a district, and proportional systems, where the number of candidates elected in the district ranges from election of two to the whole legislature to mixed systems that combine plurality and proportional district structures. Furthermore, there are different ways to measure electoral barriers. One method is to calculate the average district magnitude and account separately for threshold levels. The advantage of this solution, with respect to district magnitude, is that it distinguishes between more permissive and less permissive proportional systems and accounts for change. The drawback of this approach is that it does not account for the nonlinearity of effect shown by Bartolini and Mair (1990). This is particularly unfortunate in light of new evidence that suggests a mixed district structure has unique characteristics that differ significantly from those of both proportional and plurality systems (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). Another method is to account for the three main types of district structures with dummy variables.

However, the principal problem with this solution in the analysis conducted here is collinearity between the district structure dummy

[6] For example, Duverger, 1954; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Riker, 1986; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984; Lijphart, 1994; Dalton and associates, 1984; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Shugart, 1994; Shvetsova and Filippov, 1995; Cox, 1997; Tóka, 1997; Mozaffar, 1997, and Mozaffar and colleagues, 2003. District magnitude (number of representatives elected in a district) can vary from one in a majoritarian system to all seats contested in a system of proportional representation. In a majoritarian system, only one party can win a seat in a district. Thus, although the overall number of parties in the legislature may be higher than 1 because different parties may win different districts, it can be expected to be lower than in a system where no such restrictions exist, all else being equal. In a system of proportional representation, there is increasingly less restriction as the district magnitude increases; thus, the higher the district magnitude, the higher the overall number of parties in the legislature will be. *Threshold*, in turn, refers to the minimal share a party must get in elections before being allowed seats in parliament. Legal thresholds can apply either to all seats or only to seats allocated at the national level; they can refer to vote share, number of votes, votes as a fraction of quota, or seats won directly, either in districts or nationwide.

TABLE 5.3. *Test of the difference in the mean diversity in countries that use plurality electoral systems compared to countries that use either mixed or proportional electoral systems*

	New democracies using plurality electoral system in first elections	**New democracies using proportional or mixed electoral system in first elections**
Average linguistic diversity	0.486	0.285
Number of observations	18	50
T (in a difference of means test)		−2.82
P value		0.006

accounting for plurality systems with the principal independent variable of interest, ethnic fractionalization. As shown in Table 5.3 a test of the difference of means between ethnic diversity (measured as linguistic diversity) in new democracies that use plurality electoral systems in first elections and ethnic diversity in new democracies using proportional or mixed systems shows highly significant results. New democracies that use plurality electoral systems in first elections are significantly more diverse than those that use proportional or mixed systems.

Collinearity in a regression is a problem because it potentially affects the standard errors of the independent estimators that are collinear in a way that may make determining whether they significantly impact the dependent variable of interest difficult. Consequently, it is likely that a dummy variable that accounts for plurality district structure will adversely affect the significance of the diversity variable and vice versa. In the worst case neither variable would appear to affect vote stability in a regression significantly, although both are quite important.[7]

Another problem with using dummy variables in this regression is that they mask the differences in magnitude within each system type and do not account for change in magnitude between or within proportional systems or for Bartolini and Mair's (1990) nonlinear effect of district structure on

[7] Indeed, alternate runs (not included here in the interest of space) show this to be precisely the problem. When either a diversity variable or a dummy variable that accounts for plurality systems is included in a regression that estimates volatility in first elections, both are quite significant. When they are included in the regression together, however, neither achieves significance.

volatility. This is of a particular concern in new democracies, where institutional change may be especially important because party systems are still significantly fluid. For example, legislative fractionalization increased significantly in Peru before the legislative elections in 1995, and in Lithuania before the legislative election in 2000, arguably as a result of important but subtle institutional changes. In Peru the district magnitude changed, and in Lithuania the runoff requirement in the mixed system was eliminated. Neither change would be captured through either the solution of accounting for magnitudes or the district dummies.

Furthermore, as the example of Lithuania shows, district structure and threshold are only two of the many institutions that affect the numbers of parties and the concomitant volatility of electoral preferences. Recent research highlights, for example, the effect of registration rules on the number and types of parties that enter legislatures (Birnir, 2001, 2004-a; Moreno, 2003, 2005).

Finally, the effect of institutions is contextual. For instance, a plurality district structure in India, where there are many ethnic groups that tend to be geographically concentrated, yields a significantly higher number of parties in the legislature than does a similar plurality system in the United Kingdom. Thus the effect of institutions depends on population characteristics such as size and location of groups.

Consequently, the dilemma here is determining which electoral institutions to include in the analysis and which form the variables should take. I take my cue from some of Bartolini and Mair's (1990) findings and rely on the product of all the various institutions, party fragmentation.[8] This solution directly identifies the hypothesized mechanism between electoral institutions and volatility, that is, change in the number of parties as a result of changing institutions between countries or within a country, and accounts for all major and minor institutional changes that affect volatility through their effect on legislative fractionalization. Furthermore, this

[8] The apparently simple task of counting parties is anything but. Of the many versions I experimented with (all parties, new and reappearing parties, brand new parties only, etc.) the best fit resulted from a variable where all parties that receive seats are counted separately including those that run in coalitions. Counting parties does not account for independents. Therefore, in alternate runs I included a variable that denoted whether independents ran in the system. This variable was not statistically significant and is excluded from the analysis here. It is my hunch, however, that some of the importance of the former Soviet Republic region dummy may be due to the high number of independents who run in many of these former republics.

solution takes into account the divergent effects of similar institutions in different countries. Finally, I account for federalism with a separate variable in light of new evidence suggesting that party systems in federal systems are more diffuse than party systems in unitary countries, with important consequences for vote stability (Brancati, 2003).

The Economy

Ethnicity and institutions are not the only factors that influence citizens' voting decisions, even in early elections. Since Downs's (1957) and Fiorina's (1981) assertions, it is widely accepted that citizens take economic conditions into consideration when they decide for whom to vote. There is, however, much less consensus on which economic factors influence people and how. For instance, do voters base their choice on how their own pocketbook is doing (Campbell et al., 1960; Kramer 1971, 1983), or are they more sociotropic in that they consider how the economy is doing overall (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981)?[9]

How exactly economic effects will manifest themselves in terms of electoral volatility is also not certain. It is possible that the worse the economy does, the worse the incumbent government will fare and the greater the electoral volatility. In a good year, however, support for the incumbent party might also increase and in this way cause increased electoral volatility.

Predictions associated with transition would lead one to believe that voters take aggregate economic conditions into account when making vote decisions. Scholars studying new democracies posit that voters hold incumbents accountable for deteriorating economic conditions associated with transition and vote them out of office (Przeworski, 1991).[10] Empirical results from the study of a wide range of European countries presented at a 1998 conference on economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000) largely support the idea that voters take aggregate economic conditions into account when voting. In addition, the authors

[9] In the literature, pocketbook voting is also called *egotropic voting*, whereas voting based on general economic conditions is called *sociotropic voting*.

[10] Research that focuses on more established democracies supports this idea. For instance, Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) argue that "the voters' performance calculus is dominated by economic concerns centered upon the nation; reflects in a modest and indirect way economic concerns centered upon the group; and draws scarcely at all from economic concerns centered upon the family" (p. 512).

find voters to be myopic in that they have short time horizons and tend to be more retrospective than prospective. Further, they find that voters respond mainly to a few macroeconomic variables, the most important of which are unemployment, growth, and inflation. Finally, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) find that aggregate growth decreases electoral volatility in legislative elections in Latin America.

Theories of pocketbook voting also have received some support in recent years. For instance, Nannestad and Paldam (1997) argue that Danish voters are primarily pocketbook voters. Weyland (1998) finds that the political judgments of Venezuelans are based on their prospective assessments of their pocketbooks. Romero and Stambough (1996) find that Americans who vote for congressional representatives are retrospective pocketbook voters, and according to Gomez and Wilson (2001), politically sophisticated voters tend to vote their pocketbook, contrary to earlier theories. Finally, Wei-Kang Wong (2001) shows that pocketbook voting is an important determinant of voter preferences in approximately forty countries worldwide.[11]

In keeping with both types of studies, I control for both the effects of the aggregate economy and individual economic conditions. The variable I use to account for the effect of the aggregate economy is the annual percentage change in the rate of growth of real gross domestic product (GDP). The variable I use to account for individual economy is GDP per capita. Given the lack of agreement regarding whether voters are prospective or retrospective, and given support for the idea that voters are myopic, I include each measure in the year of the second election.[12]

History and Culture

As Harrison and Huntington (2000) point out, *Culture Matters*. Inevitably the divergent histories and cultures of the different countries

[11] Wong (2001) argues that even while accounting for pocketbook voting, much variation remains in voter preferences. However, his statistical analysis shows that preference for redistributive policies (which he argues is indicative of pocketbook voting) is highly significantly and positively associated with lower-income countries.

[12] The source of all economic data in this analysis is the Penn World Table 6.1 (Heston et al., 2002). I used the GDP per capita constant prices. The data cover 1950 to 2000 only. The tables do not include aggregate growth figures. To calculate growth I multiplied GDP per capita and country population in the corresponding year. Then I calculated growth in $T2$ (second election) when compared to $T2 - 1$ (year before second election). When I compared my figures to growth rates reported by the World Bank, there was some difference. The likely source is differences in base calculations in the two sources.

and regions of the world influence the voting behavior of their populations in many different ways. To name but a few, historical legacies such as Leninism in Eastern Europe, the experience of World War II in Western Europe and Asia, the cycling between populism and brutally repressive military regimes in Latin America, and racial politics in Africa undoubtedly influence the subsequent voting behavior of the respective populations. Cultural norms of behavior on the basis of gender, the importance placed on maintenance of loyalty, the treatment of subgroups in society, and countless other factors similarly influence the voting behavior of the populations in question. Any comparative study of voting behavior must, therefore, attempt to capture some of the influences of the widely varying historical and cultural legacies of the world.

History and culture have proved to be the most difficult variables to measure in the social sciences. How does one quantify experience and norms? While I do not claim to have an answer to this question, one of the greatest benefits of a multicountry, multiregional empirical study is the facility with which one can use region or country dummy variables to hold many unmeasured historical and cultural factors constant. Assuming that history and culture are at least region-, if not country-specific, regional dummy variables or even country dummy variables can capture what in all likelihood are some of the effects of history and culture, after accounting for other factors such as ethnicity, economy, and institutions.[13]

[13] Region variables are not the only way to capture some of the historical specifics. Other historical aspects that are easily quantifiable include, for instance, democratic tradition. In countries where authoritarian regimes lasted for a short period and/or the democratic period preceding the authoritarian regime was long, parties can be expected to have established, lasting relationships with voters. These relationships usually can survive a short break in democracy. In these countries ethnic cues therefore probably are less important than in countries without any democratic history. In Chile, for instance, parties had ample time to establish lasting relationships with voters in a strong tradition of democracy before Pinochet gained power. The authoritarian regime lasted a relatively short time, and after its demise the old democratic parties restored much of their former relationship with voters. Indeed, regressions run on regional subsets of the data (Birnir, 2001) revealed that the number of years of last democratic period affects the level of volatility in Latin America. The difference between Latin America and the rest of the world (where it is not clear that prior democratic experience had any effect) is also interesting because it supports the idea that only in recent democracies in Latin America were parties easily able to resume their former position in society and restore relationships with their constituencies. In other parts of the world, the current democratic period is often the first period of competitive elections held in a very long time. In Eastern Europe, for example, most party members from the last competitive period are no longer available to vote. In Romania, while there was some party competition during the interwar period, it could hardly be called fully democratic. Some fifty years later, when democracy was

THE DATA AND METHOD

Wilson and Butler (2004) warn that studies that use time series cross-sectional data often do not account for unobserved variation across analytical units and the passage of time. Consequently, they argue, many of the central findings that use these types of data are not robust. In response to this and other methodological concerns, I have empirically tested the implication that ethnic diversity stabilizes vote choice in new democracies above and beyond that of homogeneous countries in stages. Chapter Four tested this hypothesis cross-sectionally at the subnational level in Romania, where variation across analytical units was minimal. Similarly, the first tests in this chapter use country level cross-sectional data of election results, one observation per country, in addition to demographic, institutional, and economic data from sixty-nine democratizing or re-democratizing countries between 1945 and 2003. Table 5.4 presents summary statistics for the first election period (first two elections) for all the variables included in the analysis in this chapter.

King (1997) articulates several benefits of such aggregate analysis. First, aggregate data from new democracies are readily available, whereas individual survey data often are not available or are very unreliable. Furthermore, aggregate data provide much geographic information that often is not evident in more disaggregated data. Finally, aggregate comparative studies provide important historical and cultural controls, as discussed.

Unfortunately, King's methodological criticisms of aggregate analysis apply as well. One of the problems with national election data is aggregation bias, "the effect of the information loss that occurs when individual-level data are aggregated into the observed marginals" (King, 1997, p. 17).[14] In this analysis there are two related types of aggregation bias.

established, very few of the leaders of the old parties were alive and their old constituency had dwindled. Although some of the parties were revived successfully (the largest party in the democratic convention that ruled from 1996 to 2000 was in name a continuation of the National Christian Peasant Party, which was established in 1869, banned in 1947, and revived in 1989), the new parties resemble the old ones in little more than name, and their constituencies are different. The current democratic era represents the first period of truly competitive elections. In many African countries, relationships between parties and voters have never before been cultivated. Finally, in some countries members of parties from the previous competitive election period may have been hindered from regaining their previous party membership, as in the case of post–World War II Germany, Austria, and Japan. I will not pursue this issue further here but suggest that this is a promising topic for further study.

[14] To deal with this problem, King (1997) has devised a method of estimating bounds that he argues is considerably more reliable than standard confidence estimates. For an overview

TABLE 5.4. *Summary statistics for variables included in the analysis of the first election period (elections one and two) in new democracies*

	Obs.	Mean	Stdev	Min	Max
Volatility	59 [a]	17.50	9.94	3.45	41.70
Linguistic and racial fractionalization	69	0.40	0.23	0.002	0.88
Linguistic fractionalization	68 [b]	0.34	0.27	0.002	0.87
Religious fractionalization	69	0.41	0.21	0.005	0.86
GDP (constant dollars) per capita	56 [c]	4,995.66	3,175.40	681.07	12,170.99
GDP (constant dollars) growth	54 [c]	2.80	6.56	−10.26	24.60
Number of parties in the legislature in second election	65 [d]	9.49	6.63	2	35
Parliamentary system	69	0.43	0.50	0	1
Presidential system	69	0.35	0.48	0	1
Semipresidential system	69	0.22	0.42	0	1
Federal system	69	0.17	0.38	0	1
Western Europe	69	0.12	0.32	0	1
Eastern Europe	69	0.16	0.37	0	1
Latin America		0.26	0.44	0	1
Former Soviet Republics (including the Baltics)	69	0.10	0.30	0	1
Asia (including Turkey)	69	0.19	0.39	0	1
Africa (including Israel)	69	0.16	0.37	0	1
Year of second election	69	1983	17.36	1946	2004

[a] See Table 5.1 for missing data.
[b] Linguistic fractionalization missing for El Salvador.
[c] Missing economic data immediately after World War II and for recent years.
[d] Number of parties is missing for Georgia, Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, and Philippines.

The first involves inferences drawn about the voting behavior of the ethnic individual from national vote figures. Inferences drawn about the individual voter from aggregate data are sometimes unreliable. As the reader will recall, however, the preceding chapter employs King's preferred solution to this problem, using more disaggregated data for estimation of population parameters in the subnational study of voting in Romania. The

of the debate about the merits of this method, see, for example, Voss (2003). For use of this method in the context of ethnic voting in a single country, see Chandra (2004).

aggregate test in this chapter, therefore, serves to generalize and verify the finding of ethnic vote stability that was demonstrated in the disaggregate in the preceding chapter.

The second aggregation problem in national studies of vote stability, as discussed by Mair (2000), is that Przeworski's measure of the dependent variable potentially can conceal some of the true volatility that occurs in each election. That is to say, a party conceivably could lose its entire previous constituency and gain all new voters, so that its volatility would measure 0 while real volatility would actually be 100 percent. Consequently, according to Dalton and associates (1984),[15] the measure cannot be used to infer stability of individual partisan preferences. Unless, however, there are systematic differences between countries in how volatilities at the local level conceal volatility from national volatilities calculations, there is no reason to believe cross-country comparisons are unreliable. Furthermore, even if there are systematic regional differences, or even systematic country differences, this problem in the aggregate is ameliorated with the use of region-specific or country-specific variables. The greater danger is to place too much confidence in the interpretation of single-country volatility, and, as Dalton and colleagues (1984) suggest, the most reliable way of dealing with this problem is to examine district level results rather than national election results, which is similar to what I did in the preceding chapter.

The dependent variable of national level volatilities between the first and second elections is a continuous variable that theoretically ranges from 0 to 100. Consequently, I use ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to estimate the effect of ethnicity on vote stability. Heteroskedasticity, or the possibility in cross-sectional data that the errors are drawn from different distributions for different values of the independent variable across units (countries), is a concern, so I use Huber-White robust standard errors. The region-specific variables also help account for variation across units.

VOTE STABILITY AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

The results of the statistical analysis in Table 5.5 support the hypothesis that increasing ethnic fractionalization decreases initial electoral volatility and offer some additional insights as well. First, the results show that

[15] See footnote 4, page 10, in Dalton and co-workers (1984).

linguistic fractionalization better predicts vote stability of ethnic groups in first elections than does a measure that includes racial components or a measure of religious fractionalization. Furthermore, it appears that institutional structures affect initial levels of volatility. The results also suggest that the economy and regional differences have an important effect on early vote stability. The following discussion highlights the properties of each model specification and explains the significance of each variable.

The first model includes several variables: the measure of ethnic fractionalization that centers both on racial and linguistic characteristics, a measure of religious fractionalization, a variable accounting for legislative fractionalization, two variables accounting for parliamentary and presidential systems (in reference to semipresidential systems), federal systems, five of the six regional variables (Eastern Europe, Latin America, former Soviet Republics, Asia, and Africa; the reference variable is Western Europe), and the decade variable accounting for three pairs of decades corresponding to changing party system types. The second model includes the same variables except that it substitutes a measure of linguistic fractionalization for the measure that combines racial and linguistic fractionalization. The third model includes all of the same variables as the second model but adds the two economic variables, which measure GDP per capita and GDP growth.

As expected, all of the measures of social fractionalization are negatively related to volatility in the first two models when controlling for other relevant influences. A comparison of the first and second models demonstrates, however, that the measure of linguistic diversity better captures voting dynamics in new democracies than the diversity measure that includes racial components in addition to linguistics. The overall fit of the second model is better than that of the first and the linguistic variable is statistically significant, whereas the measure that includes racial components does not approach significance. This finding is quite interesting as it indicates that for political purposes, linguistic identification is important in first elections whereas racial identification is not. Anecdotally, this finding seems to describe ethnic politics quite well, as ethnic political groups are defined more often along linguistic lines, for instance, Hungarians in Romania or Basques in Spain, and less often along racial lines exclusively. Consequently, the principal measure of ethnic diversity I use in subsequent specifications is that of linguistic fractionalization, and I refer to this measure as *linguistic diversity* or *ethnic diversity* interchangeably. In Chapter Seven, I return to the measure of religion and the measure that

includes racial components to examine the differences in performance of these measures over time.

The Controls

A number of the control variables in Table 5.5 are important to the analysis, though not all are significant. I will discuss the economic variables first because they are only included in the third model. Neither economic variable is significant. More importantly, the economic variables restrict the number of cases significantly. Insidiously, however, this restriction is not random, because nearly all first elections in Western Europe are eliminated because of the unavailability of economic data immediately after World War II. Very recent economic data also are unavailable, so the deletion is systematic at the other end of the spectrum for countries that democratized in the late 1990s, which tend to be those in Africa and Asia. This restriction of cases likely explains why the linguistic fractionalization measure is not statistically significant in the third model, where the economic data are included.[16] The improved fit of model three indicates that economic variables are important to this analysis. Because of this systematic elimination of cases, however, the economic variables are not included in the remaining analysis in this chapter but will resurface in Chapter Seven.

An interesting observation that emerges from the analysis in Table 5.5 is that in first elections, the nuanced measure of electoral institutions is associated with vote stability in the second model, which also includes a measure of linguistic fractionalization as well as in the third model. Vote stability is positively linked to the number of parties in the legislature, which in turn is determined by the interaction of myriad electoral institutions and demographic conditions. Furthermore, the variable that accounts for presidential systems only increases vote stability when compared to that for semipresidential systems in the restricted model three, which includes economic variables. Consequently, the most likely reason for this change of effect of presidential systems between models is the systematic restriction of data in model three.

Federal structure has no discernible effect on vote stability. Furthermore, as the regional variables demonstrate, only in the former Soviet Republics do volatilities differ consistently from volatilities in Western

[16] Log transformations of the economic variables did not improve their fit and so are not discussed further here.

TABLE 5.5. *Regression: Ethnic fractionalization and volatility in the first election period (elections one and two) (cross-sectional sample of all new democracies 1945–2003)*

Dependent variable: Vote stability	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**
Linguistic and racial fractionalization	−1.851		
	(8.479)		
Linguistic fractionalization		−13.289	−6.922
		(6.557)*	(6.015)
Religious fractionalization	−2.758	−3.507	2.972
	(9.984)	(9.277)	(8.418)
Number of parties in the legislature	0.317	0.396	0.303
	(0.220)	(0.197)#	(0.160)#
Parliamentary system [a]	−3.932	−1.898	−5.220
	(5.300)	(4.935)	(4.798)
Presidential system [a]	−7.872	−6.596	−14.365
	(6.139)	(5.463)	(4.918)**
Federal system	−3.081	−1.810	−4.090
	(2.726)	(2.552)	(2.488)
Eastern Europe [b]	7.346	7.866	14.597
	(5.916)	(5.529)	(5.337)*
Latin America [b]	8.456	8.696	19.683
	(7.056)	(6.098)	(7.580)*
Former Soviet Republics (including the Baltics) [b]	9.467	13.092	15.795
	(7.847)	(7.627)#	(7.295)*
Asia (including Turkey) [b]	−0.740	2.457	8.158
	(4.516)	(4.662)	(5.586)
Africa (including Israel) [b]	6.721	13.457	17.580
	(9.473)	(8.880)	(9.669)#
Decades	−0.966	−0.293	−1.379
	(2.381)	(2.194)	(2.239)
GDP per capita			0.756e-04
			(4.956e-04)
GDP growth			0.309
			(0.230)
Constant	18.428	15.994	12.592
	(7.777)*	(7.287)*	(8.947)
Observations	59	58	46
R^2	0.27	0.32	0.50

Note: Ordinary least squares; robust standard errors in parentheses.
[a] Reference category semipresidential systems.
[b] Reference category Western Europe.
#significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.

Europe. A probable reason is higher volatility accompanying party system change between Western Europe and former Soviet Republics, where some of the most recent democratizers are located. This regional effect probably usurps party system effects that might otherwise be picked up by the variable that accounts for the decades.

VOTE STABILITY AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY OVER TIME

Ethnic diversity that centers on linguistic differentiation appears to jumpstart party system stability in new democracies worldwide, but how does this effect play out over time? As outlined in Chapter Two, ethnicity is not the only cue voters use to make their voting decisions. Union membership, preexisting party loyalties, and other such group memberships also are very important influences on voting behavior. While it is likely that in new democracies ethnicity is initially the best developed voting cue available for party formation, others will quickly come into being.

As associations such as unions and political parties develop, we would expect these organizations to provide the same kinds of information and cues to ordinary voters that were at the beginning only provided to those who saw themselves as ethnic group members. As these interest-based associations incorporate more citizens, homogeneous countries should catch up with ethnically heterogeneous countries in terms of stability. As these other associations develop, the party system will become more stable whether the country is ethnically heterogeneous or not. In this case, we would expect the observable effect of ethnicity on vote stability to decline over time. How fast that decline will occur is difficult to say.

One possible way of capturing this declining relative effect of ethnicity is to use an interaction between the ethnic variable and the logarithm of time.[17] This interaction term allows the expected magnitude of the effect of ethnicity to vary in different periods. Furthermore, the logarithm of time provides the benefit that the numbers taper off gradually, indicating a decreasing marginal effect on volatility between election periods.[18] When this diminishing change between periods is multiplied across all ethnic scores in each period through an interaction term, it imposes this marginally decreasing effect on the ethnic variable, producing a variable

[17] Another way of capturing this effect is through the inverse of time; it, however, drops off more sharply than the logarithm and rapidly approaches 0.

[18] Including the square of time would accomplish something similar because the two transformations are highly correlated. Because the logarithm of 1 is 0, logarithms are, however, more appropriate than the square as discussed in the text.

that indicates the gradual decline of the relative importance of ethnicity as a voting cue. Ethnicity itself does not become less important as a voting cue, but the discernible stabilizing effects disappear as other voting cues develop. An additional benefit is that the logarithm of 1 is 0. Therefore, in the first election period, when we would expect ethnicity to matter most, the model returns a prediction that shows the effect of the ethnic variable only because the interactive term (including the logarithm of time) is 0.

To test the idea of declining relative importance of ethnic diversity on vote stability, I added two more election periods (each election period consists of two elections) to the data for all countries that meet the democratic criteria outlined, or as many elections as have been held since democratization if fewer than four elections (three election pairs). As Wilson and Butler (2004) point out, regression analysis presents some problems when used with time series data. One concern is the possible correlation of the error terms across periods within a country. Such correlation violates one of the fundamental assumptions of OLS regression, that error terms not be correlated. However, the transformation of the electoral data from vote shares to volatilities theoretically decreases this problem, as there is less reason to expect that volatilities across periods within a country are correlated. Nonetheless, heteroskedasticity, or the possibility that the errors are drawn from different distributions for different values of the independent variable across time within units, is still a concern, so I use Huber-White robust standard errors.[19]

The regression includes the linguistic fractionalization variable, the logarithm of time, and the interactive variable of the logarithm of time and linguistic fractionalization. The control variables are the same and the economic variables are excluded because they restrict the number of cases significantly.

Ethnicity over Time

Table 5.6 shows that in the first election period (between the first and second elections), the effect of increasing ethnic fractionalization is to

[19] The reason I chose Huber and White's robust errors rather than following Beck and Katz's (1995) suggestions for Panel Corrected Standard Errors is that one of the principal differences between H&W and B&K is that B&K correct for contemporaneous correlation between panels. Since election years in panels are not contemporaneous across all panels or even a large number of panels this is not a concern. I thank Jeffry Lewis for this insight. Furthermore, since autocorrelation is not a great concern in the use of volatility data, I do not cluster on country.

decrease volatility. The total effect between the first and second elections is determined by the negative coefficient of the ethnic fractionalization variable itself because the log of the time variable (and the interactive variable) is 0. The fractionalization variable borders on significance in a one-tailed test, and the effect between the first two elections is about two thirds of the magnitude, as in the preceding cross-sectional sample. Furthermore, the interactive term containing the fractionalization variable and the time variable is significant and the variable accounting for time is significant in a one-tailed test.

Of the control variables only the dummy variable accounting for former Soviet Republics reaches statistical significance. History and culture possibly affect voting behavior. However, regional dummies do not appear to be the best way to capture these effects. Because of its one-tailed significance in the previous regression I expect the significance of the variable accounting for institutions to improve with a larger number of cases though it is not significant in Table 5.6. In turn, I believe that there are two interpretations of the finding that neither parliamentary nor presidential systems have a close to significantly different effect on vote stability over time when compared to semipresidential systems. The first is that system type really never mattered, and that the finding that it did in first elections was spurious. The second is that in first elections voters may not fully understand and react to electoral institutions (Duverger, 1954) but do understand and react to system type (presidential coattails, etc.). This effect is obscured, however, by the effects of electoral institutions in subsequent elections.

A concern is that the results that show a significant relationship between ethnicity and vote stability are driven by outliers where political effects unrelated to the measure of linguistic fractionalization are the true causes of vote choice. To examine this possibility, Figure 5.1 displays a residual plot by linguistic fractionalization. The residual plot shows that volatilities in most countries fall within 20 percentage points of predicted volatility given the attributes of the country. The few that do not are Lithuania between 1996 and 2000, Mauritius between 1967 and 1976, Peru between 1990 and 1995, Spain between 1976 and 1982, and Thailand between 1996 and 2001. High volatilities in Spain with linguistic fractionalization of 0.41, Mauritius of 0.45, and Thailand of 0.63 all counter the hypothesis that ethnic diversity induces stability, because all of these countries score well above the average linguistic fractionalization in this sample (0.30). Consequently, none of these countries is driving the results, and reasons for high volatilities are likely unrelated to ethnicity.

TABLE 5.6. *Relationship between ethnic fractionalization and volatility over time (pooled time series, cross-sectional sample, three first election periods [elections one through four], all new democracies 1945–2003)*

Dependent variable: Volatility of electoral preferences	**(1)**
Linguistic fractionalization	−8.443
	(5.169)
Linguistic fractionalization × log of time	17.122
	(7.140)*
Log of time	−4.456
	(2.515)#
Religious fractionalization	−6.799
	(4.688)
Number of parties in the legislature	0.229
	(0.148)
Parliamentary system [a]	−0.701
	(2.346)
Presidential system [a]	−0.397
	(2.426)
Federal system	−1.611
	(1.806)
Eastern Europe [b]	4.266
	(3.395)
Latin America [b]	3.350
	(3.178)
Former Soviet Republics (including the Baltics) [b]	13.610
	(4.732)**
Asia (including Turkey) [b]	0.157
	(3.052)
Africa (including Israel) [b]	2.921
	(5.523)
Decades	1.090
	(1.273)
Constant	15.147
	(4.163)**
Observations	161
R^2	0.22

Note: Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
[a]Reference category semipresidential systems.
[b]Reference category Western Europe.
#Significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.



FIGURE 5.1. Residual plot: Ethnic fractionalization and volatility, first three election periods (elections one through four) (pooled time series, cross-sectional sample, all new democracies 1945–2003)

For instance, a likely reason volatility is high in Mauritius despite the country's above-average diversity is that nine years passed between founding elections in 1967, one year before Mauritius gained independence,[20] and the second election in 1976. According to Nohlen and coworkers (1999) the by-election of 1970 was followed by a series of strikes supported by the political party Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM). In response, the government of Mauritius postponed the elections that were scheduled for 1972 until 1976. This was not a popular move by the government, and the MMM won a majority of seats in the 1976 election. Apparently, therefore, ethnicity was not the cause of high volatilities in Mauritius.

To the contrary, ethnic groups in Spain likely contributed indirectly to the unusual vote instability. Basque terrorism grew after the 1978 election, and 1980 marked ETA's bloodiest year with the killing of 118 people. This

[20] The reason Mauritius is included in the data even though first elections occurred before independence is that the legislature remained unchanged after independence. The Independence Party, which won the 1967 election, ruled until the second election, when it finished a close second after the MMM. See Appendix B for inclusion criteria.

development probably increased popular dissatisfaction with the ruling party's handling of the group and contributed to the change in popular support from the UDC to the PSOE among Spanish voters, who turned out in record numbers in 1982.[21] Ethnic Basque and Catalan voters did, however, act according to expectations during this time, as support for both Catalan and Basque parties increased between 1979 and 1982[22] because both groups were at that time likely candidates for governing coalitions.[23]

In Thailand the electoral system was changed between the 1996 and 2000 elections from a bloc plurality system (with an average of three representatives elected in a district) to a mixed system, with 400 members elected in single-member districts and 100 members elected in a nationwide district. Furthermore, the number of representatives elected was increased from just under 400 to 500 members. This change should be accounted for by the variable that records legislative fractionalization. Indeed, the number of parties in the legislature decreased from eleven parties to nine. The electoral system change, however, was only one part of a constitutional change that aimed to decrease corruption at the district level. This change apparently resonated well with voters, who turned out in greater numbers in 2000 than ever before.[24]

Fractionalization in Lithuania at 0.32 and Peru at 0.33 is also slightly higher than the average, but volatilities between the 1996 and 2000 elections in Lithuania and the 1990 and 1995 elections in Peru were quite high. It is not likely, however, that these high volatilities resulted from ethnic politics. In the 2000 elections in Lithuania, the electorate who likely expressed their frustration with the economic situation, particularly rising unemployment, dealt a blow to the largest party in the ruling coalition, the conservative Homeland Union, in favor of the left-of-center Social Democratic Coalition, composed in part of former Communists. Furthermore, turnout in the 2000 election was 59 percent compared with 53 percent in 1996, and the electoral system was changed before the 2000

[21] Turnout (total votes/voting age population) in Spain was 79.36 percent in 1977, 72.32 percent in 1979, 83.11 percent in 1982, 73.72 percent in 1986, 71.28 percent in 1989, 77.43 percent in 1993, 80.56 percent in 1996 and 73.79 percent in 2000. (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2004).

[22] As shown in Chapter Seven.

[23] As I discuss in Chapter Six.

[24] Turnout in Thailand in 2000 reached 70.11 percent in 2000, up from 65.03 percent in 1996 and even lower numbers earlier (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2004).

election when the runoff requirement in plurality districts was eliminated (*East European Constitutional Review*, 2000). All of these factors likely contributed to the high vote instability between 1996 and 2000. In turn, President Fujimori's autocoup in 1992 threw the country into political turmoil, which itself explains much of the great vote instability between 1990 and 1995 in Peru.[25]

All of these countries counter the hypothesis that ethnic diversity induces vote stability; consequently, there is no reason to think outlier countries are creating this effect in the statistical analysis. Because, however, the reasons that cause the high volatilities in Lithuania, Mauritius, Peru, and Thailand are unrelated to ethnicity, and because ethnic politics in Spain at worst contributes indirectly to the vote instability, there is reason to believe these countries may hide some of the true effect of ethnicity. As a result, the regression in Table 5.7 includes controls for Lithuania between 1996 and 2000, Peru between 1990 and 1995, Thailand between 1996 and 2001, Spain between 1979 and 1982, and Mauritius between 1967 and 1976.

The effect of ethnicity between the first two elections is significant in a one tailed test but the substantive effect is only marginally affected by the inclusion of additional controls, as expected, because of the outliers.[26]

The interactive term is affected, however, in decreased magnitude. This is interesting because outlier elections in Lithuania Peru, Spain and Thailand included elections from the second election period (elections two and three) or later. Clearly, therefore, controlling for these outliers is important to the substantive interpretation of the development of the ethnic vote over time despite the fact that, with the exception of Spain, volatilities were likely determined by factors other than ethnicity.

[25] Volatilities in Peru have tended to be quite high since democratization for reasons unrelated to ethnicity. For example, volatility between the 1980 and 1985 election was over 40 percent. A likely reason is that in the early 1980s, the country was beset by economic problems left over from the military government, and a few years later El Niño caused widespread flooding in parts of the country and severe droughts in others, with devastating economic consequences. In addition, the terrorist organization Sendero Luminoso was gaining strength during the early 1980s. All of these factors contributed to President Belaunde's party's significant loss in the 1985 election despite the party's very strong public support when Belaunde was restored to power in 1980. Compounding the volatility was a significant increase in voter turnout between the 1980 and 1985 elections (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2004).

[26] Of the elections only those in Mauritius were founding elections.

TABLE 5.7. *Regression: Ethnic fractionalization and volatility, first three election periods, controlling for Mauritius, Peru, Thailand, Spain, and Lithuania (pooled time series, cross-sectional sample, all new democracies 1945–2003)*

Dependent variable: Volatility of electoral preferences	
Linguistic fractionalization	−7.974
	(4.734)#
Linguistic fractionalization × log of time	12.591
	(5.953)*
Log of time	−4.061
	(2.357)#
Religious fractionalization	−5.840
	(4.139)
Number of parties in the legislature	0.167
	(0.132)
Parliamentary system [a]	−1.693
	(2.174)
Presidential system [a]	0.173
	(2.237)
Federal system	−0.033
	(1.597)
Eastern Europe [b]	6.849
	(2.724)*
Latin America [b]	3.490
	(2.661)
Former Soviet Republics (including the Baltics) [b]	13.915
	(3.918)**
Asia (including Turkey) [b]	1.503
	(2.482)
Africa (including Israel) [b]	2.619
	(3.562)
Decades	0.264
	(1.142)
Outliers (Mauritius, Peru, Thailand, Spain, Lithuania)	30.286
	(3.240)**
Constant	16.059
	(4.044)**
Observations	161
R^2	0.45

Note: Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
[a] Reference category semipresidential systems.
[b] Reference category Western Europe.
significant at 10%; *Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.



FIGURE 5.2. Substantive effect as ethnic fractionalization varies one standard deviation around the mean (ethnic fractionalization and volatility in first three election periods controlling for Lithuania, Mauritius, Peru, Spain, and Thailand)

Because of the use of logarithms and the conditionality of the other variables in the regression, interpreting the substantive effect of linguistic diversity by itself is difficult. Therefore, using Table 5.7, Figure 5.2 shows the expected effect of ethnic fractionalization in the first three election periods (four elections) as ethnic fractionalization varies one standard deviation around its mean, while holding other variables constant.[27] The only factors that vary are the levels of linguistic heterogeneity and time.

The highest initial volatility of electoral preferences demonstrated in Figure 5.2 occurs in the country with linguistic fractionalization one standard deviation (0.25) above the mean fractionalization of the sample (0.30). The lowest initial volatility occurs in the country with fractionalization at one standard deviation below the mean. In the real world, countries with close to average fractionalization include Russia and Bulgaria; those countries with fractionalization that is close to a standard deviation below the mean include Albania and Poland; and countries with

[27] The method for doing this is to multiply average values of each variable with the corresponding coefficient while allowing only the variable of interest to vary in the data.

fractionalization at close to a standard deviation above the mean include Israel and Paraguay. As Figure 5.2 shows, the higher the ethnic fractionalization in a country, the lower the initial volatility in electoral preferences. Between the first and second elections the effect of varying fractionalization one standard deviation around the mean is 4 percent. Furthermore, the regression results lend support to the idea that ethnically homogeneous countries tend to catch up quickly to ethnically heterogeneous countries as voting cues other than ethnicity develop over time. In the third election volatilities in ethnically homogeneous and diverse countries converge.

In addition to more homogeneous countries' catching up to ethnically diverse countries in terms of stabilization of electoral volatilities, it appears that the initial effect of ethnic stabilization is reversed after the first few elections. Between the third and fourth elections, ethnically diverse and homogeneous countries diverge again as variation of one standard deviation around the mean fractionalization increases vote instability nearly 3 percent. There are three possible explanations for this. The first is that the continued stabilizing influence of ethnic voting is obscured by the development of other stabilizing identities after the first election, while variables unrelated to ethnicity drive up volatilities in diverse countries. The second is the idea of ethnically induced party stability as a second-best option for long-term party system development, mentioned in the Introduction. This is the idea that in countries where electoral institutions restrict legislative representation to larger parties, and where small ethnic groups initially vote for smaller ethnic parties, ethnic group members will withdraw their vote from the ethnic party once they realize it does not clear the electoral hurdle and cannot represent them, thus temporarily increasing vote instability as they search for representation. The final possibility is that ethnic groups are not finding satisfactory representation through electoral participation and increase vote instability permanently as they continually search for nonexisting representation. I will return to this subject in Chapter Seven.

CONCLUSION

Ethnic diversity as measured through linguistic diversity stabilizes vote behavior in heterogeneous new democracies above and beyond that of homogeneous countries. This finding is quite robust and substantively significant. It shows up in county-level analysis in Romania as greater vote stability in heterogeneous counties than in homogeneous ones. It is strong and substantively interesting in a cross-sectional analysis of first

elections, as well as in time series cross-sectional analysis of the first four elections (three election periods) of all new democracies since 1945.

This finding is particularly interesting in the context of social cleavage theories that argue that cleavages are associated with vote stability (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). While such previous studies show a general relationship between the existence of social cleavages and vote stability, this study is the first to differentiate the effects of ethnic cleavages from other types of cleavages, theoretically through the argument of Ethnic Attractors and empirically in new democracies. Furthermore, while Bartolini and Mair (1990) differentiate between the effects of their cultural indicator (religion and linguistic heterogeneity combined) at high and low levels of fractionalization, they make no empirical temporal distinctions between the effects of social cleavages when party systems are less and more institutionalized. Thus, the idea that ethnic cleavages stabilize voting immediately in new democracies, and that voting associated with other cleavages takes more time to develop, is new. Moreover, this chapter shows that voters at large quickly catch up with ethnic voters as information shortcuts other than ethnicity develop in new democracies.

The final finding related to ethnic diversity in this chapter is that after the first couple of elections, volatility of electoral preferences in many ethnically heterogeneous countries increases over time. This observation raises two questions: Under what conditions do ethnic groups become increasingly volatile over time and what is the effect of this increasingly volatile electoral behavior? To answer these questions, we must take a step back and examine the claim of flexibility and representation given what we know about initial vote stability of ethnic groups. As predicted by Ethnic Attractors, this chapter demonstrated that ethnic information shortcuts do stabilize ethnic voting behavior in the short term. According to the argument of Ethnic Attractors, ethnic groups also will be stable but flexible political actors in the long term, provided their interests are represented.

However, this chapter also showed that ethnic groups tend to become increasingly volatile in their electoral behavior over time. Following from the argument of Ethnic Attractors, this increased ethnic vote instability is caused by the lack of representation of the interests of ethnic groups resulting from constraints that are exogenous to the group. The rival hypothesis, drawing on the ethnic conflict literature, is that ethnic groups are not represented in government because they are inherently inflexible political actors. According to this logic, governing entails compromise by definition, and ethnic groups with their intransigent demands cannot

be included in that process. Which of these arguments is correct in the long term? Is the demonstrated early vote stability of ethnic groups really symptomatic of inherent intransigence that in the long term leads to their exclusion from governing structures and causes ethnic political behavior to spiral down a volatile electoral path? Alternatively, is the argument of Ethnic Attractors correct in that ethnic groups are inherently flexible and stable political actors who only become intransigent and volatile in response to external constraints on representation? These questions are addressed in the following chapters. Chapter Six delves into the question of ethnicity and intransigence in the context of representation through three in-depth case studies. Building on the conclusions of Chapter Six, Chapter Seven attempts to determine which ethnic groups become increasingly volatile and the political consequences of representation or the lack thereof.

6

Ethnic Politics and Access

In March 2003, Batasuna (a Basque political party) and its two predecessors[1] were outlawed.[2] The wisdom of this move is debated. According to Mata (2002), if it "walks like a duck, flies like a duck, and swims like a duck, it probably is a duck." In other words, Mata argues Batasuna is probably the political wing of the violent ETA and as such should be "done away with" (2002), and others agree (see Table 6.1 for a list of acronyms used in this chapter). Gonzales (2002) argues that the Basque national identity is in great part fabricated and that Batasuna's ties to ETA have been so extensively proved that banning the party is overdue. Still other observers disagree. Some critics fear a backlash from Basques, who have increasingly denounced the ETA's violent tactics, while others object to the antidemocratic tendencies entailed in a ban on a political party ("Terrorism in Spain," 2002).

The ban of Batasuna raises interesting questions about the causal relationship between representation and intransigence. As stated by the argument of Ethnic Attractors proposed in Chapter Two, ethnic groups are not inherently intransigent. However, they do respond to exogenous constraints. In particular, implications of the argument predicted that in

[1] These are Euskal Herritarok and Herri Batasuna.

[2] In June 2002, the Spanish parliament passed a new law of political parties. Article nine states that any party that engages in activities that endanger "democratic principles" can be banned. The article goes on to define such activities broadly to include support and legitimization of violence as means to political ends. The law preceded a special session of parliament on August 26 in which a motion to outlaw Batasuna, the alleged political wing of ETA, was passed. See the newspaper *El País* (Spain) at www.elpais.es. for detailed reports on the process.

TABLE 6.1. *Acronyms and organizational names used in the chapter*

Country/region	Acronym/name	Name
Romania	NSF, DNSF, PDNSF	National Salvation Front, split into Democratic National Salvation Front and Democratic Party–National Salvation Front
Romania	UDMR	Hungarian Democratic Forum
Romania	PDSR, PSD	Party of Social Democracy in Romania, called Social Democratic Party after a merger in 2000 with PSDR
Romania	PSDR	Social Democratic Party of Romania
Romania	PUNR	Romanian National Unity Party
Romania	CD, PNL	Democratic Convention (including PNL-National Liberal Party)
Romania	USD, DP	Social Democratic Union (including the Democratic Party and PSDR Social Democratic Party of Romania)
Romania	PRM	Greater Romania Party
Romania	PUR	Humanist Party
Romania	SRI	Romanian Intelligence Service
Bulgaria	MRF, NMRF, ANS	Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms, later split into National Movement for Rights and Freedoms and Alliance for National Salvation
Bulgaria	CP, BSP	Communist Party, later Bulgarian Socialist Party
Bulgaria	UDF	Union of Democratic Forces
Bulgaria	UtdDF	United Democratic Forces, Coalition including the UDF and others
Bulgaria	BZNS	Agrarian Party
Bulgaria		Patriotic Alliance
Bulgaria		Monarchists and Greens
Bulgaria	BBB	Bulgarian Business Block
Bulgaria	SNM	Simeon II National Movement
Spain	Batasuna	A Basque political party
Spain	CiU	Convergence and Union
Spain	ETA	Basque Land and Freedom
Spain	ETA-HB	ETA-Herri Batasuna
Spain	Ekin	To Do
Spain	EGI	Basque Youth from the Interior
Spain	PNV	Basque Nationalist Party
Spain	FNC	Catalan National Front
Spain	PSAN and PSAN-*p*	National Liberation Socialist Party, *p* meaning provisional
Spain	FAC	Catalan Liberation Front
Spain	Terra Lliure	Free Land
Spain	PP	Popular Party
Spain	UCD	Center Democratic Union
Spain	CC	Catalunya's Centrists
Spain	PSOE	Spanish Socialist Worker's Party
Spain		Canary Island Coalition
Europe	EU	European Union
United States/Europe	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

the face of ethnicity's continued salience, lack of representation likely diminishes ethnic voters' incentive to participate in electoral politics and pushes them to look for alternative means of promoting the ethnic issue, including extraconstitutional means such as protest and even violence. In other words, exclusion causes violence. The popular argument used by the Spanish government is, however, that the ban of Batasuna is a direct response to violence perpetrated by ETA. In this case, according to the government, violence causes exclusion.

The objective of this chapter is to explore the causal relationship between exclusion and violence. The principal question here is that of the chicken and the egg: Which came first, violence or exclusion? To this end, I present three case studies of ethnic party and state relations. The cases confirm and further specify the propositions made in Chapter Two. In sum, there is nothing inherently intransigent about ethnic political behavior. Rather, ethnic group politics develops as moderate or intransigent over time, depending on the level of inclusion of the ethnic group in government and the accompanying attitudes of other ruling parties. Thus, while the initial level of ethnic groups' inclusion in democratization processes may be a historical accident rather than a strategic move by other political actors, all of the cases clearly suggest that the causal arrow runs from exclusion to intransigence and/or violence, and not the other way. Finally, given the proper strategic conditions, the cases suggest that there are few obstacles to ethnic groups' inclusion in government even when these groups have previously perpetrated violence against the state. More specifically, ethnic group transgressions of intransigence and even violence are forgiven under political circumstances in which parties with a plurality rely on the legislative support of the ethnic group.

ROMANIA, BULGARIA, AND SPAIN

Representation

According to an earlier definition, *representation* refers to the political sponsoring of issues that are important to the group, on the group's behalf, at all stages of the legislative game: from policy promises made before election, to policy advocacy in the legislature, to policy enactment in government. The definition of *government* is, however, context dependent. For instance, if the context is regional politics, the relevant body is the regional legislature or council. In this book, the subjects of interest are ethnic political behavior at the state level and concomitant effects

on short-term party-system development and long-term regime stability. Therefore, the context of representation here is state politics as conducted in the national legislature.

The Cases

The selection of cases to evaluate the causal direction between exclusion and violence is fairly intricate. First, two competing propositions are being evaluated. The first, drawn from the ethnic conflict literature, is that ethnic groups are inherently politically intransigent. The second, from Chapter Two, is that ethnic groups are politically stable but flexible; therefore, the implication is that when ethnic groups become intransigent, the cause is lack of representation. A single case study does not suffice either to juxtapose the explanatory power of these two propositions or to cast light on the possible exogenous causes of intransigence. Indeed, a convincing test requires that all countries with politically salient ethnic groups are examined. The following chapter tests the causal claim made here – that exclusion causes intransigence and even violence – in a statistical study of all democracies with electorally active ethnic groups. However, the issue of representation is more nuanced than an aggregate statistical study can capture. Therefore, this chapter explores representation and intransigence and/or violence through three case studies.

The selection criteria for the case studies require first that the country be ethnically heterogeneous. Second, to discern the effects of political participation at the level of government as well as at the level of voter participation, at least one minority group must be large enough to support a separate political party that participates in national elections. Third, the country must also allow or tolerate the participation of the ethnic political party during at least some points in its democratic history. Finally, to determine what causes ethnic political intransigence, the cases must provide a range of ethnic political behavior from peaceful and flexible to intransigent and even violent.

The cases selected are Romania, Bulgaria, and Spain, because these countries provide a good range of ethnic political behavior. Ethnic groups in Bulgaria and Romania experienced extensive repression before democratization and strained ethnic relations, including violence, after restoration of democracy. Consequently, the ethnic minorities in both countries underwent periods of radicalization around the time of democratization. After democratization, the Turkish party in Bulgaria did not, however, become increasingly politically intransigent. Rather, it soon became an

important and flexible player in Bulgarian politics, moving in and out of government coalitions and cooperating with every other major party in Bulgarian politics. By comparison, democratization in Romania was followed by considerable intransigence of the Hungarian minority party. Rather than continue down that path, however, the party changed its course a few years after democratization and became a flexible political player, even cooperating in parliament with one of its historical foes.

Similarly, ethnic groups in Spain experienced severe repression before re-democratization. Consequently, the Spanish ethnic groups that are the subject of this chapter, the Basques and the Catalans, also underwent radicalization. Initially both groups developed intransigent and violent political factions. After re-democratization, however, only Basque political intransigence and violence grew at the expense of more peaceful political expression, while the Catalans became important and flexible political players.

LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF ETHNIC POLITICAL STABILITY

In contrast to the ethnic conflict literature, the argument of Ethnic Attractors proposed in Chapter Two implies that the demonstrated vote stability of the Hungarian minority shown in Chapter Four is not a symptom of inherent political intransigence. Indeed, the process of information dissemination resulting from continuous ethnic socialization suggests flexibility in political behavior. If the hypothesis that ethnicity functions as a stable, but not fixed, information shortcut for political choices is right, it implies that when ethnic groups do become politically intransigent, and even violent, the cause is not ethnicity per se.

The principal objectives of this chapter are to examine the validity of the flexibility claim made by the propositions of Ethnic Attractors through three case studies, and to speculate about the exogenous events that might contribute to political intransigence and even violence. Three main observations emerge from the following case studies: First, ethnic groups are not inherently politically intransigent; second, ethnic political intransigence depends to a great extent on whether the group is included in government coalitions and on the attitude of the ruling party toward it; third, the determinant of which minority groups are included in government coalitions and which are treated as adversaries is an instrumental decision by the largest party in the legislature. This decision is based on the relative size of the parties in parliament and the size of their constituency rather than the ruling parties' previous notions about ethnic groups. Thus,

parties from which the largest party tends to solicit support are those that are large enough to create a minimum winning coalition or help the largest party fulfill policy objectives in other ways.

The means by which access to governing coalitions has a moderating effect on ethnic groups, while exclusion contributes to increasing intransigence, is straightforward. Political actors pursue political goals. In electoral politics, the ultimate goal for both politicians and their constituencies is access to government. In government, groups can bargain over policy proposed by their coalition partners and have some of their own policy objectives passed. Therefore, the best opportunity politicians have to influence government is within a governing coalition or in an alignment[3] with the government.[4] If an ethnic group permanently occupies the position of opposition so that its demands are never discussed, it has less of an incentive to moderate its demands. Similarly, if the ruling group is never forced to cooperate with the ethnic group, it also has little reason to moderate its opposition to the ethnic group's demands. In turn, a perpetually adversarial political relationship between the ethnic group and the ruling group is likely to spiral into intransigence and even violence.

THE UDMR IN ROMANIA

The political experience of the Hungarian minority in Romania sharply illustrates how antagonistic policies and exclusion by the ruling party contribute to increasing intransigence of the minority party. Inclusion and moderate coalition partners, however, promote more moderate ethnic political behavior. Furthermore, when both parties perceive a benefit from cooperation, previous enmity over ethnic issues is put aside. To show the effects of inclusion and exclusion, this section describes political events in Romania from before democratization through events that followed the 2004 legislative and presidential elections.

The Hungarian Minority under Ceauşescu

As did other European minorities discussed in this chapter, the Hungarian minority in Romania suffered considerable repression immediately before

[3] Formal participation in a government coalition is not a necessary condition for the occurrence of this moderating effect as long as the principal party is sufficiently small that it depends on the support of the ethnic group, or has other reasons to do so. In other words, while the ethnic group may not wish to join the coalition formally, this kind of political bargaining can take place informally.

[4] See Kaare Strom (1990) on the relative costs and benefits of being part of the coalition.

democratization in 1990. Whereas the relationship between the administration and the minority was relatively amicable in the middle of the century, it deteriorated sharply during the 1970s and 1980s. The policies of cultural assimilation through language and agrarian systematization,[5] initiated by Ceauşescu in 1972, were considered particularly detrimental to the Hungarian national identity. The oppression served to consolidate the community against the state, leading to the outbreak of the revolution of 1989 in Timisoara. The revolt spread from there to the rest of Romania.

The relationship between the Hungarian minority and the government was not always antagonistic. During the 1950s, a Hungarian autonomous region was established, granting the minority extensive cultural rights. However, this nominal autonomy was abolished in 1968, and from that point on, the relationship between the minority and the government deteriorated. By the mid-1980s, no Hungarian-speaking secondary schools were left, and instruction for Hungarian speakers in mixed schools decreased significantly. The increasingly stringent cultural assimilation policies of the government were not restricted to education. Among other coercive measures, the minority was pressured to Romanize Hungarian names, Hungarian-language newspapers were forced to refer to municipalities by their Romanian names, and the history of Romania was reinterpreted to discount the role of Hungarians. Most serious was the authorities' renewed emphasis in the spring of 1988 on the systematization of villages. This policy involved proposals to bulldoze thousands of villages and replace them with agroindustrial centers. The policy was not specifically aimed at the Hungarian minority, but because much of that population is rural and the policy included a wholesale destruction of churches, graveyards, and other symbols of local culture, it was considered a threat to the minority's national identity.[6]

In December 1989, local authorities evicted László Tökés, a popular ethnic Hungarian bishop who had repeatedly spoken out against the

[5] Responding to the growing disparity between rural and urban life, the government initiated a program of "systematization" to extend modern facilities into the countryside. "Systematization" was to change the face of rural Romania dramatically. The program, which was officially initiated in 1974, aimed at doubling the number of cities while phasing out or forcibly dissolving and relocating the remainder of Romania's 13,000 villages. Because of lack of funds, the systematization program proceeded slowly in the 1970s, but the 1980s saw a renewed commitment to the program (*Library of Congress*, 2001).

[6] For an excellent account of the general effects of these policies on Romanian society, see, for instance, Katherine Verdery (1996).

government's systematization policies. His supporters in Timisoara, including many ethnic Romanians, organized a demonstration to protest his political persecution. Thousands later joined them in further protests, which transformed into anti-Communist demonstrations. When troops from the Ministry of Interior attempted to break up the demonstrations, several protesters were killed.[7] The brutal violence was condemned internationally, and the unrest quickly spread to the rest of the country. Later that same month, Ceauşescu was deposed and executed, and a supposedly revolutionary force called the National Salvation Front (NSF) established a provisional government led by the interim president, Ion Iliescu. In 1990, the NSF organized the first democratic elections in Romania, which they won in a landslide.

The First Democratic Phase – Two Administrations Led by Iliescu

One of the principal propositions of this chapter is that exclusion from democratic government contributes to the radicalization of ethnic minorities. In some cases, a government may also use an antagonistic relationship with a minority to deflect attention from domestic problems such as a sluggish economy and to gain support among nationalists. In such cases, radicalization or increasing intransigence of minority politics is expected. It is the objective of this section to show that this is exactly what occurred in Romania during the first two democratic administrations. The government had no incentive to appeal to the minority, as it won an absolute majority of the seats in the legislature in the first election, and nationalist parties commanded a greater share of the vote than did the Hungarian minority in the second election. Consequently, the government placated the nationalists and antagonized the minority. For their part, the Hungarian minority party became increasingly vocal about its claim to territorial autonomy, a demand that was a particular thorn in the side of the nationalists and, eventually, every other political party.

When the first democratic elections were held in Romania in 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (UDMR) contested seats only in Transilvania. Nonetheless, it won 7.5 percent of the national vote. This vote percentage made the UDMR the second largest party in parliament. The National Salvation Front, the predecessor to the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR in the 1996 election and PSD or Social Democrat Party in the 2000 election), still had a comfortable majority in parliament,

[7] For a recent political history of Romania see, for example, Steven Roper (2000).

with 69 percent of the vote and 263 deputies out of a total 395. In other words, the NSF was in no way constrained by the second largest party or by any other party in parliament. As a consequence, the ruling party had little incentive to consider any minority demands. In light of increasing nationalism and pressing economic woes, it therefore was not surprising that the government immediately adopted a rigid stance in its dealings with the minority party. Rather, the conflict likely provided a welcome distraction from economic troubles and garnered the NSF support among hard-line nationalists. The attitude of the government became evident immediately after the election, when it issued a statement alleging that Hungarians from inside and outside Romania had provoked Romanians in Târgu Mures. The statement referred to an incident of ethnic violence that occurred shortly before the election that left six dead and some 300 injured.[8] Most other accounts blame the instigation of the violence on ethnic Romanian supporters of the militant organization Vatra Românească.[9]

From there on, the relationship between ethnic Hungarians and the NSF and NSF-aligned parties only deteriorated. In the 1992 local elections, the chairman of the nationalist Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR), Gheorghe Funar, was elected mayor of Cluj, which is heavily populated by ethnic Hungarians. The mayor immediately reverted to cultural assimilation policies reminiscent of those of the Ceauşescu regime. Among other demands, he insisted that all Hungarian language signs in town be removed and that Hungarian language broadcasts and education be stopped. The PDSR government aligned with the PUNR. In addition to tacitly supporting Funar's policies, the government decided to replace the two ethnic Hungarian prefects in Harghita and Covasna with two ethnic Romanians. The resulting furor[10] forced the government to retract the replacement and instead appoint two prefects for each county, one Romanian and the other Hungarian.

In 1992, Iliescu's wing of the NSF, called the Democratic National Salvation Front (DNSF), won the legislative election. Though the UDMR retained its vote share, it was now only the fifth largest party in parliament. Among the parties that received a higher vote share than the UDMR was Funar's nationalist PUNR. Needless to say, the relationship between the

[8] Accounts of exact numbers of casualties vary; see Kostecki (2002, p. 17).

[9] For detailed accounts of ethnic relations in Romania with particular emphasis on politics see Gallagher (1995), Mungiu-Pippidi (1998), and Kostecki (2002).

[10] See, for instance, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (1993) report No. 64, 02.

government and the Hungarian minority did not improve. Funar's anti-Hungarian claims became increasingly outlandish and threatening, and soon he and other nationalists began calling for a ban of the UDMR.

On their part, the Hungarian leaders of UDMR augmented their intransigence. In 1991, they threatened to walk out of talks about the constitution, and they later voted against the new constitution because it did not include proper recognition of minority rights. More importantly, however, UDMR's Hungarian leaders stepped up their claims to territorial autonomy by strongly criticizing the constitution for designating Romania as a unitary state.

In 1993, the Congress of the UDMR elected a perceived moderate as the party's chair and changed its overall goal from territorial autonomy to local and regional self-administration. This moderate swing was short-lived, however. A few months later, the party adopted a new draft minority law calling for individual, local, and regional autonomy, leaving the reference to territorial autonomy unclear. According to the draft, the majority nation should also be required to know the minority language in areas where the minority constitutes at least 30 percent of the population. President Iliescu, leader of the PDSR, in turn, publicly condemned minority aspirations to territorial autonomy.

The issues of dispute between the government and the Hungarian minority were not restricted to autonomy. In 1991, a number of schools that had increased education in Hungarian reverted to Romanian-only education. Then, in 1995, Iliescu signed an education bill requiring that nearly all admission examinations to tertiary education, as well as history and geography education in primary and secondary schools, be in Romanian. In addition, the law restricted teaching in Hungarian at the university level to teacher training and art colleges. After the UDMR's amendments to the bill were rejected in 1994 when the chamber passed the bill, the president of the UDMR, Béla Markó, claimed that the law was more restrictive than Ceauşescu-era education legislation had been and threatened to appeal the law to European bodies.

The rhetoric of both sides only intensified in the wake of the education bill. At an international conference held in Bucharest, Iliescu stated that political autonomy granted to minorities could threaten national and regional security. Moreover, the deputy leader of the UDMR, Arpad Maron, accused Iliescu and Oliviu Gherman of making anti-Hungarian remarks that smacked of fascism. Then in 1995, the PDSR signed a cooperation protocol with PUNR and other parties, which obliged the signatories to cooperate and support clear orientation toward economic reform and

to fight "anti-Romanism."[11] On their part, the UDMR renewed their demands for autonomy in Hungarian-majority areas. In December 1995, the UDMR took an even more radical turn when it decided to form a special council composed of Hungarian local government officials to coordinate local decision making. The government parties interpreted this as a prototype for the administrative body of future autonomous Hungarian areas and therefore declared the move unconstitutional. This time even the opposition parties joined in the criticism of the UDMR. The UDMR, however, did not relent. The UDMR president, Markó, publicly rejected the Romanian concept of a nation state and claimed that regional self-government was necessary to guarantee Hungarian minority rights.

After these events, even the opposition partners of the UDMR, in particular the electoral alliance called the Democratic Conventinon (CD), accused the UDMR of smearing Romania's image and isolating the country internationally. The leadership of the CD also warned that this could result in the Hungarian community's isolation within Romania. In June 1995, the members of the CD and other opposition parties then urged the UDMR to renounce the aim of territorial autonomy and collective rights. When the UDMR declined, the other parties decided to end further direct cooperation with the party. The Hungarian stance became no more conciliatory when later that year Tökés repeated his earlier accusations that the Hungarian minority in Romania had been the victim of ethnic cleansing.

The Second Democratic Phase – the CD Government

A second principal proposition of this chapter is that inclusion in government serves as a moderating influence in ethnic politics. The inclusion does not have to occur as a benevolent gesture by coalition partners who believe in the cooperative capacity of the minority. Rather, the coalition partners generally include the minority party out of necessity when their majority in parliament is threatened. It is the objective of this section to show that this is exactly what happened in Romania during the third administration. In 1996, the CD won the election with a plurality and included the UDMR in the coalition government from the outset. The result was a notable move toward moderation of the UDMR's policies.

[11] For news accounts in English on the exchange between the UDMR and Romania's nationalist parties, see the full Radio Free Europe newsline archives at www.rferl.org. See also current Romanian newspapers available online, including Adevarul at www.adevarulonline.ro and Romania Libera at www.romanialibera.com.

Most importantly, while the parliamentary party still pursued issues of education reform, it deemphasized and redefined claims to autonomy as a process of general Romanian decentralization.[12]

In 1996, the CD won the parliamentary elections and gained 122 seats out of 328.[13] Along with the 53 seats won by the USD (Social Democratic Union), the coalition government had a majority in parliament. The CD, however, was an extremely fragile alliance of several parties whose cooperation was strained well before the election. Indeed, the story of the CD administration is one of continuous disunity, with coalition parties frequently split on issues. Consequently, the principal party in the CD likely wanted to ensure the cooperation of the UDMR's 25 deputies early on. Because the three opposition parties in parliament, the PDSR and its nationalistic partners the PRM and PUNR, together had 128 deputies, the ongoing possibility of coalition-member defection augmented the importance of maintaining a cooperative relationship with the UDMR.

Thus, in the first administration, the UDMR was given two ministries and several local posts.[14] The main concession made to ensure UDMR's cooperation, however, was an emergency education ordinance approved in mid-1997 that allowed instruction in Hungarian at all education levels and promised further consideration of the situation. In 1998, the government also set up a commission to evaluate the possibility of establishing a Hungarian-language state university. Finally, in 1999, the parliament approved a new education law that increased teaching in minority languages. Among other provisions, the law permitted technical and vocational training in Hungarian and the organization of universities and faculties in minority languages. The chair of the UDMR, Markó, welcomed the new law as an important step.[15]

[12] The development of this debate within UDMR is complex. In general, however, it can be characterized as a split between Markó's increasingly moderate interpretation of autonomy as a process of general Romanian administrative decentralization and Tökés's increasingly radical emphasis on territorial autonomy, which nationalist Romanians interpret as separatist. For a further discussion of the development of this debate between 1989 and 1996, see Anna-Mária Bíró (1996). For current updates, see the UDMR's Web site at www.UDMR.ro.

[13] In addition, 13 seats were awarded to non-Hungarian minority groups.

[14] These were the portfolios of tourism and of minorities. According to Kostecki (2002), the UDMR lost the tourism portfolio in 1998 but gained the Department of Health (p. 25).

[15] At that time, the leader of the radical wing of the party, Tökés, announced that the Hungarian government would provide financial assistance for a Hungarian-language university in Romania (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999-b.) Over time, the actions of the Hungarian government became a bone of contention between radical leaders of the

For the first time since democratization, the Romanian government also put a lid on the rhetoric and actions of the nationalists. Among the early concerns of the CD government were access to the European Union and NATO, and peaceful inclusion of the Hungarian minority in the government served this purpose. Thus, the government began to rebuff Funar's habitual protests against everything Hungarian. For instance, in 1997, when the opposition accused the UDMR of pursuing ethnic cleansing in Transilvania and of planning to secede from Romania, the government used its majority to quell the allegations.

Any mention of autonomy, previously a central theme for the UDMR, was notably missing from its parliamentary discourse. The nonparliamentary radical wing of the party led by Tökés raised the issue again in the Szeklerland Forum in September 1998. Among other conclusions, the forum called for a separate Hungarian-language university, restoration of confiscated property to the Hungarian church and individuals, and territorial autonomy for the area broadly encompassing Harghita and Covasna, known as Szeklerland. Notably, the majority of the UDMR's leadership did not even attend the forum. The moderate sentiment was clearly shared by the rank and file, because the following year, an overwhelming majority of the UDMR congress reelected as chairman the representative of the moderate wing of the party, Markó.[16]

The Fourth Administration – Moderate PSD Minority Cabinet

As mentioned, inclusion in government serves as a moderating influence in ethnic politics. The same holds true when a minority government commands enough of a plurality that it does not have to enter into a coalition but depends nonetheless on the ethnic group for policy support. In such instances, a minority government may enter into formal or informal agreements with the ethnic minority to secure its support in exchange for legislative concessions that fall short of inclusion in the cabinet. The agreement also has a moderating effect on the ethnic minority, as it sees benefit in continued cooperation with the government. After the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections, this was the scenario in Romania. What is of particular interest is that the party that after the election composed the minority government was the PDSR, now called the Social Democratic

Hungarian minority and the Romanian government, because the Romanian government views Hungarian government support of the Romanian-Hungarian minority as a threat. For more on this topic see Jenne (2006).

[16] According to news reports, the numbers were 274 votes against 157.

Party (PSD). As discussed previously, the relationship between the PDSR and the UDMR was extremely antagonistic during the two first administrations, when the PDSR/PSD did not depend on the support of the UDMR. This time around, however, both parties demonstrated considerable flexibility in overlooking past relations to their current mutual benefit.

In November 2000, Romanians went to the polls again. The PSD won a plurality of 155 seats in the parliament; the nationalist PRM (Greater Romania Party), which now includes the former chair of the PUNR, Gheorghe Funar, won 84 seats; the PD (Democratic Party) and the PNL (National Liberal Party) won 31 seats each; the UDMR won 27 seats; and 18 seats were distributed to various other minorities (Shafir, 2000-a). While the UDMR, PD, and PNL were unlikely to join the PRM on many policy proposals, the threat of a vote of no confidence was a very real possibility for the PSD government. Therefore, it needed to align itself with at least one of the other parties.

For a variety of reasons the PRM, which previously had been a PSD ally, was an impossible choice this time around. First of all, the chair of the PSD, Iliescu, faced the PRM chair, Vladim Tudor, in runoff elections. While the PRM is quite popular, the percentage of the population that opposes it is still larger. The UDMR, PD, and PNL combined held eighty-nine seats to the PRM's eighty-four seats, and many of their supporters made their opposition to the PRM quite clear after the election in a number of public demonstrations.[17] To attract these voters in the presidential election, Iliescu had to distance himself from the PRM.

Furthermore, representatives of both the European Union and the United States made it very clear that in return for their continued cooperation with Romania, including the PSD's explicitly desired inclusion in the EU and NATO, the Romanian government would be expected to foster minority and other human rights consistent with EU and U.S. policies (ibid.). In other words, the PSD had better not align with the PRM.[18]

Which of the other parties would make the best choice of a partner, from the PSD point of view, was not immediately clear after the election. While cooperation with the UDMR would signal the PSD's new commitment to minority rights, that partnership could also alienate some voters

[17] See, for instance, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2000-a).

[18] Kostecki (2002) argues that three main factors have contributed to improving ethnic relations in Romania: the government's desire to join NATO and the EU, increasing moderation of Hungarian leaders, and the constant transformation of Romanian society (pp. 33–34). His argument lends support to the idea that inclusion of a minority in government is an instrumental decision.

who dislike the UDMR. As for the PD and the PNL, both were likely to capitalize on any difficulties the PSD administration would encounter, then become the only viable PSD alternative in future elections.

Consequently, the PSD decided to play it safe and appeal to all but the PRM. This course was quite a surprise to the PRM, which immediately after the parliamentary elections had declared itself ready for a strong partnership with the PSD. Iliescu, however, declared that the PSD and the PRM programs were "incompatible"[19] and appealed to all the other parties to collaborate with the PSD in the runoff and to support a year of parliamentary cooperation.

While turnout in the second round of the presidential election was significantly lower than in the first round, Iliescu won a resounding victory, with over 66 percent of the vote cast against Tudor's 33 percent. In December that same year, the UDMR and the PNL voted to support the PSD cabinet headed by Adrian Nastase. The PRM and the PD voted against the cabinet. In addition, the UDMR and PNL signed a joint declaration in which the parties pledged to support the government to fight extremism, poverty, and corruption, and to support integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In return for its cooperation, the UDMR received some significant concessions. According to both UDMR and PSD representatives,[20] a part of the agreement stipulated the appointment of UDMR members as deputy prefects in the heavily Hungarian counties of Harghita, Covasna, Satu Mare, Salaj, and Mures. More importantly, however, in January 2001, the chamber voted to approve a Local Public Administration law granting minorities the right to use their mother tongue in contacts with authorities and to post bilingual street signs.[21]

[19] See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2000-b), and other reports in the aftermath of the election.

[20] See several Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty newsline reports, for instance, 2000-c and 2001-a.

[21] It is worth emphasizing that not everyone within the UDMR is happy with the increasing moderation of the party. The radical wing, still led by Tökés, continues to criticize the moderate parliamentary wing of the party, calling the agreement with the PDSR schizophrenic. The word *schizophrenic* was first used, however, by Chair Markó to describe Tökés's urging his supporters to vote for Hungarian candidates who ran on lists separate from the UDMR in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Tökés then responded that the word was a good description of the agreement with the PSD (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2001-b). This further supports the principal point of this section that while the UDMR may have become increasingly radical when it was excluded from government, the parliamentary wing of the party has become significantly more moderate ever since it was first included in government.

In December 2001, the PLN, PD, and PRD attempted to censure the government for failing to respond to a report issued by the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), which alleged that Hungarians in Covasna and Harghita were creating a quasi-autonomous region with the help of the UDMR. Members of the UDMR, in turn, demanded that the SRI director and interior minister who had made these allegations public be dismissed. On their part, the government discounted the allegations.[22]

That same month, eleven Romanian and Hungarian intellectuals from Transilvania sent the parliament a proposal for a Romanian regional state.[23] The leader of the UDMR, Markó, would not commit himself to this proposal but stated simply that a parliamentary debate on the topic would be sensible, despite his own previous public rejections of the Romanian notion of a unified nation state. His rejections, of course, occurred before the UDMR was included in government. The UDMR chairman's moderation was reflected in the party at large. In January 2003, Markó was reelected chairman at the party's national congress while Tökés, claiming he had been forced out of the party, held a separate meeting in a nearby church.[24]

The Fifth Administration – Moderate UDMR in a Governing Coalition

Romanians headed to the polls again in 2004. A coalition of the PDS and PUR (Humanist Party of Romania) won a plurality with 132 seats, and a coalition of the National Liberal Party (PNL – formerly in the CD coalition) and the Democratic Party (PD – formerly in the USD coalition), called the Justice and Truth alliance, won 112 seats. The UDMR won 6.2 percent of the vote and 22 seats. Somewhat unexpectedly the former Bucharest mayor, Traian Basescu, representing the center right Justice and Truth alliance, won the second round of the presidential election

[22] Interestingly, during this time one of the principal sources of tension between the UDMR and the PSD was the Hungarian government's law that grants special rights to ethnic Hungarians in Romania.

[23] Economist Intelligence Unit (2002-b). This is at least the second of such proposals. Another, called the *Cluj declaration*, was circulated in 1992 as a result of "radicalization of the [UDMR]" (p. 15 Kostecki). A third such declaration, called the *Cluj Napoca declaration* or the *Transilvania proclamation*, was circulated in 1998 during the second administration, but its importance was discounted by Markó (Zamfirescu, 1998).

[24] Economist Intelligence Unit (2003). For the continuing dispute between Tökés and Markó, see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports for updates at www.rferl.org.

and appointed the PNL leader, Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, as prime minister. Having been partners in the 1996–2000 administration the Justice and Truth alliance's most natural association was with the UDMR. More importantly, adding the 22 seats of the UDMR to the governing coalition allowed the Justice and Truth alliance to surpass the 132 seats held by the PDS-PUR by 2 and the UDMR received a number of ministries in turn (Shafir, 2004).

Reinforcing the second principal proposition of this chapter, that inclusion in government serves as a moderating influence in ethnic politics, UDMR rhetoric, in turn, is very conciliatory. On behalf of all Hungarians, for example, Markó, the UDMR president and Romania's current vice prime minister, greeted the participants at the national convention of the Democratic Party in June 2005 with the admission "We are living in times when Hungarians can succeed only through cooperation with Romanians." He then went on to discuss the work ahead, most notably a law package with the modest goal of decentralization (Uniunea Democratica Maghiara din România, 2005).

THE MRF IN BULGARIA

The UDMR is but one of the ethnic parties that sprang up in Eastern Europe during democratization in the early 1990s. Another such party is the Turkish minority party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), in neighboring Bulgaria. The story of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, both under the Communist dictatorship and later in democratic politics, conforms to a pattern similar to that of the UDMR. In general terms, this pattern begins with consolidation of the ethnic group in the face of repression, followed by political flexibility when the minority has access to state government. Indeed, as the following account shows, the MRF has proved exceptionally flexible in that it has at various times aligned with all major players in Bulgarian politics.

The Turkish Minority and the Communist Regime

Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria range from 8.5 to 10 percent of the total Bulgarian population. In absolute numbers the group counts around 1 million members.[25] Under Communism this group suffered discrimination by Bulgarian authorities for several decades with overt discrimination as

[25] For instance, Economist Intelligence Unit (1998). See also Fox and Mincheva (1995).

early as the late 1960s.[26] These policies included unification of Turkish schools with Bulgarian schools, where students were discouraged from studying Turkish. In 1984, a campaign for changing more than a million Turks' names to Bulgarian names was completed successfully in three months.[27] Soon thereafter, Bulgarian Radio's broadcasts for the Turkish minority in Turkish ended, and the monthly review of the newspaper, half of which was previously in Turkish, was now published in Bulgarian only. Officially, speaking Turkish, listening to Turkish music, wearing traditional Turkish clothing, and celebrating Muslim feasts were forbidden and subject to a fine. Turks were obliged to follow Bulgarian ceremonies for births, marriages, and burials, and in some places Turkish parents were forced to send their young children to nurseries so that the children would learn Bulgarian before Turkish (Bohlen, 1991; Lutem, 2000). These assimilation policies devastated the community, resulting in deaths and incarceration of protesters as well as mass exodus to Turkey. However, the policies also served to rally the minority community. In the words of a local MRF leader, Ahmed Karaali, "By banning Islam and the Turkish way of life, the communists actually encouraged young people to take more notice of [their cultural past]" (Power, 1992).

In the wake of the revolutions sweeping the region in 1989, the Turkish nationalistic revival reached a high point. In a gathering of about 5,000 people outside the National Assembly, ethnic Turks asked for the restoration of their real names on December 28, 1989. In an attempt to defuse the mounting ethnic tension, the government responded by condemning the arbitrary changing of names, affirming freedom of religion and the right of all to speak a language other than Bulgarian in their nonofficial communications, and the right to practice ethnic customs freely.

[26] See, for example, Ishiyama and Breuning (1998), Lutem (2000), Petcova (2002), and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2003).

[27] According to Lutem (2000), police and in some cases army units surrounded the villages where most of the Turks lived. People were gathered in the main square and asked to choose a Bulgarian name from a prepared list. Those who refused were beaten and/or imprisoned. In case of the rare organized protest, the army intervened and those arrested were sent to prison. Without the new identity cards bearing Bulgarian names, members of the Turkish minority were not accepted in banks, hospitals, public buildings, and so on, so resistance soon ceased. Before this, ethnic Bulgarians called Pomaks, who probably accepted Islam in the early Ottoman period, were forcibly converted to Christianity during and just after the Balkan Wars. After the war, strong protests and massive immigration of the Pomaks to Turkey obliged the Bulgarian government to stop the forced conversions. Nevertheless, some efforts to "bulgarize" the Pomaks continued under every subsequent political regime, reaching their climax with the Communists in the 1970s when Muslim names of Pomaks were forcibly changed to Bulgarian names.

The MRF in Democratic Politics

Despite subsequent counterdemonstrations by some 10,000 ethnic Bulgarian nationalists,[28] the government refused to retract its minority-rights policies. As the Communist Party tried to adapt further to democratic waves sweeping the region, the ban on alternative political parties was lifted. The Communist Party name was changed to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and in June, the first competitive elections were held. A likely reason for the BSP's conciliatory stance toward the Turkish minority early on during democratization is that the BSP's position in democratic elections was tenuous at best. Therefore, according to Ivanov (2003), the BSP's goal in supporting the founding of the MRF was purely instrumental and aimed to split the non-Socialist vote. Ivanov goes on to argue that the BSP succeeded, because in 1990 the party won a slim majority of 211 seats out of 400 in the national assembly. The main opposition party, Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), won 144 seats; the historical Agrarian Party (BZNS) won 16 seats; and the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) became the third largest party in parliament by winning 23 seats.

Having obtained a majority in parliament, the BSP did not include other parties in the government. However, continuing its predemocratic reversal of cultural assimilation policies, the administration did restore some additional cultural rights to minorities. These included the right to use original Turkish names and optional Turkish-language instruction in schools. At the same time, however, Bulgarian nationalists, who are an important constituency to the BSP, also continued their demonstrations against minority rights, keeping ethnic relations tense.[29] In late 1991, the legislative leadership's increasing unpopularity and inability to deal with the economic crisis of the country[30] forced the BSP to resign and call early elections. Perhaps in an attempt to pacify the nationalists, the

[28] According to some, hard-line Communists were accused of fueling the ethnic tensions in order to divert the country from democratic reforms. See, for example, Fox and Mincheva (1995).

[29] For more on ethnic relations in Bulgaria after democratization see the full Radio Free Europe newsline archives at www.rferl.org. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty news reports, Economist Intelligence Unit *Country Reports Bulgaria*, 1990-2006 and Minorities at Risk (2005-c).

[30] The BSP president, Mladenov, resigned July 6, 1990, and the Grand National Assembly elected the opposition's Zhelyu Zhelev president in August. Zhelev then went on the become Bulgaria's first democratically elected president in 1992.

BSP adopted a more strident stance toward the MRF around the same time. This included a ban on Turkish-language classes and an unsuccessful attempt to ban the MRF because of its ethnic ties.[31]

The new appeal to nationalists was not sufficient to keep the BSP in power. The opposition UDF won the elections in 1991, obtaining 110 seats in a smaller parliament with a total of 240 seats. The MRF won 24 seats, holding the balance of power to the BSP's 106 seats. Thus, as expected, one of the first actions of the new administration was to overturn the ban on Turkish-language classes. In Bulgaria's first democratic presidential race the following year, the UDF candidate, Zhelyu Zhelev, defeated the BSP candidate, Velko Valkanov, who ran an anti-Turkish campaign. However, the UDF government, led by Philip Dimitrov, was short-lived. In October 1992, deputies from the MRF joined the BSP in censuring the government, citing poor economic performance, among other reasons ("Bulgarian government toppled," 1992). After failed efforts by both the UDF and the BSP to form a government, the MRF nominated the independent ethnic Bulgarian Lyuben Berov to form a government. The government was accepted in parliament with greater support from the BSP than the UDF. This intended interim government led by Berov then turned out to be the most persistent government thus far, surviving five no-confidence votes and ruling for almost two years.

In September 1994, Berov resigned, parliament was dissolved, and elections were scheduled for the following December. Voters restored the BSP to power with 125 seats. The UDF won 69 seats, the Agrarians won 18 seats, and the MRF was reduced to 15 seats. Not surprisingly, the relationship between the BSP and the MRF again took on a renewed air of antagonism. First, the BSP appointed Ilcho Dimitrov, who was an apologist for Zhivkov's policies of "Bulgarizing" minorities, as education minister. The MRF faction in the legislature walked out in protest of Dimitrov's appointment, but to no avail (Shafir, 2000-b). Then the BSP publicly confirmed its liaison with the anti-Turkish nationalists of the Patriotic Alliance (ibid). Fortunately for ethnic relations in Bulgaria, the BSP government only lasted two years, and in April 1997, elections were held again.

[31] According to Article 11 of the Bulgarian Constitution, which was adopted in 1991, parties based on ethnicity are unlawful. Later that year the BSP, therefore, banned the MRF. After long legal disputes, MRF was recognized by the Constitutional Court and was able to register itself as a "party" in a regional court.

The MRF as a Seasoned Political Party

In 1996 the UDF and MRF issued a joint declaration of their immediate political goals to the national assembly. Then, a couple of months before the 1997 elections, the central council of the MRF authorized the leadership to negotiate with the UDF about running joint candidate lists in the election. Barely a month later, infighting flared up in the MRF. As a result the party, under the leadership of Ahmed Dogan, backed out of negotiations and formed an electoral coalition, the Alliance for National Salvation (ANS), with the Monarchists and Greens. A part of the old MRF, however, rebelled, and a senior member of the party, Gjuner Tahir, ran on the United Democratic Forces (UtdDF, including UDF) candidate lists[32] in the election. Tahir, who was expelled from the MRF by Dogan, then went on to establish the National Movement for Rights and Freedoms (NMRF).[33] Dogan, in turn, continued as the MRF's chair.

The UtdDF coalition won an absolute majority in the 1997 elections with 137 seats. The BSP won 58 seats and the ANS won 19 seats. Two smaller parties also won seats. A breakaway from the BSP called the Euroleft won 14 seats and the Bulgarian Business Block (BBB) won 12 seats. While the UDF was no longer dependent on the MRF and there was no love lost between Dogan and the UDF leader, Ivan Kostov, little in the way of ethnic demonstrations or ethnic conflict in Bulgarian politics occurred after this election. One reason may be the UtdDF's association with at least a faction of the Turkish minority through Tahir. Another reason arguably is that Bulgaria's scheduled incorporation into the European Union in 2007 plays an important role in moderating government policies toward minorities. Thus, the UtdDF government, mindful of the requirements associated with joining the European Union, continued to court Turkish and other minority voters. In 1997 it passed, and in 1999 ratified, a Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The MRF, in turn, restricted its criticism to issues such as the economy and voted in 1997 with the government in granting NATO an air corridor, and Kostov reciprocated by declaring that the MRF was a natural coalition partner for the UDF (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999-a). This nonemphasis

[32] The UtdDF coalition included the UDF and the PU (People's Union – a coalition of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Democratic Party).

[33] Initially the movement was called the Initiative Committee for Renewal. When it was officially turned into a political party, it adopted the name National Movement for Rights and Freedoms.

on potentially conflictual ethnic divisions among the political elite was reflected among the general population as early as 1995, when a national survey indicated that ethnic differences were less of a worry than unemployment, inflation, and crime to most Bulgarian citizens.[34]

The Brand New "Natural" Ally of the MRF

In 2000, disappointing results in local elections worked to reconcile the UDF and MRF further. Each party lost support and viewed a coalition after the 2001 national election as a distinct possibility. Hence, the UDF welcomed advances from the MRF, whose leader, Dogan, admitted that the MRF was isolated. In March, the leadership of the two parties met for the first time in three years to discuss a variety of issues, from NATO and EU membership, to minorities and local government. As the election grew closer, however, and the unpopularity of the UDF became more evident, the MRF became increasingly noncommittal. Thus, the party joined the BSP in expressing concerns about the government-led privatization process, though it did stop short of taking part in the BSP-led vote of no confidence (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000).

Much to everyone's surprise, a brand new political force fashioned around the former king, Simeon II Koburgotski, called the Simeon II National Movement (SNM), won the parliamentary elections in 2001, obtaining 120 of the 240 parliamentary seats. The UtdDF and the BSP, in turn, suffered heavy losses, obtaining 51 and 48 seats, respectively. The MRF again held the balance of power, winning 21 seats, and in a testament to the party's impressive political flexibility, MRF officials immediately made it clear that they viewed themselves as the natural partner for a governing coalition with the SNM (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2001).

The MRF continued its political maneuvering with an eye to minority representation in the subsequent presidential election, in which the party split with SNM, its coalition partner in the first round, and backed the

[34] According to a Bulgarian sociologist, Liliya Dimova, a national survey on "National and Ethnic Identity" conducted in Bulgaria in December 1995 shows that ethnic groups in Bulgaria are tolerant of each other. Half of the respondents believe in an ethnic minority right to form organizations to preserve their cultural identity. Unemployment, inflation, and crime are a greater worry than ethnic differences. However, issues such as access to power and political representation heighten ethnic tension. Furthermore, while 87 percent of respondents in the Kurdzhali region are convinced that minorities should be represented in local government, 59 percent oppose ethnically based parties (BBC report as related by Fox and Mincheva, 1995).

BSP's Georgi Purvanov as presidential candidate. Purvanov, who won the election, ran with Angel Marin as his vice president. Marin, in turn, stood as a candidate for the MRF in the June parliamentary elections.

After the elections, therefore, the MRF became the partner to different political parties in both the governing coalition and the office of the president. Moreover, one of the MRF's partners was a new political party, and the other was the MRF's historical foe. In this position, the MRF could skillfully influence the government on policies that affect its constituency, for instance, privatization and subsequent regulation of tobacco purchases, and employment in the state's Bulgartabac, all policy areas that have important consequences for the Turkish constituency (ibid). In short, the MRF continued to demonstrate exceptional political flexibility with the consistent objective of representing its constituency in the government of Bulgaria.

MRF – in Every Coalition

Bulgarians elected a new legislature in June 2005. The Coalition for Bulgaria, led by the BSP, won 82 of the 240 seats. The SNM won 52 seats and the MRF won 34 seats. Four other parties split the remaining 72 seats. After the BSP and SNM individually tried and failed to form a cabinet, the three leading parties together mustered enough support for the approval of a new government. Ministerial seats are distributed according to a ratio of 8:5:3, respectively, for the BSP, the SNM, and the MRF, with the MRF holding the ministries of disaster management, agriculture, and environment. The government program emphasizes economic growth, entry into the European Union, and cooperation between political parties with no sign of ethnic antagonism (Sofiaecho, 2005).[35]

THE BASQUES AND THE CATALANS IN SPAIN

Not all ethnic parties are as peaceful and flexible as the UDMR and MRF. One of the better-known examples of intransigent and violent ethnic

[35] This does not mean that there is no ethnic antagonism in Bulgaria. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2005 election report, current ethnic antagonism primarily involves the Roma community. Furthermore, while political parties are interested in the vote of this community, representatives of the community are generally too low on party lists to gain access to the legislature (OSCE, 2005).

parties is that of the Basques in Spain. Interestingly, however, another ethnic group in Spain, the Catalans, is commonly regarded as a model of flexibility and peaceful integration into national politics.

The primary objective of this section is to examine the differences between the political participation of these two groups in order to cast light on the possible reasons for the differences in levels of violence. It is not the intent of this chapter to oversimplify the extremely complex nature of ethnic politics. Thus the comparison simply points to differences in the way ruling regimes have responded to these two ethnic groups as one possible contributor to the divergence in their political histories. This section proposes that there is little discernible difference in the underlying Basque and Catalan propensity for violence. The violent expression of the Basques, however, spiraled out of control in a vicious cycle of one-upmanship with the dominant regime, exacerbated by exclusion of nonviolent Basque political parties from government coalitions.

Second, this section specifically tackles the problem of the chicken and the egg, asking whether the differences in inclusion stem from original differences in the levels of extremism and violence between these two groups. The evidence presented leads to the conclusion that predemocratic repression of these two groups, their initial levels of radicalization, and levels of violence were in many ways comparable. Thus it is proposed here that the Catalans simply were included to a greater extent early on in constitutional negotiations because of the size of their constituency. Later evidence supports this idea, as nationalistic parties have set aside their public opposition to the Basque parties when they are forced to rely on these parties for majority in government.

Ethnic Repression and the Roots of Violence

Conversi points out, "It is sometimes claimed that Basque society is inherently violent, but this can be shown to be false. . . . There have been times when Catalunya was one of the most violent societies on the continent" (1997, p. 222). Moreover, rather than being a national characteristic, Conversi argues, Basque violence is in part a reaction to state repression perpetuated through military force. The following discussion compares Basque and Catalan history under Franco to demonstrate that the increasingly violent political expression of the Basques depends more on historical accident than on any inherent national characteristic associated with ethnic intransigence.

Some argue that the Spanish Civil War resulted in part from Spanish nationalism and minority resistance to it.[36] In any event, after the war, General Franco attempted systematically to erase all signs of cultural diversity within Spain, including Catalan and Basque national expression. In the Basque territory of Euskadi, suppression of the Basque nation included closing of the Basque University, armed occupation of social and cultural associations, and the burning of books written in Euskera. The use of Euskera also was banned in schools, in any mass broadcast or publications, and in religious ceremonies. In addition, a translation of all Basque names in the civil registry was mandated, and innumerable people were imprisoned and even executed.

The Catalan nationality also endured severe repression under the Franco regime. Official cultural assimilation policies included public burning of books written in Catalan, proscriptions on the use of the Catalan language (enforced by the levying of heavy fines and imprisonment), and removal of all posters, placards, notices, signposts, and labels in Catalan. In addition, university education in Catalan was discontinued and the Institute of Catalan Studies was closed, Catalan patriotic monuments and statues were smashed, and there were attempts to ban Catalan dance and song. Anyone who opposed these measures was imprisoned, exiled, or even executed.[37] While Horowitz (1985) suggests that repression may have been less severe in Catalunya than in Euskadi, later scholars such as Diez-Medrano dispute this claim. According to Diez-Medrano (1995) there is no reason to believe that the repression was any more intense in Euskadi than in Catalunya, at least until the late 1960s.

In both regions, the cultural assimilation policies were most strictly carried out during the Falange period, or the early years of Franco's dictatorship. Scholars commonly agree that it was opposition to Franco's "cultural-homogenization policies and fascist government [that] became the chief catalyst for clandestine nationalist political mobilization in the Basque Country and Catalunya" (Díez-Medrano, 1995, p. 4).[38]

Ethnic Violence

Violence is but one face of Basque politics, and it is often forgotten that it is not necessarily a popular one, particularly in recent years. Similarly,

[36] See, for instance, Conversi (1997).

[37] For further discussion of the repression suffered by both Catalans and Basques see Díez-Medrano (1995) and Conversi (1997).

[38] See also Laitin (1989) and Conversi (1997).

observers generally overlook that "peaceful" Catalan political participation includes its share of violence. It is the aim of this section to show the initial similarities in the violent political expression of these two groups. While social and economic conditions undoubtedly elucidate some Basque political violence, this section proposes that regime response and historical accidents are also an important part of the explanation.

Scholars thus far have explained the difference in Basque and Catalan political expression as a result of sociological and economic factors. For instance, according to Conversi (1997), some of the difference is rooted in the different capabilities of Catalan and Basque culture to provide their respective populations with nonviolent symbols around which nationalism can be nurtured. He argues that whereas cultural symbols and shared values such as language were prominent in Catalunya, they were lacking in Euskadi, leaving Basque nationalists with few unifying alternatives besides violence. Diez-Medrano (1995), however, argues that the difference lies in the divergent economic structures in the two regions inhabited by these nationalities. He posits that the Catalan consumer-goods production base creates a social structure different from the Basque capital-goods production base. The distinct social structures then support different levels of political mobilization, which in Catalunya create a greater number of political alternatives. In Euskadi, however, the lack of political alternatives pushed many moderates toward the policies of separatism and even into the arms of Euzkadi 'ta Askatasuna (Basque Land and Freedom, ETA).

State Repression and Historical Accidents

Most authors, including the two mentioned previously, also agree that the initial harsh regime response to the violence served to radicalize the Basque population and popularize the ETA further. This section, therefore, details the events that led up to re-democratization. During this time, political groups that expressed themselves through violence developed among both the Catalans and the Basques. Only the latter, however, matured and gained extensive public support.

Most scholars agree that Basque radicalization, particularly through the ETA, can be traced directly to Franco's cultural assimilation policies. ETA itself was an outgrowth of what was in the 1950s a group of young university students in Bilbao who gathered weekly to study and discuss Basque history and culture. This group published an underground bulletin called Ekin (To Do), from which the group drew its name. In the late 1950s, Ekin merged with Euzko Gastedi del Interior (EGI, Basque Youth

from the Interior), which was the youth cell of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). Then in 1959, Ekin broke away from the PNV, taking many of the EGI members with it, and founded ETA.

In the early 1960s, ETA was heavily influenced by Marxism and the guerrilla warfare ideology of Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh but did not claim its first victim until 1968. The victim was a member of the Civil Guard who stopped a car transporting two ETA members who had just participated in an armed bank robbery. When the car was stopped at a second roadblock, one of the ETA members was dragged from the car and immediately executed. The execution caused popular outrage and ETA membership swelled. Later that same year, ETA carried out its first premeditated political murder. The group shot and killed an infamous police commissioner and torturer. According to Conversi (1997), this began the first cycle of ETA action, to which the state responded with brutal repression, and to which ETA responded with more violence.

At the same time, Catalan nationalists were developing their own separatist organizations, most notably the Catalan National Front (FNC). During the 1960s, the group experienced a shift toward Marxism, and in 1969 a radical faction split from the FNC to establish the National Liberation Socialist Party (PSAN), which later split into PSAN and PSAN-p (p meaning provisional). The PSAN-p advocated military insurrection, but their activities were few and were largely unnoticed by the public. In 1969, another Catalan military group, the Catalan Liberation Front (FAC), was established. This group committed more than 100 acts of violence between 1969 and 1971, but because there was no loss of life, their activity also was largely unnoticed by the public, and the group never gained much of a following.

The most recent violent military group in Catalunya dates back to 1978. In 1980 this group formally came to be called Terra Lliure (Free Land). Terra Lliure tried repeatedly to organize a military movement similar to ETA, but as were the other violent Catalan separatist movements was not very successful because of lack of organization and visibility, as well as sheer ineptitude.[39] Despite its limited success, Terra Lliure was nevertheless active until at least the early 1990s, when it announced that it was renouncing violence to seek independence from Spain through democratic means.

[39] According to Diez-Medrano several members died while trying to plant explosives. For further information about both the ETA and the various Catalan military movements see Díez-Medrano (1995) and Conversi (1997).

Democracy and Ethnicity

In short, the preceding discussion shows that both the Basques and the Catalans demonstrated an early propensity for political violence. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the Basques were so obviously beyond the pale when compared to the Catalans at the time of re-democratization that they would be excluded from government because of their history of violence. Rather, the following section suggests that the Basques were simply excluded from early constitutional negotiations because of the size of the group. Furthermore, this section proposes that continued exclusion of Basques from government coalitions is also a result of the group's size rather than ETA violence. Therefore, in 1996 when the historically Spanish nationalist Partido Popular (PP) was forced to rely on the Basque nationalist Partido National Vasco (PNV), it did so without hesitation. Finally, this section suggests that the continued exclusion of Basque parties has done little to promote moderate behavior among Basque nationalists.

Spanish Democracy

As Table 6.2 shows, the Basque nation is small compared to the Catalan nation. Therefore, it is not surprising that after re-democratization in 1977, the Catalans[40] were included in the very early governmental negotiations over the first draft of the constitution. The Basques and other minority groups, however, were only involved much later, after a first draft had already been completed. According to Gunther, Sani, and coworkers (1988),[41] some of the Basque leaders involved in these subsequent negotiations were intransigent people by nature. He also points

[40] Unless otherwise specified I am mostly referring to the Catalan parties of PDC and later CiU, and the Basque PNV. During this transition period, however, the parties were in the process of being established, and leaders from other factions were involved in negotiations as well.

[41] For further discussion see Gunther and associates (1988, pp. 116–124). The ruling coalition UDC joined forces with the Socialists, the Communist Party, and the Catalans (PDC and later CiU), excluding only the Spanish nationalist Alianza Popular. The Basques were not included in these first rounds of negotiations but were included in some later negotiations that specifically concerned their interests. In endnotes, Gunther quotes a 1978 newspaper interview with the PNV deputy Kepa Sodupe, who attributed some of the breakdown of the early negotiations with the Basques to the initial exclusion of the PNV. According to Sodupe: "A large part of the difficulties that are emerging now arose out of the exclusion suffered by the PNV during the ten months in which the Constitution was being elaborated, during which all the other political groups had the opportunity to be heard, to participate in the consensus and to decide by vote."

TABLE 6.2. *Population numbers in Basque Country, Catalunya, and Galicia*

Region	Population absolute numbers [a]	Population as percentage of national population
Basque Country	2,130,783	5.27
Catalunya	6,226,869	15.39
Galicia	2,825,020	6.98

Note: According to the Minorities at Risk data the Basques and the Catalans are the only Spanish minorities that are electorally active. Galicians, for instance, do not field ethnic parties in national elections.

[a] Not everyone living in these regions is Basque, Catalan, or Galician.

Source: Statesman's Yearbook, 1997–1998.

out, however, that according to Basque leaders, the absence of a PNV representative among the drafters of the initial text made it politically difficult for Basque nationalists to endorse the text publicly.

This early tendency to negotiate with and include Catalans explicitly in central party politics, and the increasing radicalization of Basque nationalists, continued in the subsequent electoral competition. Before the 1979 election, the ruling Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) coalition attempted to broaden its appeal by incorporating many smaller parties. The only exception to this occurred in Catalunya, where, instead of incorporating the Centristes de Catalunya (CC), the two parties entered an explicit electoral alliance. According to Gunther, this alliance did much to enhance the legitimacy of the UCD in Catalunya, and the party increased its electoral following in that region. In the Basque regions, however, rather then enter into partnerships, the UCD tried to subsume at least one Christian Democratic Basque party. As a result, the strength of extreme nationalist Basque parties increased at the expense of the UCD.

The 1982 elections changed the political landscape. The UCD lost and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) became the first party to win a majority of seats in the Spanish legislature, which it retained through 1986. Notably the early 1980s also mark the height of Basque terrorist activities. After the 1989 election, with 175 seats, the PSOE technically was one seat short of a majority. In practice, however, because of the absence of an elected Basque fugitive, the party had a de facto majority.[42] In 1993, the PSOE lost its majority in the legislature but remained the largest party with 159 out of 350 seats. After failing in attempts to attract the third largest party, the Izquierda Unida, and after appealing for support from the PNV, the ruling PSOE ended up forging a strong relationship

[42] *Political Handbook of the World* (1975–).

with the Catalan Convergence and Union (CiU). Together the two parties held a one-seat majority in the legislature, which allowed them to bypass negotiations with other parties (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993-b). As a result, the leadership of the PNV felt increasingly ostracized, and its attitude hardened not only toward the PSOE but also toward the CiU. The opposition parties, IU and PP, also criticized the PSOE-CiU coalition strongly, accusing the PSOE of being held for ransom by the CiU.[43] Despite this criticism, as well as the increasing troubles of the socialist government, the coalition was retained until 1995. In September the CiU withdrew its support and called on the president to call for elections in 1996.

Just before the national election, the PP changed its critical tune and began praising the cultural characteristics of the Catalan nation and courting top Catalan leaders. Then, elections to the Catalan assembly deprived the CiU of the majority of seats it had held since 1984. The PSOE also lost in the Catalan assembly, but the PP more than doubled its representation. The aftermath of these elections saw a PP promise to respect the Catalan plurality, at least until the national elections. The implicit message was an appeal for reciprocal support in the national assembly. However, because of the historical hostilities between the centrist PP and the CiU, coalition formation was difficult, though it was pivotal because the political landscape provided no other large coalition partner. By providing concessions, such as increasing regional control over income taxes, autonomy of ports, and an end to compulsory military service, the PP was eventually able to secure the support of the CiU. For an absolute majority, however, it still needed the support of one other small party. The options were the PNV and the Canary Island Coalition. Rather than relying on the support of one or the other, the PP opted to secure the support of both. In turn, the PNV acquired a higher degree of fiscal autonomy and compensation for assets confiscated during the Civil War.[44]

While the PNV for the first time was visibly important to the central coalition government, the ETA-Herri Batasuna (ETA-HB) engaged in

[43] At one point the relations between the PNV and the CiU became so strained that in a newspaper interview a PNV leader called the CiU "the military wing of the PSOE" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993-a).

[44] The Basque economic charter already provided the Basque country with the right to collect all its own taxes and transfer a small amount back to the government for services rendered. The new agreement gave the Basque government greater powers to vary the rates of taxes it applies. These concessions later caused political turmoil as the Basques accused the government of trying to breach the agreement and the Catalans accused the government of granting the Basque region greater concessions than Catalunya. For further discussion see the *Economist*'s Series on Spain, including Basque politics, from November 23, 2000, and Economist Intelligence Unit (1996, 1997-a).

one of its greatest public relations gaffes. The organization kidnapped a young local town councilor, whom they murdered when the government refused to meet their demands to transfer all ETA prisoners to jails close to Basque Country. What made the situation even worse was that the ruling PP was already engaged in discussions with Basque political parties to resolve the issue. The resulting public outcry protesting the murder was unprecedented both within and outside Basque country. Protests included 500,000 people marching in Bilbao, 1.5 million in Madrid, and 1 million in Barcelona,[45] suggesting that Basques and Spanish nationals alike were fed up with ETA violence.

The split between the moderate Basque population and the radical ETA is very interesting and quite significant. It suggests that the ethnic population at large supports radical factions only when the group is being met with intransigence by nonethnic politicians. This development is analogous to the split in the Hungarian community in Romania, where the radical faction (though nonviolent) is marginalized as the Hungarian party becomes increasingly integral to national governance. Both cases suggest that the ethnic populations are anything but dogmatic. Rather, they support the radical groups (and their absolutist demands) only as a last resort when the ethnic group faces exclusion as a result of intransigence of majority political parties. Radical group response to popular attitudes sometimes, however, lags. Alternatively, radical factions become too invested in violence to respond to an increasingly peaceful popular sentiment. Either possibility is interesting and merits further study.

The coalition was brought to an end when the PP won a majority of seats in the 2000 elections, and in 2003, the PP succeeded in having Batasuna banned. Subsequently, the PP became increasingly critical of the PNV. As was to be expected, Basque nationalists, including leaders of the PNV, reacted with increasing intransigence. Indeed, shortly after Batasuna was outlawed, the PNV proclaimed that it would attempt to give voice to the constituency of Batasuna without breaking the law (Pradera, 2003).[46] In September 2002, the PNV president of the Basque regional government, Juan José Ibarretxe, for the first time openly declared support for Basque independence from Spain. The Basque regional government went on to promise to prepare a formal draft of the proposal and a referendum before its term ran out in 2005 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002-b).

[45] In some instances people even took to lynching members and sympathizers of the ETA-HB. Economist Intelligence Unit (1997-b).

[46] "El PNV dice que buscará dar voz a las agrupaciones de Batasuna excluidas, pero sin caer en la 'desobediencia.'"

Three days before the 2004 legislative elections the PP infamously blamed the deadly Madrid metro terror attack on ETA. When the evidence suggested that the real perpetrators were Islamic fundamentalists, Spanish voters mobilized to throw out the PP government, likely in part as a protest against the government involvement in the war in Iraq and arguably in part as a reaction against the government scapegoating of ETA. In the elections the PSOE won a plurality of 164 seats, enabling it to form a minority government with the intention of negotiating individually with minor parties including the Basques. What to expect of future developments of ethnic relations in Spain is unclear. Despite the ban of Batasuna a renewed spiral of violence does not appear impending, however, because Basques are still represented by the PNV, which currently is involved in negotiations with a weak PSOE government that can use all the political support it can muster.[47]

CONCLUSION

The objective of this chapter was to begin examining the long-term effects of ethnic political stability. In particular, I sought here to establish the causal direction between ethnic group access to government and intransigence and/or violence. The examination started by developing case studies of the Hungarian minority in Romania, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and the Basque and the Catalan minorities in Spain. The case studies all suggest that there is nothing inherently intransigent about ethnic-minority politics. Rather, the level of ethnic-minority political intransigence depends to a great extent on minority inclusion in, or influence on, government coalitions. Thus, when the ruling parties themselves are intransigent and exclusionary in their behavior, the ethnic minorities become increasingly intransigent. Conversely, when the ruling parties are conciliatory and inclusionary, the ethnic minorities themselves moderate their political behavior.

Moreover, this chapter has shown that the attitudes of both the ruling parties and the minority parties are instrumental rather than based on preconceived notions. Thus when the ruling parties need to rely on the ethnic minority for a majority in parliament or because including a minority helps the government achieve foreign policy goals, even the staunchest nationalist parties moderate their rhetoric and actions in order to court the minority. Similarly, the minority parties often consider cooperating with their historical foes when given the opportunity to enter government.

[47] See Spanish newspaper accounts in *El Mundo* and *El País*.

This observation is particularly important because it gets at the causal relationship between intransigence and/or violence and who is included in government. While some would argue that only moderate ethnic groups are included, the observation about instrumentalism suggests that it is the size of the constituency and the party in the legislature, rather than previous history, that determines who is included in, and who is excluded from, government coalitions.

A juxtaposition of the cases in this chapter draws attention to the fact that relative national conditions of the minority may weigh heavier on their level of satisfaction than absolute conditions. Thus, while the Turks in Bulgaria arguably live under more dire economic conditions than Basques in Spain, and certainly have less political autonomy, the Basque minority is still more disgruntled than the Turkish minority. One reason, I posit, is the relative level of incorporation into national politics.[48] The Turks play an integral role in national Bulgarian politics while the Basques are marginalized in Spanish national politics.

These ethnic groups are but a few of many that follow the pattern described. Other groups include the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, which was included on and off in governing coalitions from 1948, when Sri Lanka became independent, until 1956 and again from 1965 to 1971 (Kearney, 1973; Horowitz, 1985).[49] When the minority was included, as in the 1965 UNP-led coalition, the cooperation lasted as long as tangible policy benefits were obtained.[50] During this time the relationship between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority was not violent. Since the early 1970s, however, Tamils have been excluded from government

[48] Note that this argument differs from arguments about relative deprivation (Gurr 1970) as the focus is not economic conditions or general political discrimination but specifically on access to the executive. For further discussion of arguments about relative deprivation see Chapter Seven.

[49] Since independence in 1948, the Sinhalese United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (now called the People's Alliance) have dominated Sri Lankan politics. Much of the time neither the UNP nor the SLFP had an absolute majority in the legislature.

[50] Horowitz (1985) traces the story of the UNP's decision to include the Tamils in coalition (pp. 379–386). While he classifies the coalition as one of commitment, the evidence he presents also shows that "taken together, these two considerations – votes as well as seats – were powerful influences pushing the UNP toward the Center of the ethnic party spectrum" (p. 383). Tangible benefits to the Tamils, in turn, included that "the Tamil language would continue to be used in the Tamil North and East, and would also be acceptable for use in the courts. The Federal Party's long-standing demand for the creation of district councils was conceded by the UNP, as was a system of preferences for Tamils in land colonization schemes in Tamil areas threatened by influx of Sinhalese settlers" (p. 386).

coalitions in Sri Lanka because fractionalization in the legislature has been sufficiently high to allow the ruling Sinhalese parties to sidestep the Tamil parties and form government coalitions with other Sinhalese parties. Therefore, beginning in the 1970s, the relationship between the two sides became increasingly antagonistic, and in 1983 a full-scale civil war broke out. The violence currently stops short of a civil war, but the Tamil parties presently are not included in government coalitions. Furthermore, the government accuses the Tamils of stalling peace talks by continuing to kill opponents since the cease-fire began (Jayasinghe, 2003; Naji, 2003).

In addition to these case studies and the case of the Tamils, several other ethnic groups in the world either peacefully participate in or violently oppose democratic government. The remaining questions are, How do ethnic groups transition from stable support of their group in first elections, as shown in Chapter Five, to violence? Furthermore, how accurate is the assertion that lack of representation plays a role in the violence? These questions are the subject of the following chapter.

7

The Ethnic Effect on Regime Stability

> On the face of it, there is much to commend the commonsense view that parties and coalitions that reach across ethnic lines, embracing the various groups in conflict, will somehow have the capacity to bridge ethnic differences.
>
> Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 365

Anecdotal evidence in Chapter Six suggests that ethnic politics is closely tied to representation of the group in Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, and even Sri Lanka. When ethnic groups in these countries have had access to governing coalitions, they have demonstrated political flexibility in programmatic demands and willingness to work with a variety of political partners, including old foes. At the same time, political representatives of these ethnic groups all responded inflexibly to augmented intransigence of nonethnic political parties.

According to the implications of Ethnic Attractors, the electoral corollary of successful representation of ethnic issues in government is continued support for the ethnic political party[1] or a nonethnic party that represents the group, while failure to represent the group is punished with decreasing support for the party. Consequently, there is great stability in

[1] It is worth highlighting again that I make an operational distinction between an ethnic party and a nationalist party on the basis of the definition of ethnic identity laid out in Chapter Two. In this book ethnic parties are those that represent a minority group or a majority group that is divided into smaller ethnic groups, whereas nationalistic parties represent unified majority groups. Thus the black Xhosa and Zulu in South Africa and the indigenous Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia are ethnic groups, as are Croats, Serbs, and Muslims in Bosnia. To the contrary Serbs in Serbia and Flemings in Belgium are nationalistic groups.

electoral support for the successful Hungarian party in Romania, as discussed in Chapters Four and Six. Furthermore, as shown in Table 7.1, with respect to the total votes of each group, there is on average greater stability in electoral support for Catalan parties over time than in support for Basque parties. Moreover, the Turkish party in Bulgaria has enjoyed growing vote stability despite the fact that overall volatility in the country has increased steadily since democratization.

Chapter Five explained that during democratization ethnic groups, voting sincerely, are more stable in their vote preferences than voters at large. Soon after democratization, however, the ethnic vote becomes significantly less stable than that of nonethnic voters. The first objective of this chapter is to reconcile the two observations, that Hungarians, Catalans, and Turks solidly support their chosen political parties over time while ethnicity is associated with increasing volatility in the aggregate study of the national vote shortly after democratization.

The explanation suggested in this chapter is that after the first couple of democratizing elections, ethnic groups contribute to increasing volatilities in three ways, while the party system as a whole consolidates. First, as shown in Table 7.1, successful ethnic parties, or successful nonethnic parties that represent the ethnic group, may contribute to increasing vote instability shortly after democratization by attracting an increasing number of ethnic votes. This is true of, for instance, both Catalan parties in Spain and the Hungarian party in Romania. Second, when members of ethnic groups who initially voted for unsuccessful ethnic parties switch their votes strategically to stronger ethnic contenders or successful nonethnic parties that represent the ethnic group, volatility may increase temporarily. Basque voters, for example, demonstrated their loss of faith in the ability of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) to represent them through increasing electoral and party volatility. The votes and number of seats the PNV won in the national legislature decreased from the first election after democratization until the 1996 election, when the party finally achieved access to the coalition government, as discussed in Chapter Six. In the subsequent election, the vote and seat share of the party increased again.[2] During the decline of the PNV, other Basque parties, including the Basque Left, Batasuna, and Basque Solidarity, appeared and disappeared as Basque constituents searched strategically for representative alternatives.

[2] This decrease and increase is very slight because the party is small, but it is a change nonetheless. Vote share goes from 1.7 percent and eight seats in 1977 to a vote share of 1.3 and five seats in 1996. In 2000 the PNV received 1.5 percent of the vote and seven seats.

TABLE 7.1. *Electoral support for Basque and Catalan parties in Spain and Turkish parties in Bulgaria, with respect to national volatility levels*

Spain: Catalan parties								
Year	1979	1982	1986	1991	1993	1996	2000	Averages
Total vote in second election	3.40	4.40	5.70	5.40	5.70	5.40	5.50	5.07
Volatility	0.20	1.00	1.50	0.10	0.50	0.30	1.10	0.67
Volatility as percentage of vote	5.88	22.73	26.32	1.85	8.77	5.56	20.00	13.01
National volatility	7.80	36.95	10.00	6.45	9.60	3.75	10.90	12.21
Spain: Basque parties								
Year	1979	1982	1986	1991	1993	1996	2000	Averages
Total vote in second election	3.20	3.40	3.20	3.50	2.60	2.50	1.90	2.90
Volatility	1.20	0.20	0.60	0.50	0.70	0.30	1.00	0.64
Volatility as percentage of vote	37.50	5.88	18.75	14.29	26.92	12.00	52.63	24.00
National volatility	7.80	36.95	10.00	6.45	9.60	3.75	10.90	12.21
Bulgaria: Turkish parties								
Year	1991	1994	1997	2001				Averages
Total vote in second election	7.50	5.40	7.60	7.50				7.00
Volatility	1.50	2.10	2.20	0.10				1.48
Volatility as percentge of vote	20.00	38.89	28.95	1.33				22.29
National volatility	9.20	13.50	20.75	45.41				22.22

Note: Catalan parties include Initiative for Catalunya-Greens, Catalan Republican Left, Catalan Center Party, Democratic Union of Catalunya, Convergence and Unity, Democratic Convergence of Catalunya, and Democratic Left of Catalunya. Basque parties include Basque Nationalists, Basque Left, United People (Herri Batasuna), and Basque Solidarity. Turkish parties in Bulgaria include Movement for Human Rights and Freedoms and Alliance for National Salvation.

Third, when neither ethnic parties nor nonethnic parties represent the group, ethnic voters begin searching for representation shortly after democratization. Madrid (2005-a, 2005-b) for instance, makes the case that indigenous voters in Latin America are exceptionally unstable in their vote behavior because until recently no ethnic parties successfully represented the population. The fact that nonethnic parties did not incorporate indigenous programmatic demands either ensures continued volatility (Birnir, 1999, 2004-a; Madrid, 2005-a; Birnir and Van Cott 2007). In contrast, since it first ran in the 1996 national elections, the indigenous party Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País (MUPP) in Ecuador has enjoyed relatively stable support (Birnir, 2004-a). Similarly, recent indigenous party alternatives in Bolivia may consolidate and stabilize the indigenous vote there (Birnir and Van Cott, 2007).

Therefore, while party systems consolidate and parties' willingness and capabilities to represent ethnic groups become clear after democratizing elections, ethnic groups may contribute to vote instability. The argument of Ethnic Attractors would, however, lead us to believe that over time, electoral politics will sort out successful ethnic parties from unsuccessful ones and nonethnic parties that successfully represent ethnic groups from nonethnic parties that do not. Thus, when party systems have stabilized, and as long as the ethnic identity remains salient, ethnic groups can be divided into two categories. The first is groups that have established stable relationships with successful ethnic parties or nonethnic parties that represent the ethnic issue. These ethnic groups will continue to be very settled in their vote behavior as they consistently vote for the ethnic or nonethnic party that represents them. The second category contains ethnic groups that have searched for representation in vain through ethnic and nonethnic parties alike. Ultimately, this lack of representation eliminates the incentive for unrepresented groups to participate in electoral politics, and they exit electoral politics and begin a search for alternative means of political expression.

The length of time consolidation of party systems takes in any particular country is likely heavily dependent on that country's unique history. Two testable implications about ethnic political behavior in mature party systems do, however, emerge in Chapter Three from the argument of Ethnic Attractors. The first is that represented ethnic groups will be stable in their vote behavior over the long term; the second is that unrepresented groups eventually will exit electoral politics to pursue other means to representation. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to testing these two implications.

ETHNIC GROUP REPRESENTATION AND VOTING OVER TIME

The prediction in this book about ethnic vote stability is that ethnic diversity increases vote stability during democratization and in the long term among ethnic groups that are represented. In the interim, during stabilization of the party system, ethnic groups may contribute to vote instability as successful ethnic parties attract new ethnic votes and nonrepresented groups search strategically for representation. Consequently, the relationship between ethnicity and the vote shown in Chapter Five changed from negative to positive over time, with ethnicity contributing to vote stability during democratization and to instability shortly thereafter while the party systems were in the process of stabilization. Furthermore, this chapter suggests that if we examine the relationship between ethnicity and the vote over an even longer period, including the phase of stabilized party systems, the full relationship between ethnicity and the vote is actually wavy over time. First, ethnicity stabilizes the vote, followed by a period of destabilizing influence while ethnic groups transition from sincere to strategic voters. This period is succeeded by a stability in the ethnic vote as represented ethnic groups vote strategically for successful parties and unrepresented ethnic groups pursue other means of voicing their demands. Consequently, we would expect stabilizing and destabilizing influences to cancel each other out over time, or at least diminish each other significantly in a linear prediction. Table 7.2 shows the results from the tests of the linearity of the relationship between ethnic diversity and vote stability.

The models in Table 7.2 contain the same countries as do the regressions in Chapter Five. The difference is that whereas the regressions in Chapter Five included the first two and first four elections, respectively (first election period and election periods one through three), the two models in Table 7.2 include all elections that have been held in all new democracies between 1945 and 2004. Both of the specifications in Table 7.2 also contain all the same control variables as the models in Chapter Five.[3]

The first model in Table 7.2 confirms the expectation that the relationship between ethnic diversity and vote stability is not linear over time.

[3] I tested the difference of means of diversity in countries that use plurality systems or other electoral systems in this sample as I did in Chapter Five. The difference was again statistically significant, with greater diversity in plurality systems. I also experimented with including both institutional dummy variables and the linguistic diversity measure in the same regression and found that they seriously affected the significance of one another. Consequently, I opted to stay with the number of parties as a measure of institutional permissiveness.

TABLE 7.2. *Regression: Ethnic fractionalization and volatility in new democracies, all elections*

Dependent variable: Volatility of electoral preferences	**(1)**	**(2)**
Linguistic fractionalization	3.240	9.362
	(3.200)	(3.804)*
Election period	−0.280	
	(0.154)#	
Linguistic fractionalization × first election period dummy (elections one and two)		−14.817
		(5.382)**
Linguistic fractionalization × third election period dummy (elections seven on)		−10.574
		(4.190)*
First election dummy (elections one and two)		5.153
		(2.326)*
Third election dummy (elections seven on)		0.213
		(1.473)
Religious fractionalization	−11.147	−11.697
	(2.882)**	(2.804)**
Number of parties in the legislature	0.195	0.217
	(0.102)#	(0.102)*
Parliamentary system[a]	−1.649	−2.007
	(1.292)	(1.208)#
Presidential system[a]	2.148	1.982
	(1.704)	(1.657)
Federal system	−0.730	−0.625
	(1.182)	(1.139)
Eastern Europe[b]	6.756	6.626
	(2.137)**	(2.086)**
Latin America[b]	2.868	2.864
	(1.414)*	(1.409)*
Former Soviet Republics (including the Baltics)[b]	15.134	14.581
	(3.339)**	(3.342)**
Asia (including Turkey)[b]	1.354	1.122
	(1.368)	(1.345)
Africa (including Israel)[b]	−0.782	−0.203
	(2.418)	(2.400)
Decade	1.258	1.152
	(0.740)#	(0.680)#
Constant	12.486	10.611
	(2.211)**	(2.233)**
Observations	335	335
R^2	0.33	0.35

Note: Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
[a] Reference category is semipresidential systems.
[b] Reference category is Western Europe.
Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

The linguistic fractionalization variable is nowhere close to statistical significance in a linear specification. To test this hypothesized nonlinear wavy relationship over time in the second specification, I created three dummy variables accounting for election periods. The first temporal election dummy variable, accounting for the first election period (first two elections), derives from Chapter Five's conclusion that ethnicity stabilizes voting substantially during the first two elections and becomes a destabilizing influence shortly thereafter. The second temporal election dummy variable, therefore, begins in the second election period (between the second and third elections). How long this period lasts varies among countries. Judging from the Basque case, for instance, or ethnically diverse countries in Latin America that democratized around 1980 and are still very unstable, unrepresented ethnic groups may exhibit volatile electoral behavior for a number of years. Therefore, I experimented with alternative classifications of this variable. The variable that produced the best fit accounts for the second through the sixth election periods (second through seventh elections). This is, therefore, the second temporal election dummy that I include in the regression. The third temporal election dummy, in turn, accounts for all subsequent elections.

I then interacted the dummy variables with the linguistic fractionalization variable and included two of the time dummies and two of the interactive variables in the regression in addition to the basic linguistic fractionalization variable. The idea is that the interaction variables (ethnic fractionalization and time) produce coefficients that diverge in sign and magnitude from the variables on which they draw and when interpreted together demonstrate the fluctuating effect of ethnicity on vote stability over time.

The results in Table 7.2 strongly support the idea that in new democracies the effect of ethnicity on vote stability oscillates over time. The fractionalization variable, both of the interaction variables, and one of the election period variables included in the regression are statistically significant.

The results are fairly intuitive if the ethnic fractionalization variable by itself is interpreted as accounting for the effect of ethnicity on vote stability in the second period (elections two through seven). With respect to the fractionalization variable, the first interactive variable and the first election period dummy variable then account for the effect of ethnicity in the first period (elections one and two). Finally, with respect to the fractionalization variable the second interactive and second election period dummy variables account for this effect in the third period (all remaining elections).



FIGURE 7.1. Residual plot: Ethnic fractionalization and volatility in new democracies, all elections

The reader will recall from Chapter Five, however, that outlier countries where vote behavior is exceptionally stable or unstable for reasons unrelated to ethnicity may distort the substantive effect of ethnicity. Consequently, Figure 7.1 is a residual plot using the second specification from Table 7.2. The residual plot confirms the observation from Chapter Five that most of the cases fall within 20 percentage points around the predicted volatilities, given country-specific attributes.

A few cases have significantly higher or lower volatilities. As in Chapter Five, these include, Mauritius 1967–1976, Peru 1990–1995, Thailand 1996–2001, and Spain 1979–1982. In Chapter Five I made the case that to discern the accurate substantive effect of ethnicity on vote stability, it is necessary to control for these countries. The additional outliers are Bulgaria in 1997–2001 and Greece in 1946–1950. The concern about outlier influence in this chapter, therefore, relates to the effects of vote instability in Bulgaria and Greece and whether it is necessary to control for these cases.

In Bulgaria linguistic fractionalization is, at 0.30, higher than the average in this sample, at 0.25. As shown earlier in the chapter, however, the

Turkish minority is quite stable in their vote behavior even as the rest of the country has become increasingly volatile. There is consequently good reason to think that vote instability unrelated to ethnicity masks the stabilizing effect of ethnic voting in Bulgaria, and thus it is necessary to control for this case. To the contrary, Greece, with fractionalization of 0.03, has lower than average linguistic fractionalization in this sample. The concern therefore is that Greece, with its high volatility, unduly supports the hypothesis. Hence, there is good reason to examine this case further.

It is likely that exceptional conditions contributed to the high volatility between the 1946 and 1950 elections in Greece. When the Greek Communist resistance refused to disarm in 1946, the country entered a civil war. In 1949 the insurgents were forced to surrender or flee to neighboring Communist countries. This turmoil likely affected support for the conservative People's Party (later the core of the Conservative Rally), which dominated the elections in 1946 but splintered before the 1950 election (Mackie and Rose, 1991 and 1997).[4]

Therefore, Greece clearly is a case where political turmoil contributed to unusual vote instability that unduly supports the theory, and therefore it is necessary to control for this case. Consequently, Table 7.3 presents a model that replicates the second specification from Table 7.2 but controls for all the outliers as well. Table 7.3 shows that ethnicity reduces vote instability in the first election period as expected, increases vote instability in election periods two through seven, and reduces vote instability in subsequent elections. The only change in the substantive effect is that the coefficients associated with linguistic fractionalization are smaller than in Table 7.2, while the difference in the effects between election periods remains similar and large enough to be interesting. Furthermore, significant control variables mostly remain comparable to the effects associated with them in the second specification in Table 7.2. The exceptions are the institutional variable accounting for number of parties, which loses

[4] The Greek Communist Party was banned after democratization in 1946 until the subsequent democratic period that began in 1974. However, the EDA, or United Democratic Left (in 1950 called Democratic Front, in 1961 Pan-Agrarian Democratic Front of Greece), was generally regarded as a front for the illegal Communist Party (Mackie and Rose, 1991, 1997). Following the inclusion of countries where banned ethnic parties run under nonethnic party labels (Bulgaria, Turkey), I also include Greece despite the official ban of the Communist Party. In Moldova, in contrast, the Communist Party was banned in 1994 during the first election after democratization only. When the Communist Party was allowed again in 1998 volatilities between 1994 and 1998 would be calculated as artificially high because of Communists' voting for their preferred party in 1998 after having been forced to vote for other parties in 1994.

TABLE 7.3. *Regression: Ethnic fractionalization and volatility in new democracies, all elections (accounting for outliers)*

Dependent variable: Volatility of electoral preferences	**(1)**
Linguistic fractionalization	7.011
	(3.280)*
Linguistic fractionalization × first election dummy	−11.566
(elections one and two)	(4.876)*
Linguistic fractionalization × third election dummy	−7.123
(elections seven on)	(3.761)#
First election dummy (elections one and two)	3.661
	(2.120)#
Third election dummy (elections seven on)	0.419
	(1.435)
Religious fractionalization	−11.711
	(2.546)**
Number of parties in the legislature	0.126
	(0.084)
Parliamentary system[a]	−3.015
	(1.156)**
Presidential system[a]	1.970
	(1.577)
Federal system	0.435
	(1.025)
Eastern Europe[b]	7.868
	(1.857)**
Latin America[b]	3.025
	(1.327)*
Former Soviet Republics (including the Baltics)[b]	16.804
	(3.219)**
Asia (including Turkey)[b]	1.969
	(1.185)#
Africa (including Israel)[b]	0.466
	(1.762)
Decade	0.793
	(0.620)
Outliers: High volatility, and high or low fractionalization	30.469
(Mauritius, Peru, Bulgaria, Spain, Thailand, Greece)	(2.304)**
Constant	12.123
	(2.005)**
Observations	335
R^2	0.50

Note: Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
[a] Reference category is semipresidential systems.
[b] Reference category is Western Europe.
Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.



FIGURE 7.2. Substantive effect as ethnic fractionalization varies one standard deviation around its mean (all new democracies, all elections)

significance, and parliamentary systems, which gains in significance. Moreover the region control accounting for Asia is now significantly different in a one-tailed test from the comparison group of Western Europe but the party system variable decade[5] is not significant.

Using the specification in Table 7.3, Figure 7.2 demonstrates the substantive effect of ethnicity on vote stability over time. The figure shows that in the first period (elections one and two), varying linguistic fractionalization one standard deviation around the mean, volatility is reduced over 2 percent. In the second period (elections two through seven), volatility increases over 3 percent on average as a result of ethnic diversity. In the last period (elections thereafter), volatility is reduced less than 0.5 percent when linguistic diversity varies one standard deviation around the mean. At first this does not appear to be a substantively interesting effect. It is important to remember, however, that multiple regression does not account for all of the country-specific influences on vote stability and these figures are only indicators of the true effect of diversity on vote stability. The substantive effect, therefore, is better interpreted relative to the influences of other independent variables. For example, the substantive

[5] Note that in this chapter the decade variable ranges from 1 to 4, 4 being elections held in 2000 or later. This category was subsumed under 3 (1980s and 90s) in Chapter Five because there were only a couple of cases.

effect of varying institutional structures measured as the number of parties one standard deviation around the mean increases vote instability less than 1.5 percent. Varying religious fractionalization one standard deviation around the mean decreases volatility nearly 4.5 percent. Therefore, in this context it seems that the wave effect of ethnicity on vote stability is substantively significant, particularly in early elections.

Another interesting observation about cultural diversity that emerges from Tables 7.2 and 7.3 is the importance of religion over time. While religion was not significantly associated with vote stability in first elections in the new democracies discussed in Chapter Five, it emerges as a very significant stabilizing influence over time. According to the first model in Table 7.3, going from the most religiously homogeneous country in the sample, Turkey at 0.004, to the most religiously fractionalized, South Africa at 0.86, vote instability is reduced nearly 10 percent, a substantively very significant result.

Seeing how the religious variable took on significance in the full sample, I also experimented with Alesina and colleagures' (2003) measure, which includes racial categorization in addition to linguistic categories. The reader will recall from Chapter Five that the diversity measure used in the tables is a measure of linguistic fractionalization only, because this measure produced the best fit in early elections. A few interesting observations that are worth exploring further emerged when I substituted the racial/linguistic measure for the linguistic measure in the full sample of all new democracies. As expected given the results in Chapter Five, the race/language measure failed to pick up the early stabilizing effects of diversity. Furthermore, lowering of the destabilizing effect of the racial/language division occurred much later than the stabilizing effect of linguistic division only.[6] These results suggest that the fluidity of boundaries in identification shown by Posner (2005), and in this case from linguistic to racial divisions, is quite real. Different axes of identification matter for voting behavior in elections at different times. Overall, linguistic divisions initially are more important, but racial (and religious) divisions play an increasing role over time. Furthermore, racial divisions are less stabilizing than language divisions. This last observation must be taken with a grain of salt, however, because the greatest divergence between the linguistic and linguistic/racial measure is in Latin America. Thus it may not be race per se that is a destabilizing influence on politics but the fact that divergent racial groups (indigenous groups) in Latin America have until

[6] I found this by experimenting with different time dummies and interacting them with the racial variable in the same manner as described for the linguistic variable.

recently largely been excluded from the electoral process (Madrid, 2005-a, 2005-b; Van Cott 2005). Even so, this supports Alesina and associates' (2003), Posner's (2004), and Birnir and Van Cott's (2007) suggestion that the choice of measure is paramount in studies of the effect of diversity, and that the researcher must take into account the substantive reality behind the measure before interpreting any results associated with it.

The other control variables in Table 7.3 produced results that differ in some respects from those in Chapter Five. First, when accounting for outliers, the number of parties in the legislature does not significantly affect the level of volatility. A likely explanation is that this variable does not account for the nonlinear effect of institutions identified by Bartolini and Mair (1990). Furthermore, the variable accounting for parliamentary systems (with respect to semipresidential systems) is still negatively related to vote instability but is statistically quite significant in this sample. Whether this effect of parliamentary systems is entirely an institutional effect is not, however, certain. The reason for my skepticism is that the majority of semipresidential systems are new democracies, and the majority of parliamentary systems are early democratizers. Furthermore, the full sample adds a disproportionate number of parliamentary elections because early democratizers have held many more elections than late democratizers. Compounding this effect is the fact that while volatilities in first elections have increased over time, volatilities in successive elections tend to decrease as party systems stabilize. Thus, there may be a temporal aspect to this finding that is not institutional, yet is not captured entirely by the variable accounting for the decades. Finally, in the samples in this chapter most of the region dummies are significant, indicating that with respect to volatility there are important political differences between regions.

FROM VOLATILITY TO VIOLENCE

Clearly, ethnic groups are stable in their vote behavior over the long term. The second objective of this chapter is to probe further the validity of the inference that the demonstrated ethnic vote stability is causally related to representation. Theoretically this idea is sound as outlined in the argument of Ethnic Attractors, and thus far all of the case study detail supports this causal inference.

The remaining concern in this chapter is, therefore, the testable implication from Ethnic Attractors, which predicted that if the group is *not represented* in government and, therefore, never has its policy objectives met, group members' incentive to participate in electoral politics is eliminated.

In those instances, the group will likely exit electoral politics to pursue alternative means of voicing group demands. The precise timing of the realization that the government is inaccessible to the group, and the pattern of pursuit of alternative means of representation, likely will differ greatly among countries and groups. However, there probably will also be some common threads to this realization, such as increased vote instability as the group searches for representation (Birnir, 1999; Madrid, 2005-a). Alternatively, vote instability may be supplanted or accompanied by party instability, and finally the group will likely begin to incorporate alternative means of political expression, possibly including violence and protest.

The case of the Tamils[7] illustrates the nuances of this process well. Before and during independence in 1948, Tamils worried that British domination would simply be replaced by Sinhalese domination (*Library of Congress*, 2004-b). However, the Tamil minority did rely on the electoral process to achieve its political objectives and initially was well received by the Sinhalese majority. Thus, the principal Tamil party, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (TC), was included in the first government formed by the largest Sinhalese party, the United National Party (UNP) (Kearney, 1973; Horowitz, 1985). Consequently, during this time the Tamil minority only engaged in what the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a)[8] classify as symbolic acts of resistance to voice group demands.

Nevertheless, ethnic tension escalated quickly, in part because of the Sinhalese Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) emphasis on "Sinhala only" as the national tongue in an attempt to attract Sinhalese voters from the UNP before the 1956 election. To retain this constituency, the UNP also became increasingly intransigent toward the Tamils, who in turn escalated their levels of peaceful protest to rallies, strikes, and low-level riots (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a). The SLFP won the election and the Tamils continued to protest vigorously.

In 1965 the UNP won the elections again and included the Federal Party (FP – a Tamil Congress offshoot) in the coalition. During this time MAR downgrades the level of Tamil protest to small demonstrations, rallies, and riots with fewer than 10,000 people. In 1968, however, the Federal Party withdrew from the UNP government because its leaders were convinced

[7] By Tamils I am referring to Sri Lankan Tamils and not Indian Tamils.

[8] Note that there is frequently a lag between versions of the data and the codebook as these are made publicly available as soon as one or the other are ready. The data I refer to throughout this analysis includes updates to 2003. The codebook, however, describes data through 2000. Both are avaialable at the Minorities at Risk website cited in the bibliography.

that the party could no longer derive any tangible benefits from further association with the UNP (*Library of Congress*, 2004-b).

In 1970 the SLFP won the election in coalition with two other parties on a nationalistic platform and quickly promulgated a new constitution that infringed significantly on Tamil minority rights in favor of the Sinhalese majority.[9] This change in national politics possibly affected the decision of the two smaller Tamil parties (TC and FP) and other Tamil organizations to merge in the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). While the merger increased party volatility in the system, there was no electoral volatility associated with it, as it was simply a merger of constituencies from several parties for increased leverage in the legislature. Before the constitution was ratified, Tamils perpetrated their first acts of violence, classified by MAR as ranging from "political banditry and sporadic terrorism to campaigns of terrorism" (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a, pp. 89-91). From there, the relationship between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority deteriorated rapidly, and in 1983 the country was engaged in a full-scale civil war.

By the 1990s, it was abundantly clear that TULF had no access to governing coalitions. This may have contributed to the increasing number of votes cast for other Tamil parties in the 1990s, including the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, which in 2000 received three and one seats in the legislature, respectively. At the same time the vote share of TULF decreased from 6.8 in 1977 to 1.2 percent in 2000. Thus, party volatility and protest preceded Tamil electoral volatility and violence.

As the story of the Tamils shows, the prediction that ethnic voters search for electoral representation before they begin to pursue other means of voicing their political objectives includes party volatility, electoral volatility, violence, and protest and is not a prediction of a strictly linear process. To the contrary, parts of the group may persist in fielding a political party after other segments have concluded that electoral politics is not worthwhile and exited. Alternatively, ethnic groups may pursue electoral politics and other means to representation at the same time. Both the Basques and the Tamils, for instance, are involved in electoral politics while segments of the group perpetrate violence. Furthermore, this process is dynamic, and defections may increase and decrease as the party

[9] The 1972 constitution contained none of the elements of federalism that Tamils had hoped for and conferred a privileged status on Buddhism. It eliminated the provisions for minorities provided by Article 29 in the 1948 constitution and made university admissions criteria lower for Sinhalese than for Tamils (*Library of Congress,* 2004-b).

is excluded from government for a long time, then included again. Additionally, size and other attributes of the group likely matter for exactly how electoral participation will diminish in favor of extraconstitutional action. For instance, early realizations of nonviability of their ethnic party likely will induce greater volatility and earlier exit from electoral politics among groups that are too small to enter the legislature and are not represented by other parties than among larger ethnic groups that are able to enter the legislature. The common thread, however, seems to be that lack of representation generally is followed by electoral instability and increasing levels of violence and protest.

REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF ACCESS

How reliable is the inference that lack of representation plays a role in the violence perpetrated by ethnic groups such as Basques and Tamils? Thus far, the few existing large *N* statistical studies of representation and ethnic group violence and protest are restricted to the effects of electoral barriers on legislative representation and consequent violence and protest.[10] Broadly speaking, institutional explanations of ethnic intransigence thus far attribute violence and protest to a lack of voice, itself resulting from absence of legislative representation caused by the more stringent electoral barriers of plurality districts. For example, in line with Cohen (1997),[11] Saideman and co-workers (2002)[12] hypothesize that "under PR, minority ethnic groups are more likely to have at least some representation in the legislature, and their members are thus more satisfied that their concerns are being heard within the existing political arrangements" (p. 118). However, neither Cohen nor Saideman and colleagues control for whether the ethnic groups in question are mobilized for electoral purposes, nor whether the groups ever enter the legislature (even in PR systems). Extant research thus is incomplete because it does not account for ethnic mobilization. Nor does current research explain the effect of the interaction of system type and electoral institutions discussed in Chapter Three. Furthermore, the mechanism that explicates why

[10] An exception is Powell (1982), who finds a negative correlation between ethnic fractionalization and coalition duration.

[11] Cohen (1997) finds that the more proportional or permissive the institutions, the lower the frequency of high-intensity conflict.

[12] Building on Cohen and using MAR indicators, Saideman and associates find a negative relationship between permissiveness of democratic electoral institutions and both rebellion and protest.

ethnic groups resort to violence is underdeveloped in the currently popular idea of representative voice. Building on these studies, the following discussion seeks to strengthen the causal inference of how electoral politics contributes to violence, addressing mobilization, institutional interaction, and the theory of voice, in turn.

A causal explanation that involves thwarted expectations among a group of political access to the legislature/executive as a cause of violence and protest also necessitates that these expectations are established as reasonable before their proposed effect. Thus the first pertinent question is whether nonmobilized groups are violent because of the psychological effects of institutional restrictions (Duverger, 1954) on representation, or because of other social discrimination that is unrelated to representation but may impede mobilization. Only if the former is true is the empirical inference, that restrictive electoral institutions cause violence because of restriction of representation of non-mobilized groups, accurate.

According to Duverger (1954) and Riker's (1986) refinement, the electoral system potentially restricts representation in two ways. The first is mechanical (only one party can win a seat in a single-member district; thus minority groups are excluded at the district level); the other is psychological (over time, voters vote strategically rather than sincerely). By extension, over time minority parties realize that, because of strategic voting, their chances of election are minimal under rules of plurality, and they stop mobilizing as such. In sum, restrictive institutions can bar a party from mobilizing as well as bar it from obtaining seats, even when the party obtains a significant number of votes.

As Petersen (2002) explains, however, a variety of factors other than institutions and including emotions contribute to ethnic violence. Furthermore, Yashar (1999) and Van Cott (2005) warn that institutions are but one of the constraints on political action. Indeed, the social movement literature holds that political mobilization,[13] or organization of groups for political ends, depends to a significant degree on internal characteristics of the group, such as ability to mobilize resources and elite cohesion (Kitschelt, 1986). Other determinants include the structure of political opportunity that affects people's expectations about success, including such variables as state capacity for repression and political access points

[13] Hug (2003) argues that recent studies of ethnic conflict suffer from selection bias because "mobilizing, rebelling, and violent ethnic groups are simply much easier to identify than peaceful, reclusely living tribes" (p. 269). In this chapter, however, mobilization is a precondition to reasonable expectations of access.

(Brockett, 1991; Tarrow, 1994), which can include, but are not limited to, permissive electoral institutions (Birnir, 2004-a, 2005). Therefore, in the empirical analysis of all democratic countries, the implicit assumption that violence results from the use of particular electoral structures, regardless of whether ethnic groups are mobilized, is a partial explanation at best.

To strengthen the inference that violence and protest result from restrictions on electoral action, and to control for a variety of social discrimination hypotheses that rival institutional explanations as a cause for ethnic violence, I limit the subsequent analysis to cases where ethnic groups are mobilized for electoral action. Mobilized groups[14] have clearly overcome social obstacles to political organization, controlling for the social obstacles as the cause of both lack of electoral mobilization and ethnic violence. Therefore, if groups that are mobilized for electoral purposes become violent only when the electoral barriers are restrictive, the inference that the limits placed on group representation by these barriers are at least a partial cause of the violence is more plausible. The concern with this inference, of course, is that it underestimates the psychological effect of institutions on groups that induces them to resort immediately to violence without electoral mobilization. The solution to this concern is empirical. If the psychological effect also has a significant effect on violence, this association should show up in an empirical analysis of the relationship between institutional structures and violence perpetrated by all groups that are not mobilized electorally. Consequently, I estimate the institutional effects on violence among nonmobilized ethnic groups in addition to mobilized groups.

[14] I have chosen electoral activity as the indicator of mobilization for political action because it is one of the least ambiguous indicators of a notoriously imprecise word. In concrete terms, an electorally active group fields at least one electoral party that purports to represent the group. This can be an ethnic party or a nonethnic party that makes it clear that it has incorporated the ethnic issue. To determine electoral activity of the group I first examined MAR indicators of electoral activity. Second, I surveyed all minorities in democracies to verify electoral activity as reported by MAR and find discrepancies. The results of this survey are reported in Appendix B. Restricting the universe to electorally active groups excludes some democracies that were included in the test in Chapter Three, including countries such as Argentina and Brazil. In turn, other democracies are added, for instance, the United Kingdom and Canada. Furthermore, the time frame for inclusion of some democracies changes. For instance, indigenous groups in Ecuador were prevented from fielding their own political party until 1996. Moreover, there is no evidence that this constituency was mobilized in support of a particular political party before 1996; 1996 is therefore the first year of inclusion for Ecuador in the empirical analysis in this chapter; conversely the country was included from democratization in 1979 in Chapter Three.

It is also important to emphasize that there are many ways to mobilize for electoral action. An ethnic group can support a specifically ethnic party, or the group can form a part of a larger multiethnic party or even a party that does not explicitly consider itself ethnic. The type of mobilization that occurs in a system is important for political outcomes, including violence. Indeed, many prominent scholars have argued the benefit of one type of representation as opposed to the other as a result of the electoral system (Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985, 1990-a). According to the theory of Ethnic Attractors, the importance of mobilization through ethnic parties as opposed to nonethnic or multiethnic parties is partially determined by salience of the ethnic issue. If the ethnic issue remains salient, policy costs to the group are moderately higher if it is only represented through a nonethnic or a multiethnic party. However, in stark contrast to the conclusions of these scholars, the implications of the argument also show that as long as the ethnic group is represented through either type of party, we should not expect members of the group to exit electoral politics. Only if no parties represent the group should we expect members of the group to quit electoral competition in favor of extralegal means such as violence. To test this implication, I include both groups that are mobilized through specifically ethnic parties and groups that are mobilized and represented through multiethnic or nonethnic parties that include many types of groups. The specific issues that arise in operationalization of these variables are discussed in full detail in Appendix B.

Granted, the proposition that electoral institutions have an effect on the legislative representation of mobilized ethnic groups is narrower than the more common argument that excludes the qualification of mobilization (Cohen, 1997; Saideman, 2002). Furthermore, an argument about mobilized groups does not negate the fact that restrictive electoral barriers may frustrate some mobilization and in that way cause violence. Nor does the analysis here refute the complementary explanation that the root cause of some ethnic violence are other types of social discrimination that occur outside the electoral arena among groups that may never attempt to organize for electoral competition, even in the presence of permissive electoral rules. In addition, I acknowledge that external conditions have a significant effect on the political action taken by the group.[15] None of these, however, is a problem for the analysis conducted here because the objective is not to account comprehensively for ethnic violence, but only

[15] For a good account of how external conditions influence ethnic group behavior see, for example, Jenne (2006).

to show that political access matters for the propensity of mobilized ethnic groups to engage in protest and perpetrate violence. What this case selection does accomplish is to tease out the effects of electoral competition and its aftermath on ethnic group political behavior, controlling for a variety of alternative explanations.

In conjunction with electoral institutions (plurality, proportional, mixed), system types (parliamentary, presidential, semipresidential) also potentially constrain access, as discussed in Chapter Three. Empirically, however, in the sample used here there are no presidential systems that have plurality electoral systems where the presidential party consistently obtains a majority of the seats, and only two parliamentary systems where the largest party consistently obtains a majority of seats in the legislature. These two are the United Kingdom and Canada, and in Canada the largest party has not always held a majority of seats, though it has generally been close. As predicted by the hypothesis that access contributes to peaceful ethnic politics and exclusion to violence, electorally active ethnic groups in the United Kingdom have perpetrated violence. Resistance has been nonviolent, however, since the 1960s in Canada.

Furthermore, expectations about institutional effects on access change if nonethnic parties are considered a viable venue for representation of ethnic interests. If the ethnic issue is represented through a nonethnic party, none of these institutions eliminates ethnic group expectation of access. Thus, we would not expect the group to resort to violence if it is represented through a nonethnic party. The case of the United Kingdom lends some support to this expectation. Hence, the mobilized ethnonational Irish Catholic minority has perpetrated significant violence, coded by MAR as ranging from political banditry and sporadic terrorism to local rebellions where there are armed attempts to seize power in a locale. In turn, the Scottish minority has only perpetrated what MAR classifies as the lowest level of violence or political banditry and sporadic terrorism. Irish Catholics have not been explicitly represented in cabinets, through ethnic or nonethnic parties,[16] while Nigel Griffith,[17] for instance, is a recent example of Scottish representation in a Labor cabinet in the United

[16] According to Irish country experts, including Finbarr Lane (personal e-mail communication December 3, 2003), while Irish Catholic political groups have loose connections to both the Conservatives and Labor, there has not been any direct Irish Catholic representation in the cabinet of the central government of the United Kingdom.

[17] Griffith was minister for competition and consumer affairs for the Department of Trade and Industry in 1997–98 and has held the position of minister for small business since 2001.

Kingdom. Similarly, according to Bakvis (1991), representatives of Quebec have been integral members of a number of Canadian national cabinets, a situation that may explain the predominance of nonviolent protest by the constituency. In sum, therefore, when representation through either an ethnic party or a nonethnic party is considered, all electorally active minority groups, both in the United Kingdom and in Canada, conform to the expectation that access mediates violence.

A final and related issue is an improvement on the theory of voice. While I concur with Saideman and colleagues that access to the legislature is important and influenced by institutions, in many cases voice is not enough to quell violence and protest. If the argument of Ethnic Attractors is correct, ethnic groups seek satisfaction of policy demands. Policy demands are met when the group has bargaining leverage in the legislature or direct access to the executive.[18] Accordingly, and perhaps most importantly, this chapter presents the first attempt to distinguish empirically, in a large number of cases, the divergent effects on violence and protest of different bargaining positions held by the ethnic group in the legislature.

As I discussed in Chapter Three, full representation is only achieved when the group has access to the executive. Therefore, this analysis relies on new variables that account for ethnic political party size in legislatures and group access to the executive in democracies worldwide since 1945. The universe of cases for the test of the effect of access on ethnic politics includes new democracies since 1945.[19]

THE DATA AND METHOD

The latest version (phase IV) of the Minorities at Risk data (2005-a) provides the dependent variables for this study. The MAR data have been criticized extensively for just about everything, including but not limited to the premise of collective quantification of minority needs and wants, employment of ambiguous terminology, lack of intercoder reliability, insufficient documentation of records, and issues relating to details in the coding of

[18] Along these lines Powell (2000) argues that "the greater the opposition size in the legislature, the greater generally its ability to challenge government policy proposals" (p. 104). However, he also notes that under majority government or a weak committee system, the bargaining position of opposition parties is diminished. The study here does not account for legislative features such as the committee system but points to this as an excellent venue for institutional refinement of the argument posited here.

[19] For a detailed discussion about included cases, see Appendix B.

ethnic groups and other variables.[20] One of the explicit objectives of the last phase of the MAR data collection was to improve the data and resolve these problems in line with expert recommendation. Despite significant problems, the Minority at Risk data also are unquestionably the most comprehensive collection of data that record ethnic group characteristics and actions, including violence and protest. The MAR data include a worldwide sample of 337[21] individual ethnopolitical groups.[22] They are, therefore, very well suited for interstate comparisons.[23] For the purposes of the analysis undertaken in this chapter, the independence in construction of the dependent variables (MAR) and the independent variables (my addition) provides a measure of validity, in that systematic biases related to the relationship between the variables are assuredly not a part of the data collection. In sum, therefore, while there is good reason to examine the coding carefully and to be conservative in estimates that involve the use of these data, I also have good reason to use the data in the analysis in this chapter. Appendix B discusses the cases and the measures that I have taken to improve the quality of the MAR data for the analysis.

The unit of analysis in the MAR data is the ethnic group at five-year intervals since 1945 and yearly since 1985. Treating the group as a unitary actor does not account for the influences of outbidding (Horowitz, 1985). Outbidding may result in splits within the ethnic groups into violent and nonviolent factions, and these factions may have different levels of access.[24] Nonethnic politicians presumably will choose to work with the nonviolent ethnic faction, because this faction likely is more numerous.[25] If the nonviolent faction is included in government while

[20] For a recent criticism of the premise of the data, see, for instance, Tishkov (1999). About the coding see, for example, Foltz (1994). For an overview of problems relating specifically to case selection and early coding of the dependent variables used in this study, see Fearon and Laitin's (2004) NSF proposal. For an overview of the number of these problems that have been dealt with in each stage of the data development, see user's manuals associated with each stage, in particular the user's manual for the 2002 (Minorities at Risk 2005-a) version of the data.

[21] The most recent version of the MAR data includes 285 current cases that will be updated in addition to 52 "obsolete" cases that are included to facilitate longitudional analysis but will not be updated in subsequent versions. For further discussion see users manual (p. 7, Minorities at Risk 2005-a).

[22] Some of the groups are found in many countries, for instance, the Roma.

[23] These data have been used in many studies (see the MAR Web site for a list) and even more note their usefulness in interstate comparisons, for example, Wilkinson (2004).

[24] It is important to note that while ethnic outbidding generally has been associated with democratic destabilization, Chandra challenges this view (2005).

[25] According to DeNardo (1985), the only theoretically certain effect of violence is that it alienates moderate members of the group. Consequently, nonviolent factions probably are

the violent faction is not, the group as a whole will be coded as having access while engaging in violent activity. Empirically this is not a grave problem, because it will only weaken the association hypothesized in this chapter. Theoretically, however, this simplifying assumption bears further examination in future studies.

The MAR data make no distinction between electoral activities that occur through an exclusively ethnic organization as opposed to an organization that includes the ethnic group as one of many groups. For instance, in South Africa the National Party is coded (after 1994) as an organization that is supported by ethnic groups, which include Asians, Europeans, and Coloreds.[26] In contrast, Zulus in South Africa are coded as the only group supporting the Inkatha Freedom Party. To address the question whether access through a single-group ethnic party differs from representation through a multiethnic or a nonethnic party in terms of effects on ethnic violence and protest, the variables I have added to the analysis make this distinction. Operationalization is discussed later.

The bivariate correlations of the proposed relationship between access and leverage (the group size in the legislature) and violence and protest shown in Table 7.4 support the hypothesis tested here that access influences the propensity of an ethnic group to engage in violence and protest. More specifically, these simple tests show that the longer the group is excluded from the cabinet (time since access) the more violent it becomes, and the larger the group is in the legislature (leverage) the less violence it perpetrates. Furthermore, demands voiced through peaceful protest are more likely satisfied if the group has leverage through size in the legislature, but access to the cabinet does not further reduce protest.

As shown in Chapter Four, bivariate correlations can be misleading, and it is not wise to place much faith in them until the initial relationships have been substantiated in a multivariate regression where we can control for other factors that impinge on this relationship. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to a multivariate exploration that tests the validity of the hypotheses about the relationship between access and ethnic protest and/or violence.

more numerous than violent ones. Anecdotally empirical evidence supports this notion. For instance, violent factions among Catholics in Ireland, Basques in Spain, and Tamils in Sri Lanka are relatively small and their support among the population at large varies greatly, as discussed in Chapter Six.

[26] As coded in Minorities at Risk (2005-b), the group Colored differs from blacks in that they "are heavily concentrated in the Western Cape region in the southwest of the country . . . a mixed-race people. . . . They speak Afrikaans as well as other native languages. They are culturally distinct from the majority black community; however, there is a high level of within-group heterogeneity."

TABLE 7.4. *The relationship between ethnic access (through ethnic parties) and protest and violence, and size of the ethnic group in the legislature (leverage) and protest and violence (bivariate correlations)*

	Time since group had access to government through an ethnic party	Ethnic group leverage in the legislature	Rebellion
Rebellion	0.099	−0.173	
	(0.004)	(0.000)	
Protest	0.036	−0.170	0.324
	(0.292)	(0.000)	(0.000)

Note: *P* values in brackets.

For the following test, the MAR (2005-a) data are organized as a pooled cross-sectional time series and merged with original data accounting for access to the cabinet through ethnic and nonethnic parties, relative leverage of the ethnic group in the legislature, and a number of institutional, economic, and other control variables. This section briefly describes each of the variables, the method used for estimation, and the steps I have taken to probe the causal inference that access influences subsequent ethnic political behavior.

According to the MAR data, over 160 minority groups are electorally active.[27] After applying the democratic definition used in this book to these cases and adding cases that are inaccurately listed as nonelectorally active by MAR (see Appendix B), the number of groups available for this analysis totals seventy groups in thirty-nine countries. The relevant activity of each electorally active group (violence and protest) is recorded once every five years before 1985 and yearly after that until 2003. In each country, the first year I include is 1945 or the year of democratization, if democratization occurred later. Similarly I include violence and protest scores only for years in which the group is electorally active through an ethnic or a nonethnic party (and for years after a national election in which the group has participated).

The Dependent Variables: Antiregime Activity

The MAR data contain the two antiregime indicators of rebellion and protest "initiated by members of the group on behalf of the group's interests and directed against those who claim to exercise authority over the

[27] See variables org1st5, org2st5, org3st5, MAR (2005-a).

group" (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a p. 89). The values are based on the highest observed level of rebellion or protest in the given period and are not cumulative. Both indicators include two separate variables. The first are quinquennial (recorded every five years) scores from 1945 to 1999 that code the most serious manifestation of rebellion or protest for each five-year period. The second variables are annual rebellion or protest scores from 1985 to 2003. The following tests were conducted separately for each indicator (violent rebellion, peaceful protest). The variables pertaining to each indicator, quinquennial scores before 1985, and annual scores after 1985 were merged to increase the number of observations.[28] The increased number of observations is only pertinent, however, to the equation where lagged values of protest and rebellion are not included, as explained later.

Violent Rebellion

The rebellion indicator starts at 0, which indicates that no violent activity was reported; 1 stands for political banditry and sporadic terrorism and 2 for campaigns of terrorism. Local rebellions where there are armed attempts to seize power in a locale are indicated by 3.[29] The code for small-scale guerrilla activity where there are fewer than 1,000 armed fighters, sporadic armed attacks (fewer than six reported per year), and attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group or in one or two other locales is 4. Intermediate guerrilla activity that includes one or two of the defining traits of large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity is signified by 5; 6 indicates large-scale guerrilla activity with more than 1,000 armed fighters, frequent armed attacks (more than six per year), and attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group. Finally, 7 is the code for protracted civil war that is fought by rebel military units with base areas (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a pp. 89-91). The countries, groups, and descriptive statistics for

[28] Where there was discrepancy between the two MAR indicators reb and rebel, I used the annual score recorded in the variable reb. The version of the data that I used included five cases of reb coded as 8. These are Igorots in the Philippines in 2002, Bolivian Indigenous Highland Peoples in 2002 and 2003 and Lowland peoples in 2003, Ecuador Indigenous Highland Peoples in 2002 and 2003 and in India Scheduled Tribes in 2003. According to the codebook (MAR 2005-a) a score of 8 is old coding for participation in international war, which is not a part of the currend coding for this variable (p.90). Thus I changed these five cases to missing.

[29] If the local rebellions are the opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the year being coded, they are coded as guerrilla or civil war. This code also includes declarations of independence by a minority-controlled government.

rebellious activities of each electorally active group are shown in Appendix B,Table B.6. Interestingly, the modal category of violent rebellion is 0. A plurality, at least, of electorally active ethnic minority groups have never engaged in violence. This supports the prediction of Ethnic Attractors that under broadly inclusive democratic conditions, ethnic groups tend to be peaceful political actors, and that ethnic violence is an anomaly that bears further scrutiny. Furthermore, average levels of rebellion perpetrated by electorally active groups are quite low at just over 1.

Nonviolent Protest

The scale for the protest variable also starts from 0, where no protest is reported; 1 indicates verbal opposition including public letters, petitions, posters, publications, and agitation. The score for acts of symbolic resistance such as sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, symbolic destruction of property, or political organizing activity on a substantial scale is 2. A few small demonstrations, rallies, strikes and/or riots, with total participation of fewer than 10,000 group members are indicated by 3. Medium demonstrations are scored as 4; they include rallies, strikes and/or riots, with total participation of less than 100,000 people. Finally, 5 indicates mass demonstrations, rallies, strikes and/or riots, with total participation exceeding 100,000 people (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a, pp. 87-9). The countries, groups, and descriptive statistics for protest scores of each electorally active group are shown in Appendix B, Table B.6. Contrary to the violent rebellion indicator, a plurality at least of ethnic minority groups do engage in nonviolent protest at some time, as the modal protest score is 2. Furthermore, the average level of protest is not trivial, at just under a score of two.

The Independent Variables

Ethnic Party Access to the Cabinet

The implication of Ethnic Attractors tested here is that lack of representation increases the likelihood that an electorally active ethnic group will turn intransigent and even violent over time. Full representation, in turn, is defined as including access to all levels, from electoral participation to legislative advocacy and enactment through participation in the executive. The mechanism is ethnic group member expectations about representation that are thwarted over time if her party is never granted access to the executive. The hypothesized consequence is increased propensity for violence and protest.

There are many ways to record access to the executive. For instance, ethnic parties may be given ministries, the party may enter formally into alliance with the governing party without being awarded ministries, or the party may have influence with the executive without being formally included. Any of these would count as access to the executive and be expected to decrease the group's propensity for intransigence. The more inclusive the coding, however, the more subjective it is because what constitutes a formal or an informal alliance with influence in the executive is debatable. Therefore, I have coded this variable in stages. In the first stage I have coded as having access to the executive only those ethnic groups whose ethnic party is explicitly and formally in the cabinet.

There are also many possibilities in operationalization of this variable. The first option is to code the variable as a dummy that simply records when the group is included in governing coalitions or constitutes the governing party. This option would not, however, capture the idea that frustration builds over time. To capture the effect of increasing frustration over time, the variable accounting for ethnic access to the cabinet is coded as the number of years that have elapsed since the ethnic party has been in the cabinet. The count for each group starts either at democratization, which is considered the earliest point at which an electorally active ethnic group can reasonably expect to be included in the executive, or the election in which the group enters national electoral competition if that occurs later than democratization.[30] Furthermore, the count is reset to 0 each year the group is represented by the ethnic party in the cabinet.

Clearly, the preceding operationalization does not capture instances in which the ethnic party enters into an informal alliance with the governing party, such as the case of the Catalans and the PP after the 1996 election discussed in Chapter Six, or a formal alliance without being in the cabinet, as the Hungarian party did when the PSD gained power in Romania after the 2000 election. The subjectivity of what constitutes an informal alliance creates significant problems in the creation of such a variable. Furthermore, information regarding implicit support is not always available, as government negotiations with other parties often occur behind closed doors. Nevertheless, this is important information. Therefore, I

[30] So as not to exaggerate the national political "frustration index" by including, for example, groups that are electorally active only at the subnational level the count is conservative. Therefore, counting only begins when there is evidence that the group has access to the legislature through an ethnic or a non-ethnic party or there is other reliable evidence that the group runs parties in national elections such as registration as a national party, even though MAR may classify the group as electorally active earlier. For further discussion see Appendix B.

have coded a second variable that accounts for such formal and informal alliances between the ethnic party and other parties in the executive when this information is available.

To preclude potential incompleteness and subjectivity in the coding of the implicit access variable, I use it only as a test of the additional implication that if explicit access of an ethnic party to the cabinet as coded reduces violence, a relationship including implicit access and violence should also be negative and stronger.

Access to the Cabinet through a Nonethnic Party

The ethnic group might also be represented in the cabinet through nonethnic or multiethnic parties. To test this effect I constructed a variable that records ethnic group access to cabinets through a nonethnic party. The operationalization of this variable is in form identical to the variable of ethnic party explicit access to cabinet.

To minimize subjectivity relating to the assessment of whether the ethnic group believes the nonethnic party represents it, I also coded this variable in stages. The first stage includes only clear signals of party commitment to the group, namely, instances when a member of the ethnic group holds an official position when the nonethnic party is in the cabinet.[31] A complication associated with this inference is that, as democracies develop, ethnic groups likely develop internal cleavages over economic and other policy divides, and the relative salience of the ethnic issue decreases. As predicted in Chapter Three, parts of the group may then join other parties. Consequently, clear representation of the group in the executive through a nonethnic party does not necessarily imply that any single nonethnic party represents the whole group. Rather, the inference here is that in some cases nonethnic parties in the system are open as venues to access for at least part of the group. Such venues are expected to be associated with decreasing average intransigence of the group as a whole, as members of the whole group perceive the system as open to group interests.

The second variable accounting for ethnic access to the cabinet through a nonethnic party includes instances where members of the ethnic group are elected to the legislature in a nonethnic party that is in the cabinet, but the ethnic representative holds no official position in that cabinet.

[31] With a few exceptions these are ministerial posts. The exceptions include only other visible posts of influence such as the French Canadian Chrétien's title of parliamentary secretary to Prime Minister Pearson in the 1965 Liberal cabinet in Canada. Another example is the appointment of the Roma leader Gheorghe Raducanu to head the new office for Roma affairs after the PSD won the 2000 election in Romania.

Similarly, I use this variable only as a test of the additional implication that if explicit access through a nonethnic party to the cabinet reduces violence, a relationship including implicit access through a nonethnic party and violence should also be negative and stronger.

Table 7.5 shows descriptive statistics by country and group for one of the possible forms of an ethnic access variable. The variable in the table accounts for whether the group has explicit access to government through an ethnic party or through a nonethnic party where an ethnic group member is a part of the cabinet. The minimum and maximum account for the number of years since the ethnic group has had access to the cabinet since the group became electorally active, or since democratization if the group has participated in national electoral politics since. For example, a group could score a 10 if it has participated in electoral politics since democratization, which occurred ten years ago, but never been included in government. Another example is a group that scores a 2 because it has been electorally active at least that long and/or it was included in government two years ago. Some interesting observations emerge from this table. First, a significant number of minority groups have had access to government at one time or another because the modal number of years since the group has been in government is 0 and the average for each group that has at least intermittent access is in many cases quite low. Furthermore, many minority groups have frequent access to government, as the average number of years since they have been included in government is just over nine years or roughly two administrations if an average administration lasts four years.

While Catholics in Northern Ireland who have perpetrated violence have spent the most time out of government (fifty-nine years in this sample), there are also peaceful groups that have spent nearly as long a time out of government. These include Sardinians and South Tyrolinians in Italy, who have been out of government for fifty-six years each. Moreover, with the exception of Sri Lanka's Tamils, who have not had access to government for twenty-three years in the sample, the most violent groups are not necessarily the groups that have spent a very long time out of government. To the contrary, Kurds in Turkey have representatives in most administrations,[32] and Serbs in Croatia and Adzhars in Georgia have only been out of government for twelve years (since democratization). Therefore, it does not seem likely that any one group will wield undue

[32] How "representative" Kurdish politicians in nonethnic parties are is of course debatable as Kurdish parties have also been periodically banned in Turkey.

TABLE 7.5. *Cases included in the analysis: By country and group, average time since the group has had access to government through an ethnic or a nonethnic party*

Country	Group	Observations[a]	Mean[b]	Stdev[b]	Min	Max
Albania	Greeks	13	1.62	2.18	0	6
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes	3	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	Indigenous Highland peoples	19	2.47	2.57	0	8
Bolivia	Indigenous Lowland peoples	7	4	2.16	1	7
Bosnia	Croats	8	0	0	0	0
Bosnia	Muslims	8	0.38	0.74	0	2
Bosnia	Serbs	8	0.38	0.52	0	1
Bulgaria	Roma	14	7.5	4.18	1	14
Bulgaria	Turks	14	2.64	2.87	0	8
Canada	Quebecois	26	0.15	0.78	0	4
Colombia	Indigenous peoples	14	7.5	4.18	1	14
Croatia	Serbs	12	6.5	3.60	1	12
Czech Republic	Roma	11	9	3.32	4	14
Ecuador	Indigenous peoples	8	2.63	2.26	1	6
Estonia	Russians	9	5	2.74	1	9
Fiji	East Indians	5	0	0	0	0
Georgia	Abkhazians	12	6.5	3.61	1	12
Georgia	Adzhars	12	6.5	3.61	1	12
Ghana	Ashanti	8	1.25	1.58	0	4
Guyana	Africans	12	6.5	3.61	1	12
Guyana	East Indians	12	0	0	0	0
Hungary	Roma	14	7.5	4.18	1	14

(*continued*)

TABLE 7.5 *(continued)*

Country	Group	Observations[a]	Mean[b]	Stdev[b]	Min	Max
India	Assamese	21	8.71	6.30	0	19
India	Kashmiris	21	10.71	7.78	0	22
India	Mizos	15	8	4.47	1	15
India	Nagas	21	16.67	6.80	4	27
India	Scheduled Tribes	19	11	5.63	2	20
India	Sikhs	24	9.21	8.27	0	22
Israel	Arabs	26	3.54	5.41	0	15
Italy	Sardinians	24	42	11.61	13	56
Italy	South Tyrolians	26	39.19	14.93	3	56
Latvia	Russians	11	4.09	3.18	0	9
Lithuania	Poles	12	6.5	3.61	1	12
Lithuania	Russians	8	4.5	2.45	1	8
Macedonia	Albanians	11	0	0	0	0
Macedonia	Roma	11	9	3.32	4	14
Macedonia	Serbs	6	3.5	1.87	1	6
Madagascar	Merina	11	6	3.32	1	11
Moldova	Gagauz	10	5.5	3.03	1	10
Moldova	Slavs	10	5.5	3.03	1	10
Namibia	Basters	14	8.5	4.18	2	15
Namibia	Europeans	14	8.5	4.18	2	15
New Zealand	Maori	21	3.57	5.08	0	14
Nigeria	Ibo	3	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	Yoruba	5	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	Baluchis	10	5.5	3.03	1	10
Pakistan	Mohajirs	10	2.8	2.62	0	7
Pakistan	Pashtuns (Pushtuns)	10	3.7	2.75	0	8

Pakistan	Sindhis	10	0.7	1.06	0	3
Romania	Magyars (Hungarians)	14	2.21	2.01	0	6
Romania	Roma	14	4.14	3.39	0	10
Slovakia	Hungarians	11	2.73	3.29	0	8
Slovakia	Roma	11	9	3.32	4	14
South Africa	Asians	10	5.5	3.03	1	10
South Africa	Coloreds	10	5.5	3.03	1	10
South Africa	Europeans	10	0.6	1.07	0	3
South Africa	Xhosa	10	0	0	0	0
South Africa	Zulus	10	0	0	0	0
South Korea	Honamese	16	5.25	3.86	0	12
Spain	Basques	20	17.3	6.31	4	27
Spain	Catalans	20	7.9	7.38	0	19
Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils	27	4.19	8.31	0	29
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils	27	10.07	7.80	0	23
Turkey	Kurds	23	0.04	0.21	0	1
Ukraine	Russians	10	5.5	3.03	1	10
United Kingdom	Catholics in Northern Ireland	27	40.67	16.65	1	59
United Kingdom	Scots	27	26.67	21.43	0	53
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples	5	2	1.58	0	4
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)	Albanians (Kosovo)	1	1	.	1	1
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)	Hungarians	1	1	.	1	1

[a] Inclusion in the statistical analysis is determined by presence of access scores and violence and/or protest scores.

[b] Calculation of mean and stdev is most informative in cases where the group has at least intermittent access and is influenced by availability of observations on the dependent variable.

influence on the analysis. Furthermore, it is clear that access to government is not the sole explanation for why these groups resort to violence, but according to Ethnic Attractors, exclusion contributes to the propensity for violence.

Ethnic Group Leverage through an Ethnic Party

Membership in the cabinet is only one possible bargaining position for an ethnic party. Minimum winning coalition theory leads us to believe that even a very small party has a reasonable expectation of being included in a coalition, at least on occasion. Similarly, minimal access to the legislature may give ethnic groups voice. When a group is out of the cabinet, however, consistent leverage over policy is likely determined by party size. The larger the party, the more likely it occupies a bargaining position of leverage in the legislature with which policymakers in government must reckon. Thus, to account for party policy leverage whether or not the party has direct access to the cabinet, I include a variable that accounts for the relative size of the ethnic party in the legislature after the last election.[33]

Control Variables

Many conditions other than representation theoretically influence ethnic conflict. Institutions play a role in, and are in some cases subject to, the electoral process and legislative negotiations. Other conditions, such as level of economic development and regional concentration of groups, are mostly if not entirely exogenous to the electoral process and legislative bargaining. An accurate relationship between ethnicity and violence and protest can only be discerned when we control for the maximal number of these other variables possible.

According to Linz (1990), for instance, the institutional nature of a presidential system enhances the potential for conflict over and above that of parliamentary systems, especially in nations with deep political cleavages. Horowitz (1990-b) counters, arguing that Linz's sample is biased and that the majoritarian institutional features of presidential systems exist in many parliamentary systems as well. In Chapter Three I argued that theoretically it is not clear that expectations of ethnic access differ much between presidential and parliamentary systems.

[33] The ethnic group could also have leverage when represented through a nonethnic party. The measure I would like to have for ethnic legislative leverage through a nonethnic party is a measure that accounts not only for the overall size of the non-ethnic party in the legislature but also for the ethnic contingent in that party. Thus far, however, I have not been able to construct this variable with any reliability for the universe of cases. Therefore, it is excluded from the analysis here.

Furthermore, earlier in this chapter I posited that in most countries, ethnic groups have a reasonable expectation of access to the executive regardless of the type of electoral system that is used, as long as the group is electorally active. These arguments do not indicate, however, that institutional barriers have no effect. To the contrary, it is possible that ethnic groups in presidential systems feel protected by the separation of power, and that ethnic groups in systems that use plurality rules have a lower expectation of access to the cabinet than ethnic groups that are elected through proportional representation (Saideman et al., 2002). It is argued here that the difference, however, is one of degree and not of kind. With the exception of institutions that interact with social conditions to produce true two-party systems in parliamentary systems, and two-party systems where the president's party is also the majority party in the legislature in presidential systems, none of the system types and electoral institutions discussed here eliminates ethnic minority expectation of access, but some may make access more or less likely.

Therefore, as in the test of volatility, I include three dummy variables that distinguish among presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary systems. I also include the number of parties in the legislature to account for divergent expectations associated with electoral systems. In the following test of the effect of access on protest and violence, the district structure variables distinguishing between plurality and other systems are not significantly correlated with the independent variables of interest as they were in the tests of volatility conducted in Chapter Five and earlier in this chapter. Therefore, I also include three dummy variables accounting for varying district structures (plurality, mixed, proportional) in two of the models.[34] The final institutional variable included in the analysis accounts for institutional division of territory through federalism, as this is a common consideration in the literature on ethnic conflict (Saideman, 2002; Toft, 2003; Alemán and Treisman, 2005).

As in Chapter Five, I control here for the effects of the economy. The rationale is different, however, though the measures are the same. The tests about vote stability examined the determinants of stabilization of

[34] The World Bank recently compiled an institutional dataset that includes these types of system variables in addition to some more detailed measures of magnitude. I did not use the World Bank data but relied instead on information about electoral systems published by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (1997, 2002, 2005) for two reasons. The first is the time frame – the World Bank data only include measures back to 1975. Second, I found some inconsistencies between IDEA's coding and World Bank coding and chose the former. I then supplemented the information provided by IDEA with information from a variety of statistical yearbooks.

the party system. In line with theories that posit voters hold incumbents accountable for economic performance, the question of interest was the effect of change in the economy on voter party preferences. The following test, in turn, focuses on the economic contributors to ethnic group protest and rebellion. Three principal ideas stand out as explanations for the association between ethnic group violence and protest and economic change.

The first focuses on economic scarcity as the source of ethnic conflict. Gurr (1985) explains that at the onset of economic crisis, people's expectation of material progress remain high while material conditions worsen. Under conditions of relative deprivation, upwardly mobile minority groups are likely targets for hostility as the economic crisis persists. To account for change in aggregate scarcity, I include change in aggregate growth of GDP when compared to the previous year.[35]

The second line of reasoning is modernization. Here, two principal arguments stand out. According to Lipset (1959), increasing levels of economic wealth contribute to vertical integration of society and democratic stability. Cross-cutting cleavages also contribute to democratic stability. Segmented cleavages, in turn, destabilize democracy, particularly where the segment overlaps include economic disparities. Lipset uses GDP per capita as one of his measures of the positive effects of modernization. Along the lines of Lipset, Saideman and associates (2002) propose that rich countries are better able to buy off ethnic conflict but do not elaborate further. Saideman and colleagues also use GDP per capita to measure a theoretically negative association between increasing wealth and conflict. Likewise, Fearon and Laitin (2003) use GDP per capita, but to measure two theoretically contradictory propositions associated with modernization and insurgency. The first is a theoretically positive relationship posed in the literature between the level of modernization and ethnic conflict. According to this line of reasoning, ethnic groups rebel when societies pose ascriptive barriers to upwardly mobile ethnic groups during economic modernization. The second, which is their own argument, is that insurgency is negatively related to modernization because insurgents are better able to survive if the government and military forces they oppose are "relatively weak – badly financed, organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided" (p. 80). Following these examples, I include a

[35] A related argument focuses on relative deprivation (Gurr 1970). Schock (1996) does find evidence to suggest that political violence increases as income inequality increases, but only when interacted with political institutionalization. However, recent studies, including Fearon and Laitin (2003), do not indicate that there is much empirical leverage in this theory for models that do not account for political institutionalization. Consequently, I do not pursue this line of inquiry here.

measure of GDP per capita as a control variable. The sources for this variable are Penn World Tables. Economic data from new democratizers are in many cases hard to come by and a total of 232 and 248 cases are missing for GDP per capita and growth, respectively. Given the high number of observations available for testing the determinants of protest and violence relative to the lower number of cases available for testing the determinants of volatility, inclusion of economic indicators does not raise the same concern in this test. Nevertheless, I run one model for each dependent variable without these indicators because of the systematic restrictions of these data described earlier.

Regional concentration of the group has received considerable attention in the literature. The common argument associated with regional concentration is that concentrated groups are more likely to engage in conflict (Gurr, 1993; Byman, 2002; Saideman and Ayres, 2000; Toft, 2003).[36] Thus, I include a MAR variable that accounts for regional concentration. This is a simple dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the group is regionally concentrated and 0 if it is not.[37]

New democracies are also arguably more vulnerable to rebellion and protest, including ethnic protest, but the empirical evidence in support of this argument is quite mixed (Fearon, 1998; Saideman et al., 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Hence, I include a dummy here, accounting for the first two years of democracy.

Finally, it is likely that there is some association between rebellion and protest. Presumably, if a group is engaged in one type of activity, one would reason that the group is more likely to be involved in the other type as well. Therefore, I include a lagged protest score in the models where rebellion is the dependent variable and vice versa. Table 7.6 presents summary statistics for all the variables included in this test.

The total number of observations available for the full specification is limited by the missing economic data. The variables accounting for number of years since the ethnic group has been in the cabinet in an ethnic party and the relative size of the ethnic group in the legislature are missing for 96 and 130 cases, respectively. Consequently, the number of cases in models where these variables are included are lower. Furthermore, information regarding the number of parties in the legislature is missing for nearly fifty cases. For a comprehensive list of missing cases pertaining to

[36] Toft (2003) concludes that concentrated groups defending a self-defined homeland and groups that are regionally concentrated often fight to the death, while dispersed or urbanized groups almost never risk violence to voice grievances.

[37] This variable is reg1.

TABLE 7.6. *Summary statistics: Ethnic access, protest, and violence in all democracies with electorally active ethnic groups since 1945*

	Number of observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Violent rebellion	931[a]	0.957	1.847	0	7
Nonviolent protest	934[a]	1.883	1.378	0	5
Violent rebellion lagged by group	836[a]	0.994	1.928	0	7
Nonviolent protest lagged by group	835[a]	1.937	1.384	0	5
Number of years since ethnic group has been in cabinet in an ethnic party	841[a]	9.950	12.704	0	59
Number of years since ethnic group has been in cabinet in an ethnic or a nonethnic party	937	9.029	12.808	0	59
Relative size of ethnic group in the legislature	807[a]	7.754	14.111	0	66.5
Number of parties in the legislature	889[a]	12.488	8.311	2	41
Plurality electoral system	937	0.327	0.470	0	1
Proportional electoral system	937	0.488	0.500	0	1
Mixed electoral system	937	0.186	0.389	0	1
Pure presidential system	937	0.131	0.338	0	1
Semipresidential system	937	0.216	0.411	0	1
Parliamentary system	937	0.653	0.476	0	1
GDP (constant dollars) per capita	705[a]	7499	6265	707	26905
GDP (constant dollars) growth (percentage)	689[a]	3.022	4.496	−23.917	16.504
Group regionally concentrated	743[a]	0.505	0.500	0	1
Federal system	937	0.241	0.428	0	1
New democracy (first two years)	937	0.048	0.214	0	1

[a] For a list of missing cases see Appendix B.

each variable see Appendix B, Table B.8. Finally, lagging the dependent variables by group eliminates the first observation for each group. This excludes all of the quinquennial protest and violence indicators. Consequently, I also show models that exclude variables with missing cases.

Method

The preceding discussion demonstrates that both the protest and the violence scales are clearly ordinal. Nevertheless, the common estimation procedure in most previous empirical studies of intrastate ethnic violence is ordinary least squares estimation that assumes linearity of the dependent variable (Cohen, 1997; Saideman, 2002) or a variant of least squares (Gurr et al., 1997). Recently, however, a few scholars have adopted statistical techniques fashioned specifically to handle nonlinear dependent variables for the analysis of ethnic conflict. Examples include Krain (1997), who uses Logit to estimate onset of genocide and politicide and a negative binomial count model to estimate severity, and Fearon and Laitin (2003), who estimate the onset of civil war by using Logit. Following their example, I use ordered probit estimation,[38] which was designed specifically to handle ordered categorical variables.[39] I also use Huber-White robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. To correct for theoretical autocorrelation I include a lag of the corresponding dependent variable on the right-hand side of a number of the equations.

ACCESS AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE

The implication of the argument of Ethnic Attractors developed in Chapters Two and Three is that in the long term ethnic group propensity for peaceful participation in democratic politics is influenced by the

[38] For an explanation of this method, see Long and Freese (2001).

[39] Ordered probit relaxes the assumption of linearity but introduces the assumption of parallel slopes for all outcomes of the dependent variable. To test the parallel regression assumption, I ran Wolfe and Gold's approximate likelihood-ratio test of whether the coefficients are equal across categories (see STATA 7 and 8); the test indicated that the data might not fit this assumption. It is not clear, however, that this is a serious violation. OLS, for instance, assumes that the slope parameters are not affected by the value of the dependent variable (John Londregan, personal communication November 3, 2003). A third alternative is multinomial probit estimation, which relaxes the parallel regression assumption but introduces the assumption that the categories in the dependent variable are nominal rather than ordinal. Both dependent variables are ordered. Therefore, I decided to use ordered probit but run robustness tests by estimating results also with fixed effects OLS. These tests showed no significant substantive differences between the principal explanatory variables of ethnic access to the cabinet and ethnic party size in the legislature.

TABLE 7.7. *Regression: Ethnic access, violence, and protest in all democracies with electorally active ethnic groups*

	Dependent variable: Violent rebellion (ordinal scale)					Dependent variable: Nonviolent protest (ordinal scale)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Violent rebellion (lagged one year by group)	0.953 (0.129)**	0.959 (0.127)**	0.925 (0.107)**	0.951 (0.122)**		0.065 (0.024)**	
Nonviolent protest (lagged one year by group)	0.087 (0.060)	0.105 (0.060)#	0.129 (0.058)*	0.081 (0.057)		0.559 (0.060)**	
Number of years since ethnic group has been in cabinet in an ethnic party	0.020 (0.007)**						
Number of years since ethnic group has been in cabinet in an ethnic or a nonethnic party		0.023 (0.006)**	0.024 (0.005)**	0.026 (0.008)**	0.017 (0.003)**	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.003)
Relative size of ethnic group in the legislature	−0.021 (0.010)*	−0.019 (0.010)#		−0.022 (0.008)**		−0.012 (0.004)**	−0.015 (0.003)**
Number of parties in the legislature	−0.009 (0.010)	−0.011 (0.010)	−0.007 (0.010)				
Plurality electoral system[a]				−0.066 (0.242)	−0.053 (0.106)	−0.044 (0.177)	−0.056 (0.117)
Mixed electoral system[a]				−1.205 (0.369)**	−0.464 (0.152)**	−0.232 (0.157)	−0.514 (0.104)**
Pure presidential system[b]	−0.342 (0.470)	−0.323 (0.472)	−0.395 (0.395)	−0.515 (0.427)	0.068 (0.152)	−0.108 (0.179)	−0.338 (0.122)**

Semipresidential system[b]	−0.386	−0.380	−0.413	−0.642	0.142	−0.002	−0.039
	(0.215)#	(0.220)#	(0.189)*	(0.247)**	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.097)
GDP per capita	−0.556e-04	−0.622e-04	−0.650e-04	−0.902e-04		0.040e-04	
	(0.221e-04)*	(0.206e-04)**	(0.168e-04)**	(0.258e-04)**		(0.090e-04)	
GDP growth (percentage)	0.028	0.030	0.036	0.017		0.004	
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)#	(0.021)		(0.011)	
Group regionally concentrated	0.395	0.365	0.315	0.405		0.023	
	(0.128)**	(0.124)**	(0.116)**	(0.130)**		(0.103)	
Federal system	−0.258	−0.325	−0.349	−0.725	0.679	0.183	0.425
	(0.257)	(0.280)	(0.235)	(0.351)*	(0.114)**	(0.207)	(0.129)**
New democracy (first two years)	0.335	0.319	0.214	0.371	−0.256	0.282	0.271
	(0.403)	(0.406)	(0.392)	(0.400)	(0.237)	(0.273)	(0.184)
Observations	496	503	575	525	931	525	804

Note: Ordered probit. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

[a] Reference category is proportional electoral system.

[b] Reference category is parliamentary system.

Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

representation of the group interest in central state structures, where representation is defined as access to policy and/or office-specific goods, through direct access to the executive and leverage in the legislature.

The results of the test are shown in Table 7.7. Violent rebellion is the dependent variable in the first five specifications, and peaceful protest is the dependent variable in the sixth and seventh models. The models bear out the expectation that access influences levels of violence and protest, with some additional insights.

Models one through five show that access to the cabinet is statistically significantly associated with levels of violence. The longer the group has been out of the cabinet, the higher the levels of violence. The first model accounts only for groups that field separate ethnic parties. The number of years the ethnic party is out of government is positively and significantly associated with increasing levels of violence. Models two through five add countries where the ethnic group is also represented through a nonethnic party and adjusts the counting of years since the group has had access to the cabinet to account for representation through either an ethnic party or a nonethnic party.[40] Model three excludes the variable accounting for the relative size of the ethnic party because it eliminates all of the cases where ethnic groups are represented through a nonethnic party only. The effect of exclusion changes little between models one, two and three, however. I interpret this result to indicate that representation matters, but whether it occurs through an ethnic party or a nonethnic party matters less.[41]

[40] The access through a nonethnic party variable used here is the first explicit variable coded as positive when members of the ethnic groups are in the cabinet as representatives of the nonethnic party only.

[41] A number of groups that are classified by MAR as electorally inactive or are not classified at all and do not field a separate ethnic political party that I know of and are therefore not added to the analysis here (see Appendix B) are nonetheless represented through nonethnic parties. These include Turks in Germany, Chinese in Indonesia, Chinese and Malay-Muslim in Thailand, and African Americans and Hispanics in the US, all of whom have been represented by ethnic individuals in cabinet. In addition a representative of British Afro-Caribbeans was elected to the legislature on a Liberal ticket in 1997 when the Liberals took power, and Blacks in Colombia and the Aborigines in Australia have had access to the senate through nonethnic parties but not to the cabinet. The Chinese in Indonesia are peaceful according to MAR; the Chinese and Malay in Thailand and African Americans and Hispanics in the United States have protested and/or engaged in violence; the Turks in Germany British Afro-Caribbeans and Blacks in Colombia and the Aborigines in Australia have protested. A cursory inspection of these cases suggests that representation through nonethnic parties does meet some of these groups' demands for access. The Chinese in Thailand protest more early on when they are recently represented and their protest diminishes over time. Turks in Germany protest both when they are and are not in government but do not rebel. Afro-Caribbean protest is halted in the

These findings are robust when the lagged rebellion and protest scores are included in models one through four and excluded in model five to increase the number of cases.[42]

In addition, party size in the legislature also matters when groups that engage in violence wish to extract concessions from increasingly reluctant adversaries. Increasing size of the ethnic party in the legislature is significantly (in a one or a two tailed test) associated with decreasing violence in all of the models in which it is included.

According to models six and seven, access to government does not matter for protest when controlling for other variables. However, both models show that increasing party size significantly influences the granting of concessions that are sought through peaceful protest. The larger the ethnic representation is in the legislature, the lower the levels of protest.

Given these results, the assertion so far of the institutional analysis that legislative voice mediates activity aimed against the state can be improved. While voice irrespective of size may be useful, size clearly matters to alleviating peaceful and violent protest. In other words, a bigger voice in the legislature is better. Furthermore, if the group is violent, the need for direct access to the executive coalition is greater, probably because of increased reluctance among other governing parties to grant concessions as the ethnic group popular support diminishes as a result of the violence. Whether that access occurs through ethnic or nonethnic parties does not, however, appear to be of material importance. Legislative voice alone, therefore, is only a partial resolution to violent conflict. Furthermore, additional

year after their representative is elected to the legislature though it soon begins again. In Colombia Blacks protest dies down in the late 1990s around the time they gain access for the first time. The Malay also protest and even rebel whether represented or not, but their average level of protest and rebellion is more intense when out of cabinet. The Aborigines in Australia are only represented through nonethnic parties in the senate and thus protest continually but do not rebel. Finally, while African Americans protest continually, the only instances of rebellion occur around the time of the civil rights movement, which is also around the time this group is represented in cabinet for the first time. Similarly, Hispanics in the United States protest continually but only rebel until the early 1990s, shortly after they are represented in the cabinet for the first time. Other minority groups such as the Nyanja speakers in Malawi and French and Italian minorities in Switzerland have also been represented by members of their respective ethnic groups in cabinet through nonethnic parties, but since these are missing from MAR (see Appendix B) I will not speculate about the effect of representation on their propensity for protest and violence.

[42] The dependent variable is recorded quinquennially before 1985. Lagging the dependent variable before 1985, therefore, effectively drops the case. Consequently, only the equations without lagged variables include data before 1985.

specifications with the variables of "implicit ethnic party access to cabinet" and "implicit access to cabinet through a nonethnic party" that provided more subjective measures of group access to the executive did support these general findings but did not improve the fit of the models sufficiently to warrant inclusion, given the unreliability issue discussed earlier.

The direction of the causal arrow between access and ethnic protest and/or violence is a constant concern. There are many ways to strengthen the causal inference of the test. Some of these solutions are empirical. According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), one solution involves correcting for the biased estimate by including a term that accounts for the size of the bias on the right-hand side of the regression equation. To this end, the lag of each of the dependent variables included on the right-hand side of the equation in a number of the models also provides a correction for overestimation of the effect of access on rebellion.[43]

Another empirical solution I use to strengthen the causal inference is to use auxiliary data to test the additional implication that a group's expression of concern about greater participation in politics and decision making at the central state level makes the group more likely to perpetrate violence. The MAR data include a variable that records instances in which group representatives have expressed concern about greater participation in politics and decision making at the central state level. This variable represents a direct measure of the group's concern about inclusion in the central government, whereas the relationship between actual cabinet access and resultant protest is inferred. It is possible that despite electoral activity, some groups may not care about participation in the central government and engage in violence for reasons other than exclusion. Therefore, a direct variable recording complaints about lack of inclusion in central government is useful. This particular information was recorded only in 1985, 1990, 1995, 2001, 2002, and 2003.[44] Thus the data cannot speak to the

[43] Interestingly the coefficient is actually smaller when the lags are excluded but the equations where the lags are included account for the important influence of prior protest and violence and are, therefore, important.

[44] This variable is polgr3. In the data it is coded as 1 for highly salient, 2 for significant, 3 for lesser salience. The variable also contains cases that are coded as 0 and -99. The codebook does not specify what these numbers stand for but prior grievance variables are coded 0 if there is no grievance on the issue and -99 for missing cases. I assume the same coding convention is followed for this variable (Minorities at Risk 2005-a, p. 67). Given the comparison between 0 – which presumably indicates no expression of such concern, – and the reverse ordinal classification of the magnitude of the concern, I recoded the variable as a simple dummy 0 if no concern was expressed and 1 if concern was expressed. I also ran the correlation with the grievance variable running from 0 as no

longer-term causal relationship between access and violence. Nevertheless, I did use this variable to check the validity of the test between access and violence. If continual exclusion from government really represents a concern to the group, which eventually is expressed through acts of violence, one would also expect to see a positive relationship between expression of concern about exclusion and acts of violence. As expected in light of this analysis, the positive correlation (0.099) between expression of concern about exclusion from the central government and the annual violent rebellion score teeters on one tailed significance (0.102). Furthermore, and also as expected in light of the negative relationship between size of the group in the legislature and peaceful protest, there is a statistically significant (0.001) and positive relationship (0.200) between expressions of concern about exclusion from the central government and peaceful protest scores.

Substantive Importance of Association between Access and Violence

How large is the effect of exclusion from the executive on group propensity for violence? Neither the variables themselves nor the estimation techniques are perfect measurements of the group activity. Therefore, the effects should not be interpreted literally. A more appropriate understanding simply establishes the effect in relative terms. In sum, the relative effect of access on violent rebellion rivals that of any other indicator, including economic conditions.

Predicted Probabilities

Fiorina (1981) explains that when using the probit estimate, the "observed categories are hypothesized to correspond to intervals on the underlying variable, intervals determined by $(n - 1)$ thresholds" (p. 103). He goes on to explain that when interpreting the coefficients associated with the explanatory variables, we must take these thresholds into account. Thus, using Long and Freese's (2001) procedure, I generate predicted probabilities of the values of the dependent variable (violence) associated with change in one-half of a standard deviation around the mean for selected independent variables. I use half a standard deviation because subtracting a whole standard deviation from average access scores returns

grievance expressed to 3 being "highly salient." While the direction of the relationship remained the same the bivariate relationship between rebellion and grievance did not reach significance when using this more nuanced version of the variable.



FIGURE 7.3. Substantive effect: Change in predicted probabilities of violence associated with a change of one-half standard deviation around the mean of each independent variable: Time since ethnic group has been in government (Access), GDP growth, GDP per capita, and number of parties with seats in the legislature (Institutions)

a nonsensical negative number. So as not to over- or underestimate the effect of access I use model two from Table 7.7 to generate the predicted probabilities because this specification includes a lag of the dependent variable. The independent variables in Figure 7.3 include cabinet access through an ethnic or a non-ethnic party, the variable accounting for institutional barriers through legislative fractionalization, GDP per capita, and GDP growth (for averages and standard deviations see Table 7.6). All other variables are held constant at average levels when predicted probabilities are generated for each of these independent variables.

Figure 7.3 shows the effect of each independent variable at each point on the violence scale, from 0 indicating no violence to 7 indicating civil war.[45] Thus the first four columns, each representing one independent variable, indicate the effect of each independent variable on the probability that the ethnic group does not engage in violence. The following four columns indicate the effect of these four independent variables on

[45] I thank my late colleague Paul Senese for suggesting this graphing technique.

the probability that the ethnic group will engage in the lowest level of violence, measured at 1. It is important to note that the expectation associated with the increased probability of peace (a score of 0) is opposite the expectations associated with increasing violence. For instance, the longer a group is out of government, the lower the probability of continuing peace (score of 0) but the higher the probability that the group engages in violence (measured from 1 through 7). Consequently, the columns all reverse signs between 0 and the remaining categories.

A comparison among the predicted probabilities associated with the effects of access and economy on violence (scored as 1 through 7) shows that the substantive effect of increasing exclusion from the cabinet and increasing GDP per capita on violence is substantial, at over 5 percent increase and nearly 7 percent decrease in the probability of violence, respectively, at most. More importantly, as the substantive interpretation should not be taken literally, the idea that economic conditions are associated with rebellion is widely substantiated empirically in the literature, as cited. In comparison, therefore, the effect of being excluded from the cabinet is substantively very interesting. Furthermore, the probabilities of engaging in divergent levels of violence are very different for all of these independent variables. While the figure does not show the effect on the highest levels of violence, there is some change in predicted probabilities associated with extreme violence, but they are simply too small to demonstrate on this chart. The low probabilities for all of the independent variables associated with high levels of violence are in part caused by the fact that such violence is a rare event and might be better understood with tools specifically formulated to analyze rare events. In any case, the different effects of these independent variables bode well for future research of the determinants of different types and intensity of violence. Most importantly for the analysis here the figure shows that in relative terms access compares strongly to other determinants of violence.

Control Variables

Table 7.7 does suggest that violence is greater in parliamentary systems than in semipresidential systems. Going from a presidential to a parliamentary system does not affect violent rebellion of mobilized ethnic groups. This finding supports Saideman and associates' (2002) finding of lack of support for their proposition that because of the security

dilemma ethnic groups feel safer in presidential systems. The apparent difference between semipresidential and parliamentary systems bears further scrutiny, however.

The institutional variable accounting for permissiveness of electoral institutions by counting the number of parties in the legislature is negatively associated with violence though it does not reach significance. The sign of the variable supports previous scholarship that holds that increasingly permissive institutions allow for legislative voice, which in turn mediates ethnic conflict (Lijphart, 1977; Cohen, 1997; Saideman, 2002). It is also possible, however, that restrictive institutions are less of an obstacle to mobilized ethnic groups than previously thought as the lack of significance indicates. In other words, when groups are mobilized they strategically find a way around institutional barriers by, for example, coalescing of ethnic parties or pursuit of nonethnic parties.

Model four replicates model three but substitutes two of the three dummy variables accounting for district structure (plurality and mixed with reference to proportional systems) for the variable accounting for the number of parties in the legislature. Interestingly, the dummy variable associated with mixed systems significantly decreases the probability of violence in reference to proportional systems. Alternate runs, not included here, show that the same is true of plurality systems, which increase the probability of violence with reference to mixed systems. Perhaps as suggested by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) mixed systems really present the best of both worlds in terms of facility of group access to the legislature along with relationships with individual politicians. Presumably, constituency contentedness with political representatives in the legislature thus translates into lower levels of violence. Interestingly, however, there is not a statistically significant difference with respect to violence between plurality and proportional systems. This finding appears to contradict the finding that permissive institutions are associated with lower levels of violence, as one would on average expect the number of parties to be greater in proportional systems. Further examination of the case reveals, however, that legislative fractionalization is relatively high in many of the cases that use a plurality system, which include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Consequently, it seems safe to assume that the electoral system by itself is not a sufficient determinant of ethnic group access to the legislature and consequent feelings about representation that are demonstrated through violence or lack thereof. Rather, what

determines access and group sentiment about the quality of representation is the complex interaction between demographics and the institutional structure.

The evidence, in turn, that legislative barriers have an effect on peaceful protest is less convincing as the district structure variables only achieve significance in the less well controlled specification seven. In this model the finding is the same, as with respect to violence, mixed district structures significantly reduce violence when compared to proportional systems (and plurality systems in alternate runs) whereas there is no statistical difference between plurality and proportional systems.

Nonmobilized Ethnic Groups and Electoral Institutions

To examine the prediction that the psychological effect bars groups from mobilization and consequent electoral action as discussed earlier, I ran a separate analysis that included all ethnic groups that are not mobilized for electoral action in democracies included in the MAR (2005-a) data.[46] As the higher number of cases available for this analysis (1,069) shows, there are many ethnic groups that are not mobilized for electoral action. Here I control only for the effects of the district structure (proportional, plurality, mixed) rather than the number of parties in the legislature, because the better understood district structures likely play a greater role in the group decision to run for election than other more obscure barriers that affect legislative representation. Furthermore, I control for the economy, regional concentration, and system type. The results are shown in Table 7.8, which shows a positive and a statistically significant association between plurality district structure and increasing levels of violence, and increasing levels of peaceful protest, when compared to proportional electoral systems. Mixed district structure is also positively related to peaceful protest as well when compared to proportional district structures. It appears, therefore, that nonmobilized groups do take electoral institutions into consideration when deciding whether to run for office and that plurality district structures are a deterrent to mobilization. Furthermore, this result may explain the statistically significant negative association between decreasing proportionality of district structures and increasing

[46] Where there is a discrepancy between my and MAR coding of electoral activity (see Appendix B) I including only groups that I do not count as electorally active in prior tests in this chapter.

TABLE 7.8. *Electoral barriers and unmobilized groups*

	Dependent variable: violent rebellion		Dependent variable: nonviolent protest	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Violent rebellion (lagged one year by group)		0.918 (0.110)**		0.090 (0.031)**
Nonviolent protest (lagged one year by group)		0.168 (0.042)**		0.655 (0.050)**
Plurality electoral system[a]	0.724 (0.110)**	0.183 (0.153)	0.395 (0.094)**	0.068 (0.109)
Mixed electoral system[a]	0.117 (0.163)	−0.277 (0.193)	0.306 (0.108)**	0.024 (0.126)
Pure presidential system[b]	0.003 (0.123)	0.123 (0.160)	−0.056 (0.100)	0.046 (0.104)
Semipresidential system[b]	0.052 (0.130)	0.472 (0.165)**	−0.415 (0.111)**	−0.201 (0.124)
GDP per capita	−0.307e-04 (0.058e-04)**	−0.119e-04 (0.078e-04)	0.226e-04 (0.045e-04)**	0.143e-04 (0.057e-04)*
GDP growth (percentage)	0.013 (0.012)	0.017 (0.013)	−0.008 (0.008)	−0.005 (0.008)
Group regionally concentrated	0.411 (0.103)**	0.098 (0.123)	0.493 (0.082)**	0.139 (0.092)
Observations	1069	849	1064	849

Note: Ordered probit. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
[a] Reference category is proportional electoral system.
[b] Reference category is parliamentary system.
Significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.

levels of violence found in previous empirical studies. These institutional findings disappear in the better controlled specifications that include lags of the dependent variables. This is possibly due to the reduced number of cases but this finding clearly bears further scrutiny.

Two principal observations emerge from the institutional analysis. The first is that the effects of electoral institutions on ethnic protest and violence differ for nonmobilized and mobilized groups. Whereas nonmobilized groups care only about possible access to the legislature, mobilized groups have moved beyond the simple calculation of access to the legislature to consider the substance of access, as determined through a complex interaction of demographics and institutions and the type of institutions through which this access is achieved. Furthermore, mobilized

groups care about the relationship with the legislator and the ability of that legislator or party to deliver on policy.

Other Controls for Mobilized Groups

Returning to Table 7.7, a lag of the dependent variables is significant in all models that examine levels of peaceful violence and protest of mobilized ethnic groups. Furthermore, the peaceful protest variable is statistically significant in model three and significant in a one-tailed test in model two, indicating that where there is violence the group likely also engages in nonviolent protest. Violence may also precede nonviolent protest because the lagged violence indicator is statistically significant in model six.

The effects of increasing GDP per capita on decreasing violence in models one through four are statistically significant, in line with findings of Lipset (1959), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Saideman and co-workers (2002). These results support the ideas that modernization alleviates violence (Lipset, 1959) and that wealthier countries are able to buy off ethnic conflict (Saideman, 2002). Furthermore, they support the idea that ethnic conflict is more likely at lower levels of modernization because insurgents are better able to fight unmodernized governments and armies (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) but contradict the idea that ethnic groups rebel when societies pose ascriptive barriers to upwardly mobile ethnic groups during economic modernization (literature as cited by Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, in line with Saideman and associates (2002), level of development as measured through GDP per capita does not significantly affect group propensity for peaceful protest.

The variable accounting for aggregate growth is positively associated with increasing levels of violence in models one through three. This contradicts Gurr's (1985) scarcity theory that economic crises spur ethnic violence. This variable is only significant in a one-tailed test in model three, however, and changes in the aggregate economy are not significantly associated with peaceful protest.

In line with previous findings, regional concentration of the group significantly increases violence in all the models (Gurr, 1993; Byman, 2002; Saideman and Ayres, 2000; Toft, 2003). Whether regional concentration has an effect on peaceful protest is not apparent. It is unlikely that federalism affects violence. The variable is significantly associated with violence only in models four and five, one of which does not include lagged variables. More insidiously, however, the variable changes signs between the two models. Similarly, federalism only picks up significance in

association with peaceful protest in the less well controlled specification seven. These results are in line with previous understanding that federalism does little to ameliorate conflict (Toft, 2003; Saideman et al., 2002, Alemán and Treisman, 2005). New democracies are not significantly more vulnerable to violence or protest.

CONCLUSION

The central findings in this chapter are that ethnic electoral behavior stabilizes party systems in the long run if ethnic groups are represented, that access to the cabinet significantly reduces a group's propensity for violence, and that increasing size of ethnic legislative representation decreases both violence and peaceful protest. These findings are robust[47] and substantively important. It seems, therefore, that the idea in the literature that ethnic violence is associated with voice is only partially true. While voice is probably as important for ethnic groups as for other groups that participate in electoral politics, leverage is even more crucial because it grants access to particularistic goods and paves the way for policy demands. Moreover, representation reduces group propensity for violence whether it occurs through an ethnic or a nonethnic party. As mentioned in the Introduction and discussed further in the concluding chapter of this book, this finding has significant implications for institutional developments in plural democracies.

This chapter concluded the numerous tests of the direction of causality between access and violence undertaken in this analysis. The first test of a causal relationship is a sound theory. The argument and implications of Ethnic Attractors, provided in Chapters Two and Tree, specified the theoretical underpinnings and testable implications that were the subject of this chapter. Chapter Six executed the second set of tests through analytic narratives of three countries. In particular, the case studies examined the implication of ethnic flexibility and questioned whether previously violent ethnic groups have access to, or whether they are necessarily excluded from, subsequent governing coalitions. Finally, in this chapter, the theory as it pertains to the indicators of alternative political means of violence and

[47] To examine the robustness of these findings to alternative methods and specifications I ran ordinary least squares with country fixed effects to estimate the effect of access and leverage. The results with respect to the access and violence were substantively unchanged regardless of estimation technique. The findings of leverage were more sensitive to the number of cases included in the analysis but did come in significant when the number of cases available for the analysis was sufficiently high.

protest to achieve policy goals was tested in numerous ways. I acknowledge that while access influences violence, previous violence may also affect the probability that a group is selected for coalition government. To correct for this problem, I included a lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation in each of the multiple regression models. Still, the relationship between access and violence remained significant. In addition, I tested the relationship between group propensity for violence and group concern about access by using additional data that recorded groups' expressed concerns about greater participation in politics and decision making at the central state level. Findings of all of these tests support the idea that access to government influences ethnic group propensity for violence.

This chapter also supported the understanding that permissive electoral institutions decrease the chances of violence with additional insights. The indicators accounting for district structure indicated that, indeed, it is not the difference between plurality and proportional districts that matters but rather the type of representation associated with mixing these two district structure types. These findings suggest a fruitful venue for further empirical analysis of institutional effects on ethnic group representation and political activity. The first line of inquiry might examine the interaction of electoral institutions and underlying ethnic cleavages along the lines of Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and of Cox and Amorim Neto (1997), adding the distinction of mobilization. The second might, for example, follow the empirical analysis begun in this chapter to examine in more detail the effects of legislative institutions on mobilized ethnic group access to the government and other legislative structures.

8

Conclusions

What is the effect of ethnic cleavages on the development of democracy? How do they affect democracy immediately after democratization? What effect do ethnic groups exert on later democratic development? How does the exclusion of ethnic groups from electoral politics affect democracy? These are some of the questions addressed in this book. This project does not attempt a comprehensive explanation of the effect of ethnic cleavages on democracy. Rather, its objective is to show the effect of ethnic political participation on the evolution of party systems in new democracies and highlight some incentive structures that systematically influence this participation.

The argument articulated in Chapter Two begins with ideas of socialization to specify a mechanism through which members of ethnic groups arrive at and then update their ideas about politics. All voters use information available to them to make vote choices. Socialization theory, rational choice theory, political psychology, and game theory all lead one to believe that ethnicity is a particularly salient cue. Moreover, ethnic group affiliation generally persists despite authoritarian efforts to assimilate the minority. Ethnic identities are passed on through families via language and culture, which are difficult to regulate. Therefore, under authoritarian regimes ethnic minorities already have a more developed form of group loyalty than those who identify with the dominant ethnic group. As countries democratize, it is consequently easier to translate existing ethnic group loyalties into stable party loyalties than it is to create new party loyalties among the uncommitted majority of voters. However, this increased stability does not necessarily indicate inherent intransigence. Building on the most basic contentions of this book, that ethnic voters

are not inherently intransigent and that modeling ethnic electoral behavior does not necessitate any special assumptions about the motivations of ethnic groups, Chapter Two develops the argument of Ethnic Attractors, a voting model that explains ethnic electoral behavior in new democracies.

Chapter Three considers the prediction put forward in Chapter Two, of peaceful and stable ethnic political participation, which appears counterintuitive in light of empirical evidence of ethnic vote instability and violence. This chapter draws out the implications of the argument that ethnic groups provide a stable but flexible information shortcut in new democracies given a variety of constraints. I argue that the determinant of ethnic political behavior in maturing democracies is the extent to which ethnic group interests are represented in government. Furthermore, I argue that under nearly all institutional structures ethnic groups participating in democratic electoral politics have a reasonable expectation of access.

Party systems in new democracies are more fluid and fragmented than in established democracies. If the argument in Chapter Two is correct, however, one should observe a more rapid stabilization of electoral preferences in new, ethnically heterogeneous democracies than in the ethnically homogeneous ones. In Chapter Four I test the hypothesis about regional stability at the subnational level by comparing vote stability in different counties of Romania while controlling for other factors that might contribute to differences in voter preference stability. Stability associated with ethnic voting is also one of the implications of the existing literature on ethnic politics, but this book is the first to test the microfoundations of the expected voting behavior of ethnic groups at the macrolevel in a statistical study of multiple new democracies. In Chapter Five, electoral data from new democracies since World War II provide the evidence needed to test the observable implications of the stability hypothesis at the national level. By comparing voting patterns in over sixty new party systems in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe, Africa, and Asia, I show that voter preferences do indeed stabilize more rapidly in ethnically diverse countries than in ethnically homogeneous ones.

Chapter Five also tests some complementary and alternative hypotheses. First is the alternative hypothesis that institutional structures determine the level of stability of voting behavior of the population. As I have said elsewhere (Birnir, 2004-a), institutions that affect voting behavior are not restricted to the commonly examined district structures but include institutions that bear on registration of parties and the interaction between institutions and demographics. The product of all the

institutional structures, in interaction with demographics and the number of parties in the legislature, is indeed positively associated with higher levels of volatility in new democracies. Finally, Chapter Five tests a variety of hypotheses that in general propose that divergent cultures and histories contribute to differences in volatilities between countries.

While Chapters Four and Five test the relationship between vote stability and ethnic diversity empirically at the sub-national and national levels, they leave the question of the long-term effect of ethnicity on democratic stability unanswered. Chapter Six examines whether the demonstrated vote stability inevitably leads to political intransigence, as predicted by conventional theories of ethnic political behavior, or whether ethnic groups are flexible political actors who respond to changing circumstances, as proposed in Chapter Two. In particular, Chapter Six addresses the direction of the causal arrow in the relationship between representation and violence. Two case studies, those of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and ethnic Hungarians in Romania, suggest that ethnic groups are indeed as flexible as any other group in politics given the proper incentives. The cases show that the primary incentive for flexible political behavior, as opposed to intransigence and violence, is inclusion in government. Chapter Six then goes on to examine the critical case of Spain, where only one of the two principal ethnic minorities has resorted to violence. This case is critical because it holds a multitude of alternative explanations constant, such as national economics and culture, while examining why only one of two principal ethnic minorities has maintained a position of violent resistance to the state. The contrast between the Basques and the Catalans supports the idea that access to government is an important inducement for political moderation. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that size of the ethnic party and legislative fractionalization are greater determinants of inclusion in a government coalition than history of moderation or violent behavior of the group.

Chapter Seven examines the relationship between vote stability and access, arguing that in maturing democracies, represented ethnic groups stably support the parties that represent them. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from case studies and research by Madrid (2005-a) suggest that unrepresented groups become increasingly volatile over time. The argument of Ethnic Attractors implies that individuals who belong to unrepresented ethnic groups eventually exit electoral politics in favor of alternate means of representation, which, according to the literature, include protest and violence. The chapter further posits that the process from vote instability to exit and even violence is complicated and anything but linear.

In general, however, unrepresented groups will exhibit vote instability before they pursue alternate means for representation, and the longer the group goes unrepresented the more likely it is to resort to violence.

Finally, Chapter Seven tests the hypothesis of the long-term relationship between access and ethnic protest in a statistical study of all democracies with electorally active ethnic groups. There are nearly seventy electorally active ethnic groups in close to forty democracies worldwide. Here, I merge the latest version of the Minorities at Risk protest and violence indicators with original data on minority participation in government coalitions. The results show strong support for the idea that exclusion from the legislature and national government leads to ethnic protest and violence against the state. The analysis in Chapter Seven further serves to refine and distinguish between the effects of institutional structures on representation and concomitant political activity of ethnic groups. In particular, the results suggest that current theories of institutional barriers tell an incomplete story, particularly with respect to mobilized and unmobilized groups. Furthermore, this chapter shows that access to the governing coalition is imperative to quell *violent* protest. Complementary socioeconomic explanations provide additional detail as to the causes of violence.

The objective of this concluding chapter is to briefly examine some of the empirical and theoretical implications of the findings for future analysis of party system evolution and democratic development, particularly in heterogeneous countries.

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PLURAL SOCIETIES

The central theoretical proposition developed in Chapter Two was that ethnic groups are not inherently intransigent actors in democratic politics. Once the assumption of intransigence was relaxed, the model of Ethnic Attractors generated new and interesting testable hypotheses about ethnic participation in democratic politics. The qualitative and quantitative empirical chapters that followed tested two of these hypotheses and their implications.

Chapters Four and Five examined the hypothesis that ethnicity serves an information function early on in democratic politics. This information role results in increased stability of voting preferences at the aggregate as well as at the subnational level. The second testable hypothesis, explored and confirmed in Chapters Six and Seven, was that the long-term influence of ethnicity on democratic politics is determined by the extent to

which the cleavage is represented in the central government. The strength of the findings of ethnic voting stability at the national and subnational levels, complemented by the institutional insights of Chapter Five and the importance of access shown in Chapters Six and Seven, leads me to propose the following typology for democratic development in heterogeneous countries. This typology rests on the idea of ethnic groups as information providers. It addresses how political outcomes in heterogeneous countries are expected to diverge with respect to institutional constraints and provides some interesting contrasts to the predictions of the conventional wisdom about institutional effects on ethnic political behavior.

The first type I propose follows the Romanian model. In this type of system, ethnic parties are institutionally promoted through very permissive electoral institutions and/or institutions that specifically exempt ethnic groups from barriers in order to facilitate ethnic party access to the legislature. In this type of system, the ethnic vote will remain stably cast for the ethnic party and the long-term participation of ethnic groups in politics (including support for the ethnic party) will be determined by their long-term access to policy and other government goods.[1] Importantly,

[1] Contrary to much pessimism in writing about Romania's ethnic relations, I think that the institutions coupled with rational political calculations on all sides have led the country down a path of ethnic coexistence that counters the strong nationalistic (often antiethnic minority) element in Romania's politics. I do not mean to suggest that there is no ethnic tension in Romania (see, for instance, Mungiu-Pippidi, 1998, on this subject), only that the tension is contained and there is little reason to expect the situation to deteriorate into violence. Rather, the current conflicts in Romanian ethnic politics are as likely to include an intragroup disagreement over the path the leadership of the ethnic group pursues with respect to the governing parties as interethnic conflict. This, for example, was the case in the Hungarian community in anticipation of the 2004 national elections. At this point, therefore, the principal problem in Romania's "ethnic politics" seems to be the case of the Roma, who remain less incorporated into Romanian political life than other ethnic groups. I have not done research in this area but on the basis of my personal experience in Romania and from reading secondary materials about this group I speculate that the case of the Roma is quite complex. It seems that the Roma retain the status of a minority that is considered "different/unequal" while other minorities are incorporated to a greater extent at all levels of society. With changing economic conditions and increasing income inequality among the Roma community, as in other communities, this is not simply an ethnic cleavage that is reinforced by economic conditions. Rather, Roma at all levels of society (class, social status, etc.) are still considered "different." In any event, this is a fascinating topic for further study where a host of questions remains unanswered. For instance, what explains the lack of mobilization within the Roma community? Is the apparent lack of mobilization perhaps caused by age demographics (population too young to vote), communal structures such as patriarchy (possibly lowering the female turnout),

however, these institutions do not fix the institutional solutions around particular ethnic groups but allow the ethnic categorization to emerge from society and change over time.[2]

The second type is a party system where the ethnic group soon discovers that the institutional structures do not allow for a separate ethnic party. However, a nonethnic party picks up the ethnic issues and the group votes consistently for that party, either from the very first election or soon thereafter. Similarly, the long-term participation of this ethnic group in politics will be determined by their long-term access to policy and other government goods through the larger multiethnic or nonethnic party.

The third type is a system in which (a) ethnic parties are not institutionally viable; or (b) viable ethnic parties are unable to access government; and (c) nonethnic parties that over time have access to government do not pick up the ethnic issue.

This third type is the system where ethnicity will cause problems for democratic development. Early on the problems will be manifested as high instability in vote choices of an ethnic constituency in search of representation. The indigenous vote in Ecuador before spatial registration requirements were lifted is a good example of this (see Birnir 1999, 2004-a). Furthermore, Chapter Five suggested that because legislatures can only accommodate a finite number of parties, volatilities increase more rapidly in heterogeneous countries as small ethnic groups search for representation when their ethnic parties fail to access the legislature. In the long term, as a result of lack of ethnic access to government, these are also the systems that should be expected to contribute to ethnic group propensity for violence. The Basques in Spain furnish an example.

The third part of this typology offers some interesting contrasts to the conventional institutional wisdom (Lijphart/Saideman vs. Horowitz/Reilly). It emphasizes that there are no absolute institutional solutions to ethnic representation. The ethnic issue can be excluded under either type of system. In plurality systems the conditions for exclusion are a and c, while in a PR system the conditions for exclusion are b and c.

state institutions (such as requiring fixed residency for a more transient population)? Recently the governing parties have made some effort to respond to this population, but these are very recent developments and it is unclear what consequences they will have.

[2] Wilkinson (2004) points out the fallacy of locking in and thereby perpetrating certain ethnic categories by fashioning the system around institutional mandates fixed around a particular ethnicity (pp.134–135) given the current understanding of ethnicity as constructed and fluid.

Moreover, the ethnic group also can be peacefully incorporated into long-term national politics under either permissive (PR) or restrictive (plurality) rules because the ethnic issue does not necessarily have to be represented by an ethnic party. Furthermore, assuming that the group could choose between systems where ethnic parties are viable (PR) and where the ethnic issue is only represented through a larger party (plurality), it is not clear that the group should prefer one system over the other because there is a policy tradeoff between stages of representation. Early on the ethnic group bears moderate policy costs if it is represented through a nonethnic party (plurality) and no policy cost if it is represented through an ethnic party. However, larger parties (plurality) may be more likely to achieve access to government than any one small party (PR). Thus, even if a small ethnic group consistently achieves access to the legislature as an ethnic party but never enters government, it may be worse off in the long run than if the group bore a moderate policy cost as a part of a larger party that consistently had access to government.

In addition, there is little empirical evidence that depoliticizing ethnicity by taking the issue off the table, through either elite bargaining over consociational mechanisms[3] (Lijphart) or suppression of the issue through the use of plurality rules and gerrymandering for ethnic equality in districts (Horowitz), promotes democratic stability. What does seem to promote stable democratic development is representing the ethnic issue in government. Others (Posner, 2005) have shown that the components of the ethnic identity that become politically salient (broad or narrow) change with institutional structures, but there is no conclusive evidence to substantiate the idea that ethnicity can be (or should be) entirely and successfully depoliticized. Furthermore, if ethnic groups are not inherently intransigent, the incentive for depoliticization of ethnicity is decreased.

This inquiry calls for more detailed institutional analysis. For instance, how do institutional details other than district magnitude affect the way ethnic groups are channeled into political parties? When are ethnic groups more likely to be represented through nonethnic parties when institutions

[3] Of course, grand coalition, which is a consociational mechanism, allows for representation. However, grand coalition depoliticizes the ethnic issue by fixing representation of ethnic (linguistic, religious) groups through elite bargaining. The understanding of access in this book is not to associate access with depoliticization of the ethnic issue but with representation of the issue. Thus in the latter, representation of ethnicity is not fixed but is understood as a policy tool that is used in negotiations and as a means to attract a constituency.

do not allow for ethnic parties? What institutions create incentives to, or deter larger parties from, incorporating ethnic issues under restrictive electoral barriers where the issue is not represented by a separate party? What institutions other than electoral institutions influence ethnic group ability to field a political party? After the group is elected to the legislature, what are the institutional constraints/incentives on the groups' policymaking abilities, either when an ethnic party represents the group or when a nonethnic party does?

This direction of research also calls for greater incorporation of nuances relating to the relative size and demographic makeup of the ethnic constituency as it interacts with institutions. The examples in this book show that identical institutions often produce dissimilar outcomes because the underlying cleavages are very different. In a similar vein, we need to account for the policy expectations of ethnic groups. It is not theoretically clear that all groups want or expect the same type of policy influence. It is likely, for instance, that very minor groups may not expect to have the same impact on national policy as larger minority groups. In such cases it is possible that the minor group is able to satisfy all of its policy concerns even when it is not in government because it does not seek nationally controversial policies. In such cases, concessions to the group can be used as inducements for its informal support of larger parties in government. Large minority parties, however, may expect and desire more controversial policy outcomes. It is possible that these can only be satisfied when the group has access to government. Empirically, therefore, it is possible that larger groups are frustrated more (to use the language from Chapter Seven) than smaller groups if they are excluded from central government.

Creation of an "expected frustration" index requires that we take context into account. Empirically this is a difficult task. For instance, it is not clear how reliable by themselves perceived ethnic grievances are as measures of expected frustration. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for instance, found that stated grievances such as income inequality and cultural suppression inadequately predict ethnic conflict. Another way to think about frustration, however, is that it interacts with group attributes and capabilities. Thus, rather than focus only on grievances that result from alleged discrimination against the group, we should perhaps examine the stated political objectives of the group from early mobilization and create different frustration indexes for different types of groups – small and large, for example. If the specific objectives of a mobilized group are never met, the group can be expected to rebel.

ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS

The voting model I developed in Chapter Two (see formal version in Appendix A) is capable of answering many more questions than those asked in this book. For instance, there is the general question of the political function of ethnic groups and ethnic parties where they exist. Are ethnic groups simply mobilizing vehicles for aspiring politicians, or do they provide a service to the ethnic constituency? According to the argument of Ethnic Attractors, one of the main political functions of an ethnic group is to provide accessible political information to its members. The information is provided unintentionally and sometimes intentionally, whether or not there are ethnic parties. Consequently, the group is not simply a mobilizing vehicle for politicians but serves a function for its members.

Another set of related implications concerns political information other than for whom to vote. It is quite probable that if ethnic groups in new democracies do fulfill the information function of guiding their members in deciding for whom to vote, they also disperse other political information. One such set is information regarding proper voting procedures. In new democracies we should, therefore, expect inexperienced ethnic voters to be better informed about proper voting procedures sooner than the average inexperienced voter. We would also expect ethnic voters to make fewer voting mistakes than their nonethnic counterparts, and, as a result, rates of spoiled ballots should be lower in regions dominated by the ethnic group than in regions where the ethnic group is in the minority. This difference should also be manifested in comparisons of ethnically heterogeneous and homogeneous countries, controlling for national voting education and fraud, with the former adapting faster than the latter to proper voting procedures.

From the simple argument of Ethnic Attractors, we can deduce a number of additional implications. Answering some of the questions left by the machine politics literature, ethnic groups may be particularly salient constituencies for a political party as it is likely that, at least initially, the group will vote as a bloc. Because the best interests of the group can be defined in both programmatic and patronage terms, this holds true for both patronage and programmatic political parties. The group's allegiances, however, are not fixed to a party and can change over time if the ethnic discourse changes. Consequently, while we would expect the vote of an ethnic group to remain stable all else equal, changes such as increases in patronage offered by an opposing party might change the vote of the

group.[4] Furthermore, as long as the ethnic identity remains salient we would expect a cohesive change by most members of the group from one party to another.

The Ethnic Attractors argument can also help in answering questions regarding which types of parties we should expect to emerge in a system and whether those should be expected to include ethnic parties. To determine which types of parties to expect in a system, we have to consider the Ethnic Attractor argument in conjunction with what we know about institutional effects on voting.

According to Horowitz, "where parties divide exclusively along Left-Right lines or along nonideological lines determined by patronage patterns, that is an excellent indication that ethnic divisions are not salient"(1985, p. 303).[5] The empirical evidence, however, indicates that this is not necessarily so. For instance, in the United States the electoral system has produced two parties,[6] which organize along the Left-Right spectrum so as to maximize their voter appeal. Nevertheless, ethnicity was, and in some cases still is, a very salient political issue, as the preceding discussion of machine politics indicated. Moreover, despite saliency of the ethnic constituency, ethnic parties have in some cases been excluded, though not banned, from electoral participation (Birnir, 2004-a).

Furthermore, I believe this model is capable of generating some useful insights about expected development of new party systems that are not specifically about ethnic groups but are broader in scope. The most general implication of the first part of the model is that we should expect voting preferences in all new democracies initially to be volatile and to stabilize over time as party attachments develop. This insight is useful in two ways. First, where it is substantiated empirically, it explains the mechanism of party system stabilization that pertains to voter attachments. Equally interesting are the cases that do not conform to the empirical predictions of the model. For instance, many party systems in Latin

[4] Indeed, Chandra (2004) argues that ethnic party success in recruitment depends on the party's leaders' access to patronage.

[5] Horowitz (1985, p. 319) does concede that ethnic groups will tend to vote for their own either in an ethnic party or across party lines when there are no ethnic parties. Where there are ethnic parties, ethnic groups will vote for their ethnic party although that party may occasionally run members of other ethnic groups for political purposes. This does not explain, however, the reason for the rise of ethnic parties in some systems and not in others. Furthermore, it does not explain whom ethnic groups vote for in the absence of ethnic parties or candidates.

[6] On the effects of single-member districts on the party system, see Duverger (1954) and Riker (1986).

America remain highly volatile many years after democratization. In addition to the institutional explanations highlighted in Chapter Five, the model draws our attention to the programmatic differences between systems as an explanation of the differences in voter stability of preferences.

The more specific implication contained in the first part of the model (reduction of uncertainty when a group serves an information function) applies only to groups that can fulfill an information function, such as ethnic groups. It is possible that organizations that share some of the same features (difficult to suppress under authoritarian regimes, strong attachments) serve a similar function. A probable example under conditions that limit the size of the group are religious groups. Religion is also a cleavage that is passed on within the family and is difficult to regulate under an authoritarian regime. Chapter Seven demonstrated the importance of religion to voters in maturing democracies, but much more research is needed. It is possible, for instance, that religious cleavages reinforce, cross-cut, or parallel ethnic cleavages within a particular country. Depending on how ethnic and religious cleavages cross-cut or are reinforced in the population, the patterns of consequent vote behavior could yield some interesting observations.

The long-term implications of the model for democratic stability are more broadly applicable to a variety of groups. Generally speaking, supporters of any group that organizes around a predominant issue but never achieves representation in government through an issue-specific party are expected to migrate to other parties that represent the issue. Alternatively, the group is expected to drop out of politics and even become violent if the issue remains salient but is never picked up by any party that has access to government.

Examples of the first (migration from one party to another) abound. A couple of decades ago, for instance, issue-specific ecological parties (green parties) sprouted. Over the years, however, major parties have incorporated the ecological agenda into their own platforms. Ecologically minded voters seeking representation have in many cases migrated from the smaller issue-specific parties to the larger parties, where they may incur some policy cost through dilution of the issue in return for representation of the issue in government.[7]

[7] There are other interesting variants of this example. For instance, I believe the Icelandic Women's party's ineffectiveness in representation, even when the party had access to government, explains why the party rapidly lost the sizable constituency support it had the first time it ran.

There are not many issues, other than the ethnic issue, that remain salient but are not incorporated in some form into major party agendas and whose lack of representation would be expected to compel issue-specific groups to drop out of electoral politics. Even issues such as religion and ecology usually are represented by separate parties (religious parties, green parties) or picked up by non-issue-specific parties (the Christian Right in the Republican Party, the Catholics in the Democratic party, the ecological agenda of many major parties). Occasionally, however, the issue advocated by the group is sufficiently far from the political agenda of the median voter or the issue constituency is so small that no major parties incorporate it explicitly. If the institutional structure does not allow for representation through a minority party around the issue, one would expect these groups to drop out of politics in favor of extraconstitutional means. Examples include ecoterrorists in the United States, where neither party can represent ecoextremism without alienating a majority of its constituency and small groups of ecoextremists do not have another representational outlet.

In sum, the proposition of Ethnic Attractors, that ethnicity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for political behavior of ethnic groups, and the major implications of vote stability and peaceful ethnic politics as explained by access, are substantiated in this book. This simple argument is capable of generating many more testable implications and can even be extended in interesting ways to predict voting behavior of nonethnic constituencies. Thus, following the example of several good books, while this project answers some questions, it raises many more.

APPENDIX A

The Model (Formal Version)

The version of the model in this appendix is a general voting model. In Chapter Two I apply this model to ethnic groups to predict initial vote stability due to an informational advantage and long-term vote stability provided the group receives representation. I chose to leave the model in the form of a general voting model in this appendix to drive home the fact that it possibly offers interesting insights about voting by groups other than ethnic groups in new and maturing democracies.

DEFINITIONS

In this section I will first outline the complete model and define all the terms that will be used. Then I will proceed to "unpack" the model one expression at a time. The utility in voting for a particular party in a new democracy is the utility in choosing Z given X and Y or

$$U(Z|X, Y) = -\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2 - C.$$

Utility (U) refers to a cost-benefit calculation. If the cost is lower than the benefit, there is positive utility in voting for a particular party.

X represents a voter's policy preference.
Z denotes a party's policy preferences.
Y stands for the representative capability of the party, that is, the party's ability to enter the legislature to advocate policy and into the government to enact policy.

C is the cost and benefit of voting that is not associated with policy, such as getting to a place of polling and peer approval for engaging in the activity of voting.

The expressions of the model can be understood as follows:

$U(Z|X, Y)$ symbolizes the utility in voting for party Z given a voter's policy preference (X) and the policy cost associated with representation (Y).

The expression $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2$ indicates the policy benefit or cost associated with voting. This cost decreases and the benefit increases as policy preferences of the voter (X) and policy preferences of the party (Z) converge. This expression will evolve in three ways. First, when the party's policy preferences (Z) are closer to the voter's policy preferences (X) than the policy preferences of any other party, there are no policy costs to the voter (X) in voting for the party (Z). Second, when there is great uncertainty about the party's policy preferences (Z), there are potentially high policy costs involved in voting for that party. Such high uncertainty will be called τ^2. (The term τ^2, as with other cost terms in Greek notation that I use for simplification, is squared to eliminate negative signs in order to facilitate calculations.) Third, when policy preferences of the party (Z) are known, costs to a voter associated with uncertainty about policy preferences of the party are negligible. Such negligible uncertainty will be called σ^2.

The expression $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2$ stands for the utility calculation associated with representative capabilities of the party. The cost decreases and the benefit increases as the representative capabilities (Y) of the party (Z) increase. This expression will also evolve in three ways. When the party (Z) is more representative of the voter's preferred policies (Y) than any other party, then there are no policy costs of representation associated with voting for the party (Z). Second, when the policy preferences of the party (Z) diverge from the policies that the voter wants represented (Y), but the party (Z) is representative (enters the legislature and government), the voter incurs moderate policy costs of representation if he votes for the party (Z). I will call such moderate costs α^2. Third, when the party (Z) is unable to represent the policies that the voter wants represented (Y), the voter incurs high costs if he votes for the party (Z). I will call such high costs ϕ^2. In this model, costs associated with policy divergence between a representative party's policy and a voter's preferred policy are lower than costs associated with the party's failure to represent the voter ($\phi^2 > \alpha^2$).

POLICY PROXIMITY AND VARIANCE

A voter's basic quadratic utility in voting for any party on the basis of policy preference is the utility of choosing Z, given X that is

$$U(Z|X) = -\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2.$$

The quadratic utility function demonstrates that the voter's utility in supporting party Z is greatest when the voter's policy preferences (X) are perfectly aligned with the party's policy preferences (Z) and decreases as the voter's policy preference moves further away to either side from the party's policy preference (Z). The reason for including –1/2 in the utility calculation is twofold. First, it makes intuitive sense as this term inverts the quadratic curve, and second, it facilitates later calculations.[1]

Assuming a two-party system, I call the spatial policy location of the two parties Z_L for party left and Z_R for party right. In the text, party left is the ethnic party. I maintain the notation of party left and right in this appendix to demonstrate that the model was originally written as a general voting model for new democracies and then applied to ethnic groups. In a two-party system then, the policy benefit to a voter expressed in $-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2$ is greatest when the party's (Z) policy proximity to the voter with respect to the other party is at least at the middle of the policy space between the two parties $(Z_L + Z_R)/2$ or closer. Mathematically speaking, the policy benefit is greatest when the two policies, party policy (Z) and voter's policy preferences (X), are identical, so that the expression $-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2$ equals 0 or when

$$-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2 = -\tfrac{1}{2}\left(\tfrac{Z_L+Z_R}{2} - \tfrac{Z_L+Z_R}{2}\right)^2.$$

A complicating factor in new democracies is that parties have no established legislative track records. Taking the expectation (E) of the utility function $-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2$ allows me to account for this uncertainty. The expectation is akin to the average, which is the reference point for the variance that accounts for the amount of uncertainty in the voter's mind about a party's policy position. To facilitate calculation of the variance we can insert $E(Z) - E(Z)$ into the equation because $E(Z) - E(Z) = 0$. Therefore, when I expand (calculate) the expectation of the equation $-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2$, I am really expanding $-\tfrac{1}{2}E(Z - E(Z) + E(Z) - X)^2$.

[1] This includes further calculations that I do not perform here, such as taking derivatives.

Consequently, the expectation of the utility equation of voting for the party Z can be written as

$$-\tfrac{1}{2}E(Z-X)^2 = -\tfrac{1}{2}E(Z-E(Z))^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(E(Z)-X)^2.$$

Simplifying the expression,

$$-\tfrac{1}{2}E(Z-E(Z))^2 = -\tfrac{1}{2}Var(Z).$$

Thus, the final and more explicit expression of the voter's initial utility equation including the variance is

$$-\tfrac{1}{2}E(Z-X)^2 = -\tfrac{1}{2}Var(Z) - \tfrac{1}{2}(E(Z)-X)^2.$$

Here the expression $-\frac{1}{2}(E(Z)-X)^2$ refers to the voter's expectation about the proximity of the policy of the party (Z) and the voter's own policy preference (X). The expression $-\frac{1}{2}Var(Z)$, in turn, refers to the variance of the voter's beliefs around the true policy position of the party (Z). This variance is expected to decrease over time as parties establish reputations.

In sum, therefore, this equation,

$$-\tfrac{1}{2}E(Z-X)^2 = -\tfrac{1}{2}Var(Z) - \tfrac{1}{2}(E(Z)-X)^2,$$

tells us that a voter's expected utility in voting for party (Z) is determined by the expression $-\frac{1}{2}(E(Z)-X)^2$, which denotes policy proximity of the party (Z) to the voter's policy preferences (X), and the expression $-\frac{1}{2}Var(Z)$, which represents the closeness of the voter's beliefs about the party position to the true party policy position. For convenience in interpretation, I denote a low variance ($-\frac{1}{2}Var(Z)$) or a little uncertainty in voter's beliefs about party policy preferences with σ^2 and a high variance ($-\frac{1}{2}Var(Z)$) or great uncertainty about party policies with τ^2. Furthermore, in terms of costs ($\tau^2 > \sigma^2$), high variance in beliefs about a party's policy preferences (τ^2) is potentially more costly to the voter than low variance in beliefs about a party's policy preferences (σ^2), because if the voter is wrong about a party's policy preferences that she does not know much about, she could inadvertently vote for a party that does not represent her policy preferences (X) very well.

REPRESENTATION

Building on Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968), a more accurate description of a voter's utility calculation accounts for the policy

benefit associated with representation,[2] here defined as *Y*, as well as the exogenous cost-benefit calculation[3] suggested by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) that is shared by all voters and not related to policy, here defined as *C*.

Thus, the voter's utility calculation or the utility of choosing *Z*, given *X* and *Y*, is

$$U(Z|X, Y) = -\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2 - C,$$

where *Y* stands for the policy costs associated with representation and *C* denotes costs and benefits associated with voting that are not related to policy. The party's policy position (*Z*) is, of course, essential to both parts of the equation, as it clarifies the party's policy position (*Z*) in relation to the voter's policy position (*X*) in the first expression of the equation $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2$, and the party's representative capabilities (*Y*) in relation to its policy position (*Z*) in the second expression of the equation $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2$.

The representative utility to the voter, represented by the expression $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2$ in voting for party *Z*, changes according to the extent to which the party policy (*Z*) represents the voter's policy preferences and the ability of the party to access all levels of government to represent the voter's policy preferences. The quadratic utility demonstrates that the voter's utility is the greatest when the party's policy (*Z*) is identical to the voter's policy preferences and the party is able to represent the voter's policy preferences (*Y*) at all stages, from advocacy through enactment of policy. Mathematically speaking, the greatest utility in representation to the voter occurs when $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2$ equals 0, or when

$$-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2 = -\tfrac{1}{2}\left(\tfrac{Z_L + Z_R}{2} - \tfrac{Z_L + Z_R}{2}\right)^2,$$

because at that point there are no representational costs.

Moderate costs of representation $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2$ as a result of policy divergence are called α^2. Furthermore, if the party is unable to represent the voter, the costs associated with voting for that party are high, and I will call such high costs ϕ^2. Finally, moderate costs are lower than high costs $(\alpha^2 < \phi^2)$.

[2] This is the *B*P* term articulated by Riker and Ordeshook.
[3] This is the *C-D* term articulated by Riker and Ordeshook.

The expectation (E) of the new utility function of voting for party Z given X (policy preference) and Y (representation preference), and including C (voting cost and benefit that are not associated with policy) is

$$E(U(Z \mid X, Y)) = E[-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2 - C].$$

Again the expression $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - X)^2$ denotes benefits associated with policy proximity of (Z) to the voter's policy preferences (X) and the expression $-\frac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2$ stands for the representative capabilities (Y) of the party with respect to the party's policy position (Z).

Taking (calculating) the expectation of the utility gives us

$$\begin{aligned}
E(U) &= E[-\tfrac{1}{2}((Z - X)(Z - X)) - \tfrac{1}{2}((Z - Y)(Z - Y)) - C] \\
&= E[-\tfrac{1}{2}((Z - E[Z] + E[Z] - X)(Z - E[Z] + E[Z] - X)) \\
&\quad -\tfrac{1}{2}((Z - E[Z] + E[Z] - Y)(Z - E[Z] + E[Z] - Y)) - C] \\
&= E[-\tfrac{1}{2}((Z - E[Z])^2 + (2(Z - E[Z])(E[Z] - X)) \\
&\quad + (E[Z] - X)^2) - \tfrac{1}{2}((Z - E[Z])^2 + (2(Z - E[Z])(E[Z] - Y)) \\
&\quad + (E[Z] - Y)^2) - C] \\
&= E[-\tfrac{1}{2}(Z - E[Z])^2 - (Z - E[Z])(E[Z] - X) \\
&\quad - \tfrac{1}{2}(X - E[Z])^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(Z - E[Z])^2 - (Z - E[Z])(E[Z] - Y) \\
&\quad - \tfrac{1}{2}(Y - E[Z])^2 - C] \\
&= E[-(Z - E[Z])^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(X - E[Z])^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(Y - E[Z])^2 - C] \\
&\quad [\text{because} \quad E(E(Z - E[Z])) = E(Z) - E(Z) = 0] \\
&= E[-(Z - E[Z])^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(X^2 - 2XE[Z] + E[Z]^2) \\
&\quad -\tfrac{1}{2}(Y^2 - 2YE[Z] + E[Z]^2) - C] \\
&= E[-(Z - E[Z])^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}X^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}Y^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}(-2XE[Z] \\
&\quad + E[Z]^2) - \tfrac{1}{2}(-2YE[Z] + E[Z]^2) - C] \\
&= -Var(Z) + (X + Y)E[Z] - E[Z]^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}X^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}Y^2 - C
\end{aligned}$$

In sum, therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
E(U(Z|X, Y)) &= (X + Y)E[Z] - Var(Z) - E[Z]^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}X^2 \\
&\quad - \tfrac{1}{2}Y^2 - C,
\end{aligned}$$

which is the form of the equation that I will use in the following discussion.

VOTING CHOICES

In an environment of uncertainty in a new democracy, how does a voter decide to vote for party left (Z_L) as opposed to party right (Z_R) when the party policies appear equally appealing because both are fairly vague

and the voter has little information? According to the utility definition, she should vote for party left (Z_L) when the utility of Z_L (choosing a left party), given X and Y, is greater than the utility of Z_R (choosing a right party), given X and Y. Mathematically speaking she should vote for party left (Z_L) when

$$U(Z_L|X, Y) > U(Z_R|X, Y).$$

Or, using the form of the equation stated previously, she should vote for party left (Z_L) when

$$(X+Y)E[Z_L] - Var(Z_L) - E[Z_L]^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}X^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}Y^2 - C >$$

$$(X+Y)E[Z_R] - Var(Z_R) - E[Z_R]^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}X^2 - \tfrac{1}{2}Y^2 - C.$$

After canceling the terms that are the same on the left and the right, this inequality can be rearranged to

$$(X+Y)(E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]) > Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R) + E[Z_L]^2 - E[Z_R]^2,$$

or

$$(X+Y) < \frac{Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R)}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]} + \frac{E[Z_L]^2 - E[Z_R]^2}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]}$$

and using that $a + b = (a^2 - b^2)/(a - b)$

$$(X+Y) < E[Z_L] + E[Z_R] + \frac{Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R)}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]}.$$

Furthermore, this last inequality can be rearranged to read

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} + \frac{Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R)}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]} - Y.$$

Therefore, according to this last inequality the voter should vote for party left (Z_L), when her policy preferences (X) minus the expression, $(E[Z_L] + E[Z_R])/2$, which denotes the policy middle between the two parties left (Z_L) and right (Z_R), is smaller than (to the left of) the policy middle $(E[Z_L] + E[Z_R])/2$, plus the uncertainty about the true policy positions of the two parties represented by the expression $(Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R))/(E[Z_L] - E[Z_R])$, minus the cost associated with the representative capabilities (Y) of the party for which she votes.

VOTING IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

Early on then, a voter should vote for party left (Z_L) whenever her preferred policy package is

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} + \frac{Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R)}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]} - Y.$$

However, representative potentials of any party (Y) are unclear early on. Therefore, costs associated with representation, determined by the expression $\frac{1}{2}(Z - Y)^2$, are initially negligible and equal among voters. As a result, early on we can drop Y from the interpretation to say that the voter should really continue voting for party left (Z_L) when

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} + \frac{Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R)}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]}$$

that is, when her policy preference (X) minus the policy middle $(E[Z_L] + E[Z_R])/2$ is left of the policy middle $(E[Z_L] + E[Z_R])/2$ plus the uncertainty in her beliefs about the parties' policy positions $(Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R))/(E[Z_L] - E[Z_R])$.

Thus, choosing to vote for party left (Z_L) over party right (Z_R) is a matter of the voter's policy preference (X) and how much she knows about party left's (Z_L) policy package when compared to party right's (Z_R) policy package.

Where representative capabilities of parties are generally unknown, a voter who, because of lack of information, knows nothing about either party so that the difference in the uncertainty cost associated with picking one party over another is low,

$$\frac{Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R)}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]} = \frac{\tau_L^2 - \tau_R^2}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]} = \sigma^2$$

or even 0,[4] will originally pick party left (Z_L), because she thinks that party best represents her interests because her policy preferences (X) are somewhere left of the middle. In the long run, however, as party policies are established she may find that her choice was an error and she is likely to switch parties.

To the contrary, she should vote consistently for party left (Z_L) whenever there is less uncertainty (variance) about the policy positions of party left (Z_L) than the policy positions of party right (Z_R). Stated in mathematical terms, lower variance about party left's

[4] The assumption here is that the two high uncertainties τ_L^2 and τ_R^2 are roughly equivalent.

policy (Z_L) than party right's policy (Z_R) contributes a high overall variance cost to the model because

$$\frac{Var(Z_L) - Var(Z_R)}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]} = \frac{\sigma_L^2 - \tau_R^2}{E[Z_L] - E[Z_R]} = \tau^2$$

The greater the uncertainty about the policy position of party right (Z_R), the closer the voter's true preferences (X) can move toward the right to the true policy position party right (Z_R), while the voter's utility still remains higher by voting for party left (Z_L). This result is caused by the fact that as a result of the higher variance (τ^2) around the policy preferences of party right (Z_R), voting for it could leave the voter with party policies further from her preference than anything she would get from voting for party left (Z_L).

As the voter's true policy preferences move right of middle, her utility calculation in voting for party left (Z_L) in the short term while variance in her beliefs about party right's (Z_R) policies is still greater than her beliefs about party left's (Z_L) policies, is

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} + \tau^2 - \alpha^2,$$

because as the distance between her preferred policy position (X) and the policy position of the party she is voting for (Z_L) increases, the policy cost associated with representation (Y) changes from being negligible (and dropped from the model) to moderate (α^2) as the true representative capabilities of all parties are still unknown. Therefore, it becomes increasingly costly for her to vote for party left (Z_L) as her policy changes. This change in utility puts a limit on how far right her policy preferences can move while she retains utility from voting for (Z_L).

VOTING IN MATURING DEMOCRACIES

Over time, true party policy preferences (Z) and a party's ability to represent the voter at all stages of the legislative game (Y) become increasingly clear and the variance in voters' beliefs about the parties decreases. Over time, therefore, there is less uncertainty (σ^2) about the policy positions of all parties. For practical purposes then, the utility calculation that determines whether the voter continues to vote for party left (Z_L) or switches to party right (Z_R) is

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} + \sigma^2 - Y.$$

Because the variance in the voter's beliefs about party policy positions (σ^2) becomes negligible and equal for all over time, we can also write this utility as

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} - Y.$$

When true policy preferences of all parties are known and the aggregate policy of party left (Z_L) is the closest to the voter's policy preferences of any party that is running at the policy middle $(Z_L + Z_R)/2$ or closer, and when Y is a policy of the middle $(Z_L + Z_R)/2$ or closer and is represented in government, then costs associated with representation (Y) are virtually none. In such cases, the voter's decision about whether to continue voting for party left (Z_L) can also be written as

$$X < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2}.$$

In other words, when there is low uncertainty about all parties' policies and the party left (Z_L) is at least as representative as any other party, the voter should continue to vote for party left (Z_L) as long as the voter's true policy preferences (X) are anywhere left of the policy middle $(E[Z_L] + E[Z_R])/2$.

If the voter's policy preferences change, or if the policy preferences of the party left (Z_L) change so that the two become less aligned but the party is still as representative as any other party, the voter's costs in voting for that party increase. Then, as discussed, the policy costs of representation (Y) change from none ($(E[Z_L] + E[Z_R])/2$) to moderate (α^2), and the voter's utility calculation for the benefit of continued voting for party left (Z_L) under conditions of policy certainty is

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} - \alpha^2.$$

In a two-party system, this means that the voter's true policy preferences (X) must move left for her to retain benefits from voting for party left (Z_L) rather than switching to voting for party right (Z_R). Finally, if party right (Z_R) becomes more representative and party left (Z_L) becomes less representative, the cost associated with continued voting for party left (Z_L) increases significantly to high (ϕ^2). In that case the voter's utility in continuing to vote for party left (Z_L) changes to

$$X - \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} < \frac{E[Z_L] + E[Z_R]}{2} - \phi^2.$$

TABLE A.1. *Testable implications: Costs associated with the ethnic voter's (party left) electoral choice as determined by ethnic issue salience and representative capabilities of parties*

Representative capabilities of party (Is it able to enact policy?)	**Ethnic issue salient (Ethnic party on average closer to the ethnic voter's policy preferences)**	**Ethnic issue decreasing or no salience (Nonethnic parties on average closer to the ethnic voter's average policy preferences)**
Z_L representative and	$X < M + \sigma^2$	$X - M < M + \sigma^2 - \alpha^2$
Z_R not representative	$M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2 > X - M$	$M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2 > X - M$
Z_L representative and	$X < M + \sigma^2$	$X - M < M + \sigma^2 - \alpha^2$
Z_R representative	$M + \sigma^2 - \alpha^2 > X - M$	$M + \sigma^2 > X$
Z_L not representative and	$X - M < M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2$	$X - M < M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2$
Z_R representative	$M + \sigma^2 - \alpha^2 > X - M$	$M + \sigma^2 > X$
Z_L not representative and	$X - M < M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2$	$X - M < M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2$
Z_R not representative	$M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2 > X - M$	$M + \sigma^2 - \phi^2 > X - M$

Note: In the utility equations ($M = \mathrm{E}[Z_L] + \mathrm{E}[Z_R])/2$ or the policy middle.

The reader will recall that $\phi^2 > \alpha^2$, that is, the costs associated with lack of representation are greater than the costs associated with incongruence between the true policy preferences of the voter (X) and the true policy preferences of the party (Z). Thus, as the cost in voting for a less representative party increases (ϕ^2), the policy preferences of the voter must continue to move quite far left to retain any benefit from voting for party left (Z_L). Eventually, therefore, the policy preferences of the voter will move left beyond the policy space occupied by party left (Z_L). At that point the voter bears extremely high costs and gets no policy or representational benefits from voting for party left (Z_L). If there are parties further to the left of party left (Z_L) one would expect the voter to switch allegiances to a far left party. The noteworthy implication here is that the impetus to switch parties is stronger when party left (Z_L) is not representative than when party left (Z_L) is simply dealigned with the voter's policy preference. In the two-party system defined here, however, the assumption is that there are no parties to the left. Therefore, when party left (Z_L) is not representative, it is not clear that the voter should continue voting at all.

Table A.1 summarizes voters' options over time with respect to costs involved in voting for party left and party right over time as determined by policy and representation. The table reflects the fact that when party left is not representative but other parties are, the voter's utility expectation changes from greater utility in voting for party left (Z_L) to a greater utility obtained when voting for party right (Z_R) or $E(U(Z_L \mid X, Y)) < E(U(Z_R \mid X, Y))$, because costs associated with voting for a nonrepresentative party left (Z_L) are higher than voting for a representative party right (Z_R), even when ethnic voter policy preference (X) is further away from the party right (Z_R) policy than the party left (Z_L) policy. Mathematically speaking, $\phi_L^2 > \alpha_R^2$.

APPENDIX B

Measurements and Other Methods Issues

TESTS OF VOTE STABILITY IN CHAPTERS FIVE AND SEVEN

There is little consensus as to what makes a democracy. The meaning of the word varies from Huntington's (1991) definition, which hinges on a popular election of the executive and suffrage of half of all adult males, to Diamond's (1996) description of liberal democracies, which includes conditions such as a free and independent press, political equality of citizens, and multiple and ongoing channels and means of expressing interests.[1] Because the objective of this book is to gauge the effects of the voting behavior of particular social groups on the development of new party systems, it is imperative that all members of society are allowed to participate freely and that elections are competitive,[2] free and fair. Therefore, I include all new procedural democracies that are considered free and fair by international observers.[3] *New* refers to any newly established democracy,

[1] There are many other definitions of democracy. For instance, Linz defines a system as democratic "when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule" (1975).

[2] While elections in Fiji from 1960 to 1997 and in Cyprus from 1960 are perhaps free and fair they are not really competitive. Both countries divided legislative seats (and in Cyprus composition of the government) precisely between ethnic groups with no additional competitive seats. Consequently, I exclude these cases. Fiji is included for the test of access in Chapter Seven from 1997 when a new constitution allowed for sufficiently many competitive seats that control of the legislature was not foreordained.

[3] Substantial fraud excludes countries such as Kyrgizstan in 1995 and 2000 and Mali in 1991 and 1997. I also acknowledge that the fairness of elections in some of the included

whether the previous authoritarian regime resulted from domestic events or foreign control.[4]

In addition, the country must have universal suffrage without significant restrictions such as gender or literacy requirements.[5] The reason for this last criterion is that the very ethnic populations that are the subject of interest here often have been excluded from democratic participation through a variety of suffrage requirements. Such requirements often coincide with economic class, and ethnic populations in many cases have constituted the very economic class most excluded by these requirements.

Geddes (2003) classifies regimes as authoritarian if the ruling party continually wins two-thirds or more of the seats in the legislature. If, however, I apply this rule to the selection criteria here for first elections I exclude a number of countries and elections that commonly are thought of as democratic. These include first elections after democratization in India and Costa Rica, Greece in 1974, early elections in Jamaica, and all elections in Botswana and Gambia. It is admittedly difficult to determine whether a party that holds a supermajority is truly democratic because of that party's ability to change the rules of the game to favor itself. Nevertheless, country experts have deemed elections in all of these countries free and fair. Therefore, following Przeworski (1991), I include all countries where a change of power has taken place. This includes countries such as India and Costa Rica even though a few elections breach the two-thirds

countries is still debatable. One example is Georgia, where the freedom and fairness of democratic elections has fluctuated significantly.

[4] This rule excludes democracies where suffrage was extended gradually and democracies where opposition parties entered gradually into electoral competition without an abrupt change in the party system in the tests of vote stability. These countries include Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Guyana, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, Senegal (where there has only been one clearly democratic election), Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States of America. However, democracies such as South Africa, where the great majority of parties were new in the very first election after the extension of voting rights in 1994, are included. It is worth iterating that this condition does not apply to the test of access. Furthermore, Geddes argues that including authoritarian periods of less than 3 years introduces significant misclassification (2003, p. 70). Consequently, I follow her lead in not counting authoritarian periods of less than 3 years as breaks in democracy. This affects, for example, the number of democratic periods counted in Turkey and Peru.

[5] By this rule, countries such as Brazil from 1945 to 1984, Australia, and Switzerland are excluded, as these countries employed stringent literacy and other requirements that excluded illiterates, the indigenous, or women from participation until much later than other parts of the population.

rule. In turn, I exclude Botswana and Gambia, the two countries where the ruling party has received two-thirds of seats or more in every election since democratization.[6]

Two elections are required because the volatility of electoral preferences is denoted by a shift in votes for parties from one election to the next.[7] Constituent assemblies are included as first elections as long as the election to the assembly followed all of the requirements.[8] Generally, a country must be independent for the election to be included.[9]

Finally, I only include countries that were populated by over half a million people in 2003. The reason for the restriction in size is consistency. The Minorities at Risk data that I use in Chapter Seven exclude countries with populations under half a million. Table B.1 summarizes the case selection criteria used in Chapters Five and Seven in the tests of ethnic electoral behavior, and Table B.2 lists excluded electoral democracies and the reason each was excluded.

The last issue concerns which votes and which parties to count. One of the objectives of Chapters Five and Seven is to examine the effect of ethnic voting behavior on party system development. Therefore, it would make the most sense to count all votes for all parties, even if some of the parties participated in one election only and received no seats in the legislature. Unfortunately, however, comprehensive electoral data for new democracies are extremely difficult to get. In some cases, most notably in Africa and Asia and even in some Latin American cases, country specialists themselves have not been able to assemble comprehensive electoral data.

[6] Including Botswana and Gambia in the analysis does not change the results substantively.

[7] Although this rule appears trivial, it does exclude countries such as Lebanon, Niger, Serbia-Montenegro, and Sierra Leone.

[8] For instance, elections to the French constituent assembly immediately after World War II are included. Similarly, elections to the constituent assembly in Nicaragua in 1984 are included.

[9] By this rule, for example, the first elections in occupied Latvia and Estonia are excluded. This rule also excludes Taiwan. The exceptions to this rule are Jamaica, because the country achieved autonomy significantly earlier and the assembly remained unmodified after independence, and first elections in Mauritius, Namibia, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Slovakia, because shortly before independence all held multiparty elections to an assembly that remained largely unmodified after independence (seat numbers in the assembly changed in Croatia and Georgia before the following election). Furthermore, first elections in Poland, where the Soviet Union supported the dominant party and which elected only a part of the assembly and thus were more of a referendum on democracy than regular elections, are excluded.

TABLE B.1. *Case inclusion criteria for a national level test of the relationship between ethnic diversity and vote stability*

Period	New democracy after a break when regime was either changed from an authoritarian regime to democracy or gained independence after foreign control
Parties	Multiparty competitive elections; if dominant party consistently retains two-thirds of seats, the country is excluded
Number of elections	Two elections are necessary to calculate volatility
Nondemocratic interruptions	Two consecutive elections without interruption, such as a coup, must be held
Suffrage	Universal male and female suffrage without restrictions such as literacy requirements
Constituent assembly	Included as long as there is full suffrage, and elections to it are multiparty and competitive
Free and fair	If international community through journals and other accounts assesses elections as fraudulent, then they are excluded
Independence/ autonomy	Required unless all seats are contested in an independent national assembly that remains unmodified after independence
Which votes	Ideally all votes for all parties, both those that gain representation and those that do not; because of unavailability of data this iteration includes only votes for parties that have held seats after either election
Population	Countries with population over 0.5 million (MAR criteria)

TABLE B.2. *Electoral democracies excluded for the tests of ethnic electoral behavior in Chapters Four and Seven*

Electoral democracies	**Reason for exclusion**
Andorra	Population too small
Australia	Not a new democracy
Bahamas	Population too small
Barbados	Population too small
Belgium	Not a new democracy
Belize	Population too small
Botswana	Two-thirds rule breached continuously
Cape Verde	Population too small
Colombia	No break
Denmark	Not a new democracy
Dominica	Population too small

(*continued*)

TABLE B.2 *(continued)*

Electoral democracies	Reason for exclusion
Fiji	No break
Finland	Not a new democracy
The Gambia	Two-thirds rule breached continuously
Grenada	Population too small
Guyana	No break
Iceland	Population too small and not a new democracy
Ireland	Not a new democracy
Kiribati	Population too small
Lebanon	Only one election since democracy
Liechtenstein	Population too small and not a new democracy
Luxembourg	Population too small and not a new democracy
Mali	One clearly democratic election only
Malta	Population too small
Marshall Islands	Population too small
Mexico	No break
Micronesia	Population too small
Nauru	Population too small
Netherlands	Not a new democracy
New Zealand	Not a new democracy
Niger	Not two consecutive democratic elections
Norway	Not a new democracy
Palau	Population too small
Samoa	Population too small
San Marino	Population too small
Sao Tome and Principe	Population too small
Senegal	No break; only one clearly democratic election
Seychelles	Population too small
Sierra Leone	Not two consecutive democratic elections
St. Kitts and Nevis	Population too small
St. Lucia	Population too small
Solomon Islands	Population too small
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Population too small
Suriname	Population too small
Sweden	Not a new democracy
Switzerland	Not a new democracy
Taiwan	Not an independent state
Tuvalu	Population too small
United Kingdom	Not a new democracy
United States of America	Not a new democracy
Vanuatu	Population too small
Yugoslavia	Now Serbia and Montenegro; not two consecutive democratic elections

Therefore, to maintain consistency, I have only included votes for parties[10] that have received seats in either election in a pair of elections.[11]

Volatility

To distinguish between real electoral volatility and volatility of the party system or legislature, it is necessary to trace the origin of all parties and

[10] For the same reason (lack of reliable data) volatilities are calculated without accounting for votes for independents. I also calculated volatilities accounting for votes for independent candidates as one group and ran the regressions with this alternative dependent variable. The results were substantively the same. Any votes and/or seats classified as "other" are excluded from the calculations because of missing information.

[11] While good data exist for tracing volatilities in most countries there were some holes in the data. First, in some cases data for a few seats or a small vote percentage were missing. For those cases I calculated volatilities without the missing data. I set the threshold for calculating volatilities at data not being missing for more than 5 percent of seats. These countries include Bangladesh 2001 – vote percentages missing for JD-M and BKSJL (1 seat each), Bosnia 1998 – vote percentage missing for Social Democrats of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Costa Rica 1974 – vote percentage missing for PRN Independiente (1 seat); Croatia 1990 – vote percentage missing for HKDS (2 seats); Croatia 1992 – vote percentage missing for SNS (3 seats); Croatia 1995 – vote percentages missing for HKDU (1 seat), SNS (2 seats), DZMH (1 seat); Croatia 2000 – vote percentages missing for SNS and DZMH (1 seat each); Israel 1955 – vote percentage missing for Poalei Agudat Israel (2 seats); Israel 1959 – vote percentage missing for Poalei Agudat Israel (2 seats); Mauritius 2000 – vote percentage missing for OPR (3 seats); Pakistan 1988 – vote percentages missing for PDP (1 seat), JUI(D) (1 seat), BNA (2 seats); Pakistan 1990 – vote percentage missing for PKMAP (1 seat); Pakistan 1993 – vote percentages missing for JWP (2 seats) and BNM(H), BNM(M), NDA, NPP(K), and PKQP (1 seat each); Pakistan 1997 – vote percentage missing for JWP (0 seats), PNP (2 seats), and NPP(K) (1 seat); Panama 1999 – not sure whether CD won 2 seats or no seats; Peru 1990 – vote percentage missing for FIM (7 seats).

The second category was cases where data for more than 5 percent of seats were missing. Those cases are excluded from calculation of the dependent variable with independents, or both dependent variables, depending on what data were missing. They are Argentina 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 – seat numbers or vote percentages missing for at least one party in all elections; Bangladesh 2001 – vote percentage missing for Independents; Benin 1999 – vote percentage missing for IPD (4 seats), Car-DUNYA (3 seats), MERCI (2 seats), Etoile (4 seats); Bosnia 1996 – vote percentages missing for all parties; Croatia 2003 – seat numbers missing for HSP, vote percentage missing for SDSS (3 seats) and nonpartisans (4 seats); Ecuador 2002 – vote percentage missing for all parties; Georgia 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999 – vote percentage missing for Independents; Ghana 2004 – vote percentage missing for all parties; Guinea-Bissau 1999 – vote percentage missing for all parties; Madagascar 1993, 1998 – vote percentage missing for all parties; Mongolia 1990 – vote percentage missing for Independents; Papua New Guinea 2002 – vote percentage missing for all parties; Philippines 1992 – vote percentage missing for Government Coalition (1 seat), PMP (1 seat), Opposition Coalition (8 seats), KBL (4 seats), Independents (7 seats); Philippines 2001 – vote percentage missing for all parties; Ukraine 2002 – vote percentage missing for Independents.

coalitions competing in each election in each country. Consequently, for parties that split between elections, the votes for all the offspring in the first election after the split are compared to the vote for the mother party in the previous election in order to assess the amount of change. In the second election after a split from a mother party, the changes in the offspring votes are measured separately. For parties that joined coalitions, the vote in the election before the coalition was formed for all the individual parties that later joined the coalition is compared with the aggregate vote for the coalition. In the second election after the coalition was formed, the change in vote is measured for the coalition between elections. If parties split from the coalition, their volatility is measured with reference to the earlier coalition vote in the first election after the split, but separately thereafter.[12]

CHAPTER SEVEN

The second half of Chapter Seven examines ethnic political integration into the state as measured through access to the national legislature and the executive, and its consequences as measured through expression of ethnic protest and even violence. The scope of the book is electoral politics in democracies. Thus, with two exceptions, all the same restrictions on democracy that were defined for the tests of ethnic electoral behavior apply to the tests of the effect of ethnic access in this chapter. The exceptions are that this test does not require that the democracy be new nor that two elections have ocurred.

Chapter Two defined an ethnic group as any group that defines itself as such in contrast to other groups, centering on a characteristic that is difficult or impossible to change. The tests of ethnic electoral behavior in Chapters Five and Seven used Alesina and colleagues' (2003) operational definition of ethnicity as expressed through the indexes of linguistic/racial, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. In contrast, the test of the effect of ethnic access in Chapter Seven adopts MAR's operational definition

[12] Another data problem is insufficient information for tracing when there is little information available about the parties themselves. As I explained in Chapter Three this poses a potentially serious problem for tracing volatilities and I have excluded those cases. They include Argentina 1993–95, 95–97, 97–99, 99–2001; Benin 1999–2003; Bolivia 1997–2002; France 1951–56, 56–58 (in both, especially UDCA); Georgia 1990–92; Ghana 1992–96 (especially NPP); Indonesia 1999–2004; Italy 1994–96, 96–2002; Papua New Guinea 1997–2002; Philippines 1995–98, 98–2001.

of ethnic groups as outlined in the description of the data.[13] So as not to select on the dependent variable of intransigence, the test necessarily includes both groups that show signs of intransigence (protest and/or violence) and those that do not.

Table B.3 describes the MAR inclusion criteria and the additional criteria used in this book. As the table shows, only groups in countries with a population over half a million and where the ethnic group itself had a population larger than 100,000 (or 1 percent of the country population) are included. In addition, the groups must meet at least one of the following criteria for inclusion: The group "collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-á-vis other groups in a society; and/or collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests." (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a, p. 5). The theoretical constraints for the causal test outlined previously add the requirements that the country is democratic, and that the group defines itself as an ethnic group, is electorally active, and participates in national elections.[14]

[13] The reader will recall that chapters Two and Seven distinguish between ethnic majorities that are internally divided into multiple ethnic groups and unified majorities that I consider nationalist groups. Along the same lines MAR breaks majorities such as the black population in South Africa into Zulus and Xhosa, for example, and Bolivias indigenous into Lowland and Highland indigenous peoples. Other unified majorities that consider themselves ethnic such as Flemings in Belgium are also excluded from the MAR data. To the contrary, MAR includes Serbs in Serbia-Montenegro. Since this group is a unified majority I exclude them. Melanesian Fijians (or native Fijians) are also included in MAR as an electorally active group. Since the early 1990s this group is a demographic majority in Fiji and thus excluded.

[14] To ensure that the group really is electorally active at the national level I only accept strong evidence of electoral activity, that is, classification by MAR that the group is electorally active and my verification of national electoral activity either through an ethnic party or a reliable account of representation through a non-ethnic party. If the group is classified as electorally inactive by MAR I take participation in national elections with a separate ethnic party as evidence that the group is mobilized to contest elections. Consequently, my count of expected "frustration" begins when A) MAR classifies the group as electorally active and I find evidence of this activity at the national level through electoral participation of ethnic parties or representation by non ethnic parties or B) MAR classifies the group as electorally inactive but I find an ethnic party running in national elections. For example, MAR classifies Chittagong Hill Tribes in Bangladesh as electorally active through the People's Solidarity Organization since before the first competitive elections in 1991. I find no evidence of national electoral participation by this group. In 2001, however, the government appointed Moni Swapan Dewan deputy minister for Chittagong Hill Tract affairs. I take this as evidence of national electoral activity and begin counting then. MAR classifies Russians in Estonia as electorally active from 1991. Because I don't have prior evidence of Russian representation through nonethnic parties I begin the count at 1995, which is the first time I find evidence of a national Russian party. Similarly, the Assamese, Mizos, Nagas, and Scheduled Tribes in India are classified

TABLE B.3. *Case selection criteria for the test of the effects of ethnic access in Chapter Seven*

MAR inclusion criteria		Additional inclusion criteria for the test in this chapter	
1	Population in country numbers at least 0.5 million	1	Country is democratic
2	Minority group numbers at least 100,000 or 1% of country population	2	Minority group defines itself as an ethnic group
3: Group satisfies at least *one* of the following conditions		3	Minority group is electorally active (fields or supports a political party)
A and/or	Group is at present subject to discrimination	4	Minority group participates in *national* elections
B and/or	Group is disadvantaged because of past discrimination		
C and/or	Group is an advantaged minority		
D	Group supports political organizations advocating greater group rights		

An accurate assessment of the effects of electoral access on ethnic protest and violence mandates that the analysis be conducted on the complete universe of electorally active groups in democracies. Table B.4 highlights some of the concerns associated with the inferences made in the face of

as electorally active since 1950. The first evidence I find of explicit national electoral participation of these groups is their registration in national elections in 1989, 1989, 1967, and 1984 respectively. For further information see Election Commission of India (2006). Consequently, the count of their "frustration index" begin in 1989 for Assamese and Mizos, 1967 for Nagas and 1984 for Scheduled Tribes rather than 1950. Québecois count begins in 1948 (first French Canadian Prime minister as a representative of the Liberal party) rather than 1945. In Georgia the count for Abkhazians and Adzhars starts from 1992 (first national electoral participation) rather than 1991. I count Ashanti in Ghana from 1996; Russians in Lithuania from 1996; Serbs in Macedonia from 1998; Ibo in Nigeria from 2001; Maori in New Zealand from 1972; Kurds in Turkey from 1953 and Indigenous Peoples in Venezuela from 1999.

TABLE B.4. *Case selection concerns*

	Group is violent	**Group is not violent**
Access	1 (If excluded contributes to type 1 error)	2 (If excluded contributes to type 2 error)
No access	3 (If excluded contributes to type 2 error)	4 (If excluded contributes to type 1 error)

missing data. If the hypothesis tested here accurately describes the world, in that ethnic group propensity for protest and violence decreases as access increases, I would expect most cases to fall in the upper right-hand quadrant (2) and the lower left-hand quadrant (3). If cases from either of these groups are missing, the association between increasing access and decreasing protest and violence will not be significant. If, however, the data significantly underreport the existence of groups that fall in either the upper left-hand quadrant (1) or the lower right-hand quadrant (4), I will report as significant a result that really does not exist. The first error[15] is serious and the second type[16] is a researcher's worst nightmare.

Therefore, to ensure that the analysis does not suffer from underreporting of either type, my research assistants and I surveyed the electoral activity[17] of all minority groups in all democracies since 1945 using the *World Directory of Minorities* (1997) as a guide to minorities.[18] I then compared my list of electorally active minorities to the list of groups that are included in the MAR data. This comparison generated three principal observations. I found significant discrepancies between coding of minority electoral activity by MAR and my own list. This is the least

[15] More commonly this is called a type II error.

[16] More commonly this is called a type I error.

[17] My sources for this survey include a variety of election handbooks and general reference books, including Nohlen (1993 Vols. 1 and 2); Mackie and Rose (1991, 1997); Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut (1999); Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann (2001, Vols. 1 and 2); Day (1996); Day and German (2002); *The Europa World Yearbook* (various years); *Statesman's Yearbook* (various years); *Political Handbook of the World* (various years); *World Encylopedia of Political Systems* (1983); Rose (2002); and Ameringer (1992). In addition, I examined Internet sites including CIDE, electionworld.org, and accounts by country specialists.

[18] In addition, I kept an eye out for any minority not defined by the Minorities Rights Group. Thus, I found the Russian minority in Israel, which is not discussed in the directory.

serious discrepancy for the analysis conducted here, because MAR includes values on the dependent variables for all of these groups and I was able to add them to the analysis. More serious was the finding that a number of groups that exceed the population limit set by MAR are still excluded from the data despite apparently meeting at least one of the inclusion criteria outlined in Table B.3 (the reader will recall that in addition to size only one is required for inclusion). Finally, a number of electorally active minorities that do not meet the MAR population size criteria are excluded from the data. This has serious implications for the inference about the relationship between access and violence perpetrated by small groups. I discuss each of these problems in turn later.

Discrepancies in Records of Group Electoral Activity

MAR classifies the electoral activity of groups.[19] The classification of groups as electorally active or inactive supposedly is based on information that records electoral activity of the three most widely supported organizations representing group interests that operate within the state (Minorities at Risk, 2005-a, p. 45). In reality, however, information for this particular variable often is only recorded for a single organization. If none of the organizations that are listed engage in electoral politics, the group is coded as electorally inactive. Alternatively, the information about electoral activity is coded as missing. While comprehensive reporting of electoral activity is not the objective of MAR, over- and underreporting of electoral activity are significant concerns for Chapter Seven because electoral activity as an indicator of reasonable expectation of access determines the selection of cases for the analysis.

Overreporting of electoral activity is the lesser concern because positive coding is fairly unambiguous when an ethnic organization fields a separate ethnic political party or explicitly supports a multiethnic or nonethnic party. Indeed, a comparison between the list I constructed of electoral activity of minority groups verified some electoral activity in most of the cases reported as active by MAR. One complication is that MAR does not distinguish between electoral activities that are restricted to the subnational level as opposed to electoral activity at the national level. An added constraint to the selection of cases for the test in Chapter Seven is that the groups participate in national electoral politics. Consequently, I do not

[19] The variables accounting for electoral activity in MAR are Org1st5 Org2st5 and Org3st5.

TABLE B.5. *Electorally active minorities in democracies that are excluded from the analysis of access in Chapter Seven*

Country	Group	Reason for exclusion
France	Basques	Do not contest national elections
Israel	Palestinians	Do not contest national elections
Philippines	Igorots	Do not contest national elections
Ukraine	Crimean Russians	Do not contest national elections
Russia	Buryat	Do not contest national elections
Russia	Chechens	Do not contest national elections
Russia	Kumyks	Do not contest national elections
Russia	Tatars	Do not contest national elections
Russia	Tuvinians	Do not contest national elections
Namibia	East Caprivians	No clear ethnic representation
India	Muslims	Religious sect

include groups when other sources did not confirm at the national level the electoral activity reported by MAR. As shown in Table B.5 the groups reported as electorally active by MAR but excluded here are Basques in France (represented through what MAR calls Moderate Parties), Palestinians in Israel (PLO), Igorots in the Philippines (Cordillera People's Alliance), Crimean Russians in Ukraine (Republican Party Crimea).[20] In addition, I did not find the parties named by MAR or any other parties explicitly representing the Buryats (Buryat Mongolian Peoples Party), Chechens (Caucasian Independence Party, Caucasian Peoples Confederation, Daymokhk), Kumyks (Tenglik), Tatars (Tatar Community Center), and Tuvinians (Tuva Popular Front, Khostus Tuva)[21] in Russian national elections; nor did I find these groups explicitly represented by other parties. Finally, while East Caprivians in Namibia are electorally active according to MAR, I found no evidence of participation in national elections of the ethnic party named by MAR (United Democratic Party) or explicit representation of this group through other nonethnic parties.[22]

[20] A number of Republican parties have run in Ukrainian national elections but I did not find evidence that any of these are the Crimean Republican Party.

[21] According to MAR, the Buryats also support the Communist Party and Tuvinians support the Republican Organization of Communists. I was not, however, able to find another source verifying that either of these organizations are in fact the same Communist Party that runs in national elections. Therefore, I did not include the Buryats or the Tuvinians as groups that run in national elections.

[22] The Namibia country file (Minorities at Risk 2005-d) does name the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance as another representative of East Caprivians and this party does participate

Underreporting of electoral activity occurs in at least four ways in the MAR data. First, data on electoral activity are missing for all groups from 2001 on and many groups prior to that. Second, minorities may organize political parties that are separate from the three largest organizations that, according to MAR, are supported by the group. Third, organizations named in the MAR data are possibly involved in electoral activity in an indirect manner that is difficult to discern without substantial knowledge of the country, and consequently this activity is unreported. Fourth, the classification of electoral inactivity in MAR may simply be inaccurate. I will discuss specific instances of each in turn.

First, the lack of classification of electoral activity after 2001 is a concern for countries that democratized and/or changed the configuration of the state in other ways in 2001 or later. If the cases are first selected on the democratic criterion and then on the criterion of electoral activity, all groups in countries democratizing or changing in or after 2001 are dropped. Fortunately, in the test of the effect of access on intransigence this only applies to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which established the new state union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Of the minority groups listed by MAR I found evidence of national electoral activity for both Albanians and Hungarians after 2001.[23] Examples of missing information prior to 2001 include Germans in Romania, who consistently run parties such as the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania in national elections and have been awarded seats in the legislature through the minority exception from the vote threshold discussed in Chapter Four. Similarly, MAR codes Black Africans in South Africa as a distinct group but does not list any evidence of electoral activity or organizations that this group supports. The group does, however, support at least two political parties, the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO).[24] The leader of AZAPO, Mosibudi Mangena, was awarded a deputy ministry in the cabinet in 1991. The party then abstained from the 1994 elections but did run again in 1999.

Second, MAR codes the electorally inactive "Various Militia Groups" as the only organizations supported by Croats in Bosnia. In addition,

in national elections. I have not been able to find explicit representation by this party of Caprivians. Following the convention of the frustration index count explained before I do not include this group.

[23] Both groups are listed by MAR as electorally active prior to 2001. Consequently, I do not count these as added groups in table B.6.

[24] *Political Parties of the World* (2002).

Croats in Bosnia run at least two political parties in national elections. These are the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska Demokratska Zadecnica Bosne I Hercegovine), founded in 1990, and the New Croatian Initiative (Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa), which was founded in 1998 by former members of the Croatian Democratic Union. In Croatia the only organization of Serbs is, according to MAR, the electorally inactive Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. In addition, however, Serbs in Croatia support the Serbian National Party (Srpska Narodna Stranka). The party was founded in 1991 and won three seats in the 1992 legislative election and two seats in 1995. The only organization about which MAR provides information in the case of Russians in Lithuania is the electorally inactive Yedinstvo. Since 1996, however, Russians in Lithuania also have supported the Russian Union (Lietuvos Rusų Sąjunga). In 2000 this party participated in the Social Democratic electoral alliance that won plurality in the elections to the Lithuanian parliament. Kashmiris' three main organizations in India (listed as Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, Hizb-ul-Mujhadeen, and All-Party Hurriat) are classified as electorally inactive but the Jammu Kashmir National Conference has won seats in the legislature in nearly every election since 1967. Finally, in Nigeria the only organization listed as supported by the Ibo is the electorally inactive Eastern Mandate Union, but the group also ran the All Progressive Grand Alliance Party (AGAP) in the 2003 elections.

The third source of underreporting are complex cases. Thus, the MAR data classify the three most popular organizations of indigenous peoples in Ecuador as electorally inactive, including Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). However, while the political party Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País (MUPP), which first ran in the 1996 election, is not explicitly the political wing of CONAIE, leaders of the umbrella organization have led the deputy list of the MUPP (Birnir 2004-a). Similarly, according to MAR, lowland indigenous groups in Bolivia support an electorally inactive local organization called Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (CPIB). However, this organization forms a part of a national organization called Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB). As detailed by Van Cott (2005), CIDOB forged electoral alliances with existing Bolivian parties (most notably the Movimiento Bolivia Libre) in the 1997 national election and earlier in local elections. In Colombia, Organización Indígena de Colombia (ONIC) is among the largest indigenous organizations named

as electorally inactive by MAR.[25] In 1990, however, the organization ran candidates in the National Constituent Assembly elections and won a seat. The organization went on to contest the 1991 congressional elections but retired from electoral competition in 1993. During that same time, indigenous groups also fielded Movimiento de Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia (AICO), which was first created as a social movement in 1977 under a different name. This party competed in the 1990 National Constituent Assembly elections and ran candidates in the 1991 and 1994 congressional elections (Van Cott, 2003).

Bulgaria presents another type of a complex case. As I mentioned in Chapter Six, ethnic parties are banned in Bulgaria. Nonetheless, ethnic minorities such as the Turkish minority run candidates in elections in parties that are commonly considered to represent the ethnic minority although they are not called ethnic parties. Similarly, eight Roma parties formed the Free Bulgaria coalition and contested national elections in 2001 (National Democratic Institute, 2003). The coalition failed to win any seats.

The fourth concern is inaccurate coding. In Bolivia, for instance, organizations of indigenous highland groups classified by MAR as electorally inactive include Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA), which is actually an electoral party established by a mestizo, Carlos Palenque, who capitalized explicitly on his Aymara heritage when fielding CONDEPA in elections. The party grew steadily from the time it was established in 1988 until the most recent election, when two new parties, the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP) and Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), captured much of its vote (Van Cott, 2005). Similarly, a number of Katarista parties that originated within the Aymara movement have run with some success in every election since re-democratization, most notably in a 1993 alliance that elected the first indigenous vice president of Bolivia. Most recently, in December 2005 Evo Morales, the leader of MAS, was elected the president of Bolivia. MAR only lists the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement but designates this group as electorally inactive. MAR also codes the Serbian Democratic Party representing Serbs in Bosnia as electorally inactive. However, the party has run in national elections from 1996 on, and

[25] MAR lists two additional organizations for indigenous peoples in Colombia: the Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca (CRIC), which is the predecessor of ONIC, and a National Peasant Association that I assume is Asociación Nacional de Usarios Campesinos (ANUC).

TABLE B.6. *Electorally active minorities in democracies that are added for the test of access in Chapter Seven*

Country	Group	Ethnic Party (Reason for adding)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats	Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Croatian Initiative
Croatia	Serbs	Serbian National Party
Lithuania	Russians	Russian Union
India	Kashmiris	Jammu Kashmir National Conference
Nigeria	Ibo	All Progressive Grand Alliance Party
Ecuador	Indigenous Highland peoples	Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo País
Bolivia	Indigenous Lowland peoples	Movimiento Bolivia Libre
Colombia	Indigenous peoples	Movimiento de Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia
Bulgaria	Roma	Free Bulgaria
Bolivia	Indigenous Highland peoples	Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti, Movimiento Al Socialismo
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs	Serbian People's Union

other parties represent this group as well, including the Serbian People's Union, founded in 1997, which has run in elections from 1998. Because the MAR data do contain values on the dependent variables for all of the groups with the exception of black Africans and Germans in Romania Table B.6 shows that I have added them to the test from the time that they are electorally active at the national level. Violence and protest scores for black Africans in South Africa and Germans in Romania are only recorded until 1985. Consequently, these groups are excluded from the analysis.

A number of groups that are classified by MAR as electorally inactive or not classified at all do not field a separate ethnic political party that I know of but are nonetheless represented through nonethnic parties. When the group is only represented through a nonethnic party it is not clear that the group is electorally active. Therefore, I do not add such cases in the analysis. These include Turks in Germany, Chinese in Indonesia, Chinese and Malay Muslim in Thailand, and African Americans and Hispanics in the United States, all of whom have been represented by an ethnic

individual in cabinet. Furthermore, in the United Kingdom Afro-Caribbeans have held seats in the legislature in the ruling party and Blacks in Colombia and Aborigines in Australia have had access to the legislature but not to the cabinet. Finally, the last Peruvian president, Alejandro Toledo, is of indigenous origin but no real indigenous party has fielded candidates in national elections in Peru. For speculation about the effect of access by these groups see Chapter Seven.

Cases Missing from MAR

Completeness of the sample is a constant concern. In my survey I found some large ethnic groups that are not included in the MAR data despite the fact that they fit the MAR criteria set out for a minority group as explained in Table B.3. Furthermore, I found several other electorally active ethnic groups that are excluded from the MAR data because of size. Because none of these groups is in the original MAR data, no indicators of the dependent variables are available. Therefore, if I were to add these groups I also would have to construct protest and violence scores. MAR documentation of coding including the protest and violence scores is underdeveloped. While the variable definitions are available, the codebook includes no account of how the definitional assessments were made. Consequently, so as not to risk coding discrepancies between the dependent variables provided by MAR and an original coding of these new cases, I have not included them in the aggregate test in this chapter. Rather, I simply list the groups and speculate about the effects of excluding them.

Large Groups

Several additional groups apparently meet at least one of the criteria for a "minority at risk" and are electorally active but not included in the MAR dataset. These include Francophones and the German minority in Belgium, Germans in Poland, Scheduled Castes in India,[26] Russians in

[26] Country specialists and experts on the subject of ethnicity, such as Steven Wilkinson, agree that this group fits the definition of an ethnic group. According to Wilkinson, when using Horowitz's criteria of ethnicity such as the presumption of kinship and common descent, Scheduled Castes should be defined as an ethnic group (personal e-mail communication, July 17, 2003).

Israel,[27] Swedes in Finland,[28] Montenegrins in Serbia-Montenegro,[29] the French and Italian minorities in Switzerland, and groups of African and groups of Indian descent in Trinidad and Tobago.[30] All groups are around or larger than the 100,000 and/or 1 percent limit set in the MAR data, and all support a political organization advocating greater group rights. In addition, such groups as the Germans in Poland and Scheduled Castes in India have at one point or another been subject to discrimination, and it is debatable whether the Russians in Israel do not meet this discrimination criterion as well.[31] The effect of excluding these cases is not uniform, but

[27] Country experts with whom I have conferred, such as David Carol (personal conversation, August 2003), agree that Russians in Israel are indeed a separate ethnic minority. Russians in Israel constitute a very interesting case. According to most descriptions, including the *World Directory of Minorities* (1997) and MAR (2005-a), minorities in Israel are defined in relation to the Jewish mainstream. Thus, the Minority Rights Group designates only the non-Jewish Palestinians, Druze, Circassians, and Jewish sects such as the Karaites as minorities. Similarly, the MAR data include only Arabs and Palestinians. However, some large national minorities within Israel, most notably Russians (according to Gemenne, 2002, there are over 1 million Russians in Israel), are organizing separate "ethnic" political parties. (The category "Russian" includes people from all of the Soviet Republics, but according to Goldberg, 1996, at least one-third are Russian, one-third Ukrainian, and one-third from other republics.) Furthermore, these political parties (the Da and the Israel B'aliya) have advocated immigration policies that are important to the group. These policies include "recognition by Israeli authorities of religious conversions performed by non-Orthodox rabbis and the patrilineal line of Jewish descent." Goldberg (1996) argues that these are "critical issues for many immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia."

[28] For further discussion, see Horn (2003).

[29] According to MAR (2005-a) Montenegrins are among a number of groups being considered for addition to the data.

[30] Complex countries such as Malawi where multiple ethnic groups include the Nyanja, Lomwe, Yao, and the Tumbuka speaking minorities are also an interesting omission. Even though political parties in Malawi often represent more than one ethnic group the question is whether this might be an effect of the institutional configuration in the country and perhaps these groups should be included in the data. The fact that there is some linguistic overlap between groups further complicated this issue. Similarly the Terai people in Nepal could be included as they field a political party advocating group rights. The fact that this group can be subdivided into several lingusitic groups may complicate their inclusion.

[31] For instance, between 1956 and 1959 Germany opened its borders to German Poles under a family union resettlement scheme. According to the Minorities Rights Group (1997), Polish authorities used these transfers as justification for closing German language schools, church and newspaper services, and radio broadcasts. Furthermore, not until redemocratization were German cultural rights in Poland fully restored. In India, Scheduled Castes, or Dalits, certainly seem to fit the category of a disadvantaged minority group that is united politically to advocate group rights. While the Indian constitution abolished the "untouchability" of this group by law and instituted affirmative action policies to rectify the social disadvantage of the group, this group of people still suffers considerable

a number of these cases seem supportive of the hypothesis that access mediates violence. For example, I have not found any record of violence against the state perpetrated by the Russian community in Israel, and the group has been consistently included in the central governing coalition.[32] Dalits have mostly been the subject of violence in India and they are represented in all governing structures, not through an ethnic party but rather through a variety of multiethnic parties. The Swedes are peaceful and are arguably also represented in the government.[33]

Small Groups

There are other electorally active minorities in democracies, but these groups are too small to meet the MAR criterion of 100,000 members. These groups include, but are not limited to, Italians in Croatia,[34] Slovenes in Austria, Frisians and the Danish minorities who run a joint party in Germany, Germans in Denmark, and Hungarian and Italian minorities in Slovenia. MAR does not justify the arbitrary threshold for inclusion of ethnic groups and, given the much lower numbers of participants that are required for recording of violent activities against the state, for instance, the inclusion threshold for minority groups in the data seems excessively high. The population threshold puts limitations on the inference in Chapter Seven. It is theoretically possible that, because of size, smaller groups have significantly different expectations about outcomes of the electoral process than larger groups, which in turn may affect the smaller group propensity for protest and violence. At this point the best I can do is to state that the inference here is about groups that exceed the threshold of 100,000 members or 1 percent of the population and hope that future revisions of the MAR data will rectify this selection bias.

discrimination (Minority Rights Group International, 1997). Finally, according to Gemenne (2002), there is mounting evidence of discrimination against Russian immigrants in Israel.

[32] See *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 1–7, 1999, no. 436.

[33] See Horn (2003). "The Swedish speakers have an umbrella organization, the Swedish Assembly of Finland (Finlands Svenska Folkting). Its 75 members are indirectly elected every fourth year, most recently in October 1996, on the basis of the outcome of municipal elections and they represent the Swedish speakers in the various political parties. The Assembly fosters the cultural needs of the Swedish-speaking population and submits initiatives to that effect to the Government and other authorities. It is partly subsidized by the state." http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/minorit1.html

[34] At least the Italian minority in Croatia has been included in government through the Istrian Democratic Assembly, which was in government in 2000–2001. The party has been active since democratization.

Clearly, a complete and accurate validation of coding of the groups that are included, as well as country expert assessment of which additional cases should be included, is a work in progress. Given the number of underreported and unreported cases I identified, there are probably many more groups that should be included. Ideally a cumulative scholarly effort eventually will complete a more accurate classification of all relevant cases. At the same time, however, given the details of the cases I found that are not included in MAR despite adequate size, I do not have any reason to believe that the MAR case selection biases the empirical results in favor of the hypothesis tested in Chapter Seven. Therefore, I feel justified in using the MAR data in the analysis with the caveats that any findings are only indicative of the true underlying relationships rather than absolute measures, and that the analysis speaks to groups that exceed the threshold of 100,000 members or constitute 1 percent of the national population.

Ethnic versus Religious Groups

MAR classifies groups according to whether they are Ethno-national, Indigenous, Ethno-class, Communal Contender, Religious sect, or National Minority.[35] To sidestep the debate regarding ethnicity versus religion, because it is possible that religion plays out differently in politics with respect to protest and violence than in ethnic affiliation (this is certainly the case in electoral politics as demonstrated in Chapters Five and Seven), I have excluded groups that are classified as religious sects only,[36] even when these are classified by MAR as electorally active under democratic conditions.[37] As shown in Table B.5 there is only one such electorally active group, Muslims in India, who have fielded the Indian Union Muslim League. The Muslim group in India has never entered into government and has engaged in low-level violence. Thus, exclusion of this case does not favorably bias the result of the following analysis because if included, it would support the hypothesis that minority exclusion from government leads to violence while inclusion promotes peaceful participation.

Table B.7 summarizes protest and violence scores by all countries and groups included in the analysis in Table 7.7 in Chapter Seven.

Finally, Table B.8 lists the missing cases pertaining to each variable summarized in Table 7.6 and used in the analysis of the effect of access on violence in Table 7.7 in Chapter Seven.

[35] This variable is called Type in the MAR dataset.

[36] I include Catholics in Ireland in the analysis because they are not simply a religious sect but classified by MAR as ethno-national.

[37] For analysis of the difference in access between ethnic and religious groups, see Birnir and Şatana (2004).

TABLE B.7. *Cases included in the analysis of access in Chapter Seven (by country and group, average violent rebellion, and peaceful protest)*

Country	Group	Observations	Mean	Stdev	Min	Max
Albania	**Greeks**					
	Rebellion	13	0.154	0.376	0	1
	Protest	13	1.462	1.050	0	3
Bangladesh	**Chittagong Hill Tribes**					
	Rebellion	3	0.667	0.577	0	1
	Protest	3	2.333	1.155	0	3
Bolivia	**Indigenous Highland peoples**					
	Rebellion	17	0.529	0.514	0	1
	Protest	19	2.421	0.961	0	4
Bolivia	**Indigenous Lowland peoples**					
	Rebellion	6	0	0	0	0
	Protest	7	2.571	1.397	0	4
Bosnia	**Croats**					
	Rebellion	8	0.25	0.463	0	1
	Protest	8	1.75	1.035	0	3
Bosnia	**Muslims**					
	Rebellion	8	0.125	0.354	0	1
	Protest	8	1.375	1.408	0	4
Bosnia	**Serbs**					
	Rebellion	8	0.375	0.518	0	1
	Protest	8	2.125	0.641	1	3
Bulgaria	**Roma**					
	Rebellion	14	0	0	0	0
	Protest	14	1.286	0.825	0	3
Bulgaria	**Turks**					
	Rebellion	14	0	0	0	0
	Protest	14	1.5	1.286	0	4
Canada	**Quebecois**					
	Rebellion	26	0.192	0.567	0	2
	Protest	26	1.654	0.846	0	3
Colombia	**Indigenous peoples**					
	Rebellion	14	0.857	1.562	0	6
	Protest	14	2.286	0.994	0	4
Croatia	**Serbs**					
	Rebellion	12	2.667	3.312	0	7
	Protest	12	1.167	1.193	0	3
Czech Republic	**Roma**					
	Rebellion	11	0	0	0	0
	Protest	11	1.545	0.820	1	3
Ecuador	**Indigenous peoples**					
	Rebellion	7	0	0	0	0
	Protest	8	3	1.069	1	4

(*continued*)

TABLE B.7 *(continued)*

Country	Group	Observations	Mean	Stdev	Min	Max
Estonia	**Russians**					
	Rebellion	9	0	0	0	0
	Protest	9	1.556	0.726	1	3
Fiji	**East Indians**					
	Rebellion	5	0	0	0	0
	Protest	5	1.6	1.140	0	3
Georgia	**Abkhazians**					
	Rebellion	12	3.5	2.276	1	7
	Protest	10	1.6	1.350	0	3
Georgia	**Adzhars**					
	Rebellion	12	0	0	0	0
	Protest	12	0.583	1.379	0	4
Ghana	**Ashanti**					
	Rebellion	8	0	0	0	0
	Protest	8	0.25	0.707	0	2
Guyana	**Africans**					
	Rebellion	12	0.083	0.289	0	1
	Protest	12	2	0.953	1	3
Guyana	**East Indians**					
	Rebellion	12	0	0	0	0
	Protest	12	0.417	0.900	0	3
Hungary	**Roma**					
	Rebellion	14	0	0	0	0
	Protest	14	1.143	1.231	0	3
India	**Assamese**					
	Rebellion	21	3.095	2.071	0	6
	Protest	21	2.476	1.692	0	5
India	**Kashmiris**					
	Rebellion	21	4.048	2.269	0	6
	Protest	21	4.143	0.9103	2	5
India	**Mizos**					
	Rebellion	15	0	0	0	0
	Protest	15	1.067	1.223	0	3
India	**Nagas**					
	Rebellion	21	3.286	1.419	1	5
	Protest	21	2.381	1.717	0	5
India	**Scheduled Tribes**					
	Rebellion	18	3.444	1.542	0	5
	Protest	19	2.684	1.157	1	4
India	**Sikhs**					
	Rebellion	24	2.875	2.576	0	6
	Protest	24	2.25	1.032	0	5
Israel	**Arabs**					
	Rebellion	26	0.154	0.368	0	1
	Protest	26	2.423	1.362	1	5

Country	Group	Observations	Mean	Stdev	Min	Max
Italy	**Sardinians**					
	Rebellion	23	0.304	0.470	0	1
	Protest	23	0.348	0.775	0	3
Italy	**South Tyrolians**					
	Rebellion	26	0.385	0.752	0	2
	Protest	26	1.385	1.235	0	4
Latvia	**Russians**					
	Rebellion	11	0	0	0	0
	Protest	11	2.455	0.934	1	4
Lithuania	**Poles**					
	Rebellion	12	0	0	0	0
	Protest	12	0.833	0.937	0	3
Lithuania	**Russians**					
	Rebellion	8	0	0	0	0
	Protest	8	0.25	0.463	0	1
Macedonia	**Albanians**					
	Rebellion	11	1.273	1.794	0	6
	Protest	11	2.273	1.489	0	5
Macedonia	**Roma**					
	Rebellion	11	0	0	0	0
	Protest	11	0.727	1.009	0	2
Macedonia	**Serbs**					
	Rebellion	6	0	0	0	0
	Protest	6	1.167	0.408	1	2
Madagascar	**Merina**					
	Rebellion	11	0	0	0	0
	Protest	11	1.455	1.036	0	3
Moldova	**Gagauz**					
	Rebellion	10	0.6	1.265	0	3
	Protest	10	1.9	0.994	0	3
Moldova	**Slavs**					
	Rebellion	10	1.2	1.549	0	3
	Protest	10	1.5	0.850	0	3
Namibia	**Basters**					
	Rebellion	14	0	0	0	0
	Protest	14	0.714	0.611	0	2
Namibia	**Europeans**					
	Rebellion	14	0	0	0	0
	Protest	14	1.643	0.842	0	3
New Zealand	**Maori**					
	Rebellion	21	0	0	0	0
	Protest	21	2.714	0.561	2	4
Nigeria	**Ibo**					
	Rebellion	3	0	0	0	0
	Protest	3	1.667	1.528	0	3

(*continued*)

TABLE B.7 *(continued)*

Country	Group	Observations	Mean	Stdev	Min	Max
Nigeria	**Yoruba**					
	Rebellion	5	0	0	0	0
	Protest	5	1.6	2.191	0	4
Pakistan	**Baluchis**					
	Rebellion	10	3	0.483	0	1
	Protest	10	1.1	1.197	0	3
Pakistan	**Mohajirs**					
	Rebellion	10	2	1.563	0	5
	Protest	10	4.6	0.966	2	5
Pakistan	**Pashtuns (Pushtuns)**					
	Rebellion	10	0.1	0.316	0	1
	Protest	10	2.9	1.287	2	5
Pakistan	**Sindhis**					
	Rebellion	10	0.1	0.316	0	1
	Protest	10	3.2	1.549	2	5
Romania	**Magyars (Hungarians)**					
	Rebellion	14	0	0	0	0
	Protest	14	1.857	1.351	0	4
Romania	**Roma**					
	Rebellion	14	0	0	0	0
	Protest	14	1.286	0.914	0	3
Slovakia	**Hungarians**					
	Rebellion	11	0	0	0	0
	Protest	11	2	0.894	1	3
Slovakia	**Roma**					
	Rebellion	11	0	0	0	0
	Protest	11	1	1.265	0	3
South Africa	**Asians**					
	Rebellion	10	0	0	0	0
	Protest	10	1.1	0.994	0	2
South Africa	**Coloreds**					
	Rebellion	10	0	0	0	0
	Protest	10	1.6	1.265	0	3
South Africa	**Europeans**					
	Rebellion	10	0.5	0.972	0	3
	Protest	10	1.8	0.789	0	3
South Africa	**Xhosa**					
	Rebellion	10	0	0	0	0
	Protest	10	0.2	0.632	0	2
South Africa	**Zulus**					
	Rebellion	10	0.2	0.632	0	2
	Protest	10	1.9	1.729	0	4
South Korea	**Honamese**					
	Rebellion	16	0	0	0	0
	Protest	16	1.812	0.981	0	3

Country	Group	Observations	Mean	Stdev	Min	Max
Spain	**Basques**					
	Rebellion	20	2	0	2	2
	Protest	20	3.05	0.759	1	4
Spain	**Catalans**					
	Rebellion	20	0.4	0.503	0	1
	Protest	20	2.05	1.050	0	4
Sri Lanka	**Indian Tamils**					
	Rebellion	27	0.037	0.192	0	1
	Protest	27	1.889	1.826	0	5
Sri Lanka	**Sri Lankan Tamils**					
	Rebellion	27	4.852	2.892	0	7
	Protest	27	2.260	0.859	0	4
Turkey	**Kurds**					
	Rebellion	23	5.130	2.007	1	7
	Protest	23	3.174	0.650	2	4
Ukraine	**Russians**					
	Rebellion	10	0	0	0	0
	Protest	10	1.4	1.265	0	3
United Kingdom	**Catholics in Northern Ireland**					
	Rebellion	27	1.593	0.747	0	3
	Protest	27	2.407	1.217	0	4
United Kingdom	**Scots**					
	Rebellion	27	0.111	0.320	0	1
	Protest	27	1.593	1.118	0	4
Venezuela	**Indigenous peoples**					
	Rebellion	5	0	0	0	0
	Protest	5	2.8	0.837	2	4
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)	**Albanians**					
	Rebellion	1	1	.	1	1
	Protest	1	3	.	3	3
Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)	**Hungarians**					
	Rebellion	1	0	.	0	0
	Protest	1	1	.	1	1

Note: Inclusion in the statistical analysis is determined by presence of violence and/or protest scores along with access scores.

TABLE B.8. *Missing cases pertaining to summary in Table 7.6 and analysis in Table 7.7*

Variable	Missing cases
Violent protest	Ecuador Indigenous peoples 2003
	Bolivia Indigenous Highland peoples 2002–2003
	Bolivia Indigenous Lowland peoples 2003
	India Scheduled Tribes 2003
	Italy Sardinians 1960
Nonviolent protest	Georgia, Abkhazians 1996–1997
	Italy Sardinians 1980
Violent protest and nonviolent protest lagged	First case for every group in every country
Number of years since ethnic group has been in cabinet in an ethnic party	Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tribes 2001–2003
	Bulgaria Roma 1990–2000
	Canada Québecois 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985–1992
	Czech Republic Roma 1996–2001
	Georgia Abkhazians 1995–2003
	India Assamese 1970, 1980, 1985–1990
	India Mizos 1999–2003
	India Nagas 1980, 1996–2003
	India Sikhs 1960
	Italy Sardinians 1965, 1975, 1994–1995
	New Zealand Maori 1975, 1980
	Nigeria Ibo 2001–2003
	Pakistan Mohajirs 1993–1996
	South Africa Coloreds 1994–2003
	Turkey Kurds 1955, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1985–1986
	Venezuela Indigenous peoples 1999
Relative size of ethnic group in the legislature	Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tribes 2001–2003
	Bolivia Lowland Indigenous peoples 1997–2003
	Bulgaria Roma 1990–2000
	Canada Québecois 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985–1992
	Georgia Abkhazians 1993–1994
	Georgia Adzhars 1992–1994
	India Assamese 1970, 1980, 1985–1990
	India Mizos 1999–2003
	India Nagas 1980, 1996–2003
	India Sikhs 1960
	Italy Sardinians 1960, 1965, 1975, 1996–2000
	Moldova Slavs 1994–2000
	Namibia Basters 1990–2003

Variable	Missing cases
	New Zealand Maori 1975, 1980, 1993–2001
	Nigeria Ibo 2001–2003
	Pakistan Mohajirs 1993–1996
	South Africa Coloreds 1994–2003
	Sri Lanka Indian Tamils 2001–2003
	Turkey Kurds 1955, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1985–1986
	Venezuela Indigenous peoples 1999
Number of parties in the legislature	Georgia Abkhazians 1992–2003
	Georgia Adzhars 1992–2003
	Guyana Africans 1992–2003
	Guyana East Indians 1994–2003
GDP per capita	All cases after and including 2001
	Bosnia Croats 1996–2000
	Bosnia Muslims 1996–2000
	Bosnia Serbs 1996–2000
	Bulgaria Roma 1990
	Bulgaria Turks 1990
	Croatia Serbs 1992–1994
	Fiji East Indians 2000
	Georgia Abkhazians 1992–1995
	Georgia Adzhars 1992–1995
	Guyana Africans 2000
	Guyana East Indians 2000
	Lithuania Poles 1992
	Moldova Gagauz 1994
	Moldova Slavs 1994
	Namibia Basters 2000
	Namibia Europeans 2000
	UK Catholics in Northern Ireland 1945
	UK Scots 1945
GDP growth (percentage)	All cases after and including 2001
	Albania Greeks 1991
	Bosnia Croats 1996–2000
	Bosnia Muslims 1996–2000
	Bosnia Serbs 1996–2000
	Bulgaria Roma 1990–1991
	Bulgaria Turks 1990–1991
	Canada Québecois 1950
	Croatia Serbs 1992–1995
	Fiji East Indians 2000
	Georgia Abkhazians 1992–1996
	Georgia Adzhars 1992–1996
	Guyana Africans 2000
	Guyana East Indians 2000

(*continued*)

TABLE B.8 *(continued)*

Variable	Missing cases
	Israel Arabs 1950
	Italy South Tyrolians 1950
	Lithuania Poles 1992–1993
	Moldova Gagauz 1994–1995
	Moldova Slavs 1994–1995
	Namibia Basters 2000
	Namibia Europeans 2000
	Sri Lanka Indian Tamils 1950
	Sri Lanka Sri Lankan Tamils 1950
	UK Catholics in Northern Ireland 1945 and 1950
	UK Scots 1945 and 1950
Group regionally concentrated	All cases after and including 2001

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Index