Regimes of Ethnicity: Comparing East, West, and South

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Abstract: This paper presents the comparative data on state policies on ethnic and ethno-religious diversity in fifteen specific policy areas in thirty-five countries, including some Western, Post-Communist, and Muslim-majority states, collected through a survey of country experts. These states, compared along fifteen specific policies on ethnic and ethno-religious diversity, provide a large enough dataset to give a tentative answer to questions of Western, post-Communist, and Islamic "legacies" in the treatment of ethnic and religious diversity. The fifteen state policies that are compared across these countries and regions include ethnicity and religion in the constitution, in official identification cards and censuses, ethnic priority citizenship and immigration, official languages, ethnic territorial autonomy, ethnic minority status, affirmative action, established religion, and religious education. Since ethnic distinctions sometimes overlap with religious distinctions in many countries of the world, including in many Western, post-Communist, and Muslim-majority countries, information on state policies towards religion is also collected. Based on the date on their policies, these states are classified as having monoethnic, multiethnic, and antiethnic regimes. The results shed light on whether different countries exhibit specific patterns in their policies towards ethnic and religious diversity based on Western, Post-Communist, or Islamic legacies.

Keywords: ethnicity, constitution, census, citizenship, immigration, linguistic rights, territorial autonomy, minority status, affirmative action, legacies, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Middle East and North Africa, Muslim world.

Introduction

Based on the preliminary results of the "Regimes of Ethnicity: A Global Database of Ethnic Demography and Survey of State Policies on Ethnicity" project, this paper presents an empirical overview and a theoretical assessment of fifteen state policies on ethnicity and religion in thirty-five European, Post-Communist, and Muslim-majority Third World countries. The paper seeks to ascertain whether there are systematic legacy effects of the French tradition of assimilationist "civic" nation-building, German tradition of ethnic nationhood, and Marxist-Leninist and Islamic approaches to ethnic diversity in the kinds of policies that states pursue at present. The bulk of the paper consists of comparative analyses of each of the fifteen policies one-by-one, where the expected influences of Western, Communist, and Islamic legacies are first outlined, and then the actual present-day policies in these groups of countries are reviewed. Although the results are preliminary since the survey is ongoing, in most policies there seem to be observable legacy-based patterns, attributable to historical legacies of Western, Communist, and Islamic approaches to regulating ethnic and religious diversity. Using the "regimes of ethnicity" approach in classifying these states as having monoethnic, multiethnic, and antiethnic regimes based on their policies, the paper also presents, in conclusion, a preliminary discussion of the distribution of regime types among Western, Post-Communist, and Muslim-majority states.

State Policies toward Ethnic Diversity and Nationhood: Making and Breaking Identities

State policies on ethnicity have enormous consequences on ethnic and national identity formation. As the critical scholarship on nationalism demonstrated, nations are not pre-historic entities that are simply "awakened" through the guidance and activism of nationalists; nor do they simply "emerge" from timeless ethnic essences. Nations do not make states; states make nations through the policies they pursue.[1] This paper goes beyond the abstract conclusions of the critical scholarship on nationalism, and provides a cross-national empirical overview and analysis of specific state policies aimed at shaping and regulating ethnic identities.

Consider policies of ethnic-priority immigration and ethnic-priority citizenship: Some countries have, and many more until recently had, programs to encourage the immigration of their alleged ethnic kin abroad to their putative homelands with financial, legal, and other privileges that favor them against other kinds of immigrants.[2] Such a policy clearly designates a particular ethnic group as the "titular ethnic group" with an ownership claim to the state. Conversely, ethnic-priority citizenship and immigration imply that citizens of the state not sharing a particular ethnic background not to have an equal membership claim in that political community. By changing (or aiming to change) the demography of the country in favor of a titular ethnic group, such policies also change the demographic balance against citizens who do not share the titular ethnic or racial background. Estonia, Israel, Germany, Kazakhstan, and many other states had or still have such programs favoring the immigration of particular ethnic groups to these countries. "White Australia" policy and similar policies in the United States favored the immigration of a racial category ("White") encompassing a limited set of ethnicities against others in the first half of the 20th century.[3] Ethnic-priority immigration and citizenship policies create and reinforce a monoethnic conception of nationhood by the states that implement them. How many countries implement such policies and is their distribution influenced by regional and historical legacies?

While the relationship between state policies and the character of nationhood is relatively clear in the case of ethnic-priority immigration and citizenship policies, many other policies with similar implications are often overlooked. Ethnic minority status is one such policy. The legislation of an "ethnic minority" status logically implies an "ethnic majority," with which nationhood is implicitly associated. The choices of ethnic and religious categories for the census, or the refusal to collect information on ethnic and religious background, are all indicative of distinct political choices and projects of nation building.[4] Multiple ethnic categories in the constitution or multiple official languages are both conscious political choices legally recognizing ethnic and linguistic diversity. Are these choices influenced by regional and historical legacies?

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[1] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[2] Christian Joppke, *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

[3] Ibid.

[4] David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel (eds.), *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

In some contexts, religion and ethnicity are intertwined.[5] In some countries, religious differences are used to reinforce the salience of major ethnic differences, whereas in some other countries they are used to downplay ethnic differences.[6] Hence, in this paper, some state policies on religion are also examined along with state policies on ethnicity to capture any such uses of religion on the regulation of ethnic identities.

Regimes of Ethnicity: A Global Survey of State Policies on Ethnicity

"Regimes of Ethnicity: A Global Database of Ethnic Demography and Survey of State Policies on Ethnicity" is a project funded by the European Commission in the 7th Framework Program for the period of November 2010-October 2014. As part of this survey, experts on ethnic politics are identified for every country in the world with a population over 250,000. In Part B of this survey, which is the only part that will be addressed in this paper, experts are asked fifteen "yes or no" questions as to whether their countries of expertise have certain policies on ethnicity or not. (For example, "Question 3. Is there an officially defined ethnic minority status?") For any question that is answered in the affirmative, the expert is urged to list the ethnic (or religious) categories that the policy applies to (For example, which ethnic categories are accorded "ethnic minority status"). Max Weber's definition of an ethnic group as people having "a subjective belief in common descent" is offered to the experts as the definition used in the conceptualization of this research project, but it is emphasized that the experts are free to use their own preferred definitions of ethnicity.

As argued in my previous work, policies on ethnicity adopted by a particular state, whether they be ethnic minority status, territorial autonomy, or affirmative action policies, are usually not randomly distributed but are connected and mutually reinforcing since they seek to maintain a particular and coherent relationship between ethnicity and nationality.[7] I defined three ethnicity regimes: Monoethnic, multiethnic, and antiethnic.

> "If a state seeks to restrict membership in the nation to one ethnic category only through discriminatory immigration and naturalization policies, then it has a 'monoethnic' regime… If a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as citizens (membership) but discourages or even prohibits the legal, institutional, and public expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has an 'antiethnic' regime… If a state accepts people from ethnically diverse backgrounds as its citizens (membership) *and* allows, encourages, or even participates in the legal and institutional expression of ethnic diversity (expression), then it has a 'multiethnic' regime."[8]

Previously I identified seven policies symptomatic of ethnic regime type; later, I subdivided one of these seven policy areas into three distinct policies and hence arrived at

[5] Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Harvard University Asia Center, 1996).

[6] Sener Akturk, "Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.45, No.6 (November 2009), pp.893-909.

[7] Sener Akturk, "Regimes of Ethnicity Comparative Analysis of Germany, the Soviet Union/Post-Soviet Russia, and Turkey," *World Politics*, Vol.63, No.1 (2011), pp.118-121.

[8] Ibid, pp.118-119.

nine policies related to the regulation of ethnicity.[9] In addition to nine state policies that regulate ethnic diversity and relate it to national identity, I further identified six policies that regulate religious diversity and relate it to national identity. These fifteen policies in thirty-five countries of interest constitute the empirical core of this paper. In the next section, I turn to these fifteen policies, their implications, the expected distribution of these policies among Western, post-Communist, and Muslim-majority Third World countries, and the actual distribution of these policies among these groups of countries.

Expectations of Ethnic Regime Type: Multiethnic in Post-Communist, Antiethnic in Western and Muslim-majority, Monoethnic in German-influenced Western states

There are thirty-five countries under examination. The first group consists of what used to be called the "First World" during the Cold War, mostly Western and Central European states that have not been under Communism at all, and that are mostly NATO and EU member states. Completed expert surveys for thirteen such countries are received and analyzed so far: Austria, Cyprus, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These include some of the first modern nation-states, inspired by and modeled after the "civic" nationalism based on assimilation prevalent in France and the United States, spread across Europe with the early wave of nationalism from the late 18th to the early 19th century. The expected regime type is an antiethnic one, where an ethnically diverse population is included in the citizenry but the expression of ethnic diversity is not allowed; rather, an ethnically diverse population is assimilated into a common national culture shaped by a single language, without any official expression of ethnic diversity.[10] However, a subgroup within the Western group, particularly the Central-Eastern European and Balkan states influenced by ethnic German nationalism, are expected to have a monoethnic regime type, where the nation is limited to one ethnic group only.[11]

The second group consists of post-Communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, or what used to be called the "Second World" during the Cold War. Completed expert surveys for sixteen such countries are received and analyzed so far: Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Following the Soviet example, and the Marxist-Leninist approach to the nationalities question, the expected regime type is a multiethnic one, where ethnic diversity is both emphatically included in the nation and the official expressions of ethnic diversity are paramount.[12] However, a subgroup within the post-Communist group, namely the states that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, due to the ethnic mobilization and violence

[9] Ibid, p.124. What was policy area no.4, encompassing ethnicity in the constitution, the census, and personal identification documents, is subdivided into "multiple categories in the constitution," "ethnicity in personal identification documents," and "ethnicity in the census."

[10] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998).

[11] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[12] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

surrounding that dissolution, are expected to have a monoethnic regime type.[13] States with antiethnic regimes, or monoethnic regimes (except for Yugoslav successor states), are expected to be rare in this group.

The third group consists of Muslim-majority countries in what used to be called the "Third World" during the Cold War. Completed expert surveys are received and analyzed only for six such countries so far: Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, and Mauritania. These countries were once governed with Islamic law under the Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal and other Islamic empires, whereby religion, not ethnicity, was the paramount identity.[14] The expected regime type in these states is an antiethnic one, whereby ethnically diverse Muslim populations are included in the citizenry but assimilated into new national cultures. Unlike in the first (Western) group, however, in this set of countries, religious communal identities are expected to persist at the legal and official level in some way or another, as it was under Islamic law.[15] States with monoethnic and multiethnic regimes are expected to be rare in this group.

State Policies on Ethnicity in Western, Post-Communist, and Muslim-majority countries: Expectations and Findings

At least three experts of ethnic politics for 172 countries in the world with a population over 250,000 were identified by a team of seven research assistants under my supervision at Koc University. Currently, there are more than eight hundred experts identified and more than a hundred contacted, and these numbers continue to grow as the project is ongoing. All the experts are contacted by me as the principle investigator, and the experts who participate in the survey have the choice of remaining anonymous or revealing their identity in any public materials resulting from the survey. All survey responses received from Western, post-Communist, and Muslim-majority third world countries up until August 12, 2011, are included in the analysis in this paper. Now I turn to the review and analysis of cross-national results for each policy area. These results are also summarized in the Appendix.

Policy no.1: Is there an ethnic group privileged in naturalization or citizenship? This is the primary policy that distinguishes states with monoethnic regimes from multiethnic and antiethnic ones.

Expectations no.1: Muslim-majority states, as well as most Western and post-Communist states, are *not* expected to have ethnic-priority naturalization or citizenship policies, since these states are supposed to have multiethnic or antiethnic (assimilationist) nation-state models. On the other hand, some East-Central European states influenced by ethnic German nationalism historically and the Yugoslav successor states are expected to have ethnic-priority citizenship, which is the primary and most unmistakable symptom of having a monoethnic regime type.

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[13] Michael A. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
[14] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[15] Akturk, "Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy"

Findings no.1: Fifteen of the thirty-five states examined have ethnic priority naturalization and citizenship policies. Half of post-Communist countries (eight of sixteen), almost half of Western countries (six of thirteen) have, but only one out of six Muslim-majority countries has, ethnic priority naturalization and citizenship.

Conclusions no.1: All six Western countries with ethnic priority citizenship policies, except one, are located to the east of Germany geographically, stretching from Finland in the north to Cyprus and Israel in the south, and their founding nationalisms are influenced by the ethnic variety attributed to Germany.[16] These countries are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Israel. These findings seemingly confirm the expectation with regards to the Western group, namely that this group would be further subdivided into a civic (antiethnic) variety influenced by the early wave of French/American nationalism, and an ethnic (monoethnic) variety influenced by the later wave of German nationalism. Likewise, the finding of only one Muslim-majority country with ethnic-priority citizenship policy confirms the expectation that monoethnic regime type would be rare in Muslim-majority countries due to a legal and socio-political legacy that emphasized the common religious identity of ethnically diverse populations. However, the finding of ethnic priority citizenship among half of the post-communist countries seemingly contradicts the expectation of multiethnic regime among this group. Even though a closer look demonstrates that four of the eight post-communist countries with ethnic priority citizenship policies are Yugoslav successor states (Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia), which was expected. However, another three Yugoslav successor states (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia) do not have ethnic priority citizenship, contradicting the same expectation. It appears that about half of the post-Communist countries overturned the multiethnic regime that is a Communist legacy, and adopted ethnic priority citizenship policies that put them closer to the monoethnic regime type.

Policy no.2: Is there a preference given to an ethnic group in immigration? This is also a policy that distinguishes states with monoethnic regimes from multiethnic and antiethnic ones.

Expectations no.2: Exactly the same expectations with regards to the first policy (of ethnic priority citizenship) apply here, with the additional expectation that, for these policies to cohere as "ethnicity regimes" that I described, states that have ethnic priority citizenship are also strongly expected to have ethnic priority immigration schemes.

Findings no.2: Fourteen out of thirty-five states have ethnic priority immigration policies. All six Western states with ethnic priority citizenship, plus Norway; all post-Communist states except Estonia and Montenegro, plus Ukraine, have ethnic priority immigration policy, while no Muslim-majority state has such a policy.

Conclusions no.2: The high correlation of ethnic priority citizenship and immigration policies indicates that these policies are not randomly distributed but "clustered by

[16] For example, consider the Central and Eastern European origins of Zionism, particularly of its Revisionist version espoused by Jabotinsky. Nadav Shelef, *Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel, 1925-2005* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

regime types."[17] Hence, six Western and six post-Communist countries that employ both policies are likely to have monoethnic regimes.

Policy no.3: Is there an officially defined ethnic minority status? Since ethnic minority status implies an "ethnic" majority, this is also a policy that distinguishes states with monoethnic regimes from multiethnic and antiethnic ones, though more indirectly than the first two.

Expectations no.3: Exactly the same expected distribution of states with regards to the first two policies (of ethnic priority citizenship and immigration) applies here.

Findings no.3: Nineteen out of thirty-five states officially have ethnic minority status. While only half of the Western states have ethnic minority status, an overwhelming majority of post-Communist states (thirteen out of sixteen) do. Equally significantly, none of the Muslim-majority states have ethnic minority status.

Conclusions no.3: An official ethnic minority status implies an ethnic majority and, if combined with ethnic priority citizenship and immigration policies, fully evidences a monoethnic regime type. A total of ten states, four Western and six post-Communist, display these three policies of monoethnic regime type at once: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, and Israel, as well as Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, and Slovenia. Greece, Ireland, and Montenegro do not have ethnic minority status, even though they have ethnic priority citizenship and immigration, demonstrating that ethnicity is the most important but not the only determinant of nationality in these contexts.

Policy no.4: Is there an officially defined religious minority status? Combined with ethnic minority status, especially where ethnic and religious differences overlap, religious minority status might further reinforce and harden ethno-religious exclusions. In contrast, in the absence of an ethnic minority status, especially where ethnic and religious differences are crosscutting, religious minority status might indicate more permeable ethnic boundaries and more impermeable religious boundaries, hinting at monoreligous, rather than monoethnic nationhood.

Expectations no.4: Post-communist states, due to the legacy of militant atheism under Communism, are not expected to have religious minority status. In contrast, Muslim-majority states, due to the historical legacy of religion-based communal organizations in Islamic political and legal tradition, are expected to have religious minority status. Western states are again expected to vary, with civic states of Western Europe not having religious minority status while ethnic states of Eastern Europe having religious minority status in order to aggravate ethnic distinctions.

Findings no.4: Only twelve of thirty-five states have religious minority status. In a reversal of earlier patterns, while only a clear minority of Western (five out of thirteen) and post-Communist (four out of sixteen) states have religious minority status, half of the Muslim-majority states (Algeria, Egypt, and Iran) do.

[17] Akturk, "Regimes of Ethnicity," p.119, quoted from Esping-Anderson, 1990, p.26.

Conclusions no.4: Some of the expectations are confirmed. While an overwhelming majority of post-Communist states had ethnic minority status, only four of them have religious minority status, and of these four, two are Muslim-majority post-Communist states. While none of the Muslim-majority states had ethnic minority status, half of them have religious minority status, but the fact that the other half do not, casts a serious doubt on the assumption of an uninterrupted continuity with Islamic legal-political tradition in communal classification. Three of the Western and two of the post-Communist states have both ethnic and religious minority status along with both ethnic priority citizenship and immigration policies, indicating strictly monoethnic regimes with an ethno-religious core. These are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Israel, and Poland. Greece and Ireland, which do have ethnic priority citizenship and immigration, but not ethnic minority status, have religious minority status, indicating that internally they may be more open to assimilating different ethnic groups belonging to the dominant religious tradition, while excluding religious minorities.

Policy no.5: Is there more than one ethnic group mentioned in the Constitution? In the absence of ethnic exclusions through citizenship, immigration, and minority status, this policy, along with two others, serves to distinguish multiethnic and antiethnic regimes. Mention of multiple ethnic groups in the constitution may imply a multiethnic definition of nationhood, especially if the language employed in the constitution indicates that these ethnic groups together constitute the nation.

Expectations no.5: Post-communist states are expected to have multiple ethnic categories in their constitutions, a legacy of Marxist-Leninist understanding of multiethnic nationhood, while civic Western states are expected to eschew such ethnic categories in their constitutions. There is no clear expectation for Muslim-majority states.

Findings no.5: Twelve out of thirty-five states, including a clear minority of both Western and post-Communist states, and half the Muslim-majority states, have multiple ethnic categories in their constitutions.

Conclusions no.5: Expectations were contradicted in the case of post-communist states, large majority of which do not have multiple ethnic categories in their constitutions. Another seeming contradiction is to find that Cyprus, Finland, and Israel, three of the four Western states that have ethnic priority citizenship, immigration, and ethnic minority status, also have more than one ethnic group mentioned in their constitutions. At a closer look, however, one sees that the other ethnic categories mentioned in their constitutions are mentioned as ethnic and/or religious minorities in relation to a titular ethno-religious majority, and not as equal ethnic groups that together constitute the Cypriot, the Finnish, or the Israeli nation. This is also clearly the case in Croatia and Slovenia. For example, Croats are described as the titular nation, even though twenty-two minorities are also mentioned in the Croatian constitution. Belgium is the only state among the thirty-five where the mentioning of three ethno-linguistic categories indisputably indicates that the nation is made up of the union of these three groups, while Macedonia imperfectly approaches the same model.

Policy no.6: Is there a reference to a specific religion in the Constitution? If there is, it might lead to religion-based exclusions. This policy is expected to have an impact similar to the existence of religious minority status; deepening ethnic exclusions where ethnicity overlaps with religion, but softening ethnic exclusions where most ethnic groups belong to the same religion. The existence of religion in the constitution and religious minority status in a country in the absence of ethnic-priority citizenship, immigration, and ethnic minority status would indicate the primacy of religion over ethnicity in nation building.

Expectations no.6: Same as in policy no.4, post-communist states are highly unlikely to have religion in the constitution, while Muslim-majority countries are highly likely to, and Western states are expected to bifurcate along ethnic-civic fault line observed earlier.

Findings no.6: Fourteen of the thirty-five states examined have religion in their constitution. Three-quarters of post-communist countries do not have religion in the constitution, while all Muslim-majority countries except one do, hence confirming the expectations. Five Western countries (Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Norway) also have religion in the constitution.

Conclusions no.6: Ethnic exclusions are likely to be exacerbated where they overlap with religious differences in these countries. Despite the confirmation of the expectations, it is notable that the most populous Muslim nation, Indonesia, with more Muslims than all the other Muslim-majority countries examined here combined, does not have religion in its constitution, while three of the four post-Communist states with religion in their constitutions are significantly diverse in their religious demography (Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia), indicating a high risk of religious exclusions.

Policy no.7: Is there more than one official language? The existence of more than one official language in the absence of ethnic priority citizenship, immigration, and ethnic minority status, is a strong indicator of a multiethnic regime, whereas one official language only is an indicator either of an antiethnic (assimilationist) or a monoethnic regime, depending on the first three policies.

Expectations no.7: Post-communist states are expected to have multiple official languages, again a Communist legacy of multiethnic nationhood, whereas Western states, whether of the antiethnic (civic-assimilationist) or monoethnic variety, are not expected to. Muslim-majority states, in line with the idea of downplaying ethnic differences in favor of religion, might not be expected to have multiple languages.

Findings no.7: Sixteen of the thirty-five countries, including a large majority of Western states (ten out of thirteen) and a sizable minority of post-communist states (six of sixteen) have more than one official language. No Muslim-majority country has more than one official language.

Conclusions no.7: Expectations about both Western and post-Communist states are contradicted, while the expectations about Muslim-majority states are confirmed. There is

no apparent explanation for the fact that many highly linguistically diverse post-communist countries (Bulgaria, Ukraine, Tajikistan) are officially monolingual while many highly linguistically homogenous Western countries (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Norway) are officially multilingual. In the latter cases multiple official languages at the regional or national level are mostly imperial legacies (Swedish in Finland, English in Ireland, Turkish in Cyprus, Hungarian in Austria). But why Russian or some other language does not have the same status in post-Communist countries, making them officially multilingual? Since Soviet rule was very recent and Russian is, de facto, still the lingua franca in urban spaces and among elites in many post-Soviet countries, these states might be pursuing a policy of not granting Russian (or other languages) official status in order to ensure that the titular language overtakes Russian in daily usage. On the other hand, provisions for multiple languages in the constitutions of several Western and Post-Communist states, including Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Macedonia, clearly indicative of a multiethnic regime, whereby the nation is conceived of as the union of multiple ethno-linguistic groups.

Policy no.8: Is there ethnically based territorial autonomy? The existence of ethnic territorial autonomy, if combined by the mentioning of multiple ethnic groups and/or languages in the constitution, is the definitive indicator of a multiethnic regime type. *Expectations no.8:* Therefore some post-Communist countries are likely to have ethnic territorial autonomy as a Communist legacy of multiethnic nationhood, whereas Western and Muslim-majority states are unlikely to have it.

Findings no.8: Only eight out of thirty-five states, four Western, three post-Communist, and one Muslim-majority, have ethnic territorial autonomy. These are Belgium, Finland, Norway, United Kingdom, Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Indonesia.

Conclusions no.8: Expectations are confirmed insofar as the overwhelming majority of Western and Muslim-majority states do not have ethnic territorial autonomy, but they are contradicted insofar as very few post-Communist states do. Combined with the mention of multiple ethnic categories or languages in the constitution, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Georgia qualify as the only fully multiethnic regimes among the thirty-five examined. Upon closer analysis of the explanations provided by the experts on this survey question, it is clear that the special autonomous status of Åland in Finland, Sami areas in northern Norway, Karakalpakistan in Uzbekistan, and Aceh and Papua in Indonesia, do not render these polities as "ethno-federal," but rather denotes an exceptional status for a specific region within the state. United Kingdom after the devolution, with the autonomous status of Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, each with an ethno-linguistic character, occupies a midpoint between these cases and full ethnic federations such as Belgium and Bosnia Herzegovina.

Policy no.9: Is there ethnically specific information in the census? Counting citizens and/or residents on the basis of ethnicity is a symptom of multiethnic and monoethnic regimes while assimilationist antiethnic regimes deliberately eschew categorizing their subjects on an ethnic basis.

Expectations no.9: Post-communist states are expected to have ethnicity in their censuses, since it is a Communist legacy of multiethnic nationhood, as well as monoethnic regimes within the Western group, which need ethnic censuses to distinguish ethnic minorities from the ethnic majority, the titular from the non-titular. Civic, assimilationist Western states, and Muslim-majority states that privilege religion over ethnicity, are expected not to have ethnicity in the census.

Findings no.9: Twenty-three states, nine out of the thirteen Western, thirteen out of the fifteen post-Communist, and one out of six Muslim-majority states have ethnicity in the census.

Conclusions no.9: Expectations about both post-Communist and Muslim-majority states are confirmed, since only one Muslim-majority state but an overwhelming majority of post-Communist states have ethnicity in their censuses. Only post-Communist Serbia does not have ethnicity in its census, whereas post-Communist Uzbekistan did not yet have a census since independence so it is unclear whether there would be ethnicity or not if and once a census is taken. All other post-Communist states have ethnicity in their censuses. In contrast, only Muslim-majority Indonesia has ethnicity in its census. As expected, Western states that have policies symptomatic of monoethnic regimes, such as ethnic priority citizenship and immigration policies and ethnic minority status, also had ethnicity in their censuses. These include Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Israel, and Norway. Ethnicity in the census further confirms these states' proximity to the monoethnic regime type. Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, also have ethnicity in their censuses, while not having any policies symptomatic of a monoethnic regime type. Having ethnicity in the census in the absence of any policies symptomatic of a monoethnic regime type indicates that these three states are closer to the multiethnic regime type.

Policy no.10: Is there religiously specific information in the census? Where it exists, religiously specific information in the census might have a function similar to religious minority status and religion in the constitution, discussed above, with possible interaction effects with ethnically specific policies, also discussed above.

Expectations no.10: Expectations are the same as in policies no.4 and no.6. Post-communist states are highly unlikely to have religion in the census, while Muslim-majority countries are highly likely to, and Western states are expected to bifurcate along ethnic-civic fault line observed earlier.

Findings no.10: Twenty-one states, including seven of thirteen Western, eleven of fifteen post-Communist, and three of six Muslim-majority states, have religion in the census.

Conclusions no. 10: Expectations on post-communist states are sharply contradicted, since an overwhelming majority of post-Communist states have religion in their censuses even though they Communist legacy would predict otherwise. Moreover, the results for Muslim-majority states are equivocal. Since half of Muslim-majority states categorize their subjects on the basis of religion but the other half do not, it is not possible to

confirm the hypothesis that there is continuity with Islamic legal-political tradition of categorizing subjects on the basis of religion. There is a weak confirmation of the expectations with regards to the Western states: Those Western states that have other symptoms of having a monoethnic regime, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Israel, and Norway, have religion in the census. However, Switzerland and the United Kingdom also do.

Policy no.11: Is there an official record of every individual's ethnicity? Official record of every individual's ethnicity is the microfoundation of monoethnic and multiethnic regimes, and represents a step further than ethnicity in the census or ethnic minority status, and directly defines the individual as an ethnic subject in its relation with the state.

Expectations no.11: Post-communist states are expected to have official records of every individual's ethnicity, such as ethnic identification cards, since it is a Communist legacy, whereas Muslim-majority states are expected not to have it, since they are expected to have an antiethnic regimes, which emphasize religion and downplay ethnicity in the relations between state and the individual.

Findings no.11: Twelve states, including half of the post-Communist states and a third of the Western states, have official records of every individual's ethnicity, while none of the Muslim-majority states do.

Conclusions no.11: Expectations are mostly confirmed. Despite the fact that individual ethnic records are found in a minority of states around the word, half of the post-Communist states still have such records in personal identification documents, and some that do not, until recently had (Georgia and Ukraine, for example). There is no Muslim-majority state with individual ethnic records, which is also a clear confirmation of the expectation that Muslim states are likely to have antiethnic regimes, and if any identity, they are likely to emphasize religious identities over ethnic ones. Finally, of the four Western states with individual ethnic records, three of them, Cyprus, Israel, and Norway, are indeed states that have adopted many policies symptomatic of monoethnic regimes, whereas the other one, Luxembourg, approximates a multiethnic regime type.

Policy no.12: Is there an official record of every individual's religion? Official record of every individual's ethnicity might have a function similar to, but represents a step further than, religiously specific information in the census, religious minority status, and religion in the constitution, discussed above, with possible interaction effects with ethnically specific policies, also discussed above.

Expectations no.12: The expectations are the same as in policies no.4, 6, and 10. Post-communist states are highly unlikely to have records of individual's religion, while Muslim-majority countries are highly likely to, and Western states are expected to bifurcate along ethnic-civic fault line observed earlier.

Findings no.12: Twelve states, including three Western, four post-Communist, and five Muslim-majority, have an official record of every individual's religion.

Conclusions no.12: Expectations are mostly confirmed, since all Muslim-majority countries except one record individuals' religion, while a clear minority of Western and post-Communist states do. It is only surprising that as many as four post-Communist states have records of individuals' religion, whereas only three Western states, Austria, Israel, and Switzerland, do. Based on the higher numbers of Western states with symptoms of a monoethnic regimes found in earlier questions, one would expect more of them to have individual religious records.

Policy no.13: Is there ethnically based affirmative action? Ethnic affirmative action might be an important symptom of multiethnic regime type, unless it is accompanied by monoethnic policies such as ethnic minority status and/or ethnic priority citizenship and immigration policies, in which case affirmative action would be a partial compensation for systematic and ongoing exclusion of the minority and the domination of the titular ethnicity within state and society.

Expectations no.13: Post-communist states, and Western states with a monoethnic and multiethnic orientation, are likely to have ethnically based affirmative action. Muslim-majority states and Western states with an antiethnic, assimilationist orientation are not likely to have ethnically based affirmative action.

Findings no.13: Twelve states, including four Western, seven post-Communist, and one Muslim-majority, have ethnically based affirmative action.

Conclusions no.13: Expectations are mostly confirmed since no Muslim-majority state has ethnically based affirmative action, whereas almost half of the post-Communist states do. Only four Western states have ethnically based affirmative action. As expected, three of these four, Cyprus, Finland, and Greece, are states with otherwise monoethnic policies (ethnic priority citizenship, immigration, minority status, etc.) that appear to be compensating for demographically marginal, highly excluded ethno-religious minorities within their citizenry. In contrast, ethnically based affirmative action confirms United Kingdom's tendency towards a multiethnic regime.

Policy no.14: Is there an establishment/national church/religion? Existence of a national, establishment church has a function similar to the existence of a religion in the constitution, religious minority status, religion in the census, and religion in individual identification documents (policies 4, 6, 10, 12). It excludes subjects who do not belong to that church.

Expectations no.14: The expectations are the same as in policies 4, 6, 10, and 12. Post-communist states are highly unlikely to have an establishment/national church, while Muslim-majority countries are highly likely to, and Western states are expected to bifurcate along ethnic-civic fault line observed earlier.

Findings no.14: Thirteen states, including seven Western, four post-Communist, and two Muslim-majority, have establishment/national religions.

Conclusions no.14: Expectations for the Muslim-majority countries are contradicted, since two-thirds of them do not have establishment/national religions, only Egypt and Iran have. On the other hand, the expectation that post-Communist countries would not have establishment/national churches is confirmed as three quarters of them do not, only Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, and Tajikistan do. Finally, five of the seven Western countries that have national/establishment churches are also countries that exhibited multiple symptoms of a monoethic regime type earlier: Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Israel, and Norway. The existence of a national church is likely to reinforce and harden the exclusion of ethno-religious minorities within these polities.

Policy no.15: Is there instruction about one or many religions in public schools, or schools partially funded through public resources? Religious instruction in public schools is likely to lead to the exclusion of atheists and agnostics. Moreover, if religious instruction is provided for only one religion, or a few religions to the exclusion of other religions with significant numbers of adherents among the population, it likely to alienate religious minorities.

Expectations no.15: The expectations are the same as in policies 4, 6, 10, 12, and 14. Post-communist states are highly unlikely to have religious instruction in public schools, while Muslim-majority countries are highly likely to, and Western states are expected to bifurcate along ethnic-civic fault line observed earlier.

Findings no.15: Twenty-six of the thirty-five states, including all Western states, five of the six Muslim-majority states, and eight of the sixteen post-Communist states, have instruction in one or many religions in public schools.

Conclusions no.15: The findings contradict the expectations for both Western and post-Communist states, since religious education was not expected to be found in *all* Western states, and it was not expected to be found in as many as half of the post-Communist states. Since the question asks for instruction in one or many religions, whether religious instruction fosters antiethnic assimilation, monoethnic segreation/exclusion, or a sense of multiethnic nationhood, is unclear.

Tentative Conclusions: Distribution of Western, Post-Communist, and Muslim-Majority States by Ethnic Regime Types

What kind of tentative conclusions can one reach, based on the preliminary results of the Regimes of Ethnicity survey, which were provided and analyzed above for each of the fifteen policy areas under consideration? First, the policy choices of Western, post-Communist, and Muslim-majority states in these fifteen policy areas were meaningfully clustered where we expected them to based on the assumptions I outlined throughout this paper. Those assumptions were mainly informed by the presumption that, 1) Muslim-majority states, due to the influence of an Islamic political-legal legacy of organizing subjects based on religion, downplay ethnic differences among their citizenry as a principle of state policy, and hence Muslim-majority states will be closer to the antiethnic regime type, 2) Post-Communist countries, due to the influence of a Communist legacy of multiethnic nationhood best exemplified in the models of Soviet Union and

Yugoslavia, emphasize ethnic differences but will conceive of the nation as a union of different ethnic groups, and hence post-Communist states will be closer to the multiethnic regime type, 3) Western states bifurcate between those that are influenced by German variant of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe in particular, and those that are influenced by French variant of civic nationalism in Western Europe in particular. The former will be closer to the monoethnic regime type while the latter will be closer to the antiethnic regime type. While my expectations based on these assumptions were mostly confirmed by the findings on specific policies, when these policies are combined to characterize the ethnic regime types of these states as a whole, we have a more mixed picture.

None of the Muslim-majority countries have ethnic priority citizenship, ethnic priority immigration, or ethnic minority status, with one exception only: Mauritania has had privileged citizenship for some groups in the 1980s. This sets the group of Muslim-majority countries apart from both Western and post-Communist groups, both of which have many members with monoethnic regimes. Moreover, only two Muslim-majority countries, Algeria and Mauritania, have one policy that debatably puts them closer to the multiethnic regime type: Mentioning of more than one ethnic group in their constitutions. However, this alone is a weak indicator of a multiethnic regime type, and hence, although I tentatively concluded that Algeria and Mauritania as having multiethnic regimes, I qualified that conclusion with brackets. With the partial exception of Algeria and Mauritania, the remaining Muslim-majority states, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Jordan, strictly fall under an antiethnic regime type, whereby the state accepts a multiethnic population as its citizenry, but does not allow the expression of ethnic diversity, instead opting for assimilation (Table 1).

Table 1. Western, Post-Communist, and Muslim-Majority States by Ethnic Regime Type

	Monoethnic	Antiethnic	Multiethnic
Western	Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Norway (N=7)	Italy United Kingdom (N=2)	*Belgium* Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland (N=4)
Post-Communist	Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia (N=7)	Albania Tajikistan Ukraine Uzbekistan (N=4)	*Bosnia Herzegovina* *Georgia* Kosovo Macedonia (N=4)
Muslim-majority Third World		Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan (N=4)	(Algeria, Mauritania) (N=2)
Explanations on classification	These all have ethnic-priority citizenship, and/or ethnic priority immigration, and some also have ethnic minority status	These all lack ethnic-priority citizenship, immigration, and ethnic minority status, *and*, they have no symptom of a multiethnic regime type	These all lack ethnic-priority citizenship, immigration, and ethnic minority status, *and,* they either have multiple ethnic groups and/or multiple official languages and/or ethnic territorial autonomy in

			their Constitution

The largest numbers of both Western and post-Communist states appear to have monoethnic regimes, meaning that they have ethnic-priority citizenship and/or ethnic priority immigration, and have a number of other policies such as ethnic and/or religious minority status, ethnicity in the census and identification documents, which help the state to distinguish titular, state-bearing ethnicity from others. This result is not surprising and is expected for Western states, since a large group of them are known to be influenced by the ethnic variant of nationalism historically associated with Germany, but it is somewhat surprising and unexpected coming from post-Communist states, since they are supposed to have a Marxist-Leninist legacy of multiethnic nationhood. We must then conclude, as was suggested briefly earlier, that a large segment of post-Communist states rejected the Communist legacy of multiethnic nationhood through the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, embraced a monoethnic regime in structuring their new nations.

However, it is also noteworthy that four post-Communist states, all of them successor states of either Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, maintain multiethnic regimes, meaning that they lack ethnic-priority citizenship, immigration, and ethnic minority status, *and,* they either have multiple ethnic groups and/or multiple official languages and/or ethnic territorial autonomy in their constitutions. Among these, Bosnia Herzegovina and Georgia have fuller multiethnic regimes with ethnic territorial autonomy, whereas Kosovo and Macedonia have multiple official languages and ethnic groups mentioned in their constitution, but without territorial autonomy. Likewise, four small Western European countries located between France and Germany, the Benelux countries and the Switzerland, have multiethnic regimes with multiple official languages, but only Belgium has a full multiethnic regime with ethnic territorial autonomy. Finally, several post-Communist and Western countries, lacking any policies that privilege an ethnic group in citizenship and immigration, but also lacking ethnic territorial autonomy, multiple official languages or multiple ethnic groups in their constitutions, have antiethnic regimes based on assimilation of an ethnically diversity population.

In conclusion, while Western, Communist, or Islamic legacies provide useful and often correct predictions about particular state policies in a given country, these legacies are poor predictors of the overall ethnic regime type.

APPENDIX: Results of the Regimes of Ethnicity Project (Western, post-Communist, and Muslim-majority states are written in blue, red, and green, respectively)

QUESTION	*YES*	*NO*
1. Is there an ethnic group privileged in naturalization or citizenship?	Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece(x2), Ireland, Israel, [T=6] Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, [T=8] Mauritania [T=1]	Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK [T=7] Albania, Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, [T=8] Algeria(x2), Egypt, Indonesia(x2), Iran, Jordan, [T=5]
2) Is there a preference given to an ethnic group in immigration?	Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Norway [T=7] Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine [T=7]	Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK [T=6] Albania, Bosnia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan [T=9] Algeria(x2), Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Mauritania, [T=6]
3) Is there an officially defined ethnic minority status?	Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Israel, Italy, Norway, [T=6] Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, [T=13]	Belgium, Greece(x2), Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK(x2), [T=6] Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, [T=3] Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Mauritania, Iran [T=6]
4) Is there an officially defined religious minority status?	Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, [T=5] Bulgaria, Poland, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan [T=4] Algeria, Egypt, Iran, [T=3]	Belgium, Cyprus, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK [T=8] Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine, [T=12] Indonesia(x2), Jordan, Mauritania, [T=3]
5) Is there more than one ethnic group mentioned in the Constitution?	Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Israel, [T=4] Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, [T=5] Algeria, Iran, Mauritania,	Austria, Greece(x2), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK [T=9] Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria,

	[T=3]	Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland(x2), Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, [T=11] Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, [T=3]
6) Is there a reference to a specific religion in the Constitution?	Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Norway [T=5] Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Poland [T=4] Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Mauritania, [T=5]	Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK [T=8] Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan [T=12] Indonesia [T=1]
7) Is there more than one official language?	Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, [T=10] Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia [T=6]	Greece, Italy, UK [T=3] Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, [T=10] Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Mauritania [T=6]
8) Is there ethnically based territorial autonomy?	Belgium, Finland, Norway, UK [T=4] Bosnia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, [T=3] Indonesia [T=1]	Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland [T=9] Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine [T=13] Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Mauritania [T=5]
9) Is there ethnically specific information in the census?	Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, UK [T=9] Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine [T=13] Indonesia [T=1]	Belgium, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, [T=4] Serbia, Uzbekistan (no census), [T=2] Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Mauritania, [T=5]
10) Is there religiously specific information in	Austria, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Switzerland,	Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,

the census?	UK [T=7] Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Slovenia, Tajikistan, [T=11] Egypt, Indonesia, Iran [T=3]	Netherlands [T=6] Latvia, Serbia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (no census), [T=4] Algeria, Jordan, Mauritania [T=3]
11) Is there an official record of every individual's ethnicity?	Cyprus, Israel, Luxembourg, Norway [T=4] Albania, Croatia, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, [T=8]	Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK [T=9] Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia(not anymore), Kosovo, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine(not anymore) [T=8] Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Mauritania [T=6]
12) Is there an official record of every individual's religion?	Austria, Israel, Switzerland, [T=3] Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Tajikistan [T=4] Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, [T=5]	Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, UK, [T=10] Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Latvia, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, [T=12] Mauritania [T=1]
13) Is there ethnically based affirmative action?	Cyprus, Finland, Greece, UK [T=4] Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia [T=7] Mauritania [T=1]	Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, [T=9] Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan [T=9] Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, [T=5]
14) Is there an establishment/national church?	Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy, Norway, UK [T=7] Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, Tajikistan [T=4] Egypt, Iran [T=2]	Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland [T=6] Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan [T=12] Algeria, Indonesia, Jordan,

		Mauritania [T=4]
15) Is there instruction about one or many religions in public schools, or schools partially funded through public resources?	Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK [T=13] Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Poland, Slovenia, Uzbekistan [T=8] Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mauritania [T=5]	Albania, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine [T=8] Jordan [T=1]