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"Kosovo: Delimiting Electoral Districts for a Proportional Representation System " on one page

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# Kosovo: Delimiting Electoral Districts for a Proportional Representation System

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A number of Kosovar political leaders have urged the subdivision of Kosovo into electoral districts for the purpose of central elections. The current electoral system is a closed List Proportional Representation (PR) system with a single Kosovo-wide constituency. Reformers would like to retain the List PR system, but would like to see an open party list instituted in Kosovo and, in conjunction with this, the delimitation of electoral districts. [1]

Delimiting electoral districts is both a technically feasible and, particularly if an open party list is adopted, a desirable modification to the current electoral system in Kosovo. Delimiting districts would serve a number of commendable purposes: it would democratize the election process by decentralizing power within the political parties; it would provide geographic representation for many currently neglected areas of Kosovo; it would improve the accountability of representatives to their constituency voters; and it may decrease voter apathy and increase voter participation in Kosovo. But altering the electoral system to include the delimitation of electoral districts is not a decision to be taken lightly, and it is a decision that must be made well before – preferably at least six months before – the scheduled Election Day.

## Electoral Systems that Delimit Constituencies

Traditionally, electoral systems have been categorized into three groups: plurality systems, majority systems, and proportional representation systems. [2] The most important element that differentiates these electoral systems from one another is the means by which seats in the legislature are allocated: (1) to candidates receiving a plurality of the vote, (2) to candidates obtaining a majority of the vote, and (3) proportionally on the basis of votes cast for political parties or candidates, respectively. A recent addition to these three categories is the mixed electoral system, which combines elements of both proportional representation and plurality or majority voting systems.

The significance of the delimitation process varies depending on the type of electoral system. Because most plurality and majority systems require the adoption of single-member districts and because these systems can produce disproportional election results, the delimitation process, and the decision as to which districting plan to adopt, is quite important. Although somewhat less important in the context of proportional representation systems, it is still essential that the decision on whether or not to delimit districts, and the process by which the delimitation might be accomplished, be given careful consideration.

**Plurality and Majority Systems** The delimitation of electoral districts is most commonly associated with plurality and majority electoral systems. Both systems tend to rely heavily, if not exclusively, on single-member electoral districts. These districts must be redrawn periodically to reflect shifts in the population.

Because of their reliance on single-member districts, the number of seats that a political party receives in these systems depends not only on the proportion of votes it received, but also on where those votes were cast. Under plurality and majority systems, minority political parties whose supporters are not geographically concentrated usually obtain fewer seats than their proportion of the vote would suggest they are entitled [3].

The major advantages associated with plurality and majority systems are that (1) they are usually quite simple to understand; (2) they offer voters a clearly identifiable representative ( beholden to a specific geographic area) that can be held accountable and can be called on to provide information and services; and (3) they foster one-party government that can, in certain instances, enhance the opportunity for a stable and decisive government.

The primary disadvantage of these systems is that they can produce disproportional election results; a party with a small majority of the votes may win a disproportionately large number of legislative seats. Furthermore, smaller political parties and minority groups do not fare particularly well under these systems.

**Proportional Representation Systems** There are three major types of proportional representation systems: the List PR system, the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. The MMP system, because it is a “mixed” system, will be discussed under the “mixed system” section below.

*List PR* This system is the most common PR system. Under the List PR system, if electoral districts are employed, they are relatively large multimember districts with boundaries that generally correspond to administrative divisions. To accommodate shifts in population, the number of seats allocated to individual constituencies is varied rather than redrawing the boundaries of the districts. List PR requires each party to present a list of candidates to the electorate. Electors vote for a party (or, in the case of an open list, for candidates within a certain party); parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the national vote. This system is widely used in continental Europe and Latin America. A closed list PR system, with a single constituency, is the electoral system currently in place in Kosovo.

*Single Transferable Vote (STV) System* This system, used in Ireland and Malta, is another type of proportional representation system. Under an STV system, voters are required to rank candidates in order of preference in the same manner as the Alternative Vote. After the first-place preferences are tallied, a “quota” of votes is established, which a candidate must achieve to be elected. Any candidate who has more first preferences than the quota is immediately elected. If no one has achieved the quota, the candidate with the lowest number of first-preferences is eliminated, and their second preferences are redistributed among remaining candidates. Because voting is on the basis of candidates, not parties, these countries employ small multimember districts with only three to five members elected per district. (This makes the choices on the ballot far more manageable.) Electoral district boundaries must be redrawn periodically.

The strongest argument in favor of PR systems in general is that these systems avoid the anomalous election results of plurality and majority systems and facilitate a more representative legislature. For many newly emerging and transitional democracies, particularly those that face deep societal divisions, the inclusion of all significant groups in the parliament is an essential condition for democratic consolidation.

Other **advantages** include:

1. These systems make it more likely that representatives from minority groups (and women) will be elected.
2. Few wasted votes are cast in proportional systems. Almost all votes cast within a PR system go towards electing a candidate of choice, increasing voters’ perceptions that it is worth making a trip to the polls.
3. Power sharing between parties and interest groups is more visible under these systems.

Some **disadvantages** of PR systems are:

1. PR systems usually lead to coalition governments, which can lead to legislative gridlock and the inability to carry out coherent policies.
2. Some PR systems do not provide a strong linkage between a representative and his or her electorate. (This is not true of an MMP system, however.)

3. PR systems offer a platform for small extremist parties (unless a high threshold is set for obtaining a seat in parliament).
4. Some PR systems are criticized for leaving too much power in the hands of senior party officials (i.e., a candidate's position on the party list, and therefore his or her likelihood of success, is often dependent on one or two party leaders). This is particularly true of a national closed-list PR system.

**Mixed Electoral Systems** Mixed electoral systems are becoming increasingly popular. They are called “mixed” because they employ both party list proportional representation and single-member (or small multimember) electoral districts, often with plurality or majority vote requirements.

Because mixed systems incorporate districts, delimitation must occur periodically in order to ensure electoral districts that are relatively equal in population. The importance of the delimitation process and the influence that district configurations have on the outcome of elections is dependent on whether the party list seats are used to correct any distortions in the relationship between votes cast to seats won produced by the single-member districts.

In countries such as Germany and New Zealand, seats allocated under the party list component of the system are used to compensate for any distortions in the seats-to-votes ratio produced at the electoral district level. Mixed systems that use party list seats in a compensatory manner are referred to as "Mixed Member Proportional" systems because the election results are proportional. (This system is used not only in Germany and New Zealand, but in Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Hungary, and a number of other countries as well.)

In countries such as Russia, the party list seats are not used to compensate for any disproportionality arising from elections in single-member districts [4]. Instead, seats allocated to the parties under the party list component of the election are simply added to the seats won at the electoral district level. The partisan seats-to-votes ratio may therefore be distorted. In this type of mixed system, sometimes called a "parallel" system, the district delimitation process is more important because it can have a more pronounced effect on the partisan composition of the legislature. (Parallel systems are used in Russia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as other countries.)

**Reforming the Electoral System in Kosovo** There is no perfect electoral system; major design criteria often conflict with each other or are even mutually exclusive. For example, increasing the number of seats assigned to each constituency will enhance proportionality (“representativeness”) but will reduce the geographic link between a representative and his or her constituency (“accountability”). Careful consideration must be given to prioritizing the criteria that are most important in a given political context.

Comparative electoral experience suggests that the most important electoral requirement for transitional elections, particularly in a post-conflict situation like that of Kosovo, is a system that maximizes inclusiveness and is clearly fair to all parties. This goal is best achieved by a PR electoral system; no doubt this was the reason that a PR system was adopted in Kosovo. However, since its inception, some political leaders in Kosovo have advocated a change in the electoral system in Kosovo – a change that would not necessarily jeopardize the proportionality of the election results but would, at least in the opinion of many Kosovars, enhance the “democratic nature” of the election process in Kosovo.

The current electoral system is a closed list PR system with a single Kosovo-wide constituency. Reformers would like to see an open party list instituted in Kosovo and, in conjunction with this, the delimitation of electoral districts. (An open party list would be quite cumbersome to manage with 100 Kosovo-wide seats to fill; but with districts in place, the number of seats to fill within each district would probably be one-fifth to one-seventh that size, depending on the number and configuration of the districts employed.)

According to one prominent political leader, delimiting districts and opening the party list in Kosovo would [5]:

- democratize the election process by decentralizing power within the political parties;
- provide geographic representation for many areas of Kosovo currently unrepresented;
- improve the accountability of representatives to their constituency voters; and
- decrease voter apathy and increase voter participation.

These sentiments were echoed by leaders of Reform 2004, an association of well over 200 local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Kosovo [6]. The electoral system advocated by Reform 2004 is a variant of an MMP system,

with seven multimember districts and 30 compensatory seats to ensure proportional representation. Representatives from the seven multimember districts would be elected via an open party list.

Regardless of what type of electoral system is chosen in Kosovo, assuming some system other than the current system (a single-constituency List PR system) is adopted, some delimitation of districts will be required. Although the size of the geographic area encompassed by the electoral constituency will vary depending on the type of electoral system (for example, regional list PR could adopt four or five large regions as the electoral constituencies, while an MMP system would probably require smaller constituencies), some delimitation will almost certainly be necessary. This delimitation could be as simple as adopting existing administrative boundaries (such as the current UNMIK regions) and then allocating parliamentary seats to these constituencies on the basis of population; or it could be as complex as drawing new electoral constituency lines specifically for election purposes.

### **Advantages and Disadvantages of Delimiting Districts**

The major advantage of a change to a districted system (from a single-constituency system) is that districts link elected representatives to a smaller, geographically-defined, constituency. This allows voters to hold representatives accountable – voting them out of office if they do not act in accordance to voters' wishes and returning them to office if they do. A geographic link also facilitates the exchange of information between voters and their representatives and promotes community services on behalf of constituents.

Another advantage to districts (assuming candidates are required to reside in the districts they represent) is that they ensure geographic diversity in the assembly. Of course, geographic diversity could also be mandated in a closed list PR system by establishing geographical distribution requirements on the candidate list, but this can be cumbersome, especially if there are already requirements for gender diversity or other forms of diversity placed on the list. It is even more cumbersome, perhaps even impossible, with an open list.

Districts would also permit the use of an open party list – something that is quite difficult, if not impossible, with a single constituency because the size of the candidate list would be unmanageable.

The most common argument against delimitation is that a districted system produces less proportional election results. This is not necessarily the case, however – an MMP system, for example, produces proportional election results (at least if enough compensatory seats are established).

Opponents of districting have argued that delimiting districts is a contentious and difficult process. Although drawing districts can be a contentious process (it is quite polarizing in the United States, for example), it does not have to be. Even in plurality or majority systems dependent entirely on single-member districts, the process can be quite routine and subject to little controversy. (This is true, in fact, of most countries that redistrict.) Moreover, in MMP systems like Germany and New Zealand, the process does not even register on the political radar. Delimitation need not be difficult, either; for example, if seats are simply allocated to already existing administrative units, the process can be managed quickly with little effort or resources required.

Delimitation may require an additional step in the voter verification process (potential residents will have to prove residence not just within the country, but within a specific district); it can also complicate absentee voting procedures and candidate eligibility verification. (On the other hand, if local elections have been incorporated into the election process and local administrative boundaries are not breached by electoral district lines, then it is not true that an additional step would be required.) Adding a district component may also make the ballot more complex by requiring two ballots rather than one. However, this problem can be alleviated with a single ballot MMP system.

A final drawback to delimiting districts, depending on the type of electoral system in which the districts are employed, is that the districting component may make the vote counting process more complex. While this is not true of most plurality and majority systems, it is true of mixed systems.

### **The Delimitation Process in Kosovo**

Kosovo used a single-constituency closed list PR system for the assembly elections held in 2001 [7]. A number of political leaders and local NGOs are advocating a change in this system for the upcoming (and future) central elections. Of primary interest to these reformers is the institution of an open party list. However, because a Kosovo-wide single constituency would make an open ballot quite unrealistic, electoral districts have been also been

promoted. Electoral districts offer the added advantages of guaranteeing geographic diversity and forging a closer link between voters and their representatives.

Two alternative approaches exist for delimiting electoral boundaries in Kosovo:

- Existing administrative boundaries can be used for electoral purposes.
- Electoral constituencies can be drawn that are unique (and separate from the administrative structure).

The latter option would involve a great many resources, and would be a time-consuming and labor-intensive endeavor. This would not be the case, however, if existing administrative units are used for electoral constituencies.

### **Current Administrative Units Used as Electoral Constituencies**

There are several different sets of administrative units in existence in Kosovo:

- The five UNMIK regions
- The seven regions used by the Statistical Institute to collect and report data
- The seven telephone exchanges (all identified with specific municipalities)
- The 30 municipalities across Kosovo

Co-opting administrative units for use as electoral constituencies offers several important advantages:

- Using already existing boundaries would negate the need to draw an entirely new set of electoral boundaries (which would be an extremely expensive and time consuming task).
- Using existing administrative units would mean that election administrators and voters would already be familiar with the electoral district boundaries.
- There is population data associated with these existing administrative units, making the exercise of allocating seats to constituencies easier, and more accurate, than would otherwise be the case.

On the other hand, there is at least one disadvantage associated with the use of existing administrative boundaries: the administrative units were not necessarily designed to encompass communities of interest, and could conceivably cut across ethnic lines and divide homogeneous groups that should be united in a single electoral constituency. In fact, in Kosovo, Serbian and other minority ethnic enclaves do not appear to cross municipal boundaries and therefore, so long as municipalities were assigned in their entirety to specific districts, minority ethnic communities of interest would not be divided by electoral district boundaries.

If the decision is reached to use current administrative units for electoral purposes, then the question remains as to which set of units to employ for electoral purposes. Of course, a large part of this decision is dependent on the type of electoral system adopted. For example, if a regional list PR system is selected, then the choice of administrative units is limited to the larger units (the five UNMIK regions, for example) since the electoral constituencies must be large enough to permit the allocation of several seats to each constituency. On the other hand, if an MMP system is adopted, then electoral constituencies could be smaller in size (i.e., perhaps as small as the municipalities).

The electoral system proposed by Reform 2004 includes seven electoral districts. While the districts in the current Reform 2004 proposal do not coincide exactly with either the seven regions defined by the Statistical Institute or the seven telephone exchange areas, this could easily be modified – and probably should be so that there is no question as to why certain municipalities have been assigned to certain districts.

### **Delimitation of New and Unique Electoral Constituencies**

The delimitation of constituencies in Kosovo specifically for the purposes of the election of representatives to parliament would be an enormous undertaking both in terms of the time needed and the resources required. The process would involve a number of steps, including: (1) the construction of a delimitation database; (2) the creation of a districting plan by allocating territory to specific electoral districts; and (3) the evaluation of the proposed districting plan and the adoption of a final districting plan.

*Construction of a Database* Delimitation requires the collection of several different types of information. The two essential pieces of information are population data and maps. The population data, which is typically in the form of

census enumeration data or voter registration data, provide the only means of creating constituencies that are relatively equal in population. Maps are needed to ensure that only contiguous geographic population units are assigned to constituencies and that constituency boundaries do not divide communities of interest unnecessarily.

*Formation of Electoral Constituencies* Once a database has been prepared, the next step in the delimitation process is the formation of electoral constituencies. This is the step in which the line drawers create a districting plan by assigning geographic units such as towns and villages (or city blocks) to constituencies. A redistricting plan is complete when all geographic units in the jurisdiction have been assigned to specific constituencies and the required number of electoral districts has been created.

*Evaluation of Redistricting Plan* Once the boundary authority has successfully completed a redistricting plan, summary information for the plan should be produced in order to evaluate the plan. A summary description of a redistricting plan should include information such as the geographic components of each constituency, maps of the plan showing the constituency boundaries, and a report summarizing the most relevant statistical information for each constituency in the plan.

This information should allow the boundary authority, political parties, legislators and governmental officials, citizens, and other interested stakeholders to evaluate the proposed redistricting plan according to established criteria. Public hearings may be held to solicit the comments of these stakeholders. After the solicitation process has been completed, the authority in charge of delimitation should endeavor to take these comments into account, and modify the redistricting plan accordingly.

The final stage of the process is the adoption of the new redistricting plan. Provisions for how this is accomplished should be described quite explicitly in the electoral law. In fact, the entire process (who should draw the constituencies, what criteria should be followed, etc.) should be mapped out as clearly as possible beforehand to guide authorities in charge of the process.

*Conclusion* It is not technically feasible (given the lack of sufficiently refined data and the current time constraints) for the delimitation of a unique set of electoral districts (especially single-member districts) for the 2004 central election. Furthermore, the delimitation of unique electoral districts could well prove a political nightmare in future elections and is not recommended for Kosovo.

### **Delimiting Districts in Kosovo for the 2004 Central Elections**

If electoral districts are to be adopted for the 2004 central elections, these districts should be based on current administrative district lines. The basis for this assertion is at least threefold:

- The existing population data (voter registration data) is insufficiently refined for the delimitation of unique electoral district boundaries (at least boundaries that cross municipal boundaries).
- The risk of political tensions arising during an active delimitation exercise is certainly not minimal, and therefore the delimitation of a unique set of electoral districts is best avoided.
- There is not enough time at this point (mid-February) in the election calendar to engage in a detailed delimitation exercise.

However, there is sufficient information – and enough time – at this point to modify the electoral system to include electoral districts if these districts coincide with currently existing administrative boundaries.

Although the OSCE outlined a number of objections to changing the electoral system, they did concede that districting prior to the upcoming October 2004 elections was still “technically feasible.” [8] Some of the arguments offered by OSCE for not districting in Kosovo, and the reasons why these objections are not necessarily well-founded, are as follows:

- *Districts could lead to less proportional election results* While it is true that single-member districts could result in less than proportional election results, the electoral system proposed by Reform 2004, for example, would be no less proportional than the current Kosovo-wide List PR system. And this is true of any MMP or regional List PR electoral system that incorporates districts.
- *Existing data is insufficient for ensuring districts of equal size* Although no accurate census data exists [9], there is up-to-date voter registration data that can be used to allocate seats to electoral districts. Voter

registration data is, in fact, quite often used for this purpose [10].

- *Districts require complicated procedures for voter eligibility and for absentee voter assignment* Since the voter registration process must already take into account voter residence for municipal elections, so long as municipal boundaries are not crossed by electoral districts lines (i.e., municipalities are allocated intact to a single electoral district), voter eligibility and absentee voter assignment will not be affected by the introduction of electoral districts.
- *Ballot creation and distribution would be more complicated* It is true that the single party ballot would have to be supplemented with five to seven additional ballots (one for each district) and that all of these ballots would have to be distributed across districts. But this is still far less cumbersome than the ballot production process required for open list municipal elections in 2000.
- *Vote count would be more complex* The vote count would, in fact, be more complex. With sufficient notice, however, training could commence on the vote count process and there is no reason to believe that Kosovars would be any less successful than, for example, Hungarians or citizens of any other transitional democracy with an MMP system, in counting the ballots correctly.
- *Election would be more expensive* It is true that the election would be somewhat more expensive to administer. But the trade-off would be a more “democratic” election – one that Kosovars may well be more willing to claim ownership of and participate in.

The OSCE also indicated that the administrative approval process within OSCE and UNMIK is time-consuming and may not be completed in time to institute districts prior to the upcoming election.

### Choosing a Districting Plan and Allocating Seats

The following administrative boundaries have been identified as reasonable prospects for electoral district boundaries:

- The five UNMIK regions
- The seven Statistical Institute regions
- The seven telephone exchange regions

The 30 municipalities were rejected as a possibility because some municipalities are too small in population to be accorded their own representative – a political decision would have to be made whether to allocate these municipalities a representative regardless or to combine these municipalities with other municipalities to meet the electoral quotient.

Once a districting plan has been selected, parliamentary seats must be allocated to each of the electoral districts within the plan. The allocation process (also referred to as apportionment) is almost always based on population data, usually in the form of census enumeration data or voter registration data [11].

This phase of the delimitation process is relatively mechanical, although the decision as to what formula to use for apportioning seats to districts can be a controversial one. Depending on the size of the administrative units chosen to serve as electoral districts, it is also possible that some units (i.e., small municipalities) will have to be combined if districts of relatively equal population are to be created and the electoral quotient is higher than the population of a number of these units.

A series of simulations were conducting using the three possible delimitation plans identified above. The 2003 voter registration data was used to determine the seat allocation to each of the electoral districts in these plans [12]. The results of these simulations can be found in the Appendices. The table below summarizes the results of the seat allocation exercise:

	UNMIK Districts	Telephone Exchange Districts	Statistical Institute Districts
Number of Districts	5	7	7
Range in Seat Allocation	9 to 19	6 to 18	7 to 18
Maximum Deviation	4.9%	4.9%	4.9%
Minimum Deviation	-2.9%	-7.8%	-4.8%
Total Percent Deviation	7.8%	12.7%	9.7%



## Delimitation Timeframe

The time required to delimit districts, and the cost associated with this endeavor, vary dramatically depending on how extensive the delimitation process is. If the system entails the drawing of an extensive and unique set of single-member constituencies, for example, the process can be quite expensive and time-consuming. On the other hand, if existing administrative units are used as constituencies, and legislative seats are simply allocated to these seats on the basis of population, then the delimitation process is straightforward, and not at all costly or time-consuming.

The delimitation of a restricted number of electoral districts (five to seven) that coincide with currently existing administrative regions will not require much in the way of additional time or resources. Assuming a fall Election Day, political parties (and potential candidates) will have to be informed of the change in the electoral system soon in order to prepare additional party lists and modify campaign operations – but certainly notification of such a change sometime in the spring of 2004 should be sufficient. A campaign to inform voters of the change need not begin until the summer of 2004. Ballot production will also be effected by the adoption of districts, but a decision to incorporate districts by mid-spring will not adversely affect the printing of ballots so long as the political parties are able to organize regional party lists in a timely manner. Finally, the vote count will be more complicated, but there is more than sufficient time if the decision is made in the spring to train vote counters.

### Notes:

[1] An open party list would be quite cumbersome to manage with 100 Kosovo-wide seats to fill; with districts in place the number of seats to fill within each district would probably be one-fifth to one-seventh that size, depending on the number and configuration of the districts employed.

[2] There are at least two other electoral systems that cannot be classified as plurality, majority, proportional, or mixed. These two systems, sometimes been referred to as “semi-proportional,” are the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) and Limited Vote (LV) Systems. In an SNTV system each elector has one vote but there are several seats in the constituency to be filled, and the candidates with the highest number of votes fill these positions. This system is used in Jordan and Vanuatu (and was used in Japan until 1993). A LV system is similar to SNTV, except that voters are permitted to cast more than one vote – but fewer votes than there are seats to be filled. This system is used in the Spanish upper house and in Gibraltar.

[3] There are four electoral systems commonly identified as plurality or majority systems: First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), Block Vote (BV), Alternative Vote (AV) and Two-Round System (TRS).

- First-Past-the-Post (FPTP): elections are held in single-member constituencies, and the winner is the candidate with the most votes, but not necessarily an absolute majority of the votes. Countries that use this system include the United States, Great Britain, Canada, India and many countries that were once part of the British Empire.
- Block Vote (BV): this system is an application of FPTP in multimember rather than single-member constituencies. Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and the candidates with the highest number of votes fill the positions regardless of the percentage of the vote they actually receive. This system is used in some parts of Asia and the Middle East.
- Alternative Vote (AV): in this system, electors rank the candidates in order of choice. If no candidate has over 50 percent of first-preferences, lower order preference votes are transferred until a majority winner emerges. This system is used in Australia and some other South Pacific countries.
- Two Round System (TRS): has two rounds of voting, often a week or two weeks apart. The first round is the same as a FPTP election and, if a candidate receives an absolute majority in this round, then this candidate is elected outright. If, however, no candidate has received an absolute majority, then a second round of voting (with a more limited number of candidates) is conducted, and the winner of this round is declared elected. This system is widely used in France, many former French colonies, and some parts of the former Soviet Union.

[4] For example, if a political party were to win 55% of the total vote cast in a parliamentary election but win only 45% of the constituency seats, compensatory seats would be allocated to the party such that the percentage of seats held by that party would total 55% of the assembly seats overall.

[5] Adnan Merovci, CEO of the Central Election Commission, in an interview with the author of this report on 5

February 2004.

[6] This statement is based on the author's interview (3 February 2004) with Leon Malazogu of KIPRED (Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development) and Burim Ejupi of The Forum, representatives of the two largest NGOs in Kosovo and leaders within Reform 2004.

[7] The Kosovo-wide district was used to elect 100 representatives from a general closed party list and 20 representatives from lists reserved for Kosovo's smaller communities: 10 seats to Kosova Serbs, 4 to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian community, 3 to the Bosnian Community, 2 to the Turkish Community and 1 to the Gorani community.

[8] Interview conducted by the author with Lars Lagergren and Dennis Ennis, OSCE Division of Election Operations, 4 February 2004.

[9] Although a decennial census was routinely conducted until 1991, in 1991 Albanians in Kosovo boycotted the enumeration process (and the Yugoslavian government manufactured population estimates for Kosovo). No census has been undertaken in Kosovo since then, although plans for a census are currently before the SRSG.

[10] Almost half of the countries surveyed by the Epic Project use voter registration data for districting purposes. A list of these countries include: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Barbados, Bahamas, United Kingdom, Croatia, Iceland, Namibia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. (See the EPIC Project, a joint IFES, International IDEA and UN project that can be found at [www.epicproject.org](http://www.epicproject.org).)

[11] The choice of whether to use census data or voter registration data may be guided by either practical or theoretical concerns. For instance, census data may not be the best option if a general enumeration of the population is unavailable, outdated or inaccurate (as is the case in Kosovo). On the other hand, registration data may not adequate for redistricting purposes if it fails to include information that is essential given the specific country context. From a theoretical perspective, delimitation based on registration data is likely to produce districts that are more equal with respect to the number of voters contained within them, but a counter-argument could be made that representatives serve all persons, not simply voters.

[12] A model similar to Reform 2004's suggested electoral system is utilized for the simulation exercise. However, rather than using the proposed 140 seat legislative (which is not recommended as it would dilute the value of the 20 set-aside seats) the current 120 seat legislature is retained: 20 set-aside seats, 30 compensatory seats (as proposed by Reform 2004), and 70 seats allocated to multimember districts.

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