

Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?: The Effects of Formation Costs on New Party Foundation in Latin America*

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The costs of party formation potentially alter representation and change electoral dynamics before allocation rules come into play. Furthermore, the interaction of formation rules and demographic conditions occasionally produces in new democracies unintended effects on representation that are quite distinct from the effects of other electoral barriers. Currently, however, the literature does not systematically consider the role that institutions play in party formation and party survival in new democracies. This article considers the theoretical importance of formation rules on representation in the context of party-system development. The principal hypothesis proposed is that, while not a sufficient condition for the emergence of separate ethnic political parties, elimination of spatial registration rules, which mandate registration that exceeds the group's geographic distribution, is a necessary condition. Comparative evidence from Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and a detailed case study of Ecuador suggests that pre-election spatial registration rules do, indeed, contribute to the general explanation of a lack of indigenous parties in countries with large mobilized indigenous groups. Two supplementary hypotheses and anecdotal evidence from the above countries address the effects of non-spatial pre-election requirements and post-election requirements.

Party-formation costs¹ potentially alter representation, and change electoral dynamics before allocation rules even come into play. In addition, the interaction of formation rules and demographic conditions occasionally produces distinctive

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unintended effects on representation in new democracies. For example, while restrictive electoral barriers such as low district magnitude and high vote threshold do not prevent large but geographically concentrated groups from forming new parties that explicitly represent them, registration rules sometimes do. However, the literature does not systematically consider the role that these institutions play in party formation and survival in new democracies.

This article begins by considering the theoretical importance of formation rules on representation in the context of party-system development. The introductory section proposes some hypotheses about the potential effects that distinguish formation law from other electoral law. The principal hypothesis holds that, while it is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of separate ethnic political parties at the national level, the elimination of spatial registration rules, which mandate registration that exceeds the group's geographic distribution, is a necessary condition.² The article then asks whether this hypothesis about spatial registration requirements can help explain the dearth of indigenous parties in national elections in Latin America. Political openings in many Latin American countries lead us to expect that large, mobilized ethnic groups with distinct political agendas should provide a natural cleavage for political recruitment in the presence of permissive electoral institutions. Comparative evidence from Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and a detailed case study of Ecuador suggests that pre-election spatial registration rules help to explain the lack of indigenous parties in countries with large, mobilized indigenous groups.

The second section considers how non-spatial formation rules affect party building. A second hypothesis suggests that non-spatial formation rules likely impede the participation of smaller parties, including (but not limited to) small indigenous parties. The effect of these rules is more similar to that of other electoral barriers. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from Peru and Bolivia indicates that when the electoral barriers themselves are permissive, non-spatial pre-election registration requirements perform a role akin to more stringent electoral barriers on legislative representation of smaller parties by hampering their electoral participation. Finally, the article examines post-election barriers, which are theoretically distinct from pre-election formation requirements and electoral barriers in that they do not bar parties from legislative representation. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence from Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia supports a third hypothesis: that post-election barriers likely increase the difficulty of continued small-party development, including that of indigenous parties.

The article concludes with a discussion of future research directions within this unexplored topic. These include examination of other Latin American countries that also employ or have employed spatial registration requirements, further inquiry into the possible interaction of financial requirements and economic class within a country, and the complementary function of registration rules and other institutions that affect legislative representation. Lastly, the article suggests that analysis of the effects of formation rules is a topic that should be extended to new democracies outside Latin America.

Party-Formation Requirements

Party formation denotes the appearance of a new party on the electoral scene and is influenced by institutions such as ballot-access regulation. Ballot access, in particular signature-petition requirements, was believed to alter the viability of third parties and constituency representation in congressional elections in the United States (Robeck and Dyer, 1982). More recently, however, Collet and Wattenberg (1999) found ballot access to have little effect on candidate emergence in the United States. Similarly, the effect of ballot-access barriers on West European parties is still debatable (Hug, 2001).

According to some of the more influential political scientists of our time, stable parties are instrumental for the proper functioning of democracy because parties provide representation, policy expertise, and accessible information to their constituency (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Kitschelt, 1999). Therefore, understanding what distinguishes between formation and organizational continuity of parties is essential. Institutions, including ballot-access requirements, are among the most significant determinants of party-system development, and in theory some of the effects of ballot-access laws are quite distinct from the effects of other institutions. Nevertheless, the debate regarding formation costs has not extended to the comparative literature on new democracies. Very few scholars mention ballot-access requirements for new parties, either in single-case studies or in comparative studies (Birmir, 1999; White, 2000; Van Cott, 2003).

Party-formation requirements vary between countries. The most common types of requirements, summarized in Table 1, are that a new party must register a certain number or a certain percentage of voters as supporters in order to qualify for the ballot the first time around. Alternatively, the party must have received a certain percentage of the vote in a lower-level election to qualify for the ballot in a higher-level election.³ Occasionally, these signature or vote requirements are accompanied by a spatial distribution requirement in that signatures must be obtained from certain parts of the country or state.⁴ In addition, a party must often obtain a certain percentage of the vote to retain registration after the election. Sometimes, financial requirements are also a part of the ballot-access requirements, either as a pre-election deposit or a post-election fine.

The most obvious theoretical implications of ballot-access restrictions are similar to the basic theoretical considerations associated with electoral law. The lower the district magnitude and the higher the vote threshold that is required for representation in a legislature, the more restrictive the electoral institutions (Taggepera and Shugart, 1989; Cox, 1997). Similarly, the higher the vote or signature requirement associated with party registration, the more restrictive the registration institution, theoretically with similar effects on the exclusion of smaller parties. Nevertheless, the temporal priority of registration rules creates interesting concerns. For example, if a vote or a signature requirement prior to the election is higher than the vote threshold for legislative representation, the registration requirement arguably presents the higher threshold of entry. Currently, however, the literature attributes institutional limitation on legislative representation exclusively to the effects of electoral institutions that bear on allocation of seats, without taking into account

TABLE 1
Common Ballot-Access Requirements

Requirement	Implementation
Pre-Election	
Popular Support	Collect a specified number of signatures; <i>or</i> obtain a specified number of votes in a lower-level election to qualify for ballot in a higher-level election.
Spatially Distributed Popular Support	Signatures or votes obtained must be distributed in a specified manner in the country.
Financial Viability	Pay a specified fee to appear on a ballot.
Post-Election	
Popular Support	Obtain a specified number of votes in an election to retain registration.
Financial Viability	Pay a specified amount in a fine if electoral showing does not reach a specified threshold.

possible prior effects of registration requirements. The concomitant problem is omitted variable bias, resulting in inaccurate causal explanations. This concern is not only academic. Electoral laws in new democracies are evolving for the purpose of institutional reform with respect to representation; a thorough understanding of the effects of all the pertinent legislation is, therefore, pivotal.

More important even than the obvious effects of formation law, their interactions with demographic and other social conditions theoretically distinguish the properties of formation rules from other institutions. Two possible interactions, with geographic concentration of groups and economic class, are highlighted here.

First, in theory formation rules interact with geographic distribution of groups in a way that distinguishes them from electoral rules. The exclusionary effects are well known for highly restrictive single-member districts on a large geographically disbursed group that constitutes less than a third of the population in any single district (Duverger, 1954; Riker, 1986). Similarly, vote threshold can exclude any group that is smaller than the vote percentage required for legislative representation (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). However, neither district magnitudes nor thresholds⁵ exclude large groups that are geographically concentrated. Indeed, geographic concentration of a group is sometimes the only manner in which a group can achieve representation under single-member district structure.⁶ In contrast, a geographically concentrated group of any type can be excluded from entering electoral participation with a separate political party if the spatial registration requirement exceeds the groups' geographic concentration. This rule can be as simple as requiring registration of parties in more electoral districts than the number of districts in which the group is located. The requirement can also exclude a group by requiring registra-

tion in few districts, but specifying some districts that are outside the area where the group resides. Given the temporal priority of registration rules, they can theoretically bar large, geographically concentrated groups from legislative representation despite permissive electoral rules.

A second probable interaction of formation rules is with the economic situation of a group. While the voting may be more or less difficult for economically disadvantaged groups,⁷ electoral institutions are not known to have an effect on representation that is associated with economic class. Pre-election financial requirements can, however, exclude parties from running if the party is unable to gather the funds. The ease with which parties gather funds is likely associated with the economic situation of the parties' constituency. In many new democracies, where income disparities are significant, there is reason to believe financial requirements may be more of a burden to parties that represent economically disadvantaged groups.

It is, however, important to note that there is a qualitative difference between spatial registration and financial requirements in that the spatial distribution of a party's constituency is more difficult (if not impossible) to change, while funds can often be raised, albeit with considerable effort. Thus, while spatial registration requirements can bar groups entirely from fielding a political party, the effects of financial requirements are likely to increase the difficulty of fielding a party. Furthermore, while spatial requirements can exclude large groups, financial requirements are more likely to hinder small groups from competing. Nevertheless, requirements that primarily influence the electoral participation of small parties are important if for no other reason than that many parties start small and gain popularity over time. Moreover, if legislative diversity is deemed important (Lijphart, 1977, 1999), the significance of determinants of small-party formation and development increases.

Finally, post-election requirements belong to the category of formation costs because they bear on the party's ballot access in a subsequent election. Nevertheless, post-election requirements differ theoretically from pre-election requirements in that any requirements that are implemented after the allocation of seats cannot bar a party from electoral competition or legislative representation. If, however, the post-election requirement is higher than the electoral vote threshold or more stringent than the district magnitude, it is possible that parties that are represented in the legislature lose registration between elections. Instead of focusing exclusively on representing the constituency in the legislature, a party that loses registration or is fined must expend effort to re-register and/or gather funds to pay the fine. This effort likely comes at the expense of continued political organization, particularly for small parties with limited staff and financial resources. Re-registration and endeavors to pay post-election fines are, however, likely to be mitigated by legislative exposure of the party in the interim. Therefore, post-election requirements are probably a lesser hindrance to continued legislative representation than comparable pre-election requirements are to parties that are competing for the first time.

In sum, theoretically, the potential effects of all the formation costs discussed here range from absolute exclusion of large groups through spatial registration requirements to augmenting the difficulty of small-party political organization over time due to other pre-election and post-election requirements. The specific effects depend on the nature, level, and relative temporal enforcement of the requirement,

and its interaction with characteristics of the social groups that wish to field a political party. In all cases, the potential effects of formation costs are quite distinct or strongly complementary to the effects of other electoral rules. Consequently, it is clearly necessary to examine the effects of registration in conjunction with electoral rules before purporting to explain the full effects of institutions on representation.

Ethnic Parties in Latin America and Spatial Registration Requirements

The empirical implications of the effects of formation rules are quite significant. One of the more interesting questions pertaining to the topic of new party formation in Latin America, for example, concerns what explains the dearth of indigenous parties despite large indigenous populations and permissive electoral institutions. This section discusses the role that formation costs play in indigenous party formation. The hypothesis proposed here is that, although not a sufficient condition for the emergence of separate ethnic political parties, the elimination of spatial registration rules is a necessary condition⁸ for indigenous party formation in a number of Latin American countries.

Yashar (1999) and Van Cott (unpublished manuscript) point out that any analysis of institutional effects on ethnic party formation in Latin America must be embedded in a contextual analysis of indigenous politicization. Yashar argues that in Latin America, ethnic identity has historically been weakly politicized, and expecting democratic consolidation simply because of institutional developments is naïve. Van Cott takes this argument a step further, positing that an existing ethnic cleavage is not necessarily politicized even in the face of permissive institutions. Rather, she argues, ethnic parties emerge when the ethnic leadership makes a strategic decision to form said party. Van Cott argues that, given favorable institutional conditions (and sometimes despite *unfavorable* institutional conditions), the decision to form an ethnic party requires the existence of prior organization of dense social networks of relatively large ethnic populations that provide free labor and support group affiliation. In addition, she posits that positive experiences in political processes, such as constitutional reform and organizational unity, further support the viability of an ethnic party.

Following Van Cott's lead, this section first discusses the theoretical pre-conditions for ethnic party formation as articulated through the theory of social mobilization. The theory is then used as a guide to explore the reasons for emergence or absence of indigenous parties in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. This analysis agrees with Van Cott's (unpublished manuscript) argument that while permissive institutions are a necessary component for the emergence of indigenous parties, they are not a sufficient condition. However, this paper focuses on the institutional design that is necessary for the emergence of indigenous parties, under conditions that are favorable to making the strategic decision to form an indigenous party. Thus, the paper goes on to argue that prior to an institutional change in 1995, all the pre-conditions of political mobilization were sufficiently developed in Ecuador for the emergence of an indigenous party. Only after spatial requirements were eliminated, however, did an indigenous party immediately appear. Therefore, the case of Ecuador shows strong support for the hypothesis that elimination of spatial regis-

tration rules is a necessary, although not a sufficient, component of indigenous party formation in Latin America.

Political Mobilization

The social movement literature holds that political mobilization, or organization of groups for political ends, depends on internal characteristics of the group such as ability to mobilize resources and elite cohesion (Kitschelt, 1986). Other determinants include the specific structure of political opportunity that affect peoples' expectations about success, including such variables as state capacity for repression, and political access points (Brockett, 1991; Tarrow, 1994), including permissive electoral institutions. In addition, the literature that speaks exclusively to ethnic mobilization holds that ethnic cleavages are not automatically politicized, but rather that ethnic groups overcome their collective action problem and mobilize strategically in response to exogenous conditions (Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 1992). The specific conditions in turn include, but are not limited to, economic circumstances and degree of recognition of the group by the state.

This contextual nature of mobilization is in line with the evolving definition of ethnic identity that in recent decades has moved away from the understanding of ethnicity as primordial (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972) to one of ethnicity as a constructed category (Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 1992; Laitin, 1998, Posner, forthcoming) that is highly influenced by contextual factors. This change in definition is particularly important to a contemporary understanding of indigenous movements in Latin America, which often encompass disparate indigenous nationalities, and even mestizos, that are united politically in response to common exogenous conditions.

In short, therefore, theoretically an indigenous group should be expected to mobilize politically in response to exogenous conditions when it is not represented by existing political parties. The additional requirements for mobilization are that the movement is internally consolidated and has a reasonable expectation of success. This causal complexity increases the difficulty of comparing and predicting the emergence of indigenous parties between countries. Nevertheless, the following discussion shows that when all other components are in place, indigenous parties appear only when spatial registration requirements are removed.

Mobilization and Spatial Registration Rules in Latin America

According to Yashar (1998), democratic openings occurred in many Latin American states in the 1980s and 1990s. Such openings increase the expectations of success. Not surprisingly, therefore, the region—and country-specific literature⁹ addressing indigenous mobilization in Latin America argues that in the 1980s (or at the very latest, in the early 1990s), many indigenous groups in Mexico and Central and South America began mobilizing to articulate political interests that often differed from mainstream political agendas. Indigenous groups in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala have, for instance, called for multilingual, multi-ethnic states and have argued that mainstream political parties do not adequately represent them.

Despite separate interests from mainstream political agendas and political open-

ings in countries with permissive democratic electoral institutions,¹⁰ and indigenous groups that constitute over ten percent of the national populations, a curious dearth of ethnic parties characterizes Latin America.¹¹ As shown in Table 2, each "institutional regime" period indicates a time during which institutions specifying spatial registration remained unchanged. Permissive electoral institutions are defined here as systems that use an average district magnitude greater than 1, so that the system is either a pure proportional system or at least a mixed system and any additional vote thresholds that a party must pass to achieve representation in the legislature are relatively low¹² (Mexico: 1.5% of the vote; Ecuador: 0.5 to 0.6 percent of quota required for legislative seat allocation; Bolivia: one quota; Jones, 1995, 1997). In line with current definitions of ethnicity, an "ethnic party" is defined as any party that defines itself as such or is commonly considered an ethnic party. Therefore, for instance, the Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala (FDNG) in Guatemala is considered an ethnic party despite the leadership reaching out "only to those members who were already identified with the left" (Montejo, 2002: 141) as opposed to forging a pan-Mayan movement. Similarly, Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA) in Bolivia is an ethnic party despite the fact that it was established by a mestizo, Carlos Palenque; Palenque capitalized explicitly on his Aymara heritage when fielding the party (Van Cott, unpublished manuscript). On the other hand, Renacimiento Andino in Peru is not an ethnic party; according to interviews I conducted during the 2001 electoral campaign, leaders of the party did not define it as ethnic, nor did general discussion of the party by outsiders indicate that the party was perceived as an indigenous party.¹³

As Table 2 shows, only in Bolivia and in Guatemala have non-restrictive registration institutions remained constant since democratization, and indigenous parties have appeared during these periods. In Ecuador and Peru, however, indigenous parties only appear after institutional changes from restrictive to permissive registration laws, and as yet, no indigenous party has contested national elections in Mexico, where registration rules have remained restrictive. Clearly, therefore, the separate interests of indigenous groups, lack of representation, and political openings including permissive electoral institutions are not sufficient conditions for the emergence of indigenous parties. Furthermore, it appears that the elimination of restrictive spatial registration rules does contribute to the explanation of indigenous party formation.¹⁴

Causal explanations of indigenous party formation are complex. Therefore, while Table 2 indicates that spatial registration rules play a part in the explanation, this article does not contend that they are a sufficient condition, but only a necessary condition, for indigenous party emergence. To demonstrate this causal complexity, the following discussion briefly outlines how the mobilization argument applies to Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru, with particular emphasis on registration rules. This discussion is followed by a case study of Ecuador—the only case in which other causal components were arguably present before the elimination of spatial registration rules.

As indicated in Table 2, Bolivia never employed a spatial registration requirement, and indigenous parties ran in elections from the outset of re-democratization in 1978. In Guatemala, the spatial registration requirement in the 1985 electoral code is not sufficiently restrictive to exclude indigenous party formation,¹⁵ and at

TABLE 2
Indigenous Party Formation and Spatial Registration Rules in Latin American Countries with Large Indigenous Populations and "Permissive" Electoral Rules (i.e., Magnitude and Threshold).

Country	Percent Indigenous Population	Institutional Regime*	Restrictive Spatial Registration Requirements	Indigenous Parties**
Bolivia	65	1980–	No	Yes
Ecuador	25	1980–1995	Yes	No
Ecuador	25	1995	No	Yes
Guatemala	59	1985	No	Yes
Mexico	10–20	1994	Yes	No
Peru	39	1980–1993	Yes	No
Peru	39	1993–	No	In local elections only

Sources: Minority Rights Group (1997). National Electoral and Party Law.

*Institutions that bear on registration including party law and electoral law. Beginning in 1980 if democratization occurred earlier.

**These parties include MITKA, CONDEPA and a number of other indigenous parties in Bolivia, the MUPP in Ecuador, the FDNG in Guatemala, and the MIAP (Movimiento Indígena de la Amazonía Peruana) in Peru.

least one indigenous party has emerged. The fact that this party did not emerge until ten years after democratization, however, is likely due to the limitations on political openings created by continued state repression of indigenous communities until peace accords were signed in 1996 between the government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). A second likely reason for the delay is lack of internal indigenous group cohesion (Montejo, 2002; Warren, 2002).

No indigenous parties have competed in national elections in Mexico. There the spatial requirement demands at least 3000 affiliates in ten out of the thirty-two states, or 300 affiliates in at least 100 of the 300 federal districts (EPIC, 2003). Ninety percent of people who speak an indigenous language in Mexico are concentrated in ten states in the south and the center of the country (Minority Rights Group, 1997). Therefore, unless the disparate indigenous groups in Mexico unite in a single indigenous political party, the spatial registration rule will likely deter formation of separate indigenous parties. It is, however, unlikely that the rule has had much effect to date; the recent date of democratization, which began in 1994 according to the earliest estimates, and the continued violent state response to indigenous organization (Stahler-Sholk, 1998) limit the political opening.

In Peru, an indigenous party appeared only after spatial registration requirements were lifted, but continued organization is uncertain as indigenous identity remains weakly politicized. After 1979, Peruvian parties were required to present a list of at

least 100,000 members in order to register (Tuesta Soldevilla, 1994). More importantly, each party also had to be registered as an organization in at least half of the country's twenty-five districts. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (1995), the indigenous population is concentrated in only eleven of those districts. After 1993, the spatial portion of the requirement was dropped. The first Peruvian indigenous party did not, however, appear on the electoral scene until 1999, and then only in local elections (Van Cott, 2003). A plausible explanation of this delay in indigenous party formation in Peru is that ethnicity continues to be very weakly politicized. According to a range of specialists, from academics to party leaders whom I interviewed during the electoral campaign in 2001, indigenous identity in Peru is not a salient political category, for reasons ranging from discrimination against indigenous groups, to alternative politicization and mobilization of indigenous constituencies on the basis of class,¹⁶ to the general political disarray of the 1990s that deterred any new party formation. Nevertheless, abolishing the spatial component of the law did allow for indigenous party organization in Peru, whereas such formation was not previously an option.

The Case of Ecuador

The preceding discussion shows that causal complexity of mobilization leading to new party emergence makes it difficult to isolate the effects of spatial registration requirements. Nevertheless, the cases also suggest that spatial registration rules may constitute a portion of the explanation for the lack of indigenous parties in Peru and perhaps even in Mexico. In Ecuador, however, other necessary pre-conditions were arguably in place at the time of a change in the spatial registration rules, facilitating the illustration of the role of spatial registration rules in new party formation.

Indigenous peoples in Ecuador are by all accounts numerous, although estimates vary greatly.¹⁷ According to the indigenous umbrella organization Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), indigenous peoples in Ecuador are divided into ten nationalities, of which all but one retain separate languages (CONAIE, 2002). In numbers, however, the Quichua are clearly the dominant group. Furthermore, with the exception of a portion of the very small Awa nation, the Quichua community is the exclusive indigenous presence in the mountain region, which is the political base of the country's indigenous peoples (Saltos and Vázquez, 1998).

The Quichua themselves are not a homogeneous group. Within the Quichua nation, distinctions are made between thirteen different groups, such as the Otavalos in the province of Imbabura and the Coltas in the province of Chimborazo. Therefore, local identity tends to be more specific to the particular indigenous nation or even a local component of the nation. Nevertheless, at the level of national politics, the identity of the group is "indígena."

Ecuador began democratizing in 1978, and the indigenous movement started organizing in its modern form around the same time. Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, indigenous communities throughout Ecuador were organizing strikes, roadblocks, land seizures, occupation of buildings, and other demonstra-

tions. Ecuador scholars generally agree that by the late 1980s the indigenous movement was consolidated, including the development of an “educated activist cohort” of indigenous leaders, and was mobilized by 1990 (Zamosc, 1994; Beck and Mijeski, 2001).

From the very first protests in the early 1990s, CONAIE continually presented the government with the community’s collective political claims to land and indigenous self-government. Nevertheless, as late as 1994, the only party that explicitly supported the indigenous demands for autonomy was the center-left Izquierda Democrática (ID). The populist *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares* (CFP) and *Partido Roldósista Ecuatoriano* (PRE), and the right *Partido Liberal Radical* (PLR) made no references to the indigenous population in their party platforms. Furthermore, even though the other right forces *Partido Social Cristiano* (PSC) and *Partido Unidad Republicana* (PUR) mention the “pueblo indígena” in their platforms, the references are very vague and aim to incorporate the group rather than extend autonomy. Finally, the center-left force *Democracia Popular* (DP) promises only to create an institution to coordinate or oversee the issue of the indigenous population, rather than addressing any of the indigenous grievances directly (Alban et al., 1994).

While the interaction of the indigenous movement and the state in Ecuador is not harmonious, the state did not respond with repression on par with that experienced in Guatemala prior to 1996, nor was it or comparable to that of the Mexican state in recent years. Indeed, according to Conaghan (1995), the predominant response by political elites to indigenous mobilization in the early 1990s was profound shock and lack of action. Furthermore, Ecuadorian electoral institutions were fairly permissive until 1998,¹⁸ with average district magnitudes of nearly three and a national district of twelve, and a low vote threshold of half a quota until 1987 and 0.6 quota after that (Jones, 1995).

Clearly, therefore, all of the necessary conditions were in place for the emergence of a separate indigenous political party to contest at least the legislative election of national and provincial deputies, and of the president in 1992, or that of provincial deputies in 1994. Indigenous groups were mobilized under the direction of a single organization and their clearly articulated political demands were not fully represented by any of the other political parties. Furthermore, the political system was open in terms of both state responses and electoral institutions.

Nevertheless, CONAIE rejected direct participation in elections and even refused to endorse parties or candidates until 1995, when the organization made an abrupt turnaround. That year CONAIE entered into an agreement with the newly formed broad-based popular movement *Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales* (CMS) to create a political party called *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo País* (MUPP) (Beck and Mijeski 2001 and unpublished manuscript). While the MUPP insists that it is not the political wing of CONAIE, it defines itself as a social movement as opposed to a political party—which is more akin to the definition of CONAIE. Furthermore, leaders of CONAIE, including Luis Macas and Nina Pacari Vega, have headed deputy lists of the MUPP in elections.

This history prompts two questions: Why the abrupt change in CONAIE policies? And more importantly, why did the indigenous community not field its own political party until the 1996 election, despite strength in numbers, cohesive mobilization, permissive electoral institutions, lack of political representation for clearly

articulated policy objectives, and little state repression? The reason, it is argued here, is that all of these factors notwithstanding, until 1995 restrictive ballot-access requirements prevented the indigenous communities from registering a political party, let alone competing in elections.

The Ecuadorian constitution of 1979 stipulated that no candidate could run for office unless he or she was a member of a nationally recognized party (PDA, 2002). According to the 1979 party law, to gain national recognition parties had to be national organizations with an officially inscribed membership of no less than half a percent of all registered voters in at least ten out of the twenty mainland provinces.¹⁹ Furthermore, electoral alliances between parties were banned. The culpable provision of the ballot-access law was the first, requiring registration in ten provinces of twenty, and two out of the three most populous ones by mandate. Unfortunately for would-be builders of indigenous parties, two of these three most populous provinces are on the coast. As Figure 1 shows, there is no significant indigenous population in the coastal areas. Therefore, this provision effectively prevented the indigenous communities from registering a political party.

The law prohibiting individual candidates and groups not affiliated with a political party from running was repealed after a national plebiscite on constitutional reform, held in 1995. The changes were later codified in the 1996 Constitution (PDA, 2002). Furthermore, the ban on electoral alliances was lifted.

Following the institutional changes that lifted the ban on electoral competition of individual candidates, the MUPP registered and won more than seven percent of the vote nationally in the 1996 elections. As Table 3 shows, nearly 62 percent of that vote-share was won in the highlands, and less than one percent in the coastal regions. According to Mejía Acosta (1998), the social base of this party was the indigenous movement led by CONAIE, along with other groups on the left.

The Appearance of the MUPP: Causal Relationship or Spurious Correlation?

The peak of Ecuadorian indigenous mobilization in 1990 and the appearance of the MUPP only a few years later beg the question of whether there really is a causal relationship between the institutional changes and the subsequent appearance of the party. Technically, had the rules not changed, the movement would not have been able to field candidates, despite other conditions being favorable. There is, however, more than a "technical" relationship between the two. According to Nina Pacari Vega (2002), a former leader of CONAIE and the first indigenous woman to be elected the second vice president of the Ecuadorian Congress, the causal direction points directly from earlier indigenous demands for representation to the institutional modification and subsequent representation through the MUPP. In the newsletter of the Organization of American States (OAS), Pacari Vega writes:

The constitutional reform of 1994 was another instance when democratic practice was expanded, through the inclusion of rules allowing participation by independents. The indigenous movement's initial position was that to strengthen democracy, the starting point had to be our ethnic and cultural reality and that a congress aspiring to reflect that dimension had to be representative. The discussion implied that in Ecuador there had been insufficient debate on the form that representation was to adopt within the National

FIGURE 1
Location of Indigenous Communities in Ecuador




TABLE 3
Vote for the MUPP-NP in Relation to Size of the Indigenous Community, by Province.

AMAZON	Provincial Vote Percent	Indigenous Population Percent	COAST	Provincial Vote Percent	Indigenous Population Percent	SIERRA	Provincial vote Percent	Indigenous Population Percent
Morona	19.3	25.5	El Oro	0.0	0.0	Azuay	28.5	5.9
Napo	25.7	24.5	Esmeraldas	0.0	1.2	Bolívar	9.7	28.4
Pastaza	12.8	46.9	Galapagos	0.0	0.0	Cañar	13.9	18.0
Sucumbíos	18.8	11.7	Guayas	0.0	5.2	Carchi	0.0	0.0
Zamora	0.0	2.7	Los Ríos	1.7	0.0	Chimborazo	18.8	49.3
			Manabí	0.0	4.7	Cotopaxi	15.7	27.9
						Imbabura	16.0	39.6
						Loja	0.0	5.2
						Pichincha	13.5	9.4
						Tungurahua	11.9	25.8
Total National Vote for the MUPP 7.1%								

Congress or the regional bodies. One of the criteria used then was that of not affecting the participation of others—of the provinces, for example; thus, the proposed mechanism provided an additional direct form of representation so that the indigenous nationalities could be represented in the National Congress. That proposal was not accepted, but it led to the participation of independents (Vega, 2002: 2).

The official party rhetoric of the MUPP also supports the idea that the institutional change was an important piece of the decision to form a party and field candidates. Thus, from its inception the leadership of the party has insisted that the MUPP is not really a political party but rather a political movement (Mijeski and Beck, 2001, and unpublished manuscript). This distinction is necessary for the party to qualify for the ballot; the party law itself still stipulates that in order to register as a political party an organization must register in ten provinces of twenty, and in two of the three largest (*Ley de partidos políticos*, 2001). With the change in the constitution this requirement is now, however, irrelevant to “movements” that do not call themselves political parties.

The importance of the law for the emergence of the indigenous party was also noted in the media at the time. Eduardo Tamayo (2002), for instance, commented that the institutional change was instrumental in enabling the MUPP to field candidates despite regional concentration of the movement's constituency. Thus, while maturation of the indigenous movement was a necessary component in the creation of the MUPP, it appears safe to conclude that there is also a causal relationship between the institutional change and the timing of the creation of the party. Finally, according to Van Cott, “interview subjects, and experts on the Ecuadorian indigenous-movement-based party Pachakutik, believe the 1995 change was crucial to the decision to form and electoral vehicle in 1995” (Van Cott, unpublished manuscript: 33).

The MUPP has continued to present candidates in every election since 1996. The party's vote-share dipped below the post-election vote requirement in 1998 but the party made a comeback in 2002, winning nearly eight percent of valid votes

cast nationally²⁰ and backing Lucio Gutierrez Borbua, who won the presidential runoff held in November 2002 (*Tribunal Supremo Electoral*, 2002).

Other Pre-Election Requirements

Spatial requirements are but one type of many possible pre-election requirements. In Ecuador the spatial component was certainly the most significant aspect for indigenous party formation because the number of signature required until 1995 was low (0.5 percent of voters) given the size of the indigenous constituency. In 1995 the requirement was increased to 1.5 percent of registered voters, but it is still a low number relative to the size of the indigenous community.

Indeed, given the large size of the indigenous communities in all of the countries discussed in this paper, the number of signatures required for the registration of parties is not sufficient to exclude indigenous groups from electoral participation. Nevertheless, the higher the requirement, the greater the effort of collecting for all nascent parties, including indigenous parties. Therefore, while signature requirements may not exclude parties, they likely affect new party development. Indeed, the second hypothesis proposed in this paper is that where electoral institutions are very permissive, stringent registration requirements substitute for the effects of more restrictive electoral institutions. The following discussion presents some anecdotal evidence to support this idea, but acknowledges that much more research is needed.

For example, it is likely that Peru's delay in indigenous party formation until 1999, well after the spatial requirement was dropped in 1993, was influenced by the increase in the numeral aspect of the registration requirement that occurred at the same time that the spatial requirement was eliminated. In 1993, the requirement was increased from 100,000 members, or approximately one percent of the electorate, to four percent of the electorate (Tuesta Soldevilla, 1994). Furthermore, due to increase in fraudulent signatures accompanying the augmentation of the requirement, the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones increased vigilance in verification of signatures in the late 1990s.²¹ Peru is generally thought to have quite permissive electoral institutions, with no vote threshold for representation and a relatively high district magnitude (Jones, 1995, 1997). However, a four-percent registration threshold, applied before the election and carefully enforced, potentially imposed a significant limit on representation, at least until the 2001 election when the requirement was lowered to one percent.

Observations from other countries where the magnitude of the pre-election signature requirements has changed over time, holding other institutions constant, supports the idea that an increase in pre-election registration requirements has a significant effect on small-party electoral participation. In the current democratic period in Bolivia, the change in pre-election signature requirements, from no requirement to a requirement of 0.5 percent of registered voters, is associated with a dramatic decline in the number of registered political organizations—from seventy-two before the 1985 election (of which eighteen participated in the election), to fifteen before the 1989 election (of which ten participated in the election).

In sum, anecdotal evidence from Peru and Bolivia suggests that non-spatial registration requirements are theoretically similar to equivalent electoral barriers in their effect on representation. Indeed, it appears that where electoral institutions are

permissive, registration requirements take the place of more stringent electoral barriers in restricting legislative representation of small parties. As discussed earlier, elucidating the correct causal story of institutional influence on legislative representation is important for understanding new democracies where electoral legislation is evolving. Clearly, much more research on this topic is needed.

Post-Election Requirements

The final category of formation rules discussed here is that of post-election barriers. Post-election requirements are theoretically distinct from other formation rules in that they cannot restrict representation in the same way that pre-election requirements do. It is, however, hypothesized here that post-election barriers likely hamper continued organization of small parties, including indigenous parties.

As indicated in Table 1, possible post-election barriers include both vote requirements and financial obligations. The general theoretical expectations associated with financial obligations are similar to those associated with non-spatial vote or registration requirements. If the financial requirement is a pre-election requirement that mandates a deposit before a party may register, it hampers registration of small parties by straining the resources of parties. If the financial obligation is a post-election fine for parties that fail to achieve a certain percentage of the vote, it may hinder continued organizational activity but does not necessarily restrict legislative representation in the short run.

The following discussion presents anecdotal evidence as preliminary support for the hypothesis that post-election barriers impede continued organizational activity of small parties. The effect of vote requirements in Peru and Ecuador is discussed first, followed by a consideration of the effect of fines levied against Bolivian parties after elections.

Vote Requirements

In Peru, the post-election vote requirement both before and after 1993 was, at five percent, higher than the registration requirement. Thus, any party that failed to win greater than five percent of the vote nationally lost registration, despite the fact that the party might be represented in the legislature. As Chirinos Soto (1984) points out, this occurred, for example, in 1980 when the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos (FNTC) won four seats in the national legislature but less than five percent of the vote nationally. Other parties suffered a similar fate. After re-registering in 1985, the FNTC won nearly two percent of the vote nationally and one seat in the legislature, and that same year independent lists won another 1.6 percent and two seats. In 1992, the Frente Agrícola Popular won 2.8 percent of the vote and two seats, and Solidaridad y Democracia won two percent and two seats. Nevertheless, all of these parties had to gather signatures in order to re-register according to the law before they could participate in a subsequent election. Similarly, only three of the thirteen parties that obtained seats in 1995 were, according to the law, able to compete in the 2000 legislative elections without re-registering. Finally, the 2001 electoral law made an exception: parties that had achieved representation in the 2000 election could retain their registration.

Changes in party activity in Ecuador also support the idea that post-election vote requirements matter for continued organization of smaller parties. The 1979 party law held that, to retain its license to compete in subsequent elections, a party had to receive at least five percent of the vote in two successive elections (Barczak, 1997; Mejía Acosta, 1998). The five-percent requirement was repealed in 1983, re-instituted at four percent after the election in 1992, and finally increased again to five percent in 1997 (Mejía Acosta, 1998). After the requirement was abolished in 1983, the dropout rate of parties decreased from four parties after each election to an average of 1.25 parties. As soon as the requirement was instituted again, before the 1994 election, the dropout rate after each election increased to an average of five parties. In 1997, the post-election requirement was again increased, but the 1998 electoral reform makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of post-election requirements from effects of the changing electoral law.

Clearly, the effort expended in obtaining the signatures of four or five percent of the electorate after every election in order to re-register places a greater burden on smaller parties than on larger. None of the parties in Peru or Ecuador were indigenous parties, but theoretically the continued organizational activity of small indigenous parties is equally hampered by post-election requirements.

Financial Requirements and the Case of Bolivia

Interestingly, Bolivia does not show a dropout rate corresponding to changes in its post-election vote requirement. Bolivia re-democratized in 1978 but a post-election vote requirement was not re-instituted until 1991, when a new electoral law requiring the registration of parties that failed to win half a percent of all votes cast in the general elections was revoked (Corte, 1991). The 1993 electoral code again upheld these same restrictions (Corte, 1998b), but they were changed in the 1997 electoral law holding that parties' registration was revoked if they failed to win one percent or more of the vote (Corte, 1998c). The expected effects of a post-election requirement are that parties receiving fewer votes than required may be deterred from running in a subsequent election. It is, however, unlikely that post-election requirements had much effect in Bolivia. Before 2002, in all but three cases the vote-share of the thirty-five parties that dropped out after competing in at least one election was higher than the post-election vote requirement.

Closer examination of Bolivian party-formation law, however, reveals an additional stipulation that likely affected continued organization of small Bolivian parties, including small indigenous parties. According to the 1979 electoral law, parties that failed to win fifty thousand votes in the election were required to pay the National Treasury back the amount that it cost to include them on the ballot (Corte, 1998a). This requirement remained unchanged until 1999 when the ballot fine threshold was changed to two percent of valid national votes, except that parties participating in one province only must win at least two percent of the valid vote in that province (Corte, 1999). Fifty thousand votes is anything but trivial as a proportion of votes cast, as this number constitutes between two and well over three percent of the voting population.²²

While the average vote-share of the thirty-five Bolivian parties that drop out post-election during the current democratic period is, in all but three cases, higher

than the vote-share required for continued registration, in all but four cases it is lower than the vote-share required to avoid the fine.²³ This suggests a causal relationship between hampered continual development of the majority of the small parties that dropped out and the post-election fine associated with a vote-share of three percent.

Anecdotal evidence supports the proposition that this post-election fine has indeed constituted a major roadblock in the development of new parties in Bolivia, including indigenous parties. According to Tapia (1995), the principal problem facing the founders of the Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (MITKA) was financial. Lack of resources adversely affected all of the party's organizational capabilities, from sustenance of candidates to the size of the venue that the party was able to rent to hold its conventions. After the 1978 elections were annulled, four parties, including MITKA, were fined for having received an insufficient number of votes. Tapia (1995) holds that the low number of votes received resulted partially from the party's inability to recruit voters all over the country, due to financial constraints. The post-election fine presented such hardship that the party leaders saw no alternative but a hunger strike. The government finally resolved the matter by paying the fine, but financial problems continued to plague the party.

Anecdotally, therefore, it seems likely that post-election requirements do hamper continued small party organization. In this as well, however, much more research is needed to fill in the theoretical and empirical gaps in our knowledge about the effects of formation costs.

Conclusion

The current void in the study of formation costs in new democracies is curious because party-formation costs can have fundamental effects on electoral competition. This article has striven to fill some of this void through analysis of the effects of institutional changes over time, focusing primarily on pre-election spatial registration requirements and their interaction with regionally concentrated ethnic groups. Under permissive political conditions, large, mobilized, indigenous groups articulating distinct political grievances in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru lead to the expectation of indigenous party formation. We see such party formation in Bolivia, where spatial registration requirements have never been employed; in Guatemala, where spatial location of indigenous groups exceeds the mandate of the requirements; and in Peru and Ecuador after spatial requirements were eliminated. It is, however, likely that continual spatial registration requirements in Mexico, and requirements in Peru and Ecuador before these rules were eliminated, help to explain the absence of or delay in the formation of indigenous parties in these countries.

The causal complexity of mobilization leading to new indigenous party formation increases the difficulty of isolating the effects of formation costs. Nevertheless, the case study of Ecuador shows that, while holding all else as constant as one can hope for in the study of political mobilization, the requirement that indigenous political organizations register both in the highlands and coastal areas—despite absence of indigenous groups in these areas—acted as an absolute barrier to the participation of indigenous peoples in the electoral process through their own party.

When these restrictions were lifted in 1995, Ecuador immediately experienced the emergence of an indigenous party. Since then, the party has experienced moderate to significant electoral success in every election.

This article considers only countries with large indigenous groups and permissive electoral institutions. It is possible, however, that organization and subsequent legislative representation are restricted in countries with smaller indigenous groups that also employ spatial registration requirements. These include Colombia, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Indeed, the emergence of the first indigenous parties in Colombia in 1991 coincides with the elimination of spatial registration requirements. Hopefully, continued research on this topic will further clarify the effect of spatial registration rules on ethnic party formation in Latin America.

The concern about the interaction between spatial registration rules and demographics is not simply academic. According to Mejía Acosta (1996: 53–54), the spatial registration rules in Ecuador were explicitly fashioned to counter the extreme party fractionalization that was thought to draw on regional divisions and impede successful governance at the national level. There is no evidence to suggest that these rules were intended to exclude the indigenous population. Indeed, restrictive spatial registration requirements prevent representation of indigenous interests in the legislature only if the sole venue for such representation is separate indigenous parties. Thus, other new ethnically heterogeneous legislatures outside Latin America are currently considering or have recently instituted spatial registration rules as an incentive for political parties to appeal to more than one ethnic group, with the positive objective of reducing ethnic conflict (Reilly, 2003). Before legislators decide to implement these rules, however, it is imperative that they consider the possible trade offs between fragmentation and representation in the event that non-ethnic parties fail to address “ethnic” issues. In such cases, the implementation of spatial registration rules is more likely to exacerbate than reduce ethnic conflict (Birbir, unpublished manuscript).

Furthermore, this article has presented anecdotal evidence to support the proposition that restrictive but non-spatial pre-election registration requirements hampered formation of small parties in Peru and Bolivia. Finally, it was posited that while qualitatively different from pre-election requirements, post-election requirements (including financial requirements) impede the organizational continuity of small parties in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

The anecdotal evidence associated with post-election fines in Bolivia raises interesting questions for future research on indigenous party organizational continuity. Indigenous parties are among the most volatile of small Bolivian parties, and a few have had continued electoral success. For example, CONDEPA grew steadily from the time it was established in 1988 until the most recent election when two new parties, the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP) and Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), captured much of its vote (Van Cott, unpublished manuscript). Similarly, a number of Katarista parties that originated within the Aymara movement have run with some success in every election since re-democratization, most notably in a 1993 alliance that elected the first indigenous vice president of Bolivia. Sustained electoral success for new indigenous Bolivian parties is, however, the exception, and is sometimes limited by financial constraints (Tapia, 1995), leading to the question of whether the possible interaction between the economic situation

of a group and party-formation costs, hypothesized above, applies to indigenous party formation. Indigenous groups in Latin America are in all cases some of the most economically disadvantaged groups within their respective countries. **Theoretically, therefore, it is not unlikely that a financial requirement is a heavier burden for indigenous parties in Latin America than for small parties in general.**

Undoubtedly, **the unexplored domain of formation rules and their interaction with social and demographic conditions provides a fertile ground for future study.** The proposed lines of inquiry extend outside of Latin America to other regions where **new democracies have incorporated formation rules into their institutional structure.** In general, therefore, any study that purports to speak to the institutional constraints on representation in new democracies **needs to address formation costs,** in particular those **enforced prior to elections.** Furthermore, such analysis must to pay close attention to the **conjunction of demographics and formation institutions,** which potentially produces **unexpected consequences for representation.**

Notes

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- 1. The term "formation costs" is adopted from Simon Hug's (2001) work on party systems. Formation costs refer to the set of institutional hurdles that a new party faces before it can participate in elections or before it can continue participating from one election to the next. Hug focuses on a set of two variables: public party financing and ballot access. The ballot-access requirement he examines is twofold. First, there is a petition-signature requirement. Second, there is an electoral deposit. These, however, are only a few of the possible variables associated with formation costs, and the variables included in this study differ depending on the country, as explained later. The principal difference between Hug's use of the term and the use of the term in this paper is that here formation costs can include post-election requirements in addition to pre-election requirements.
- 2. In this article, I define spatial registration rules in relation to the group, in that I call the rules restrictive if they require registration exceeding the geographic location of the group. It is important to note that the same rule can be restrictive for one group while it is permissive for another group, depending on geographic distribution.
- 3. Both of these are, for instance, common requirements in the United States, where some states differentiate between major and minor parties in that the requirements for vote percentages for minor parties in a preceding election are lower than requirements for major parties. The preceding elections are most often gubernatorial elections. For a list of state requirements, see Bott (1990).
- 4. By contrast, for U.S. Congressional elections, for example, most states do not impose a spatial distribution requirement above and beyond the percentage requirement. In other words, in most cases, registered supporters or voters can reside anywhere in the state. There are, however, exceptions. For instance, for Congressional elections, Hawaii requires an established political party to maintain registration of ten percent of the state vote in half of the congressional districts at last

election. For a new party petition, Montana requires five percent of votes cast for a successful gubernatorial candidate at last election, including that amount in at least a third of the legislative districts, or five percent of votes cast at last election for a successful candidate of a particular office sought. This requirement is different for presidential elections, in which candidates must register in all states (Bott, 1990).

5. While it is not unheard of that vote threshold requirements in elections be spatial, in that a party must have gained above a certain percent of the vote in a certain number of districts to enter the legislature, this is not a common requirement. More commonly, the vote requirement is simply national.
6. This is the basic idea behind Riker's argument (1986). Riker's refinement of Duverger's law was that single-member districts produce a two-party system at the district level. There may, however, be more than two parties in the national legislature because which two parties are favored at the district level may vary from district to district.
7. Theoretically, it is not completely clear what this effect is; economically disadvantaged constituencies may be underrepresented because they are unable to take the time to vote or travel to a place of voting. However, it is also possible that these groups receive special attention on the day of voting, in terms of transportation to a place of voting and "compensation." Anecdotal examples of both abound in the Latin American case literature. For a good discussion of clientelism in the Latin American context see, for example, Geddes (1994).
8. Alternative spatial registration rules may be circumvented with legislation that thwarts the requirement by, for instance, exempting the indigenous group from compliance.
9. This literature is quite extensive; see, for example, Brockett, 1991; Albó, 1994; Zamosc, 1994; Nash, 1995; Selverston, 1997; Yashar, 1999; Cleary, 2000; Beck and Mijeski, 2001; Warren, 2002; Van Cott, 2000, 2003.
10. While not the only determinant of favorable political conditions, permissive electoral institutions, including a high district magnitude and a low threshold of representation, are important indicators in democratic regimes. For discussion of the effects of electoral institutions in Latin America, see, for instance: Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Amorim-Neto and Cox, 1997.
11. Many non-indigenous parties include indigenous constituencies, but given the distinct nature of indigenous demands, it is still likely that under favorable political conditions indigenous groups can be expected to field their own party or parties.
12. This definition follows the plurality/proportional dichotomy articulated and tested in the ethnic conflict literature, where representation as mediated by the electoral system is thought to influence the level of ethnic conflict (Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Horowitz, 1985, 1991; Cohen, 1997; Saideman et al., 2002; Reilly, 2002). In addition, this definition accounts for the general contention in the electoral literature that thresholds substantially influence representation in the legislature. For a thorough discussion of thresholds and their effects, see Taagepera and Shugart (1989) and Cox (1997).
13. Subsequent interviews conducted by Van Cott with rural leaders in Peru confirm this assessment of the Party. (Van Cott, personal communication).
14. The only country with a large indigenous population as a percentage of the national population excluded from the table is Belize, where the indigenous population constitutes 10 percent of the population (MRG 1997), because the country uses a plurality single-member district electoral system. Mexico is, however, included because legislators are elected through a mixed system of single-member districts and a national district that includes 200 members (Jones 1995, 1997). Other countries with any indigenous populations that are excluded are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, and Venezuela. In all of these countries, indigenous groups account for less than ten percent of the total population (MRG 1997). In addition, some of these countries use restrictive electoral institutions. For instance, in Argentina the threshold of representation is 3 percent, which is higher than the percent of the indigenous population, at just over 1 percent. In addition to Belize, Venezuela uses a plurality single-member district system. In Chile, indigenous groups account for 7.5 percent of the population, and the low district magnitude (two) is likely a hindrance to representation.
15. The requirement is that parties must at a minimum be organized in twelve departments, and in fifty counties with at least one member for every two thousand registered voters nationally, at

- least half of which must be literate (PDA 2003: Art. 19, 24, and 49). However, Mayans, who are the only indigenous group in Guatemala, are represented in substantial numbers in all but approximately five of the twenty-two departments (Warren, 2002). Consequently, the spatial requirement could not have prevented Mayan party formation in Guatemala.
16. For a detailed account of Peruvian mobilization, see Stokes (1995).
 17. According to the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador, indigenous peoples make up approximately 45 percent of the total population. According to SIISE (1999), the rural indigenous population makes up roughly 12 percent of the total rural population, which accounts for about half of the total population of the country. According to Saltos and Vázquez (1998), the total indigenous population is approximately 22 percent of the total population of the country.
 18. In 1998, the electoral system was changed to a multi-seat, candidate-based majoritarian system. For further discussion, see Mejía Acosta (1997) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989).
 19. The Galapagos Islands are the only province off the mainland. This requirement was tripled to 1.5 percent of registered voters before the 1978 election to reduce the number of parties running in the election of that year (Mejía Acosta, 1998).
 20. This percentage accounts for all votes received both by the party alone and in alliance with other parties.
 21. Tuesta Soldevilla, personal communication in Lima, Peru, 2000.
 22. Author's own calculations based on voting data from Romero Balliván (1998).
 23. Parties, by election year: 1979, APIN, VO; 1980, MITKA, PUB, AFIN, FDR, MITK-1, MNR-U, PRA-P, PRIN; 1985, ACP, ARENA, AUR, FNP, FPU, MNRI, MNRI-1, MNRV, MRTK, PDC, POR; 1989, PS-1, FULKA, MIN; 1993, FSB, ASD, ARBOL, MKN, VR-9, independent organization; 1997, IU, EJE, MBL, PDB, VSB.

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