International Mediation and the Question of Failed Peace Agreements: Improving Conflict Management and Implementation

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This study examines the contribution of international mediation to the successful termination of conflicts. In particular, we look at what exactly can mediation do, and what do we mean by success in mediation? We identify a short-term definition of success that relates only to the signing of an agreement, and a long-term definition of success that relates to the duration of peace following an agreement. We discuss the factors that may contribute to the failure of peace agreements, and use a contingency framework to argue that a settlement is only one aspect of a dynamic conflict, rather than a defining termination point. Within this framework we study how mediation can help with achieving peace agreements and ensuring they remain viable and are adhered to. We examine our ideas in the context of three conflicts, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone.

INTRODUCTION

In May 1991 the United States, Portugal, Russia, and the United Nations joined forces to mediate the civil war between Angola's warring factions. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) agreed to sign the Bicesse Accords.[1] However, what was to follow was far short of peace. Elections were held in 1992 and the MPLA won a majority. This prompted Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA forces, to carry out his earlier threat to return to war if he lost the elections: "If I lose, then the elections were rigged and I will send my men back to the bush to fight again—we will not accept defeat."[2] What followed was one of the bloodiest and most

devastating periods in Angola's extended history of war, as a result of which over 300,000 people are believed to have died between 1992 and 1994.[3]

Angola provides us with a harsh reminder that the signing of a negotiated agreement does not necessarily translate to durable peace. Mediation and other forms of conflict management seem to bring at best a short period of stability to civil wars. Usually, this period only lasts a few years, and then the conflict erupts again, often in a more violent form.[4] Most mediation research to date has tended to look at the processes involved in helping disputants reach some form of agreement.[5] It is only relatively recently, prompted by events such as those in Angola, that scholars of conflict management have looked beyond the signing of agreements to their durability.[6] We want to look at this issue and ask why successfully mediated peace settlements fail to bring durable peace to societies torn apart by intrastate conflicts. We will do this by considering not only the variables that influence whether or not mediated agreements are reached, but also the variables that are important in determining the *durability* of agreements.

This approach raises two difficult problems, the first of which is the need to establish a clear definition of what we mean by "success" in the conflict management field. There are clearly many perspectives on what constitutes or how to recognize success.[7] Success can be a short-term or a long-term condition. It can be defined in terms of objective conditions on the ground (e.g., reduced number of fatalities), or in terms of some subjective criteria (e.g., signing a just and fair agreement). Traditionally, mediation analysis has only used short-term measures to define success.[8] Thus, the signing of a peace treaty by the combatants is generally seen as successful. However, cases such as Angola forced many observers to think more seriously about the dynamics of a relationship between combatants, and to examine the fate of peace agreements signed with the help of a mediator. Do they last? Are they stable? Do they bring peace to a region?

The second problem that we face is the difficulty of determining the extent to which a failed peace agreement can be attributed to the efforts of a mediating third party. A peace agreement may fail to sustain the conditions necessary for peace because the parties involved wish to resume hostilities or ignore the provisions of their peace treaty. Similarly, the environment in which an agreement is signed may be so fraught with difficulties that even the most expertly mediated agreements are destined to fail. If we accept this line of thought,

then it seems highly unlikely that we would suggest mediation failure as the sole cause of a short-lived peace agreement. It seems simplistic to suggest that the failure of peace agreements can be attributable to only one factor in the overall conflict environment.[9] Likewise, mediation efforts cannot be evaluated by a simple dichotomy of whether or not a peace agreement was signed, regardless of the durability and stability of the agreement. Instead, peace should be conceived as a dynamic, multifaceted process in which a mediated peace agreement is just one part of the process.

We aim to differentiate between mediation failure, failure of the disputants themselves, and failure that is occasioned by the difficulties present in the conflict environment. The available literature concerning negotiated settlements suggests several factors that can improve the durability of negotiated settlements, which include international security guarantees, provisions for military and political power-sharing, and the level of specificity in the composition of the agreement. In addition, the environment in which the conflict and subsequent agreement take place will also influence settlement durability. By considering these factors in conjunction with the mediation process, we will be better equipped to evaluate the overall success of mediation efforts.

The argument will be elaborated by using the contingency framework of conflict management and mediation. This is a broad framework of conflict management associated with the work of Bercovitch.[10] The framework incorporates elements of the structure, process (performance), and environment of conflict management and reflects the dynamic nature of the process by looking at events both in terms of historical experience and future expectations. Within the framework any outcome (e.g., peace agreement or failure to reach one) can be analyzed in terms of the nature of the conflict, mediation behavior, and the conflict environment. The contingency framework is also dynamic (it deals with past, present, and future aspects of conflict management and mediation) and provides an opportunity for a longer-term analysis of mediation success and durability of mediated outcomes. The rationale for this framework is to place mediation efforts within a broader context, and thus to argue that outcome duration is related to many factors and not just mediation efforts.

This study proceeds in four sections. The first section examines in more detail the problem of defining success in the context of mediated agreements and what is meant by lasting or durable peace. The second part discusses various theories on why peace agreements fail by focusing

on the work of Stedman, Walter, Fortna, and Hoddie and Hartzell. The third section considers the contingency framework and suggests how this might be utilized in order to provide an approach for understanding failed peace settlements and assessing the likelihood of success for future mediated agreements in ethnic war. Finally, the fourth segment discusses three case studies where peace settlements have failed to produce lasting peace and offers a new perspective of analyzing such outcomes.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING SUCCESS

Recent works by such scholars as Stedman, Hoddie and Hartzell, Walter, and Fortna draw attention to the question of the duration, and not simply the signing, of peace agreements.[11] If we think of success as characterized by lasting agreements, then an agreement must be implemented, adhered to, and observed if its preceding mediation efforts are to be described as successful. Thus, there may well be a need to revise the meaning of success in conflict management and mediation. Mediators have to overcome many barriers to get the parties to sign a peace agreement. It is just as important to ask if the agreement a mediator helps to broker has any lasting effects.

As with many other areas of the social sciences, there is a major obstacle in trying to identify and understand what is meant by success in conflict management and mediation. This is particularly so as conflicts have changed radically over the past two decades; major battles between well-defined armies are becoming increasingly rare.[12] Conflicts are now overwhelmingly (more than 90 percent) internal in nature,[13] and involve complex ethnic dynamics, identity politics, high civilian casualties, and lack of democratic laws and institutions.[14] Internal conflicts are complex, and any outcome they seem to evince is far from clear-cut. These "ethnic" or "internal" wars are often remarkably resistant to any conflict management efforts.[15] Walter asserts that it is a rare scenario where the parties in conflict choose, of their own accord, to seek a peaceful solution.[16] Instead, unless there is some degree of regional or international pressure, the warring sides almost always choose to fight to the finish. Negotiations are hardly an option for parties in an internal conflict. Walter's research shows that most violent internal conflicts end with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side. Indeed, between 1940 and 1990, 55

percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions.[17]

These are precisely the kinds of conflicts where mediation, or some other form of external intervention, are required. Internal conflicts are usually characterized by high intensity and a commitment to violence, polarized and distorted perceptions of the parties in conflict, zero-sum attitudes, and communication breakdowns.[18] This is a main reason why parties in such conflicts need help. External parties, acting as peaceful mediators, can make it easier for relevant parties to make a commitment to peace by providing aid in restoring communications, altering perceptions, facilitating ideas, and relaying information. Licklider suggests that mediation can be helpful in achieving a negotiated settlement, thus resulting in fewer casualties and lessening the chances of any future fatalities.[19] Mediation is a constructive, peaceful instrument that is associated with the cessation, if not always the resolution, of intrastate conflicts.

However, in some cases, where mediation takes place and a peace agreement is produced, the conditions for a durable peace do not take hold. This was highlighted by the Rwandan genocide, or the conflict in Angola, which serve as a reminder of the failure to ensure a lasting peace—in this case even after a detailed settlement, including carefully constructed power-sharing arrangements, had been worked out by all the parties during mediation. The list of countries where mediated peace settlements have failed to bring lasting peace is extensive and includes Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Liberia, and Somalia.[20] The issue of what is "success," and how to recognize it remains very problematic. Klieboer argues that defining mediation success only in terms of achieving a short-term peace agreement is highly unsatisfactory.[21] Other scholars will use an arbitrary period of time such as three or five years where fatalities do not meet a certain threshold to measure whether or not a conflict has ended and hence determine whether or not an agreement is a success.[22] Is there another way to think of what is meant by "success" of mediated peace settlements?

If we take a long-term view of success, we must recognize that it may take ten to fifteen years to determine if a peace agreement is going to last and therefore be successful.[23] Fortna suggests that the criterion of whether violent hostilities resumed could be used to distinguish permanent peace from any cease-fire that fails.[24] Yet the longer time passes, the more likely it is that new factors will influence the situation and make it difficult to determine whether these factors

or those related to the original agreement produced renewed conflict. In addition, we need to think seriously about how much time should pass before the agreement is considered successful.

Stedman argues that a definition that does not involve time is more useful.[25] He defines success of conflict management or mediation with reference to two variables: first, whether the specific conflict was brought to an end through the efforts of a third party, and second, whether the conflict is terminated on a self-implementing basis that will allow that third party to withdraw from the process without fear of renewed war. For example, Stedman asserts that if the peacekeeping force mandated by the UN could not bring the civil war to a close in Angola then its mission was a failure. And if UN forces did bring the conflict to an end, but could not leave for fear of renewed conflict, this must be seen as partial success only. If the peacekeepers brought the conflict to a close, and departed without the war restarting in a two-year period, this could be deemed a success.

We believe it is important to think more broadly about the notion of mediation success. We need to distinguish between short-term and long-term peacebuilding and reconstruction. A long period of peace and stability is not something that happens as a result of a written and signed agreement. That agreement must be implemented fully by both parties, and they must adhere to its provisions for many years. Lederach argues that international mediation and conflict management actors lack a long-term view of the situation. Instead they take a myopic focus on crisis negotiation and fail to "appreciate the multiplicity and interdependence of peacebuilding roles and activities."[26] We would like to take heed of Lederach's criticism and take a longer-term perspective on the notion of mediation success. In doing so, we will use Stedman's approach to define mediation success. Mediation success is said to occur when (a) an agreement is reached as a result of third-party influence and (b) the agreement is implemented so that "when the outsiders leave, the former warring parties refrain from returning to war."[27] Successful mediation entails more than helping to fashion a fragile peace agreement. It means a tangible, long-term commitment to all the key components of a stable peace.

THE THEORY

Cases like Angola and Rwanda have spurred a growth in the literature relating to the failure of peace agreements. Scholars are beginning to

explore conditions that produce, or fail to produce, durable peace by focusing on the time period prior to signing a peace agreement. This period is fraught with risk and uncertainty generated by the security concerns of the parties to the conflict. Hartzell argues that the three primary concerns are "(1) that one's opponent may gain control of the coercive apparatus of the new state, (2) that one's opponent may gain an advantage in the allocation of political power within the new state, and (3) that one's opponent may gain an economic advantage within the new state."[28] As a result, specific strategies may be required during this period to ensure that the agreement is implemented and peace is lasting. Here we explore four of the most substantive ideas about the relationship between conflict management efforts and the failure of peace settlements. Although they emphasize different dimensions, they all stress the importance of third parties both in helping to produce an agreement and its compliance.

Stedman and Measuring Difficulty

Stedman notes the importance of recognizing that third parties in the resolution of ethnic conflict differ considerably along many dimensions.[29] Some mediators may be willing to provide resources and risk troops or other resources to uphold an agreement; other parties may not. Each conflict will vary in terms of the parties' commitment and the presence of those keen to uphold or destroy an agreement. Those who wish to destroy any chance of an agreement are called "spoilers." Spoilers are defined as "leaders or factions hostile to a peace agreement and willing to use violence to undermine it" and commonly include neighboring states that are hostile to the agreement.[30] The problem of spoilers is often augmented by the presence of "spoils," or "valuable, easily tradeable commodities" that are profitable during war times.[31] The correlation between the presence of "spoils" and intractable civil war has generated considerable academic debate with the apparent correlation often referred to as the "resource curse."[32] Clearly, the greater the presence of spoils, and the strength and coherence of spoilers, the fewer the chances of achieving a peace agreement, and fewer still are the chances of that agreement lasting.

Stedman contends that in order for peace agreements to be durable in such cases, the international community must provide greater resources and show a resolve to commit peacekeepers and other troops if necessary. He recognizes that "the willingness of a state to

invest blood and treasure to implement a peace agreement in any civil war depends on a prior judgment that making peace in that war is important to its vital security interests."[33] In other words, the willingness of regional or international efforts and proximate states to participate may depend on a perception that the continuation of an internal conflict threatens their own vital interests. Only such a perception may compel states to commit resources to ensuring that spoilers do not succeed in scuttling a peace agreement. The political will of other states is therefore as important in securing a long-lasting agreement as are the efforts of the parties themselves.

Finally, Stedman notes that once a commitment has been made to help with a peace agreement, the various tasks of that commitment must be prioritized. To ensure a peace agreement is long-lasting, priority must be given to the demobilization of soldiers and the demilitarization of politics, so that the parties are no longer pursing political change violently but through legitimate political means. Then, the parties should be taught to engage in lawful party politics. Finally, outside efforts must be directed at promoting democracy and human rights so that everyone feels they have a stake in the viability of the agreement, generating what Hoddie and Hartzell refer to as a "self-enforcing" agreement.[34]

Walter and International Security Guarantees

Walter argues that, in most cases, combatants will choose to walk away from the negotiating table and return to war unless a third party is present to assist and help guarantee the implementation of the agreement.[35] The greatest challenge is to design a peace agreement that convinces the combatants to lay down their arms, shed their partisan armies, and surrender conquered territory even though such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce all the provisions of the agreement. Achieving that is no mean feat.

Groups, just like individuals, need security guarantees. Walter contends that when groups obtain third-party security guarantees, they have a motivation and incentive to implement their settlement. Combatants do not have as much difficulty resolving underlying problems and reaching an agreement as they do in implementing the agreement. Walter asserts that civil war negotiations often fail not because the circumstances on the ground are not "ripe" for resolution, or because the peace agreement itself was not comprehensive enough,

but rather because the parties in conflict cannot credibly promise to abide by the terms of the agreement. Only third-party security guarantees will give them the necessary feeling of security to fulfill their commitments under the peace settlement.

Hoddie and Hartzell: Military Power-Sharing Arrangements

Hoddie and Hartzell looked at the implementation of peace agreements in an effort to determine the factors that produce durable settlements.[36] They argue that a major concern of each of the parties involved in a conflict is that there is no guarantee that war will not return, except for "a faith that their former enemies hold a preference for peace over war."[37] Given the history of violence between parties in conflict, it is difficult for disputants to accept that their opponent is genuine about moving beyond conflict and upholding the terms of an agreement. "Former combatants require assurances that no single group will be able to use the power of the state to secure what they failed to win on the battlefield, and perhaps threaten the very survival of their rivals."[38] Negotiated agreements that include provisions to divide and balance power between competing groups help to prevent any one party from becoming dominant and threatening the security of others.

Hoddie and Hartzell define power-sharing institutions as "those rules that … allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power."[39] Power-sharing can be exercised in four major areas: political, territorial, military, and economic. Using a sample of 38 internal conflicts that ended by the way of a negotiated agreement between 1945 and 1998, Hoddie and Hartzell found that the risk of settlement failure was reduced by 53 percent when the negotiated agreement included extensive provisions for power-sharing between the former combatants. Like Stedman and Walter, Hoddie and Hartzell also found that the presence of a third party to help enforce the terms of the agreement reduced the likelihood of settlement failure.

Fortna: The Specificity of Agreements

Along with the inclusion of provisions for power-sharing within a peace agreement, Fortna suggests that the parameters of any agreement must be sufficiently clear and precise.[40] It must be easy for

both sides to distinguish compliance from noncompliance. The more specific a peace agreement is, the less likely there will be confusion over whether one side is meeting its obligations or not. Additionally, in order to foster mutual trust and cooperation, strategies must be in place to ensure that accidents are prevented from triggering new violence. For example, marking the exact location of a cease-fire line ensures that there is less chance that one side will accidentally overstep its boundary through miscalculation.[41]

THE CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK

However, we look at it, third parties, whether as mediators or peace-keepers, play a significant role in the duration of any peace agreement. While we accept this argument, we wish to take it a step further and argue that we need to look at a broader context of mediation, a context that is more sensitive to time variations and to a wide variety of other factors in the settlement environment. We believe that the contingency framework allows us to study mediation, but compels us to take into account numerous other independent variables that could affect its performance and the duration of peace. Our argument is that this framework offers a better way of understanding why some mediated agreements fail while others succeed.

Mediation is a complex process that is shaped by the factors of conflict environments. Kleiboer discusses the various elements that influence the success of the mediation outcome and divides the factors into five areas: the nature of the dispute, characteristics of the disputants, nature of the mediator, international environment, and the strategies and processes implemented by the mediator.[42] Kleiboer illustrates the complexity of the mediation process itself without even taking into consideration the unique difficulties associated with the implementation environment. It is clear from the theoretical overview of the preceding section that the likelihood of the success of a mediated peace settlement is greatly shaped by the varying elements at play in the implementation environment. However, for a mediator or scholar of international conflict, having a long list of factors that shape the final outcome of mediation without some way to conceptualize the process of peace is confusing and complicated. This section looks at the relevance of the contingency framework in conceptualizing the process of mediation and peace implementation.

Figure 1. A contingency model of mediation. Adapted from Bercovitch and Houston (1996).

The contingency approach (Fig. 1), developed by Bercovitch and used by Bercovitch and Houston to understand the success and failure of mediation attempts, breaks all the variables of the mediation process into categories and distinguishes between context variables and process variables. Bercovitch and Houston, using the contingency approach to mediation, assert that "mediation outcomes, whether successful or not, are logistically seen as the result of the interactions of context and process variables."[43] The contingency framework draws our attention to a host of variables in the conflict management environment; it permits specific examination of cases of mediation or a large-scale comparative analysis of numerous cases, and it allows us to focus on and study any variable or combination of variables. However, what the framework does not do is examine the postconflict management consequences of mediation. There is no mention of how third parties can help implement or monitor an agreement. This is what we intend to rectify here.

Therefore, an adapted contingency approach is suggested here (Fig. 2). In order to take into consideration the effects of the implementation environment on the success of a mediated peace agreement, we will incorporate three main themes of the implementation literature into the expanded contingency framework: the specificity of the agreement, third-party guarantees, and conflict management environment. The first of the three issues concerns the "implementation" stage and looks at how specific the agreement is. Fortna argues persuasively that the more specific the agreement, the more likely it is to hold.

Antecedent Conditions   Current Conditions   Consequent Conditions

Context	Perform.	Implementation	Outcomes
1. Nature of the Mediator 2. Nature of the Parties 3. Nature of the Dispute	Mediation Behaviour	1. Specificity of Agreement 2. Guarantees 3. Difficulty of Environment 4. Provisions for Power-sharing	Success or Failure of Mediation

Figure 2. A revised contingency model of mediation.

More precisely, we are looking at features such as the specific identification of the cease-fire line, time line for demobilization, and dispute resolution processes in place for working out any problems that arise during the implementation. All of these measures help remove the doubts that each party has in trusting and cooperating with the other side. A specific mediated agreement sets the stage for a more successful implementation as it spells out, to a certain degree, the process that is to follow.

The second issue concerns third-party guarantees. All the studies cited above highlight the importance of third-party guarantees to the durability of a peace agreement. Third-party guarantees, such as the presence of a peacekeeping force, are designed to ensure that the provisions of the settlement will be implemented, and parties may feel reassured that ''cheating'' will not take place. Security guarantees offer incentives to both parties to comply and to engage in constructive behavior.

The third issue we address is that of the conflict management environment itself, and how it can affect the duration of peace. In particular, we are thinking of an environment that breeds ''spoilers'' or one from which they are largely absent. Two other factors in the environment that merit analysis are the proximity of hostile neighboring states and the availability of spoils (e.g., diamonds).

The final issue that requires consideration is the inclusion of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements.[44] Power-sharing provisions help to reduce the fear among combatants that their opponents will gain full control of the instruments of the new state and use this

newly found power to accomplish what they could not achieve during the conflict. We are looking for specific provisions that provide for power-sharing in the political, territorial, military, and economic spheres.

In order to analyze the usefulness of this approach for facilitating greater understanding of the success or failure of mediated peace agreements, this study now focuses on several cases studies. The conflicts and subsequent mediation attempts in Angola, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone are analyzed in the following section.

Case studies are widely used in the study of conflict and its management. They allow us to explore in detail a small number of instances and learn more about the processes by which a specific outcome had been reached. But case studies must provide much more than a detailed account of an event. We choose a specific case for the purpose of saying something meaningful about that case, but also about other broadly similar cases. The case study approach is not ideographic, nor nontheoretical. We use case studies here within a well-developed conceptual framework, and we focus on some aspects of the case only to explain a broader class of behavior and to refine our conceptual framework, if necessary.

The cases here were chosen neither randomly nor because they ''fit'' the theory. The cases were chosen because they permit cross-case comparison, are representative of the population of cases where mediation had a major role in an internal conflict, are familiar, and have current relevance. We also chose our cases to reflect, as far as is possible, regional variability, outcome variability, different conflict issues, different actors, and different time periods. Choosing a few cases to represent a set of protracted internal conflicts that have undergone mediation efforts and a peace agreement strikes us as the best way to assess the relationship between our theoretical ideas and data from the real world.

ANGOLA

The Nature of the Conflict

Angola has a long history of conflict. The Portuguese colonized Angola in the sixteenth century, and it became an important trade link with countries in Asia and a base for the developing slave trade. With the advent of organized anticolonialism in Africa in the early 1960s,

and with Portugal showing every sign that it was considering withdrawing from Angola in 1970, at least four separate groups began fighting for Angolan independence. A rushed independence agreement and a weak Marxist–Leninist regime created the conditions for an intense and prolonged civil war.[45] The nationalist groups that led the anticolonial struggle failed to agree on an appropriate power-sharing arrangement.[46] A civil war erupted not long after Angola gained its independence in 1974. Despite several attempts by the international community to bring reconciliation through peace agreements, civil war continued until the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002.[47]

The civil war in Angola had primarily been fought between the governing party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the National Union for the Toal Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces. The civil war resulted in more than 500,000 people killed and over three million people internally displaced. Events on the ground were further exacerbated by the tendency of other powers to intervene militarily, e.g., more than 50,000 Cubans fought for the MPLA. By the late 1980s, the MPLA had created a viciously oppressive, fundamentally intolerant, and thoroughly corrupt system that enriched their members (a minority in Angola) by embezzling billions of dollars in revenues from the exploration and sale of Angola's large oil resources.[48] The opposition party, UNITA, for its part terrorized large parts of Angola, and the "Bicesse Accords," signed in 1991 between UNITA, the MPLA, the United States, Russia, and Portugal, saw both sides fail to keep their promise of adhering to the agreement. Successive UN peacekeeping missions in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998 failed to bring peace to the country, leaving it virtually ungovernable.[49]

Over the years, the causes of the Angolan civil war have become blurred and less identifiable.[50] What claimed to be a war of independence has mutated into an intractable ethnic conflict that has been sustained primarily for the benefit of a handful of people on either side. Years of mistrust produced an environment where neither side was willing to compromise, preferring continued conflict to any solution that might involve relinquishing anything to the other side.

A History of Failed Peace Agreements

As briefly described in the introductory paragraphs, in May 1991, the United States, Portugal, Russia, and the UN cooperated to mediate between the MPLA and UNITA to broker the Bicesse Accords. The

circumstances appeared ripe for a settlement since prior to the mediation of this agreement both parties faced severe food shortages that forced them to agree on a cease-fire arrangement along the food transportation routes.[51] Heavy military losses on both sides added to the stalemate, as the parties realized they could not risk more losses and instead sought a political solution.

After a year of mediation and negotiation, the Bicesse Accords were reached. The settlement involved the establishment of a multiparty democracy, international supervision of the cease-fire and monitoring of the elections, demobilization of the rival armies, and the creation of a single national army.[52] Elections that were widely regarded by the international community as being "free and fair" were held in September 1992, and the MPLA won with an absolute majority.[53] However, UNITA would not accept defeat. In swift reaction, the UN, United States, Portugal, Russia, and even some African representatives tried, in a mad flurry of diplomatic efforts, to uphold the Bicesse Accords. Nevertheless, Savimbi would not acknowledge the election results; he refused to give the MPLA the upper hand and appear the loser.[54]

Finally, after months of continued negotiation with the two sides, the UN managed to bring UNITA and the MPLA to the negotiation table in Lusaka. Both sides approached mediation with extremely hostile and polarized positions, reflecting deep division. UNITA demanded a more serious role in the central government, rather than the token positions they had been offered at the end of the 1992 elections. The MPLA wanted UNITA to withdraw from the 60 percent of the country that it controlled at the time, and subsequent disarmament of UNITA's army. However, after international pressure, the parties agreed to the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 through the mediation of Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN Alioune Blondine Beye. Even though the Lusaka Protocol tried to address the weaknesses of the Bicesse Accords, it failed to produce a durable settlement to Angola's war. The Lusaka Agreement brought a peace that only lasted until 1997.[55]

A CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT

Specificity of the Agreement

The Bicesse Accords appeared specific, providing for international guarantees, demobilization, and elections. The first issue in the

agreement was the establishment of a comprehensive cease-fire between the government and UNITA, and included specific regulations such as the condition that required both parties to refrain from importing lethal equipment. The agreement also stipulated clear terms for the reorganization of the military and police force along with political reforms including the introduction of democratic multiparty elections and allowing for UNITA to become a legal political party.[56] Despite the eventual breakdown of both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol, both agreements appear to have been clear and unambiguous; hence, it seems unlikely that the failure of these agreements stemmed from any confusion or misinterpretation.

Guarantees

International guarantees were sadly lacking in the case of Angola. Although the Bicesse Accords provided for international supervision of the agreement, Stephen Chan writes that nobody had a strong interest in Angola's conflict although several actors were involved in the mediation process. The UN, he writes, had "no choice but to 'do Angola on the cheap'" because its resources were stretched thinly to cover several similar conflicts and mediation efforts.[57] UN Special Representative for Angola Margaret Anstee condemned this low-key approach and famously described her mandate in Angola as like "flying a 747 with only enough fuel for a DC3."[58] The deployment of about 1,000 UN international personnel in Angola is indicative of the inadequacies of the mission; the Namibia operation, regarded as a success, had around 6,000 UN personnel for a population and an electorate less than one-sixth the size of Angola's.[59] Furthermore, Chan argues that the UN never had any control over the election process and could not guarantee that it was free and fair. In addition, the United States had little interest in acting swiftly or purposefully in Angola for it was preoccupied with other matters. Hence, the conflict lacked genuine interest from third parties as it did not pose any direct threat to their security.

Difficulty of the Implementation Environment

Angola's implementation environment appears inherently difficult. However, Stedman's criteria for assessing difficulty levels imply that Angola did not have a large degree of implementation difficulty.

Although Angola borders the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has had a long history of conflict, the countries surrounding it were not hostile to peace.[60] Indeed, South Africa, a near neighbor, helped mediate the peace settlement. However, there is evidence of illegal diamond smuggling from Angola into neighboring countries, especially as Angola has one of the largest sources of diamonds in Africa.[61] Accordingly, any receiving country would have some vested interest in ensuring the conflict was prolonged in order to continue receiving diamonds and other such smuggled commodities.

Difficulty indicators two and three of the contingency framework are the presence of spoils and spoilers. Without a doubt Angola has plenty of spoils. Part of the intractable nature of the conflict is tied up in the war economy generated primarily by diamonds and oil. Malaquias describes the MPLA as ''drowning in oil''[62] with members enriching themselves and their families through their monopoly of this resource. Such resources most definitely constitute spoils, and the presence of these reminds the parties that they have something to fund their war if the settlement does not work out to their liking. Furthermore, although the peace agreement appeared to be unthreatened from spoilers of dissenting factions, Savimbi acted as a spoiler himself by returning to war instead of taking a secondary role in a new political system. Moreover, Savimbi's spoiler actions could not be managed by the international community as it had limited leverage over him.[63]

Power-Sharing

The events following the signing of the Bicesse Accords prove that the agreement did not provide for some equal way of sharing political power, thereby motivating UNITA to refuse to give up power and risk making the party more vulnerable in the power-increased hands of the MPLA. The Bicesse Accords did specify that both UNITA and the MPLA would contribute 20,000 soldiers to the new national army and that both sides would be guaranteed positions in the police force.[64] However, when the MPLA gained a majority in the 1992 elections, Savimbi refused to accept the result and the country was again plunged into civil war. The Lusaka Protocol attempted to address power-sharing problems, particularly in the political sphere where both parties were able to participate in all levels of government, and UNITA was given certain ministerial portfolios and assured participation in the National Assembly.[65] In spite of these measures, the new agreement failed to last.

It seems that despite what the agreement addressed, the parties saw more benefit in pursuing their goals through violence.

Summary/Analysis

It appears that a number of factors were at work in the failure of conflict management in Angola. The mediated agreement was good in the sense that it had a high level of specificity and was clearly constructed. However, the Bicesse Accords did not include sufficient provisions for power-sharing. More importantly, both peace agreements in Angola lacked any form of external enforcement. Similarly, when looking at the settlement environment there are both positives and negatives with regard to the durability of peace agreements. The neighbor countries of Angola were supportive of peace; however, Angola's spoils of diamonds and oil and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi both impeded progress toward durable peace.

This case has interesting implications with regard to our interpretation of mediation success. In the short term, mediation was clearly successful in leading to both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol. However, in the longer term, these agreements failed to bring any lasting peace to the country. Based on our analysis, it is clear that this failure cannot be squarely placed on the shoulders of the mediators only. While the nature of the mediated agreements, particularly the Bicesse Accords, may not have provided adequate power-sharing provisions and certainly lacked any enforcement mechanisms, we argue that factors such as the political environment and the presence of spoilers had a greater detrimental effect on the duration of peace than any strategy or behavior adopted by the mediator.

SRI LANKA

The Nature of the Conflict

Although violence has been intermittent since independence from British colonial rule, ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka came dramatically to the surface in the early 1980s as violent Sinhalese-Tamil riots rocked the country, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. The Sri Lankan conflict has its roots in years of ethnic disharmony between the Sinhalese majority, which make up around 74 percent of the country's population, and the Tamil minority, at around 22 percent.[66] The

Sinhalese have been in governance since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948. The government wasted no time passing discriminatory legislation against the Tamils, institutionalizing ethnic difference.[67] Militant Tamils formed a rebel force and concentrated their efforts on murdering Sinhalese. From early 1983 the war stepped up as Tamil attacks grew worse and the Sinhalese responded. The government was slow to act, by which time many were dead, including around 400 Tamils.[68] Violence continued, including an attack in 1985 by Tamil guerrillas illegally dressed as government soldiers who went on a killing spree. Ponmoni Sahadevan describes the situation as follows:

> The good news (for the Sinhalese) is that the Sri Lankan State has withstood the mounting ethnic challenge to its territorial integrity and resisted the pressure for its reconstitution or re-composition. The bad news (for the Tamils and some of the Sinhalese) is that the State's survival has been at a very high cost. Apart from severe damage caused to the socio-economic fabric of the country, several thousands of people have lost their lives in more than a decade-long ethnic war.[69]

The Peace Process and Indian Mediation

Failed peace agreements are an integral part of the Sri Lankan conflict. Sahadevan writes, "The history of the peace process is as old as the outbreak of the conflict; a total failure of the former has gradually added greater intensity and complexity to the latter."[70] India's involvement in the conflict has been the most persistent and noteworthy since it has had a vested interest in the outcome. Not only have Indian Tamils long had historical links with the Sri Lankan Tamils, but Sri Lanka is also geopolitically important to India.[71] Sri Lanka is only thirty miles from the tip of India. India and Sri Lanka share boundaries, culture, and interests. Therefore, Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's conflict was potentially of benefit to both countries.

India has always tried to maintain a delicate balance between interfering in Sri Lankan affairs and protection of Sri Lankan Tamils. On several unsuccessful occasions in the 1980s, India attempted to encourage the Sinhalese government to broker an agreement and resolve the conflict with the Tamil people. It was not until 1987 that a peace settlement was reached through Indian mediation.

In 1987, violence in Sri Lanka reached particularly dangerous proportions. This compelled India to suspend its good offices, which gave Sri Lanka a strong warning signal that India was very concerned with Sri Lanka's situation. As a result of Indian pressure, the Sinhalese government reopened negotiations in April 1987. This led to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in late July 1987. The peace accord established an immediate cease-fire with the surrender of arms by Tamil militants and the withdrawal of the government's army.[72] Furthermore, it provided for the integration of the north and eastern provinces into a single administrative unit, which effectively gave the Tamil population, mostly located in those areas, a limited form of autonomy.[73] Elections to the north-eastern provincial council were to be held no later than December 1987 under Indian observation. In addition, the Tamil language was given official status. The agreement also committed Indian forces to aid Sri Lanka in the implementation of this agreement, if such forces were necessary.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was never signed by the Tamils. India did not succeed in bringing the various Tamil factions together to sign the agreement. Although the government forces withdrew, a cease-fire was established, and Indian peacekeeping forces were in place, the Tamils rejected the 1987 accords, wanting more decentralization of powers. They refused to disarm, and renewed fighting followed. This brought the Tamil troops into war with the Indian peacekeepers, forcing the Indian government to withdraw its forces in 1990. An estimated 1,000 Indian troops died in less than three years.[74] Sahadevan describes the period of Indian involvement in the Sri Lanka conflict (1983–1987) as "the most hectic part of any peacemaking efforts on the island."[75] Despite ongoing efforts from various third parties, including Norwegian shuttle diplomacy that led to a cease-fire agreement in 2002, the situation in Sri Lanka remains ominous as the conflict continued with the dissolution of the cease-fire in January of 2008 and the immediate resumption of hostilities thereafter.[76]

A CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT

Specificity of the Agreement

The agreement mediated by India was specific in its attempt to guarantee the Tamils a degree of independence. What the agreement

process failed to do was include all the parties in conflict in the mediation process. It appears that the Tamils were never present, and Indian officials negotiated on their behalf, acting as both negotiator and mediator. Indian mediation in the Sri Lankan conflict is unusual given India's dual role, and perhaps the strategies employed were factors in the eventual collapse of the agreement. Yet, India managed to persuade the Sinhalese government to offer the Tamils a degree of independence that was unheard of before. The Indians mediated a fairly comprehensive agreement considering the state of the conflict prior to the beginning of the mediation process.

Guarantees

Guarantees were provided under the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, as India agreed to send peacekeeping troops in order to enforce the implementation of the agreement. What these troops could not do was to force the Tamils to sign the agreement. Instead it appears that India presumed the agreement would be to the satisfaction of the Tamils and that they would sign it. However, attacks were carried out on Indian peacekeeping forces, despite Indian intentions for peace. They were forced to leave, cutting their losses and saving the lives of as many men as possible. Guarantees were physically present, but not sufficiently welcome.

Difficulty of the Implementation Environment

Taking a look at the difficulty of the environment, first it appears that the presence of a hostile neighbor was not the case with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's only and most vocal neighbor, India, was its mediator. The Indian government was set on implementing peace in Sri Lanka to suit its own national and regional security concerns. However, in contradiction to the goals of the central Indian government, during the 1980s the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) received secondary support from the Tamil-led state government of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. It wasn't until 1991 that this support ended when the Indian government fired the Tamil Nadu state government in response to its allegiance with the Sri Lankan Tamils. Additionally, Sri Lanka does not have a large amount of disposable natural resources with which to fund the conflict, which decreases the likelihood that the presence of spoils drove the parties, specifically the Tamils, to resume fighting.

Finally, the chance of spoilers was high in Sri Lanka because the Tamils were not physically part of the peace agreement process and the Tamils themselves were split into several factions.

Power-Sharing

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord contains no provisions for power-sharing of the coercive apparatus of the state. Resolution 2.9 of the accord states that "all arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka."[77] By requiring the Tamils to surrender their arms and failing to include any provisions for military or political power-sharing, the agreement provided no tangible assurances that the government of Sri Lanka would not take advantage of its opponent's vulnerability and seek an outright military victory.

Summary/Analysis

In contrast with the case of Angola, the breakdown of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord appears to have more to do with the nature of the mediation effort than the settlement environment. The agreement was negotiated between the Indian and Sri Lankan governments without substantive involvement of the Tamil movement. As a result, the LTTE was not satisfied with the terms of the agreement. One of the major flaws in this agreement was that it failed to provide substantial provisions for power-sharing. India did provide a security guarantee of sorts; however, it was not welcomed by the Tamils and lacked the necessary strength to maintain security in Sri Lanka. Unlike the civil war in Angola, the settlement environment in Sri Lanka posed no obvious impediments to successful settlement. Sri Lanka is not rich in natural resources and the only spoilers present were the LTTE, which can be explained by their exclusion from the negotiation process.

This mediation effort cannot be described as a success.[78] The Indian mediators were not able to broker an agreement that had any real prospect of maintaining long-term peace and stability. While an agreement was put together, it was only ever agreed to by one of the disputants. Given that the settlement environment did not pose any major problems, it appears from this analysis that the primary cause of the agreement failure was the initial mediation process.

SIERRA LEONE

The Nature of the Conflict

Conflict in Sierra Leone has been nothing short of complex and vicious. What started as a relatively small incursion led to a conflict that has displaced approximately half of Sierra Leone's population.[79] It officially began in 1991, when a small militia, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) supported by Liberian rebel Charles Taylor, crossed from Liberia into Sierra Leone.[80] Taylor saw the opportunity to expand his influence beyond the borders of Liberia and benefited from the Sierra Leone conflict through the illegal trafficking of diamonds. The Sierra Leone conflict, in part, revolves around the war economy generated by diamonds. Diamonds are an incentive to prolong the fighting, as they fund the violence and enrich the rebel forces. Michael Ross highlights this: his study found that resource wealth created an incentive for separatist rebellion in Sierra Leone where rebel groups were able to sell mineral rights to foreign firms or neighboring governments.[81]

In 1992, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) overthrew the president of Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh, claiming Momoh had secret connections to the RUF. The coup leaders installed themselves as the new National Provisional Ruling Council and promised to defeat the RUF. The new council increased the size of the SLA and removed any civilian checks on the military. However, as David Keen writes, "frustrated at the lack of support and usually unable to pin down an elusive enemy, many soldiers turned to looting, to illegal mining, and to attacks on civilians."[82] These rogue soldiers became known as "sobles"—soldiers by day, rebels by night. To complicate matters further, the council, unable to effectively fight the RUF, employed private security company Executive Outcomes to help fight the RUF. This was an effective short-term intervention, yet it created long-term problems. Reno argues that the increased security allowed civilians the chance to put greater pressure on the council to hold elections, which were eventually held in 1996. It also created insecurity for the SLA, who feared that Executive Outcomes would replace the military. As a result, soldiers began to collaborate more closely with the RUF forces. When Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone in 1997, the SLA instigated another coup and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.[83]

Civilians in Sierra Leone have borne the brunt of the war. Many have suffered from gross human rights violations. Mutilations became more common and were aimed at discouraging people suspected of supporting the old government. Child soldiers have been used and forced into committing atrocities against their own communities.[84] Rebels have forcibly administered drugs in order to secure cooperation and support. Brutality is widespread and civilians suffer not only at the hands of the rebels, but are at the mercy of the SLA as well. Civilians have resorted to forming civil defense groups called "kamajors."[85] However, this has only fueled attacks on civilians as soldiers and rebels alike perceive such moves as a lack of support.

The Peace Process

Dubious peace talks were held in 1996 between the military and rebel forces. Keen writes that "in the face of democratic elections and a military onslaught from the kamajors and … Executive Outcomes, the factions no longer found it convenient to portray themselves as 'enemies', preferring now to make a public show of common interests, mutual goodwill, and the shared view that peace was imminent if only elections could be forestalled."[86] Although a peace agreement was reached in 1996 (the Abidjan Peace Agreement) and UN peacekeepers were deployed, it did not last. International demobilization and reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone were poorly funded and lacked commitment. The international community imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone and the old government was restored after the 1997 coup. In retaliation, the military attacked the capital and killed over 6,000 people.[87] This incident drew international attention and compelled the international community to call for a formal peace agreement.[88] Mediation led by the Economic Community of West African States began in 1999.

On July 7, 1999, the government and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement. The agreement called for the disarming of all warring groups, the appointment of RUF members to cabinet positions, and the transformation of the RUF into a political party.[89] As well as a role in government, the agreement provided amnesty for the RUF from all war crimes. Unfortunately, the agreement failed to bring any form of peace to Sierra Leone. UN peacekeepers were installed to help ensure the implementation of the agreement. However, the leader of the rebel forces let the UN mission know that

he believed the UN had no business in Sierra Leone.[90] In 2000, UN troops came under attack and around 300 were abducted.[91] The RUF was eventually forced to begin to comply with the terms of the Lomé Peace Agreement after its power was substantially reduced following costly fighting with Guinean and British forces that came to the aid of the government of Sierra Leone.[92]

A CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

Specificity of the Agreement

In the case of Sierra Leone, it appears that it was not so much the nature of the peace agreement that was the main problem. The Lomé agreement stipulated the cessation of hostilities and also included a number of political and military reforms.[93] However, whether specific or not, implementing a peace agreement was always going to be a hard task in a complex conflict environment such as Sierra Leone's. The failure of the agreement is more adequately revealed by examining the lack of guarantees and the difficulty of the environment.

Guarantees

Although UN peacekeepers were installed to enforce the terms of the agreement, they lacked the ability and numbers to provide any credible source of guarantee for the peace implementation process.[94] Many of the troops lost their weapons to RUF fighters and proved no match for them, especially following the abductions of UN peacekeepers in 2000. While reinforcements were sent from Britain, they only arrived after the abductions, and by this stage the agreement had already shown signs of collapse.[95]

Difficulty of the Implementation Environment

The Sierra Leone implementation environment appears the most difficult out of the three case studies examined in this article. In this case the presence of a hostile neighbor, spoils, and spoilers were all present and active contributors to the failure of the peace settlement. Charles Taylor, who was by 2000 the president of Liberia, had always supported the RUF and supplied them with weapons during the UN

abduction crisis. Reno writes that this "reflected a continuing longer-term relationship, in which Taylor served as a commercial channel for RUF-supplied diamonds mined in Sierra Leone."[96] The wealth of diamonds in Sierra Leone had already provided the RUF and SLA with funding for the conflict, and without conflict such illegal revenue would be less likely. Furthermore, spoilers were a major concern. The sheer number of various parties to the conflict made the possibility of spoilers more likely, as evidenced by the RUF factions who, unhappy with the UN presence in Sierra Leone, contributed to the "spoilt" conditions of the peace agreement and disarmament process.

Power-Sharing

Both the 1996 Abidjan agreement and the 1999 Lomé agreement included provisions for power-sharing in the military, political, and economic spheres. The 1996 agreement stipulated that rebels who met certain criteria would be integrated into the national military. The 1999 agreement took this one step further by proposing the construction of a new national army comprised of soldiers from both sides of the conflict along with an extensive program to help reintegrate former combatants into society.[97] Along with provisions for military power-sharing, Sierra Leone's peace agreements also included provisions for political power-sharing.[98] The 1996 agreement allowed the RUF to form a legal political party while the 1999 agreement instituted political power-sharing at all levels of government, giving the RUF one senior cabinet seat, three other cabinet positions, and four posts of deputy minister.[99] Finally, both agreements included provisions for the equitable distribution of natural resources among all citizens and for political reforms to rid the country of extreme poverty and starvation.[100] Hence, it seems that the failure of the 1996 and 1999 peace agreements in Sierra Leone cannot be attributed to a lack of power-sharing provisions.

Summary/Analysis

The Lomé Peace Agreement was specific, included numerous provisions for military and political power-sharing, and was intended to be supported with security guarantees. The fact that the UN peacekeepers lacked the necessary strength to enforce the terms of the agreement should not be seen as a failure of mediation, but as an

unfortunate reality of the UN's thinly spread resources. This analysis shows that rather than the mediation process, the major factor contributing to the failure of peace agreements in Sierra Leone was obstacles inherent in the settlement environment. The RUF received clear support from neighboring Liberia, both sides were split into various factions, and the conflict was primarily funded by Sierra Leone's blood diamonds.

Therefore, despite the short-lived nature of the negotiated peace agreements in Sierra Leone, the mediation efforts should not necessarily be viewed as a failure. In an environment fraught with difficulties, it is hard to find fault with the mediation effort.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite the complex and intractable nature of ethnic or internal conflict, many mediation efforts have produced peace agreements. A peace agreement would appear to signal the end to an armed conflict and the success of the mediation effort. However, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone are three examples from an expanding list of cases where mediated peace agreements have failed to bring lasting peace.

These cases force us to rethink the meaning of mediation success and how it can be measured. Because purportedly successful mediation efforts are contradicted by the fact that it can take only weeks or months for violence to restart, undermining any attempt to bring about lasting peace, a better conceptual grasp on the nature of the peace process is required. Stedman, Hoddie and Hartzell, Walter, and Fortna address the problem of failed peace agreements and suggest it is related to the implementation environment. The implementation environment, they assert, is a vulnerable and complex environment for parties in conflict. It requires specific measures to ensure an agreement is implemented and a longer period of peace occurs in that country.

An approach that only considers factors from the implementation environment, however, lacks a wider, process view of conflict management. The contingency approach helps to conceptualize the most important variables that are involved in any peace process. The contingency approach allows for a measure of both those factors that may lead to an agreement being reached and its successful implementation. In this manner, we are now able to distinguish between short-term mediation success, which is indicated by the signing of a new agreement, and long-term mediation success, which is indicated by

the successful implementation of the agreement and the creation of a lasting and viable peace.

The contingency approach can now be used to answer the question why successfully mediated agreements fail at times to bring lasting peace. Although the implementation criteria do provide useful insight into the failure of mediated peace agreements, more has to be taken into account if we are to provide a fuller picture of this complex issue. The implementation environments in Angola, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone were unstable and fragile, and there is no doubt that they had a significant impact on the success of the mediated agreement. The various factors of guarantees, power-sharing, spoilers, and spoils explain to differing extents why implementation was difficult and complex in these cases. However, these factors are not the only reasons why mediation fails to create a lasting peace.

It is important to view the implementation environment as only one segment in the puzzle of why mediated peace settlements succeed or fail to bring lasting peace. Other factors, such as the intractable nature of the conflict, the resources of the mediator, or mediation strategies, may also provide important clues to why agreements fail. The failure of mediated agreements is more complex than just the factors involved in the implementation environment, and the contingency approach attempts to integrate all of these factors into one framework.

There are obvious implications for practitioners. In none of the cases here did the mediators want the agreement to fail. This suggests that they had little or no foresight that it would, or even might, fail. Practitioners therefore need to be more discriminating in their judgment of mediation success and not just consider reaching an agreement as being good enough. They have an ethical imperative to consider whether the agreement that they helped the parties in conflict to fashion can lead to long-term mediation success. This requires that mediators go beyond a narrow focus on signing an agreement in the full glare of publicity to an approach that is more forward-looking. Agreements therefore must be meticulously assessed prior to being constructed. Practitioners thus need to think of their own behavior and the nature of a conflict as well as the likely implementation environment. Mediators may well need new tools and concepts to evaluate what they can achieve, and how long an agreement may last. Much more work needs to be done in this important area, and we hope that this exploratory piece will bring these matters to the attention of both academics and practitioners.

NOTES

1. See Agiodun Williams, "Negotiations and the End of the Angolan Civil War," in *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*, ed. David R. Smock (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

2. Ibid., 209.

3. See Lise M. Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

4. See Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," in *Resolving International Conflict: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

5. Such as Jacob Bercovitch, *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), and Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt, *Mediation Research* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1989). See also William Dixon, "Third party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlements," *International Interactions*, 26:4 (October 1996): 653–681; Derryick Frazier and William Dixon, "Third party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements," *International Interactions*, 32:4 (October 2000): 385–408; and Michael J. Greig, "Stepping Into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?," *American Journal of Political Science*, 49:2 (April 2005): 249–266.

6. For example, see Caroline Hartzell, Mathew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables," *International Organization*, 55:1 (Winter 2001): 183–208; Caroline Hartzell, "Explaining The Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43:1 (February 1999): 3–22.

7. See Josephine Zubek, Dean Pruitt, Robert Peirce, Neil McGillicuddy, and Helena Syna, "Disputant and Mediator Behaviors Affecting Short-Term Success in Mediation," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36:3 (September 1992): 546–572.

8. See Marieke Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40:2 (June 1996): 370–390.

9. See Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables."

10. For an analysis of the Contingency Model, see Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, "Why Do They Do It like This? An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44:2 (April 2000): 170–202; see also Jacob Bercovitch, "The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations," in *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1992), 1–29.

11. See Stephen John Stedman, "International Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Stephen John Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001); Stephen John Stedman, "Introduction," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Barbara Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, 51:3 (Summer 1997): 335–364; Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Virginia Page Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *International Organization*, 57:2 (Spring 2003): 337–372; Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," *Journal of Peace Research*, 40:3 (2003): 303–320; Suzanne Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Negotiating the Terms," *American Journal of Political Science*, 43:3 (July 1999): 912–934.

12. See Monty G. Marshall and Ted R. Gurr, *A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (College Park, MD: Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003).

13. See, for example, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007); see also Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,"

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    14. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing fear: the origins and management of ethnic conflict." *International Security*, 21:2 (Fall 1996): 41–76.

    15. Ibid. See also Nicholas Sambanis and Michael Doyle, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 94:4 (2000): 779–802; Paul Collier, "Ethnic Civil War, Securing the Post-Conflict Peace," *Harvard International Review*, 28:4 (Winter 2007): 56–61; Elisabeth J. Wood, "Civil Wars: What We Don't Know," *Global Governance*, 9:2 (2003): 247–260.

    16. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," 335.

    17. Ibid., 337.

    18. See I. William Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1995); Chaim Kauffman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Civil Wars," *International Security*, 20:4 (Spring 1996): 136–175.

    19. See Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993," *The American Political Science Review*, 89:3 (September 1995): 681–693.

    20. See Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*.

    21. See Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation."

    22. James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?," *Journal of Peace Research*, 41:3 (2004): 275–301.

    23. Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*, 7.

    24. Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace," 348.

    25. Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*, 8.

    26. John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 73. See also Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

    27. Stedman, "Introduction," in *Ending Civil Wars*, 2.

    28. Caroline Hartzell, "Explaining The Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars."

    29. Stedman, "Introduction," in *Ending Civil Wars*, 2–4.

30. Ibid., 3; see also Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, 22:2 (1997): 5–53.

31. Ibid.; see also Michael L. Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 41:3 (May 2004): 337–356.

32. See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49:4 (2005): 625–643.

33. Ibid., 3.

34. Hoddie and Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements."

35. Walter, *Committing to Peace*, 3; see also Hartzell et al., "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables," 183–208.

36. Hoddie and Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," 303–320. See also Alvaro de Soto and Gracina del Castillo, "Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador," *Global Governance*, 1:2 (Winter 1995): 189–203; Licklider, *The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil War*; Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Stephen J. Steadman and Donald Rothchild, "Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment," *International Peacekeeping*, 3:2 (1996): 17–35; Caroline Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43:1 (February 1999): 3–23.

37. Hoddie and Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," 305.

38. Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science*, 47:2 (2003): 319.

39. Ibid., 320.

40. Fortna, "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and Durability of Peace," 337–372.

41. Ibid.

42. See Kleiboer, "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation."

43. Bercovitch and Houston, "The Study of International Mediation," 15.

44. See Philip G. Roederer and Donald Rotschild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

45. See Christine M. Knudsen and I. William Zartman, "The Large Small War in Angola," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 541 (1995): 130–143.

46. See Assis Malaquais, "Making War & Lots of Money: The Political Economy of Protracted Conflict in Angola," *Review of African Political Economy*, 28:90 (2001): 521–536.

47. See *Accord: From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2004) for an extensive discussion of the various peace processes in Angola.

48. Ibid., 522.

49. Ibid., 523.

50. Knudsen and Zartman, "The Large Small War in Angola," 131.

51. Ibid., 135.

52. Ibid., 136.

53. Dame Margaret J. Anstee, "The Role of International Mediators in Conflicts: *Lessons Learned from Angola*," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 14:2, p. 73.

54. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "The Angola UNITA Conflict" (2002), http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=3 (accessed November 2007).

55. Some estimates put the resumption of the war much earlier, as the Uppsala Conflict Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute at Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset lists a minor armed conflict in 1995, which may have possibly reached the intensity of being a war.

56. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "The Angola UNITA Conflict" (2002), http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=3 (accessed November 2007).

57. Stephen Chan, "The Failure of Mediation in Angola" (1993), http://www.upmf-grenoble.fr/orihs/cahiers/1/chan.pdf (accessed November 29, 2003).

58. Cited in Manuel J. Paulo, "The role of the United Nations in the Angolan peace process" (2004), http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/angola/un-role.php (accessed September 29, 2003).

59. Ibid.

60. However, in the later stages of the conflict, Namibia entered the conflict fighting on the side of the government.

61. See Malaquais, "Making War & Lots of Money."

62. Ibid.

63. Anstee, "The Role of International Mediators in Conflicts: *Lessons Learned from Angola*."

64. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "The Angola UNITA Conflict" (2002), http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=3 (accessed November 2007).

65. Ibid.

66. General Board of Global Ministries, "History of Sri Lanka" (2004), http://gbgm-umc.org/country_profiles/country_history.cfm?Id=153 (accessed January 21, 2004).

67. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "The Sri Lanka LTTE Conflict" (2006), http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID= 151 (accessed January 2007).

68. Ibid.

69. P. Sahadevan, "Resistance to Resolution: Explaining the Intractability of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka." *International Journal of Group Tensions*, 27:1 (1997): 19.

70. Ibid., 20.

71. Venkateshwar P. Rao, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India's Role and Perception." *Asian Survey*, 28:4 (1988): 419–436.

72. Ibid., 433.

73. Ibid.

74. General Board of Global Ministries, "History of Sri Lanka."

75. Sahadevan, "Resistance to Resolution," 20.

76. Roland Buerk "Sri Lanka Ceasefire Formally Ends." *BBC News* (January 16, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7190209.stm (accessed May 22, 2008).

77. *The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Sri Lanka Agreement* (1987), http:// peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php (accessed November 2007).

78. Roger Mac Ginty describes India's intervention into the conflict as a "…'worst case scenario' in which a poorly conceived and executed intervention in support of a partial peace accord fueled the conflict to reach a further level of intensity." See Roger Mac Ginty, *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

79. See David Keen, "Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone," *International Politics and Society*, 2 (2003): 67–94.

80. Ibid.; see also William Reno, "War and the Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security* (Stockholm: International Peace Research Institute, 2001).

81. Michael Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? A Medium-N Analysis" (2003), http://www.polisci.ucla.edu (accessed May 22, 2008).

82. Keen, "Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths," 82.

83. Reno, "War and the Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone."

84. See Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Sierra Leone Country Page" (n.d.), http://www.child-soldiers.org/regions/country?id=191 (accessed May 2008).

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval argue that the mediation process that occurred in Sierra Leone was typical of a new post-Cold War pattern in which Western states have chosen to use multiparty mediation as a response to mounting public opinion to intervene for humanitarian reasons in states that are not part of their security interests. See I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 440.

89. Ibid.

90. "Sierra Leone Timeline," *BBC News* (August 31, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/741070.stm (accessed February 4, 2004).

91. "Fears for UN Mission in Sierra Leone," *BBC News* (May 6, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/738967.stm (accessed May 22, 2008).

92. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "The Sierra Leone Conflict" (2002), http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=94 (accessed November 2007).

93. Ibid.

94. More recently, Michael O'Hanlon remarks that, "The Sierra Leone mission is likely to continue and in fact may need to become more ambitious in order to establish lasting stability—since doing so may require defeating RUF forces." See Michael O'Hanlon, "Expanding Global Military Capacity to Save Lives with Force," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, 332.

95. The fact that the British were able to provide much-needed support to this UN mission leads Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall to conclude, "When an international or regional body is called upon to oversee peace implementation and deploy peacekeepers, a lead nation working alongside the operation may be required …," in *Taming Intractable Conflicts:*

Mediation in the Hardest Cases (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 170.

96. Reno, "War and the Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone."

97. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "The Sierra Leone Conflict" (2002), http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=94 (accessed November 2007).

98. Even though the agreement contained equal power-sharing provisions for the two main conflicting parties, the principle of whether to end the war by designing an agreement that gave the perpetrators new positions of power in the government apparently presented an ethical challenge to the mediators because it overlooked the issue of justice while "rewarding" the parties. See I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, 452.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.