

# Mathematical Modeling of Epidemic Diseases

A case study of the COVID-19 coronavirus

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# Part I

## Short Lecture



An introduction to biological systems modeling

Compartmental modeling of a pandemic

Agent-based modeling of a pandemic



# An introduction to biological systems modeling

Compartmental modeling of a pandemic

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# Introduction to modeling

## What is a model?

An entity that resembles a system or object in certain aspects, but is easier to work with as compared to the original system.



# Introduction to modeling

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An entity that resembles a system or object in certain aspects, but is easier to work with as compared to the original system.

## Models are used for:

1. System identification
2. Simulation
3. Prediction
4. Control (the ultimate objective; but not always achievable)



# Introduction to modeling

(continued)

Is it possible to model a complex biological and social phenomena such as a global pandemic?



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(continued)

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2. Knowledge of the sources of **modeling and observation errors**



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(continued)

Is it possible to model a complex biological and social phenomena such as a global pandemic?

Yes! But subject to some conditions:

1. Defining the model **scope** and **level of abstraction**
2. Knowledge of the sources of **modeling and observation errors**
3. Access to reliable data



# Mathematical modeling of epidemic and pandemic diseases

## Context

Mathematical epidemiology; Biological systems modeling; Applied mathematics; Computer simulation



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## Major approaches

- ▶ Top-down (macro-level modeling): **compartmental models** and **spatio-temporal compartmental models**
  - ▶ **Tools:** ordinary differential equations, partial differential equations, dynamic systems, estimation theory




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## Major approaches

- ▶ Top-down (macro-level modeling): **compartmental models** and **spatio-temporal compartmental models**
  - ▶ **Tools:** ordinary differential equations, partial differential equations, dynamic systems, estimation theory
- ▶ Bottom-up (micro-level modeling): **modeling the activity of a population of individuals**
  - ▶ **Tools:** agent-based methods, cellular automata and computerized simulations

 These methods can be combined in a **hybrid model**



An introduction to biological systems modeling

Compartmental modeling of a pandemic

Agent-based modeling of a pandemic



# Compartmental modeling

## Definition

A **compartmental model** is a **weighted directed graph** representation of a linear or nonlinear **dynamic system**



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A **compartmental model** is a **weighted directed graph** representation of a linear or nonlinear **dynamic system**

## Steps

1. Partition the population into **homogeneous** groups of individuals (known as **compartments**)
2. Assign time-variables to the compartments
3. Write flow equations between the compartments
4. Model analysis, simulation, parameter estimation, and prediction



# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

## Epidemic disease spread in large populations

A population of  $N$  individuals can be partitioned into **population fractions**:

- ▶ **Susceptibles**:  $s(t)$
- ▶ **Exposed** (without symptoms):  $e(t)$
- ▶ **Infected** (with symptom):  $i(t)$
- ▶ **Recovered**:  $r(t)$
- ▶ **Deceased**:  $p(t)$

subject to  $s(t) + e(t) + i(t) + r(t) + p(t) = 1$




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subject to  $s(t) + e(t) + i(t) + r(t) + p(t) = 1$

 In the sequel we study a:

**mortal non-immunizing susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered (SEIR)**  
model




# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

## A mortal SEIR model without lifetime immunity

Start with the compartments.




# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

## A mortal SEIR model without lifetime immunity

Individuals are infected as they contact infected or exposed subjects.




# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

## A mortal SEIR model without lifetime immunity

The exposed either recover or become infected with symptoms.




# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

## A mortal SEIR model without lifetime immunity

The infected either recover or pass away.




# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

## A mortal SEIR model without lifetime immunity

The recovered may again become susceptible.






# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

## A non-immunizing fatal susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered (SEIR) model

The full model and its corresponding dynamic equations, which can be numerically solved from **initial conditions**  $[s(t_0), e(t_0), i(t_0), r(t_0), p(t_0)]$ :



$$\frac{ds(t)}{dt} = -\alpha_e s(t)e(t) - \alpha_i s(t)i(t) + \gamma r(t)$$

$$\frac{de(t)}{dt} = \alpha_e s(t)e(t) + \alpha_i s(t)i(t) - \kappa e(t) - \rho e(t)$$

$$\frac{di(t)}{dt} = \kappa e(t) - \beta i(t) - \mu i(t)$$


$$\frac{dr(t)}{dt} = \beta i(t) + \rho e(t) - \gamma r(t)$$

$$\frac{dp(t)}{dt} = \mu i(t)$$



# Typical solutions

The life-time immune case ( $\gamma = 0$ )



# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

What can we learn from the macro-level SEIR model?



# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

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1. Is the model **observable**? Are its parameters **identifiable**?
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3. The future trend of the pandemic can be **estimated** with quantitative **confidence intervals**



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# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseased

(Continued)

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6. Potential future outbreaks



# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseased

(Continued)

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


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5. The effect of quarantine, social distancing, lockdown, and reopening can be studied
6. Potential future outbreaks
7. The model accuracy and the consistency of the reported data



# Typical solutions

(Continued)


The non-immunizing case ( $\gamma \neq 0$ ) in short- and long-term



# Typical solutions

(continued)


## Insufficient lockdown periods



# Typical solutions

(continued)

## Healthcare system saturation and breakdown



Time-variant model parameters:

$$\beta(t) = (\beta_s - \beta_0)h(i(t)) + \beta_0$$

$$\mu(t) = (\mu_s - \mu_0)h(i(t)) + \mu_0$$

where

$$h(i) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 + \tanh \left( \frac{i - i_0}{\sigma} \right) \right]$$



# Model extensions

Is the model unique?



# Model extensions

Is the model unique? **No!**




# Model extensions

Is the model unique? **No!**

## A modified SEIR model

- An extension of the fatal SEIR model for Coronavirus modeling is to assume that the recoveries from exposure and infection are separate compartments  $r_e$  and  $r_i$ :



- **Other possible extensions:** consider age groups, gender, seasons, geopolitical factors (hemispheres, cities, countries, continents, etc.)





# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

What we can't do with macro-level models?



# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

What we can't do with macro-level models?

1. Explicit modeling of individual behaviors



# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

What we can't do with macro-level models?

1. Explicit modeling of individual behaviors
2. Modeling family-level or community-level behavior



# Compartmental modeling of epidemic diseases

(Continued)

## What we can't do with macro-level models?

1. Explicit modeling of individual behaviors
2. Modeling family-level or community-level behavior
3. Modeling background individual diseases



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# Micro-level modeling of epidemic diseases

## Agent-based models

1. Individuals are modeled as abstract entities with certain properties and behaviors in an environment



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  - ▶ **Properties:** age, gender, nationality, infection status, background illness, social group, environment density, chance of illness, etc.
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# Micro-level modeling of epidemic diseases

## Agent-based models


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3. Marginal statistics (e.g. the number of exposed, infected, recovered, etc.) are calculated over the entire population



# Micro-level modeling of epidemic diseases

(continued)

## Illustration of the individual entity



```
Environment.h  Individual.h  Epidemiology.cpp
Epidemiology (Global Scope)

class Individual
{
    friend class Environment;
private:
    Gender gender;
    double age;
    double height;
    double weight;

    Nationality nationality;
    Country country;
    Location location_initial;
    Location location;
    DisplacementMatrix displacement_matrix;

    HealthRecord healthrecord;
    InfectionStatus healthstatus;
    InfectionLevels healthlevel;
public:
    int Move();
    friend int InteractBilateral(Individual indv1, Individual indv2);
    friend int ImpactUnilateral(Individual indv_source, Individual indv_destination);
    int ImpactEnvironment(Environment env);
    int GetImpactedByEnvironment(Environment env);
}
```

83 % No issues found Ln: 40 Ch: 1



# Micro-level modeling of epidemic diseases

(continued)

## Illustration of an agent-based environment




Figure: adopted from <https://youtu.be/gxAa02rsdIs>

# Micro-level modeling of epidemic diseases

(continued)

## Pros

1. The provided information is low-level and higher in resolution (at individual, family, and community-level)
2. Can result in guidelines for individuals, families, syndicates, etc.
3. Is more graphical and more convincing for decision makers!



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(continued)

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2. Can result in guidelines for individuals, families, syndicates, etc.
3. Is more graphical and more convincing for decision makers!

## Cons

1. Selection and tuning of individual parameters is more difficult than in macro-level models
2. Mathematical proofs for identifiability, stability, and confidence intervals are no longer achievable
3. The simulations can be very susceptible to initial conditions (simulation seeds)



# Resources and further reading

## Resources

1. The theoretical details of this research: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11371>
2. The source codes of this research: <https://github.com/rsameni/EpidemicModeling.git>
3. COVID-19 real-time data: <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/>
4. Johns Hopkins University's CSSE Git repository: <https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19>

## Further reading

1. Epidemic models: Brauer et al. (2012)
2. Biological systems modeling: Haefner (2005); de Vries et al. (2006)
3. The stochastic aspects of mathematical epidemiology: Britton (2010); Pellis et al. (2012); Brauer et al. (2012); Miller (2019)
4. Optimal estimation and Kalman filtering: Grewal and Andrews (2001)
5. Linear systems theory: Kailath (1980)
6. Bill Gates' 2015 TED talk on pandemic outbreak: [https://www.ted.com/talks/bill\\_gates\\_the\\_next\\_outbreak\\_we\\_re\\_not\\_ready](https://www.ted.com/talks/bill_gates_the_next_outbreak_we_re_not_ready)
7. An interesting video on agent-based methods (the micro-modeling approach): <https://youtu.be/gxAa02rsdIs>



## Part II

# Detailed Lecture



Introduction

Compartmental modeling

Mathematical epidemiology

The proposed model

Parameter identification

Future work and further reading





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## Why to model a system?

1. System identification
2. Simulation
3. Prediction
4. Control (the ultimate objective; but not always achievable)

 From top to bottom the problem becomes more difficult.



# Introduction to modeling

(continued)

## Context and limitations

- ▶ Models are **not unique** (different models can co-exist for a single system)
- ▶ A model is only “**a slice of reality**”
- ▶ All models have a **scope**, outside of which they are invalid
- ▶ Modeling can be done in different **levels of abstraction**

**Example:** The **diffusion law** is a macroscopic-level model, not a microscopic one.



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(continued)

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## Modeling doctrine

“A model should be as simple as possible, as complex as necessary”



# Mathematical modeling of epidemic & pandemic diseases

## Major modeling approaches

- ▶ Top-down (macro modeling):
    - ▶ **Compartmental models**: ordinary differential equations and dynamic systems
    - ▶ **Spatio-temporal models**: partial differential equations
  - ▶ Bottom-up (micro modeling):
    - ▶ **Individual activity modeling**: cellular automata
-  These methods can be combined in a **hybrid model**
-  The herein presented method for epidemic modeling is based on compartmental modeling



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# Compartmental modeling

## Background

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- ▶ A **Compartmental model** (also known as **mass transport** or **mass action**) is a **weighted directed graph** representation of a dynamic system
- ▶ A **Compartment** is an abstract entity representing the quantity of interest at the desired level of abstraction (volume, number, density, etc.).
- ▶ Each compartment is assumed to be internally **homogeneous** (no distinction between its elements)
- ▶ Compartments interact together through a set of rate equations



# Compartmental modeling

(continued)

## Example

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x}(t) &= \lambda - \gamma x(t)^2 - \alpha x(t) \\ \dot{y}(t) &= \alpha x(t) - \beta y(t) \\ \dot{z}(t) &= \gamma x(t)^2 + \beta y(t) - \rho z(t)\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$




Figure: A sample nonlinear compartmental model

# Compartmental modeling

(continued)

## Notes

1. Compartmental models can be converted to a set of first order linear or nonlinear equations (and vice versa), by writing the net flow into the compartments.
2. A compartmental model is **linear** (**nonlinear**), when its rate flow factors are independent (dependent) of the state variables.
3. A compartmental model is **time-invariant** (**time-variant**), when its rate flow factors are independent (dependent) of time.
4. Compartmental models may be **open** or **closed**. In closed systems, the quantities are only passed between the compartments, while in open systems the quantities may flow into or out of the whole system.



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# Modeling the propagation of epidemic diseases

## Assumptions:

- ▶ Contagious diseases transfer via contact with **reproduction number**  $\mathcal{R}_0$
- ▶ The disease may or may not be fatal
- ▶ There may or may not be births during the period of study
- ▶ The disease may or may not result in lifetime or partial immunity
- ▶ Vaccination may or may not exist

Depending on the assumptions, different models may be proposed.



# Modeling the propagation of epidemic diseases

(continued)

## Reminder: exponential outbreak of diseases

Disease propagation by contact implies that for a number of  $x(t)$  infected individuals:

$$\frac{dx(t)}{dt} \approx \frac{x(t + \Delta) - x(t)}{\Delta} = x(t)\phi(t) \quad (2)$$

where  $\phi(t)$  is the **reproduction function**. In the discrete case, the  $k$ th generation of the infection spread  $x_k \stackrel{\Delta}{=} x(k\Delta)$  is:

$$x_{k+1} = \underbrace{[1 + \Delta\phi(k\Delta)]}_{\mathcal{R}_0 \text{ (reproduction number)}} x_k$$

If for all  $k$ ,  $\mathcal{R}_0 < 1$  (or  $\phi(\cdot) < 0$ ), the infection vanishes; otherwise if  $\mathcal{R}_0 > 1$  (or  $\phi(\cdot) > 0$ ) it spreads.






# Examples of compartmental models for contagious diseases


## The susceptible-infected models with and without immunity

The population is split to susceptibles  $S(t)$  and infected  $I(t)$  individuals, subject to  $S(t) + I(t) = N$



(a) Susceptible-infected (SI)

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{S}(t) &= -\alpha S(t)I(t) \\ \dot{I}(t) &= \alpha S(t)I(t)\end{aligned}$$




(b) Susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS)

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{S}(t) &= -\alpha S(t)I(t) + \gamma I(t) \\ \dot{I}(t) &= \alpha S(t)I(t) - \gamma I(t)\end{aligned}$$


# Examples of compartmental models for contagious diseases (continued)

## The susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model

The population is divided to three groups:  $S(t)$ : susceptibles,  $I(t)$ : infected,  $R(t)$ : recovered, subject to  $S(t) + R(t) + I(t) = N$ .



(a) SIR with life-time immunity



(b) SIR without life-time immunity


$$\begin{aligned}\dot{S}(t) &= -\alpha S(t)I(t) \\ \dot{I}(t) &= \alpha S(t)I(t) - \beta I(t) \\ \dot{R}(t) &= \beta I(t)\end{aligned}\quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{S}(t) &= -\alpha S(t)I(t) + \gamma R(t) \\ \dot{I}(t) &= \alpha S(t)I(t) - \beta I(t) \\ \dot{R}(t) &= \beta I(t) - \gamma R(t)\end{aligned}$$


# Examples of compartmental models for contagious diseases (continued)

## Typical SIR solutions


With a given initial condition SIR models can be numerically solved.



(a) SIR model with immunity



(b) SIR model without immunity

 For epidemic diseases, the peak and slope of  $I(t)$  is more important than the total number of infected individuals. Why?




# Examples of compartmental models for contagious diseases

(continued)

## A fatal SIR model without life-time immunity

The family of SIR models may also have birth and death rates (making the system *open*):



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Parameter identification

Future work and further reading



# A macro-level model for the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic


## Assumptions and level of abstraction

- ▶ The compartments are the population fractions (subject to  $s(t) + e(t) + i(t) + r(t) + p(t) = 1$ ):
  - ▶  $s(t)$ : susceptible
  - ▶  $e(t)$ : exposed (symptom-less)
  - ▶  $i(t)$ : infected (with symptom)
  - ▶  $r(t)$ : recovered
  - ▶  $p(t)$ : deceased
- ▶ Birth and natural deaths have been neglected
- ▶ No distinction between male and female subjects
- ▶ No age groups have not been considered (no population pyramid)
- ▶ No vaccinations
- ▶ No geopolitical factors (country borders, regional quarantines, etc.)



# The proposed model

A non-immunizing fatal susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered (SEIR) model



$$\frac{ds(t)}{dt} = -\alpha_e s(t)e(t) - \alpha_i s(t)i(t) + \gamma r(t)$$

$$\frac{de(t)}{dt} = \alpha_e s(t)e(t) + \alpha_i s(t)i(t) - \kappa e(t) - \rho e(t)$$

$$\frac{di(t)}{dt} = \kappa e(t) - \beta i(t) - \mu i(t)$$

$$\frac{dr(t)}{dt} = \beta i(t) + \rho e(t) - \gamma r(t)$$

$$\frac{dp(t)}{dt} = \mu i(t)$$

(4)

# The proposed model

(continued)

## The model parameters

- ▶  $\alpha_i$ : contagion factor between the infected and susceptibles
- ▶  $\alpha_e$ : contagion factor between the exposed and susceptibles
- ▶  $\kappa$ : rate of symptom appearance in exposed subjects
- ▶  $\gamma$ : reinfection rate
- ▶  $\beta$ : recovery rate of the infected
- ▶  $\rho$ : recovery rate of the exposed (recovery without symptoms)
- ▶  $\mu$ : mortality rate of the infected
- ▶  $e_0$ : initial exposed population (seed).





# Fixed-point analysis

## Reminder

The fixed-points of continuous dynamic systems (**flows**) of the form  $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x})$  are the solutions of  $\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}^*) = \mathbf{0}$ , and the fixed-points of discrete-time dynamic systems (**maps**) of the form  $\mathbf{x}_{k+1} = \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x}_k)$  are the solutions of  $\mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x}^*) = \mathbf{x}^*$ .



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## The model fixed-points

The studied model has only one fixed-point, which is the **no-disease case**  $i(t) = e(t) = r(t) = 0$ :

$$(s^*(t), e^*(t), i^*(t), r^*(t), p^*(t)) = (1 - p_0, 0, 0, 0, p_0) \quad (5)$$



# Stability of the fixed-point by perturbation analysis

## Reminder

The stability of the fixed-point  $\mathbf{x}^*$  can be checked by **perturbation analysis**: set  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}^* + \delta\mathbf{x}$  and check the sign of  $\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}^* + \delta\mathbf{x})$ . If the system's dynamics drives it back to the fixed-point, the fixed-point is stable.



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## Stability of the model fixed-point

Letting  $(s(t), e(t), i(t), r(t), p(t)) = (1 - p_0 - \epsilon, \epsilon, 0, 0, p_0)$  for some  $0 < \epsilon \ll 1$ , we find:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{ds(t)}{dt} &= -\alpha_e(1 - p_0 - \epsilon)\epsilon \approx -\alpha_e(1 - p_0)\epsilon < 0 \\ \frac{de(t)}{dt} &= \alpha_e(1 - p_0 - \epsilon)\epsilon - \kappa\epsilon - \rho\epsilon \approx (\alpha_e - \alpha_e p_0 - \kappa - \rho)\epsilon \\ \frac{di(t)}{dt} &= \kappa\epsilon > 0 \quad \frac{dr(t)}{dt} = \rho\epsilon > 0 \quad \frac{dp(t)}{dt} = 0\end{aligned}\tag{6}$$



# Stability of the fixed-point by perturbation analysis

(continued)

## Result

The fixed-point is **unstable**, which implies that the outbreak of pandemics are inevitable and potentially mortal.



# Stability of the fixed-point by perturbation analysis

(continued)

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The fixed-point is **unstable**, which implies that the outbreak of pandemics are inevitable and potentially mortal.

What happens after the outbreak and how can we control it?



# Stability of the fixed-point by perturbation analysis

(continued)

## Result

The fixed-point is **unstable**, which implies that the outbreak of pandemics are inevitable and potentially mortal.

What happens after the outbreak and how can we control it?

## Fact

The system does not have any external inputs to be used for control. We can only change the parameters of the system (by quarantine, social distancing, hygiene, etc.), such that it becomes **internally stable**.



# Studied aspects

The aspects studied in the sequel:

1. The linear approximation during its initial outbreak
2. The general nonlinear case when a large fraction of the population has been infected
3. Parameter identification





# Epidemic outbreak behavior

## Large population approximation

During the primary stages of an epidemic outbreak (when a small fraction of a large population are infected), we can assume  $s(t) \approx 1$ . What does this imply?



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### Interpretation

1. The propagation behavior during outbreak does not depend on the total population, but rather depends on hygiene and contact patterns.



# Epidemic outbreak behavior

## Large population approximation

During the primary stages of an epidemic outbreak (when a small fraction of a large population are infected), we can assume  $s(t) \approx 1$ . What does this imply?

### Interpretation

1. The propagation behavior during outbreak does not depend on the total population, but rather depends on hygiene and contact patterns.
2. During the primary stages of an epidemic outbreak, it has the same properties and takes the same number of victims in countries with 10 million, 100 million or 1 billion population.



# Epidemic outbreak behavior

(continued)

Linear approximation ( $s(t) \approx 1$ ):

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{de(t)}{dt} \\ \frac{di(t)}{dt} \\ \frac{dr(t)}{dt} \\ \frac{dp(t)}{dt} \end{bmatrix} \approx \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} (\alpha_e - \kappa - \rho) & \alpha_i & 0 & 0 \\ \kappa & -(\beta + \mu) & 0 & 0 \\ \rho & \beta & -\gamma & 0 \\ 0 & \mu & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}}_{\mathbf{A}} \begin{bmatrix} e(t) \\ i(t) \\ r(t) \\ p(t) \end{bmatrix} \quad (7)$$

Defining  $\mathbf{x}(t) = (e(t), i(t), r(t), p(t))^T$ , (7) can be written in matrix form:  $\frac{d}{dt}\mathbf{x}(t) = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}(t)$ ,  $\mathbf{x}(0) = (e_0, 0, 0, 0)$



# Eigen-analysis of the linearized model

Eigenvalues (defining  $\delta \triangleq \alpha_e - \kappa - \rho$ ):

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_1 &= 0, & \lambda_2 &= -\gamma \\ \lambda_3 &= \frac{\delta - \beta - \mu + \sqrt{(\delta + \beta + \mu)^2 + 4\kappa\alpha_i}}{2} \\ \lambda_4 &= \frac{\delta - \beta - \mu - \sqrt{(\delta + \beta + \mu)^2 + 4\kappa\alpha_i}}{2}\end{aligned}\tag{8}$$

Eigenvectors:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{v}_1 &= (0, 0, 0, k_1)^T, & \mathbf{v}_2 &= (0, 0, k_2, 0)^T \\ \mathbf{v}_3 &= k_3\left(1, \frac{\lambda_3 - \delta}{\alpha_i}, \frac{\rho\alpha_i + \beta(\lambda_3 - \delta)}{\alpha_i(\lambda_3 + \gamma)}, \frac{\mu(\lambda_3 - \delta)}{\alpha_i\lambda_3}\right) \\ \mathbf{v}_4 &= k_4\left(1, \frac{\lambda_4 - \delta}{\alpha_i}, \frac{\rho\alpha_i + \beta(\lambda_4 - \delta)}{\alpha_i(\lambda_4 + \gamma)}, \frac{\mu(\lambda_4 - \delta)}{\alpha_i\lambda_4}\right)\end{aligned}\tag{9}$$



# Eigen-analysis of the linearized model

(continued)

## Reminder

- ▶ The dynamic system  $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}(t)$  is stable if all the eigenvalues of  $\mathbf{A}$  have negative real parts.
- ▶ The solution of the system is:

$$\mathbf{x}(t) = \sum_{k=1}^m a_k e^{\lambda_k t} \mathbf{v}_k \quad (10)$$

subject to  $\mathbf{x}(0) = \mathbf{x}_0$ .



# Eigen-analysis of the linearized model

(continued)

## Properties

1.  $\lambda_3 > \delta > \lambda_4$ ; hence  $\lambda_3$  is the dominant eigenvalue.



# Eigen-analysis of the linearized model

(continued)

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2. The necessary and sufficient condition for the system stability is  $\lambda_3 < 0$ , or:

$$\kappa\alpha_i < (\kappa + \rho - \alpha_e)(\beta + \mu)$$





# Eigen-analysis of the linearized model

(continued)

## Properties

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2. The necessary and sufficient condition for the system stability is  $\lambda_3 < 0$ , or:

$$\kappa \alpha_i < (\kappa + \rho - \alpha_e)(\beta + \mu)$$

3. During the outbreak, the infected and exposed populations are:

$$\begin{aligned} i(t) &= \frac{e_0(\lambda_3 - \delta)(\delta - \lambda_4)}{\alpha_i(\lambda_3 - \lambda_4)} [\exp(\lambda_3 t) - \exp(\lambda_4 t)] \\ e(t) &= \frac{e_0}{\lambda_3 - \lambda_4} [(\lambda_3 - \delta) \exp(\lambda_4 t) + (\delta - \lambda_4) \exp(\lambda_3 t)] \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$



# Model properties during outbreak

## Result: exponential outbreak

*If  $\lambda_3 > 0$ , the system is unstable, the epidemic outbreaks exponentially and without enforcing lockdown, social distancing and quarantine of the infected cases (resulting in a change of the eigenvalues), the exponential increase in the number of infected subjects continues to a point where a significant percentage of the population is infected (and deceased).*



# Model properties during outbreak

(continued)

## Result: reproduction number

*Under countermeasures, the model eigenvalues change and  $\lambda_3$  (the dominant eigenvalue), or equivalently the **reproduction number**  $\mathcal{R}_0 = e^{\Delta\lambda_3}$ , is the parameter that can be tracked as a score for evaluating how good countermeasures such as social distancing and quarantine perform. The system is stabilized when  $\mathcal{R}_0 < 1$ .*



# Model properties during outbreak

(continued)

## Result: initial infection size

*The initial infected seed size  $e_0$  is not the most critical parameter for epidemic management. Regions with smaller initial seeds of infection may end up with a higher infection and death toll, depending on factors such as human-contact patterns and personal hygiene.*



# The general nonlinear case

## The system model revisited

As the infection rate increases,  $s(t)$  is no longer close to 1. Taking  $s(t) = 1 - e(t) - i(t) - r(t) - p(t)$ , the nonlinear model in (4) can be rewritten as:


$$\begin{aligned}\frac{de(t)}{dt} &= [1 - e(t) - i(t) - r(t) - p(t)][\alpha_e e(t) + \alpha_i i(t)] - \kappa e(t) - \rho e(t) \\ \frac{di(t)}{dt} &= \kappa e(t) - \beta i(t) - \mu i(t) \\ \frac{dr(t)}{dt} &= \beta i(t) + \rho e(t) - \gamma r(t) \\ \frac{dp(t)}{dt} &= \mu i(t)\end{aligned}\tag{12}$$

which can be numerically solved from an arbitrary initial condition.






# Typical solutions

The life-time immune case ( $\gamma = 0$ )



# Typical solutions

The non-immunizing case ( $\gamma \neq 0$ ) in short- and long-term



# Typical solutions

(continued)

## Result: repeated waves of the disease

*The epidemic disease can repeat pseudo-periodically over time (in later seasons or years) and turn into a persistent disease in the long term. The amplitude and time gap of the infection peaks depends on the model parameters.*

**Example:** The 1918 Spanish flu, which had three pandemic waves.  
See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish\\_flu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_flu).





# Typical solutions

(continued)

## Result: repeated waves of the disease

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
**Example:** The 1918 Spanish flu, which had three pandemic waves. See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish\\_flu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_flu). **Note:** In our model, the peaks can be found by finding the solutions of the model when  $\frac{di(t)}{dt} = 0$  (the local infection peaks).



# Typical solutions

(continued)

## Short quarantine periods



# Typical solutions

(continued)

## Result: inadequate lockdown


*Imposing quarantines is effective in delaying and reducing the infection population peaks; but is insufficient in the long term. Social distancing and other measures should remain for a long period after the initial quarantine, to make the number of contaminated subjects equal to “zero.”*



# Typical solutions

(continued)

## Healthcare system saturation and breakdown



Time-variant model parameters:

$$\beta(t) = (\beta_s - \beta_0)h(i(t)) + \beta_0$$

$$\mu(t) = (\mu_s - \mu_0)h(i(t)) + \mu_0$$

where

$$h(i) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 + \tanh \left( \frac{i - i_0}{\sigma} \right) \right]$$



# Typical solutions

(continued)

## Result: healthcare system breakdown


*The death toll increases significantly as the system approaches the break-point of its healthcare resources.*



# Model extensions

## Unobservable exposed recoveries

An extension of the fatal SEIR model for Coronavirus modeling, assuming that the recoveries from exposure and infection are separate compartments  $r_e$  and  $r_i$ :



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# Parameter identification

## Methods for identifying the model parameters

1. **Offline:** Using constrained nonlinear least squares parameter estimation
2. **Online:** Using extended Kalman filter for joint parameter and variable estimation





# Constrained nonlinear least squares parameter estimation

## Problem Formulation

Consider the general form of the state-space model:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) &= \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}(t), \mathbf{w}(t); \boldsymbol{\theta}(t), t) \\ \mathbf{y}(t) &= \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x}(t); \boldsymbol{\theta}(t), t) + \mathbf{v}(t)\end{aligned}\tag{13}$$

Define the modeling error function

$$\mathbf{e}(t) \triangleq \mathbf{y}(t) - \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x}(t); \boldsymbol{\theta}(t), t)\tag{14}$$

The problem of parameter estimation can be formulated as

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}} = \arg \min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \text{tr} \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{e}(t) \mathbf{W} \mathbf{e}(t)^T]\tag{15}$$

subject to:  $\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\min} \leq \boldsymbol{\theta} \leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_{\max}$ ,  $\dot{\mathbf{x}}(t) = \mathbf{f}(\mathbf{x}(t), \mathbf{w}(t); \boldsymbol{\theta}, t)$ ,  $\mathbf{x}(0) = \mathbf{x}_0$



# An extended Kalman filter for joint parameter and variable estimation

## Problem Formulation

Suppose that we consider the parameters as state variables with a Wiener process dynamics:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{de(t)}{dt} &= [1 - e(t) - i(t) - r(t) - p(t)][\alpha_e(t)e(t) + \alpha_i(t)i(t)] \\ &\quad - \kappa(t)e(t) - \rho(t)e(t) \\ \frac{di(t)}{dt} &= \kappa(t)e(t) - \beta(t)i(t) - \mu(t)i(t) \\ \frac{dr(t)}{dt} &= \beta(t)i(t) + \rho(t)e(t) - \gamma(t)r(t) \\ \frac{dp(t)}{dt} &= \mu(t)i(t) \\ \frac{d\alpha_i(t)}{dt} &= \frac{du_i(t)}{dt} + w_i(t) \quad \frac{d\alpha_e(t)}{dt} = \frac{du_e(t)}{dt} + w_e(t) \\ \frac{d\kappa(t)}{dt} &= w_\kappa(t) \quad \frac{d\beta(t)}{dt} = w_\beta(t) \quad \frac{d\rho(t)}{dt} = w_\rho(t) \\ \frac{d\mu(t)}{dt} &= w_\mu(t) \quad \frac{d\gamma(t)}{dt} = w_\gamma(t)\end{aligned}\tag{16}$$



# An extended Kalman filter for joint parameter and variable estimation

(continued)

## Measurements

The regular reports of the infected, recovered and death tolls can be considered as (noisy) measurements of the state variables:

$$\begin{bmatrix} I(t) \\ R(t) \\ P(t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} e(t) \\ i(t) \\ r(t) \\ p(t) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} v_e(t) \\ v_i(t) \\ v_r(t) \\ v_p(t) \end{bmatrix} \quad (17)$$

where  $I(t)$ ,  $R(t)$ , and  $P(t)$  are the reported values (potentially inaccurate).

## Origin of measurement noise

Inexact population information, intentional and unintentional misreports, mis-classified death reasons (e.g. for the elderly or the subjects suffering from multiple health issues).



# An extended Kalman filter for joint parameter and variable estimation

(continued)

**Question:** Can we estimate the model parameters and the unmeasurable variable  $e(t)$  from the regular inaccurate reports?



# An extended Kalman filter for joint parameter and variable estimation

(continued)

**Question:** Can we estimate the model parameters and the unmeasurable variable  $e(t)$  from the regular inaccurate reports?

## Reminder: observability

The state-space model:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x}(t) &= f(x(t), w(t); \theta(t), t) \\ y(t) &= g(x(t); \theta(t), t) + v(t)\end{aligned}\quad (18)$$

is **observable** from its outputs, if the state variables can be estimated from the observations in finite time (**Kailath, 1980**).

## Reminder: observability rank-test

The dynamic system (18) is observable if the following matrix (known as the **observability matrix**) is rank  $n$  (the number of state variables):

$$\mathcal{O}_k = \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{C}_k \\ \mathcal{C}_k \mathcal{A}_k \\ \vdots \\ \mathcal{C}_k \mathcal{A}_k^{n-1} \end{bmatrix} \quad (19)$$

where  $\mathcal{A}_k$  and  $\mathcal{C}_k$  are the Jacobians of  $f(\cdot)$  and  $g(\cdot)$ , with respect to the state vector.



# An extended Kalman filter for joint parameter and variable estimation

(continued)

---

## Algorithm 1 An extended Kalman filter for simultaneous compartment variables and model parameters tracking

---

**Input:** Noisy measurements (regular inaccurate reports) of the epidemic spread  $y_k$

**Input:** Initial conditions:  $\mathbf{Q}$ ,  $\mathbf{R}$ ,  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0^+$ ,  $\mathbf{P}_0^+$

**Output:**  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_k^+$  (vector of state and model parameter estimates)

```
1: for  $k = 0 \dots T$  do
2:   State prediction:
3:    $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{k+1}^- = \mathbf{f}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_k^+, \bar{\mathbf{w}}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_k^+, k\Delta)$ 
4:    $\mathbf{P}_{k+1}^- = \mathbf{A}_k^+ \mathbf{P}_k^+ \mathbf{A}_k^{+T} + \mathbf{Q}$ 
   Measurement update:
5:    $\mathbf{K}_k = \mathbf{P}_k^- \mathbf{C}_k^{-T} [\mathbf{C}_k^- \mathbf{P}_k^- \mathbf{C}_k^{-T} + \mathbf{R}]^{-1}$ 
6:    $\hat{\mathbf{y}}_k^- = \mathbf{g}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_k^-; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_k^-, k\Delta)$ 
7:    $\mathbf{i}_k = \mathbf{y}_k - \hat{\mathbf{y}}_k^-$ 
8:    $\hat{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_k^+ = \hat{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_k^- + \mathbf{K}_k \mathbf{i}_k$ 
9:    $\mathbf{P}_k^+ = [\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{K}_k \mathbf{C}_k^-] \mathbf{P}_k^-$ 
10:  Check and enforce variable and parameter ranges using hard-constraints
11:  Performance monitoring
12: end for
```

---



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# Exercises and future work

## Model extensions

The model can be extended from various aspects, including:

- ▶ Considering birth and natural death
- ▶ Differentiating between various groups (infants, adults, elderly, gender, prior illness, etc.)
- ▶ Parameter estimation from real data
- ▶ Finding the repetition periods of the pandemic wave





# Resources and further reading

## Resources

1. The theoretical details of this research: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11371>
2. The source codes of this research: <https://github.com/rsameni/EpidemicModeling.git>
3. COVID-19 real-time data: <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/>
4. Johns Hopkins University's CSSE Git repository: <https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19>


## Further reading

1. Epidemic models: Brauer et al. (2012)
2. Biological systems modeling: Haefner (2005); de Vries et al. (2006)
3. The stochastic aspects of mathematical epidemiology: Britton (2010); Pellis et al. (2012); Brauer et al. (2012); Miller (2019)
4. Optimal estimation and Kalman filtering: Grewal and Andrews (2001)
5. Linear systems theory: Kailath (1980)
6. Bill Gates' 2015 TED talk on pandemic outbreak: [https://www.ted.com/talks/bill\\_gates\\_the\\_next\\_outbreak\\_we\\_re\\_not\\_ready](https://www.ted.com/talks/bill_gates_the_next_outbreak_we_re_not_ready)
7. An interesting video on agent-based methods (the micro-modeling approach): <https://youtu.be/gxAa02rsdIs>



# The proposed model in a glance

A non-immunizing fatal model with five compartments: **susceptibles**  $s(t)$ , **exposed**  $e(t)$ , **infected**  $i(t)$ , **recovered**  $r(t)$  and **deceased**  $p(t)$ :



The mathematical properties of this model has been studied both analytically and by simulation in our technical report:

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11371>

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