






# Formal Methods Analysis of 5G-AKA Protocol with Comparison to 4G EPS-AKA Protocol

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
December 10, 2020

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




- ### Introduction
- Added speed and volume expands the network in 5G.
  - Security of the protocol is still raises questions.
  - IoT devices have the highest potential of using 5G AKA.
  - Cyber security concerns related 5G AKA protocol
  - Specification of 5G AKA recently updated - never been analysed
  - 4G EPS-AKA has many security concerns
  - 5G AKA protocol claims to have solved all issues in 4G EPS AKA.

- ### Questions
- What visualizations are produced in modeling the 5G AKA protocol using CPSA?
  - What is found from analyzing the visualizations produced by the tool?
  - Security properties of 5G better than 4G??
  - Do the changes made to 4G to solve the identified security flaw?
  - Could the solutions simplified?
  - Any additional problems arose when a solution was introduced for a security flaw of 4G?




- Anyone can replay the initial authentication message to the SN.
- Since this message contains the UE's identity, this allows an adversary to track users.




HN does not know which SN or UE it is communicating with. Once it receives the SUPI it simply generates the AV and passes it along the network.

Model when the channel between the HN and SN is not secure, the HN has no way of authenticating participants.

In 5G, an adversary is still able to replay the initial authentication message (i.e., SUCI). Adversary has no information about the identity of the UE



Model when the channel between the HN and SN is not secure, the SN is not needed for authentication.



Increased HN control allows the HN to verify that the authentication was successful.

An additional key confirmation round was added to test whether the implicit agreement on  $K_{SEAF}$  is sufficient to establish agreement on the SN.




Thank you  
• Dr. Edward Ziegler-Technical Director  
• Dr. Alan Sherman-Faculty Advisor

- ### 4G EPS-AKA Analysis
- HN cannot authenticate the UE
  - Channel between the SN and HN is supposed to be confidential because it is a wired connection. If we remove that assumption then the HN cannot verify the SN or UE.
  - User Identity (IMSI) is sent in plaintext over the network. Adversary can track IMSI by identifying eNodeB its connected to.
  - Insecure IMSI could lead to a MITM attack among others.
  - Adversary can impersonate an eNodeB and replay messages



- ### 5G AKA Analysis
- Initialization message can still be replayed
  - Underspecified channel between HN and SN. Added a long term shared key between HN and SN to provide confidentiality.
  - Removing confidentiality assumption could lead to a possible replay attack by a malicious server.



Results

- Different entities have different security properties
- Lack of explanation in the documentation about confidentiality and authenticity between SN and HN
- Solution: Introduce long-term key between SN and HN
- SUPI seems secure in 5G
- Additional verification of the response by SN improves authentication of HN
- Key hierarchy play a major role in the authentication procedure

