Formale Semantik o2. Referentielle Semantik

Roland Schäfer


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stets aktuelle Fassungen: https://github.com/rsling/VL-Deutsche-Syntax

Inhalt

- 1 Organization
 - Syllabus
 - Course Structure
 - Our subject
- 2 Linguistic theories
 - Semiotics
 Generative Grammar
 - Levels of representation
- A referential framework
 - The simple case
 - Complex cases

- 4 Some fundamental semantic notions
 - Entailment
 - Presupposition
 - Ambiguity, Synonymy, Vagueness, ...
- From reference to sense
 - Referential and non-referential NPs
 - A 'reference' for complex terms?
 - Sentences refer to o and 1
 - Sense and reference
- 6 We're talking in fragments: F1
 - A syntax
 - The semantics: individuals, sets, functions, T-sentences
 - Bottom-up evaluation



• Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, Meaning and Grammar

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- Partee, ter Meulen & Wall, Mathematical Methods in Linguistics

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- Blackburn, Bos & Striegnitz, Learn Prolog now!
- Blackburn & Bos, Computational Semantics for Natural Language

• Bucher, Einführung in die angewandte Logik

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- Sag, Wasow & Bender, Syntactic Theory

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- Partee, Noun Phrase Interpretation and Type-shifting Principles
- Copestake, Flickinger & Sag Minimal Recursion Semantics

• Formal Semantics, 90 min. on Wednesday

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- PROLOG, 30 min. on Wednesday

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- Tutorial, 90 min. on Friday

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- Summer course (implementation), 1 week

The first weeks: Preliminaries (subject to changes)

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Session 1 Introduction to Referential Semantics
(CM chap. 1 & 2)
Session 2 Set theory, ordering theory, statement logic
(PMW chap. 1 - 6)
Session 3 Predicate calculi (PMW chap. 7 & 8)
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The middle weeks: First steps (subject to changes)

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Session 4 Quantification and model theory
(CM chap. 3)
Session 5 Quantification in English (CM chap. 3)
Session 6 Intensionality (CM chap. 5)
Session 7 Tense, modals, complementizers
(CM chap. 5)
Session 8 \lambda (CM chap. 7)
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The final weeks: Advanced topics (subject to changes)

Session 9 Word meaning (CM chap. 8)

Session 10 Generalized quantifiers (CM chap. 7)

Session 11 Type shifting (Partee)

Session 12 Underspecified scope (Copestake et al.)

Session 13 Backup session

Session 14 Final test on 2004-07-13

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- The meaning of an expression is the idea conveyed by it.
- ...is the mental image it creates.
- ...is what a speaker wants to achieve by uttering it.
- ...is the set of objects to which it refers (for example in the case of nouns).

• The study of the intellectual concepts perceivable in the world.

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- The study of the intellectual concepts perceivable in the world.
- ...of how the brain processes expressions, relates it to (fields of) cognitive concepts.
- ...of how a discourse of planful and intelligent agents (humans) is structured.
- ...of the correspondences between expressions and objects; and of how expressions are combined to be used productively.

• Which objects do words refer to?

- Which objects do words refer to?
- What makes sentences true?


- Which objects do words refer to?
- What makes sentences true?
- How is the informational value of sentences related to their logical structure?

- Which objects do words refer to?
- What makes sentences true?
- How is the informational value of sentences related to their logical structure?
- How can sentences be unambiguously interpreted?


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- how the brain works with sentences,


- what words mean,
- how the brain works with sentences,
- the structure of discourse (at least not much).



The theory of signs: a triangle



Semantics in the Chomskian T-model




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- No interpretation proper at LF.
- Movement transformations after the sentence has been uttered.
- At the LF level, sentences have a form compatible to their logic.
- Why? Syntax itself is often inadequate to express all alternatives of a sentence's logical representation.



aboutness

- aboutness
- referential nature

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- objectiveness (of content)

- aboutness
- referential nature
- informative
- objectiveness (of content)
- But which linguistic elements refer to what?

Names

an individual name $\ \ \longrightarrow \ \$ one object in the world

Harald Schmidt

Common nouns

a common noun \longrightarrow lots of objects soldier

etc.

Adjectives

an adjective $\ \ \longrightarrow \ \$ lots of different objects of different kinds

is human





Sentences

a sentence

 \longrightarrow

a situation, a fact, ...



A humming bird is hovering over a red flower.



not at all (object type mismatch)

ullet A humming bird \longrightarrow one of many individuals

- A humming bird \longrightarrow one of many individuals
- ullet is hovering \longrightarrow a property of that individual

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- over \longrightarrow a relation between individuals
- $a red \longrightarrow a$ property of another individual
- ullet flower \longrightarrow the other one of many individuals
- ullet is hovering over a red flower \longrightarrow a complex property.

• Frege's principle is indispensable!


- Frege's principle is indispensable!
- Harald Schmidt is human.

- Frege's principle is indispensable!
- Harald Schmidt is human.
- Harald Schmidt is human and tall.

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- Harald Schmidt is human and tall and male.

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- Harald Schmidt is human and tall and male and not blue.

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- Harald Schmidt is human and tall and male and not blue.
- Harald Schmidt is human and tall and male and not blue and grumpy in the morning...



• entailment

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- presupposition

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- ambiguity

- entailment
- presupposition
- ambiguity
- synonymy

• A: This is electronic.

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- B: This is a presentation.

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- B: This is a presentation.
- C follows logically: This is an electronic presentation

- A: This is electronic.
- B: This is a presentation.
- C follows logically: This is an electronic presentation
- $A, B \vdash C$

Entailment: pure logic

- A: This is electronic.
- B: This is a presentation.
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- A ⊬ C

Entailment: pure logic

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- C follows logically: This is an electronic presentation
- A, B ⊢ C
- A ⊬ C
- B ⊬ C

• D: Harald Schmidt is human.

24 / 55

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- $D \vdash D \land D$

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- When X is true, Y is true.
- A situation described by Y is also described by X.
- The information given by Y is fully contained in the information given by X.
- One cannot say X is true and Y is false.

ullet Harald Schmidt is a talkmaster. o Harald Schmidt is human.

- Harald Schmidt is a talkmaster. \rightarrow Harald Schmidt is human.
- Harald Schmidt is tall. \rightarrow Someone is tall.

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- ullet Harald Schmidt cancelled his show. o Harald Schmidt's show was cancelled.

• A: Willy Brandt is the current chancelor of the FRG.

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- A, B, and C presuppose E: There is a chancelor of the FRG.
- Note: A ⊢ D, A ⊢ E
- But: B / D, B / E, C / E

Presuppostion: two tests

• Presuppositions are triggered by all sorts of sentences (incl. negations, modals, conditionals, etc.).

Presuppostion: two tests

- Presuppositions are triggered by all sorts of sentences (incl. negations, modals, conditionals, etc.).
- Presuppositions can be negated while the sentence which presupposes them remains true. Entailments cannot be negated while keeping the entailing sentence true.

Ambiguity in syntax

• She saw the man with a telescope.

Ambiguity in syntax

- She saw the man with a telescope.
- She [saw the man] with a telescope.

Ambiguity in syntax

- She saw the man with a telescope.
- She [saw the man] with a telescope.
- She saw [the man with a telescope].

Ambiguity in semantics: scope

Everybody loves somebody.

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- Every person loves at least one other person. (Needn't be the same.)

Ambiguity in semantics: scope

- Everybody loves somebody.
- Every person loves at least one other person. (Needn't be the same.)
- There is one person loved by everyone


Synonymy

• Lexical synonymy: humming bird $\stackrel{\text{lex}}{\equiv}$ colibri

Synonymy

Synonymy

- Lexical synonymy: humming bird ^{lex} = colibri
- $A \equiv B \text{ iff } A \vdash B \text{ and } B \vdash A$



Noun-like expressions and complex NPs

• I saw a man.

Noun-like expressions and complex NPs

- I saw a man.
- I saw the green wobbly thing crawling near.

Noun-like expressions and complex NPs

- I saw a man.
- I saw the green wobbly thing crawling near.
- I saw it.

Problems with referential NPs

• The dark subatomic particles in the universe have a total mass much larger than the visible subatomic particles.

Problems with referential NPs

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- Problems with referential semantic theories don't concern Rumpletweezer.

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- The dark subatomic particles in the universe have a total mass much larger than the visible subatomic particles.
- Problems with referential semantic theories don't concern Rumpletweezer.
- and of course, vagueness (e.g., Sorites Paradox)

Problems with non-referential NPs

some guy

Problems with non-referential NPs

- some guy
- not the faintest trace of blood

Problems with non-referential NPs

- some guy
- not the faintest trace of blood
- any axiom of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory

Beyond pointin-at-and-naming

We need a logic to explain for effects like:

```
my humming bird's favorite flower is red
some flower is red
```

• a: colibri

- a: colibri
- b: humming bird

- a: colibri
- b: humming bird
- c: a brunette lady

- a: colibri
- b: humming bird
- c: a brunette lady
- d: a brown-haired dame

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- e: the primates

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- f: the apes and humans

- a: colibri
- b: humming bird
- c: a brunette lady
- d: a brown-haired dame
- e: the primates
- f: the apes and humans
- $a \stackrel{lex}{\equiv} b$, $c \stackrel{lex}{\equiv} d$, $e \stackrel{lex}{\equiv} f$

• A: A colibri is hovering over a red flower.

- A: A colibri is hovering over a red flower.
- B: A humming bird is hovering over a red flower.

- A: A colibri is hovering over a red flower.
- B: A humming bird is hovering over a red flower.
- C: Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady

- A: A colibri is hovering over a red flower.
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- E: Primates are intelligent.

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- C: Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady
- D: Lauren Bacall was a brown-haired dame
- E: Primates are intelligent.
- F: The apes and humans are inteligent.

- A: A colibri is hovering over a red flower.
- B: A humming bird is hovering over a red flower.
- C: Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady
- D: Lauren Bacall was a brown-haired dame
- E: Primates are intelligent.
- F: The apes and humans are inteligent.
- $A \equiv B$, $C \equiv D$, $E \equiv F$

• Ax1 Two expressions (e.g., NPs, sentences) that are synonymous have the same reference.

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- Formally: $A \equiv B \text{ then } [\![A]\!] = [\![B]\!]$

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- Note: [A] is applicable to simplex and complex expressions A; it just produces the reference of A.
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- Ax1 Two expressions (e.g., NPs, sentences) that are synonymous have the same reference.
- Formally: $A \equiv B$ then A = B
- Note: [A] is applicable to simplex and complex expressions A; it just produces the reference of A.
- Ax2 If we replace expression B within expression A with the synonymous expression C, then A does not change its reference.
- Formally: If [B] = [C] then [[A B]] = [[A C]]

One common property of sentences: the truth value

• A: Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady. (assumed to be true in the actual world)

One common property of sentences: the truth value

- A: Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady. (assumed to be true in the actual world)
- B: My cat sleeps quietly. (assumed to be true in the actual world)

First conclusion

• [TA] = The truth value of 'Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady' is 1.

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- [TA] = The truth value of 'Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady' is 1.
- [TB] = The truth value of 'My cat sleeps quietly' is 1.
- Such that $A \equiv [TA]$ and $B \equiv [TB]$. (Check: Whenever A is true, [TA] is true and v.v.)

First conclusion

- [TA] = The truth value of 'Lauren Bacall was a brunette lady' is 1.
- [TB] = The truth value of 'My cat sleeps quietly' is 1.
- Such that A = [¬A] and B = [¬B].
 (Check: Whenever A is true, [¬A] is true and v.v.)
- So, by Ax1 [A] = [[TA]] and [B] = [[TB]]

Second conclusion

Check the denotations of the contained NPs:
 [the truth value of A] = [the truth value of B] =

Second conclusion

- Check the denotations of the contained NPs:
 The truth value of A = The truth value of B =
- Such that by Ax2:

```
\llbracket \llbracket \llbracket \mathsf{T} A \rrbracket \rrbracket = \llbracket \llbracket \llbracket \mathsf{T} B \rrbracket \rrbracket
```

Second conclusion

- Check the denotations of the contained NPs:
 The truth value of A = The truth value of B =
- Such that by Ax2: [[_A]]] = [[_B]]
- Why? Exchanging the referentially identical NPs 'the truth value of A' and 'the truth value of B' in the otherwise identical sentences '_ is 1' forces us to conclude by Ax2 that also the whole sentences must have the same reference. Our book (CM) is a bit vague on that point.

Final conclusion

$$[A] = [[TA]] = [[TB]] = [B] = 1$$

Sentences denote truth values.

• indirect encoding of 'richer' semantics (One must know the truth conditions of a sentence and the state of affairs to decide about the truth of a sentence.)

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- a minimal common semantic property of sentences
- easily computable in a formal system (binary)
- their logic provides a basis for 'richer' semantics (cf. second half of class)

Frege also thought, reference couldn't be all

Туре	Reference	Sense
NP	individuals	individual concepts
	Venus	
VP	sets	property concepts
	humming birds	
S	1 or 0	thoughts
	I like cats.	

Some terminology


• reference = extension = what we're dealing with first

Some terminology

- reference = extension = what we're dealing with first
- sense = intension = what we will be dealing with later

Some terminology

- reference = extension = what we're dealing with first
- sense = intension = what we will be dealing with later
- proposition = the intensions of sentences as informational content: The 'thought that S'.



How are sentences compositionally built up?

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- What do their parts denote?
- How does the denotation of the parts contribute to the whole.
- T-sentences: S of L is true in v iff p.
- S a sentence, L a language, v a state of affairs, p a statement of the truth conditions.

 ${}^{\bullet} \; \mathsf{S} \to \mathsf{N} \; \mathsf{VP}$

- $S \rightarrow N VP$
- $\bullet \ S \to S \ conj \ S$

- $S \rightarrow NVP$
- $S \rightarrow S conj S$
- ${\color{red} \bullet} \; S \to neg \; S$

- $S \rightarrow NVP$
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- $\bullet \ S \to neg \ S$
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- ${\color{red} \bullet} \ \, VP \to V_i$
- ${}^{\bullet} \ VP \to V_t \ N$

A lexicon

- ullet N o Herr Webelhuth, Frau Eckardt, the Turm-Mensa
- $\bullet\ V_i \rightarrow$ is relaxed, is creative, is stupid
- $\bullet \ V_t \to \textit{prefers}$
- ullet conj o and, or
- \bullet neg \rightarrow it is not the case that

• [Herr Webelhuth] = Herr Webelhuth

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- [Frau Eckardt] = Frau Eckardt
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- [is relaxed] = {x:x is relaxed}
- [is creative] = {x:x is creative}

- [Herr Webelhuth] = Herr Webelhuth
- [Frau Eckardt] = Frau Eckardt
- [the Turm-Mensa] = the Turm-Mensa
- [is relaxed] = {x:x is relaxed}
- [is creative] = {x:x is creative}
- [[is stupid]] = {x:x is stupid}

- [Herr Webelhuth] = Herr Webelhuth
- [Frau Eckardt] = Frau Eckardt
- [the Turm-Mensa] = the Turm-Mensa
- [is relaxed] = {x:x is relaxed}
- [is creative] = {x:x is creative}
- [is stupid] = {x:x is stupid}
- [[prefers]] = {\langle x,y \rangle: x prefers y}

Some words don't really 'denote', they act like functions

•
$$\llbracket \mathsf{neg}
rbracket = \left[egin{array}{c} 1 o 0 \\ 0 o 1 \end{array}
ight]$$

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•
$$\llbracket \textit{neg} \rrbracket = \left[egin{array}{c} 1
ightarrow 0 \ 0
ightarrow 1 \end{array} \right]$$

$$ullet$$
 $extbf{[and]]} = egin{bmatrix} \langle 1,1
angle
ightarrow 1 \ \langle 1,0
angle
ightarrow 0 \ \langle 0,1
angle
ightarrow 0 \ \langle 0,0
angle
ightarrow 0 \end{bmatrix}$

$$\bullet \hspace{0.1cm} \llbracket \textit{or} \rrbracket = \left[\begin{array}{c} \langle 1,1 \rangle \rightarrow 1 \\ \langle 1,0 \rangle \rightarrow 1 \\ \langle 0,1 \rangle \rightarrow 1 \\ \langle 0,0 \rangle \rightarrow 0 \end{array} \right]$$

T-sentences: rule-to-rule

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- [[S S1 conj S2]] = [conj] (\[S1],[S2]\)
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- $\bullet \ \llbracket \llbracket [\mathsf{VP} \ \mathsf{V}_t \ \mathsf{N} \rrbracket \rrbracket = \{x \colon \langle x \text{, } \llbracket \mathsf{N} \rrbracket \ \rangle \in \llbracket \mathsf{V}_t \rrbracket \}$

- $[[S \ N \ VP]] = 1 \ iff <math>[N] \in [VP]$, else o
- [[S S1 conj S2]] = [conj] (([S1],[S2]))
- [[s neg S]] = [neg] ([S])
- $\llbracket \llbracket V_t \ N \rrbracket \rrbracket = \{x: \langle x, \llbracket N \rrbracket \rangle \in \llbracket V_t \rrbracket \}$
- semantics for non-branching nodes: pass-up

Herr Webelhuth is relaxed

• Circumstances (Model): Herr Webelhuth is an element of the set of relaxed individuals.

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- ullet (1) The syntax is well-formed by S ightarrow N VP

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- (3) for VP: [is relaxed] = {x: x is relaxed}

- Circumstances (Model): Herr Webelhuth is an element of the set of relaxed individuals.
- ullet (1) The syntax is well-formed by S ightarrow N VP
- (2) for N: [Herr Webelhuth] = Herr Webelhuth
- (3) for VP: [is relaxed] = {x: x is relaxed}
- (4) for S: $[[S \ N \ VP]] = 1 \ iff [[N]] \in [VP]$, else O

The tree:

```
1 since [Herr Webelhuth] ∈ [is relaxed]


N

VP


[Herr Webelhuth] [is relaxed]
```

We compute syntactic representations, not flat sentences

(s_1 Frau Eckardt is creative) and it is not the case that (s_2 Herr Webehlhuth is relaxed) and (s_3 Frau Eckardt prefers the Turm-Mensa).



Circumstances: Herr Webelhuth is relaxed, Frau Eckardt is creative, and Frau Eckardt does not prefer the Turm-Mensa:



Literatur I

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