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Abstract Correspondence pertains to Gen Fogleman interview with Defense News, with background information including miscellaneous talking/point papers on various subjects and various Defense News clippings.

Descriptive Notes: In personal collection of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman (USAF Retired). FULL TEXT DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE IN ELECTRONIC FORM VIA CLASSIFIED NETWORK.

Title Added Entries
Background Paper, Department of Air Force (DAF), Quadrennial Defense Review, 24 Jun 1997 **
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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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16 Jun 1997-20 Jul 1997

~~Source Staffers~~ DEF NEWS
MARK WACSIN 27 Jul 97

MEMORANDUM FOR SAF/PA

FROM: AF\XP

SUBJECT: CSAF Interview (Your memo, 16 Jun 97)

Attached is the background paper on force reductions outlined in the QDR for the CSAF's interview with the Defense News.

1 Atch
Background Paper

LAWRENCE P. FARRELL, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
DCS/Plans and Programs

01174936

Background Paper
on
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

- The QDR restructures the Air Force consistent with current needs and future responsibilities. Key to QDR is three major tenets -- rightsizing force structure; infrastructure streamlining by outsourcing in mission support and services support areas; and reinvesting dollars saved toward key modernization programs.

- In the force structure area, the active component is reduced modestly from current levels while the air reserve component is modernized -- the net result is an increase in the total numbers of reserve component fighters, and a significant increase in guard and reserve capability and flexibility. Specifically:
  -- 13 active FWEs to 12.17; reserve component grows from 7 to 8:04 FWEs.
  -- Converts 6 reserve component Air Defense squadrons from current mission to general purpose.
  -- Decreases total procurement of F-22 from 438 to 339.
  -- Reduces the JSTARS fleet from 19 to 13 aircraft; maintains currently planned B-2 force of 21 aircraft.

- Additionally, the Air Force specifically targeted overhead areas for streamlining. For example:
  -- Consolidates fighter, bomber and theater airlift squadrons, increasing the number of aircraft in each squadron while decreasing the number of squadrons.
  -- Reduces intermediate headquarters to streamline the command structure.

- The Air Force's outsourcing strategy projects significant infrastructure efficiencies will be achieved through aggressive outsourcing actions.
  -- We will take great care to avoid hollowing out our forces by reducing workload as we reduce manpower.
  -- We plan to meet workload in designated support functions by outsourcing to the private sector where it makes sense and gains efficiencies.
  -- Almost 97% of the projected QDR savings will come from outsourcing in the mission support and services support areas.
  -- The QDR resulted in a reduction of 26.9K military authorizations and 18.3K civilian authorizations. Of these, over 25K military and 18K civilian reductions will be achieved through outsourcing.

- Finally, we will allocate identified savings toward key modernization programs as well as other areas that enhance the force. Money saved by the Air Force will be reinvested in the Air Force.

Lt Col Hickman, AF/XPMP, 24 Jun 97, 695-1963

WASHINGTON, DC

Office of the Secretary

16 JUN 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR SAF/AQ
AF/QR
AF/XO
AF/XP

FROM: SAF/PA

SUBJECT: CSAF Interview

General Fogleman is scheduled to do an interview with Mark Walsh, Defense News, on 27 June. The interview is for 30 minutes.

We would appreciate your assistance in preparing General Fogleman for the interview. We have identified potential topics and suggested OPRs. Please provide unclassified talking paper or background paper on the subject. We would also appreciate the inputs on a disk or e-mailed to *wileym@af.pentagon.mil*. Our POC is Lt Col Miles Wiley, 697-2842.

To provide General Fogleman with time to review, we would appreciate your input by 25 June.

RONALD T. SCONYERS
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Public Affairs

Attachment:
Topics

~~Gen Fogleman~~ DEF NEWS
MARK WALSH 27 Jun 97

XO 1. Defensive information warfare

XO 2. Debate waging over more B-2s

AQ 3. F-22 - when will it fly? What are consequences of not flying it as originally planned.

XP 4. Force reductions outlined in QDR and QDR in general
QR

XO 5. DAWMS
QR

~~Issue Briefs~~ DEF NEWS
MARK WAGS 14 27 Jul 27 Jul

Wiley, Miles, , SAF/PAN

From: Ogden, James, MAJ, AF/QR
To: Wiley, Miles, , SAF/PAG
Subject: CSAF Interview w/Defense News
Date: Friday, June 20, 1997 6:04PM

Here's QR's input for Question #4. "Force reductions outlined in the QDR and the QDR in general".

<<File Attachment: QDRTAL~1.DOC>>

XO-DAG will answer question #5. They'll chop their input with QR enroute to you.

VR, Maj Ogden

FYI: Col Lasch thinks we should do the reception in the Press Briefing Room instead of going up to the mess afterwards. Your thoughts?

Staff Summary Sheet

	To	Action	Signature (Surname), Grade, Date		To	Action	Signature (Surname), Grade, Date
1	PA	INFO		2	XO	INFO	

Grade and Surname of Action Officer	Symbol	Phone	Suspense Date
LtCol Levy	XOI-QR	695-8065	

Subject	SSS Date
CSAF Interview with Defense News	25 June 1997

Summary

Purpose. Provide background material supporting General Fogleman's 27 June interview with Defense News.

Discussion. XO-generated background material is attached.

ARTHUR D. SIKES, JR., Brig Gen, USAF
Deputy Director of Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
DCS/Air and Space Operations

Tabs
1. BP on Defensive Information Warfare
2. Talking Paper on DAWMS

AF Form 1768, Staff Summary Sheet (Word for Windows Version 6.0) DNSSS.DOC
QUEST Template Version 3.1a 25 June 1997, 1019

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

Office of the Secretary

NIGHT BAG ON 1 JULY 97

30 JUN 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FOGLEMAN

FROM: SAF/PA

SUBJECT: Interview

ON CSAF Calendar 1630

Sir, you are scheduled for an interview with Mark Walsh, Defense News, on 2 July.

Mr. Walsh provided potential topic areas in advance. The staff's inputs on the potential topics are at Attachments 1-5. At Attachment 6 is a copy of the QDR report.

At Attachment 7 are some recent stories Mr. Walsh has written on pilotless JSF, IW Expansion, F-22 Cost Dilemma, JSF Competitors, DAWMS Changes and DAWMS Delay. Some additional stories by Mr. Walsh are at Attachment 8.

Lt Col Miles Wiley will monitor.

V/R

Alan

ALAN E. DEFEND
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Public Affairs

Attachments:
1. IW
2. B-2s
3. F-22
4. QDR
5. DAWMS
6. QDR Report
7. Specific Stories
8. Additional Stories

~~GEORGE SCHEFFERS~~ MARK WALSH DEF NEWS 27 Jul 27 Jun

BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

AIR FORCE DEFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE

1. The Air Force has become irreversibly dependent on interconnected telecommunications and automated information systems in the conduct of its mission. Timely, accurate, and secure information is essential to the protection of Air Force forces and the successful conduct of air and space operations. Air Force mission-critical information, information systems, and information processes are under attack and at risk to adversarial collection, exploitation, manipulation, and denial. Accordingly, the Air Force will implement all available measures -- technical and procedural -- to ensure critical information functions are adequately protected. As stated in Global Engagement, "our top IW priority is to defend our own increasingly information-intensive capabilities." Already dedicated and operational in the garrison defense of computer systems, the Air Force will continue to invest in defensive IW, and move to defend its forward-deployed systems.

2. The three principles of our implementation vision are: (a) reducing the opportunities presented to potential adversaries by educating, training, and increasing the awareness of our airmen to vulnerabilities and protective measures; (b) improving our measures to protect against and detect attack on information and information systems by aggressively pursuing emerging technological capabilities and synergy created by integrated defense-in-depth solutions and; (c) building the necessary relationships, within the DoD, to secure the information needs of all constituencies.

LtCol John Levy/AF/XOIOW/695-8065/23 June 1997

3. Efforts are under way to integrate defensive information warfare (IW-D) into all aspects of the application of Air Power. The Air Force, in cooperation with the Services and Defense agencies, is focusing on a common approach toward operationalizing IW-D. Efforts in six major areas are coming together to support the warfighter. They include: education, training, and exercises; policy; doctrine; assessments; organization infrastructure; and technology.

- Education, training, and exercises offer the greatest return on investment. Our Air University institutions now focus on the study of IW concepts, policy issues, doctrine integration, and the role of IW throughout the range of military operations and all levels of war.
  - Training for system and network administrators to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities is another investment yielding high dividends.
  - Exercising operational structures to be prepared to respond to IW-D challenges is crucial. We recently participated in Eligible Receiver-97, a JCS-sponsored exercise. This exercise afforded us a tremendous opportunity to assess our IW capabilities. Lessons learned from exercises like Eligible Receiver will help accelerate and shape Air Force policy and doctrine.
- The Air Force is also participating in joint discussions that focuses on IW policy issues. Across this broad range of issues, we are examining the Air Force's role and the potential impact of emerging technologies and other factors. The Air Force is fully engaged in the revision of existing policy in addition to developing new IW directives and instructions where needed.

- The Air Force Doctrine Center is the lead agent for developing Air Force doctrine for information warfare. This doctrine will include both offensive and defensive IW principles.
- Capabilities assessments focus on the programmatic aspects of IW. Air Combat Command, as lead MAJCOM for the IW Mission Area, performs an operational assessment of current capabilities and projects future requirements. This process serves as the primary analytic tool to support our MAJCOMs in articulating their warfighting requirements.
- Many components have begun to organize to support IW activities. The interservice coordination requirements so central to IW effectiveness require careful attention to current organizational approaches. MAJCOMs have initiated or expanded some capabilities to respond to security incidents and perform vulnerability assessments to fielded systems. These capabilities will play a vital role in mitigating vulnerabilities over time. The Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) explores, applies and migrates offensive and defensive Information Warfare capabilities for operations, acquisition, testing and advanced IW training for the Air Force. Within the AFIWC, the Computer Emergency Response Teams (AFCERT) provide warning about system vulnerabilities and provides patches to fix problems on base. AFIWC also monitors the Automated Security Incident Measurement system at Air Force-wide locations providing indications of wide scale intrusions. The AFCERT, coupled with our AFCIC-led Base Information Protection (BIP) program provides protective measures for base-level computer networked systems

at active and reserve locations. BIP installation begins at Langley AFB and 13 other bases in FY97 and continues through FY01 with current funding at $67M.

- The Air Force Information Warfare Battlelab has a core of Air Force IW experts working with other IW organizations to support the full spectrum of AF operations by rapidly identifying innovative and superior ways to: plan and employ IW capabilities; organize and train forces and; influence doctrine and tactics in order to meet current and emerging missions.
- The keystone of IW is technology. General Shalikashvili noted that,"Warfare is changing with the growth of technological change, and we must not only stay abreast of it, but dominate it." The exponential growth in information technology capabilities requires a sustained effort within the IW community, particularly with respect to IW-D, to ensure our operational concepts give us a force that dominates any future battlefield.

4. The growing dependence of our critical warfighting functions on vulnerable telecommunications and automated information systems infrastructures poses a significant challenge to the Air Force. While much has been accomplished in a very short time, many challenges remain. These challenges are complex and will require extensive discussion involving representatives from many differing points of view. In the meantime, the Air Force will aggressively pursue our goal of achieving information superiority because on tomorrow's battlefield, it will be as critical to victory as air and space superiority.

(TY$M)	Prior	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	TC	Total
RDT&E	23,391.4	595.5	355.7	44.9	209.5	72.0	13.3	13.9	0.0	24,696.2
PROC	18,528.4	136.0	255.9	279.3	171.7	50.5	36.6	17.9	27.8	19,504.1
QTY	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21

MAIN POINTS

- IOC declared 1 April 1997 (3 block 20 B-2s and required support).
  - FOC in 3rd Quarter FY99 (8 block 30 B-2s and required support).
  - All 21 aircraft delivered to ACC by July 00.

- Multistage Improvement Program (MSIP) strategy finalized to spend the B-2 FY97 RDT&E Congressional plus-up ($116M). Contract awarded 9 May 97.
  - GAM-113
    - Integration and Testing currently underway. Safe separation demonstrated. Two bomb drops (inert warhead) completed to date– met 20 ft CEP requirement.
    - First hardware delivery planned for Jan 98.
  - Joint Standoff Weapon/Generic Weapons Interface System (JSOW/GWIS).
    - JSOW integration scheduled for FY98 and combat capability available in FY99.
    - GWIS provides cheaper, faster integration of future smart weapons.

- On 1 July 97, B-2 Combined Test Force (CTF) transitions to a sustainment level.
  - ACC will provide aircraft for testing.
  - Follow-on tests will support JASSM integration, MSIP programs.

- Air Force aggressively managing the cost of ownership for the B-2.
  - Cost per flight hour driven by small fleet size (16 PAA and 6848 Flt Hrs FY03).
  - Initiatives are in place to reduce cost in LO maintainability, software/hardware maintenance, and program depot maintenance (PDM).
  - B-2 operational and support costs are comparable to the fleet support costs for other platforms (B-1, B-52, F-15E).
  - O&M (3400) funding shortfalls FY98-FY99 impact ability to meet goals.

- B-2 final RCS signature meets ACC requirements.

- GAM-113 near-precision, adverse weather, deep penetrating, conventional weapon capability continuing successful test on B-2.
- JSOW a stand-off conventional weapon capability available FY99 on B-2
- Generic Weapon Interface System (GWIS) allows quicker, cheaper future weapon integration.
- Aircraft deliveries on track.

DEF NEWS
MARK WAGSIT 27 Jul 27 Jul

Heavy bombers, with global range and the ability to rapidly deliver large payloads, are key forces for our post-Cold War national security strategy

- Long-range, "just over the horizon" bombers are exactly the responsive, flexible, cost-effective capability our nation needs as we approach the 21st Century. Bombers are key to maintaining our *global* presence.
- Their global range, large payloads and immediate response capability, put heavy bombers at the core of our two-Major Regional Conflict warfighting strategy

B-1B Lancer: Backbone of the Conventional Bomber Force

- Conventional weapons and defensive system upgrades improve the B-1's lethality and survivability, allowing it to respond on the first day of a conflict
- Investing approximately $2.4 billion for advanced munitions integration and increased survivability over the next decade
  - B-1s achieved the additional capability to deliver Cluster Bomb Units (CBU)-87/89/97s in FY96
  - M-117 (750 lb), General Purpose munition, and Mk-62 (500 lb) Quick Strike naval mine integration are both expected in FY97
  - The new Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), 2,000 lb GPS-aided munition, with limited capability in FY98 and full capability by FY00
  - Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) kits to improve accuracy of CBUs and the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) missile will be fielded in FY02
  - Integrating the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) in FY02 will give the B-1 long-range standoff precision weapon capability
- Avionics development efforts include incorporating Global Positioning System (GPS) and secure anti-jam radio in FY00 and begin mission computer upgrades in FY01
- Additionally we are upgrading the B-1 defensive system to improve survivability against advanced air defenses
  - The defensive systems upgrade, to be fielded in FY02, provides improved situational awareness and countermeasures to meet the threats of the next century
- Programmed reliability and maintainability improvements will ensure the B-1 fleet achieve desired mission-capable (MC) rates and reduce the overall cost of ownership

B-2A Spirit: Next Generation Power Projection

- The B-2 programmed weapons integration is part of its baseline procurement program
  - Mk-84s are certified for use on B-2s now in service at Whiteman AFB, MO
  - The B-2 Block 20 aircraft have GPS-aided Munitions (GAM), 2,000 lb bomb, capability now
  - Mk-82 (500 lb), General Purpose munition, Mk-62 mine, M-117 and CBU-87/89/97, available FY98
  - JDAM capability, on final production Block 30 aircraft, will be available in FY98
  - JSOW capability available FY99
  - Projected schedule for JASSM, will provide FY03 precision standoff capability

B-52H Stratofortress: Mainstay of the Nuclear-Capable Bomber Force and Conventional Workhorse

- The current AGM-142 Raptor, standoff precision missile, and Harpoon guided anti-ship missile completed fleet-wide integration in 1996
- B-52s receive nearly $1.2 billion in upgrades to maintain conventional effectiveness well into the next century
  - Includes the Integrated Conventional Stores Management System to communicate with advanced weapons
  - CBU-97 will be integrated by FY97
  - JDAM will be integrated by FY98
  - WCMD will be integrated by FY99
  - The Air Force is incorporating JSOW into the B-52 in FY00
  - The Air Force is using B-52 as the bomber threshold platform for JASSM, integration beginning in FY01
  - GPS integration will be completed by FY99 and secure anti-jam radio by FY00
  - The B-52 defensive suite will be improved with the addition of a third ALQ-172 jamming system by FY03

~~George Seffens~~
MARK WAGIT
DEF NEWS
2 Feb 97

AIRCRAFT PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) INTEGRATION

MAIN POINTS

- Next generation PGM development and production plans closely coordinated with aircraft modification plans
  - -- Aircraft integration at a high level of intensity in late 1990s
  - -- Integration planned on practically all AF combat aircraft
  - -- Aircraft achieve capability for most PGMs at turn of the century

- GPS Aided Munition (GAM) interim PGM on B-2 Blk 20 aircraft FY96
  - -- GAM/113 B-2 Blk 30 ready FY98

- SFW integration F-16C/D, B-1B, B-2, B-52, F-15E in turn: FY 96- FY98

- JDAM first next generation PGM to be operational
  - -- Early emphasis on bombers: B-2 - FY97, B-52 - FY98, B-1B - FY99
  - -- F-16 - FY99; F-15E and F-117 in FY02; F-22 - FY04

- WCMD first capability on B-52 in mid-FY98
  - -- Followed by F-16 in FY99; B-1B, F-15E in FY02

- JSOW's first capability on F-16 and B-2 in FY99
  - -- B-52 in FY00 and B-1B in FY02 completes bomber fleet
  - -- F-15E capability also in FY02

- JASSM last to enter production
  - -- JASSM bomber integration: B-52 - FY01, B-1B - FY02, B-2 - FY03
  - -- F-16C/D in FY04; F-15E and F-117 later



**Dates reflect first operational platform capability--not projected weapons apportionment.

UNCLASSIFIED

FUTURE WEAPON DELIVERIES VS BOMBER CAPABILITY

WEAPON / AIRCRAFT	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05
JDAM		▲							
B-52		▲							
B-2		▲							
B-1				▲					
Cumulative Deliveries		304	2,150	4,961	8,601	17,715	28,820	39,852	50,340
WCMD			▲						
B-52			▲						
B-2 *						△			
B-1						▲			
Cumulative Deliveries			200	623	2,470	5,224	8,024	11,024	15,024
JSOW			▲						
B-52				▲					
B-2 *			△						
B-1						▲			
Cumulative Deliveries			16	79	216	429	793	1,325	1,973
JASSM					▲				
B-52					▲				
B-2							▲		
B-1						▲			
Cumulative Deliveries					39	117	250	430	700

*** Unfunded** ▲ **Weapon Available** ▲ **Aircraft Combat Capable** △ **Unprogrammed**

Typical Bomber Conventional Weapons Carriage

TYPE	B-52H	B-1B	B-2
GENERAL PURPOSE	Internal+External	Internal (2 bays)	Internal (2 bays)
Mk-82 (500 lb)	45	56	80 FY98 (IOC)
M-117 (750 lb)	45	8 low drag/6 retard FY97	36 FY98 (IOC)
Mk-84 (2000 lb)	18		16
PRECISION			
GBU-10 (laser guided Mk-84) Paveway II	10*		
GBU-12 (laser guided Mk-82) Paveway III	10*		
NEAR PRECISION & ACCURATE			
GPS Aided Munition (GAM) (2000 lb)			16
JDAM (2000 lb)	12 FY98 (IOC)	16 FY00 (IOC)	16 FY98 (IOC)
STANDOFF			
JSOW (1000 lb)	12 FY00 (IOC)	8 FY02 (IOC)	16 launcher FY00**
JASSM	12 FY01 (IOC)	8 FY02 (IOC)	16 launcher FY02
AGM-84 Harpoon (500 lb)	8 (19 shipsets)		
AGM-86 CALCM (1000 lb)	20		
AGM-142 Have Nap (750 lb)	3 (10 shipsets)		
CLUSTER BOMBS			
CBU-52/58/71	45		
CBU-87 CEM	24	20	34 FY98 (IOC)
CBU-89 GATOR	24	20	34 FY98 (IOC)
CBU-97 SFW	45 FY97 (IOC)	20	34 FY98 (IOC)
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD)	16 FY99 (IOC)	20 FY02 (IOC)	
NAVAL MINES			
Mk-40 (1000 lb)	18		
Mk-52 (625 lb)	30		
Mk-55 (2000 lb)	20		
Mk-56 (2000 lb)	16		
Mk-60 (2000 lb)	18		
Mk-62 (500 lb)	45	56 FY97	80 FY98 (IOC)
Mk-63 (1000 lb)	18		
Mk-64/65 (2000 lb)	18		

* Requires companion aircraft targeting (i.e., buddy lasing)
** Unfunded

SUMMARY OF
ACC BOMBER ROADMAP VALIDATION STUDY
February 1997

PURPOSE: Validate the Bomber Roadmap with emphasis on B-1's role as "backbone" of conventional bomber fleet. Also assess arsenal aircraft concept.

ASSUMPTIONS:

- Examine future SWA and NEA scenarios with programmed fighter and bomber modernization (DSUP, JASSM, JSOW, JDAM, WCMD) complete.
- 16 PMAI B-2s and OPLAN fighters flow into theater at the rate projected in Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study.
- Invading enemy force moves at approximately 30 km/day.
- B-1 and B-52 bombers average 0.75 sortie rate during halt phase of war.

CONCLUSION:

- In conjunction with OPLAN fighter forces, the programmed fleet of 100 deployable plus 30 CONUS-CONUS bombers is appropriate to meet potential objectives early in an MRC. Bomber force structure cuts would put major CINC objectives at risk, especially if those cuts include reductions in the B-1 fleet.
    - A SWA halt phase scenario with 9 days to build up forces prior to D-day requires 16 B-2s and 40-50 B-1 equivalent bombers.
    - A SWA short warning, C-day = D-day, halt phase scenario requires 16 B-2s and approximately 90 B-1 equivalent bombers with all planned modernizations completed.
- In all phases of the war, a fully modernized B-1 is more capable and cost effective than the B-52.
- 20 PMAI arsenal aircraft are effective in the early days of an MRC, but are not a good tradeoff if we must retire the B-1 fleet to pay for them.

Maj Paul Skowronek/ACC/XP-SASS/2066/pjs/12 Feb 97

UNCLASSIFIED

~~Source Serials~~ Def News
MARKWAGSIT 27.0 27 Feb

Executive Summary of
The Congressional Budget Office Study
"A Look at Tomorrow's Tactical Air Forces"

- Over the next 20 years, DoD plans to modernize the 4,400 Tactical Air fleet aircraft
- CBO analysts have several concerns:
  - -- Report's main theme - **3 fighter modernization programs are unaffordable**
  - -- Perceived lack of threat
  - -- Concern over aging issue for current US aircraft
  - -- Navy will experience aircraft shortages as we enter the beginning of the 21st Century
- CBO analysts offered four options (see atch)
- CBO analyzed the F/A-18E/F, F-22 and JSF programs
  - -- F/A-18E/F
    - --- Navy plans to buy 1000 over 1997-2015 period for $61M each
    - --- CBO concurs with Navy cost estimate
  - -- F-22
    - --- CBO estimates aircraft cost growth to $108M for $70B total program cost
    - --- CBO suggested recent restructure announcement validates predicted cost growth
  - -- JSF
    - --- Described as "least defined program"
    - --- Questioned optimistic cost goals given expected performance
    - --- CBO Est $22B for dev & $197B for procurement (vs SPO Est $20B & $145B)
      - ---- Procurement 36% higher
      - ---- DoD may need $11.9B per year
- Navy Analysis of the Threat for the Turn of the Century
  - -- US will have 3,500 tactical aircraft
  - -- Countries most likely to be involved in major regional conflicts are Iran, Iraq & NK
  - -- Inventories of Iraq, Iran & NK will total less than 1000 combined (old & new aircraft)
- Threat Recognition
  - -- New more stealthy aircraft will weather improvements in air defenses better than old
  - -- *"The United States relies on air power to offset the capabilities of enemy ground forces, as a way to hold down US casualties, and as a supporting arm for US and friendly ground forces. Because of that reliance, simply offsetting enemy fighter and air-defense capabilities may not suffice."*
- Aircraft Age
  - -- DoD historically retires aircraft when they are 20 years old
  - -- Current plans call for retaining aircraft much longer
  - -- Services argue older fleets are more difficult to operate and more expensive to maintain
- Cost Issue (assuming constant budget (2002-2020) with fixed fighter share)
  - -- CBO projects a $9.6B annual cost - $3B more than might be available
  - -- DoD price goals (particularly for JSF) will require departing from historical trends
  - -- Services must increase historical fighter procurement share of budget
  - -- Predicts real declines in defense funding authority through 2002
    - --- Baby-boomer's Medicare and social security will require larger share of budget
    - --- Fighter aircraft will compete with Navy ships and Army helicopters
    - --- National and theater-level missile defense will compete for funds

SAF-FML/18 Feb 97/614-8110

~~Source Serfers~~
MARKWAGIN
DEF NEWS
27 Jul 97

Options

OPTION I	Set Priorities for development and only develop highest priorities
Option IA	Emphasize Air Force Mission and save $2.5B from Admin's plan - Purchase F/A-18E/F for Navy, F-22 for Air Force - Purchase JSF for Air Force and eliminate JSF for USN & USMC -- No Navy stealth -- Eliminate USMC fixed wing air -- Reduces JSF program risk
Option IB	Emphasize Navy & USMC Missions and save $4.5B from Admin's plan - Cancel F-22 Dev Program (potential impact on JSF Program) - Purchase 894 F-16Cs and 492 F-15Es for AF - Purchase Navy & USMC JSF versions
OPTION II	Build on existing development efforts by creating cross-service versions - Purchase F-22 for Air Force and cancel JSF - Develop F-22 for Navy or F-117 for Navy - Purchase F/A-18E/Fs for USN, USMC, & USAF - Purchase Comanche helicopters for USMC - $2.6B less than Admin's plan
OPTION III	Purchase more aircraft already in production - Purchase 768 F-16s & 214 F-15Es for USAF - Purchases 60 AV-8Bs for USMC - Cancels F/A-18E/F and purchases F/A-18C/D for USN - Delays and reduces F-22 to 240 aircraft (reduces program risk) - Defers JSF by 7 years (reduces program risk) - Saves $3.6B from Admin's plan
OPTION IV	Make proportional cuts to all programs and accept force cuts - Modernization at the expense of force structure - Purchase currently planned aircraft at reduced levels

SAF-FML/18 Feb 97/614-8110

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Air Force Investment



Air Force Investment Chart Breakdown

Fighters: F-15 Mods, F-22

Mobility: C-130 Mods, C-130J, C-141 Mods, C-17 (MYP), C-17 Program Mods, C-20 Mods, C-21 Mods, C-5 Mods, KC-135 Mods, KC-XX (F), C-12 Mods, C-32A, H-60, VC-137 Mods, KC-10A Mods, CV-22

Multi-role: EF-111 Mods, F-117 Mods, F-15E, F-16 Mods, JSF (AF), LRI

Munitions: AGM-130 powered GBU-15, AGM-88A HARM Mods, AIM-9X, AMRAAM, Sensor Fuzed Weapon, JASSM, JSOW, JDAM, Wind-Corrected Munitions

Other: A-10 Mods, E-3 Mods, Airborne Laser, T-38, JPATS

Space/Intel: E-8 (F), Defense Airborne Recon Program (F), RC-135 & U-2, Advanced EHF (MILSTAR replacement), Defense Satellite Comm System (MYP), MILSTAR, National Airspace System, Polar Adjunct, SHF Follow-on Satellites, WWMCCS/Global Command &Control System, Defense Meteorological Sat Program (MYP), NPOESS Satellites, Global Positioning Satellites (MYP), NAVSTAR GPS (user equip), ESMC/WSMC Improvement and Modernization, Medium Launch Vehicle, EELV, Satellite Control Network, Space Schuttle Operations, Space Boosters (MYP)

Strategic: B-1B (MYP), B-1B Mods, B-2A (MYP), B-2A Mods, B-52 Mods, Advanced Cruise Missile, MM II/III Mods, Cheyanne Mountain Complex, E-4, BMEWS, DSP (MYP), SBIRS, Space Based IR Sensor Program

POINT PAPER
ON
F-22 FIRST FLIGHT STATUS
AS OF 27 JUN 97

FIRST FLIGHT ASSESSMENT

- First Flight Date: Still aggressively pursuing earliest completion of required tests leading to a safe first flight.

SUMMARY

- Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)/Engine Runs:
  -- Successful APU run conducted on 24 Jun; failed to start in support of engine run later that day
    --- Initial indications from two subsequent start failures suggested Stored Energy System (SES) slow start time-out. Investigation continues.
  -- Engine, S/N 004 foreign object damaged (FOD) repair status:
    --- Blended all damage, stage 2 fan Integral Bladed Rotor (IBR) blend exceed acceptable limits
    --- Removal and replacement of IBR in process
    --- Rotor will be repaired at P&W CT facility; engine availability as spare by 12 Jul
  -- Flight test engines 003/005 are installed in A/C 4001 with S/N 001 as a spare
    --- Ran both engines on aircraft, completed significant portion of engine runs 2
    --- Post run inspections revealed no foreign object damage
- Software:
  -- OFP #14, containing an Integrated Vehicle Subsystem Controller (IVSC)/Flight Control System (FLCS) update, was released 23 Jun
  -- Core regression tests of OFP #14, started in VMS Integration Facility (VIF) and Vehicle Subsystem Simulator (VSS) 23 Jun; will complete 29 Jun/A/C load scheduled for 29 Jun
  -- OFP#15, incorporating additional IVSC/FLCS updates, will be released prior to scheduled Taxi tests

CHRONOLOGY

- 28/29 Jun OFP 14 load and required maintenance are scheduled.

- 27 Jun Engine run 2 completion is scheduled.

- 26 Jun: APU start successful but PAO cooling loop anomaly indication caused run to be truncated. Investigation led to removal and replacement of PAO controller. A depreservation run of the RH engine and a low power run of both engines was accomplished. Engine run 3 was conducted in the afternoon. The run, lasting 45 minutes, accomplished checks of the hydraulic, Environmental Control System (ECS) and nozzle vectoring systems. Run terminated when fuel reached maximum allowable temperature. Evaluating operation of Thermal Management System (TMS) and ECS valves. Inlet and engine inspections were conducted by Pratt and Lockheed personnel prior and subsequent to engine run. No damage was detected and no FOD was identified in the inspected areas.

- 25 Jun: Data being reviewed to determine cause of APU failure to start. Planned engine starts delayed due to thunderstorms in area and instrumentation system problems.

Lt Col Merchant/ASC/YFFF/DSN785-1711, x2496/kdm/27 Jun 97

- 24 Jun: APU start from the emergency SES system successfully completed. Subsequent attempt to start the APU using the battery and external power was unsuccessful.

- 23 Jun: Testing on hold for "Big Mac" address reconfiguration. Successfully corrected instrumentation and telemetry problem.

- 22 Jun: VMS regression testing completed. Completed hydraulic Safety of Flight (SOF). Pratt completed inspection of Engine #4. A/C moved to Pad #56 at 1600 in preparation for APU/Engine runs

- 21 Jun: A/C move to Pad #56 delayed by weather and instrumentation checks. Good progress made in working down remaining A/C build tasks. FOD free certification signed by LMAS Safety/QA/Eng. Engine runs authorized

- 20 Jun: Main landing gear swings completed. Nose gear minimum pressure/emergency extend anomaly identified. Overtorqued eccentric nut was problem. Arresting gear latch system corrected; ground safety uplock problem remains (CR in system). Brake functional testing completed. Software Cg/weight data files successfully loaded. Hydraulic system check completed. Completed FOD X-rays. Awaiting analysis

RECOMMENDATION

- None. Information only

LOCKHEED MARTIN · BOEING

ROAD TO FIRST FLIGHT
REMAINING TASK DURATIONS
(As of 06/27/97)



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Background Paper
on
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

- The QDR restructures the Air Force consistent with current needs and future responsibilities. Key to QDR is three major tenets -- rightsizing force structure; infrastructure streamlining by outsourcing in mission support and services support areas; and reinvesting dollars saved toward key modernization programs.

- In the force structure area, the active component is reduced modestly from current levels while the air reserve component is modernized -- the net result is an increase in the total numbers of reserve component fighters, and a significant increase in guard and reserve capability and flexibility. Specifically:
  -- 13 active FWEs to 12.17; reserve component grows from 7 to 8:04 FWEs.
  -- Converts 6 reserve component Air Defense squadrons from current mission to general purpose.
  -- Decreases total procurement of F-22 from 438 to 339.
  -- Reduces the JSTARS fleet from 19 to 13 aircraft; maintains currently planned B-2 force of 21 aircraft.

- Additionally, the Air Force specifically targeted overhead areas for streamlining. For example:
  -- Consolidates fighter, bomber and theater airlift squadrons, increasing the number of aircraft in each squadron while decreasing the number of squadrons.
  -- Reduces intermediate headquarters to streamline the command structure.

- The Air Force's outsourcing strategy projects significant infrastructure efficiencies will be achieved through aggressive outsourcing actions.
  -- We will take great care to avoid hollowing out our forces by reducing workload as we reduce manpower.
  -- We plan to meet workload in designated support functions by outsourcing to the private sector where it makes sense and gains efficiencies.
  -- Almost 97% of the projected QDR savings will come from outsourcing in the mission support and services support areas.
  -- The QDR resulted in a reduction of 26.9K military authorizations and 18.3K civilian authorizations. Of these, over 25K military and 18K civilian reductions will be achieved through outsourcing.

- Finally, we will allocate identified savings toward key modernization programs as well as other areas that enhance the force. Money saved by the Air Force will be reinvested in the Air Force.

Lt Col Hickman, AF/XPMP, 24 Jun 97, 695-1963

~~Source Series~~ DEF NEWS
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TALKING PAPER

ON

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, has been a comprehensive review of how we in the Defense Department do our business. Here are the key QDR facts and figures.

QDR Facts

- The QDR was reported to the Congress and released to the public on 19 May
- The QDR will be assessed by an outside National Defense Panel mandated by Congress in the FY97 Defense Authorization. This panel will look at the QDR's results and make independent recommendations to Congress

Air Force Objectives in the QDR

- Help policymakers to understand air and space power's increased contribution to our national security
- Continue our modernization
- Sustain our readiness
- Preserve the forces we need to execute our missions
- Operationalize our long range planning effort
- Ensure that everyone involved in decisions about deploying our forces understands the impact these decisions have on the Air Force—and especially how these deployment decisions affect our people and our readiness

All of our objectives were accomplished. Air and space power's contribution is recognized in an unprecedented way in the strategy outlined in the QDR (detailed below). We will field our key modernization programs, maintaining world-class capabilities in each of our core competencies. We will sustain our readiness, continuing to provide the nation with the rapid global responsiveness and presence that only air and space power can provide. We will retain the forces in the numbers and quality needed to execute our mission.

Airpower's Role in the QDR Strategy

- The QDR's new strategy calls for **shaping** the international environment, **responding** to the full spectrum of crises, and **preparing** now for an uncertain future
- In the response part of the strategy, and at the high end of the crisis continuum, is fighting and winning major theater wars
- One of the three military requirements for fighting and winning a major theater war plays very strongly to the strengths of air and space power: "Being able to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of their objectives in two theaters in close succession, one followed almost immediately by another"
- Although air and space power are important parts of the joint team in carrying out the entire strategy, this especially critical, high stakes phase of the strategy seems tailor made for air

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and space power. Words like "rapidly" and "two theaters in close succession" mean that air and space power will be highly valued by defense policymakers and CINCs when they are called upon to execute this new strategy

This recognition of the value of air and space power in the early phases of conflict is unprecedented—and will be developed further as we refine the analytical tools and models that we use to make force structure choices.

QDR Force Structure Changes (Air Force)

On the personnel side, we will accelerate the effort to transfer work from uniformed members to civilian or private sector employees where this can be done without hurting readiness. In other cases, we will cut manpower. Many people will be rightfully concerned about the impact these changes will have on the Air Force, on the careers of Air Force people, and on their families. Air Force people can rest assured that their leaders will work very diligently to minimize that impact. Here are the facts of the force structure changes:

- Active Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWEs) move from 13 to 12.17
- Reserve FWEs move from 7 to 8.04
- 6 Reserve Component Squadrons convert from air defense to general purpose, training, or other missions
- Total F-22 procurement decreased from 438 to 339 aircraft (with feasibility study of an F-22 derivative to replace the F-15E and F-117 when it becomes necessary)
- US JSTARS fleet reduced from 19 to 13 aircraft
- No B-2 procurement beyond currently planned force of 21 aircraft
- Active Duty force structure will be reduced by 26,900 personnel
- Air Reserve Component force structure will be reduced by 700 personnel
- Air Force civilians will be reduced by 18,300 personnel
- Reductions are to be complete by FY03 and require Congressional approval of enabling legislation for both the drawdown and for outsourcing work presently done by the Air Force

The Secretary of Defense's decisions in the QDR will not mean doing more with less. We are aggressively looking at the number of deployments and exercises and the demands they place on our people. We will do everything possible to ensure that those problems are understood by policymakers as deployments are planned and exercise schedules are constructed.

Although many of the details of the reductions are yet to be decided, we will execute any reductions through voluntary programs to the maximum extent possible. For both military and civilian reductions, we will use incentives first to encourage voluntary separations or retirements as we execute the QDR results.

As we have in the past, the Air Force will come out of this period of transition strong and ready for the challenges that we will face in the decades ahead. Through all of the changes the Air Force has come through, there has been one constant; our people's commitment to excellence and to making the mission happen.

Lt Col Bruner, AF/QRS, 696-1576, 15 May 97

DEF NEWS
MARKWASH 27 May 97

TALKING PAPER
ON
DEEP ATTACK WEAPONS MIX STUDY (DAWMS)

- **Background:** DAWMS is a two part, Congressionally-mandated study that evolved from the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), the 1996 Defense Authorization Bill and White House direction. The purpose of Part I was to identify an "optimum mix of weapons" for deep strike. Part II was chartered to assess force structure requirements and to identify deep attack redundancies within DoD. Part II was also tasked to address the issue of additional B-2s. Analysis centered on a 2-MRC strategy in the 2006 time frame with excursions of 1998, 2014, reduced warning, limited access and enemy use of chemical warfare. Due to time required to develop baseline data and resolve concerns with assumptions, Part I completion was delayed approximately one year (to April 97). The force structure tradeoff analysis portion of Part II was subsumed into the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review), yet the redundancy analysis (relative warfighting contributions of various deep attack systems) was not conducted. As a result of this modification, DAWMS Part II only conducted B-2 tradeoff analysis.

- Part I: Optimum Weapons Mix

-- Air Force Concerns with DAWMS modeling: The process, input data (baseline data and assumptions) and the models are suspect. The study used a two model approach. TACWAR was used to analyze the campaign at the theater level. Results from TACWAR were then used to calibrate attrition, ground combat results, air to air combat results and campaign phase lengths in the linear programming weapons optimizer WORRM (Weapons Optimization Resource and Requirements Model). Previously identified limitations in TACWAR generated concern from the outset, as did the intention to use WORRM, a previously untried model.

--- TACWAR is a piston driven, force on force model. Even though it models airpower, it does so at a significantly aggregated level. This leads to inherent inefficiencies in modeling airpower (particularly SEAD, air superiority, strategic attack and the full impact of interdiction). TACWAR 's inherent limitations and questionable application in DAWMS deprived airpower flexibility and inaccurately reflected the JFACC's ability to intelligently plan and execute an air strategy. The model also uses subjective operator modeling adjustments called "Scalar Factors" that degraded airpower effectiveness below JMEM data, test results, and the historical combat record. These degrades are intended to capture the impacts of target acquisition and identification and various aspects of the "Fog and Friction" of war. The settings used in TACWAR for this analysis were set far too low resulting in some cases of over 30 sorties being required to kill a single tank /APC. Overall mission effectiveness averaged 4 to 5 times lower than Desert Storm or Bosnia results.

--- Output from TACWAR was subsequently used to "calibrate" the WORRM model. Early WORRM results were severely criticized by all of the Services because they produced operationally implausible results. These were caused primarily by an excessively large target set (2 ½ times the DIA-provided target set) coupled with a unrealistically benign low altitude environment that nearly eliminated helicopter attrition.. The target set had been initially inflated

by a factor called Operational Flex (Ops Flex) to compensate for the "Fog and Friction of War" in WORRM. On top of Ops Flex, additional degrades were added onto airpower to attempt to capture C4ISR limitations. This was partially redundant to existing degrades in the model and input data -- in effect this "double counted" degrades. This resulted in the model being forced to buy cheap, direct attack weapons. This problem was exacerbated by the relatively benign low altitude environment that selected low altitude direct attacks as opposed to medium altitude overflight with wind corrected munitions.

---. As the problems became apparent, the Services applied "operational judgment". These runs became known as the "Hybrid" cases and produced more operationally plausible results. Ops flex was removed, returning the modeled target set to a more realistic size, while low altitude attrition was scaled up to remedy the benign low altitude environment. Additionally, attrition fidelity was increased by adjusting the phases to add an initial 2-day "SEAD" Phase with its inherent higher attrition.

-- Part I Results. Although the final results still had some problems based on overly optimistic helo survivability and ATACMs lethality, they were deemed acceptable to the Air Force. DAWMS Part I did not call for any migration of funds between Services and the final recommendations were broad regarding actual weapons programmatic decisions. General findings for individual weapons from Part I:

Hellfire II -- increased buy by about 13,000 (from @ 6,000 to 20,000)
Hellfire Longbow -- roughly cut buy in half (from @ 9,000 to 4,500)
ATACMs -- All versions including ATACMs/BAT, except for the BAT (P3I) -- reduce procurement to minimums
ATACMS II and IIa (BAT (P3I)) -- increased buy by @ 50%
SLAM-ER -- full conversion of harpoons to SLAM-ER (@ 1500)
TLAM - D -- did not buy any additional TLAM
JASSM -- increased buy by @ 50% (from @ 1,300 to 1,900)
WCMD (kits) -- nearly doubled buy (from @ 25,000 to 44,000)
SFW / SFW (P3I) -- bought in roughly programmed quantities
JSOW (Baseline and BLU-108) -- buys were essentially 0 for both variants
JSOW (Unitary) -- bought at about 80% of programmed level (@1,100 / 1,400)
JDAM -- bought at about 90% of programmed level (@ 50,000 / 60,000) model did use more BLU-109s than currently envisioned and also indicated more Mk-83 (1,000 lb) variants than programmed may be warranted
GBU-24 /27 -- Purchased in relatively large quantities (@ 15,000 additional)

--- Even with all of the specific modeling data available, it is important to note that DAWMS refrained from making specific programmatic decisions and provided its findings in very broad terms. It was concluded that the general trends from DAWMS modeling be used as a guideline to support the ongoing CBMR and JWICA processes.

- **Part II:** B-2 Tradeoff Analysis

-- Air Force Concerns with DAWMS Part II modeling: Due to time constraints, WORRM became the main model used for DAWMS Part II analysis (takes less time to run than TACWAR). The Air Force strongly objected to the change in models for Part II as this was contrary to the original study plan and did not use a campaign model designed to assess theater level platform effectiveness. Within WORRM, the force structure tradeoffs were measured against the additional B-2s that could have been purchased with the cost savings derived from each force structure reduction. Target Value Destroyed (TVD) was the primary Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) -- this captured both numbers of targets destroyed and their relative importance.

--- Initial results revealed several modeling flaws and inaccurate assumptions that resulted in huge disparities in sortie utilization rates. Senior OSD leaders claimed this was caused by "excess TACAIR" and not modeling flaws. The Air Force strongly protested and requested additional excursions that would raise UTE rates to near normal levels. This request was granted, and runs were made that reduced Build Phase phase lengths by 30 days and adjusted attrition caps.

-- Part II Results: Study results clearly show that while additional B-2s provide enhanced warfighting capabilities in selected conditions, near term budgetary obstacles and capability gaps were created during the 10-12 year period required to build the additional bombers. Importantly, Air Force B-1s and TACAIR were less attractive options than carriers and carrier air wings (more expensive and far less warfighting contribution in Halt Phase). The DAWMS Part II quantitative analysis showed additional B-2s provide considerable combat capability during the "Halt Phase" of a campaign, especially with reduced warning times and / or limited access. Note: Army ground maneuver forces and eSB (National Guard enhanced Separate Brigades) were not included in the DAWMS tradespace.

SUMMARY:

The Air Force did well in both DAWMS Part I and Part II. The optimum weapons mix revealed an Air Force weapons program basically on track, while the Navy program put too much emphasis on few weapons, and the Army program appeared to be underfunded.

An exciting new development is the series of modeling excursions requested by the Air Force (reduced MTW Phase lengths). In effect, results clearly show an MTW can be reduced by 30 days with the same military outcome achieved (CINC goals, military objectives and target value destroyed) ... with less attrition! This sets a precedent for future joint analyses – conflicts do not require the arrival of "overwhelming" heavy ground maneuver forces to achieve designated CINC campaign goals .... and can be done at much less cost in dollars and lives. Importantly, it may be the only assessment conducted in the QDR that addressed military capability to support DoD's new "Decisive Halt" Strategy.

From: Wiley, Miles, , SAF/PAN
To: Mark Walsh
Subject: RE: gen fogleman interview - june 27
Date: Friday, June 13, 1997 11:46AM

Mark

thanks. On IW, it will have to be defensive IW. Other than that, looks good.

miles

>>From: Mark Walsh
>>To: Wiley, Miles, , SAF/PAN
>>Subject: gen fogleman interview - june 27
>>Date: Friday, June 13, 1997 2:12PM
>>
>>here are some areas i'd like to talk to gen. fogleman on during our
>>meeting june 27.
>> - information warfare
>> - debate waging over more b-2s
>> - f-22 - when is this thing going to fly? what are consequences of not
>>flying it as originally planned.
>> - force reductions outlined in qdr
>> - qdr in general
>> - dawms in general
>> - anything that may come up between now and then and anything else he
>>may want to get out here.
>>thanks
>>maw
>>

~~Issue Papers~~ DEF NEWS
MARKWALSH 27 Jun 97

1. Defensive information warfare

2. Debate waging over more B-2s

3. F-22 - when will it fly? What are consequences of not flying it as originally planned.

4. Force reductions outlined in QDR and QDR in general

5. DAWMS

~~Issues Briefs~~ DEF NEWS
MARK WACSIT 23Jul27Jun

Wiley, Miles, , SAF/PAN

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thanks
maw

~~ISSUE SUPPORT~~ DEF NEWS
MARK WALSH 27 Jun 97

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

Office of the Secretary

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FOGLEMAN 18 APR 1997

FROM: SAF/PA

SUBJECT: Proposed Media Events for June

Sir, based on your guidance, we have worked with Ms. Taylor to tentatively schedule several media events in June.

Robert Dorr, World Airpower Journal, is tentatively scheduled to interview you on 3 June at 1400 for 30 minutes. Stan Crock, Business Week Magazine, is tentatively scheduled for an off-the record breakfast on 4 June at 0730 for 60 minutes. The editorial staff of Air Force Times is tentatively scheduled to meet with you on 17 June at 1000 for 90 minutes. George Seffers, Defense News, is tentatively scheduled to interview you on 27 June at 0930 for 30 minutes.

With your approval, we will finalize these events.

RONALD T. SCONYERS
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Public Affairs

CSAF Decision

Dorr	___ Approved	___ Disapproved
Crock	___ Approved	___ Disapproved
Times	___ Approved	___ Disapproved
Seffers	___ Approved	___ Disapproved

~~Issue Sheets~~ DEF NEWS
MARK WA 5 14 2 Jul 27 Jun

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

Office of the Secretary

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL FOGLEMAN 20 FEB 1997

FROM: SAF/PA

SUBJECT: Interview Request

Sir, George Seffers, Defense News, has requested an interview with you. You may recall you recently had a courtesy call with him. The last time you did an interview with Defense News was in June 1995 with Theresa Hitchens. Mr. Seffers would like to discuss a variety of topics to include this year's posture statement, Global Engagement and modernization. He has agreed to provide specific topic areas prior to the interview.

Mr. Seffers understands your calendar is very full and the interview may not be until after April. With your approval, we will work with Ms. Taylor to find a convenient time in the May-June time frame.

RONALD T. SCONYERS
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Public Affairs

CSAF Decision

Approved ✓

Disapproved ____

See Me ____

~~SEFFERS~~ DEF NEWS
MARK WAGIT 2Jul97

DoD TACAIR Investments Highlights
(Chart attached)

Year	AF TACAIR $	% DoD TOA
1974	9.27B	3.6
1984	16.22B	4.6
1996	5.46B	2.2
2004	11.02B	4.4

Notes:

- $FY 96
- Chart shows constant $ funding for all major tactical aircraft programs since the 1960s.
- JAST program shown is consistent with DAB Alternative (first production funding in FY05) and $15B EMD estimate by program office.
- F/A-18E/F production funding is from FY97-19 and the F/A-18E/F is shown at $39M.
- F-22 production funding is from FY98-09 and it is shown at $73M (DPP projection) vice $89M (current CAIG).

The line shows the annual total of *these programs only* as a % of combined AF and DON toplines.

DEF NEWS
MARK WAGIT 2Jul27Jan
4

USAF Aircraft Programs



Time-Phased Modernization Plan



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MARCH 2001