

Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur

Date..... Time: 60 mins Full Marks: 25
Third Class Test (Autumn) Semester 2020-21 No. of Students: 56
Sub. No. MA 61027 Subject Name: Cryptography and Network Security

Instruction: The test is in open-book, open-notes mode. Answer all questions. No marks will be awarded without proper justification. Notations used are as explained in the class.

1. [2 + 2 = 4 **mark**] Here is a variation of the ElGamal Signature scheme. The key is constructed in a similar manner as before: Alice chooses a generator g of Z_p^* and a random integer a , $0 \leq a \leq p-2$, such that $\gcd(a, p-1) = 1$, and computes $g^a \bmod p$. Alice's public key is $(p, g, g^a \bmod p)$ and her private key is a . Let $m \in Z_p^*$ be a message to be signed. Alice computes the signature (r, s) on message m , where

$$r = g^k \bmod p,$$

$$s = (h(m) - kr)a^{-1} \bmod (p-1).$$

Here h is a suitable hash function. The only difference from the original ElGamal Signature Scheme is the computation of s . Answer the following questions concerning this modified scheme:

- (a) Describe how a signature (r, s) on a message m would be verified using Alice's public key.
- (b) Describe computational advantage of the modified scheme over the original scheme.
2. [2 + 2 = 4 **mark**]
- (a) Determine the Galois field $\text{GF}(3^3)$ generated by $x^3 + 2x + 1 = 0$ and list down the polynomial equivalents for each ternary 3-tuple in this field.
- (b) Find the inverse of 121 in $\text{GF}(3^3)$ generated by $x^3 + 2x + 1 = 0$.
3. [1 + 2 = 3 **mark**] The field $\text{GF}(2^5)$ can be constructed as $\mathbb{Z}_2[x]/(x^5 + x^2 + 1)$.
- (a) Compute $(x^4 + x^2) \times (x^3 + x + 1)$.
- (b) Using the **Extended Euclidean algorithm**, compute $(x^3 + x^2)^{-1}$.
4. [2 **mark**] Show that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is not hard in the multiplicative group Z_p , for any odd prime p .
5. [3+3 = 6 **mark**] Let E be the modular elliptic curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + 3x \pmod{17}$.
- (a) Find all points of E (including the point at infinity).
- (b) Find $2(8, 14)$.

————P.T.O.————

6. [3 mark] Let \mathcal{G} be a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) instance generator, i.e., \mathcal{G} on input a security parameter k outputs (q, G_1, G_2, e, P) where q is prime, G_1, G_2 are groups of order q , $e : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$ an admissible symmetric bilinear pairing and P a generator of G_1 . Show that if the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in G_2 is easy, then the BDH problem with respect to \mathcal{G} is easy.
7. [3 mark] Let $e : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$ be a symmetric admissible bilinear pairing, where both G_1 and G_2 are prime order groups of order q . For a fixed but arbitrary $Q \in G_1^*$ define the isomorphism $f_Q : G_1 \rightarrow G_2$ by $f_Q(P) = e(P, Q)$. Show that if the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard in G_2 then f_Q is strongly one-way.
(A Strong One-Way function is a function which is easy to compute and can be inverted only with a negligible probability on a random input or it is hard to invert on all but a negligible fraction of inputs.)

————The End————