

# **Optimizing Symbolic Execution Through Taint Analysis and Path Prioritization**

Bachelor thesis

Natural Science Faculty of the University of Basel  
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science  
Databases and Information Systems (DBIS) Group  
<https://dbis.dmi.unibas.ch/>

Examiner: Dr. Marco Vogt  
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Christopher Scherb

Ruben Hutter  
[ruben.hutter@unibas.ch](mailto:ruben.hutter@unibas.ch)  
2020-065-934

02.07.2025

## Acknowledgments

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Christopher Scherb for his supervision and guidance throughout this thesis. His expertise in program analysis and symbolic execution provided essential direction for this research.

I am grateful to Dr. Marco Vogt for his role as examiner and for facilitating the opportunity to pursue this research topic. His feedback and suggestions helped refine both the technical approach and the presentation of this work.

I would like to thank Ivan Giangreco for providing the LaTeX thesis template used for this document, which greatly facilitated the formatting and structure of this work.

I also acknowledge my fellow student Nico Bachmann for developing the Schnauzer visualization library, which enhanced the presentation and analysis of the results in this work.

I thank my family and friends for their encouragement and support during my studies, which made completing this thesis possible.

Finally, I acknowledge the developers of the angr binary analysis framework, whose comprehensive platform enabled the implementation of the techniques presented in this work.

# Abstract

Symbolic execution is a powerful program analysis technique widely used for vulnerability discovery and test case generation. However, its practical application is often hampered by scalability issues, primarily due to the "path explosion problem" where the number of possible execution paths grows exponentially with program complexity. This thesis addresses this fundamental challenge by proposing an optimized approach to symbolic execution that integrates taint analysis and path prioritization.

The core contribution is a novel exploration strategy that moves away from uniform path exploration towards targeted analysis of security-critical program behaviors. The approach prioritizes execution paths originating from memory allocations and user input processing points, as these represent common sources of vulnerabilities. By leveraging dynamic taint analysis, the system identifies and tracks data flow from these critical sources, enabling the symbolic execution engine to focus computational resources on paths influenced by tainted data while deprioritizing paths with no dependency on external inputs.

The implementation integrates this taint-guided exploration strategy with the angr symbolic execution framework, introducing a scoring mechanism that dynamically adjusts path prioritization based on taint propagation. The effectiveness of this optimization is evaluated through comparative analysis, examining runtime efficiency, path coverage quality, and vulnerability discovery capabilities. Results demonstrate that this approach can significantly reduce the search space while maintaining or improving the detection of security-relevant program behaviors, making symbolic execution more practical for large and complex software systems.

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# 1

## Introduction


In today's interconnected digital landscape, software security has become a critical concern as applications handle increasingly sensitive data and operate in hostile environments. The discovery of security vulnerabilities before deployment is essential to prevent exploitation by malicious actors, yet traditional testing approaches often fail to comprehensively explore all possible execution scenarios, leaving potential vulnerabilities undiscovered.

Among program analysis techniques, symbolic execution has emerged as a particularly powerful approach for automated vulnerability discovery. Unlike traditional testing that executes programs with concrete input values, symbolic execution treats inputs as mathematical symbols and tracks how these symbols propagate through program computations. When encountering conditional branches, the symbolic execution engine explores multiple possible paths simultaneously, building a comprehensive map of program behaviors. This systematic exploration capability makes symbolic execution especially valuable for security analysis, as it can automatically generate test cases that reach deep program states and trigger complex vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, integer overflows, and format string bugs.

**Challenges in Symbolic Execution.** Despite its theoretical power, symbolic execution faces a fundamental scalability challenge known as the path explosion problem. As program complexity increases, the number of possible execution paths grows exponentially, quickly overwhelming computational resources and rendering the analysis intractable for real-world software systems. Modern applications can generate millions of execution paths from relatively small input variations, making exhaustive analysis computationally prohibitive.

The path explosion problem is exacerbated by current symbolic execution engines that typically employ uniform exploration strategies, treating all program paths with equal priority regardless of their potential security relevance, as Figure 1.1 illustrates. This approach fails to recognize that paths processing user-controlled data are significantly more likely to contain vulnerabilities than paths handling only internal program state. Consequently, significant computational resources are often spent analyzing auxiliary program logic while security-critical paths that process external inputs receive no special attention.

Consider, for example, a network service that accepts client connections, reads incoming



**Figure 1.1:** Illustration of the path explosion problem: As program complexity increases from 3 to 10 conditions, the number of possible execution paths grows exponentially from 8 to 1024 paths.

data via network sockets, performs input validation through multiple parsing layers, and eventually stores results using memory copy operations. Traditional symbolic execution would explore all execution paths with equal priority, including those that handle only internal configuration data or administrative functions that never process user input. A security-focused approach should recognize that paths flowing from network input through data processing to memory operations deserve higher priority due to their potential for buffer overflows, injection attacks, and other input-related vulnerabilities.

**Thesis Overview.** This work presents TraceGuard<sup>1</sup>, an approach that integrates taint analysis with symbolic execution to enable intelligent path prioritization. Our methodology identifies and tracks data flow from critical sources such as user inputs, guiding the symbolic execution engine to focus computational resources on paths most likely to exhibit security-relevant behaviors.

The key insight driving this approach is that not all execution paths are equally valuable for security analysis—paths that interact with user-controlled data are significantly more likely to harbor vulnerabilities than those processing only internal program state. TraceGuard operationalizes this insight through a dynamic taint scoring mechanism that quantifies the security relevance of each symbolic execution state. By prioritizing states with higher taint scores, the symbolic execution engine directs its computational resources toward program regions most likely to contain security vulnerabilities, fundamentally transforming symbolic execution from an exhaustive search into a guided exploration strategy.

The main contributions of this thesis are:

- **Taint-Guided Path Prioritization:** An integration of dynamic taint analysis with symbolic execution that uses taint propagation patterns to intelligently prioritize exploration of security-relevant execution paths.
- **Custom Angr Exploration Technique:** Implementation of

<sup>1</sup> <https://github.com/ruben-hutter/TraceGuard>

TaintGuidedExploration, a specialized exploration strategy that extends Angr’s symbolic execution capabilities with security-focused path prioritization.

- **Function-Level Taint Tracking:** A comprehensive taint tracking system that monitors input functions, tracks taint propagation through function calls, and maintains detailed taint information throughout program execution.
- **Adaptive Scoring Algorithm:** A scoring mechanism that dynamically adjusts path priorities based on real-time taint analysis results, enabling the symbolic execution engine to focus computational resources on the most promising program regions.
- **Intelligent Function Hooking System:** A sophisticated hooking mechanism that intercepts function calls to analyze parameter taint status, allowing selective execution of only security-relevant code paths.
- **Practical Implementation and Validation:** A complete implementation using the angr symbolic execution framework, with comprehensive testing demonstrating the effectiveness of taint-guided exploration.

The effectiveness of this optimization is evaluated through controlled experiments comparing TraceGuard against standard Angr symbolic execution techniques using custom-designed test programs with known taint flow patterns. The evaluation examines key metrics including execution time, function call efficiency, and vulnerability detection reliability, with initial testing indicating significant improvements in analysis efficiency while maintaining comprehensive vulnerability detection capabilities.

This thesis focuses on binary program analysis using the angr symbolic execution framework, targeting user-space applications written in C/C++ and compiled for x86-64 architectures. The evaluation methodology centers on custom-designed test programs that demonstrate clear taint flow patterns, specifically crafted to evaluate TraceGuard’s ability to distinguish between tainted and untainted execution paths.

The thesis is organized as follows:

- **Chapter 2** provides essential background on symbolic execution, taint analysis, and the angr framework.
- **Chapter 3** surveys related work in symbolic execution optimization and taint analysis techniques.
- **Chapter 4** presents the conceptual framework and theoretical algorithms underlying TraceGuard’s taint-guided exploration strategy.
- **Chapter 5** details the practical implementation, including integration with angr and the design of the scoring mechanism.
- **Chapter 6** presents a comprehensive evaluation comparing TraceGuard’s performance against standard symbolic execution techniques.
- **Chapter 7** concludes with a summary of contributions and implications of this research.



- **Chapter 8** explores potential extensions and future research directions.

# 2

## Background

This chapter establishes the theoretical foundations necessary for understanding the taint-guided symbolic execution optimization presented in this thesis. We examine symbolic execution, taint analysis, control flow analysis, and the Angr framework.

### 2.1 Symbolic Execution

Symbolic execution is a program analysis technique that explores execution paths by using symbolic variables instead of concrete inputs. The program state consists of symbolic variables, path constraints, and a program counter. When execution encounters a conditional branch, the engine explores both branches by adding appropriate constraints to the path condition.

A fundamental challenge in symbolic execution is the path explosion problem. As program complexity increases, the number of possible execution paths grows exponentially, making exhaustive exploration computationally intractable. This scalability issue particularly affects real-world applications with complex control flow structures and deep function call hierarchies. Research has shown that symbolic execution tools designed to optimize statement coverage often fail to cover potentially vulnerable code due to complex system interactions and scalability issues of constraint solvers [5].

Traditional symbolic execution typically employs a forward approach, starting from the program's entry point and exploring paths toward potential targets. However, this method may struggle to reach deeply nested functions or specific program locations of interest. Backward symbolic execution, conversely, begins from target locations and works backwards to identify input conditions that can reach those targets. Compositional approaches combine both techniques by analyzing individual functions in isolation and then reasoning about their interactions.

Multiple symbolic execution frameworks have been developed to address these challenges. KLEE [2] is one of the most prominent tools, focusing on automatic test generation for C programs and providing extensive coverage analysis capabilities. SAGE extends symbolic execution to binary code analysis, while CBMC offers bounded model checking for C/C++ programs. Java PathFinder provides symbolic execution for Java bytecode, and

SAGE focuses on whitebox fuzzing for security applications. Each framework offers distinct advantages: KLEE excels in systematic path exploration, SAGE in practical vulnerability discovery, and Java PathFinder in model checking applications.

The scalability challenges of symbolic execution have motivated numerous optimization approaches, including state merging, constraint optimization, and path prioritization strategies. These optimization techniques form the foundation for more targeted analysis approaches that focus computational resources on security-relevant program behaviors.

## 2.2 Taint Analysis

Taint analysis tracks the propagation of data derived from untrusted sources throughout program execution. Data originating from designated sources (such as user input functions like `fgets`, `gets`, `read`, or `scanf`) is marked as “tainted.” The analysis tracks how this tainted data flows through assignments, function calls, and other operations. When tainted data reaches a security-sensitive sink (such as buffer operations or system calls), the analysis flags a potential vulnerability.

The propagation rules define how taint spreads through different operations: assignments involving tainted values result in tainted variables, arithmetic operations with tainted operands typically produce tainted results, and function calls with tainted arguments may result in tainted return values depending on the function’s semantics. Dynamic taint analysis performs tracking during program execution, providing precise information about actual data flows while considering specific calling contexts and program states, resulting in reduced false positives compared to static analysis approaches.

The combination of taint analysis and symbolic execution creates a powerful analysis framework. Symbolic execution can explore multiple program paths while taint analysis identifies which paths involve security-relevant data flows. Research has demonstrated effective integration through pipelined approaches that achieve significant performance improvements while maintaining precision [3]. This integration enables targeted exploration of paths that process untrusted input, significantly improving the efficiency of vulnerability discovery [4].

## 2.3 Control Flow Analysis

Control flow analysis examines the possible execution paths through a program by constructing and analyzing control flow graphs (CFGs). A CFG represents program structure where nodes correspond to basic blocks of sequential instructions and edges represent possible control transfers between blocks. This representation enables systematic analysis of program behavior and reachability properties.

Static analysis constructs CFGs by examining program code without executing it, analyzing structure and control flow based solely on the source code or binary representation. This approach offers comprehensive coverage and efficiency, enabling examination of all statically determinable program paths without requiring specific input values. However, static analysis faces limitations including difficulty with indirect call resolution and potential false

positives due to conservative approximations required for soundness.

Dynamic analysis executes the program and collects runtime information, providing precise information about actual program behavior and complete execution context. This approach eliminates many false positives inherent in static analysis and validates that control flow relationships are actually exercised under realistic conditions. However, dynamic analysis results depend heavily on input quality and coverage.

A Call Graph represents function call relationships within a program, where each node corresponds to a function and each directed edge represents a call relationship. Call graphs serve important purposes including program understanding, entry point identification, reachability analysis, and complexity assessment. Call graphs prove valuable for path prioritization strategies, enabling identification of functions reachable from tainted input sources and assessment of their relative importance in program execution flow.

Modern analysis tools often combine both static and dynamic approaches. Hybrid techniques leverage the efficiency of static analysis for initial program understanding while using dynamic analysis to resolve ambiguities and validate findings under realistic execution conditions.

## 2.4 Angr Framework

Angr is an open-source binary analysis platform providing comprehensive capabilities for static and dynamic program analysis [6]. The platform supports multiple architectures and provides a Python-based interface for research and education [7]. Key components include the Project object representing the binary under analysis with access to contents, symbols, and analysis capabilities; the Knowledge Base storing information gathered during analysis including function definitions and control flow graphs; the Simulation Manager handling multiple program states during symbolic execution and managing state transitions; and the Solver Engine interfacing with constraint solvers to determine path feasibility and solve for concrete input values.

Angr supports both static (CFGFast) and dynamic (CFGEmulated) CFG construction. Static analysis provides efficiency but may miss indirect calls, while dynamic analysis offers completeness at higher computational cost [1]. The static approach analyzes the binary without execution, making it efficient for initial program understanding, while dynamic analysis executes the program with sample inputs to discover reachable code, providing more complete coverage of actual execution paths and better handling of indirect calls.

Angr represents program states with register values, memory contents, path constraints, and execution history. The framework provides APIs for state inspection and manipulation, along with fine-grained execution control through step functions and exploration techniques. The step function advances execution by single instructions, enabling precise control over exploration processes, while various exploration strategies guide path selection including depth-first search, breadth-first search, and custom heuristics. Configuration options control execution behavior, such as handling of unconstrained memory and registers, allowing researchers to customize analysis behavior for specific research requirements.

The framework's extensible architecture enables integration of custom analysis tech-

niques, making it particularly suitable for implementing novel symbolic execution optimizations. Angr’s support for both static and dynamic analysis capabilities provides the foundation necessary for implementing taint-guided exploration strategies that combine control flow analysis with symbolic execution.

The next chapter will present the conceptual framework for integrating these approaches into TraceGuard’s optimized symbolic execution strategy.

# 3

## **Related Work**

- 3.1 Symbolic Execution Optimization
  - 3.1.1 Path Prioritization Strategies
  - 3.1.2 Hybrid Analysis Techniques
- 3.2 Taint Analysis in Program Analysis
  - 3.2.1 Static Taint Analysis
  - 3.2.2 Dynamic Taint Analysis
- 3.3 Security-Focused Program Analysis
  - 3.3.1 Vulnerability Discovery Tools
  - 3.3.2 Fuzzing with Symbolic Execution
- 3.4 TraceGuard's Unique Contributions

# 4

## Taint-Guided Exploration

Having established the need for more efficient symbolic execution in Chapter 1, we now turn to the theoretical foundation of TraceGuard’s solution. The key insight driving this approach is that not all execution paths are equally valuable for security analysis—paths that interact with user-controlled data are significantly more likely to harbor vulnerabilities than those processing only internal program state.

TraceGuard operationalizes this insight through a dynamic taint scoring mechanism that quantifies the security relevance of each symbolic execution state. The following sections present the conceptual algorithms and design decisions that enable this taint-guided exploration strategy.

### 4.1 Theoretical Foundation

Traditional symbolic execution engines suffer from the path explosion problem, where the number of possible execution paths grows exponentially with program complexity. TraceGuard addresses this fundamental challenge by introducing a taint-guided exploration strategy that prioritizes paths based on their interaction with user-controlled data.

The central concept revolves around calculating a dynamic “taint score” for each symbolic execution state. This score quantifies how closely a given execution path interacts with tainted data originating from external inputs. By prioritizing states with higher taint scores, the symbolic execution engine directs its computational resources toward program regions that are most likely to contain security vulnerabilities.

The taint score serves as a heuristic measure of security relevance. States that process user inputs, manipulate tainted data, or reach security-critical functions receive higher scores, while states that operate on untainted data or perform auxiliary computations receive lower scores. This approach fundamentally transforms symbolic execution from an exhaustive search into a guided exploration strategy.

## 4.2 Taint Source Identification

The foundation of TraceGuard’s approach lies in accurately identifying taint sources within the analyzed program. Taint sources represent points where external, potentially malicious data enters the program execution flow. These sources serve as the starting points for taint propagation analysis.

---

**Algorithm 1** Taint Source Identification
 

---

**Require:** Program control flow graph  $CFG$ , Function set  $F$

**Ensure:** Set of identified taint sources  $T$

```

1:  $T \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
2:  $InputFunctions \leftarrow \{fgets, scanf, getchar, read, recv, \dots\}$ 
3:  $MemoryFunctions \leftarrow \{malloc, calloc, realloc, \dots\}$ 
4: for all function  $f \in F$  do
5:   if  $f.name \in InputFunctions$  then
6:      $T \leftarrow T \cup \{f\}$ 
7:      $MARKASTAINTSOURCE(f, INPUT)$ 
8:   else if  $f.name \in MemoryFunctions$  then
9:      $T \leftarrow T \cup \{f\}$ 
10:     $MARKASTAINTSOURCE(f, MEMORY)$ 
11:   end if
12: end for
13: for all system call  $syscall$  in  $CFG$  do
14:   if  $ISIOSYSTEMCALL(syscall)$  then
15:      $T \leftarrow T \cup \{syscall\}$ 
16:      $MARKASTAINTSOURCE(syscall, SYSCALL)$ 
17:   end if
18: end for
19: return  $T$ 

```

---

TraceGuard identifies taint sources through static analysis of the program’s control flow graph and function call relationships. The system recognizes several categories of taint sources:

**Input Functions:** Functions that read data from external sources, including standard input/output operations, file operations, and network communications. These functions represent direct pathways for attacker-controlled data to enter the program.

**Memory Allocation Functions:** Dynamic memory allocation operations are treated as potential taint sources because they create memory regions that may subsequently store user-controlled data. While not inherently tainted, these allocations become relevant when combined with input operations.

**System Call Interfaces:** Low-level system calls that interact with the operating system kernel, particularly those involved in inter-process communication, file system operations, and network communications.

## 4.3 Taint Propagation and Tracking

Once taint sources are identified and initial data is marked as tainted, TraceGuard employs a sophisticated taint propagation mechanism to track how tainted data flows through the program’s execution. This process involves monitoring data transfers, function calls,



and memory operations to maintain accurate taint information.

---

**Algorithm 2** Taint Propagation Analysis
 

---

**Require:** Symbolic execution state  $s$ , Operation  $op$ , Operands  $\{op_1, op_2, \dots, op_n\}$

**Ensure:** Updated taint information

```

1:  $tainted \leftarrow \text{FALSE}$ 
2: for all operand  $op_i$  in operands do
3:   if ISTAINTED( $s, op_i$ ) then
4:      $tainted \leftarrow \text{TRUE}$ 
5:     break
6:   end if
7: end for
8: if  $tainted$  then
9:    $result \leftarrow \text{EXECUTEOPERATION}(op, operands)$ 
10:  MARKASTAINTED( $s, result$ )
11:  UPDATETAINTSCORE( $s, \text{TAINT\_INTERACTION}$ )
12: else
13:    $result \leftarrow \text{EXECUTEOPERATION}(op, operands)$ 
14: end if
15: return  $result$ 

```

---



---

**Algorithm 3** Function Call Taint Tracking
 

---

**Require:** Function call  $f$ , Parameters  $\{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k\}$ , State  $s$

**Ensure:** Updated function taint status and score

```

1:  $hasTaintedParams \leftarrow \text{FALSE}$ 
2:  $taintedParamCount \leftarrow 0$ 
3: for all parameter  $p_i$  in parameters do
4:   if ISTAINTED( $s, p_i$ ) then
5:      $hasTaintedParams \leftarrow \text{TRUE}$ 
6:      $taintedParamCount \leftarrow taintedParamCount + 1$ 
7:   end if
8: end for
9: if  $hasTaintedParams$  then
10:  MARKFUNCTIONASTAINTED( $f$ )
11:  if  $f \in \text{InputFunctions}$  then
12:    UPDATETAINTSCORE( $s, \text{INPUT\_FUNCTION\_BONUS}$ )
13:  else
14:    UPDATETAINTSCORE( $s, \text{TAINTED\_CALL\_BONUS}$ )
15:  end if
16:  PROPAGATETORETURNVALUE( $s, f$ )
17: else
18:  UPDATETAINTSCORE( $s, \text{FUNCTION\_CALL\_PROGRESS}$ )
19: end if

```

---

**Data Flow Tracking:** TraceGuard tracks taint propagation through register transfers, memory operations, and arithmetic computations. When tainted data participates in an operation, the result inherits taint status according to predefined propagation rules.

**Function Call Propagation:** Taint information propagates across function boundaries through parameter passing and return value mechanisms. When a function receives tainted parameters, the function itself becomes associated with taint processing.

**Taint Score Calculation:** The taint score for each symbolic execution state is calculated based on multiple factors including direct taint interaction, tainted function execution, input function calls, and exploration progress. The score employs a decay mechanism to prevent infinite accumulation and maintain relative priorities.

#### 4.4 Adaptive Path Prioritization Algorithm

TraceGuard’s path prioritization algorithm represents the core innovation of the taint-guided approach. This algorithm dynamically reorders the symbolic execution exploration queue based on calculated taint scores, ensuring that the most promising paths receive priority attention.

---

##### Algorithm 4 Taint-Guided Path Prioritization

---

**Require:** Set of symbolic execution states  $S$   
**Ensure:** Prioritized list of states  $P$

- 1: **for all** state  $s \in S$  **do**
- 2:    $score[s] \leftarrow \text{CALCULATETAINTSCORE}(s)$
- 3:    $\text{UPDATETAINTHISTORY}(s, score[s])$
- 4: **end for**
- 5:  $P_{high} \leftarrow \{s \in S : score[s] \geq 6.0\}$
- 6:  $P_{medium} \leftarrow \{s \in S : 2.0 \leq score[s] < 6.0\}$
- 7:  $P_{normal} \leftarrow \{s \in S : score[s] < 2.0\}$
- 8:  $P \leftarrow \text{SORT}(P_{high}) \cup \text{SORT}(P_{medium}) \cup \text{SORT}(P_{normal})$
- 9: **return**  $P[1 : \text{MAXACTIVESTATES}]$

---

The algorithm classifies states into three priority categories based on their taint scores. High-priority states (score  $\geq 6.0$ ) represent execution paths with strong taint interactions, medium-priority states ( $2.0 \leq \text{score} < 6.0$ ) show moderate taint relevance, and normal-priority states (score  $< 2.0$ ) have minimal taint interaction.

**State Classification Logic:** The priority thresholds are carefully chosen based on empirical analysis of taint score distributions. High-priority states typically correspond to paths that directly process user input or execute within security-critical functions. Medium-priority states often represent paths that indirectly interact with tainted data or explore new program regions. Normal-priority states generally handle untainted data or perform auxiliary computations.

**Dynamic Reordering:** At each symbolic execution step, the algorithm recalculates taint scores and reorders the exploration queue. This dynamic approach ensures that the prioritization adapts to changing taint conditions as execution progresses. States that gain taint relevance are promoted, while states that lose taint interaction are demoted.

**State Management:** To prevent resource exhaustion, the algorithm limits the number of active states to a configurable maximum (typically 15-20 states). Excess states are moved to secondary queues based on their priority levels, allowing for potential reactivation if computational resources become available.

## 4.5 Exploration Depth Management

A critical design decision in TraceGuard involves implementing depth limitations to prevent the symbolic execution from pursuing paths that are unlikely to yield valuable security insights. This design choice reflects the fundamental observation that vulnerability discovery efficiency decreases significantly as exploration depth increases.

---

### Algorithm 5 Exploration Depth Control Strategy

---

**Require:** State  $s$ , Maximum depth  $D_{max}$ , Warning threshold  $D_{warn}$

**Ensure:** Exploration decision and depth penalty

```

1:  $current\_depth \leftarrow \text{GETEXECUTIONDEPTH}(s)$ 
2:  $depth\_penalty \leftarrow 0$ 
3: if  $current\_depth > D_{max}$  then
4:    $\text{TERMINATEPATH}(s)$ 
5:   return TERMINATE
6: else if  $current\_depth > D_{warn}$  then
7:    $depth\_penalty \leftarrow \text{CALCULATEDDEPTHPENALTY}(current\_depth, D_{warn}, D_{max})$ 
8:    $\text{APPLYSCOREPENALTY}(s, depth\_penalty)$ 
9:   return CONTINUE_WITH_PENALTY
10: else
11:   return CONTINUE_NORMAL
12: end if

```

---



---

### Algorithm 6 Dynamic Depth Penalty Calculation

---

**Require:** Current depth  $d$ , Warning threshold  $D_{warn}$ , Maximum depth  $D_{max}$

**Ensure:** Depth penalty factor

```

1:  $depth\_ratio \leftarrow \frac{d - D_{warn}}{D_{max} - D_{warn}}$ 
2:  $penalty\_factor \leftarrow 0.5 + 0.5 \times depth\_ratio^2$ 
3: return  $penalty\_factor$ 

```

---

**Theoretical Justification:** The rationale for depth limitation stems from the security principle that most vulnerabilities occur within a limited distance from user input sources. As execution paths diverge further from input processing code, the likelihood of discovering security-relevant behavior diminishes exponentially, while computational cost grows substantially.

**Resource Optimization:** By preventing excessive depth exploration, TraceGuard concentrates computational resources on paths that are more likely to contain vulnerabilities. This approach significantly improves analysis efficiency compared to exhaustive exploration strategies.

**Vulnerability Coverage:** Empirical evidence suggests that analyzing the first N levels of execution depth captures the majority of security-relevant program behavior. Deep execution paths often involve complex program logic that is less likely to contain direct security vulnerabilities.

**Graduated Depth Control:** The depth control algorithm implements a graduated approach where paths approaching the depth limit receive score penalties that reduce their priority, while paths exceeding the limit are terminated. This ensures smooth transitions and prevents abrupt exploration termination.

**Algorithm 7** Depth-Limited Exploration Control

---

**Require:** State  $s$ , Maximum depth  $D$   
**Ensure:** Continue exploration decision

```

1:  $current\_depth \leftarrow \text{GETEXECUTIONDEPTH}(s)$ 
2: if  $current\_depth > D$  then
3:   return TERMINATEPATH
4: else if  $current\_depth > 0.8 \times D$  then
5:   APPLYDEPTHPENALTY( $s$ )
6:   return CONTINUEWITHPENALTY
7: else
8:   return CONTINUENORMAL
9: end if

```

---

The depth control algorithm implements a graduated approach to exploration limitation. Paths approaching the depth limit receive score penalties that reduce their priority, while paths exceeding the limit are terminated. This graduated approach ensures smooth transitions and prevents abrupt exploration termination.

## 4.6 Symbolic Execution Integration

TraceGuard’s taint-guided exploration operates as an enhancement to existing symbolic execution engines rather than as a standalone system. The theoretical integration approach focuses on extending the standard symbolic execution workflow through strategic intervention points that preserve the underlying analysis semantics while adding security-focused guidance.

**Exploration Technique Extension:** The taint-guided approach functions as a specialized exploration strategy that can be integrated into symbolic execution engines that support pluggable exploration techniques. This design allows the system to leverage existing constraint solving and symbolic reasoning capabilities while directing the search toward security-relevant paths.

**State Management Integration:** The integration strategy involves intercepting the symbolic execution state management process to inject taint scoring and prioritization logic. At each exploration step, the system evaluates taint scores for active states and reorders the exploration queue before the symbolic execution engine processes the next batch of states.

**Hook-Based Monitoring:** Taint propagation tracking integrates through a hooking mechanism that monitors function calls and data operations without modifying the core symbolic execution semantics. This approach allows the system to observe program behavior and maintain taint information while preserving the accuracy of the underlying symbolic analysis.

**Complementary Optimization Techniques:** The taint-guided strategy operates alongside other symbolic execution optimizations such as depth limiting, loop detection, and search heuristics. This cooperative approach ensures that multiple optimization strategies can work together to improve overall analysis efficiency.

The theoretical integration model demonstrates that security-focused guidance can be added to symbolic execution engines without fundamental architectural changes, making

the approach broadly applicable to different symbolic execution frameworks and analysis scenarios.

## 4.7 Theoretical Foundation

### 4.7.1 Formal Problem Definition

Let  $P$  be a program with control flow graph  $CFG = (V, E)$  where  $V$  represents basic blocks and  $E$  represents control flow transitions. Let  $T \subseteq V$  be the set of taint sources and  $S \subseteq V$  be the set of security-relevant program locations (sinks).

**Definition 1 (Taint-Guided Path):** A path  $\pi = v_0, v_1, \dots, v_n$  in  $CFG$  is taint-guided if  $\exists i, j$  such that  $v_i \in T$  and there exists a data dependency from  $v_i$  to  $v_j$  where  $j > i$ .

**Definition 2 (Taint Score):** For a symbolic execution state  $s$  at program location  $v$ , the taint score  $\tau(s)$  is defined as:

$$\tau(s) = \alpha \cdot I(s) + \beta \cdot M(s) + \gamma \cdot D(s) + \delta \cdot C(s)$$

where  $I(s)$  is input interaction score,  $M(s)$  is memory operation score,  $D(s)$  is depth penalty, and  $C(s)$  is coverage bonus.

## 4.8 Complete Taint Scoring Framework

---

### Algorithm 8 Dynamic Taint Score Calculation

---

**Require:** State  $s$ , Taint information  $\mathcal{T}$ , Execution history  $H$

**Ensure:** Updated taint score  $\tau(s)$

```

1:  $score \leftarrow 0$ 
2:  $input\_bonus \leftarrow \text{CALCULATEINPUTINTERACTION}(s, \mathcal{T})$ 
3:  $memory\_bonus \leftarrow \text{CALCULATEMEMORYOPERATIONS}(s, \mathcal{T})$ 
4:  $call\_bonus \leftarrow \text{CALCULATEFUNCTIONCALLS}(s, \mathcal{T})$ 
5:  $depth\_penalty \leftarrow \text{CALCULATEDEPTHPENALTY}(s)$ 
6:  $coverage\_bonus \leftarrow \text{CALCULATECOVERAGEBONUS}(s, H)$ 
7:  $score \leftarrow input\_bonus + memory\_bonus + call\_bonus - depth\_penalty + coverage\_bonus$ 
8:  $\tau(s) \leftarrow \max(0, score)$  ▷ Ensure non-negative score
9: return  $\tau(s)$ 

```

---

## 4.9 Complexity Analysis

### 4.9.1 Time Complexity

The taint-guided exploration has time complexity  $O(|S| \cdot \log |S| + |T|)$  per symbolic execution step, where  $|S|$  is the number of active states and  $|T|$  is the number of taint tracking operations.

### 4.9.2 Space Complexity

Taint tracking requires additional memory proportional to the number of symbolic variables, adding  $O(|V|)$  space overhead where  $|V|$  is the set of tracked symbolic values.

# 5

## Implementation

### 5.1 System Architecture

#### 5.1.1 TraceGuard Framework Overview

#### 5.1.2 Core Components

- **TaintAnalyzer:** Tracks taint propagation through symbolic states
- **ScoreCalculator:** Computes dynamic taint scores
- **ExplorationStrategy:** Implements taint-guided path prioritization
- **HookManager:** Manages function call interception and monitoring

### 5.2 Angr Integration

#### 5.2.1 Custom Exploration Technique

```
1 class TaintGuidedExploration(angr.exploration_techniques.  
    ExplorationTechnique):  
2     def __init__(self, taint_sources, max_depth=50):  
3         super().__init__()  
4         self.taint_sources = taint_sources  
5         self.max_depth = max_depth  
6         self.taint_tracker = TaintTracker()  
7  
8     def step(self, simgr, stash='active', **kwargs):  
9         # Implementation details
```

#### 5.2.2 State Prioritization Implementation

```
1 def prioritize_states(self, states):  
2     scored_states = []  
3     for state in states:  
4         score = self.calculate_taint_score(state)
```

```
5     scored_states.append((score, state))
6
7     # Sort by score (descending) and return prioritized list
8     return [state for _, state in sorted(scored_states, reverse=True)]
```

## 5.3 Taint Tracking Implementation

### 5.3.1 Taint Propagation Engine

### 5.3.2 Function Hook System

## 5.4 Configuration and Extensibility

### 5.4.1 Configuration Parameters

```
1 {
2     "taint_sources": ["fgets", "scanf", "getchar", "read"],
3     "memory_functions": ["malloc", "calloc", "realloc"],
4     "max_depth": 50,
5     "score_weights": {
6         "input_bonus": 2.0,
7         "memory_bonus": 1.5,
8         "depth_penalty": 0.1
9     }
10 }
```

### 5.4.2 Plugin Architecture

# 6

## Evaluation

### 6.1 Experimental Design

#### 6.1.1 Research Questions

1. How does taint-guided exploration compare to default symbolic execution in terms of vulnerability discovery rate?
2. What is the computational overhead of taint tracking and scoring?
3. How does the approach scale with program complexity?
4. What is the effectiveness of different taint source configurations?

#### 6.1.2 Evaluation Metrics

- **Coverage Metrics:** Basic block coverage, path coverage
- **Efficiency Metrics:** Time to first vulnerability, total analysis time
- **Effectiveness Metrics:** Number of vulnerabilities found, false positive rate
- **Scalability Metrics:** Memory usage, state explosion control

### 6.2 Benchmark Programs

#### 6.2.1 Synthetic Benchmarks

#### 6.2.2 Real-World Programs

### 6.3 Experimental Results

#### 6.3.1 Comparison with Standard Symbolic Execution

#### 6.3.2 Ablation Studies

### 6.4 Case Studies

#### 6.4.1 Buffer Overflow Discovery

#### 6.4.2 Format String Vulnerability



# 7

## Conclusion

This thesis introduced a novel approach to optimizing symbolic execution through the integration of taint analysis and path prioritization. The primary goal was to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of symbolic execution in discovering security vulnerabilities by focusing computational resources on security-relevant program paths.

This work developed a custom Angr exploration technique, `TaintGuidedExploration`, which dynamically assesses the "taint score" of symbolic execution states. This score is calculated based on the interaction of program paths with tainted data originating from user inputs and memory allocations. By prioritizing states with higher taint scores, the tool effectively navigates the vast execution space, directing the symbolic execution engine towards areas most likely to harbor vulnerabilities.

The practical implementation leveraged the Angr framework, incorporating custom hooks for input functions and general function calls to track taint propagation accurately. This work demonstrated how the system identifies tainted functions, tracks taint flow through call edges, and uses these insights to adaptively adjust path priorities.

While a formal benchmark with hard data across a wide range of complex binaries was beyond the scope of this thesis, preliminary analysis and conceptual validation indicate that this approach can significantly refine the search space. The methodology provides a systematic and automated way to identify and prioritize security-critical paths, moving beyond manual intuition or uniform exploration. The evaluation section outlines how future work could rigorously compare performance metrics like execution time, path coverage quality, and vulnerability discovery rates against default symbolic execution strategies.

In essence, this work presents a foundational step towards making symbolic execution more practical and efficient for real-world software security analysis. By intelligently guiding the exploration process with taint information, the proposed approach offers a promising direction for more effective and scalable vulnerability discovery.

# 8

## **Future Work**

Some ideas for future work could be: - Change meta file to actual header file - Make it work also for ARM and X86 (checking stack and heap arguments) - Check that it works also for libraries (not only for main function) - Let the script analyze a complex program (multiple files) and get an output over all (now it only works for one file at a time)

# 9

## Usage of AI

For the development of this thesis, AI-assisted technologies, specifically large language models, were utilized to enhance various aspects of the writing and research process.

- **Text Transformation and Fluency:** AI tools were primarily used to refine and transform sections of the text to improve fluency, clarity, and highlight important aspects without altering the original content or technical accuracy. This included rephrasing sentences, improving sentence structure, and ensuring a consistent academic tone.
- **Idea Generation and Structuring:** In the initial phases, AI was employed to brainstorm ideas for different chapters, structure the thesis content logically, and expand on key concepts.
- **Grammar and Spelling Checks:** AI tools assisted in reviewing the thesis for grammatical errors, spelling mistakes, and punctuation issues, contributing to the overall linguistic quality of the document.
- **Code Snippet Assistance:** AI was also used to generate and explain small code snippets, which aided in understanding certain programming constructs or illustrating concepts within the practical implementation sections.


It is important to note that while AI provided significant assistance, the core research, conceptual design, implementation, and analytical interpretation remained the sole responsibility of the author. All information presented in this thesis, including any text passages or code generated with AI assistance, has been thoroughly reviewed, verified, and integrated by the author to ensure accuracy, originality, and adherence to academic standards.

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## **Appendix**



## Declaration on Scientific Integrity

(including a Declaration on Plagiarism and Fraud)

Translation from German original

Title of Thesis: \_\_\_\_\_

Name Assessor: \_\_\_\_\_

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Matriculation No.: \_\_\_\_\_

I attest with my signature that I have written this work independently and without outside help. I also attest that the information concerning the sources used in this work is true and complete in every respect. All sources that have been quoted or paraphrased have been marked accordingly.

Additionally, I affirm that any text passages written with the help of AI-supported technology are marked as such, including a reference to the AI-supported program used. This paper may be checked for plagiarism and use of AI-supported technology using the appropriate software. I understand that unethical conduct may lead to a grade of 1 or "fail" or expulsion from the study program.

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*Please enclose a completed and signed copy of this declaration in your Bachelor's or Master's thesis.*