


TraceGuard: Taint-Guided Symbolic Execution

Bachelor Thesis Presentation

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
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Today's Journey

1. **The Challenge:** Software vulnerabilities and current detection limits
2. **The Problem:** Why symbolic execution struggles
3. **The Insight:** Taint-guided exploration concept
4. **The Solution:** TraceGuard's approach and implementation
5. **The Evidence:** Evaluation results and performance gains
6. **Seeing It Work:** Live demonstration
7. **Looking Forward:** Future directions and broader impact

The Problem

Where Do Software Vulnerabilities Actually Hide?



Vulnerability Hotspots:

- ▶ **Data Entry:** Network I/O, file parsing, user input
- ▶ **Data Processing:** String operations, format parsing, validation
- ▶ **Data Storage:** Memory allocation, buffer operations
- ▶ **Business Logic:** Complex algorithms, decision trees

Risk decreases as data moves away from external sources

Common Vulnerability Patterns

Input-Related Vulnerabilities:

- ▶ **Buffer overflows:**

`strcpy(small_buf, user_input)`


- ▶ **Format string bugs:**

`printf(user_string)`

- ▶ **Injection attacks:** SQL, command injection

- ▶ **Integer overflows:** Size calculations from input

Example Attack Flow:




Key Insight: Following the data flow from input to vulnerability

The Challenge: Finding These Vulnerabilities

Traditional Testing Approaches:

- ▶ **Manual code review:** Time-intensive, incomplete coverage
- ▶ **Unit testing:** Limited to expected inputs
- ▶ **Integration testing:** Misses edge cases
- ▶ **Static analysis:** High false positive rates



The Gap: Security vulnerabilities often trigger under specific, unexpected input conditions


Symbolic Execution - The Promise

Goal: Find all possible bugs automatically

Method: Treat inputs as mathematical symbols

Power: Can generate test cases for any reachable code


Advantage: Handles complex conditions that random testing cannot reach



Instead of testing with specific values, explore **ALL** possible values


The Reality - Path Explosion Problem

Simple Program (3 conditions)



Total Paths: $2^3 = 8$

Complex Program (10 conditions)



Total Paths: $2^{10} = 1024$

- ▶ 3 conditions → 8 possible paths
- ▶ 10 conditions → 1,024 possible paths
- ▶ 20 conditions → 1,048,576 possible paths
- ▶ **Real programs:** Millions of conditions = computational infeasibility

Exponential growth kills practical application

Comparing Approaches - Fuzzing vs. Symbolic Execution

| Fuzzing | Symbolic Execution |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Fast, lightweight | Slow, resource-intensive |
| Shallow bug discovery | Deep path exploration |
| Random/guided input generation | Systematic path coverage |
| Struggles with complex conditions | Handles complex logic well |

Challenge

Both struggle with scale, but in different ways:


- ▶ **Fuzzing:** Hard to reach deep code paths
- ▶ **Symbolic Execution:** Exponential path explosion

We need the systematic power of symbolic execution with better efficiency

The Insight


The Core Insight - Taint as a Guide

Classical Exploration:



Explores everything

Taint-Guided Exploration:



Follows the data


Key Realization

- ▶ Not all execution paths are equally likely to contain vulnerabilities
- ▶ Paths processing user-controlled data deserve priority

What is Taint Analysis?

Definition: Track data derived from untrusted sources

- ▶ **Sources:** User input functions (fgets, scanf, network recv)
- ▶ **Propagation:** Through assignments, function calls, memory operations
- ▶ **Sinks:** Security-sensitive operations (strcpy, system calls)



```
char buffer[100];
fgets(buffer, 100, stdin); // TAINT SOURCE
process_data(buffer);      // TAINT PROPAGATES
strcpy(dest, buffer);      // POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY
```

Traditional Approach vs. TraceGuard

Traditional Symbolic Execution:

- ▶ Explore all paths uniformly
- ▶ Hope to eventually reach vulnerable code
- ▶ Often times out before finding bugs
- ▶ Wastes resources on irrelevant paths


TraceGuard's Taint-Guided Approach:

- ▶ Real-time taint tracking during symbolic execution
- ▶ Dynamic prioritization based on taint interaction
- ▶ Focus computational resources on security-relevant paths
- ▶ Find more vulnerabilities with focused exploration

Key Innovation: Integration, not post-processing

The Solution


TraceGuard Architecture - Overview



Integration Point

- Built on Angr symbolic execution framework

How TraceGuard Works - Function Hooking




Function Hooking Strategy:

- ▶ **Input Function Hooks:** Detect taint introduction
- ▶ **Generic Function Hooks:** Monitor taint propagation
- ▶ **Real-time Detection:** Analyze register/memory contents
- ▶ **Taint Marking:** Create symbolic variables with taint IDs

Example: When `fgets()` is called → Create "taint_source_fgets_001" symbolic variable

Dynamic State Scoring Algorithm



Scoring Components:


- **Base Score:** From taint interactions (+20.0 for input functions)
- **Bonuses:** Execution within tainted functions (+3.0)
- **Penalties:** Excessive execution depth ($\times 0.95$ for deep paths)
- **Classification:** High (≥ 6.0), Medium (≥ 2.0), Normal (< 2.0)

Result: Three-tier exploration queue prioritizing security-relevant states

Exploration Strategy

Bounded Exploration:

- ▶ Maximum 15 active states
- ▶ Priority queues: High \rightarrow Medium \rightarrow Normal
- ▶ Dynamic replacement: New high-priority states replace low-priority ones
- ▶ Overflow management: Store excess states in reserve pools



Advantage

- ▶ Prevents path explosion while maintaining security focus

The Results


Test Suite Design

- ▶ **7 synthetic programs** targeting different challenges
- ▶ **Known vulnerabilities** with clear taint flow patterns
- ▶ **Controlled comparison:** TraceGuard vs. Classical Angr strategy

Programs Test:

- ▶ Simple baselines, conditional explosions, deep exploration
- ▶ Multi-function analysis, perfect scenarios, recursive calls
- ▶ State explosion stress test


Key Results - Execution Time Performance



Key Insights

- ▶ **Competitive Performance:** TraceGuard shows -5.3% to +8.5% time variation compared to Classical Angr.
- ▶ **Complex Branching Improvement:** Achieved an 8.5% time improvement in the `test_conditional_explosion` scenario.
- ▶ **Scalability in Stress Test:** Maintained comparable execution time in the `test_state_explosion` scenario, despite its complexity.


Vulnerability Detection Effectiveness



Perfect Detection with Superior Performance

- ▶ **100% Vulnerability Coverage**
- ▶ **Strategic Advantage in Complexity:** TraceGuard found 5× more vulnerabilities in the challenging `test_state_explosion` scenario.
- ▶ **Consistent and Enhanced Reliability:** TraceGuard maintains consistent detection for all test types while providing a significant leap in highly complex environments.

Coverage vs. Effectiveness



Paradigm Shift

- ▶ **Traditional Metric:** More coverage \implies better analysis
- ▶ **Our Finding:** Focused exploration \implies more critical vulnerabilities
- ▶ **The Proof (Example: `test_state_explosion`):**
 - ▶ TraceGuard found 5× **more vulnerabilities** with only **36.8% of Classical's coverage**.

Quality of exploration matters more than quantity

Live Demo



Demo Setup

Target: `examples/program6`

What we'll see:

1. Taint source detection (fgets)
2. Real-time taint propagation tracking
3. Guided exploration prioritization
4. Vulnerability discovery and reporting
5. Interactive visualization

[LIVE DEMO]

Future Directions

Enhanced Configuration:

- ▶ **Header file integration:** Replace meta files with automatic C/C++ header parsing
- ▶ **Adaptive parameters:** Dynamic configuration based on program complexity
- ▶ **Custom entry points:** Support user-defined analysis starting points
- ▶ **Performance tuning:** Systematic optimization of scoring parameters

Architecture & Scale:

- ▶ **Multi-architecture:** Complete ARM and x86 platform support
- ▶ **Library analysis:** Support for analyzing library interfaces
- ▶ **Real-world validation:** Large-scale commercial software testing
- ▶ **Input source expansion:** Network protocols, file formats, IPC

Academic Impact

- ▶ **Methodology:** Security-aware program analysis paradigm
- ▶ **Tool:** Open source platform for continued research
- ▶ **Validation:** Empirical evidence for taint-guided approaches

Conclusion

What I Achieved

- ▶ **Addressed fundamental limitation:** Path explosion in symbolic execution through intelligent prioritization
- ▶ **Demonstrated effectiveness:** 100% vulnerability detection with a remarkable improvement in challenging scenarios
- ▶ **Practical implementation:** Complete system built on Angr framework, ready for deployment
- ▶ **Research foundation:** Platform for continued security-aware program analysis research

Key Results

- ▶ **Increased vulnerability discovery:** Found more vulnerabilities while exploring only 36.8% to 75.0% of basic blocks
- ▶ **Competitive performance:** Maintained execution times within 10% of classical approaches
- ▶ **Validated approach:** Proved that security-focused exploration outperforms uniform path coverage

Questions?

Questions and Discussion

TraceGuard: Taint-Guided Symbolic Execution for Enhanced Binary Analysis

Ruben Hutter

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Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Christopher Scherb

Tool: <https://github.com/ruben-hutter/TraceGuard>