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1st Quiz - Example

- I) Determine **the remaining pure strategies** after iteratively eliminating strictly dominated strategies in $n \times m$ games Q1, Q2 and Q3.

Game	Remaining Pure Strategies	
	Player 1	Player 2
Q1	B	X
Q2	2	3
Q3	4	5

- II) Compute a **mixed strategy Nash equilibrium** in 2×2 games Q4, Q5 and Q6.

Game	Nash Equilibrium	
	Player 1	Player 2
Q4	$0.75 \rightarrow 1, 0.25 \rightarrow 2$	$0.5 \rightarrow 2, 0.5 \rightarrow 1$
Q5	$0.33 \rightarrow 1, 0.67 \rightarrow 2$	$0.67 \rightarrow 2, 0.33 \rightarrow 1$
Q6	$0.46 \rightarrow 1, 0.54 \rightarrow 2$	$0.86 \rightarrow 2, 0.14 \rightarrow 1$

- III) Compute a **Nash equilibrium** in $n \times m$ games Q7, Q8 and Q9, assuming that they can be completely solved, or reduced to 2×2 games through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.

Game	Nash Equilibrium	
	Player 1	Player 2
Q7	$0.8 \rightarrow C, 0.2 \rightarrow E$	$0.53 \rightarrow d, 0.47 \rightarrow f$
Q8	$0.67 \rightarrow A, 0.33 \rightarrow C$	$0.5 \rightarrow c, 0.5 \rightarrow a$
Q9	$0.5 \rightarrow C, 0.5 \rightarrow B$	$0.67 \rightarrow 6, 0.33 \rightarrow 5$

If you were not able to solve any of the previous questions, use this space to explain why.