Project Computational Game Theory
Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas

Ruben Vereecken, Yoni Pervolarakis and Laurens Hernalsteen

Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels, BELGIUM
{rvereeck,ypervola,lhernals}@vub.ac.be

Abstract

Engaging in repeated group interactions such as *Public Good Games* (**PGG**), groups of individuals may contribute to a common pool and subsequently share their resources. In this paper we will recreate the research and results from the paper *Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas* (Pinheiro et al., 2014). Studying evolutionary dynamics, where individuals behave on what they observed in the previous round, a simple strategy *All-Or-None* **(AON)** will emerge. AON consists of cooperating only after an unanimous group behavior. This strategy will prove its robustness by the presence of errors and different group sizes. ***Short summary of results....***

Introduction

Methods

Results

Discussion

Something something

Acknowledgments

Help from Flvio L. Pinheiro....

References

Pinheiro, F. L., Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., and Pacheco, J. M. (2014). Evolution of all-or-none strategies in repeated public goods dilemmas. *PLoS Comput Biol*, 10(11):e1003945.