

Interlinking Probability and Game Theory: Bidding Strategies in Ad Auctions

Bidding Strategies in Ad Auctions

A practical and widely applicable model that interlinks Probability and Game Theory is the analysis of bidding strategies in online ad auctions, such as those used by Google AdWords or Facebook Ads. These platforms use complex auction mechanisms to allocate ad space, and understanding these can greatly benefit from concepts in both Probability and Game Theory.

Model Outline

Auction Mechanism

- **Second-Price Auction (Vickrey Auction):** Advertisers bid for ad space, and the highest bidder wins but pays the price of the second-highest bid.
- **Generalized Second-Price Auction:** Extends the Vickrey auction to multiple ad slots.

Bidders' Valuations

Model each advertiser's valuation of the ad slot as a random variable. For simplicity, assume valuations follow a known distribution (e.g., normal or uniform).

Bidder Strategies

Use Bayesian Nash Equilibrium to determine optimal bidding strategies. Bidders need to factor in their own valuations and beliefs about other bidders' valuations.

Expected Revenue

Calculate the expected revenue for the auctioneer based on the distribution of bids.

Steps to Develop the Model

Define the Auction Setting

Assume n advertisers. Each advertiser i has a valuation V_i drawn from a distribution F_i .

Analyze Bidding Strategies

In a second-price auction, the dominant strategy for each bidder is to bid their true valuation V_i . For a generalized second-price auction, derive the equilibrium bidding strategy using Bayesian analysis.

Simulate the Auction

Implement a simulation to model the auction process and verify theoretical predictions. Use statistical methods to analyze the distribution of winning bids and revenue.

Optimize Ad Placement

Develop strategies to optimize ad placement based on bidder behavior and auction outcomes. Use machine learning algorithms to predict bidder valuations and improve auction efficiency.

Bidding Strategies in Ad Auctions

Auction Setup

- **Advertisers:** Assume there are 3 advertisers (A, B, and C) bidding for an ad slot.
- **Valuations:** Each advertiser has a private valuation for the ad slot, which is their maximum willingness to pay. The valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution $U[0, 100]$.
- **Auction Type:** Second-price auction, where the highest bidder wins the ad slot but pays the price of the second-highest bid.

Bidding Strategy

In a second-price auction, the optimal strategy for each advertiser is to bid their true valuation. This is because the payment is determined by the second-highest bid, so bidding more or less than their true valuation does not benefit them.

Example Scenario

- **Advertiser A's Valuation** (V_A): \$70
- **Advertiser B's Valuation** (V_B): \$50
- **Advertiser C's Valuation** (V_C): \$30

Each advertiser bids their true valuation:

- Bid from A: \$70
- Bid from B: \$50
- Bid from C: \$30

Auction Outcome

- **Winner:** Advertiser A, with the highest bid of \$70.
- **Payment:** Advertiser A pays the second-highest bid, which is \$50.

Expected Revenue Calculation

To calculate the expected revenue for the auctioneer, we need to determine the expected value of the second-highest bid. Let's denote the valuations as V_1, V_2 , and V_3 (sorted in decreasing order).

For n bidders with valuations uniformly distributed over $U[0, 100]$:

- The probability density function (pdf) for the highest valuation V_1 is $f_{V_1}(v) = n(F(v))^{n-1}f(v)$, where $F(v)$ is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of $U[0, 100]$.
- For the uniform distribution $U[0, 100]$, $f(v) = \frac{1}{100}$ and $F(v) = \frac{v}{100}$.

Thus, the pdf for the highest valuation V_1 is:

$$f_{V_1}(v) = 3 \left(\frac{v}{100} \right)^2 \frac{1}{100} = \frac{3v^2}{100^3}$$

The expected value of the second-highest bid V_2 for 3 bidders is:

$$E[V_2] = \int_0^{100} v \cdot f_{V_2}(v) dv$$

Where $f_{V_2}(v)$ is the pdf of the second-highest bid:

$$f_{V_2}(v) = \binom{3}{2} \left(\frac{v}{100} \right) \left(1 - \frac{v}{100} \right) \frac{1}{100} = 3 \left(\frac{v}{100} \right) \left(1 - \frac{v}{100} \right) \frac{1}{100} = \frac{3v(100-v)}{100^3}$$

Thus:

$$\begin{aligned}
E[V_2] &= \int_0^{100} v \cdot \frac{3v(100-v)}{100^3} dv \\
E[V_2] &= \frac{3}{100^3} \int_0^{100} (100v^2 - v^3) dv \\
E[V_2] &= \frac{3}{100^3} \left[100 \frac{v^3}{3} - \frac{v^4}{4} \right]_0^{100} \\
E[V_2] &= \frac{3}{100^3} \left[\frac{100 \cdot 100^3}{3} - \frac{100^4}{4} \right] \\
E[V_2] &= \frac{3}{100^3} \left[\frac{100^4}{3} - \frac{100^4}{4} \right] \\
E[V_2] &= \frac{3}{100^3} \left[\frac{4 \cdot 100^4 - 3 \cdot 100^4}{12} \right] \\
E[V_2] &= \frac{3 \cdot 100^4}{12 \cdot 100^3} \\
E[V_2] &= \frac{300}{12} = 25
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the expected revenue from the second-highest bid in this auction setup is \$25.

Auction Setup

- **Scenario:** We consider a scenario with three advertisers (A, B, and C) competing for an ad slot in a second-price auction.
- **Valuations:**
 - Advertiser A values the ad slot at \$70.
 - Advertiser B values the ad slot at \$50.
 - Advertiser C values the ad slot at \$30.

Each advertiser's valuation is their maximum willingness to pay for the ad slot.

- **Auction Type:** In a second-price auction, the highest bidder wins the auction, but the price paid is equal to the second-highest bid.

Bidding Strategy

In a second-price auction, the dominant strategy for each advertiser is to bid their true valuation. This is because:

- If they bid higher than their true valuation: They might win the auction but risk paying more than their actual value.
- If they bid lower than their true valuation: They might lose the auction even if they value the ad slot more than the price paid by the winner.

Thus, each advertiser will bid their true valuation.

- **Bids:**

- Advertiser A bids \$70.
- Advertiser B bids \$50.
- Advertiser C bids \$30.

Auction Outcome

The highest bid is from Advertiser A (\$70), so Advertiser A wins the auction. The price paid by Advertiser A is the second-highest bid, which is \$50.

Expected Revenue Calculation

To generalize this and calculate the expected revenue for the auctioneer, we need to determine the expected value of the second-highest bid when there are n bidders. Suppose the valuations are uniformly distributed over $[0, 100]$.

The expected value of the k -th order statistic (in this case, the second-highest bid) for a uniform distribution can be calculated using order statistics formulas. For n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables uniformly distributed over $[0, 100]$, the expected value of the k -th largest value is given by:

$$E[V_{(k)}] = \frac{k}{n+1} \times 100$$

For three bidders ($n = 3$) and the second-highest bid ($k = 2$):

$$E[V_{(2)}] = \frac{2}{3+1} \times 100 = \frac{2}{4} \times 100 = 50$$

Therefore, the expected revenue for the auctioneer in this setup is \$50.

Practical Implications

This model helps advertisers and auctioneers understand and predict outcomes, optimize bidding strategies, and design efficient auction mechanisms. In real-world applications, such as online ad auctions, these insights can lead to more effective allocation of ad slots and maximization of revenue.