

# General Secure Multiparty communication

We know how to do 2-Party Private Computation (using Oblivious Transfer)

↳ base case ( $k=2$ ).

TTP

① ——— ②

Any one node is corrupted

(under adversary control)

↳ no issues [doesn't know computation] (Red only control)

Assume that we can make a TTP for  $k$  nodes, even if upto  $k-1$  nodes are corrupted, Adversary would not know the computation

① ② ... ②

TTP<sub>k</sub>

For  $k+1$

① ② ... ② ②

TTP<sub>k</sub>

TTP (2 Party Priv.)

Need to show that if atleast one node is not corrupted, computation is secure

if node  $(k+1)$  is secure

→ TTP is secure (1 node of 2 PPC is not corrupted)

if  $n \in [1, \dots, k]$  is secure.


→ TTP<sub>k</sub> is secure (By induction)

→ TTP is secure (1 node of 2 PPC is not corrupted)

if we have 3 nodes, if 2 are corrupted, we can create TTP using PPC (Oblivious transfer shown before)

However if just 1 node is corrupted, we do not need PPC, (In general, for  $t$ -faults,  $n > 2t$  does not req. PPC) can just use (Decentralisation)


Decentralisation



XOR is overkill (even if 2 values among  $a, b, c$  are known we still do not know TTP value)

instead create a line (at random) through  $(1, a), (2, b), (3, c)$  [TTP value is y-intercept]

or more specifically, just consider a line with TTP value =  $s$  as intercept



Shamir's Secret Sharing

$n$  shares


up to  $t$  of them should not reveal anything about secret  $s$  (in TTP)

$p(x) \rightarrow$  random  $t$ -degree polynomial (with coefficients  $\in \mathbb{F}$   $\mathbb{F} > n$ )

$p(0) = s$

$p(i) = s_i \forall i \in [1, n]$

Building Instruction Set (for add'n & multiplication)



Add'n

$z \leftarrow x + y$  works

Assume underlying polynomial of  $x_i = p$

i.e.  $p(0) = x$

$p(1) = x_1$

⋮

$p(i) = x_i$

Assume underlying polynomial of  $y_i = q$

$q(0) = y$

$q(1) = y_1$

⋮

$q(i) = y_i$

∴ for  $r = p + q$  of degree  $t$  s.t

$r(0) = x + y$

$r(1) = x_1 + y_1$

⋮

$r(i) = x_i + y_i$

∴ Directly Adding two secrets is fine.

Scalar Multiplication

$z \leftarrow \lambda x$  works

underlying poly of  $x \rightarrow p$

∴  $\exists r = \lambda p$  s.t

$r(0) = \lambda x$

$r(1) = \lambda x_1$

⋮

$r(i) = \lambda x_i$

Multiplication

$z_i \leftarrow x_i * y_i$  still works

underlying polynomial of  $x \rightarrow p$

" " "  $y \rightarrow q$

$(r = p * q)$

$r(0) = p(0) * q(0) = x * y$

$r(1) = p(1) * q(1) = x_1 * y_1$


⋮

$r(i) = p(i) * q(i) = x_i * y_i$

However this creates a  $2t$  degree polynomial  
↓  
need to convert it  $t$ -degree polynomial

Protocol (no clue wtf i am writing)

not possible unless  $(n > 2t)$



$s = xy = \sum \lambda_i z_i$   $\lambda_i = \text{public}$

each  $i$  does a secret sharing with TTP and shares  $z_i$  ( $t$ -degree secret sharing)

Now TTP has  $z_i \rightarrow$  can calculate  $\sum \lambda_i z_i$  to store  $s$

↳  $z_i = t$  degree

∴  $s = t$  degree