Exercise 1

See Fig. 1.

Exercise 2

See Figures 2 and 3.

Exercise 3

Without the dsaparam option, the generation of DH parameters takes much longer because it generates a strong prime, i.e. a prime number p such that (p-1)/2 is also prime. This ensures that the multiplicative group \mathbb{Z}_p^* does not contain small subgroups. The existence of small subgroups within a larger group in a cryptographic protocol is undesirable in the sense that it confines shared secrets to a smaller set of possible values than if it were to use the whole group \mathbb{Z}_p^* .

On the other hand, using the dsaparam DSA rather than DH parameters are read or generate, which are then they are converted to DH format, making the key exchange process more efficient.

Note: See Figs. 4 and 5.

Exercise 4

Running the following function with the previously generated DH parameters, we can see that $X^y \pmod{p} = Y^x \pmod{p}$ holds.

```
from sage.all import *

def ex4(p, q):
    x = randrange(q)
    y = randrange(q)

X = Mod(q ** x, p)
    Y = Mod(q ** y, p)

return Mod(X ** y, p) == Mod(Y ** x, p)
```

Note: See Figs. 6 and 7.

Exercise 5

We know that p = 1373, g = 2, X = 974 and y = 871. We can determine Y by computing the following:

$$Y = q^y \mod p = 2^{871} \mod 1373 = 805$$

Knowing the value of X and y, we can then determine the shared secret g^{xy} by computing the following:

$$q^{xy} = (q^x)^y = X^y = 974^{871} \mod 1373 = 397$$

Finally, we can find Alice's secret exponent by solving:

$$X = g^x \mod p \Leftrightarrow 974 = 2^x \mod 1373 \Leftrightarrow x = 587$$

Exercise 6

The Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CHD) consists in computing the shared secret g^{ab} given only the public values g^a and g^b , and not any of the secret values a or b. The motivation is to ensure that even if an eavesdropper captures g^a and g^b , they will not be able to determine the shared secret g^{ab} .

The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH) is stronger than the CDH. To ensure that an attacker can't learn anything about the shared secret g^{ab} , this value needs only to be indistinguishable from a random group element. This being said, given g^a , g^b and a value that is either g^{ab} or g^c for a random value c, each with probability 1/2, the DDH problem consists of determining whether g^{ab} was chosen.

An algorithm that solves the Computational Diffie–Hellman problem can be used to solve the Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem. Given g^a, g^b and g^c , and assuming we can solve CDH, we can derive g^{ab} from g^a and g^b . Then, to solve DDH, we only have to check if the result equals g^c .

Appendices

Exercise 1

```
DH Parameters: (4096 bit)
    prime:
        00:fc:e2:cb:4a:5b:fa:9e:31:60:51:d4:d1:47:2e:
        8e:cd:b3:2b:12:f0:7c:90:c2:0a:fa:77:1d:98:86:
        bc:20:c5:0e:15:ee:54:b9:39:74:ff:76:3d:c0:b7:
        b5:02:8f:3b:0f:55:b9:72:64:79:e4:ff:22:3d:02:
        c2:c1:2e:45:0f:82:05:7d:a2:4a:13:7c:d6:4e:fd:
        4d:6b:3f:ae:b5:5a:9a:a1:c4:ff:1c:30:3a:a4:56:
        ad:fd:9f:b6:7a:00:19:b3:ae:7d:11:22:86:3a:24:
        7b:76:91:72:c0:12:da:50:de:8f:3e:1c:90:ef:8b:
        a6:09:1e:e8:41:a5:69:4f:f4:51:77:30:df:8c:ba:
        cd:62:14:a8:78:00:86:c3:90:96:e4:98:71:49:62:
        6d:6a:ba:0e:0b:74:8b:0e:e9:0f:3f:b2:b2:2e:0d:
        55:03:ba:6c:85:5f:e1:aa:d7:a5:a9:1e:42:b8:4e:
        d5:50:a8:d8:f9:8c:c2:cd:4c:a0:5d:62:27:12:69:
        b8:6b:c2:45:b0:30:95:c6:6f:43:b9:70:14:0d:6e:
        e5:6d:86:11:42:ff:ea:51:5f:be:75:5f:01:b3:6a:
        9c:91:37:2f:f8:b5:b8:e5:0c:63:87:82:dc:e9:c8:
        7b:24:bb:6b:63:69:8e:24:a6:5a:b5:fc:fe:dd:1a:
        1e:03:8f:c3:f1:9b:30:7e:82:ee:0b:0d:98:ba:23:
        31:0f:a7:a6:49:4c:ef:41:3f:60:58:d4:c9:da:47:
        d0:43:ce:60:4a:b0:8c:19:7d:dc:24:c7:0d:44:f6:
        41:c4:a4:5f:1f:79:6d:74:c6:90:fd:ef:a5:3f:ef:
        dc:e4:55:c5:2b:f0:52:dd:64:06:0a:aa:8f:c8:26:
        72:12:25:ae:9c:e0:a6:c4:b3:cc:20:55:a8:af:d2:
        da:b5:03:2a:61:7d:a6:ac:db:bf:87:86:d6:14:a8:
        9a:28:0a:98:86:81:a4:00:ac:06:a2:d5:11:37:01:
        2a:0e:aa:9d:2b:ed:d8:56:82:53:59:b1:68:d0:b2:
        e5:7e:d7:12:75:a8:57:1b:d8:d6:a5:cb:aa:93:95:
        95:c4:2f:c8:ee:b1:d7:d1:4f:4a:a9:3e:3d:4a:19:
        20:6c:58:c2:78:6f:1b:03:35:52:03:45:8e:b4:cf:
        6b:e8:76:32:7a:ff:45:8b:f6:67:16:61:9a:c6:e3:
        15:2b:cb:4a:da:46:4e:03:01:77:76:69:b1:7c:d8:
        7c:47:8a:3f:05:c4:e8:d9:35:97:b9:39:48:9a:2d:
        3f:66:83:5b:79:c6:4c:28:d5:bf:82:7f:47:b7:3c:
        98:82:b7:1c:49:0e:d9:3d:d4:14:8b:ff:39:36:c9:
        2f:ba:93
   generator: 2 (0x2)
```

Figure 1: Generation of DH parameters without the dsaparam option

Exercise 2

```
DH Parameters: (4096 bit)
   prime:
        00:a1:45:4e:ac:71:31:85:e9:4a:07:9e:50:80:9a:
        7b:2c:0b:ac:41:1b:f5:85:fa:19:fb:ab:00:f8:ec:
        17:c3:21:0e:be:b3:14:d4:be:0f:24:42:1c:cd:26:
       41:b9:09:06:19:e8:5a:0a:d9:79:d9:0f:39:57:b3:
        96:7e:73:ef:20:29:94:0c:0e:00:b7:a6:6e:33:5a:
       b4:2c:2c:a1:4f:ea:65:00:b8:6f:a3:d2:c1:6c:dc:
       ea:97:a0:96:3f:2c:60:de:e1:7c:b2:7a:21:89:70:
        f5:8f:65:6e:81:c5:a4:bd:b1:e9:9b:6a:98:89:9d:
        e9:44:7f:67:01:9c:f0:03:f1:ff:04:d9:1d:c1:de:
       89:90:dc:c3:eb:b9:91:59:9d:d9:c3:c3:92:f0:f5:
       ac:62:79:be:b3:e5:1f:95:9c:65:89:0e:22:90:b9:
       8b:9b:b5:d4:8f:93:9c:c3:93:1c:cb:3e:e4:69:fb:
        57:e1:8e:1b:3f:71:09:b9:31:ec:98:e0:25:b3:33:
        53:81:12:80:fc:8d:30:1c:36:10:9a:00:10:8f:93:
       35:aa:d1:60:41:2d:22:a7:85:a0:54:0e:24:3b:49:
        30:d4:f4:fc:c8:d7:24:90:21:fb:23:6e:43:c4:76:
        20:5a:e5:b5:b7:d7:e5:dc:07:a2:cd:4e:81:93:50:
       a5:78:68:73:ee:a4:76:3a:fb:af:7f:bd:cf:2f:8e:
       c0:e0:0e:9f:20:f1:62:49:92:4f:c4:74:6c:ec:67:
        06:8b:57:99:0f:ac:28:31:3a:ea:8a:e9:a7:21:f0:
        58:64:f5:cb:0c:f4:3b:38:ca:e4:59:31:3d:ec:17:
       02:80:4e:07:2c:f2:c4:78:66:d6:5a:9d:63:90:b5:
       b0:65:85:2f:fc:0a:c8:1d:d3:10:d4:6f:7c:84:5d:
        2a:52:18:18:ba:fd:fa:51:c9:01:82:a4:5c:44:f1:
       37:52:ba:23:9b:f6:43:fa:76:53:3f:04:f4:af:d3:
       ba:48:bc:c2:0e:8e:79:8f:ea:df:ab:8a:b0:8e:95:
       8f:ab:ef:cc:fb:28:11:8b:28:8c:c1:63:0c:5c:70:
       b1:77:10:49:80:ca:ef:0e:8f:c5:8f:c2:ed:49:61:
       e0:59:0b:d3:ac:4b:79:57:44:18:fd:b1:54:7f:d7:
       d8:d8:d1:ab:b3:e8:5f:13:18:d4:3c:09:f4:4e:cc:
       59:a7:14:09:d0:43:1a:90:5a:72:e8:30:0f:51:f1:
        33:34:e7:36:14:e3:de:d1:29:a5:fd:50:9b:3b:12:
        30:c6:fd:f2:05:6a:03:60:80:f9:23:3a:33:e0:e3:
       ce:23:c5:5e:b2:27:0e:96:36:f7:18:4c:81:13:15:
       b0:e9:1b
```

Figure 2: Prime number generated using DH parameter generation with the dsaparam option

```
generator:
    7e:4f:9e:eb:dc:3d:4a:c6:1b:e8:4f:2f:30:54:d1:
    15:8f:8e:41:47:3a:52:8d:50:ec:58:81:3e:d8:05:
    6b:9c:ef:e3:67:01:5a:dd:b3:7c:15:bf:55:46:29:
    29:de:91:03:a5:ff:eb:8d:e7:47:69:75:e8:bf:fe:
    4e:4b:8b:bf:85:48:d4:7c:ea:2c:cc:c8:97:4f:a6:
    ed:46:7b:49:a9:af:90:58:12:8d:4c:55:ee:ff:ab:
    5a:c2:78:55:7f:d7:d5:bd:97:18:25:2f:0f:16:4a:
    34:23:cc:e7:a4:63:ea:83:d1:2c:8c:3b:29:8e:ac:
    52:7f:f2:9b:48:47:5b:0d:cc:a9:31:59:82:4e:2e:
    70:b3:e9:a7:9e:a8:37:fd:4c:c8:63:4e:1a:f1:c4:
    c3:f3:15:86:40:5d:37:f7:74:a3:cd:59:d9:f6:96:
    3a:c8:09:56:70:01:da:65:05:bc:f5:63:27:c7:d1:
    61:0b:c4:56:a7:0f:c9:f5:c4:9f:ff:fa:ee:da:c5:
    27:c6:d7:a6:c0:53:4d:3b:c4:67:dd:39:c0:4b:cb:
   98:2a:02:fd:79:14:b2:56:89:08:b9:6f:60:d8:f3:
    15:93:cd:a4:88:00:70:e2:16:1b:2b:6d:66:44:1f:
    a6:b0:93:95:6c:32:df:46:09:bb:b7:c1:3c:4a:61:
    1e:cb:c4:3b:37:b6:1f:95:8b:7e:0e:9e:70:ec:59:
    a4:a4:4b:bb:f4:00:b6:de:4e:4c:90:88:0c:6d:a3:
   8e:6b:63:bc:83:b0:c8:2d:08:27:18:28:98:41:74:
    67:c1:a7:a7:01:40:6c:db:0f:e9:93:c7:64:40:ad:
   3c:47:25:50:a0:c6:12:48:7f:c3:cb:42:d6:29:f9:
    d2:55:be:b7:6a:70:c3:4d:84:43:f2:2c:8a:0c:a0:
    9f:0c:92:68:d9:d3:ce:6a:1f:8f:ef:ad:42:23:d7:
    69:2d:29:5e:7c:35:21:b2:a3:a3:1b:5d:ab:8c:a7:
    15:bb:10:2e:95:e9:f4:fa:20:c6:f6:19:d2:b3:11:
    2e:dd:69:23:d1:48:f3:ae:8e:63:66:1f:68:9a:f0:
    81:75:70:a5:40:eb:0d:2c:81:b1:61:6e:57:40:b8:
    5a:fd:d2:93:8c:6c:83:26:af:b3:2e:24:2f:aa:21:
    ae:65:82:5d:2e:1b:6e:ed:08:76:bb:2a:fe:f9:62:
   32:8d:e2:96:33:8b:a4:d1:cb:cc:74:ae:b0:ef:62:
    20:b9:13:22:94:fd:40:4d:4e:6b:8e:6e:ca:42:d8:
    80:36:82:92:bb:8d:76:4b:1c:9b:34:02:52:0c:1d:
    5f:f2:e0:bb:4b:67:3f:29:0f:02:e9:d1:fd:1f:12:
    48:bf
```

Figure 3: Group generator generated using DH parameter generation with the dsaparam option

Exercise 3



Figure 4: Prime number generated using DH parameter generation without the dsaparam option




Figure 5: Prime number generated using DH parameter generation with the dsaparam option

Exercise 4

```
> 7 - 01ffle Hellman python -1 ex4.py

> 2 - 01ffle Hellman python -1 ex4.py

-1 - 01ffle Hellman python
```

Figure 6: Checking that $X^y \pmod p = Y^x \pmod p$ holds for the DH parameters generated without the <code>dsaparam</code> option

→ 7 - Diffic Nellman python -i ex4.py

> cx4(0x00a1454eac713185e94a079e50809a7b2c0bac411bf585fa19fbab00f8ec17c3210ebeb314d4be0f24421ccd2641b9090619e85a0ad979d90f3957b3967e73ef2029940c0e00b7a6
6e335ab4z2c2ca1fea6590b80fa3d2z16cdcea97a0965f2c60dee17cb27a218970f58f656e81c5a4bdb1e99b6a98899de9447f67019cf003f1ff04d91dc1de8990dcc3ebb991599dd9c3c392f0
f5ac6279beb3e51f959c65890e2290b98b9bb5d48f939cc3931ccb3ee469fb57e18e1b3f7109b931ec98e025b3335381128b67c8d301c361093e0108f93353aad160412d22a785a6540e243b490
d4f4fcc8d7249021fb236e43c476205ae5b5b7d7e5dc07a2cd4ee1393ba63786372eead4763abaf7f7bdcf2f8ec0e00e9720f16249924fc4746cecf67668b57990fac28313ae8a8e9a721f088467
cbbcf43b38cea459313dec1702804e07zcf2c47866d65a9d6390b5b66585zffc0ac81dd310d446f7c845d2a521818bafdfa51c90182a45c44f13752ba239bf643fa76533f04f4afd3ba48bcz0e
8e798feadfabab08e958fabefccfb28118b288cc1630c5c70b177104980caef6e8f5c58fc2ed4961e0590bd3ac4b79574418fdb15447fd48d8d1abb3e85f1318d43c09f44ecc59a714099d0431a
9e5a72e8300f51f13334e73614e3ded129a5fd509b3b1230c6fdf2056a036080f9233a33e0e3ce23c55eb2270e9636f7184c811315b0e91b, 0x00f8c0680b078902615c411336d9b7b6425d5f
031a02480f7432c07809ae213a3b)
True

>>> ■

Figure 7: Checking that $X^y \pmod{p} = Y^x \pmod{p}$ holds for the DH parameters generated with the dsaparam option