

Round Optimal Distributed Key Generation of Threshold Cryptosystem based on Discrete Logarithm Problem

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Abstract

Distributed key generation is one of the most challenging tasks for threshold cryptosystems. Designing such a protocol and proving its security against a malicious, adaptive adversary are very important in practice. In this paper, we propose a one round distributed key generation protocol for discrete logarithm problem (DLP) based threshold cryptosystems. Our construction generalizes the scope of design of one round key generation protocol to a broad class of encryption schemes with efficient constructions of proofs of fairness. Since the protocol is one round (optimal), a simple protocol design can be achieved easily. Especially our scheme is compatible with an existing PKI where users may have their own preference on the encryption schemes. Furthermore, the publicly verifiable encryption with fairness developed in this paper can be used as building blocks of a variety of cryptographic applications such as publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS), e-voting and auction schemes.

1 Introduction

A threshold cryptosystem builds a fault-tolerant system by distributing secret key among a set S of servers. Usually there is a common public key pk and a number of secret key shares $\{sk_i\}_{i \in S}$ held by players in the group respectively. The players can cooperate to reconstruct the secret key, or sign messages or decrypt a ciphertext encrypted by pk without reconstructing the secret key, so that malfunctioning of some servers up to a threshold will not affect the correctness of the output. Solutions to quite a proportion of multiparty protocols turn out to be implementing a distributed TTP by a threshold cryptosystem: key recovery, signature escrow, contract signing, fair exchange of digital signatures, e-voting and auction.

One of the most difficult tasks in constructing such fault-tolerant systems is the distributed key generation. A centralized server acting as a Key Distribution Center often becomes the target of attackers. A distributed key generation, i.e., each server contributes to the random secret key, is thus desirable in principle. Previous schemes of such threshold key generation have often adopted a multiparty-computation-fashioned protocol to distribute secret key shares among players against malicious adversaries. However, these schemes need intricate design techniques with inborn complexity in communication rounds: in a sharing phase the shares are sent to share holders via fully connected pair-wise secure channels and an additional complaining phase is needed to detect cheaters among a dealer and share holders via a broadcast channel. Shares' secrecy can be protected by secure channels, however, the cheater somehow survives even after the key generation, when some player accuses the dealer, a third player cannot distinguish between these two facts:

- The dealer has distributed a false share.
- The share holder lies on a good share.

In this paper, we try to solve this problem by proposing a non-interactive key generation under general computational assumption, where the share holder has no chance to misbehave.

1.1 Related Work

Threshold cryptosystems have been studied in [7, 8, 22, 6, 17], one common property of these schemes is that they work only with an honest majority. In [7, 8] Desmedt et al. defined the concept of threshold schemes and proposed the first implementation. However, this yields no provably secure solution. The first provable secure practical scheme was proposed by Shoup and Gennaro in [22] based on the Diffie-Hellman problem [9] in the Random Oracle model [3], which is resilient against a static adversary. Later research has focused on improving the security against stronger attacks: in [16], Lysyanskaya et al. proposed two new security definitions: namely the concurrent adversary and the rushing adversary. They further improved the result resisting an erasure-free adversary for signature schemes and encryption scheme [17], in which (1) an adversary corrupts servers at any point of the protocol depending on its entire view of the computation; (2) when corrupted, the players have to hand over the adversary their entire computation history; i.e., nothing can be erased.

The first distributed key generation of discrete logarithm problem based threshold cryptosystems was proposed in [19] by Pedersen, but later in [12] a flaw of their scheme was found by Gennaro et al. that the key is not uniformly generated in the key space with a malicious adversary and also a solution is given to deal with such type of adversary. In [6], Canetti et al. improve their results to resist a malicious, adaptive adversary.

A one-round key generation protocol can disable the adaptive adversary, in the sense that an adaptive adversary in a one-round protocol achieves nothing more than what a static adversary does. Fouque and Stern made the first attempt towards the one round distributed key generation [11]: A non-interactive proof of verifiable encryption discrete logarithm is attached to the shares encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem [18] to remove the complaining phase in the key generation protocol. However, their scheme is limited to Paillier encryption as the only tool. Another drawback is that to distribute discrete logarithm problem based key shares, one must manage keys of extra Paillier cryptosystems, which is based on composite degree residuosity assumptions: these degrade the security of the whole system by introducing with new number-theoretic assumptions and new key management issues.

1.2 Our Results

We give generalized one round distributed key generation of discrete logarithm based threshold schemes. Compared with previous schemes, our scheme enjoys following advantages:

OPTIMISTIC EXECUTION. Previous solutions often make use of both broadcast channels and private channels in sharing phase, however, we notice that a private channel hides the adversary in such a way that if there should arouse a dispute a third party cannot tell whether the sender or the receiver is lying. So a special complaining phase is needed to correctly share a secret without a trusted dealer [19]. Theoretical results in [14, 4, 20] have already shown the possibility that given fully connected pair-wise secure channels, any multiparty computation (including the distributed key generation) can be performed provided that the number of dishonest players $t < n/3$ and given a broadcast channel together with pair-wise private channels, can be secure against a static adversary corrupts up to $t < n/2$ players. However, complexity of general multiparty computation protocols prevents their applications in practice. Besides, since we are to construct a public key scheme, a private channel that guarantees information-theoretic secrecy is unnecessarily luxury. In real world we can expect a more *optimistic* scenario where the servers do not always malfunction. Thus for a set of honest protocols, the second round of communication for cheater identification may be omitted. For

this task a broadcast channel plus a public key encryption cryptosystem with “checkability” seems enough. The concurrent adversary and adaptive erasure-free adversary as defined by [16] is of no significance in a one-round non-interactive protocol and a rushing attack will make no harm if we take the advantage of a synchronous network.

ROBUSTNESS AND EFFICIENCY. Our protocol provides security against dishonest majority cheaters, namely $t < n$, because the cheaters can be identified and eliminated in the end, while previous multiple-round protocols can work only with $t < n/2$ in the key generation phase thus in the whole protocol. Moreover, there is only a broadcast channel necessary while both broadcast channel and pairwise secret channel are used in [19, 6]. We emphasize on the efficiency of our protocol. There are totally n^2 shares and each user broadcasts $O(ln)$ data where l is the security parameter, the whole data flow over the network is $O(ln^2)$. Considering the hidden coefficient in previous schemes, multiple rounds of communication and maintenance of the pairwise private channels, the complexity is acceptable for a network with low density. It can be further improved by using batch verification and offline computation techniques. Note that we assume each decryption server which stores the secret key share can process parallel computations while the communication costs are not dominant.

USER PREFERENCE AND FLEXIBILITY ON KEYS. Since each server may have already set up their encryption keys, introduction of additional Paillier cryptosystem may increase the amount of secret keys in the whole system. Our scheme works best for a situation that every player has his preference on keys. In previous schemes, if the public-secret key pairs of Paillier encryption have not been set up, there must be another auxiliary protocol executed to do the overhead. In our scheme, users have more flexibility.

GENERALIZED DESIGN TECHNIQUES. Another contribution of this work is a generalized template for designing non-interactive protocols. If a multiparty protocol can be simulated as information transmitted from a trusted party to all players then it can be designed using our template. The technique introduced here can be applied to other multiparty protocols as building blocks.

MINIMUM SET OF ASSUMPTIONS. Another theoretical result of this work actually implies that a distributed discrete logarithm key generation protocol can only be based on Diffie-Hellman problem and existence of a broadcast channel, while previous protocols rely more assumptions beyond, like additional pairwise private channels [19] or other mathematical problem, e.g., decisional residuosity problem [18, 11].

2 Basic Model

There are mainly two types of threshold cryptosystems in practice, namely, those based on the RSA problem and those on the discrete logarithm problem. We shall limit our scope to threshold cryptosystems based on intractability of the discrete logarithm problem because RSA based distributed key generation cannot be made one-round since a primality test is necessary for those secret prime factors of the public modulus, while discrete logarithm type is more amiable for the selection of secret keys. Let p and q denote large primes such that q divides $p - 1$, \mathcal{G} is a subgroup of Z_p^* with generator g , the secret key is an element x , such that public key is $y = g^x \bmod p$.

Definitions of discrete logarithm problem (DLP), Diffie-Hellman problem and RSA problem are well-known and shall be omitted here.

2.1 Network and Players

We shall assume a synchronous network in all our discussion. In practice such network can be constructed via GPS (Global Positioning System) [15]. The players in the protocol should be connected with a broadcast channel which sends the same information to every player. There is no need to maintain any pairwise secure channels.

Assume n players over a synchronous open network are fully connected. A (t, n) distributed threshold secret key generation is a protocol run among these players, who each chooses a secret number and shares it among all the players. Finally, honest players can decide a unique public key and corresponding secret key shares, such that if $t + 1$ or more players decrypt a ciphertext or issue signatures jointly, while t or less players can computationally have no information on the secret keys assuming that the discrete logarithm problem is intractable.

2.2 Possible Adversarial Behaviors

We follow [17] to describe the capabilities of the adversary. We assume the existence of n parties communicating over a synchronous broadcast channel with rushing, where up to a threshold l parties may be corrupted. Lysyanskaya et al in [17] describe a scheme to deal with such adversary, however, their protocol require interaction in the Share phase. An *adaptive* adversary can depend on the protocol history to schedule his attack while static adversary cannot. An adaptive adversary makes no difference from a static adversary if the protocol is non-interactive. Moreover, the underlying encryption scheme used here need not have chosen ciphertext security. Throughout this paper, the adversary is considered to be *static*, whose attack strategy can be assumed to be fixed at the beginning of the protocol.

In our protocol, we permit *malicious* adversary that attempts to deviate the key generation protocol from correct execution, typically, an adversary is allowed any of the following:

- The adversary chooses to at most t players to corrupt. Once corrupted, the players have to hand all their data to the adversary and all their actions are controlled by the adversary.
- Each player chooses a random number and shares it using a public verifiable encryption via broadcast channel, while corrupted player may response correctly or not.
- The adversary can launch pre-scheduled attack during the execution, make arbitrary deviations from the protocol.

2.3 Security Definition

The security of the distributed secret key generation protocol is defined in terms of *correctness* and *confidentiality*. By correctness, we mean the following:

1. Each subset of at least $t + 1$ shares defines the same secret key x . t is called the threshold.
2. All honest parties have the same public key $y = g^x$. This should not be disturbed by a malicious adversary.
3. The secret key is uniformly distributed in the key space. That is, each element of the group is chosen as the secret key with equivalent probability.

Confidentiality property requires that any PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) adversary should not learn any information on the secret key by corrupting at most t players. Furthermore, this can be expressed by simulatability. If a PPT adversary corrupts at most t servers which is erasure-free during the key generation, then the view of the adversary in the real execution shouldn't be distinguishable from the output of a program called a simulator, which is executed in expected polynomial time.

2.4 Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

Definition 1 (Public Key Encryption) A public key encryption scheme is a 3-tuple algorithm: (K, E, D) , where K is the probabilistic key generation algorithm; E , maybe probabilistic, is the encryption algorithm which maps a plaintext m to a ciphertext c ; D is a deterministic algorithm, which on input c recovers m .

Definition 2 (Homomorphic Encryption) A function $F : G \rightarrow H$ maps from group G to group H is called a *homomorphism* of G into H if F preserves the operation of G . If $*$ and \circ are polynomial time computable operations of G and H , respectively, then F preserves the operation of G if for all $a, b \in G$: $F(a * b) = F(a) \circ F(b)$. If an encryption scheme maps plaintext and ciphertext as above relations, we call it a homomorphic encryption scheme.

Remark 1 A homomorphic encryption must be malleable, which will not be IND-CCA secure [2]: given $E(M)$, the adversary can compute easily $E(M * k)$. We emphasize here that we are designing a non-interactive protocol, all encryption will be only be performed once, then discussions on adaptive chosen ciphertext security can be omitted.

3 Previous Schemes

In this section, we briefly review some related protocols designed for distributed discrete logarithm key generation.

3.1 Pedersen Scheme

Pedersen's scheme was the first attempt to eliminate the trusted dealer to construct a threshold key cryptosystem with shares generated from Shamir's secret sharing scheme [21]. He ingeniously used the homomorphic property of discrete logarithm. Each player acts as the dealer to use a broadcast channel to distribute his public key shares and public checksum and pair-wise private channels are used to distribute the secret share, finally the broadcast channel is used again to identify possible misbehavior.

Suppose p, q are large primes. A player P_i chooses x_i from \mathcal{G} which is a subgroup with order q of Z_p^* at random. He also picks t random numbers $a_{i,k}$ in Z_q . For $f_i(X) = \sum_{k=0}^t a_{i,k} X^k$ where $a_{i,0} = x_i$, he privately sends a secret share $s_{i,j} = f_i(j) \bmod q$ to another player P_j with the private channel and broadcasts public information $y_{i,j} (= g^{s_{i,j}} \bmod p)$ and $A_{i,k} (= g^{a_{i,k}} \bmod p)$ for $k = 0, 1, \dots, t$. Each player P_j receives his secret share and the signature of P_i on the share and check if: $y_{i,j} = \prod_{k=0}^t A_{i,k}^{j^k} \bmod p$.

If $s_{i,j}$ is not the discrete logarithm of $y_{i,j}$ participant P_j broadcasts a complaint against P_i . If more than $n/2$ players complain against player P_i , then it is clear that player P_i is cheating and he will be disqualified. Otherwise, if less than $n/2$ players complained, P_i will reveal the secret key share $s_{i,j}$ and the signature on it for player P_j who has made the complaint. If he fails to reply any of the equation $y_{i,j} = g^{s_{i,j}}$, he will be disqualified. Otherwise he can still be qualified. Later a set of qualified players Q can be decided. The public key will be $y = \prod_{i \in Q} y_i$, where $y_i = A_{i,0} = y^{x_i}$.

Since after the complaining phase revelation of the secret key shares are performed, a flaw was indicated in [12] that the adversary can create a bias in the distribution of the last bit of the public key with probability $3/4$ rather than $1/2$. A second complaining phase is necessary for the identification of the cheaters and all players have to manage both a broadcast channel and private channels. However, this scheme is simple, no need to maintain other secret key of different cryptosystems.

3.2 Fouque and Stern scheme

Fouque and Stern proposed a protocol using only public channel [11]: Suppose p'_j, q'_j are large primes and $N_j = p'_j q'_j$ is the modulus in Paillier cryptosystem. G_j is an element in $Z_{n_j}^*$ of order a multiple of N_j . Let λ to be the Carmichael lambda function $\lambda(N)$. The public key is $PK_j = (N, G)$ and the secret key is $SK_j = \lambda$.

For a non-interactive proof of fair encryption of discrete logarithm, Player P_i generates a random secret $s_{i,0}$, sets $a_{i,0} = s_{i,0}$ and chooses $a_{i,k}$ at random from Z_q for $1 \leq k \leq t$. Number $a_{i,0}, \dots, a_{i,t}$ jointly define the polynomial $f_i(X) = \sum_{k=0}^t a_{i,k} X^k \in Z_q[X]$. Then he computes $s_{i,j} = f_i(j) \bmod q$. He broadcasts: for $k = 0, \dots, t$, $A_{i,k} = g^{a_{i,k}} \bmod p$ and $y_{i,j} = g^{s_{i,j}} \bmod p$, $Y_{i,j} = G^{s_{i,j}} u_{i,j}^{N_j} \bmod N_j^2$, and a proof $(e_{i,j}, z_{i,j}, w_{i,j}) \in [0, B] \times [0, A] \times [0, N_j]$, where $e_{i,j} = H(g, G, y_{i,j}, Y_{i,j}, g^r y_{i,j}^{-e_{i,j}} \bmod p, G^{z_{i,j}} w^{N_j} Y_{i,j}^{-e_{i,j}} \bmod N_j^2)$, and $y_{i,j}^q = 1 \bmod p$, where $|A| \geq |B| \circ |S| + k$, k is the security parameter.

For each $1 \leq i, j \leq n$, the players verify that:

$$\prod_{k=0}^t A_{i,k}^{j^k} = \prod_{k=0}^t g^{\sum_{k=0}^t a_{i,k} j^k} = g^{f_i(j)} \bmod p$$

and check whether $g^{f_i(j)} \bmod p$ is equal to $y_{i,j}$ in order to verify that the distribution is correct. The players also verify the proofs $(e_{i,j}, w_{i,j}, z_{i,j})$: if $e = H(g, G, y_{i,j}, Y_{i,j}, g^{z_{i,j}} g^{-e_{i,j}} \bmod p, G^{z_{i,j}} w^{N_j} Y_{i,j}^{-e_{i,j}} \bmod N_j^2)$, and $y_{i,j}^p = 1 \bmod p$ for $1 \leq i, j \leq n$.

Players which do not follow the protocol are disqualified. The set of qualified players decides the public key y in the same way as in [19]. And the players will have correct secret key shares distributed. The public key will be the computed using Lagrangian interpolation polynomial. Thus secret key shares of discrete logarithm has been generated for a (t, n) threshold cryptosystem.

4 Publicly Verifiable Encryption with Proof of Fairness

In fact, the proof system used in Fouque and Stern scheme based on Paillier encryption scheme is a kind of homomorphic encryption schemes with additive homomorphic properties. We remark that e.g. the RSA-Paillier encryption scheme holding similar property and proof system can be formed analogously. However, not all the encryption schemes have such helpful properties, which may appear likely to be the multiplicative homomorphic (e.g. RSA): $E(M_1 \times M_2) = E(M_1) \times E(M_2)$.

4.1 A One-Round Model for Threshold Cryptosystem

A trick is played here: a tag is attached to the ciphertext which allows everyone be able to check the validity of the ciphertext without decrypting it. Via a public channel, each player broadcasts a public commitment and verifiable encryption of all his shares. The secret key share to player P_j is encrypted under P_j 's public key together with a tag so that everyone may check the correctness of the secret share while having no idea of what it is. So a cheating dealer can be detected and disqualified immediately in the key generation phase. If there is one honest player, the resulting public key and secret key will be distributed uniformly in the key space.

The construction of such a tag can in fact using general zero-knowledge for \mathcal{NP} language combined with any encryption scheme to provide the encrypted plaintext is in fact the discrete logarithm of a publicly known value. However, to emphasize the efficiency of practical use, we construct a verifiable encryption of discrete logarithm over any homomorphic encryption schemes. Note that our definition of homomorphism is much broader.

4.2 Publicly Verifiable Encryption of Discrete Logarithm

The key idea of our publicly verifiable encryption is in fact a non-interactive publicly verifiable encryption, where with a public input y a prover proves a ciphertext c encrypts x under a public key PK (typically belongs to a third party), such that $(x, y) \in R$, where R is a binary relation varying from applications. In the discrete logarithm key generation, R refers to the discrete logarithm, i.e., x is the discrete logarithm of a public value y to the base g . Our protocol differs from the one in [5] is that our underlying encryption scheme is homomorphic, while the one in [5], used in a verifiable signature escrow context, should avoid homomorphic property to maintain chosen ciphertext security. Our scheme apparently may be more efficient than theirs. Abe in [1] has also designed checkable encryption schemes based on various underlying encryption in the random oracle model. However, the construction there is aiming at chosen ciphertext security and actually only proves whether the ciphertext sender knows the corresponding plaintext. In our key generation protocol, we require not only that the ciphertext is formed validly, but also it should be discrete logarithm of some publicly known value, in other words, the relation R should be verified at the same time. Let's first look at some examples with typical encryption schemes:

4.2.1 Example 1: ElGamal Encryption

This protocol is observed to first appear in [23]. It is a combination of ElGamal encryption scheme and Schnorr signature assuming double exponent exists in a subgroup of prime order. Let Z_p be a multiplicative group with order p , where p is a large prime. Let p, q be two large primes such that $q|p-1$. Let \mathcal{G} be a subgroup of Z_p^* with generator g . Suppose the DDH problem is hard in this subgroup.

- **Key generation:** $(p, q, h, z) \leftarrow Z_p(1^k)$, where h is another generator of \mathcal{G} , $z \in_R Z_q$. Then the secret key is z and the public key is $v(= h^z \bmod p), p, q$ and a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ (l is the security parameter, where 2^{-l} is negligible).
- **Encryption:** To verifiably encrypt x satisfying $y = g^x$, set $C = (A, B)$ as standard ElGamal encryption, where $a \in_R Z_q$, $A = h^a$, $B = x^{-1} \cdot v^a$, a proof of fairness can be constructed as follows: select $r_1, \dots, r_l \in_R Z_q$, for $1 \leq i \leq l$, compute $w_{1i} = h^{r_i} \bmod p$ and $w_{2i} = g^{v^{r_i}}$. Denote $c = H(v, h, g, p, q, A, B, w_{11}, w_{21}, \dots, w_{1l}, w_{2l})$.
- **Validity test:** Verifier checks if $c \stackrel{?}{=} H(v, h, g, p, q, A, B, w_{11}, w_{21}, \dots, w_{1l}, w_{2l})$. Let c_i denotes the i th bit of $c = H(v, h, g, p, q, A, B, w_{11}, w_{21}, \dots, w_{1l}, w_{2l})$, then for $1 \leq i \leq l$, $b_i = r_i - c_i \cdot a$, check if $w_{11} \stackrel{?}{=} h^{b_1} A^{c_1}$, and $w_{i2} \stackrel{?}{=} g^{(v^{b_i})}$ if $c_i = 0$, or $w_{i2} \stackrel{?}{=} y^{(B \cdot v^{r_i})}$ if $c_i = 1$.
- **Decryption:** For a valid ciphertext that passes the above test, output $x = A^z/B$ as plaintext.

4.2.2 Example 2: RSA encryption

RSA encryption operates in the group Z_N^* , where $N = p'q'$, p' and q' are large primes. It is trivial that p', q', p, q must be distinct to maintain the system secure.

- **Key generation:** $(p', q') \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, $N = p'q'$, and $\phi(N) = (p' - 1)(q' - 1)$. e is a small prime and select private key $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)$. \mathcal{G} is a subgroup of Z_p^* with generator g , such that $q > N$. Publish public key as e, N and a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ (l is the security parameter, where 2^{-l} is negligible) as public encryption key.
- **Encryption:** $B = x^e \bmod N$, $y = g^x$, a proof of fairness can be constructed as follows: $r_1, \dots, r_l \in_R Z_q$, for $0 \leq i \leq l$, $A_i = r_i^e \bmod N$. Let c_i denote i th bit of $c = H(e, N, B, A_1, \dots, A_l, B_i, \dots, B_l, b_1, \dots, b_l)$, $B_i = g^{r_i}$ and $b_i = x^{c_i} \cdot r_i \bmod N$. Then the ciphertext is B and the proof is $(A_1, \dots, A_l, B_i, \dots, B_l, b_1, \dots, b_l)$.

- **Validity test:** First check if $c \stackrel{?}{=} H(e, N, q, p, B, A_1, \dots, A_l, B_i, \dots, B_l, b_1, \dots, b_l)$. For $1 \leq i \leq l$, let c_i denote the i th bit of $c = H(e, N, B, A_1, \dots, A_l, B_1, \dots, B_l)$ as c_i , verify $b_i^e \stackrel{?}{=} A_i$ and $B_i = g^{A_i}$, if $c_i = 0$; or $b_i^e = B \cdot A_i^e$ and $g^{b_i} = y \cdot B_i$, if $c_i = 1$.
- **Decryption:** For a valid ciphertext that passes the above test, output $x = c^d \bmod N$ as plaintext.

Remark 2 *In these schemes the total data size to broadcast expands with a factor of l , the security parameter, however, the probability error is exponentially small in the constructions.*

5 Generalization to Arbitrary Homomorphic Encryption

In this section, we show the above result can be generalized to arbitrary homomorphic encryption schemes. As shown above, any encryption scheme that maps a plaintext from the input domain G to a ciphertext in the output domain H preserving operations can be expressed as: $E(M_1 * M_2) = E(M_1) \circ E(M_2)$, where $*$ and \circ are two operations defined in G and H respectively. Note that three operations $+$, \times , \exp are well defined in a finite field. For a homomorphic encryption maps preserved operations in G and in H , there are often two kinds of homomorphic properties: additive homomorphic ($+$ \rightarrow $*$, \times \rightarrow \circ ; or \times \rightarrow $*$, \exp \rightarrow \circ) and multiplicative homomorphic (\times \rightarrow $*$, \times \rightarrow \circ ; or \exp \rightarrow $*$, \exp \rightarrow \circ).

Furthermore, because of the encryption scheme above mappings holds oneway, which suggests that it is possible to open some masked value on the right side while maintaining secret on the left side. When considering two typical homomorphic properties, in either case the non-interactive proof of fairness can then be constructed:

Case 1: additive homomorphic encryption. The same operation is preserved in the domain for the relation \mathcal{R} and the encryption E , e.g., if additive homomorphic property is preserved in both G and H holds for both discrete logarithm relation and the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme, the proof system can be constructed efficiently using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [10]. In such case, a challenge to the discrete logarithm relation can be easily turned to a challenge of the homomorphic encryption, then a zero-knowledge proof can be constructed proving the $R(x, y)$ under PK .

Case 2: multiplicative homomorphic encryption. The same operation is preserved in different domains G and H respectively. E.g. $+$ \rightarrow \times for discrete logarithm relation and \times \rightarrow \times for the homomorphic encryption, such as RSA encryption in Example 2. In such case since there is no direct way bridging over the challenge of the first one to the second one, however, a cut-and-choose methodology can be executed sequentially. Actually we can adopt the following: by mapping 1 bit challenge to $+$ for discrete logarithm in G to \times for encryption in H . In such case, the error probability is exponentially small after sequentially repeated proof execution.

We have the following theorem on Case 1:

Theorem 1 *Proofs from Case 1 based on homomorphic encryption can be made zero-knowledge efficiently.*

Proof. We shall first make the construction and then prove that it satisfies the requirements of zero-knowledge. One can refer to [13] for a precise definition of zero-knowledge proof. There are three operations in all. For relation \mathcal{R} , assume there exists additive homomorphic encryption scheme: $E(M_1 + M_2) = E(M_1) \times E(M_2)$ and $E(M_1 \times k) = E(M_1)^k$. The prover chooses a random element r from G and compute $E(r)$ in H as a commitment. Such commitment by the encryption scheme is unconditionally binding (guaranteed by deterministic property of a public key encryption scheme) and computationally concealing. Then from a verifiable public random source (for simplicity, consider a random oracle), a random reference c is derived and the prover uses the two pairs of relations, $E(r \times x) \rightarrow E(r) \times E(x)$ and $E(x^c) \rightarrow E(x)^c$. He then sends $w = r + x \times c$, $E(r)$, $E(x)$ to the verifier, who verifies the two pairs of relations: by $E(w) = E(r) \times E(x)^c$.

First, it is easily seen that an honest prover will always be able to construct such proof. Second, assume that a cheating prover doesn't know x and is able to compute such proofs. Since c is a public random source accessible by both the prover and verifier, in other words, c is fixed once chosen, then having the ability to find $x' \neq x$ from the output $E(r + x' \times c) = E(r + x \times c)$ contradicts the deterministic property of the underlying assumption of the encryption schemes. Third, given w and $E(x)$, the verifier can easily simulate all the information gained in the protocol, by obtaining a random c' from the random public accessible source, calculate x' from $w' = r' + x' \times c'$ and construct $E(r' + x' \times c') = E(r') \times E(x')^{c'}$. ■

Case 2 is a little cumbersome, since no direct operation is preserved in both encryption scheme and fairness of an relation (here discrete logarithm of a public value). Now the relation (here for example discrete logarithm) maps $M_1 + M_2 \rightarrow M_1 \times M_2$, however, the homomorphic encryption only maps $E(M_1 \times M_2)$ to $E(M_1) \times E(M_2)$ and $E(M_1^k)$ to $E(M_1)^k$. Since there is no direct method to obtain $E(M_1)^k$ in general, we cannot proceed except for some special cases where an efficient operation can be achieved for one bit (e.g. homomorphic relation $M^0 = 1$ or $M^1 = M$ holds for discrete logarithm), we can then base the proof on cut-and-choose methodology.

For $1 \leq i \leq l$, the prover chooses r_i randomly from Z_q . Let the public random source output a challenge bit c_i . The prover computes $E(r_i)$ and $w_i = r_i \times x^{c_i}$, and together with $E(x)$ sends them to the verifier. The verifier opens every commitment by verifying $E(w_i) = E(r_i) \times E(x)^{c_i} = E(r_i)$, if $c_i = 0$; $E(w_i) = E(r_i) \times E(x)^1 = E(r_i) \times E(x)$ if $c_i = 1$. Last, one should also care the discrete logarithm stuff, actually, it is easy to do it by checking the above holds for a discrete logarithm (refer example 2). We then have the following theorem on such construction:

Theorem 2 *The construction for Case 2 is a secure zero-knowledge proof with error probability exponentially small.*

Proof. The commitment by using homomorphic public key encryption is both binding and concealing¹. First, completeness is clear that an honest prover can construct such proof. Second, this is a standard "cut-and-choose" argument, that an honest verifier can only be cheated is roughly 2^{-l} , if the l -bit string is chosen uniformly random. Third, for $1 \leq i \leq l$, let the verifier constructs a simulator outputs random r'_i and forms the proof in the same way $E(r'_i + x \times c'_i)$, where c'_i is the i th random bit obtained from the verifiable public random source. In the view of an adversary whether this is from an honest prover or the simulator is computationally indistinguishable, if $E(r_i)$ and $E(r'_i)$ are identically distributed in H . ■

Since RSA encryption is a multiplicative homomorphic encryption, we can prove its security with similar reasoning:

Corollary 1 *The protocol given in Example 2 is a secure verifiable encryption with proof of fairness, where public randomness is generated by random oracle.*

6 Distributed Key Generation for Discrete Logarithm Based Threshold Cryptosystems

6.1 The scheme

The main protocol uses homomorphic encryption with public verifiable proof of fairness as a building block to build a (t, n) threshold cryptosystem. To have public key shares pk_i of player P_i and corresponding secret key shares (sk_1, \dots, sk_n) correctly distributed, suppose each player P_j has his personal public key and secret key pair (E_{PK_j}, D_{SK_j}) (they can be chosen independently and based on different assumptions). Each share

¹More precisely, for deterministic encryption scheme, e.g. RSA, it is only concealing in a weaker sense, however, we note that this weak concealing property is enough for the proof of fairness, since it is not opened to any player except the receiver.

is verifiably encrypted and broadcasted to every player so that every player can verify if other players have received the correct share. A cheating dealer can be caught immediately once he cheats. Since the network is supposed to be synchronous, then rushing attacks and other attacks will not take place. The main protocol is performed as follows:

1. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, P_i chooses a random number x_i from the $x_i \in_R Z_q$, computes $y_i = g^{x_i}$, and share x_i with Shamir's secret sharing scheme: he sets: $a_{i,0} = s_{i,0} = x_i$ and chooses $a_{i,k}$ at random from Z_q for $1 \leq k \leq t$, which the number $a_{i,0}, \dots, a_{i,t}$ define a polynomial $f_i(X) = \sum_{k=0}^t a_{i,k} X^k \in Z_q[X]$ of degree t . Then he computes $s_{i,j} = f_i(j) \bmod q$. He broadcasts: for $k = 0, \dots, t$, $A_{i,k} = g^{a_{i,k}} \bmod p$ and $y_{i,j} = g^{s_{i,j}} \bmod p$, and an encryption $E_{PK_j}(s_{i,j})$ of secret key share for Player P_j under the correct publicly verifiable encryption with proof of fairness introduced in section 5. Especially he will keep the share when $j = i$.
2. Player P_1, \dots, P_n each verifies $\prod_{k=0}^t A_{i,k}^{j^k} = \prod_{k=0}^t (g^{a_{i,k}})^{j^k} = g^{\sum_{k=0}^t a_{i,k} j^k} = g^{f_i(j)}$ and check whether $g^{f_i(j)}$ is equal to $y_{i,j}$ in order to verify that the distribution is correct. The players also verify the proofs that $E_{PK_j}(s_{i,j})$ is the correct encryption of $s_{i,j}$ to the public key PK_j .
3. The players which do not follow the protocol will be disqualified. The remained set of player forms the set Q and they can generate the threshold key system with the public key (y, y_1, \dots, y_n) and secret shares (x_1, \dots, x_n) where Player P_j will get correct shares from $i \in Q$, and compute the following: $x_j = \sum_{i \in Q} s_{i,j}$, $y_j = g^{x_j}$, $y = \prod_{i \in Q} A_{i,0} = g^{\sum_{i \in Q} f_i(0)}$ ($i, j \in Q$) respectively, $A_{i,0}$ can be computed from the Lagrangian interpolation polynomial given $A_{i,j}$ ($1 \leq j \leq t+1$).
4. The secret can be constructed if $t+1$ honest players gather. $sk = \sum_{j=1}^{t+1} b_j x_j$, where

$$b_i = \prod_{1 \leq k \leq t+1, k \neq j} \frac{j}{k-j}$$

6.2 Security analysis

We proceed to prove the security our scheme:

Theorem 3 *The above scheme is a secure distributed key generation protocol for a threshold cryptosystem.*

Proof. We build our proof on the following two claims for two requirements in the security definitions:

Claim 1 *Our protocol is correct against a static adversary.*

It is clear that any subset of $t+1$ honest players can reconstruct the secret key. For the public verifiability, the honest players can be decided, thus the public key can be uniquely decided. If there is one honest player, the public key y and the secret key x will be uniformly random in the subgroup.

Claim 2 *Our protocol protects the confidentiality of the secret key against a static adversary.*

For the zero-knowledge property of the publicly verifiable encryption scheme, a PPT adversary cannot break the confidentiality of the secret shares. Furthermore, We can build a simulator which is a pre-decided program in stead of real protocol run. In the view of an adversary, from above analysis we can prove similarly the sharing phase can simulated: it is computationally indistinguishable for the adversary to tell the output from a simulator from a real program. Since the verifiable encryption is simulatable.

Combining two claims, we complete the proof of the theorem. ■

The scheme in [11] can be regarded as a special case if we take the proof knowledge of the style in the Pailler encryption for Case 1.

7 Conclusion

Our key generation protocol is round optimal (one round). The non-interactive encryption with proof of fairness developed in this paper can be used as building blocks for other complicated schemes. We remark that actually, this technique can be used to any protocol which can be emulated as data flow from Trusted Authority to the players without interactions such as secret sharing. Since homomorphic encryption is malleable, it is not possible to achieve security against an adaptive adversary with multiple invocations. However, such protocols are *composable* since an independent set up with randomly chosen parameters is needed every time, for instance, a key generation protocol.

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