UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
RIVERSIDE

Why Are People Like This?

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirem cm f ents for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

Philosophy

By

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April 2021

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Committee Chairperson

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# Acknowledgements

A lot of people helped with this project. I thank them here.

# Dedication

For everyone.

# ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Why Are People Like This?

by

Nichi Yes

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Philosophy

University of California, Riverside, June 2022

Dr. Eric Schwitzgebel, Chairperson

I’m trying to understand people. I’ll write a better abstract later.

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[**Most theorists recognize the interplay of different sources of data and diverse influences. While some have tried to integrate data relevant to understanding personality disorders, no theorist discussed starts out with an integrative model to locate personality disorders. (Millon 2011 40) That it does is, again, what I take to be the central virtue of Millon’s theory.**](#_4fdg94xhp4bw) **460**

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## 

# Preface:

Please allow me to spoil some current trends in human thought before we begin. Each of us has a unique personality. Socialism divides us. A science of personality can exist as we have the conceptual tools to describe every individual in relation with every other individual. The work of Theodore Millon draws on mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and sociology; chaos theory, relativity theory, dispersion theory, evolutionary theory, neuroscience, and philosophy to comprehensively explain and describe the concepts surrounding personality and apply them clinically. Thus I am writing with both theoretical and practical ends in mind: I aim to unify our understanding of the sciences as humans with the three primary bipolarities of life, as well as enhance our understanding of humans through the sciences.

## Description of Document

This document is *Why Are People Like This?* and is my doctoral dissertation. The fact that so many people care about the letters that come after my name if this thing works is why the title is an expression of exasperation with humanity.

The title of a document can communicate a lot, and it’s most often the only part people see. In this case, it is a question that haunted me for the entirety of graduate school and also life. Since I cannot help but pursue understanding people, I record my wisdom here. This way the taxpayers get something for the nice education they afforded me.

## Preliminary Remarks

I don’t want to make this any more difficult to read by adding a lengthy preface. I do, however, need to note upfront that I frequently refer to people by personalities. While in everyday speech I don’t refer to people as, say, “paranoids” and “schizoids”, and if I were to be completely precise in every instance I would indeed write “persons with a paranoid personality” and “persons with a schizoid personality type”, but that would make this text much longer and much more cumbersome. As I am endeavoring to describe all personalities, I take it that this doesn’t treat any particular group unfairly.

# Introduction

Everyone is different. The ways we think, feel, and act in this world tend to follow some common patterns. In this work, I try to figure people out. I do so in four chapters. The first focuses on personality itself and sets out to create a map of the space of the different personalities. It does so primarily by following Theodore Millon’s work*.* The second chapter focuses on one of the main factors that shape personality, dissociation. The third chapter turns outward to provide context for personality. The fourth chapter then turns to evil.

The guiding motivation in my research here is simply to understand how people work. I’m, quite bluntly, very weird, and my mind gives me an experience of life that’s really quite different from that of most of the people I’ve encountered. More on me later; what’s important about my unusual experience here is that because I experience everything from my own perspective, the “default” of my model of how minds operate is based a lot on my own. This is normal, of course, but combined with being an outlier, it creates the position of not knowing which parts are the weird parts. Studying philosophy has been interesting in part because it gives me a view into how people think about things. Like I said I study psychologists, I also study philosophers. Having students to teach in Philosophy classes has given me the opportunity to have serious discussions about substantive yet accessible and widely meaningful topics with a wide variety of people.[[2]](#footnote-1)

Psychology has an obvious claim to this endeavor as well, but so do History, Art, and Medicine. Philosophy is perhaps, though, the most promiscuous discipline, as there’s a Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of Philosophy, and pretty much any other discipline you can imagine. Note the title page of this Dissertation says I’m submitting this for the “Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy” degree, and you’ll notice pretty much every other Ph.D. dissertation says “Doctor of Philosophy in” whatever field it’s in, and the reason for that is that, mostly in the past, the study required for the degree includes knowledge of the field’s philosophy. So that rather quickly marries Philosophy to most disciplines. This gives me, a philosopher, just about the best excuse one can find for polymathy in today’s hyperspecialized academy. There are still clear signs of my philosophical training, but there’s also still signs of my mathematical and musical trainings from before that, and those don’t seem to get in the way but rather aid in making sense of how the bigger picture all fits together.

This is all pretty academic so far, which seems bound to miss a lot of what people are. So I’ve taken dives into different arts and music, tried new things with whoever has been friendly enough to share some experiences, and browsed far corners of the Web. I occasionally make direct use of some of this in the *Treatise*. Movies, television, and video games all provide some especially rich ideas of personality. Some video games try to simulate people, which also provides some explicit models of personality to look into.

To introduce the main text, I should give a brief idea of what I’m talking about. I distinguish humans from persons. Humans are the animals, the biological machines made of cells. The only persons we have a consensus on being real are human, and we’ll indeed focus almost entirely on human personality. However, gods, angels, aliens, machines, and all kinds of things can be persons in fiction. Some people argue that in this world there are divine, mechanical, or non-human animal persons. That is beyond the scope of this work. Personality, then, can be understood as a person’s way of being. Put more analytically: intentional behaviors are actions. As one develops, actions cluster into more complex actions. For instance, when learning a piece on the piano, the multiple intentional key-presses through practice become intentional series-of-key-presses. Collections of actions related about a domain cluster into action systems. These action systems are activated in response to one’s environment. The development of a personality is the development of a coordinated system of strategic activation of action systems. In humans this usually takes around six to nine years. Through the lens of personality, then, we can describe and explain everything we do, to whatever degree of precision our science is developed to at a moment.

The task of Chapter 1, then, is to work up the science of personality, Personology. There’s a way to systematically understand the ways personalities work, and don’t work, drawing on a wide range of disciplines, though centered on building a foundation in biology for application in psychology. We’ll begin from the nature of personality to develop a rigorous theory while confirming with what empirical evidence exists along the way.

The task of Chapter 2 is thus to explore what happens when the action systems are not unified, synchronically or diachronically. This is taken to be the default state of infants, and an uncommon state for adults.

The task of Chapter 3 will be to look to how groups of people act. While this sounds like an overwhelming task for a chapter, the holomorphisms with personality will make the work of the first two chapters save us immense time.

Finally the task of Chapter 4 is to look to one natural application: making the world less bad.[[3]](#footnote-2) Understanding the interactions of personality, environments, and chance will enable us to understand why people do the things they do.

# 

# Chapter 1: Personality

## On *Towards a New Personology: An Evolutionary Model*

“People exhibit distinctive and abiding characteristics” (Millon 1990 5). This is the insight from which we begin Personology. The aims can be categorized as theoretical, nosological, instrumental, and interventional. I.e. Personology is a clinical science of which theories, nosology, instruments, and interventions are desiderata. Whereas past works merely sought to describe personality, Millon’s evolutionary model seeks explanatory quality for classification (Millon 1990 18).

At any point in time, a species possesses a limited set of genes that serve as trait potentials. The salience of these potentials evolves within each individual’s life (Millon 1990 22).

**Phylogenesis:** Gene frequencies change over generations

**Ontogenesis:** Salience of traits change over lifetime (Millon 1990 22)

Evolutionary and ecological principles are demonstrated in the aims of existence, adaptation, replication, and abstraction.

**Existence:** “serendipitous transformation of random or less organized states into those possessing distinct structures of greater organization.”

**Adaptation:** “homeostatic processes employed to sustain in open ecosystems”

**Replication:** “reproductive styles that maximize the diversification and selection of ecologically effective attributes”

**Abstraction:** “emergence of competencies that foster anticipatory planning and reasoned decision making” (Millon 1990 25).

“Random fluctuations assume sequences that often become both self-sustaining and recurrent” (Millon 1990 30).

The two *strategies of existence* are to *achieve existence* and to *preserve existence*. In life, these take the form of *life enhancement* and *life preservation*, that is, the drives to create life and avoid death. The pair is analogous to attraction and repulsion, as life enhancement is pleasure, i.e. attraction to life, and life preservation is pain, i.e. repulsion from death. Everything must override entropy to become, and then circumvent entropy to be (Millon 1990 25-30). That is, for a thing to physically go from nothing to something, it must, for a time, overcome entropy–be a space with less chaos inside than outside. Then, for a thing to physically remain a thing, it must have that time of its overcoming entropy last awhile.

The two *modes of adaptation* are *ecologic accommodation* and *ecologic modification*. As modes of being, these are to passively fit in and to actively stir. The former is the core process of the plant kingdom, the autotrophs, and the latter of the animal kingdom, the heterotrophs. The passive mode requires that the environment provide nourishment and protection, whereas the active mode requires that the being consume preformed organic matter (Millon 1990 32-36).

What is this difference in requirement between the modes of being? The boundary of the being, i.e. the perimeter of the volume of decreased entropy, encircles the passive mode. Plants depend on their environments for nourishment and protection, i.e. life enhancement and death avoidance. So, for plants, pleasure and pain come from outside. For animals, pre-formed organic matter must be consumed. In becoming able to actively protect their lives, animals became dependent on outside sources for nourishment. We can further divide the heterotrophs into herbivores and carnivores, the former depending on plants for nourishment, and the latter animals. These interactions anticipate the next bipolarity.

Existence is to becoming as adaptation is to being (Millon 1990 34).

Modes of adaptation sustain organisms by “sucking orderliness” from its environment, i.e. receiving more energy than expended in harvesting (Millon 1990 35)

“Life arose when molecular aggregates formed a complex system capable of reproducing itself” (Millon 1990 36)

The two strategies of reproduction are propagation and nurturance. Propagation is exemplified by the oysters which have millions of offspring that the parents pay minimal attention and effort to. It’s the r-strategy, the male gender, and the selfish orientation. In humans, males produce billions of sperm. Nurturance is exemplified by the apes which have few offspring that the parents pay a high amount of attention to. It’s the k-strategy, the female gender, and the otherish orientation. In humans, females produce about 400 eggs.

[Future drafts to include further coverage of Millon 1990.]

## On *Disorders of Personality*

I will now move to Millon’s 2011 *Disorders of Personality: Introducing a DSM/ICD Spectrum from Normal to Abnormal*. This book works from the personality disorders described by the various versions of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* and the *International Classification of Diseases*, proposes new models for understanding them in relation with one another and the person as a whole. It also helpfully fills in much of the spectrum from personality disorders to normal personality styles as well as blends between personalities. I will at times also find it useful to fill in details with *Personality Disorders in Modern Life*, Second Edition, by Theodore Millon and Seth Grossman, Carrie Millon, Sarah Meagher, and Rowena Ramnath (2004).

### Re-Introduction to Personality

As we’ve just jumped 20 years forward in Personology research, we ask again: What is personality? Theodore Millon defines one as a set of “styles of adaptive functioning”. At least, he defines the non-disordered kind of personality as such, but I’ll get into the concept of personality disorder later; indeed, further discourse on the meaning of the term “personality” will also wait until later. For now I will just discuss how Millon analyses the concept in its bio-evolutionary aspects. By this I mean this first section will instead move directly to break down a personality into functional parts, hypothesized for their functional role in a system driven by natural selection. I take this material from the first chapter of his 2011 textbook. Following this, I will return to the 2004 text for some further analysis of personality.

### Justification of a Taxonomy Based in Biology

Beginning with a taxonomy of the aims of personality’s functioning requires justification. My aim here is to extend the philosophical tradition while being informed by the psychological. By recommending Theodore Millon, I am also taking a side, advocating for a biological point of view in psychology and for the need for a good explanation of the psychological vehicles, as understood by the various‌ ‌schools‌ ‌of‌ ‌Psychology‌ ‌of‌ ‌Personality. In the dissertation, I will answer what arguments he is in and who disagrees with him. This text serves as evidence in favor of Millon's claim in Chapter 1 and its contextualization elsewhere.

Millon synthesizes many historical sources from a variety of perspectives. As such, I chose Millon's book, which I believe is critical for further synthesizing this theory and model‌ ‌with‌ ‌ other ‌ theories ‌ and ‌ ‌ models. I will later contrast my Millonian model with other models. My hypothesis is that they will generally be able to be incorporated or explained. This process of synthesis of psychological theories is illustrated below.

#### Illustration of Process of Synthesis of Psychological Theories



Who would disagree with basing a view of personality on natural selection? Disagreements may arise from the factual accuracy of Darwinian theories of evolution or from the purported relationship between personality and natural selection. Regarding the former, I think that there’s a strong enough consensus in the field of Biology for us to accept such theories despite some people having reasons to object. Regarding the latter, we should consider the ways the relationship might be different. According to Millon, we should expect this evolutionary model of personality to be accurate because each facet of personality developed through evolution.

Allow me to illustrate. For billions of years, the Earth had no life on it. Sometime in the very distant past, some molecular structures self-replicated in organized ways. There are arguments over whether to find the origin of life in the origin of encapsulation, metabolism, or RNA reproduction. Regardless, cells formed, and they reproduced. After some time, multicellular organisms began to form. These structures of many cells replicate themselves, i.e. they reproduce, and while at first reproduction was always a single organism produced by a single organism, later developments in biological life on Earth allowed for two organisms to input in the reproduction of many organisms, i.e. they later sexual reproduced. Some continue to reproduce asexually. How many times an organism reproduces varies based on the length, circumstances, and activities of its life. As time moves forward, organisms die. The circumstances and activities of each life determine the length of each life. Thus the circumstances and activities of each organism, as I’m using “organism” here to mean as I just used “life” to mean, determine when it lives, and how many it contributes to the reproduction of. Applied to each organism in the sequence of life, this becomes the principle of natural selection. As we are still humans generally in the process of sexual reproduction, the personalities we enact must have come from some combination of the human and her environment, and the human is the result of a process of biological evolution, and the humans have such a big influence on our environments and our perceptions of them that the human is a good place to look first.

Being requires distinction (from non-being). Life can be understood, then, as a process of moving an arrangement at time t(x) to an arrangement at time t(y). It gets more complicated from here. Though we can also consider sequences without necessarily getting time measurement involved. Life is seen from the point of view of personality as having length, circumstances, and activities. Yet there are other factors that create personality that can override‌ ‌the‌ ‌human‌ ‌element. Accordingly, you may think other factors ‌ ‌ should ‌ be ‌ ‌ the ‌ ‌ foundational ‌ ‌ components ‌ ‌ of ‌ ‌ our ‌ ‌ model. What are these other factors? The same question will open the chapter on the context of personality, that is, what other factors influence human behavior besides personality, and how are the parameters for‌ ‌defining‌ ‌personality‌ ‌determined?[[4]](#footnote-3) There are many possibilities to describe, including the physical, the chemical, the anthropological, the psychological, the sociological, the legal, and the clinical, but I can say with confidence that the biological and thus human is both accurate and encompassing of the other possibilities’ explanatory powers, while also being the most secure and salient. Millon’s justification for the model uses the relatively high level of unity and evidentiary support in Biology to justify its use in priority over psychological, sociological, and other possibilities that are not yet in a state of theoretical unity. It seems reasonable to expect that the biological study of humans would be far more important than Physical Science in this domain. One could start a model of personality with the Physics of Personality, but its benefits besides sparseness, when sparseness is a benefit, are also found in Biology. Although biological understanding is teleological, the end-seeking organisms it understands are mechanical and are therefore physical. Social, practical, and cultural understandings of personality are‌ ‌useful‌ ‌to‌ ‌understand‌ ‌personality, but they are multifarious and thus any Personology would have to choose between them, whereas Biologists have already come to something of a consensus that we can work from.

### Preface to *Disorders of Personality*

Millon begins the Preface with a justification of the guiding principles of the book:

“Guiding the principles and content of this book is Darwin’s concept of natural selection. In line with this ‘‘law’’, personology and personality disorder are conceived as varieties of successful and failed natural selection efforts by humans as they attempt to achieve an optimal balance among the three essential elements comprising life: (1) existential survival (avoiding death/pain and enhancing life/pleasure); (2) ecological adaptation (environmental accommodation/passive and environmental modification/active); and species replication (maximizing reproduction/ self and nurturing progeny/others).” (Millon 2011 ix)

The balance of these three elements, as described in the preceding sections, will serve as the foundations of this model. Our first task then is to clarify and justify these three elements.

Millon is regarded as an expert on personality, and this description of the text I think justifies its use:

“The task of authoring and improving the most successful professional-level book in the field (the first two editions sold some 70,000 copies in 27 printings) is not merely to tweak prior editions or to transmit recently established knowledge, but to introduce substantive and innovative ideas that will further guide developments in the subject. I have sought to fulfill this latter role by providing a strong theoretical base for allying and integrating normal and abnormal personality spectrum concepts in accord with Darwinian evolutionary ideas, as well as to elaborate a dimensional schema of traits for therapeutic planning.” (Millon 2011 ix)

There are two major clinical manuals the book companions:

“This book may be seen as an introduction and companion volume to the forthcoming Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), scheduled for publication by the American Psychiatric Association in 2013.” (Millon 2011 ix)

These two manuals were early obvious considerations for structuring this chapter around. Unfortunately, both manuals use poorly-grounded categorizations of the personality disorders, and neither considers the spectrum from abnormal to normal. Note, however:

“Not only has the DSM-5 committee altered its name to that of the Personality and Personality Disorders Work Group, but there has been an increasing recognition in the field that normal and abnormal personality conceptions be organized within a single conceptual framework” (Millon 2011 x)

The professional community is coming to understand personality as existing in this multi-spectral framework, as opposed to the older conceptions of personality disorders as discrete pathologies.

Millon describes his book as satisfying this need:

“It is in this book where I have moved vigorously forward with the novel proposal that a coordinated structural model based on Darwinian theory can provide the overarching framework for identifying and articulating normal and clinical personality styles, types, and disorders spectra. “ (Millon 2011 x)

Why base the model on Darwinian theory? Because the personology field has exhibited no coherent, shared conceptions until now, nor possessing a synthesizing framework to guide the field, so it needs an overarching substantive framework to galvanize its different part. A system based on evolutionary principles can do this. (Millon 2011 x)

Millon has long been proposing personality categories. (Millon 2011 xi). He began with a ‘‘biosocial framework’’, later developing the one called an ‘‘evolutionary model.’’ Even though they appear to diverge, the two conceptual schemas are consistent and complementary. “The former derives its constructs largely from learning theory and undergirds developmental ontogenesis; the latter includes constructs derived from evolutionary theory that are applicable both to phylogenesis and human adaptive styles” (Millon 2011 xi)[[5]](#footnote-4)

A note regarding the uses of key concepts in the DSM-5 and Millon’s model:

“The DSM-5 will propose that a central role be given to the concepts of positive and negative emotionality; these correspond directly to the theory’s survival bipolarity of pleasure (life enhancement) and pain (death avoidance). Similarly, the externalizing and internalizing DSM concepts parallel in most regards the theory’s adaptation bipolarity of active (ecologic modification) and passive (ecologic accommodation). And the DSM’s self- and interpersonal functioning dimension matches fully the theory’s replication bipolarity of self (reproductive maximization) and other (reproductive nurturance). However, whereas the DSM lists these imaginative bipolar formulations as separate and uncoordinated proposals, our Darwinian-based theory shows how they interrelate and thereby generate deductively not only the classical group of DSM personality disorders, but clarify and innovate novel normal styles and historically overlooked ones as well.” (Millon 2011 xii)[[6]](#footnote-5)

### Historical, Theoretical, and Methodological Foundations

“That the incidence of both mild and severe mental disorders is strikingly high in contemporary society cannot be denied.” (Millon 2011 3)

What is a mental disorder? The concept *mental disorder* is, at its most basic, that of an incongruence between normal mental processes and those that are dysfunctional, personally or socially. Because normalcy and function are value-laden, so is mental disorder. Once the bounds of normalcy are set, then whether mental processes are normal can be factually determined. Once the bounds of functionality are set, then whether mental processes are functional can be factually determined. Among the value-laden concepts, mental disorder is especially important to our lives. While there are many ways to understand it, most people believe in the medical model in the contemporary United States. By “medical model” I here mean an understanding of mental disorder as a kind of illness, and thus the proper object of treatment of Western medicine. I say “believe in” because most people do not think theoretically, and for most people only seldom even explicitly, about mental disorder, but they do assent to statements they understand to be the opinion of those deemed authorities by medical institutions and behave as such. In other words, most Americans believe in the medical model (for mental disorder) like most Americans believe in Christianity, rather than how a theorist understands the medical model or a theologian Christianity. This isn’t to disparage the public, but to warn that to many readers, such a model may just seem to be the way things obviously are and must be.

The concept is also important practically because our institutions do in fact follow a medical model, in research and treatment. While I find the medical model to be deeply inadequate for psychiatry, not to mention medicine, it must be understood to make sense of the ongoing research on mental disorders. Moreover, to be conversant with an existing audience, I must use existing language, and so I will at least start with the terms in academic and professional use. I’m saying this early to be upfront about the fact that I am not always saying what I take to be the most correct, but rather the most correct given the conceptual and lexical framework we have to work with at whatever point in this text we’re at.

Gregory Zilboorg writes (1941) that “detachment suggests a certain lack of feeling, reviewing the events of the past with the cold eye of an unconcerned and unaroused observer.” (Millon 2011 3) Millon suggests instead that “To look on our subject’s history as if it could be portrayed as a series of dots on a statistical table will miss an essential aspect of its vitality.” (Millon 2011 3)[[7]](#footnote-6)

While the dissertation will discuss Personology’s place in the sciences in Chapter 3, a brief discussion is warranted here as Millon uses Kuhn’s concept of paradigm to understand the competing theories in the field:

“As is evident throughout this book, Thomas Kuhn’s brilliant, if controversial, concept of ‘‘paradigm’’ characterizes the divergent patterns of thought regarding the subject of the mind and mental science (1962). Kuhn’s concept recognizes that an articulated set of assumptions are posited by theorists and investigators concerning the fundamental entities of which a subject is composed; also, it identifies questions that may legitimately be asked about such entities and the techniques that may be employed in seeking answers to relevant questions. Once a paradigm is established it becomes the given groundwork for ‘‘puzzle solving,’’ that is, the rules that scientists and clinicians may employ to further elaborate their subject.

Although Kuhn has described how new paradigms replace previous paradigms, he does acknowledge that competing paradigms can coexist, each posing its own set of propositions, rules, and questions that followers may seek to answer” (Millon 2011 4)

By using Millon’s model, I do not intend to say that the other models are wrong or useless. It is in fact from those other models that Millon synthesizes his theory. Due to the environment the mental health sciences are produced in, they “are largely the result of an evolutionary process of haphazard variation and natural selection” (Millon 2011 4)[[8]](#footnote-7)

Consider several of the competing schools of Psychology and Personality:

“To Kretschmer (1925), body morphology was a significant variable in conceptualizing pathological types; for Cattell (1957, 1965), statistically derived trait dimensions were given preeminence; for Horney (1950), it was the interpersonal orientation developed to resolve unconscious conflicts that received emphasis.” (Millon 2011 5)

Again, though, there’s reason for optimism regarding Millon’s project:

“What should be especially heartening is that theorists and classifiers have been convinced that the complexities and intricacies of personality can, in fact, be studied systematically and will, it is hoped, yield to efforts at scientific comprehension. “ (Millon 2011 5)

With my use of Millon’s evolutionary theory of personality justified, we move to the historical antecedents. Millon’s book describes these in much greater detail, but I will reconstruct and quote some key points in the following section. Because we’ve covered a lot in this first section, let’s take a moment to review before getting into the history.

### Review

Millon defines a personality as a set of “styles of adaptive functioning”. I chose to synthesize Millon's book because of the many historical sources he synthesizes. I will later contrast my Millonian model with other models. My hypothesis is that they will generally be able to be incorporated or explained. The disputes may arise over the accuracy of Darwinian theories of evolution or the connection‌ ‌ between‌ ‌personality‌ ‌and‌ ‌natural‌ ‌selection. On the first point, there is enough consensus in the field of Biology for us to accept such theories. Regarding the latter, we should consider the ways the relationship might be different. According to Millon, we should expect this evolutionary model of personality to be accurate because each facet of personality developed through evolution.

Being requires distinction (from non-being). Life can be understood, then, as a process of moving an arrangement at time tx to an arrangement at time ty. It gets more complicated from here. Life is seen from the point of view of personality as having length, circumstances, and activities.

Millon’s justification for the model uses the relatively high level of unity and evidentiary support in Biology to justify its use in priority over psychological, sociological, and other possibilities that are not yet in a state of theoretical unity. Personality can be understood from the perspective of social, practical, and cultural understanding, but we must choose from these perspectives to comprehend personality, whereas the biologies have already reached a consensus of sorts that we can work with. the personology field has exhibited no shared conceptions nor synthesizing framework to guide the field, so it needs an overarching framework to galvanize its different parts.

The concept *mental disorder* is that of an incongruence between normal mental processes and those that are dysfunctional, personally or socially. Because normalcy and function are value-laden, so is mental disorder. Most people believe in the medical model in the contemporary United States. By “medical model” I mean an understanding of mental disorder as a kind of illness, and thus the proper object of treatment of Western medicine.The concept is also important practically because our institutions do in fact follow a medical model, in research and treatment.

With this much understood, we can move further into Millon’s book. For the sake of brevity in the main text, I will be foregoing a lot of detail. Readers interested in more historical detail may want to now turn to the Appendix of Millon’s Historical Antecedents. Either way, we’ll begin with a brief history of personology.

### Historical Antecedents

Millon begins with the humoral theory of personality, which continues to appear. The following table is illustrative:

##### Table of Hippocrates’ Four Humours




Image from [Hippocrates, Galen & The Four Humours](https://www.thecolourworks.com/hippocrates-galen-the-four-humours/).

In this table we can see how persistent this way of classifying personalities has been. It connects everything from the bodily to the spiritual, from values to function types. Admittedly, pretty much any combination of two variables with ordered values can be made to fit the metaphors, and with any collection of four types, it’s tempting to find a meaningful way to make them fit the pattern. I’ll skip ahead now to late nineteenth-century France, where Ribot (1890) varied sensitivity and activity to construct several types.(Millon 2011 7-8) I organize Ribot’s types in the following graph.

##### Graph of Ribot’s Character Types



“a decade or so later were a number of theorists from other European nations. Most notable among them were the Dutch psychologists Heymans and Wiersma (1906–1909). On the basis of a series of highly sophisticated empirical studies, they identified three fundamental criteria for evaluating character: activity level, emotionality, and susceptibility to external versus internal stimulation. These criteria anticipated identical threefold schemas (each based, however, on highly dissimilar theoretical models) developed by McDougall (1908/1932), Meumann (1910), Freud (1915/1925b), and Millon (1969). By combining these criteria, Heymans and Wiersma deduced the presence of eight character types:

1. The ‘‘amorphous’’ character, reflecting the interplay of passive, nonemotional, and external susceptibility.

2. The ‘‘apathetic’’ character, developing from a passive, nonemotional, and internal orientation.

3. The ‘‘nervous’’ character, a product of a passive, emotional, and external responsiveness.

4. The ‘‘sentimental’’ character, who is passive, emotional, and internally impressed.

5. The ‘‘sanguine’’ character, noted as active, nonemotional, and externally receptive.

6. The ‘‘phlegmatic’’ character, typified by active, nonemotional, and internal tendencies.

7. The ‘‘choleric’’ character, reflecting an active, emotional, and external susceptibility.

8. The ‘‘impassioned’’ character, representing an active, emotional, and internal sensitivity.” (Millon 2011 8)

I organize their character types into the following table.

##### Table of G. Heymans and E. Wiersma’s Character Types

| Low Activity/Passive | | | | High Activity | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Low Emotionality | | High Emotionality | | Low Emotionality | | High Emotionality | |
| External orientation | Internal orientation | External orientation | Internal orientation | External orientation | Internal orientation | External orientation | Internal orientation |
| Amorphous | Apathetic | Nervous | Sentimental | Sanguine | Phlegmatic | Choleric | Impassioned |

This turns out to be awfully close to what we end up with, but there’s still some steps left to go. Still, it’s worth noting that a jump in empirical verification scale went into developing this typology.

#### Contemporary Proposals

We can move along now to the current main schools of personology: Psychoanalysis[[9]](#footnote-8) has continued to be highly productive and insightful, especially by ego-analytic theorists and the British object-relations school. (Millon 2011 23) Otto Fenichel[[10]](#footnote-9) classifies character traits into sublimation and reactive types, and thus recognizes that instinctual energy can develop into character forms free of conflict resolution. (Millon 2011 23-24) Hartmann (1958), Rapaport (1958), and Erikson (1950) recognize the origins of character may be found in instinctual energies free of conflict resolution.[[11]](#footnote-10) For Hartmann and Rapaport, the ego and id instincts derive from a common matrix of biological potentials, differentiating into separable energies for adaptive functioning “‘preadapted to handle average expectable environments.’’” (Millon 2011 24) Klein (1948), argues that fantasy was a major primitive ability that exhibits a regular developmental sequence reflecting the infant’s relationship with her mother.[[12]](#footnote-11) On her object-relations theory, the mind is composed of “preformed internal representations of the infant’s external relationships”. Thus the mind possesses ‘‘prewired’’ fantasies, which in turn implies unlearned knowledge that shapes the child. (Millon 2011 24) Kernberg[[13]](#footnote-12) constructed a framework for organizing types by level of severity and proposed a dimension of structural organization as primary. (Millon 2011 24-25) Factor and cluster analyses calculate intercorrelations among a large group of variables such as traits, behaviors, and symptoms. (Millon 2011 26) [[14]](#footnote-13)

“Cognitivists[[15]](#footnote-14) stress that individuals react to the world in terms of their unique perception of it. No matter how unconsciously distorted these perceptions may be, it is the person’s way of construing events that determines behavior.” (Millon 2011 30) Interpersonal theories[[16]](#footnote-15) put personality in terms of “recurrent interpersonal tendencies that shape and perpetuate styles of behavior, thought, and feeling.” McLemore and Brokaw (1987) note the avoidant personality enacts a consistently fearful and self-effacing stance toward an environment that resists exhibiting the very experiences of acceptance and intimacy so desired. (Millon 2011 32)

Most theorists recognize the interplay of different sources of data and diverse influences. While some have tried to integrate data relevant to understanding personality disorders, no theorist discussed starts out with an integrative model to locate personality disorders. (Millon 2011 40) That it does is, again, what I take to be the central virtue of Millon’s theory. We turn now to explain that theory.

### The Four Aims of Personality Functioning

In this section we consider the space of personalities and add order to the space. I.e. I will describe how to organize the space of personalities. As personalities are styles of adaptive functioning, the space can thus be organized according to the aims of the functions. The four aims of personality functioning are named existence, adaptation, replication, and abstraction. Existence is the process of transformation of chaos into order. This can be bifurcated into life enhancement and life preservation. That is, “existence” refers to the processes by which a biological human organism maintains it’s special (in the sense of “species”) form, and we find this aim in the form of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. This is, put more simply, the most basic thing a lifeform can be striving to do: be. When this aim is fundamentally failed at, one is then dead. The processes that constitute life cease. When our pleasure and pain perceptions are mapped in what is taken to be the most normal or adaptive functioning, though “normal” here in the sense of adaptive rather than statistically usual, processes that enhance life are pleasurable, and those that threaten or damage life are painful. Existence as an aim of human functioning can thus be modeled in terms of what is found pleasurable, and to what degree each experience is found pleasurable, what is found painful, to what degree each experience is found painful, how strong an attraction pleasure is, and how strong a repellant pain is. The concepts of pleasure and pain are themselves the subject of many volumes of complex philosophy, though the concepts being grasped at here are the feeling-good and the feeling-bad. Behaviorally, they’re simpler to explain, as beings that do things that extend their lives will tend to live longer than beings that do things that end their lives. This balance is what distinguishes life from non-life.

What is personality functioning? What is naming? Why is the survival of existence considered‌ ‌the‌ ‌aim‌ ‌of‌ ‌pleasure‌ ‌and‌ ‌pain? Well, those are just the names we are giving to those functions of personality. But how could one disagree with the claim that the most basic thing a lifeform can strive to do is be? And what alternatives are there to failing at aiming at being or being dead?

Adaptation is the aim of achieving homeostasis in an environment. Humans are ever in a process of trying to achieve a kind of balance in amounts of water, nutrients, temperature, sensory stimulations, and so on. This divides into ecological accommodation and ecological modification. That is, passive inhibition and active stimulus-seeking proclivities. In older taxonomies, this was the distinction between plant and animal, and the old distinction is still intuitively useful. Purely passive organisms, as plants were once thought to be, accommodate their environments. While there were probably active tendencies throughout the ancestry, the innovation of being able to modify one’s environment to better suit oneself instead required a new kind of balance.

Replication is the aim of maximizing diversification and selecting ecologically effective attributes. These manifest in personalities as strategies for reproductive individuation and reproductive nutureance, via self-actualization and other-encouraging, respectively.

Abstraction, finally, is the aim of fostering anticipatory planning and reasoned decision making. This is later divided into the processing of thinking and feeling.

### Table of Aims of Personality and Associated Stages of Development of Being

| **Aim of Personality** | **Associated Stage of Development of Being** | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Existence | Pain | Pleasure |
| Adaptation | Active | Passive |
| Replication | Self | Other |
| Abstraction | Think | Feel |

Regarding boundary replication, cellular automata are a nice model, but reality has many dimensions, unlike most popular such models. In the viewpoint of personality, life actually does appear to be like that. From these three initiations of Life, we have together information that replicates engines that throughput boundaries that divide. This gives rise to a being with what we’ll call preferences, according to the names pleasure and pain. The question then is how to attain the contents of these in a particular personality.

We may also notice that Millon takes as a sort of default that Being is passive, like plant life. But is the default instead Being is active, Being has a balance of the two, a weird imbalance, or some other option? At this point we have Being with stuff coded as good called pleasure and stuff coded as bad called pain. Consider the total possible sortings, i.e. arrangements of matter that may have been. Those that were were, those that were not were not. Things that do that which must to be consequently are, and those that do not consequently are not. Those beings that do not do anything to be are not, and those that do not avoid their destruction also stop existing.

From this section, we have a Table of Personality Aims.

### Table of Personality Aims.

Personality aims

* 1. Existence
     1. Life enhancement: Pleasure
     2. Life preservation: Pain
  2. Adaptation
     1. Ecological accommodation: Passive
     2. Ecological modification: Active
  3. Replication
     1. Individuation and Self-Actualization: Self
     2. Nutureance and Other-Encouraging: Other
  4. Abstraction
     1. Thinking
     2. Feeling

## Poles

In the following sections I further describe each and develop the theory around each pole (or polarity).

### Pain

The Pleasure-Pain Polarity aims to enhance and preserve life. What exactly does this mean? We turn again to Millon. Because of its essentiality to his theory, it’s worth going through painstakingly slowly. So, let’s first look at his introduction to this polarity:

“Two intertwined strategies are required, one to achieve existence, the other to preserve it. The aim of the first is the enhancement of life, that is, creating or strengthening ecologically survivable organisms; the aim of the second is the preservation of life; that is, avoiding events that might terminate it.” (Millon 2011 50)

This, I take it, should be clear after the preceding sections. Next, the argument for its place in the model:

“Existence reflects a to-be or not-to-be issue. In the inorganic world, ‘‘to be’’ is essentially a matter of possessing qualities that distinguish a phenomenon from its surrounding field; that is, not being in a state of entropy. Among organic beings, to be is a matter of possessing the properties of life as well as being located in ecosystems that facilitate the enhancement and preservation of that life. In the phenomenological or experiential world of sentient organisms, events that extend life and preserve it correspond. largely to metaphorical terms such as pleasure and pain, that is, recognizing and pursuing positive sensations and emotions, on the one hand, and recognizing and eschewing negative sensations and emotions, on the other.” (Millon 2011 50)

A lot is developed here. We first get a very simple concept of being, the inorganic. There is a lot of metaphysics one could argue here, but as a matter of practice, this is how we do things. Or, rather, conceive of things. And as the metaphysical debate between the existence of things and stuff in the universe makes rather apparent, our concept of things do basically require discreteness, which in the physical world is being distinct from surroundings. My pillow exists[[17]](#footnote-16) just because it’s in a state that is different from the not-pillow around it. And even if I were to throw it into a pile of pillows, it’d still be the pillow that it is rather than one of the others. But if I dump a glass of water into a pool of water, that water doesn’t retain its individuality. If I light my pillow on fire and let it burn, it will also stop existing. Perhaps this sounds really simple, and it is, but I do find these simple things tend to get blown out of proportion by readers unless really hammered home how simple they are.

That’s the inorganic; to be a living being requires more: “possessing the properties of life” and “being located in ecosystems that facilitate the enhancement and preservation of that life”. The first is perhaps obvious as, well, a dead being is not alive. The second is perhaps a bit unobvious as while being located in hospitable ecosystems seems like an additional requirement from nowhere, but if we look back to the inorganic, we can imagine a similar requirement existing for inorganic existence. Considering my pillow again, it only exists in the systems that facilitate the enhancement and preservation of its distinction from everything else. Moreover, Millon calls this “not being in a state of entropy”, which must be analogous to the ecosystem requirement for life. Why? Because if taken as a strict zero-tolerance policy on entropy, then nothing can be in a state of entropy, as being in a state of entropy is by the zero-tolerance policy disqualifies something from being a thing. So a more full phrasing would be “not being in a state of entropy long enough to be destroyed”. Likewise, life cannot survive in an inhospitable environment for too long.

Finally we have the experiential world of sentient organisms in which ”events that extend life and preserve it correspond largely to metaphorical terms such as pleasure and pain.” That is, the mind of a sentient organism experiences pleasure, normally, as the response to events extending life, and pain to those that destroy it.

He next describes normality, and further details the requirements evolution has for pain and pleasure:

“An interweaving and shifting balance between the two extremes that comprise the pain-pleasure bipolarity typifies normality. Both of the following criteria should be met in varying degrees as life circumstances require. In essence, a synchronous and coordinated personal style would have developed to answer the question of whether the person should focus on experiencing only the pleasures of life versus concentrating his or her efforts on avoiding its pains.” (Millon 2011 50)

This is basically to say that normal personalities balance pain-avoidance and pleasure-seeking. One might think a criterion based on the avoidance of pain would be obvious. However, whether mental health reflects the absence of mental disorder is an ongoing debate. Whereas this kind of relationship must exist between health and disease, defining health solely as the absence of disorder will not suffice. “As a single criterion among several, however, features of behavior and experience that signify both the lack of (e.g., anxiety, depression) and an aversion to (e.g., threats to safety and security) pain in its many and diverse forms provide a necessary foundation on which other, more positively constructed criteria may rest.” A positive account of normality must be more than simply the absence of abnormality, yet from a definitional point of view normality does preclude non-normality. To see how variations on pain polarity vary, consider avoidant personalities (Millon, 1969, 1981), whom have “an excessive preoccupation with threats to one’s psychic security, an expectation of and hyperalertness to the signs of potential rejection that lead these persons to disengage from everyday relationships and pleasures.” In contrast, the risk-taking attitude is seen in antisocial personalities. “Here there is little of the caution and prudence expected in the normal polarity range of avoiding danger and threat; rather, we observe its opposite, a rash willingness to put one’s safety in jeopardy, to play with fire and throw caution to the wind.” (Millon 2011 50-51)

### Pleasure

Next we turn to pain’s co-polarity, pleasure:

“At one end of the existence polarity are attitudes and behaviors designed to foster and enrich life, to generate joy, pleasure, contentment, fulfillment, and thereby strengthen the capacity of the individual to remain vital and competent physically and psychically. This polarity asserts that existence/survival calls for more than life preservation alone; beyond preserving life via pain avoidance is pleasure enhancement. A note or two should be recorded on the pathological consequences of a failure to attend to a polarity. These are seen most clearly in the personality disorders labeled schizoid and avoidant. In the former, there is a marked hedonic deficiency, stemming from an inherent deficit in affective substrates or the failure of stimulative experience to develop either or both attachment behaviors or affective capacity (Millon, 1981). Among those designated avoidant personalities, constitutional sensitivities or abusive life experiences have led to an intense attentional sensitivity to psychic pain and a consequent distrust in either the genuineness or durability of the pleasures, such that these individuals can no longer permit themselves to experience them. Both of these personalities tend to be withdrawn and isolated, joyless and grim, neither seeking nor sharing in the rewards of life.” (Millon 2011 50)

Because of their basicness, one should be able to imagine how the pleasure-pain polarity in any sort of lifeform. More to our point, however, we can imagine the variety of possibilities for how much pleasure or pain one may be able to feel and actually feel at a time. These two are normally a middle amount of susceptibility. Some people manage to have minimally painful lives, though many are unfortunately very painful on the whole. Some people experience pain and pleasure in alternating waves, while some others experience both or neither. Some parts of the personality space, as we can see are defined just in terms of a notable pleasure-pain polarity setting. Feeling too much or too little pain or pleasure can cause major problems in one’s life, as can feeling pleasure or pain in response to inappropriate stimuli.

### Passive

We turn now from the polarities of pain and pleasure to the polarities we call passive and active, each disposing one to a different way of handling one’s being in an environment:

“For an organism to maintain its unique structure, differentiated from the larger ecosystem of which it is a part, to be sustained as a discrete entity among other phenomena that compose its environmental field, requires good fortune and the presence of effective modes of functioning. This evolutionary principle relates to what we have termed the modes of adaptation; it is also framed as a two-part polarity. The first may best be characterized as the mode of ecological accommodation, signifying inclinations to passively ‘‘fit in,’’ to locate and remain securely anchored in a niche, subject to the vagaries and unpredictabilities of the environment, all acceded to with one crucial proviso: that the elements making up the surroundings will furnish both the nourishment and the protection needed to sustain existence. Though based on a somewhat simplistic bifurcation among adaptive strategies, this passive and accommodating mode is one of the two fundamental methods that living organisms have evolved as a means of survival. It represents the core process employed in the evolution of what has come to be designated as the plant kingdom, a stationary, rooted, yet essentially pliant and dependent survival mode. By contrast, the second of the two major modes of adaptation is seen in the lifestyle of the animal kingdom. Here we observe a primary inclination toward ecological modification, a tendency to change or rearrange the elements constituting the larger milieu, to intrude on otherwise quiescent settings, a versatility in shifting from one niche to another as unpredictability arises, a mobile and interventional mode that actively stirs, maneuvers, yields, and, at the human level, substantially transforms the environment to meet its own survival aims. The active-passive polarity means that the vast range of behaviors engaged in by humans may fundamentally be grouped in terms of whether initiative is taken in altering and shaping life’s events or whether behaviors are reactive to and accommodate those events.  
‘‘Normal’’ or optimal functioning, at least among humans, appears to call for a flexible balance that interweaves both polar extremes. In the first evolutionary stage, that relating to existence, behaviors encouraging both life enhancement (pleasure) and life preservation (pain avoidance) are likely to be more successful in achieving survival than actions limited to one or the other alone. Similarly, regarding adaptation, modes of functioning that exhibit both ecological accommodation and ecological modification are likely to be more successful than either by itself.” (Millon 50-51)

The polarities have the same basic relationship with each other that pain and pleasure do. One may wonder what benefit the passive mode provides:

“On first reflection, it would seem to be less than optimal to submit meekly to what life presents, to adjust obligingly to one’s destiny. As described earlier, however, the evolution of plants is essentially grounded (no pun intended) in environmental accommodation, in an adaptive acquiescence to the ecosystem. Crucial to this adaptive course, however, is the capacity of these surroundings to provide the nourishment and protection requisite to the thriving of a species.

To the extent that the events of life have been and continue to be caring and giving, is it not perhaps wisest, from an evolutionary perspective, to accept this good fortune and ‘‘let matters be’’? This accommodating or passive life philosophy has worked extremely well in sustaining and fostering those complex organisms that make up the plant kingdom. Hence passivity, the yielding to environmental forces, may be in itself not only unproblematic but, where events and circumstances provide the pleasures of life and protect against their pains, positively adaptive and constructive.” (Millon 52)

### Active

“The active end of the bipolarity signifies the taking of initiative in altering and shaping life’s events. As stated previously, such persons are best characterized by their alertness, vigilance, liveliness, vigor, and forcefulness, their stimulus-seeking energy and drive. Others exhibiting this tendency to master their environments become problematic owing to the fact that it is not balanced or oriented in psychologically healthful ways. This may be seen in the antisocial personality who is impulsive, precipitate, excitable, rash, and hasty, seeking to elicit pleasures and rewards in a less than culturally acceptable manner. Although specific expressions and goals vary and change from time to time, actively aroused individuals will intrude on passing events and energetically and busily modify the circumstances of their environment.” (Millon 2011 52-53)

To further understand the polarities so far, let’s consider how they interact with each other, still abstracted from the remaining four. Considering first the interplay of the life aims, of life enhancement and life preservation, which we can call together life extension, with environmental modification and accommodation, which we can together call environmental adaption. A person’s life extension aims have to do fundamentally with that person’s continued being, and her environmental adaptation aims then fundamentally with responding to where one is.

Out of a concern that this may begin to sound too much like Hegel for some readers to find sensical, I will now step back to reassure you of the ordinariness of these words. There are a number of basic and important questions that can be asked about people. English has six as convenient single-word questions: Who? What? When? Where? Why? How? I take it the usage of these is familiar enough that I don’t need to demonstrate how to ask each of a person.

### Self

Turning now to the third pair of polarities:

“If an organism merely duplicates itself prior to death, then its replica is ‘‘doomed’’ to repeat the same fate it suffered. However, if new potentials for extending existence can be fashioned by chance or routine events, then the possibility of achieving a different and conceivably superior outcome may be increased. And it is this co-occurrence of random and recombinant processes that leads to the prolongation of a species’ existence. This third hallmark of evolution’s procession also undergirds another of nature’s fundamental polarities, that between self and other.” (Millon 2011 53)

More simply, products of biological evolution are selected by reproduction patterns. The two basic strategies of sexual reproduction are also balanced with each other:

“Recombinant replication, with its consequential benefits of selective diversification, requires the partnership of two parents, each contributing its genetic resources in a distinctive and species-characteristic manner. Similarly, the attention and care given the offspring of a species’ matings is also distinctive. Worthy of note is the difference between the mating parents in the degree to which they protect and nourish their joint offspring. Although the investment of energy devoted to upbringing is balanced and complementary, rarely is it identical or even comparable in either devotion or determination. This disparity in reproductive investment strategies, especially evident among animal species (insects, reptiles, birds, mammals), underlies the evolution of the male and female genders, the foundation for the third cardinal polarity we propose to account for evolution’s procession.  
Not only do species differ in where they fall on the r- to K-strategy continuum, but within most animal species an important distinction may be drawn between male and female genders. This latter differentiation undergirds what has been termed the self- versus other-oriented polarity. Humans can be both self-actualizing and other-encouraging, although most persons are likely to lean toward one or the other side. A balance that coordinates the two provides a satisfactory answer to the question of whether one should be devoted to the support and welfare of others or fashion one’s life in accord with one’s own needs and desires.” (Millon 2011 53)

Notice here that unlike the preceding polarity pairs that had a species-wide definition of normal, sexually reproducing organisms have a different normal for each sex. We should be careful here to remember that these polarities are shaped by evolution, as products of it. The animal kingdom alone has myriad products of the same evolution that don’t neatly fit a sex binary. Strictly speaking, neither do humans, though inasmuch as intersexuality is generally not considered normal, it fits that the strong bimodal distribution is enough to indicate a norm for the species. Looking at the political forecast, that may soon enough change, i.e. by people expanding the definition of “normal” with regard to sex. I look to the political forecast, beyond the scope of this work to justify, rather than, say, the scientific research forecast because this is a made up distinction. This book is right now playing a little role in how we use the distinction. By “made up” I don’t mean to imply insignificance, but rather that while indeed there are a bunch of cells in whatever shapes they’re in regardless of what theoretical distinctions we make,[[18]](#footnote-17) what distinctions we make are based on our purposes. As I announced in the beginning, I am not normal, and I don’t take abnormality to be a bad thing, nor necessarily a good thing, and so unless I learn a significant reason or something changes before I finish on this point about the normality of intersex humans[[19]](#footnote-18) I will take it as fine in this regard at least to still have the two normals for self and other. I do think that if the change in sex norms does happen, then it won’t be very hard to adapt the model anyway. The bodies being distinguished in fact have degrees of maleness and femaleness, and the personalities modeled degrees of self and other orientation. These don’t map onto each other super neatly, especially as sex is itself manifest in many ways throughout the human body. While the study of personality does tend to focus on the psychological, it’s worth repeating here that just as the whole organisms are modeled with this foundation so far, the whole person, including the human part, lives the personality.

You may have noticed that it’s probably a common enough intuition that the male/female balance for most men is clustered around something high and low like 99/1 and for most women around 1/99. Meanwhile the self/other pairs are probably closer to 60/40 and 40/60. The idea being that we need mostly balanced personalities to function well, but when thinking about one’s male or female body, many then look at the main contrasts in anatomy. Indeed, if the scoring were 50 maleness for each testicle and 50 femaleness for each ovary, we would have a remarkably simple scale, though one that would capture mostly the right shapes and categorizations as a lot of people’s basic intuitions on the matter. It misses a lot of what the body does, though. In considering anatomy and physiology more generally, we can also see ways in which the male and female fit self and other oriented development. Some, like the balance of sex hormones, can be divided by measureable values that are indepdently variable. Men and women both usually have a mix of testosterone and estrogen, men with more testosterone and women with more estrogen. When someone is high in both, some dysfunction can result, though often the body can expel the excess and convert extra estrogen to testosterone. When someone is low in both, long-term severe health complications tend to follow if not treated. Others are like breast size in that differences are differences in the values of a single spectrum with a male and female end. One might argue that the testosterone/estrogen ratio can be one scale, though there’s no way to really get the same pattern of relationship with breast size as we saw with the hormones. Part of this is due to the lack of deficient middle. Expanding on this, there are four ways the sexes can vary on a feature, with a deficient middle, with an excess middle, with both middles, or with a neutral middle.



I’ll return to this later. My point is to get us to considering models that capture more of the balances, as these will make the connection with self and other clearer. Let’s return to finishing the self polarity:

“The converse of reproductive nurturance is not reproductive propagation but rather the lack of reproductive nurturance. Thus, to fail to love others constructively does not assure the actualization of one’s potentials. Both may and should exist in normal/healthy individuals.” (Millon 2011 53)

This looks more like the balancing act seen in the endocrine system.

### Other[[20]](#footnote-19)

To introduce the other polarity,[[21]](#footnote-20) Millon returns us to the nature of sexual reproduction and how its shaping of our evolution is reflected in personality:

“As described earlier, recombinant replication achieved by sexual mating entails a balanced though asymmetric parental investment in both the genesis and nurturance of offspring.” (Millon 2011 54)

That is, at the couple level, the investment by parents in children is balanced, but asymmetrical. A similar balance as found between the previous two pairs of polarities is thus found between self and other, but rather than within individuals, within couples.[[22]](#footnote-21)

Millon also notes that “[t]he pathological consequences of a failure to embrace the polarity criterion of ‘‘others’’ are seen most clearly in the personality disorders termed antisocial and narcissistic. Both personalities exhibit an imbalance in their replication strategy; in this case, however, there is a primary reliance on self rather than others. They have learned that reproductive success as well as maximum pleasure and minimum pain is achieved by turning exclusively to themselves. The tendency to focus on self follows two major lines of development.  
 Those whom the biosocial theory characterizes as exhibiting the active-independent orientation resemble the outlook, temperament, and socially unacceptable behaviors of the DSM antisocial personality disorder. They act to counter the expectation of pain at the hand of others by actively engaging in duplicitous or illegal behaviors in which they seek to exploit others for self-gain. Skeptical regarding the motives of others, they desire autonomy and wish revenge for what are felt as past injustices. Many are irresponsible and impulsive, actions they see as justified because they judge others to be unreliable and disloyal. Insensitivity and ruthlessness with others are the primary means they have learned to head off abuse and victimization.” (Millon 2011 54)

### Triggers

In the preceding sections, we looked at what each of the basic polarities underlying personality in the bioevolutionary model are. In this section, we focus on what activates the polarities. To clarify, some questions we’ll answer include: What determines what someone finds pleasurable? What determines what someone finds painful? What determines what someone finds selfish or altruistic? What determines what someone perceives as an active or passive strategy?

We should first note that the personalities are patterns of behavior “in which the personality system functions distinctively and sometimes maladaptively in relation to its environment.” Understanding both person and environment as dynamic systems that co-evolve, then the successive states of the person-environment system must be subject to constraints that lie in both person and environment (Loevinger 1957) Some environmental constraints are powerful and lead to convergent behavior, like red stoplights, whereas environments with minimal constraints, or poor defined constraints, can lead to divergent and novel behavior (Millon 2011 66-67).[[23]](#footnote-22)

In addition to the person-environment distinction and interactions, we should decompose the personality system (artificially) into domains reflecting the person’s cognitions, interpersonal conduct, etc.[[24]](#footnote-23) Here we enter the domain of the plainly philosophical. Millon points out that the organismic-dynamic metaphor leads to a paradox between “what is desired of an exposition of personality development” and “what is possible”. Scientific theories are simplifications of reality, involving “trade-offs between scope and precision.” In embracing a multidomain organismic-contextual model, we set our aim at the complete explanation of personality development as a totality. We must also accept “the impossibility of any such explanation given the probabilistic character of the interactions espoused by the model we have assumed.” (Millon 2011 67)

Despite our aspirations, a certain amount of ontological imprecision is built into the guiding metaphor. The term ontological is aptly used, because it posits the existence or reality of experimental error—the interaction of personality variables is often synergistic or nonlinear rather than additive.” (Millon 2011 67)[[25]](#footnote-24)[[26]](#footnote-25)[[27]](#footnote-26)[[28]](#footnote-27)[[29]](#footnote-28)

Temperament dispositions of maturing children strengthen the likelihood that certain traits will become dominant (Bates, 1980, 1987; Thomas, Chess, & Korn, 1982). Highly active and responsive children, for instance, gain a lot of information about the events and people around them, and they do so quickly. If they continue to run into insurmountable barriers, their zest and energy may result in them experiencing personal gratification quickly or, conversely, their lively and exploratory behavior may result in painful frustration. Because they cannot meet their activity needs, they may act in erratic and maladaptive ways (Tackett & Krueger, 2005). Temperament also affects psychological variables such as attachment (Belsky & Rovine, 1987) (Millon 2011 71).

Dyads and triads are often described by interpersonal theorists as systems of reciprocal influence. Child temperament elicits counterreactions from others that confirm and accentuate the individual's initial temperamental dispositions (Livesley, Jang, & Vernon, 2003; Papousek & Papousek, 1975). As well as the child's behavior, the parent's behavior is influenced by the child's biological moods and activity levels (Kagan & Saudino, 2001). Mothers tend to quickly reciprocate when infants have a cheerful disposition and easy needs to care for (Osofsky & Danzger, 1974). The converse holds as well (Bishop, Spence, & McDonald, 2003). Thus the child elicits parental reactions that reinforce the initial pattern (Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005). We see that innate dispositions can be reversed by strong environmental pressure, whether a cheerful child is crushed by contemptuous parentous or shy children made self-confident by an encouraging family atmosphere (Smith & Pederson, 1988). (Millon 2011 72)

While in some cases later experience can reverse early behavior patterns, we do not fully understand these situations without referring to the historical background of events that preceded‌ ‌them (Henderson, Marshall, Fox, & Rubin, 2004; Rothbart & Dewberry, 2002; Rubin, 1993; Tackett & Krueger, 2005). There is an intrinsic continuity throughout life of personality functioning (Millon 2011 74).

“Maturation refers to the intricate sequence of ontogenetic development in which initial diffuse and inchoate structures of the body progressively unfold into specific functional units. Early stages of structural differentiation precede and overlap with more advanced stages in which lower level units interweave and connect into a complex and integrated network of functions displayed only in the adult organism. It was once believed that the course of maturation—from diffusion to differentiation to integration—arose exclusively from inexorable forces laid down in the genes. Maturation was thought to evolve according to a preset timetable that operated autonomously of environmental conditions. This view no longer is tenable. Maturation follows an orderly progression, but the developmental sequence and level of the organism’s ultimate biological equipment are substantially dependent on a variety of psychosocial stimuli and nutritional supplies. Thus, maturation progresses not in a fixed course leading to a predetermined level, but is subject to numerous variations that reflect the character of the organism’s environment.” (Millon 2011 75)

“Special note should be made here of the ‘‘new’’ field of epigenetics (Hertwig, 1896; Waddington, 1942), the study of orchestrated chemical reactions that switch parts of the developing organism’s genome off and on at strategic times. Thus, the action of the genome’s DNA is not a fixed constant, but a set of potentials that can be activated or deactivated depending on environmental diet and psychosocial experiences, such as stress and affection (Lamb & Jablonka, 2005; Reinberg, Allis, & Jenuwein, 2007). These flexible epigenomes allow us to regulate and adjust to changes in the world around us, and to learn from our experiences via cellular signals and tags that ‘‘remember’’ long-term the nature of its developmental experiences some of which are transgenerational (Pembrey, 2002)” (Millon 2011 75)

“The notion that degree of stimulation can produce changes in neural development is not new. Spurzheim, in 1815, proposed that the organs of the brain increase by exercise. Ramon y Cajal suggested in 1895 that since neural cells multiply only marginally after birth, cerebral exercise will result primarily in the proliferation of neural collaterals and therefore in the growth of more extended and diverse intercortical connections. For more than 50 years, experimental biologists have reported that the development and maintenance of neural connections are dependent on periodic stimulus activation. Bok showed that nerve fibers grow out along the path of repeated stimuli; he termed this phenomenon stimulogenous fibrillation. Similar observations in the 1930s led Kappers to formulate the concept of neurobiotaxis. Valid criticisms have been leveled at certain features of these concepts, but there appears to be considerable support from recent research that neurochemical processes, essential to the growth and branching of neural structures, are activated by stimulation; extremes of stimulus impoverishment or enrichment appear to prompt an under- or overdevelopment of neural connections and patterns.” (Millon 2011 76)

“Numerous investigators have shown that an impoverished environment in early life results in permanent adaptational difficulties. For example, experimental animals reared in isolation tend to be markedly deficient in such traits as emotionality, activity level, social behavior, curiosity, and learning ability. As adult organisms, they possess a reduced capacity to manipulate their environments, to discriminate or abstract essentials, to devise strategies, and to cope with stress.” (Millon 2011 77)

“Intense levels of early stimulation also have effects. Several investigators have demonstrated among animals that an enriched environment in early life results in measurable changes in brain chemistry and brain weight. Others have found that early stimulation accelerates the maturation of the pituitary adrenal system, whereas equivalent stimulation at later stages is ineffective. On the behavioral level, enriched environments appear to enhance problem-solving abilities and increase the capacity of the organism to withstand stress. Comparable data among humans is either lacking or equivocal. Nevertheless, several theorists have proposed that enriching experiences can foster the development of higher intellectual abilities and adaptive coping behaviors (Derryberry & Reed, 2003).” (Millon 2011 77-78)

“The first phase, existence, concerns the survival of integrative phenomena, whether a nuclear particle, virus, or human being, against the forces of entropic decompensation. Evolutionary mechanisms associated with this stage relate to the processes of life-enhancement and life-preservation. The former are concerned with orienting individuals toward improving the quality of life; the latter with orienting individuals away from actions or environments that decrease the quality of life, or even jeopardize existence itself. These two superordinate processes may be called existential aims. At the highest level of abstraction, such mechanisms form, phenomenologically or metaphorically, a pleasure-pain polarity. Most humans exhibit both processes, those oriented toward enhancing pleasure and avoiding pain. Some individuals, however, appear to be conflicted in regard to existential aims (e.g., the sadistic), whereas others possess deficits in such aims (e.g., the schizoid). In terms of evolutionaryneuropsychological stages (Millon, 1969, 1981, 1990), orientations on the pleasure-pain polarity are set during a sensory-attachment developmental stage, the purpose of which is to further mature and selectively refine and focus the largely innate ability to discriminate between pain and pleasure signals.” (Millon 2011 80)

“Everything that exists, exists in an environment. To come into existence as a surviving particle or a living creature is but an initial phase. Once an integrated structure exists, it must maintain its existence through exchanges of energy and information with its environment. This second evolutionary phase relates to what is termed the modes of adaptation; it also is framed as a two-part polarity: a passive orientation, that is, to be ecologically accommodating in one’s environmental niche, versus an active orientation, that is, to be ecologically modifying and to intervene in or to alter one’s surrounds. These modes of adaptation differ from the first phase of evolution, in that they relate to how that which has come to exist, endures. In terms of neuropsychological development, this polarity is ontogenetically expressed as the sensorimotor-autonomy stage, during which the child typically progresses from an earlier, relatively passive style of accommodation to a relatively active style of modifying his or her physical and social environment.  
The accommodating-modifying polarity necessarily derives from an expansion of the systems concept. Whereas in the existence phase the system is seen as being mainly intraorganismic in character, the adaptation phase expands the systems concept to its logical progression, from person to person-in-context. Some individuals, those of an active orientation, operate as genuine agencies, tending to modify their environments according to their desires. For these individuals, an active-organism model is appropriate. Other persons, however, seek to accommodate to whatever is offered or, rather than work to change what exists, seek out new, more hospitable venues when current ones become problematic. For these individuals, a passive-organism model is appropriate.” (Millon 2011 80-81)

“Although organisms may be well adapted to their environments, the existence of any life-form is time limited. To circumvent this limitation, organisms exhibit patterns of the third polarity, replicatory strategies, by which they leave progeny. These strategies relate to what biologists have referred to as an r- or self-propagating strategy, at one polar extreme, and a K- or other-nurturing strategy at the second extreme. Psychologically, the former is disposed toward individually oriented actions that are perceived by others as egotistic, insensitive, inconsiderate, and uncaring; the latter is disposed toward nurturant-oriented actions that are seen as affiliative, intimate, protective, and solicitous (Gilligan, 1981; Rushton, 1985; Wilson, 1978). Like pleasure-pain, the self-other polarity is not unidimensional. Where most humans exhibit a reasonable balance between the two polar extremes, some personality disorders are quite conflicted on this polarity, as are the compulsive and negativistic personalities. In terms of neuropsychological growth stages, an individual’s orientation toward self and others evolves largely during the ‘‘pubertal-gender identity’’ stage.  
As with the passive-active polarity, the self-other bipolarity necessarily derives from an expansion of the systems concept. Where the adaptation phase exists contemporaneously within an environment, replication is seen as evolving longitudinally over time. As before, the goal of the organism is its survival or continuance. When expressed across time, however, survival means reproducing, and strategies for doing so.” (Millon 2011 81)

“The reflective capacity to transcend the immediate and concrete, to interrelate and synthesize diversity, to represent events and processes symbolically, to weigh, reason, and anticipate, each signifies a quantum leap in evolution’s potential for change and adaptation (Millon, 1990). Emancipated from the real and present, unanticipated possibilities and novel constructions may routinely be created by various styles of abstract processing. It is these capacities that are represented in the neuropsychological stage of intracortical-integration.  
The capacity to sort and to recompose, to coordinate and to arrange the symbolic representations of experience into new configurations is, in certain ways, analogous to the random processes of recombinant replication, though they are more focused and intentional. To extend this rhetorical liberty, genetic replication represents the recombinant mechanism underlying the adaptive progression of phylogeny, whereas abstraction represents the recombinant mechanism underlying the cognitive progression of ontogeny. The uses of replication are limited, constrained by the finite potentials inherent in parental genes. In contrast, experiences, internalized and recombined through cognitive processes, are infinite. Over one lifetime, innumerable events of a random, logical, or irrational character transpire, construed and reformulated time and again, some of which proving more, and others less adaptive than their originating circumstances may have called forth. Whereas the actions of most subhuman species derive from successfully evolved genetic programs, activating behaviors of a relatively fixed nature suitable for a modest range of environmental settings, the capabilities of both implicit and intentional abstraction give rise to adaptive competencies that are suited to radically divergent ecological circumstances that themselves may be the result of far-reaching acts of symbolic and technological creativity.

The abstract mind may mirror outer realities, but reconstructs them in the process, reflectively transforming them into subjective modes of phenomenological reality, rendering external events subject to individualistic designs. Every act of apprehension is transformed by processes of abstract symbolism. Not only are internal and external images emancipated from direct sensory and imaginal realities, allowing them to become entities, but contemporaneous time also loses its immediacy and impact, becoming as much a construction as a substance. Cognitive abstractions bring the past effectively into the present, and their power of anticipation brings the future into the present, as well. With past and future embedded in the here and now, humans can encompass, at once, not only the totality of our cosmos, but its origins and nature, its evolution, and how they have come to pass. Most impressive of all are the many visions humans have of life’s indeterminate future, where no reality as yet exists.” (Millon 2011 81-82)[[30]](#footnote-29)

“The first year of life is dominated by sensory processes, functions basic to subsequent development in that they enable the infant to construct some order out of the initial diffusion experienced in the stimulus world, especially those based on distinguishing pleasurable from painful ‘‘objects.’’ This period has also been termed that of attachment because infants cannot survive on their own (Fox, Kimmerly, & Schafer, 1991) but must ‘‘fasten’’ themselves to others who will protect, nurture, and stimulate them (provide them with experiences of pleasure rather than those of pain).

Such themes are readily understood through an evolutionary theory of personality development. Where evolution has endowed adult humans with the cognitive ability to project future threats and difficulties as well as potential rewards, human infants are comparably impoverished, being as yet without the benefit of these abstract capacities. Evolution has ‘‘provided’’ mechanisms or substrates that orient the child toward life-enhancing activities or venues (pleasure), and away from potentially life-threatening ones (pain). Existence during this highly vulnerable stage is quite literally a to-be or not-to-be matter.

As noted previously, life-enhancing actions or sensations can be subsumed under the rubric of pleasure, whereas life-threatening actions or sensations can be subsumed under the metaphorical term pain. Such a pleasure-pain polarity simply recognizes that although the behavioral repertoire of the young child—the operational means, so to speak—may be manifestly diverse (e.g., smiles, coos, stranger anxiety, primitive reflexes), the end, or existential aim, is universal and has as its bare minimum the maintenance of life itself. In the normal organism, both pleasure and pain are coordinated toward ontogenetic continuity. However, whether as a result of genetic factors, early experiences, or their interaction, some pathological patterns display aberrations in their orientation toward pleasure or pain. Deficits in the strength of both painful and pleasurable drives, for example, either constitutionally given or experientially derived, are involved in the schizoid pattern, whereas a reversed or conflicted pleasure-pain orientation inclines toward the masochistic or sadistic disorders.” (Millon 2011 83)

“The early neonatal period is characterized by undifferentiation. The organism behaves in a diffuse and unintegrated way, and perceptions are unfocused and gross. Accordingly, the orientation of the infant is toward sensations that are proportionately broad and undifferentiated, although increasingly the distinction between pleasure and pain becomes central to subsequent refinements. Freud recognized that the mouth region is a richly endowed receptor system through which neonates establish their first significant relationship to the world, but it is clear that this oral unit is merely the focal point of a more diverse system of sensory capacities for making significant distinctions. Through oral and other tactile contacts, the infant establishes a sense, or ‘‘feel,’’ of the environment that evokes pleasurable or painful responses.

According to neuropsychological and evolutionary theories, it would be expected that the amount and quality of tactile stimulation to which the neonate is exposed will contribute significantly to the infant’s development as precocities or retardations, depending on the level of stimulation. Moreover, it is likely that the quality and patterning of this stimulation may lead the infant to experience inchoate feelings tentatively drawn against the background of pleasure-pain. These form the phenomenological prototypes of such later-evolving emotions as fear, joy, sadness, anger.” (Millon 2011 83)

“The neonate cannot differentiate between objects and persons; both are experienced simply as stimuli. How does this initial indiscriminateness become progressively refined into specific attachments? For all essential purposes, the infant is helpless and dependent on others to avoid pain and supply his or her pleasurable needs. Separated from the womb, the neonate has lost the physical attachment to the mother’s body and the protection and nurturance it provided; the infant must turn toward other regions or sources of attachment to survive and obtain nourishment and stimulation for further development (Bowlby, 1982; Gewirtz, 1963; Hinde, 1982; Lamb, Thompson, Gardner, & Estes, 1985; Ribble, 1943; Spitz, 1965). Attachment behaviors may be viewed, albeit figuratively, as an attempt to reestablish the unity lost at birth that enhanced and protected life. In fact, recent investigations show that although initial attachments are transformed across stages of development, they remain important across the life span (e.g., Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). Whether the infant’s world is conceptualized as a buzz or a blank slate, the child must begin to differentiate venues or objects that further his or her existential aims, supplying nourishment, preservation, and stimulation, from those that diminish, frustrate, or threaten them. These initial relationships, or internal representational models (e.g., Crittenden, 2000), apparently ‘‘prepared’’ by evolution, become the context through which other relationships develop.” (Millon 2011 84)

“Not until the end of the first year has the infant matured sufficiently to engage in actions independent of parental support. Holding the drinking cup, the first few steps, or a word or two, all signify a growing capacity to act autonomously. As the child develops the functions that characterize this stage, he or she begins to comprehend the attitudes and feelings communicated by stimulative sources. No longer is rough parental handling merely excess stimulation, undistinguished from the playful tossing of an affectionate father; the child now discerns the difference between harshness and good-natured roughhousing  
In the sensorimotor-autonomy stage, the focus shifts from existence in itself to existence within an environment. From an evolutionary perspective, the child in this stage is learning a mode of adaptation, an active tendency to modify his or her ecological niche, versus a passivetendency to accommodate to whatever the environment has provided. The former reflects a disposition toward taking the initiative in shaping the course of life events; the latter a disposition to be quiescent, placid, unassertive, to react rather than act, to wait for things to happen, and to accept what is given. In the prior sensory-attachment stage, the infant was in his or her native mode, so to speak, largely passive, mostly dependent on parental figures to meet existential needs. Although the child may have engaged in behaviors (e.g., crying) that seemed active by virtue of the arousal they evoked in others, these signals were intended to recruit others in the service of fundamental needs. Here it was parental figures, rather than the child itself, who either modified the ecological milieu or sought out a more hospitable one. With the development of autonomous capacities, the young child finds that he or she is embedded in an environment that can be explored and later modified, or feared and accommodated to. The child must ‘‘decide’’ whether to ‘‘break out’’ of dependence on parental figures or to perpetuate this dependent pattern into later years. Whatever alternative is pursued, it is, of course, a matter of degree rather than a yes-no decision. Undoubtedly important in children’s orientation toward the environment are their attachments. Those children who possess a ‘‘secure base’’ will explore their environments without becoming fearful that their attachment figure cannot be recovered (Ainsworth, 1967). On the other hand, those without such a base tend to remain close to their caretakers, assuming the more passive mode, which is likely to ultimately restrict their range of coping resources through decreased or retarded sociocognitive competence (Millon, 1969).” (Millon 2011 85)

“Somewhere between the 11th and 15th years, a rather sweeping series of hormonal changes unsettle the psychic state that was so carefully constructed in preceding years. These changes reflect the onset of puberty and the instantiation of sexual- and gender-related characteristics that are preparatory for the emergence of the r- and K-strategies—strong sexual impulses and adultlike features of anatomy, voice, and bearing. Erratic moods, changing self-images, reinterpretations of one’s view of others, new urges, hopeful expectancies, and a growing physical and social awkwardness, all upset the relative equanimity of an earlier age. Disruptive as it may be, this turbulent stage of growth bifurcates and focuses many of the remaining elements of the youngster’s biological potential. Not only is it a preparatory phase for the forthcoming independence from parental direction, but it is when the psychological equivalent of the r- and K-strategies, self (male) and other (female) orientations, begin to diverge and then coalesce into distinct gender roles.

With the unsettling influences of adolescence, both physiological and social, and the emergence of the individual as a being of genuine reproductive potential, the r- and K-strategies begin to take on an implicitly criterial role in the selection of the behaviors of the moment, as well as future goals, from a universe of implicit alternatives. These strategies are psychologically expressed, at the highest level of abstraction, in an orientation toward self and an orientation toward others. Here the male can be prototypally described as more dominant, imperial, and acquisitive, and the female more communal, nurturant, and deferent.

These representations—self and other and their coordination—are essential to the genesis of the personality system. Both attachment theory and the evolutionary model presented here recognize the importance of self and other constructs. From an attachment perspective, these constructs represent inchoate interpersonal relationships, the intricacies of which are made possible by cognitive developments. No longer is the world an unorganized swirl of events; increasingly, it is organized around relationships and expectations. Although relationships are organic wholes (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986), within these wholes the individual’s orientation (i.e., expectations about future states of the relationship and outcomes desired from the relationship) is toward self and other, and the individual may possess positive or negative models of each (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991)” (Millon 2011 87)

“Developing a gender identity is not so much acquiring a means for satisfying libidinal impulses as it is a process of refining the youngster’s previously diffused and undifferentiated sense of self. This is achieved most effectively by reflecting the admiration of a beloved other. The feedback received in real and fantasized love relationships assists the teenager to revise and define his or her gender identity. It serves also to clarify and to further develop a new self-concept that encompasses relationships with peer companions of both genders, rather than parents or siblings.” (Millon 2011 88)

“The intracortical-integration stage coordinates with the fourth phase of the evolutionary progression, the thinking-feeling polarity. The peak period of neurological maturation for these psychological functions generally occurs between the ages of 4 and 18. The amount and kind of intrapsychic and contextual stimulation at these times of rapid growth will have a strong bearing on the degree to which these functions mature. Thinking and feeling are broad and multifaceted constructs with diverse manifestations. Whereas the focus in the first three stages of development was on the child’s existential aims, modes of adaptation, and gender identification, here the focus shifts to the individual as a being-in-time.


Initially, the child must acquire abstract capacities to transcend the purely concrete reality of the present moment and project the self-as-object into myriad futures contingent on the child’s own style of action or accommodation. Such capacities are both cognitive and emotional, and may have wide-ranging consequences for the personality system if they fail to cohere as integrated structures, as in the more severe personality disorders (e.g., borderline and schizotypal)

What capacities unfold during this stage, and what consequences can be attributed to differences in the quality and intensity of relevant experience?” (Millon 2011 89)

“Progressively more complex arrangements of neural cells become possible as children advance in maturation. Although these higher-order connections begin in early infancy, they do not form into structures capable of rational foresight and adult-level planning until the youngsters have fully developed their more basic sensorimotor skills and pubertal maturations. With these capacities as a base, they are able to differentiate and arrange the objects of the physical world. As verbal skills unfold, they learn to symbolize concrete objects; soon they are able to manipulate and coordinate these symbols as well as, if not better than, the tangible events themselves. Free of the need to make direct reference to the concrete world, they are able to recall past events and anticipate future ones. As increasingly complex cortical connections are established, higher conceptual abstractions are formulated, enabling the children to transfer, associate, and coordinate these symbols into ideas of finer differentiation, greater intricacy, and broader integration. These internal representations of reality, the product of symbolic thought, the construction of events past, present, and future, take over as the primary elements of the representational world. Especially significant at this period is a fusion between the capacities to think and to feel.” (Millon 89-90)

“When the inner world of symbols is mastered, giving objective reality an order and integration, youngsters are able to create some consistency and continuity in their lives. No longer are they buffeted from one mood or action to another by the swirl of changing events; they now have an internal anchor, a nucleus of cognitions that serves as a base and imposes a sense of sameness and continuity on an otherwise fluid environment. As they grow in their capacity to organize and integrate their world, one configuration becomes increasingly differentiated and begins to predominate. Accrued from experiences with others and their reactions to the child, an image or representation of self-as-object has taken shape. This highest order of abstraction, the sense of individual identity as distinct from others, becomes the dominant source of stimuli that guides the youngster’s thoughts and feelings. External events no longer have the power they once exerted; the youngster now has an ever-present and stable sphere of internal representations, transformed by rational and emotional reflections, which govern his or her course of action and from which behaviors are initiated.” (Millon 2011 90)

### Figure: Models of Two Personalities, from Millon 2011

 Here we see two models, each of a personality. On each is measured the pleasure/pain, active/passive, and self/other polarities. As Millon describes it, each person has a constitutional disposition. That is, everyone’s personality must fall within a certain range given the factors set by their birth. I’ll question this later, but for now, it’s a useful first approximation. This dotted rectangle indicates the maximum and minimum values each person’s personality could obtain in life. The solid rectangle represents the range the personality achieves through life, and the filled-in rectangle the current range of dispositions each person is experiencing. On this model, we assume each is presently alive, and thus has a current personality. Looking retrospectively at a life, we could model the filled in rectangles oscillating as time passes, sometimes pushing the solid rectangles closer to the dotted bounds. The person who is as she does, as Sartre described our lives, is just that black time-rectangle-snake. When we instead think of people as they were, and imagine potentials if other paths through the solid rectangle bounds were taken, we get a different idea of who they are. Finally, those who are thinking largely of one’s potential as who one is seem to be thinking mostly about the dotted lines.

The dotted lines and their being distinct from the others capture several important claims about personality being made here. Our current positions in personality space change as time passes. Each of us have a range of possible personalities we can live out, but that range is also limited.

This model doesn’t try to capture the interconnectedness of the polarities, though it does capture the distinctness of the positionings on each end of each polarity. That is, each person’s pleasure and pain levels are determined with a degree of independence from each other, as do the other polarities. Because of the many-dimensionality of these multiple ranges, each different by person, I suspect the tools of linear algebra will quickly become useful in this modelling.

We can come away from this model with simple numerical representations for now, and this will be immediately useful. What I am offering then is a symbolic logic of personality. Let P(n) be a function mapping positive integers to personalities. There’s not necessarily any pre-given order to the personalities, but we can still number them for the sake of indexing. What’s important here is this allows us to reliably refer back to the same personality and compare and contrast different personalities. What’s also important is that possibilities suggested by the logic will pose useful questions about the realities of personalities. By this I mean that we can adjust our logical constraints and see what happens syntactically and semantically, and this process will naturally pose questions about which particular models of individual personalities actually describe a real person’s personality. There are after all, only so many billions of people who have ever lived. In the future there will be so many people that I cannot even imagine it now, or none, or any number in between. If the future includes an infinite increase in the number of people, then perhaps not, but if there will only ever be a finite number of people, or if we simply limit our view of reality to exclude the future, then our ability to create permutations of personality measurements without limit means that the limited number of realized personalities are lesser in number by virtue of their number being limited rather than unlimited.

Millon’s boxes are rather homogenous, though I take this to be more to avoid confusion that may be raised by heterogeneity in box dimensions. Let’s first seek to symbolize his boxes. Person 1 is designated by P(1) and Person 2 is designated by P(2). At this stage, let’s let

P(n)=

| Constitutional Pleasure Maximum | Constitutional Pain Maximum | Constitutional Activity Maximum | Constitutional Passivity Maximum | Constitutional Self Maximum | Constitutional Other Maximum |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Life Pleasure Maximum | Life Pain Maximum | Life Activity Maximum | Life Passivity Maximum | Life Self-Orientation Maximum | Life Other-Orientation Maximum |
| Current Pleasure Maximum | Current Pain Maximum | Current Activity Maximum | Current Passivity Maximum | Current Self-Orientation Maximum | Current Other-Orientation Maximum |
| Current Pleasure Minimum | Current Pain Minimum | Current Activity Minimum | Current Passivity Minimum | Current Self-Orientation Minimum | Current Other-Orientation Minimum |
| Life Pleasure Minimum | Life Pain Minimum | Life Activity Minimum | Life Passivity Minimum | Life Self-Orientation Minimum | Life Other-Orientation Minimum |
| Constitutional Pleasure Minimum | Constitutional Pain Minimum | Constitutional Activity Minimum | Constitutional Passivity Minimum | Constitutional Self-Orientation Minimum | Constitutional Other-Orientation Minimum |

Each of these values are variable and related!

Each value in the matrix is an integer between 0 and 100, though we do not know what precisely these numbers would correspond to in the world yet. It’s fine, after all, if we aren’t yet familiar with locations on a map we haven’t seen before.


Let Z be the set of all integers. Let Zp be the finite set of initial positive integers with a cardinality equal to the number of people there are. Then for all z in Zp, P(z)=

| z1,1 | z1,2 | z1,3 | z1,4 | z1,5 | z1,6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | ... |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | ... |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | .. |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | ... |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | z6,6 |

There are 36 cells in this matrix, with 100 possible values in each cell, so we have 10^36 personalities in the space modeled by these matrices. That’s an ununillion personalities. 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 personalities.

The next figure from Millon (2011) is this table describing the four components of the Evolutionary Model.

### Figure: Table of the Four Components of the Evolutionary Model

In essence, the survival functions justify the role in the Evolutionary Model, as human life survives via these eight psychological functions. They are labelled as “evolutionary phases'' because they also map to phases our pre-human ancestors went through to give birth to humanity. The holographic principle, essentially that processes tend to combine into processes that resemble the contributing processes, appears to resonate with this, as we each go through corresponding developmental stages in each of our own lives.

The neuropsychological stages also connect at this point clearly to some of the interests of the here and now I promise in the Preface of this text. While these four, sensory-attachment, sensorimotor-autonomy, pubertal-gender-identity, and intracortical-integration all in fact correspond to developmental processes that take place throughout one’s entire life, their relevance and plasticity throughout life definitely changes, and usually along lines determined by being a member of the human species. However, what we’re up to during these stages is a feature of where and when we live, and as what people in our societies. Right now, in the United States in roughly 2020, though thankfully after it, I notice plenty of distrust, confusing content for pleasure and pain aims, and many conditions that can complicate these stages. The K-12 education system is at least the norm, though it’s still quite easy to critique and criticize how it’s actually done. Communications technologies have fundamentally changed how we relate to each other and ourselves. I grew up with a seeming divide in worlds, looking back, between my childhood and adolescent years marked by an influx of social media. My older friends seem to generally understand a lot less about how my younger friends communicate with each other, and often enough vice-versa. This might be brushed off as the usual generational flux, except it’s happening faster than a biological generation, as “older” and “younger” here can mean only a couple of years, and give or take geographic proximity to urban areas and familial wealth. This is substantiated in the relevant literature. Part of my proposal is to expand on that substantiation. Changing trends in adolescent and adult sexual orientation and gender identity also suggest interesting developments in the influence of culture on this stage of development. Finally, as many of the most philosophically interesting, by which I mean unusual in ways whose existence defies the expectations set by the normal understandings, cases of brains and brains-as-minds come to us as the intracortically disintegrated, manifesting as Borderline Personality Disorder, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and other conditions.

Fortunately, given the shared components for the determiners of the values of p(Z), if we have the complete set of values for all times of the middle two rows, then we can easily calculate the values of the second and fifth rows. In practice, clinicians have information to reasonably measure some points in time as well as some functions that range over some extended sets of times. For example, someone might experience a substantial rise in the amount of pleasure she experiences over the course of a year, so this might be expressed as z1,3=50y+50 and z1,4=40y+40 for t=0-1. Over time, a complete story of one’s life can be constructed and analysed to be able to calculate z1,2 and z1,5. At this stage, we don’t know how to find z1,1 or z1,6, but we do know enough to make some useful estimates for predicting what future values of z1,3 and z1,4 are possible. This can be done for other values of x in zx,y, and all this means that p(Z) is a function of p(za,zb) and t for 0<a<7 and b=1,3,4, and 6. and t=[0, the length of the person’s life]. The focus of Chapters six through fifteen of Millon’s 2011 book are essentially describing these functions. He never uses the formalization, but it will help us ensure completeness and consistency of my model, and it will also be useful for the creation of the personality simulator I’m developing to aid in this research.

“Trust may be described as a feeling that one can rely on the affections and support of others. There are few periods of life when an individual is so wholly dependent on the goodwill and care of others as during the relatively helpless state of infancy. Nothing is more crucial to the infant’s well-being than the nurturance and protection afforded by caretakers. Through the quality and consistency of this support, deeply ingrained feelings of trust are etched within the child. From the evolutionary model presented earlier, trust and mistrust represent facets of the pleasure and pain constructs, generalized to adaptational venues within the physical environment, such as the nursery, as well as to the environment of prototypal social objects. Within the infant’s world, of course, trust and mistrust lack their phenomenological and moral dimensions, resembling more global and undifferentiated feelings of soothing calm (pleasure) or tense apprehension (pain) than consciously abstracted states.” (Millon 2011 94)

“Such perceptual indiscriminateness of associations is highly significant. Thus, feelings and expectancies arising from specific experiences become highly generalized and come to characterize the child’s image of the entire environment. Because children are unable to make fine discriminations, their early attachments become pervasive and widespread. Nurtured well and given comfort and affection, they will acquire a far-reaching trust of others; they learn that discomfort will be moderated and that others will assist them and provide for their needs. Deprived of warmth and security or handled severely and painfully, they will learn to mistrust their environment, to anticipate further stress, and view others as harsh and undependable. Rather than developing an optimistic and confident attitude toward the future, they will be disposed to withdraw and avoid people for fear that these persons will re-create the discomfort and anguish that were experienced in the past.” (Millon 2011 95)

“Children become progressively less dependent on their caretakers during the sensorimotor-autonomy stage. By the second and third years, they are ambulatory and possess the power of speech and control over many elements in their environment. They have acquired the manipulative skills to venture forth and test their competence to handle events on their own (White, 1960). In terms of the evolutionary model, this stage concerns the active-passive polarity. Here children struggle to breakout of the inherently dependent and passive mode of infancy. Rather than remain a passive receptacle for environmental forces, clay to be molded, they acquire competencies that enlarge their vistas and allow them to become legitimate actors in their environments.” (Millon 2011 95)

“The many crushes and infatuations experienced during the pubertal period serve as a genuine source of development. Gender roles emerge in significant ways by interacting with others, especially as enacted in peer group relationships. Adhering to the models of peer behaviors helps the youngster find and evaluate how certain gender roles fit (Horn, 2003). The high school clique, the neighborhood gang, the athletic team, all aid the teenager in discovering his or her gender identity, providing both useful role models and instant social feedback (Nucci, 2001). The bull session among boys and the endless phone conversations between girls serve significant goals by providing evaluative feedback as youngsters search to define themselves. It is particularly during the time of rapid body changes when genital impulses stimulate sexual fantasies that the adolescent learns to rely on peers as important guides and sounding boards.” (Millon 2011 95)

“The emergence of this final developmental stage—with its capacities for thinking, feeling, evaluating, and planning—leads youngsters to formulate a clear image of themselves as a certain ‘‘kind of adult,’’ an identity discernible from others, capable of having independent judgments and of fashioning their own course of action. Healthy children must acquire a coherent system of internalized values that will guide them through a changing and varied environment. They must find their own anchor and compass by which to coordinate both their feelings and ideas about life. Equipped by successful efforts toward autonomy, they will have confidence that they possess a direction in life that is valued by others and that can safely withstand the buffeting of changing events (Smetana, 2006). In terms of the evolutionary model, such children are capable of integrating their feelings and thoughts, setting their own agendas, and becoming masters of their own fate.” (Millon 2011 95)[[31]](#footnote-30)

## Connections

“An atmosphere, a way of handling the daily and routine activities of life, or a style and tone of interpersonal relatedness—all come to characterize the family setting within which the child develops. Events, feelings, and ways of communicating are repeated day in and day out. In contrast to the occasional and scattered events of the outside environment, the circumstances of daily family life have an enduring and cumulative effect on the entire fabric of the child’s learning. Within this setting, the child establishes a basic feeling of security, imitates the ways in which people relate interpersonally, acquires an impression of how others perceive and feel about him or her, develops a sense of self-worth, and learns how to cope with feelings and the stresses of life. The influence of the family environment is preeminent during all of the crucial growth periods in that it alone among all sources exerts a persistent effect on the child.” (Millon 2011 98)

“In what ways can these enduring experiences be differentiated? Because the ebb and flow of everyday life consists of many inextricably interwoven elements, any subdivision that can be made must reflect some measure of arbitrariness. To avoid the errors of etiologic simplification, the reader should keep in mind that the features separated into each of the five categories described in the following sections represent only single facets of an ongoing and complex constellation of interactive events.  
The five categories are: 1. Parental feelings and attitudes 2. Methods of behavior control 3. Family styles of communication 4. Content of teachings 5. Family structure” (Millon 2011 98)

“The most overriding, yet the most difficult to appraise, aspect of learned experience is the extent to which the child develops a feeling of acceptance or rejection by his or her parents (Baumrind, 1967; Baumrind & Thompson, 2002; Kuczynski, 2003). With the exception of cases of blatant abuse or overt deprecation, investigators have extreme difficulty in specifying, no less measuring, the signs of parental neglect, disaffiliation, and disaffection (Arcus, 2001). Despite the methodological difficulties that researchers encounter, the child who is the recipient of rejecting cues has no doubt about being unappreciated, scorned, or deceived (Roopnarine, 2004).  
Children who are exposed throughout their early years to parents who view them as unwanted and troublesome can only establish a deep and pervasive feeling of isolation in a hostile world. Deprived of the supports and security of home, these children may be ill disposed to venture forth with confidence to face struggles in the outer world (G. Patterson, 2002). Rejected by their parents, they may anticipate equal devaluation by others (Emde, 1989). As a defense against further pain, they may learn the strategy of avoiding others; they may utilize apathy and indifference as a protective cloak to minimize the impact of the negative reinforcements they now expect from others. Different strategies may evolve depending on other features associated with rejection; children may imitate parental scorn and ridicule, and learn to handle their disturbed feelings by acting in a hostile and vindictive fashion (Cicchetti & Carlson, 1989; Mueller & Silverman, 1989). When children are rejected by parents, they are likely to anticipate equal devaluation by others (Dodge, Murphy, & Buchsbaum, 1984; Dornbusch, Ritter, Leiderman, & Roberts, 1987; Steinberg, Elmen, & Mounts, 1989).  
Rejection is not the only parental attitude that may result in insidious damage to the child’s personality; attitudes represented by terms such as seduction, exploitation, and deception contribute their share of damage as well. But it is usually the sense of being unwanted and unloved that proves to have the most pervasive and shattering effect (Cicchetti & Beeghly, 1987). Children can tolerate substantial punishment and buffeting from their environment if they sense a basic feeling of love and support from their parents; without this support, their resistance, even to minor stress, is tenuous (Billings & Moos, 1982; Lewinsohn, 1974).  
More importantly, parental feelings and attitudes need not be the same, nor uniformly conveyed by both parents (Goodnow, 2002). Differences in parental relationships are the norm for most children. One parent may be attentive and overprotective while the other is hostile or indifferent. In a sense, the recombinant process of hereditary transmission, in which children receive half their chromosomes from each of two parents, is duplicated at the experiential level, as well. Dissimilar aspects of human thought, feeling, and behavior are conveyed by each parent through implicit modeling or direct tuition. Children incorporate these two variant models, either keeping them as separate modes of experience or fusing them in a combinatorial synthesis.

Hence, it is not uncommon for children to acquire attitudes and feelings about themselves that are divided or split, partly reflecting the relationship with their mother, and partly with their father, no less also with older siblings or relatives. As we read the typical background of one or another of several personality disorders, we may find individuals who have experienced two or more of the characteristic histories described. Exposed to a ‘‘single’’ parent who was consistent and whose attitudes and feelings were not subverted or countermanded by other adult models, the child may develop into a ‘‘pure’’ textbook type. For the most part, however, youngsters reflect the impact of a variety of adult models, hence resulting in a mixed personality configuration (e.g., somewhat narcissistic and somewhat compulsive; partly dependent and partly avoidant). In later sections pertaining to ‘‘adult types,’’ we will see personality mixtures that reflect different, and sometimes conflictual combinations of parental feelings and attitudes to which the youngster was exposed (Kerr & Stattin, 2000; Parke, 2002).” (Millon 2011 98-99)

“What training procedures are used to regulate the child’s behavior and to control what he learns? As noted earlier, incidental methods used by parents may have a more profound effect than what the parent intended; that is, the child acquires a model of interpersonal behavior by example and imitation as well as by verbal precept (Dodge & Pettit, 2003; Ladd & Pettit, 2002; Mounts, 2000). What are some of the pathogenic methods of control? Five are noted here.” (Millon 2011 99)

**Punitive methods:** “Parents disposed to intimidate and ridicule their offspring by using punitive and repressive measures to control their behavior and thought may set the stage for a variety of maladaptive patterns (El Sheikh, Cummings, & Goetsch, 1989; Hill & Herman-Stahl, 2002; Loeber & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986). If these children submit to pressure and succeed in fulfilling parental expectations (i.e., learn instrumentally to avoid the negative reinforcement of punishment), they are apt to become overly obedient and circumspect. Quite typically, these individuals learn not only to keep in check their impulses and contrary thoughts, but, by vicarious observation and imitation, learn to adopt the parental behavior model and begin to be punitive of deviant behavior on the part of others. Thus, an otherwise timid and hypertense 16-year-old boy, whose every spark of youthful zest had been squelched by harshly punitive parents, was observed to be ‘‘extremely mean’’ and punitive when given the responsibility of teaching a Sunday school class for 7-year-olds. Should these youngsters fail to satisfy excessive parental demands, and be subject to continued harassment and punishment, they may develop a pervasive anticipatory anxiety about personal relationships, leading to feelings of guilt, hopelessness, and discouragement, resulting in such instrumental strategies as social avoidance and withdrawal (Eccles, 2002). Others, faced with similar experiences, may learn to imitate parental harshness and develop hostile and aggressively rebellious behaviors. Which of these reactions or strategies evolves will depend on the larger configuration of factors involved (Ferster, 1973; Lazarus, 1968; Lewinsohn, 1974; Patterson, 2002).” (Millon 2011 99-100

**Contingent reward methods:** “Some parents rarely are punitive but expect certain behaviors to be performed prior to giving encouragement or doling out rewards (Davidov & Grusec, 2005; Stoolmiller, 2001). In other words, positive reinforcements are contingent on approved performance. Youngsters reared under these conditions tend to be socially pleasant and, by imitative learning, tend to be rewarding to others. But often we observe that they seem to have acquired an insatiable and indiscriminate need for social approval. For example, a 15-yearold girl experienced brief periods of marked depression if people failed to comment favorably on her dress or appearance. In early childhood, she had learned that parental approval and affection were elicited only when she was ‘‘dressed up and looked pretty’’; to her, failure on the part of others to note her attractiveness signified rejection and disapproval. It would appear then that contingent reward methods condition children to develop an excessive need for approval; they manifest not only a healthy social affability but also a dependency on social reinforcement (Grolnick, 2003).” (Millon 2011 100)

**Inconsistent methods:** “Parental methods of control often are irregular, contradictory, and capricious (Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Patterson, 1982). Some degree of variability is inevitable in the course of every child’s life, but there are parents who display an extreme inconsistency in their standards and expectations, and an extreme unpredictability in their application of rewards and punishments. Youngsters exposed to such a chaotic and capricious environment cannot learn consistently and cannot devise nonconflictive strategies for adaptive behavior; whatever behavior they display may be countermanded by an unpredictable parental reaction (Barber, Bean, & Erickson, 2002). To avoid the suspense and anxiety of unpredictable reactions, the child may protectively become immobile and noncommittal (Grych & Fincham, 2001). Others, imitatively adopting what they have been exposed to, may come to be characterized by their own ambivalence and their own tendency to vacillate from one action or feeling to another. We know that irregular reinforcements build difficult-to-extinguish behavior patterns; thus, the immobility or ambivalence of these youngsters may persist long after their environment has become uniform and predictable (Krishnakumar & Buehler, 2000)” (Millon 2011 100)

**Protective methods:** “Some parents so narrowly restrict the experiences to which their children are exposed that these youngsters fail to learn even the basic rudiments of autonomous behaviors (Baumrind, 1967). Overprotective mothers, worried that their children are too frail or are unable to care for themselves or make sensible judgments on their own, not only succeed in forestalling the growth of normal competencies, but, indirectly, give children a feeling that they are inferior and frail. These children, observing their actual inadequacies, have verification that they are weak, inept, and dependent on others (Millon, 1981; Parker, 1983). Thus, not only are these youngsters trained to be deficient in adaptive and self-reliant behaviors but they also learn to view themselves as inferior, and become progressively fearful of leaving the protective ‘‘womb.’’” (Millon 2011 100-101)

**Indulgent methods:** “Overly permissive, lax, or undisciplined parents allow children full rein to explore and assert their every whim. These parents fail to control their children and, by their own lack of discipline, provide a model to be imitated that further strengthens the child’s irresponsibility (Crouter & Head, 2002). Unconstrained by parental control, and not guided by selective rewards, these youngsters grow up displaying the inconsiderate and often tyrannical characteristics of undisciplined children. Having had their way for so long, they tend to be exploitive, demanding, uncooperative, and antisocially aggressive. Unless rebuffed by external disciplinary forces, these youngsters may persist in their habits and become irresponsible members of society (Millon, 1969).” (Millon 2011 101)

“The capacity of humans to symbolize experience enables them to communicate with one another in ways more intricate and complex than are found in lower species. Free of the simple mechanisms of instinctive behavior, and capable of transcending the tangibles of the objective world, humans can draw from events of the distant past and project to those of the distant future. The symbolic units and syntax of language provide people with a powerful instrumentality for thought and communication. Each family constructs its own style of communication, its own pattern of listening and attending, and its own way of fashioning thoughts and conveying them to others. The styles of interpersonal communication to which children are exposed serve as a model for attending, organizing, and reacting to the expressions, thoughts, and feelings of others. Unless this framework for learning interpersonal communication is rational and reciprocal, they will be ill-equipped to function in an effective way with others. Thus, the very symbolic capacities that enable people to transcend their environments so successfully may lead to serious misdirections and confusions; this powerful instrument for facilitating communication with others may serve instead to undermine social relationships. Although illogical ideas, irrational reactions, and irrelevant and bizarre verbalizations often arise as a consequence of extreme stress, their roots can be traced as frequently to the simple exposure to defective styles of family communication (Campbell, 1973; Mash & Johnston, 1982; Morrison, 1980; Tizard & Hodges, 1978)” (Millon 2011 101)

“Parents transmit a wide range of values and attitudes to their children through direct tuition or unintentional commentary (Dorr, 1985; Emde, 1979). The family serves as the primary socialization system for inculcating beliefs and behaviors. Through these teachings the child learns to think about, be concerned with, and react to certain events and people in prescribed ways.” (Millon 2011 102)

“The most insidious and destructive of these teachings is training in anxiety. Parents who fret over their own health, who investigate every potential ailment in their children’s functioning, and who are preoccupied with failures or the dismal turn of events, teach and furnish models for anxiety proneness in their children (Coolidge & Brodie, 1974; Parker, 1983; Waldron, Shrier, Stone, & Tobin, 1975). Few incidents escape the pernicious effects of a chronically anxious and apprehensive household. Fantasies of body disease, vocational failure, loss of prized objects, and rejection by loved ones illustrate the range of items that can intrude on and color otherwise neutral events when there is a tendency toward this general disposition.” (Millon 2011 102)

“Feelings of guilt and shame are generated in the teachings of many homes. A failure to live up to parental expectations, a feeling of having caused parents to make undue sacrifices and of having transgressed rules and embarrassed the family by virtue of some shortcoming or misbehavior, illustrate events that question the individual’s self-worth and produce marked feelings of shame and guilt. Furthermore, the sacrificing and guilt-laden atmosphere of these parental homes provides a model for behavioral imitation. Youngsters who are admonished and reproached repeatedly for minor digressions often develop a deep and pervasive self-image of failure. If those children admit their misdeeds, and adopt their parents’ injunctions as their own, they will come to view themselves as unworthy, shameful, and guilty. To protect against feelings of marked self-condemnation, such children may learn to restrict their activities, to deny themselves the normal joys and indulgences of life, and to control their impulses far beyond that required to eschew shame and guilt. In time, even the simplest of pleasures may come to be avoided.” (Millon 2011 102)

“Destructive attitudes can be taught directly through narrow or biased parental outlooks— feelings of inferiority and social inadequacy are among the most frequent. Particularly damaging are teachings associated with sexual urges. Unrealistic standards that condemn common behaviors such as masturbation and petting create unnecessary fears and strong guilt feelings; sexual miseducation may have longrange deleterious effects, especially during periods of courtship and marriage.” (Millon 2011 102)

A child's lack of presence of significant adult family members may prevent them from copying many of the complex patterns of behavior needed as adults (Emery, 1982; Ferri, 1976; Millon, 1987b). Children imitate evenw parents who provide them with undesirable role models. (Millon 2011 102)

“Children subject to persistent parental bickering and nagging not only are exposed to destructive models for imitative learning but are faced with upsetting influences that may eventuate in pathological behaviors (Crockenberg, 1985; Cummings, Pelligrini, Notarius, & Cummings, 1989; Grych & Fincham, 2001; Rutter & Giller, 1983). When strife and marked controversy prevail, they shatter the stability of life so necessary for the acquisition of a consistent pattern of behaving and thinking. There is an everpresent apprehension that one parent may be lost through divorce; dissension often leads to the undermining of one parent by the other; an air of mistrust frequently pervades the home, creating suspicions and anxieties: a nasty and cruel competition for the loyalty and affections of children may ensue (Slomkowski & Manke, 2004). Children often become scapegoats in these settings, subject to displaced parental hostilities (Hetherington, 1972). Constantly dragged into the arena of parental strife, the child not only loses a sense of security and stability but may be subjected to capricious hostility and to a set of conflicting and destructive behavior models (DuRocher, Schudlich, & Cummings, 2003).” (Millon 2011 103)

“Sibling relationships often are overlooked as a major element in shaping the pattern of peer and other intimate competitions (Circirelli, 1982; Conger, Bryant, & Brennom, 2004; Dunn & Kendrick, 1981; Wagner, Schubert, & Schubert, 1979). The presence of two or more children within a family requires that parents divide their attention and approval. When disproportionate affection is allotted to one child, or when a newborn child supplants an older child as the ‘‘apple of daddy’s eye,’’ seeds of discontent and rivalry flourish (Dunn, 2004). Intense hostility often is generated; because hostility fails to eliminate the intruder and gains, not the soughtfor attention, but parental disapproval, the aggrieved child often reverts to regressive or infantile maneuvers, (e.g., baby talk or bedwetting). If these methods succeed in winning back parental love, the youngster will have been reinforced through instrumental learning to continue these childish techniques. More often than not, however, efforts to alter parental preferences fail miserably, and the child may continue to experience deep resentments and a sense of marked insecurity. In the future, such persons often display a distrust of affections, fearing that those who express them will prove to be as fickle as their parents. Not unlikely also is the possibility that the intense hostility they felt toward their siblings will linger and generalize into envious and aggressive feelings toward other competitors” (Millon 2011 103)

“It seems plausible that the order of a child’s birth within the family would be related to the kinds of problems the child faces, and the kinds of strategies he or she is likely to adopt. For example, the oldest child, once the center of parental attention, experiences a series of displacements as new sibs are born; this may engender a pervasive expectation that ‘‘good things don’t last.’’ However, to counteract this damaging experience, the youngster may be encouraged to acquire the skills of autonomy and leadership, may be more prone to identify with adult models and may learn, thereby, to cope with the complications of life more effectively than less mature siblings. The youngest child, although petted, indulged, and allotted the special affections and privileges due the family ‘‘baby,’’ may fail to acquire the competencies required for autonomous behaviors. He or she may be prone to dependency and prefer to withdraw from competition; the higher incidence of mental disorder among the last-born in families lends support to these interpretations (Snell, Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1966; Gregory, 1958). Only children appear to be especially resilient to severe emotional difficulty. This may reflect their special status as sole recipient of parental attention, approval, and affection. In this singular and unhampered state, children may learn to view themselves as especially gifted; with this confidence in self-worth as a base, they may venture into the larger society secure in the conviction that they will be as well received there as in the parental home. Despite this sound beginning, they are ill-equipped to cope with the give-and-take of peer relationships because they have not experienced the sharing and competition of sibling relationships.” (Millon 2011 103-104)

“It is a common belief, attributable to popularizations of psychology in our literature and news media, that most forms of psychopathology can be traced to a single, severe experience—the hidden residues of which account for the manifest disorder. Freud’s early writings gave impetus and support to this notion, but he reversed himself in his later work when he was made aware that patient reports of early trauma often were imaginative fabrications of their past. Current thinking in the field suggests that most pathological behaviors accrue gradually through repetitive learning experiences.  
Despite the primacy that enduring and pervasive experiences play in shaping most pathological patterns, there are occasions when a particularly painful event can shatter the individual’s equanimity and leave a deeply embedded attitude that is not readily extinguished. An untimely frightening experience—abusive or not—or an especially embarrassing and humiliating social event, illustrate conditions that can result in a persistent attitude. The impact of these events may be particularly severe with young children because they usually are ill prepared for them and lack the perspective of prior experience that might serve as a context for moderating their effects (Field, 1985; Garmezy, 1986; Weissman & Paykel, 1974). If a traumatic event is the first exposure for a youngster to a particular class of experiences, the attitude he or she learns in reaction to that event may intrude and color all subsequent events of that kind. Thus, an adolescent whose first sexual venture resulted in devastating feelings of guilt, inadequacy, or humiliation may harbor such feelings long after the event has passed.

Traumatic events persevere in their learned effects for essentially two reasons. First, a high level of neural activation ensues in response to most situations of marked distress or anxiety. This means that many diverse neural associations become connected to the event; the greater the level of neural involvement, the deeper and more pervasive will be the learned reaction, and the greater the difficulty will be in extinguishing what was learned. Second, during heightened stress, there often is a decrement in the ability to make accurate discriminations within the environment; as a consequence, traumatized individuals generalize their emotional reaction to a variety of objects and persons who are only incidentally associated with the traumatic source. For example, a youngster injured in an auto accident may develop a fear reaction not only to cars but to all red couch covers (the color of the seat of the car in which he was riding), to men in white jackets (the color of the medical intern’s uniform who attended to him after the accident), and so on. Because of the seemingly illogical nature of these fears (the difficulty of tracing their connection to the accident), they are not readily amenable to rational analysis and unlearning.

Despite the severity and persistence of the effects of certain traumatic events, they tend to be stimulus-specific; that is, limited to stimulus conditions that are highly similar to those in which they were first learned. In certain cases, however, these experiences may give rise to a chain of reactions and events that establish pervasive pathological trends. Thus, in the next section we see that the conditions of early experience, whatever their nature, may persist long after the event that prompted them has passed.” (Millon 2011 104)[[32]](#footnote-31)

“Acquired behaviors and attitudes usually are not fixed or permanent. What has been learned can be modified or eliminated under appropriate conditions, a process referred to as extinction. Extinction usually entails exposure to experiences that are similar to the conditions of original learning but that provide opportunities for new learning to occur. Essentially, old habits of behavior change when new learning interferes with, and replaces, what previously had been learned; this progressive weakening of old learnings may be speeded up by special environmental conditions, the details of which are not relevant to our discussion. What happens if the conditions of original learning cannot be duplicated easily? According to contiguity learning theory, failure to provide opportunities for interfering with old habits means that they will remain unmodified and persist over time; in other words, learnings associated with events that are difficult to reproduce are resistant to extinction. The next question we ask is: Are the events of early life experienced in such a manner as to make them difficult to reproduce and, therefore, resistant to extinction? An examination of the conditions of childhood suggests that the answer is yes! The reasons for asserting so have been formulated with extraordinary clarity by David McClelland (1951)” (Millon 2011 107)

“Biologically speaking, the young child is a primitive organism. The child’s nervous system is incomplete; he or she perceives the world from momentary and changing vantage points and is unable to discriminate and identify many of the elements of experience. What the child sees and learns about the environment through infantile perceptual and cognitive systems will never again be experienced in the same manner in later life.

The presymbolic world of fleeting and inarticulate impressions recedes gradually as the child acquires the ability to identify, discriminate, and symbolize experience. By the time youngsters are 4 or 5 years old, they view the world in preformed categories and they group and symbolize objects and events in a stable way that is quite different from that of infancy.

Once these perceptions have taken on discriminative symbolic forms, children can no longer duplicate the perceptually amorphous, presymbolic, and diffusely inchoate experiences of their earlier years. Unable to reproduce these early experiences in subsequent life, children will not be able to extinguish what they learned in response to them; no longer perceiving events as initially sensed, they cannot supplant the early reactions with new ones. These early learnings will persist, therefore, as feelings, attitudes, and expectancies that crop up pervasively in a vague and diffuse way.” (Millon 2011 107-108)

“Young children lack not only the ability to form a precise image of their environment but the equipment to discern logical relationships among its elements. Their world of objects, people, and events is connected in an unclear and random fashion; they learn to associate objects and events that have no intrinsic relationship; clusters of concurrent but only incidentally connected stimuli are fused erroneously. Thus, when a small boy experiences fear in response to his father’s harsh voice, he may learn to fear not only that voice but the setting, the atmosphere, the pictures, the furniture, and the odors—a whole bevy of incidental objects that by chance were present at that time. Unable to discriminate the precise source in his environment that ‘‘caused’’ his fear, he connects his discomfort randomly to all associated stimuli; now each of them becomes a precipitant for these feelings.” (Millon 2011 108)

“Young children’s discriminations of their environments are crude and gross. As they begin to differentiate the elements of their world, they group and label them into broad and unrefined categories. All men become ‘‘daddy’’; all fourlegged animals are called ‘‘doggie’’; all foods are ‘‘yumyum.’’ A child who learns to fear a particular dog, for example, will learn to fear not only that dog but all strange, mobile four-legged creatures. To the child’s primitive perception, all of these animals are one of a kind.

Generalization is inevitable in early learning. It reflects more than the failure of young children to have had sufficient experiences to acquire greater precision; their indiscriminateness represents an intrinsic inability to discriminate events because of their undeveloped cortical capacities.

As the undifferentiated mass of early experiences becomes more finely discriminated, learning gets to be more focused, specific, and precise; a 10-year-old will learn to fear bulldogs as a result of an unfortunate run-in with one but will not necessarily generalize this fear to collies or poodles because the youngster knows and can discern differences among these animals.” (Millon 2011 108)

“These three interlocking conditions—presymbolic, random, and generalized learning— account in large measure for the unusual difficulty of reexperiencing the events of early life, and the consequent difficulty of unlearning the feelings, behaviors, and attitudes generated by these events.” (Millon 2011 109)

“Of the many factors that contribute to the persistence of early behavior patterns, none plays a more significant role than social and interpersonal relationships. These relationships can be viewed fruitfully from the perspective usually taken by sociologists and social psychologists. To these scientists, the varied cultural and institutional forces of a society promote continuity by maintaining a stable and organized class of experiences to which most individuals of a particular group are repeatedly exposed. Reference to these broader social determinants of continuity will be made occasionally in later chapters. For the present, our focus is on the more direct and private side of interpersonal experience.” (Millon 2011 109)

“The typical daily activities in which young children participate are restricted and repetitive; there is not much variety in these routine experiences. Day in and day out, they eat the same kind of food, play with the same toys, remain essentially in the same physical environment, and relate to the same people. This constricted environment, this repeated exposure to a narrow range of family attitudes and training methods, not only builds in deeply etched habits and expectations but prevents children from having new experiences that are so essential to change. The helplessness of infants, and the dependency of children, keep them restricted to a crabbed and tight little world with few alternatives for learning new attitudes and responses. Early behaviors fail to change, therefore, not because they may have jelled permanently but because the same slender band of experiences that helped form them initially may continue and persist in influence for many years.” (Millon 2011 109)

“The notion that parents’ responses to a child’s early behaviors may accentuate those behaviors was raised earlier in the chapter; we noted that a circular interplay often arises that intensifies the child’s initial biological reactivity pattern. Thus, unusually passive, sensitive, or cranky infants frequently elicit feelings on the part of their mothers that perpetuate their original tendencies.

This model of circular or reciprocal influences may be applied not only to the perpetuation of biological dispositions but to behavior tendencies that are acquired by learning. Whatever the initial roots may have been—constitutional or learned—certain forms of behaviors provoke or pull from others, reactions that result in a repetition of these behaviors (Leary, 1957). For example, a suspicious, chip-on-the-shoulder and defiant child eventually will force others, no matter how tolerant they may have been initially, to counter with perplexity, exasperation, and anger; the child undermines every inclination on the part of others to be nurturant, friendly, and cooperative. An ever-widening gulf of suspicion and defiance may develop as parents of such children withdraw, become punitive, or ‘‘throw up their hands in disgust’’; controls or affections that might have narrowed the gulf of suspicion and hostility break down. Each participant, in feedback fashion, contributes his or her share; the original level of hostile behavior is aggravated and intensified. Whether the ‘‘cause’’ was the child or the parent, the process has gotten out of hand, and will continue its vicious and inexorable course until some benign influence interferes, or until it deteriorates into pathological form (Gottman & Katz, 1989).”

“The dominant features of a child’s early behavior form a distinct impression on others. Once this early impression is established, people expect the child to continue behaving in a distinctive manner; in time, they develop a fixed and simplified image of ‘‘what kind of person the child is.’’ The term stereotype, borrowed from social psychology, represents this tendency to simplify and categorize the attributes of others.

Once people have stereotyped a child, they no longer view the youngster passively and objectively because they now are sensitized to those distinctive features they have learned to expect. Stereotypes take on a life of their own; they operate as a screen through which children’s behaviors are selectively perceived so as to fit the characteristics attributed to them. Children who are cast in such a mold will experience a consistency in other people’s reactions that fails to recognize the varieties and complexities of individual behavior. No matter what these children do, they find their behavior is interpreted in the same fixed and rigid manner. Exposed time and time again to the same reactions and attitudes of others, these children may give up efforts to change. For example, if a defiant young boy displays the slightest degree of resentment to unfair treatment, he will be jumped on as hopelessly recalcitrant; should he do nothing objectionable, questions will be raised as to the sincerity of his motives. Faced with repeated negative appraisals and unable to break the stereotype into which he has been cast, the youngster will relapse after every effort to change, and continue to behave as he did originally, and as others expect. “ (Millon 2011 110)

“Significant experiences of early life may never recur again, but their effects remain and leave their mark. Physiologically, we may say they have etched a neurochemical change; psychologically, they are registered as memories, a permanent trace and an embedded internal stimulus. In contrast to the fleeting stimuli of the external world, these memory traces become part and parcel of every stimulus complex that activates behavior. Once registered, the effects of the past are indelible, incessant, and inescapable. They now are intrinsic elements of the individual’s makeup; they latch on and intrude into the current events of life, coloring, transforming, and distorting the passing scene. Although the residuals of subsequent experiences may override them, becoming more dominant internal stimuli, earlier memory traces remain in one form or another. In every thought and action, the individual cannot help but carry these remnants into the present. Every current behavior is a perpetuation, then, of the past, a continuation and intrusion of these inner stimulus traces.” (\*Millon 2011 110)

“Painful memories of the past are kept out of consciousness, a process referred to as repression. Similarly, current experiences that may reactivate these repressed memories are judiciously avoided. The individual develops a network of conscious and unconscious protective maneuvers to decrease the likelihood that either of these distressing experiences will occur.

As a consequence of these protective efforts, however, the person narrows or constricts his or her world. Repression reduces anxiety by enabling the individual to keep the inner sources of discomfort from awareness, but it also thwarts the person from ‘‘unlearning’’ these feelings or learning new and potentially more constructive ways of coping with them. Likewise, by defensively reducing activities to situations that will not reactivate intolerable memories, the individual automatically precludes the possibility of learning to be less anxious than in the past, and diminishes the chances for learning new reactions to formerly stressful situations. For example, a highly intelligent and physically attractive 15-year-old girl had progressively withdrawn from school and social activities; for several years there had been marked disharmony at home, culminating in a well-publicized scandal involving her parents. Although her teachers and peers viewed her personally in a favorable light and made efforts to show their continued acceptance, her embarrassment and fear of social ridicule led her into increasing isolation and fantasies that she would be humiliated wherever she went. As a result of her own protective actions, then, the young girl preserved unaltered her memories of the past; in addition, they persisted and forced her along paths that prevented their resolution. The more vigilant her protective maneuvers and the more constrictive her boundaries, the more limited would be her competencies for effective functioning and the more she would be deprived of the positive rewards of life.” (Millon 2011 111)

“Certain processes not only preserve the past but transform the present in line with the past. Cameron (1947) described this process, which he referred to as reaction-sensitivity, with insight and clarity. To him, once people acquire a system of threat expectancies, they respond with increasing alertness to similar threatening elements in their life situation. For example, persons who develop bodily anxieties often become hypochondriacal; that is, hyperalert to physiological processes that most people experience but ignore.

Kelly’s notion of personal constructs(1955) may be seen as an extension of the concept of reaction-sensitivity. To him, people acquire anticipatory cognitive attitudes as a consequence not only of threatening but of all forms of past experience; these constructs guide, screen, code, and evaluate the stream of new experiences to which the individual is exposed. Thus, a person who has learned to believe ‘‘everyone hates me’’ will tend to interpret the incidental and entirely innocuous comments of others in line with this premise

The role of habits of language as factors shaping one’s perceptions are of particular interest. As Whorf (1956) and others have shown, the words we use transform our experiences in line with the meaning of these words. For example, a child who has been exposed to parents who respond to every minor mishap as ‘‘a shattering experience’’ will tend to use these terms himself in the future; as a consequence, he will begin to feel that every setback he experiences is shattering because he has labeled it as such.” (Millon 2011 111)

“We have just described a number of factors that lead individuals to perceive new experiences in a subjective and frequently warped fashion; perceptual and cognitive distortions may be viewed as the defective side of a normal process in which new stimulus conditions are seen as similar to those experienced in the past. This process, though usually described in simpler types of conditions, commonly is referred to as stimulus generalization. In the present section, we turn our attention to another closely related form of generalization—the tendency of people to react to new stimuli in a manner similar to the way in which they reacted in the past—we speak of this process as behavior generalization.” (Millon 2011 112)

“Maladaptive behaviors persist not only as a consequence of generalized learned habits. Intrapsychic sources also ‘‘drive’’ the individual to re-create situations of the past that were frustrating or unresolved. Freud spoke of this process as repetition compulsions; by this, he meant the unconscious tendency to reconstruct situations in the present that parallel failures or disappointments of the past, and to persist in the attempt to undo these disappointments even though these attempts repeatedly have proven unrewarding.” (Millon 2011 113)


“We would be remiss in our presentation if we failed to recognize that personality pathology may be shaped by the institutions, traditions, and values that compose the cultural context of societal living; these cultural forces serve as a common framework of formative influences that set limits and establish guidelines for members of a social group (J. Miller, 2002). However, we must be careful to view ‘‘society’’ and ‘‘culture’’ not as entities but as convenient abstractions that characterize the pattern of relationships and responsibilities shared among group members (Harkness & Super, 2002).” (Millon 2011 114)

“Few characterizations of American life are more apt than those that portray our society as upwardly mobile. Stated differently, our culture has maximized the opportunity of its members to progress, to succeed, and to achieve material rewards once considered the province only of the aristocracy and well-to-do. With certain notable and distressing exceptions, the young of our society have been free to rise, by dint of their wits and their talents, above the socioeconomic status of their parents. Implicit in this well-publicized option to succeed, however, is the expectancy that each person will pursue opportunities and will be measured by the extent to which he or she fulfills them. Thus, our society not only promotes ambition but expects each of its members to meet the challenge successfully (Pellis, 2002). Each aspiring individual is confronted, then, with a precarious choice; along with the promising rewards of success are the devastating consequences of failure, as may be seen in the developmental background of certain narcissistic personality disorders.” (Millon 2011 115)

## Effects

We can divide the aspects of a personality system into the functional and structural domains. We can also consider them at the behavioral, phenomenological, intrapsychic, and biophysical levels. See the following figure:

### Figure from *Disorders of Personality* Chapter 3


(Millon 2011 143)

The following table summarizes a lot of information about these domains. Readers who would like additional detail may wish to now turn to the Appendix of Personality Trait Domains.


### Table of Personality Traits

| Trait | Domain | Description | Associated Personality Spectrum |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Impassive | Expressive Emotion | Is colorless, sluggish, displaying deficits in activation and emotional expressiveness; appears to be in a persistent state of low energy and lack of vitality (e.g., phlegmatic and lacking in spontaneity). | AAS |
| Peculiar | Expressive Emotion | Is perceived by others as eccentric, disposed to behave in an unobtrusively aloof, curious, or bizarre manner; exhibits socially gauche habits and aberrant mannerisms (e.g., manifestly odd or eccentric). | ESS |
| Fretful | Expressive Emotion | | SRA |
| Puerile | Expressive Emotion | | DAD |
| Impetuous | Expressive Emotion | | EET |
| Dramatic | Expressive Emotion | | SPH |
| Haughty | Expressive Emotion | | CEN |
| Defensive | Expressive Emotion | | MPP |
| Impulsive | Expressive Emotion | | ADA |
| Precipitate | Expressive Emotion | | ADS |
| Disconsolate | Expressive Emotion | | DFM |
| Abstinent | Expressive Emotion | | AAM |
| Embitteredl | Expressive Emotion | | DRN |
| Spasmodic | Expressive Emotion | | UBC |
| Disciplined | Expressive Emotion | Maintains a regulated, emotionally restrained, and highly organized life; often insists that others adhere to personally established rules and methods (e.g., meticulous and perfectionistic). | RCC |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | AAS |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | ESS |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | SRA |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | DAD |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | EET |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | SPH |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | CEN |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | MPP |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | ADA |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | ADS |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | DFM |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | AAM |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | DRN |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | UBC |
|  | Interpersonal Conduct | | RCC |
|  | Cognitive Style | | AAS |
|  | Cognitive Style | | ESS |
|  | Cognitive Style | | SRA |
|  | Cognitive Style | | DAD |
|  | Cognitive Style | | EET |
|  | Cognitive Style | | SPH |
|  | Cognitive Style | | CEN |
|  | Cognitive Style | | MPP |
|  | Cognitive Style | | ADA |
|  | Cognitive Style | | ADS |
|  | Cognitive Style | | DFM |
|  | Cognitive Style | | AAM |
|  | Cognitive Style | | DRN |
|  | Cognitive Style | | UBC |
|  | Cognitive Style | | RCC |
|  | Self-Image | | AAS |
|  | Self-Image | | ESS |
|  | Self-Image | | SRA |
|  | Self-Image | | DAD |
|  | Self-Image | | EET |
|  | Self-Image | | SPH |
|  | Self-Image | | CEN |
|  | Self-Image | | MPP |
|  | Self-Image | | ADA |
|  | Self-Image | | ADS |
|  | Self-Image | | DFM |
|  | Self-Image | | AAM |
|  | Self-Image | | DRN |
|  | Self-Image | | UBC |
|  | Self-Image | | RCC |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | AAS |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | ESS |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | SRA |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | DAD |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | EET |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | SPH |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | CEN |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | MPP |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | ADA |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | ADS |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | DFM |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | AAM |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | DRN |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | UBC |
|  | Intrapsychic Content | | RCC |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | AAS |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | ESS |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | SRA |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | DAD |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | EET |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | SPH |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | CEN |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | MPP |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | ADA |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | ADS |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | DFM |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | AAM |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | DRN |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | UBC |
|  | Intrapsychic Dynamics | | RCC |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | AAS |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | ESS |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | SRA |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | DAD |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | EET |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | SPH |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | CEN |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | MPP |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | ADA |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | ADS |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | DFM |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | AAM |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | DRN |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | UBC |
|  | Intrapsychic Architecture | | RCC |
|  | Mood/Affect | | AAS |
|  | Mood/Affect | | ESS |
|  | Mood/Affect | | SRA |
|  | Mood/Affect | | DAD |
|  | Mood/Affect | | EET |
|  | Mood/Affect | | SPH |
|  | Mood/Affect | | CEN |
|  | Mood/Affect | | MPP |
|  | Mood/Affect | | ADA |
|  | Mood/Affect | | ADS |
|  | Mood/Affect | | DFM |
|  | Mood/Affect | | AAM |
|  | Mood/Affect | | DRN |
|  | Mood/Affect | | UBC |
|  | Mood/Affect | | RCC |

### Table of Acronyms for Personality Spectra

(Millon 2011 167)


### Table of Expressive Emotion

(Millon 2011 168)


### Table of Interpersonal Conduct

(Millon 2011 169)

### Table of Cognitive Style

(Millon 2011 170)

### Table of Self-Image

(Millon 2011 171)

### Table of Intrapsychic Content

(Millon 2011 172)

### Table of Intrapsychic Dynamics

(Millon 2011 173)

### Table of Intrapsychic Architechture

(Millon 2011 174)

### Table of Mood/Affect

(Millon 2011 175)

## Inventory

### Millon’s Fifteen Personality Disorders

This section will provide an initial map of the fifteen personality disorders Millon describes. The fifteen can be categorized as *interpersonally imbalanced*, *intrapsychically conflicted*, *emotionally extreme*, and *structurally defective*. While each personality disorder can be then placed on spectra with normal and unusual variants. I use “unusual” here as “abnormal” carries connotations of disorder, whereas “unusual” merely statistical minority. I will elaborate on this abstraction of spectra with normal and unusual variants later, as it will provide an important dimension for understanding personality.

At this point we have the pleasure and pain and active and passive polarities, which develop the self and other polarities. The self is found because those that make more of themselves tend to exist more. The other is found because those that take care of others develop social abilities which greatly enhance survival ability.

### Interpersonally Imbalanced Personality Disorders

The interpersonally imbalanced are those who are dysfunctionally other-oriented or self-indulging.[[33]](#footnote-32) To be clear, by “dysfunctionally” I only mean to indicate that the patterns of behavior are contrary to one’s own ends. This is not to say that dysfunctional behavior cannot be ego-syntonic, as it’s quite common for one to think that one is acting in one’s own best interest as one would describe and agree with in experience but also be wrong. For example, the narcissistic personality disorder can seem like a good thing from the inside at times, as feeding one’s own ego passively does tend to feel pretty good. It’s dysfunctional inasmuch as it tends to lead to social disaster. Our ancestors that were the first lifeforms on Earth to take care of their young, the other-encouraging aspect of personality, were able to survive long enough to make more of themselves, over and over, via sexual reproduction. Via a long process I won’t detail here, though I will later provide a general understanding of. I’ll also detail ego-syntonicity and ego-distonicity later, though they can be basically understood as whether one’s personality (disorder) is agreeable to the person at a time. The below table displays the possible combinations of ego-syntonic and ego-dystonic functional and dysfunctional personalities to further clarify the concept.

### Table of Ego-Tonicity and Personality Functionality

|  | **ego-syntonic** | **ego-dystonic** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Functional personality** | Likes own actions,  Likes own consequences | Dislikes own actions,  Likes own consequences |
| **Dysfunctional personality** | Likes own actions,  Dislikes own consequences | Dislikes own actions,  Dislikes own consequences |

The category label “interpersonally imbalanced” is used as, when pathological, the personalities are characterized by cycles of behavior that dysfunctionally over-prioritize indulging their own ends or others’. One might think of these as the overly selfish and pathologically altruistic, as a starting point, though there is of course much more nuance to be had.

The other-oriented are described as dependent personality disorders in some literatures, the self-indulging independent in those same literatures. The dependent perplexingly bifurcate into the histrionic and dependent, though by Millon, and they are not usually bifurcated as such in those literatures. The independent into the antisocial and narcissistic.

**Deferential-Attached-Dependent Personality**: The **DAD Spectrum**. “Those with a needy dependency pathology have learned that feeling good, secure, confident, that is, feelings associated with pleasure and the avoidance of pain, acquire a passive reliance on the goodwill of others. These persons become strongly bonded and display a strong need for interpersonal support and attention. Should they be deprived of social affection and nurturance, they are likely to experience marked discomfort, perhaps even sadness and anxiety.” (Millon 2011 272)

**Sociable-Pleasuring-Histrionic Personality:** The **SPH Spectrum**. “Turning to others as their primary strategy, as do those in the DAD spectrum, are a group of personalities that take an active dependency stance. They achieve their goal of maximizing protection, nurturance, and reproductive success by engaging busily in a series of manipulative, seductive, gregarious, and attention-getting maneuvers with others.” (Millon 2011 273)

**Confident-Egotistic-Narcissistic Personality:** The **CEN Spectrum**. “Patients falling into what the theory refers to as an ‘‘independent’’ personality pattern exhibit a primary reliance on self rather than others. They have learned that maximum pleasure and minimum pain is achieved by minimizing the significance of others and turning passively to a naive but high validation of self.” (Millon 2011 273)

**Aggrandizing-Devious-Antisocial Personality:** The **ADA Spectrum**. “Those whom the theory characterizes as exhibiting an active-independent orientation resemble the outlook, temperament, and socially unacceptable behaviors of the DSM antisocial personality disorder. They act to counter the expectation of pain at the hands of others; this is done by actively engaging in duplicitous or illegal behaviors in which they seek to exploit others for self-gain. Skeptical regarding the motives of others, they desire autonomy, and wish revenge for what are felt as past injustices.” (Millon 2011 273)

#### Map of Interpersonally Imbalanced Personalities

|  |  |  |  | Self>Other |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Narcissistic |  |  |  |  |  | Antisocial |  |
|  |  | Egotistic |  |  |  | Devious |  |  |
|  |  |  | Confident |  | Aggrandizing |  |  |  |
| Passive>Active |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Active>Passive |
|  |  |  | Deferential |  | Sociable |  |  |  |
|  |  | Attached |  |  |  | Pleasuring |  |  |
|  | Dependent |  |  |  |  |  | Histrionic |  |
|  |  |  |  | Other>Self |  |  |  |  |

This is only meant to introduce them all briefly before we begin each in depth, so please take this early maps as basic overviews, the ones you find at the front of the atlas.Do note that the X axis is blacked out as in those cells Self=Other, so those personalities are not interpersonally imbalanced. We’ll see more of this space filled in later, and then I’ll fill in the rest myself.

### Intrapsychically Conflicted Personality Disorders

The *intrapsychically conflicted* are split in interpersonal relations and intrapsychic structures. The two kinds here are less symmetrical than the previous two. They are the *insecurely ambivalent* and the *paradoxically discordant*. The *insecurely ambivalent personality disorders* are constituted by a split between aims of independence and dependence. That is, the content of the aims of self-indulgence and other-orientation contradict each other. The paradoxically discordant have a reversal in content of their pleasure and pain polarities. That is, for them it seems good to aim for pain and avoid pleasure. In humans, this is the phenomenologically realized possibility of life enhancement feeling bad and life destruction feeling good.

#### Illustration of Normal and Paradoxically Discordant Pleasure and Pain Contents and Consequences



These manifest in life as patterns of self-conflict, hence “intrapsychically conflicted”. In the case of the insecurely ambivalent, whom are ambivalent towards others because of their perceived conflict between their own and others’ ends, and thus insecure as they perceive others as sources of both pleasure and pain, the conflict thus emerges from their actions aimed at benefiting themselves contradict their actions aimed at the social good. Conflict arises for the paradoxically discordant as perceiving life-destruction as pleasant, and life-enhancement as painful, leads to self-destructive and socially destructive acts, which makes the pursuit of life enhancement and preservation quite frustrating.

Each of these conflicts is influenced by whether a passive or active mode of adaptation is dominant. The *negativistic personality disorder* is the actively fought conflict of motives between self and other. The *compulsive personality disorder* is the passive form. Likewise, *sadistic* and *masochistic personality disorders* are the forms of pain-pleasure reversal.

**Assertive-Denigrating-Sadistic Personality:** The **ADS Spectrum**. “There are patients in whom the usual properties associated with pain and pleasure are conflicted, discordant, and reversed. As with the masochistic, to be described shortly, these patients not only seek to create painful events for others, but experience them as pleasurable. This variant of pleasure-pain reversal considers pain (stress, fear, cruelty) rather than pleasure to be the preferred mode of relating actively to others.” (Millon 2011 273)

**Abused-Aggrieved-Masochistic Personality:** The **AAM Spectrum**. “As with the assertive-sadistic, this troubled disorder stems largely from a discordant reversal of the pleasure-pain polarity. These patients engage in relationships that are at variance with this normal polarity balance. To this personality spectrum, pain may have become a preferred experience, passively accepted if not encouraged in intimate relationships” (Millon 2011 273)

I pause here to map these six with six of the previous. The interesting new variable here is whether pain is aimed normally or inverted. These six condense on the previous axes by intensifying active with object and passive with self.

#### Map of Paradoxically Discordant Personalities and Nearby Interpersonally Conflicted Personalities

|  |  |  |  | Active>Passive Other>Self |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Sadistic |  |  |  |  |  | Histrionic |  |
|  |  | Denigrating |  |  |  | Pleasuring |  |  |
|  |  |  | Assertive |  | Sociable |  |  |  |
| Seek Pain |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Avoid Pain |
|  |  |  | Abused |  | Confident |  |  |  |
|  |  | Aggrieved |  |  |  | Egotistic |  |  |
|  | Masochistic |  |  |  |  |  | Narcissistic |  |
|  |  |  |  | Passive>Active Self>Other |  |  |  |  |

Here already we can see the utility of my novel mapping of this model, as here the basic relationships because obviously related. Our previous coverage of the interpersonally imbalanced personalities should have already made it clear how the polarities sharing the Y axis here interact when people have the normal contents in their pain and pleasure recognition. While the relationships on the previous map were probably already pretty easy to compare with their nice 2x2 combination of variables. Now to make room we take the X=(-Y) diagonal and reuse it along our Y axis. So in regards to just interpersonal imbalance, Histrionics are still the opposite of Narcissists. However that axis of opposition of the interpersonally imbalanced that we had to drop here, the X=Y diagonal, represented variety ranging from the Dependent to the Antisocial. Given the similarities between Sadists and Antisocials, one may anticipate their being mapped together. If we wanted to include all of the personalities so far, we might include a Z axis running from higher passive and other to higher active and self. Then we would see the whole map from before in the XZ plane, and also see the lack of inverted pain personalities with those polarity combinations.

A worthwhile caveat at this point: These maps are only mention to indicate two dimensions of order with neither areas nor measures yet. Meaning? The only information actually included in these maps is what order personalities go in left to right and top to bottom, whatever those directions represent in the given map. We will address these topological upgrades to the model later.

**Discontented-Resentful-Negativistic Personality:** The **DRN Spectrum**. “Those persons whom the theory speaks of as ‘‘ambivalent’’ are oriented toward both self and others, but there is an intense conflict between the two. A number of these patients, originally represented in the DSM as the passive-aggressive personality, vacillate between giving primacy one time to others and then to self the next, behaving obediently one time, and reacting defiantly the next. Unable to resolve their ambivalence, they weave an actively erratic course.” (Millon 2011 273)

**Reliable-Constricted-Compulsive Personality:** The **RCC Spectrum.** “These compliant personalities display a picture of distinct other-directedness, a consistency in social conformity and interpersonal respect: their histories usually indicate having been subjected to constraint and discipline, parental strictures, and high expectations. Beneath an overtly passive veneer they experience intense desires to rebel and assert an underlying and covert self-oriented feeling and impulse. Trapped in their ambivalence they are often unable to make decisions or act.” (Millon 2011 274)

#### Map of Intrapsychically Conflicted Personalities

| Passive-Other/Active-Self |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | Negativistic |  |
|  |  | Resentful |  |  |
|  | Discontented |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Self-Other Conflict |
|  | Reliable |  |  |  |
|  |  | Constricted |  |  |
|  |  |  | Compulsive |  |
| Active-Other/Passive-Self |  |  |  |  |

There’s no real opposite to a self-other conflict. I considered self-other harmony, but our model’s normal is already supposed to be well-functioning. While people’s self-other conflicts take on very complex forms, the basic DRN-RCC distinction is made by whether one’s own or others’ ends should be active or passive. This does add a new feature to our model, combining active/passive and self/other polarities. To suggest helpful possible self-descriptions for the top and bottom combinations, “I am conflicted between accommodating others and pursuing my goals,” and “I am conflicted between modifying the world for others and making myself comfortable.”

Let us pause at this halfway point to gather the entities and factors in play so far. Everything in the model happens in the World. The World contains many People. Each Person has a Personality which describes the operating styles of the person. These personalities vary fundamentally on polarities of pain and pleasure, activity and passivity, self-propagation and other-nurturance. Thinking and feeling remained tabled for now. These poles are labeled pleasure, pain, active, passive, self, and other, and together they model human personalities. Each of them has a value, which earlier we used 0-100 as the range, but we could easily just use low, medium, and high.

Let’s call all of the things that enhance life Good. Let’s call things contrary to life’s preservation Bad. Good and Bad is relative to each person. Normally functioning personalities associate Good with Pleasure and Bad with Pain. A Person has a concept of herself, which her mind represents to herself as herself, but she should remember that her self-concept only seems to be her. Nonetheless, one’s self-concept has a big role to play in mental functioning. She is spatiotemporally located and understands herself as such. So she’s also in a constant negotiating between herself and the World outside her, her Environment. The Active and Passive aspects of her personality describe her tendencies to modify or accommodate her Environment. There are other people, too. She can understand they also have a similar thing going on for them, and as part of normal human personality, is inclined to carry over her other polarity balances to this one, that negotiating between Self and Other.

The first map uses two axes, X ranging from Passive>Active to Active>Passive. This is a short notation, and I don’t mean to imply that this map has an identical projection over different areas with equal Passive minus Active values. One may also have done well to have gone from High Passive+Low Active to Low Passive+High Active. The same basic things can be said of the Y axis. The second map introduces Seek Pain, indicating the intensity of the Pain polarity in those who experience Pain as Good. Then the last of these maps introduces the Self-Other Conflict indicating the incompatibility of what’s been considered Good for oneself and Good for others. The Y axis’s poles describe the conflicts, the Self and Other conflicting in their Active and Passive modes.

### Emotionally Extreme Personality Disorders

The *emotionally extreme personality disorders* include those that are *affectively impassive* and *intensely expressive*. The affectively impassive include the *avoidant* and *schizoid*. The intensely expressive, *turbulent* and *depressive*. The avoidant and schizoid are respectively distinguished by their preference for an active or passive adaptation mode. Both have a lack of feeling of pleasure, and avoidants actively avoid external stimulation, possibly hyper-sensitive to pain, while schizoids develop a passive-mode-heavy adaptation strategy as they are desensitized to both pleasure and pain.

“On what basis can pathology in the level or capacity of either the pain and pleasure polarities be seen as relevant to personality?” Apathetics, Asocials, and Schizoids, as well as those on the autistic spectrum are deficient in both pleasure and pain polarity objectives are deficient. That is, “they lack the capacity, relatively speaking, to experience life’s human relationship events either as painful or pleasurable. Without these motivations, they may act passively as social life goes by.” (Millon 2011 272) We categorize them as follows:

**Shy-Reticent-Avoidant Personality:** The **SRA Spectrum**. “Another clinically meaningful combination deriving from problems in the pleasure-pain polarity comprises patients with a diminished ability to experience pleasure while, at the same time, possessing an unusual sensitivity and responsiveness to psychic pain. To them, life is vexatious, possessing few rewards and much anguish. Hence, they are hyperalert and actively seek to avoid the anticipation of pain.” (Millon 2011 272)

Following this, those with a hyper-sensitivity to pleasure that develop a dysfunctional hyperfixation on pursuing pleasure are described as having the *turbulent personality disorder*, and those with the pain version of the same the *depressive personality disorder*.

**Ebullient-Exuberant-Turbulent Personality:** The **EET Spectrum**. “This group of individuals is unusual by virtue of the central role they give to the active pursuit of the pleasurable side of the pain-pleasure polarity. Typically energetic and buoyant in manner they may become overly animated, scattered, and manic,” (Millon 2011 272-273)

**Dejected-Forlorn-Melancholic Personality:** The **DFM Spectrum**. “Chronic feelings of sadness and depression are typical of these persons who persist, despite periods of objective good fortune, in being downhearted and gloomy. Oriented to the pain polarity, they characteristically behave in a passive ‘‘giving up’’ manner.” (Millon 2011 273)

#### Map of Emotionally Extreme Personalities

|  |  |  |  | Emotional Imbalanced |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Melancholic |  |  |  |  |  | Turbulant |  |
|  |  | Forlorn |  |  |  | Exuberant |  |  |
|  |  |  | Dejected |  | Ebullient |  |  |  |
| Passive |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Active |
|  |  |  | Apathetic |  | Shy |  |  |  |
|  |  | Asocial |  |  |  | Reticent |  |  |
|  | Schizoid |  |  |  |  |  | Avoidant |  |
|  |  |  |  | Low Pleasure |  |  |  |  |

Finally, the *structurally defective* include the *schizotypal, borderline*, and *paranoid personality disorders*. The schizotypal and borderline involve the dissolution or diffusion of ego capacities, and conversely, the paranoid the overly rigid separation of ego capacities. We categorize them as follows:

**Eccentric-Schizotypal-Schizophrenic Personality:** The **ESS Spectrum**. “This personality spectrum also represents a markedly deficient orientation in the pleasure-pain polarity schema. Eccentric, Schizotypal and Schizophrenic personalities experience to varying degrees minimal pleasure, have difficulty cognitively in consistently differentiating between self and other approaches to life, as well as utilizing effectively either or both active or passive modes of adaptive functioning. Many regress into social isolation with minimal personal attachments and obligations.” (Millon 2011 272)

**Mistrustful-Paranoid-Paraphrenic Personality:** The **MPP Spectrum**. “Here are seen a vigilant mistrust of others and an edgy defensiveness against anticipated criticism and deception. Driven by a high sensitivity to pain (rejection-humiliation) and oriented strongly to the self-polarity, these patients exhibit a touchy irritability, a need to assert themselves, not necessarily in action, but in an inner world of self-determined questionable beliefs and assumptions.” (Millon 2011 273)

**Unstable-Borderline-Cyclophrenic Personality:** The **UBC Spectrum**. “This personality spectrum corresponds to the theory’s emotionally dysfunctional and maladaptively ambivalent polarity orientation. Conflicts exist across the board, between all three polarities—pleasure and pain, active and passive, self and other. They seem unable to take a consistent, neutral, or balanced position among these polar extremes, tending to fluctuate from one end to the other. These persons experience intense endogenous moods, with recurring periods of dejection and apathy, often interspersed with spells of anger, anxiety, or euphoria.” (Millon 2011 273-274)

From this section we have a Table of Personality Disorders.

### Table of Personality Disorders

1. Interpersonally imbalanced
   1. Other polarity too high
      1. Active: Histrionic
      2. Passive: Dependent
   2. Self polarity too high
      1. Active: Antisocial
      2. Passive: Narcissistic
2. Intrapsychically conflicted
   1. Self-Other Content Conflict
      1. Active-Self, Active-Other: Negativistic
      2. Passive-Self, Active-Other: Compulsive
   2. Pain-Pleasure Content Switched
      1. Other: Sadistic
      2. Self: Masochistic
3. Emotionally Extreme
   1. Low Pleasure
      1. Active: Avoidant
      2. Passive: Schizoid
   2. Emotionally imbalanced
      1. Pain: Depressive
      2. Pleasure: Turbulent
4. Structurally defective
   1. Dissolution of ego
      1. Schizotypal
      2. Borderline
   2. Rigidification of ego
      1. Paranoid

From the Table of Personality Disorders it is clear that this map of personality is quite incomplete, even missing some edges. In what follows, I will fill in this map. First, let us pause to recollect the forty-five personality styles presented thus far:

#### Table of Personality Spectra

| Spectrum | Description |
| --- | --- |
| **Deferential-Attached-Dependent Personality** (**DAD)** | needy dependency pathology, learned that feelings associated with pleasure and the avoidance of pain acquire a passive reliance on the goodwill of others, become strongly bonded, display a strong need for interpersonal support and attention,likely to experience marked discomfort, perhaps even sadness and anxiety if deprived of social affection and nurturance |
| **Sociable-Pleasuring-Histrionic Personality (SPH)** | turning to others is their primary strategy, take an active dependency stance, achieve their goal of maximizing protection, nurturance, and reproductive success by engaging busily in a series of manipulative, seductive, gregarious, and attention-getting maneuvers with others |
| **Confident-Egotistic-Narcissistic Personality (CEN)** | exhibit a primary reliance on self rather than others, learned that maximum pleasure and minimum pain is achieved by minimizing the significance of others and turning passively to a naive but high validation of self |
| **Aggrandizing-Devious-Antisocial Personality (ADA)** | act to counter the expectation of pain at the hands of others; this is done by actively engaging in duplicitous or illegal behaviors in which they seek to exploit others for self-gain, skeptical regarding the motives of others, desire autonomy, and wish revenge for what are felt as past injustices |
| **Assertive-Denigrating-Sadistic Personality (ADS)** | the usual properties associated with pain and pleasure are conflicted, discordant, and reversed, seek to create painful events for others and experience them as pleasurable, considers pain rather than pleasure to be the preferred mode of relating actively to others |
| **Abused-Aggrieved-Masochistic Personality (AAM)** | engage in relationships that are at variance with normal pain-pleasure polarity balance, pain may have become a preferred experience, passively accepted if not encouraged in intimate relationships |
| **Discontented-Resentful-Negativistic Personality (DRN)** | oriented toward both self and others, but there is an intense conflict between the two, vacillate between giving primacy one time to others and then to self the next, behaving obediently one time, and reacting defiantly the next, unable to resolve their ambivalence, they weave an actively erratic course. |
| **Reliable-Constricted-Compulsive Personality (RCC)** | display a picture of distinct other-directedness, a consistency in social conformity and interpersonal respect: their histories usually indicate having been subjected to constraint and discipline, parental strictures, and high expectations, beneath an overtly passive veneer they experience intense desires to rebel and assert an underlying and covert self-oriented feeling and impulse, trapped in their ambivalence they are often unable to make decisions or act |
| **Shy-Reticent-Avoidant Personality (SRA)** | diminished ability to experience pleasure, an unusual sensitivity and responsiveness to psychic pain, life is vexatious, possessing few rewards and much anguish, hyperalert and actively seek to avoid the anticipation of pain |
| **Apathetic-Asocial-Schizoid Personality (AAS)** |  |
| **Ebullient-Exuberant-Turbulent Personality (EET)** | central role given to the active pursuit of the pleasurable side of the pain-pleasure polarity, typically energetic and buoyant in manner, may become overly animated, scattered, and manic |
| **Dejected-Forlorn-Melancholic Personality (DFM)** | chronic feelings of sadness and depression, characteristically behave in a passive ‘‘giving up’’ manner. |
| **Eccentric-Schizotypal-Schizophrenic Personality (ESS)** | markedly deficient orientation in the pleasure-pain polarity schema, experience to varying degrees minimal pleasure, have difficulty cognitively in consistently differentiating between self and other approaches to life, as well as utilizing effectively either or both active or passive modes of adaptive functioning, many regress into social isolation with minimal personal attachments and obligations |
| **Mistrustful-Paranoid-Paraphrenic Personality (MPP)** | vigilant mistrust of others, edgy defensiveness against anticipated criticism and deception, driven by a high sensitivity to pain (rejection-humiliation) and oriented strongly to the self-polarity, touchy irritability, need to assert themselves, not necessarily in action, but in an inner world of self-determined questionable beliefs and assumptions |
| **Unstable-Borderline-Cyclophrenic Personality (UBC)** | conflicts exist across the board, between all three polarities—pleasure and pain, active and passive, self and other, seem unable to take a consistent, neutral, or balanced position among these polar extremes, tending to fluctuate from one end to the other, experience intense endogenous moods, with recurring periods of dejection and apathy, often interspersed with spells of anger, anxiety, or euphoria |


To understand how the options have been mapped out, I present the following.

#### Table of Personality Spectra Polar Values

| Spectrum | Pain | Pleasure | Passive-Active | Self | Other |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAD** |  |  | Passive | low | high |
| **SPH** |  |  | Active | low | high |
| **CEN** |  |  | Passive | high | low |
| **ADA** |  |  | Active | high | low |
| **ADS** | inverted | inverted |  |  | high |
| **AAM** | inverted | inverted |  | high |  |
| **DRN** |  |  | Active-Self; Passive-Other |  |  |
| **RCC** |  |  | Active-Other; Passive-Self |  |  |
| **SRA** | high | low | Active |  |  |
| **AAS** | low | low | Passive |  |  |
| **EET** |  | high |  |  |  |
| **DFM** | high |  |  |  |  |
| **ESS** | low | low | passive | low | low |
| **MPP** | high |  |  | high | low |
| **UBC** |  |  |  |  |  |

Also helpful is the following circulagram from Millon:

### Personality Spectrum Circulagram

(Millon 2011 275)

This circulagram is a helpful overview of Millon’s categories of personalities, though the limited understanding of the structure of their space is rather evident. Do notice in all five major categories, there’s an Active-Passive spectrum to consider. Though in making these five groups of three fit, do note the major categories have in fact changed, as we’re now looking at Evolutionary Orientations. These are *Detached*, *Dependent*, *Independent*, *Discordant*, and *Ambivalent*. Notice this way of putting things puts Scizotypal with Schizoid and Avoidant, Paranoid with Antisocial and Narcissistic, and Borderline with Negativistic and Compulsive. Each of the evolutionary orientations is defined in terms of main strategy for pain/pleasure. Detached personalities are low on both polarities. Independent and Dependent each turn to Self or Other as the source of Pleasure/Pain. Discordant personalities have strangely aimed Pleasure/Pain, and Ambivalent have conflicts between their own and other Pleasure/Pain.

#### Table of Pain/Pleasure and Active/Passive

| Pain/Pleasure Aim | Passive |  | Active |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Low | AAS | ESS | SRA |
| Self | CEN | MPP | ADA |
| Other | DAD | EET | SPH |
| Discordant | AAM | DFM | ADS |
| Ambivalent | DRN | UBC | RCC |

Interesting how the three most severely disordered (ESS, MPP, UBC) are in the balanced middle column. This is a helpful way to look at the 45 personalities arranged, but do note we could keep finding useful ways to rearrange them. Some of the personalities aren’t very clear fits for their rows, but five categories that mostly work for this is a feat. However, also note that clustering them this way hides what isn’t being represented. As we saw earlier, this is an incomplete list, despite the neat appearance of this grouping. Also, the generic axis of normality to disorder makes some personalities seem closer together than they are. Two opposite personality disorders are of course more different from each other than from more mild manifestations of their personality styles.

### Functional Domains

The last section briefly talked about functional and structural domains, but now we should take a closer look at them:

**Emotional expression:** “These inferred emotional attributes relate to the observables seen at the ‘‘behavioral level’’ of data, and are usually recorded by noting what and how the patient acts. Through inference, observations of overt behavior enable us to deduce either what the patient unknowingly reveals about him- herself or, conversely, what he or she wishes others to think or to know about him or her. Not only is the range and character of expressive emotions wide and diverse, but they convey distinctive and worthwhile clinical information, from communicating a sense of personal anxiety to exhibiting a disciplined self-control, and so on. Characteristics such as impassivity, fretfulness, impetuousness, impulsiveness, resentfulness and so on are among the varied forms of emotional expression worthy of note. This domain of emotional data is likely to be productive in differentiating patients on all three polarities of Millon’s (1990) theoretical model.” (Millon 2011 278)

**Interpersonal conduct:** “A patient’s style of relating to others also is noted essentially at the ‘‘behavioral’’ data level and may be captured in a number of ways, such as how his or her actions impact on others, intended or otherwise; the attitudes that underlie, prompt, and give shape to these actions; the methods by which he or she engages others to meet his or her needs; or his or her way of coping with social tensions and conflicts. Also notable is the person’s ability to appreciate and understand the emotions and intentions of others, as well as the capacity or desire to form affiliative relationships, the ability to consider multiple points of view, and whether relationships are mutually rewarding and reciprocal. Extrapolating from these observations, the clinician may construct an image of how the patient functions in relation to others, be it antagonistically, respectfully, aversively, secretively, and so on” (Millon 2011 278)

**Cognitive style:** “How the patient focuses and allocates attention, encodes and processes information, organizes thoughts, makes attributions, and communicates reactions and ideas to others represent data at the ‘‘phenomenological’’ level, and are among the most useful indexes to the clinician of the patient’s distinctive way of functioning. By synthesizing these signs and symptoms, it may be possible to identify indications of what may be termed an impoverished style, or distracted thinking, or cognitive flightiness, or constricted thought, and so on.” (Millon 2011 278)

**Intrapsychic dynamics:** “Although the ‘‘dynamics’’ of self-protection, need gratification, and conflict resolution are consciously recognized at times, they represent data derived primarily at the intrapsychic level. Because these ‘‘defense mechanisms’’ are internal processes, they are more difficult to discern and describe than processes anchored closer to the observable world. As such, they are not directly amenable to assessment by self-reflective appraisal in their pure form, but only as derivatives potentially many levels removed from their core conflicts and their dynamic regulation. By definition, these dynamic regulatory mechanisms co-opt and transform both internal and external realities before they can enter conscious awareness in a robust, unaltered form. When chronically enacted, they often perpetuate a sequence of events that intensifies the very problems they were intended to circumvent. Despite the methodological problems involved, the task of identifying which dynamic mechanisms are chosen (e.g., rationalization, displacement, reaction formation) and the extent to which they are employed is extremely useful in a comprehensive personality assessment. No organizing principle has yet been found by which a periodic table or taxonomy of these dynamic mechanisms might be rationally constructed (Vaillant, 1971) and thereby put on a nonarbitrary basis. Consequently, those mechanisms ultimately selected for measurement may be conceptualized through theoretically disparate orientations and at diverse levels of abstraction, as the history of psychodynamic literature well illustrates. Studies seem to indicate that although the measurement of the intrapsychic mechanisms has improved through content objectification and specification, current procedures to assess them still leave something to be desired. In particular, it is likely that the external validity of intrapsychic measures will remain more difficult to establish than that of self-report inventories for some time to come.” (Millon 2011 279)

### Structural Domains

The previous section concerned with those domains that pertain to personal functioning. All of the things described within each are about what the person does. These next domains instead structure the personality itself. These are generally long-standing features of people, as opposed to the above which, while the personality’s styles may stay the same, the actions will keep being new.


**Self-image:** “As the inner world of symbols is mastered through development, the ‘‘swirl’’ of events that buffets the young child gives way to a growing sense of order and continuity. One major configuration emerges to impose a measure of sameness on an otherwise fluid environment, the perception of self-as-object, a distinct, ever-present, and identifiable ‘‘I’’ or ‘‘me.’’ Selfidentity stems largely from conceptions formed at this phenomenological level of analysis. It is especially significant in that it provides a stable anchor to serve as a guidepost and to give continuity to changing experience. Most persons have an implicit sense of who they are, but differ greatly in clarity, accuracy, and complexity (Millon, 1986b) of their self-introspections. Notable here is the ability to reflect on one’s internal experiences, whether self-appraisals are distorted, dependent on others rather than one’s own values; is one’s self-sense characterized by a lack of authenticity, poorly regulated and unstable, simplistic, impoverished, fragile, concrete, contradictory, and so on. Specific self characteristics worthy of note would include a view of self as estranged, admirable, combative, discontented, and so on. Few can articulate the psychic elements that make up this image, such as stating knowingly whether they view themselves as primarily alienated, or inept, or complacent, or conscientious, and so on. Only a few instruments have been developed to aid in the identification of differences in self-image.” (Millon 2011 280)

**Intrapsychic content:** “As noted previously, significant early experiences with others leave an inner imprint, a structural residue composed of memories, attitudes, and affects that serves as a substrate of dispositions for perceiving and reacting to life’s ongoing events. Analogous to the various organ systems of which the body is composed, both the character and substance of these internalized representations of significant figures and relationships of the past can be differentiated and analyzed for clinical purposes. Variations in the nature and content of this inner world can be associated with one or another personality and lead us to employ descriptive terms to represent them, such as shallow, contrived, vexatious, debased, undifferentiated, concealed, fluctuating and irreconcilable.” (Millon 2011 280)


**Intrapsychic architecture:** “The overall architecture that serves as a framework for an individual’s psychic interior may display weakness in its structural cohesion, exhibit deficient coordination among its components, and possess few mechanisms to maintain balance and harmony, regulate internal conflicts, or mediate external pressures. The concept also refers to the structural strength, interior congruity, and functional efficacy of the personality system. ‘‘Organization’’ of the mind is a concept almost exclusively derived from inferences at the ‘‘intrapsychic level’’ of analysis, and are akin to and employed in conjunction with current psychoanalytic notions such as borderline and psychotic levels; this usage, however, tends to be limited, relating essentially to quantitative degrees of integrative pathology, not to qualitative variations in either integrative structure or configuration. ‘‘Stylistic’’ variants of this structural attribute may be employed to characterize each of the personality prototypes; their distinctive organizational attributes are represented with descriptors such an inchoate, fragile, spurious, unruly, depleted, disjoined, and compartmentalized.” (Millon 2011 280)

**Mood/temperament:** “Few observables are clinically more relevant from the biophysical level of data analysis than the predominant character of an individual’s affect and the intensity and frequency with which he or she expresses it. The meaning of behaviorally expressed momentary and transient extreme emotions is easy to decode. This is not so with the more subtle moods and feelings that insidiously and repetitively pervade the patient’s ongoing relationships and experiences. Not only are the expressive features of mood and drive conveyed by terms such as apathetic, mercurial, woeful, irritable, distraught, labile, fickle, or hostile (communicated via self-report), but they are revealed as well, albeit indirectly, in the patient’s level of activity, speech quality, and physical appearance. The most useful aspect of this attribute as it relates to the theory is its utility in appraising features relevant to the pleasure-pain and active-passive polarities.” (Millon 2011 283)

### Table of Expressions of Personality Spectra Across Trait Dimensions

(Millon 2011 281)

### Table of Personality Spectra Levels and Variants

(Millon 2011 282)

### Deferential Styles, Attached Types, Dependent Disorders: The DAD Spectrum

We now turn to the fifteen chapters of Millon that each cover a personality spectrum. All have already been introduced, so now we can explore each spectrum in a bit more detail.

“Both the DAD dependent spectrum and the SPH histrionic spectrum personalities (sociable styles, pleasuring types, histrionic (SPH) disorders) are distinguished from other personality patterns by their marked need for social approval and affection, and by their willingness to live in accord with the desires of others. The ‘‘centers of gravity’’ of both DAD dependents and SPH histrionics lie in others, not in themselves. They adapt their behavior either to solicit or to please those to whom they are oriented, and their intense search for support and affection leads them to deny thoughts and feelings that may arouse the displeasure of others. They avoid placing themselves first lest their actions be seen by others as undesirable. Both of these other oriented personalities feel empty or lost when alone and need repeated assurances that they will not be abandoned. Exceedingly sensitive to disapproval, they may experience any form of disinterest or criticism as deeply distressing.

DAD spectrum dependents and SPH histrionics do differ, however. DAD personalities take an ecologically passive stance, leaning on others to guide their lives, encouraging others to take the initiative, to arrange their life circumstances, and to be available to nurture and protect them. Moreover, DAD spectrum personalities, whether mild, moderate, or severe variants, need others to manage their lives. By contrast, SPH spectrum histrionics are active, taking the initiative to arrange and to modify the ecological circumstances of their lives, ensuring first and foremost that the [attention] and approval they need from others will be elicited by their own behavior. They do not sit by passively, waiting for the competencies and skills of others to give shape to their lives. They do not cling or seek nurturance, as do the DAD spectrum dependent personalities. Rather, the principal goal is to actively secure attention and approval as a means to avoid disinterest and abandonment. In contrast to the DAD spectrum dependent, the SPH histrionics possess the will and the ability to take charge of their lives; however, despite initial surface appearances to the contrary, they are deeply insecure, unsure of whether they are really desirable and truly loved.” (Millon 2011 288)

The DAD and SPH are worth comparing as both are characterized by an imbalance between a high other and low self polarity. Both see others as the primary source of good in their lives, but they vary in whether they pursue or wish for the desired relationships.

“In general, all DAD personalities have a notable tendency to denigrate themselves and their accomplishments. What self-esteem they possess is determined largely by the support and encouragement of others. Unable to draw on themselves as a major source of comfort and gratification, they passively arrange their lives to ensure a constant supply of nurturance and guidance from their environment. However, by turning exclusively to external sources for their support, DAD persons leave themselves open to the whims and moods of others. Losing the affection and protection of those on whom they lean leads them to be exposed to the potential void of nothingness. To protect themselves, DAD persons quickly submit and comply with what others wish, or make themselves so agreeable and cooperative that no one would want to abandon them.”

The “deferrential” label is revealing; perhaps a fitting name for the entire spectrum would be “compliant”, as the central feature is abdicating oneself to others.


“Epidemiologic studies vary appreciably in their results. Meta analysis suggests the inpatient prevalence as between 15% to 25%, while outpatient data indicates the percentage as significantly less, around 10% (Klein, 2003; Oldham & Morris, 1990). Gender differences are modest, with a 2 to 1 ratio favoring females (Bornstein, 1997).” (Millon 2011 289)

That inpatient rates are higher for DPD is unsurprising given the proclivity for dependency that defines the personality.


“We next turn to the dependent personality as interpreted by the Evolutionary Polarity model; Figure 6.1 outlines the major motivational elements that undergird the ecologically adaptive style of this personality spectrum. As with the majority of other personalities, the role of the enhancement (pleasure) and preservation (pain) polarities are of only modest significance. This minimal role is not found in the case of the AAS schizoid, SRA avoidant, and DFM melancholic depressive personality spectra; here, the pleasure domain is notably deficient and the pain domain is prominent. In the DAD dependent personality spectrum, primary attention may be found in the other (nurturant) and the passive (accommodating) polarities. DAD dependents share with the SPH histrionic personality spectra a major ecological commitment to another-oriented direction; both seek support, attention, and protection from others. However, for the dependent personality, there is also an adaptive style of searching for guidance and support from others, a need to have them not only provide nurturance and protection but also to guide and show them how and when to achieve these security goals. This contrasts with the actively oriented ecological style of the histrionic personality, who arranges his or her life circumstances by making things happen. SPH histrionics may need others for attention and approval but are unwilling to accept the possibility that these might not be forthcoming; hence, they arrange and manipulate events, rather than wait for others to do it for them. SPHs take active steps to achieve their goals effectively and reliably. By contrast, DADs entrust all to others, being passive, loyal, trustworthy and dependable, but lacking in initiative and competence.” (Millon 2011 294)

In each chapter, Millon provides a handy figure quickly conveying the strengths of the polarities for each spectrum of personalities.


#### Figure 6.1 from Millon 2011

 (Millon 2011 294)

#### Table of Trait Domains of DAD Spectrum

(Millon 295)

### Figure of Salience of Trait Domains in the DAD Spectrum

(Millon 2011 296)

**Intrapsychic Dynamics:** **Introjection/Denial:** “The inadequacies that dependents see within themselves may provoke feelings of emptiness and the dread of being alone. These terrifying thoughts are often controlled by introjection, a process by which they internalize the beliefs and values of another, imagining themselves to be one with, or an integral part of, a more powerful and supporting figure. By allying themselves with the competencies of their partners, they can avoid the anxieties evoked by the thought of their own impotence. Not only are they uplifted by illusions of shared competence, but through incorporation they may find solace in the belief that the attachments they have constructed are firm and inseparable.” (Millon 2011 297)

“Denial mechanisms also characterize the dependent’s defensive style. This is seen most clearly in the Pollyanna quality of dependents’ thoughts. DADs are ever-alert to soften the edges of interpersonal strain and discomfort. A syrupy sweetness may typify their speech, and they may persistently cover up or smooth over troublesome events. Especially threatening are their own hostile impulses; any inner feeling or thought that might endanger their security and acceptance is quickly staved off. A torrent of contrition and self-debasement may burst forth to expiate momentary transgressions.” (Millon 2011 297-298)

#### Inventory of DAD Styles

“Individuals comprising the DAD spectrum have historically been found in all traditional cultures. They are persons whose roles are characterized as subordinate to others, expected to act in a self-abnegating manner, and exhibiting a public posture of low self-esteem. Even in our own Western culture, in the early part of the 21st century, there remain many settings where women play an inferior and subjugated role. Since the advent of the feminist movement, however, women no longer nor should they be willing to accept the status of second-class citizens. Despite this important advance, the role of deferential ministering to the wishes of men remains a pervasive cultural style throughout much of the undeveloped world.” (Millon 2011 299)

* **Altruistically Deferential Personality Style:** “This first of the normal personality variants on the DAD spectrum comprises individuals whose primary mode of relating is that of being attractive and pleasing others, all done in order to become close, if not inseparable, from significant others, a captivating and appealing person full of well-intentioned behaviors. Where feasible, they seek to become congenial and faithful to others, to be comely and fetching and, most importantly, to be needed and desired by them. Appealing and interesting, it is their hope that others will reciprocate with harmony, affection, and genuine warmth. They not only seek reciprocity to ensure their closeness, if not dependency, hoping through their friendly comments and deferential actions to confirm their agreeable sense of self, the image that they are in fact alluring and pleasing persons for others to see and appreciate. The importance of likability to these agreeably pleasing individuals leads them to attend to how others react to them, to hope others will display an abundance of reciprocal appeal and affection. There is a deep disparity, however, that develops between their self-image of being amiable and charming, and the inner reality that they are, in fact, needy persons, persons who seek and deeply need the reciprocal support and attention of others on whom they depend. Displaying an inviting and cheerful attitude helps confirm for this engaging individual that he or she is truly a winsome and attractive person.” (Millon 2011 300)
* **Accommodatingly Deferential Personality Style:** “The deferentially accommodating person’s behavior is best characterized by a submissiveness, a leaning on others for affection, nurturance, and security. The fear of being abandoned leads this personality to be overly compliant and obliging. Some of these individuals handle their fears by being socially gregarious and superficially charming, often evident in the seeking of attention and in self-dramatizing behaviors. These latter persons will be described as Appeasing Sociables, to be discussed in Chapter 7. They possess an unusual knack for placating and conceding; as normal variants of the histrionic, they comfortably exhibit gregarious, charming, and self-dramatizing behaviors. Both accommodating deferentials and appeasing socializers are gracious, neighborly, benevolent, compliant, eager to please, that is, obliging and agreeable in their relationships with others. What differentiates them is the strong tendency of the accommodating personality style to be self-sacrificing, their ability to adopt not only a submissive style, but to play the role well of inferior and subordinate to others. In this regard, we may see in these individuals a basic amalgamation between the dependent and masochistic personality styles.” (Millon 2011 301)

“Why and how do Deferential personalities slip to more severe levels of pathology? Numerous cultures have established acceptable roles for those at the normal Deferential level. Hence, few will deteriorate to the Attached level or, if they do, they are likely to be tolerated as providing a useful submissive function in relation to others.” (Millon 2011 303)


* **Childlike Attached Personality Type:** “There is reason to believe that maturation does not follow a predetermined course in all individuals; moreover, persons differ in the speed in which certain processes develop. Similarly, there is evidence to indicate that not all persons mature in all their capacities and functions to the same level. For example, in the intellectual realm, there are persons who appear extraordinarily talented in mathematics and music at a very early age; conversely, there are those who never achieve even a modest level of accomplishment at any point in their life in these same realms. Individual differences in the level and rapidity of maturational development is widespread across all attribute domains.” (Millon 2011 303)
* **Selflessly Attached Personality Type: “**Selflessly attached personalities not only subordinate themselves to others, a characteristic shared by other DAD personalities, but merge themselves totally with another such that they lose themselves in the process. These persons willingly give up their own identity as independent human beings to acquire a more secure sense of significance, identity, emotional stability, and purpose in life. As the process of total identification with another becomes established and integrated, these individuals fail increasingly to develop any of their own, personally distinctive, potentials. And as their own sense of self becomes a less significant part of their being, whatever they do is done almost entirely in the service of extending the status and significance of another, be it a person or an institutional entity.” (Millon 2011 306)

“Will the Attached personality regress readily to a more severe level? Clinical Dependency is likely to exist mostly in cultures (ecological habitats) that actively reject these submissive and pacific personalities. Their occurrence typically follows a significant personal loss or serious family complications. Although all combinations are possible theoretically, experience and research show that only certain personality types tend to overlap or coexist with the dependent disorder. This discussion draws on the evidence of several statistical cluster studies to supplement what theoretical deduction and observation suggest as the most prevalent personality mixtures. Also included are patterns that reflect differences in the pathogenic background of the various DAD personality spectrum variants.” (Millon 2011 307)

* **Ineffectual Dependent Personality Disorder:** The ineffectual dependent type shows similarities to the *languid schizoid* pattern. Both styles exhibit a general lack of vitality, low energy level, fatigability, and a general weakness in expressiveness and spontaneity. Hence, we are likely to see with some frequency that ineffectual dependents reflect the intermingling of both basic dependent and schizoid characteristics. However, the languid schizoid is motorically and affectively deficient. Moreover, thought processes among purer schizoid personalities, though not markedly deficient, appear unfocused, particularly with regard to interpersonal matters. Schizoid languid types also show a deficiency in the expression of affect, a defect stemming in all probability from an anhedonic temperament, inclining them to be persistently aloof from life’s social interactions. By contrast, ineffectual dependents do not want to be isolated from close personal relationships. Although seeking to be close and caring, these dependent types lack drive and staying power, are deficient in their adultlike skills, and seem simply unwilling to pursue solutions to end even minor problems.” (Millon 2011 307)
* **Disquieted Dependent Personality Disorder:** “This adult subtype is likely to be prevalent in settings that minister to ambulatory chronic patients who are sustained in a dependent and largely parasitic state by virtue of institutional rewards and requirements. As with other dependent varieties, their behavior may be characterized as submissively dependent, self-effacing, and noncompetitive. Others are leaned on for guidance and security, and a passive role is assumed in relationships. These dependents, however, give evidence of intense apprehensiveness and fearfulness that overlie a sulking lack of initiative and an anxious avoidance of autonomy. Hence, the disquieted dependent reflects a commingling of the basic dependent style with that of the avoidant personality.” (Millon 2011 307-308)

“As noted in previous chapters, features of other personalities often fuse with the DAD dependent personality prototype spectrum, as seen in various Adult variants (e.g., immature, ineffectual). It would be of interest, however, to visually represent which Axis II disorders have, in fact, been found empirically to covary with the DAD dependent personality. The highest degree of correspondence for the dependent personality is found with the avoidant (SRA) and masochistic (AAM) personality disorders. Lesser co-morbidities are seen with the histrionic (SPH) and the melancholic (DFM). Not to be overlooked are minor degrees of concurrence with compulsive (RCC) and negativistic (DRN) personality spectra.” (Millon 2011 312)


#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the DAD Spectrum

(Millon 2011 326)


### Sociable Styles, Pleasuring Types, Histrionic Disorders: The SPH Spectrum

“Turning to others as their primary strategy, as do those of the DAD dependent spectrum (deferential styles, attached types, dependent disorders), are a group of personalities that take an active dependency stance. These equally interpersonally imbalanced personalities of the *SPH histrionic spectrum* (*sociable styles*, *pleasuring types*, *histrionic disorders*) achieve their goal of maximizing protection, nurturance, and reproductive success by engaging busily in a series of manipulative, seductive, gregarious, and attention-getting maneuvers with others.” (Millon 2011 330)


#### Figure 7.1 From Millon 2011

(Millon 2011 340)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the SPH Spectrum

(Millon 2011 341)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the SPH Spectrum

(Millon 2011 342)

**Intrapsychic Dynamics: Dissociation/Repression: “**As already noted, SPH persons actively seek to avoid introspection and responsible thinking. Not only are they characteristically attuned to external rather than internal events, but their lifelong orientation toward what others think and feel has prevented them from learning to deal with their own inner thoughts and feelings. As a consequence, they lack intrapsychic skills and must resort to gross mechanisms to handle unconscious emotions. What they have learned best is to simply seal off, repress, or dissociate entire segments of memory and feeling that may prompt discomfort. As a result, much of their past is a blank, devoid of the complex reservoir of attitudes and emotions they should have acquired through experiences. SPH personalities regularly alter and recompose their self-presentations to create a succession of socially attractive but changing facades. By disconnecting their true selves from the theatrical pose they present to the world, they can distract themselves sufficiently to avoid reflecting on and integrating the emptiness that inheres within them or the painful thoughts and emotions that otherwise surge up into consciousness.

To the degree that SPH personalities possess an inner world of thought, memory, and emotion, they try to repress it and to keep it from intruding into their conscious life. This they do for several reasons. First, their own sense of worth depends on the judgment of others; there is no reason to explore the inner self, for they alone cannot appraise their personal value or provide acceptance or approval. Second, by turning attentions inward these personalities distract themselves from attending to the outer world. This divided attention can prove troublesome because they feel they must be ever alert to the desires and moods of others.

The contrast between their pretensions and objective reality leads these personalities to repress not only one or two deficiencies within themselves but all of their inner self; it is the triviality of their entire being, its pervasive emptiness and paucity of substance that must be kept from awareness. Repression is therefore applied across the board; it is massive and absolute.” (Millon 2011 345)

“Intrapsychic Architecture: Disjointed The morphologic structure and organization of the SPH spectrum’s inner world is loosely knit and carelessly united. Internal controls and regulations are scattered and unintegrated, with ad hoc methods used to restrain impulses, coordinate defenses, and resolve conflicts. Regulatory mechanisms must, of necessity, be broad and sweeping to maintain overall psychic stability and cohesion. Of course, when successful, these efforts only undermine psychic coherence by further disconnecting and isolating this personality’s thoughts, feelings, and actions.

Having deprived themselves of past learnings, SPH personalities are less able to function on their own and thereby perpetuate their dependency on others. Moreover, to compensate for the void of their past, and for the guidance these learnings could provide, they remain locked into the present. In short, the intrapsychic world of the SPH personality not only remains skimpy and insubstantial, but their preoccupation with external immediacies has led to a further impoverishment of what little richness and depth they may possess.

To preserve their exteroceptive vigilance, they must reduce ‘‘inner’’ distractions, especially those that may be potentially disturbing. SPH persons seek actively to blot out any awareness of the barrenness of their intrapsychic world. This inner emptiness is especially intolerable because it points to the fraudulence that exists between the impressions they seek to convey to others and their true cognitive sterility and emotional poverty.” (Millon 2011 345)

“Our society is one in which friendliness and general sociability is usually rewarded and viewed in favor. That is not the case necessarily in other cultures. In these cultural folkways people who are emotionally expressive and socially gregarious are sometimes viewed with suspicion, seemingly overly superficial and nonsubstantive. The traits of these personalities derive from the special circumstances of their upbringing and experience, not just qualities stemming from the influences and values of the larger society. When we think of an outgoing personality, not extremes such as those with the histrionic full disorder, we should assume that both cultural and unique life experiences have coalesced, creating a pattern of behaviors thereby that stems from both the specifics of the individual’s unique past and the impact of more general social influences.” (Millon 2011 346)

**Gregariously Sociable Personality Style: “**These emotionally unrestrained individuals are often seen by others as going out of their way to expose their charms and display their allure publicly. Through their openly demonstrative actions and commentary they wish to be seen as attractive and appealing. By dint of their wiles and physical appeal, there is a desire to become part of their social network or even their more intimate orbit. Their ambition is to disclose for others whatever behaviors and temptations will be judged by them as appealingly desirable. This they do by virtue of either their natural physical attractiveness or by their social flattery, unusual attire, bizarre ornaments, or upscale and popular styles” (Millon 2011 347)

**Appeasingly Sociable Personality Style:** “The desire to please another, to make the person like them, to approve of them, to tell them that what they are doing is good, is the major driving force that motivates these appeasing personality styles. Approval from others is their supreme goal. Not only do these mild histrionics want to demonstrate that they love everybody and will do anything for them, but appeasing personalities want everyone to praise and commend them in return. The search for reciprocal recognition and approval compels and justifies everything they do. Appeasing sociable persons show an unusual knack for pleasing people, for being thoughtful about their wishes, for making them become friends rather than mere acquaintances. What is most distinctive about these personalities is the need on their part to placate others, to try to mend schisms that have taken place, and to patch up or smooth over troubling matters. These SPH persons share attributes most evident in those of the DAD spectrum. They moderate conflicts by yielding, compromising, and conceding to the wishes of others and are ready to sacrifice themselves for approval and commendation. The configuration of characteristics that typify this appeasing style often encompasses an admixture of histrionic, dependent, and compulsive features.” (Millon 2011 348)

“Under what conditions does the normal segment of the SPH personality regress to a more pathological *Pleasuring* level? Sociability does not usually result in psychic deterioration. It tends to be a style that produces beneficent consequences. However, the Sociable’s persistent attention-seeking, shallowness, and flightiness can become grating to others, leading to increasing annoyance and withdrawal, if not explicit rejection, on their part. Given the Sociable person’s vulnerabilities, a downturn to the more extreme pleasuring level is likely under these circumstances. It is only when the essentially normal skills of the sociable style begin to fail that we see these individuals regress into the more-or-less frantic pleasuring behavior typical of this personality type. Here we see increasing efforts to gain the attention of others, a trend that leads them to become cognitively flighty and scattered in their social gregariousness. As before, two variants of the mid-level spectrum personalities will be discussed.” (Millon 2011 351, emphasis added)

**Theatrically Pleasuring Personality Type:** “The theatrically pleasuring person is a caricature of the basic SPH histrionic spectrum—dramatic, romantic, attention-seeking. As Fromm recognized in his description of the ‘‘marketing orientation,’’ there are individuals who live life as if they were public commodities, objects for sale. No characteristic of oneself is seen as intrinsic—as a stable and fundamental aspect of the self. It is the appearance of things that is everything. These personalities transform themselves into something synthesized, something that appears in ways other than it really is, as actors do in their professional work. This readily devised image is projected on the world, shifting from time to time as the occasion calls for. Theatrical personalities package themselves to meet the expectations of others as closely as possible. They are chameleons of sorts, changing their colors and shadows to fit whatever environment in which they find themselves. We may describe this variant of the SPH spectrum as affected and mannered, one who ‘‘puts on’’ striking and eye-catching postures and clothes, markets his or her appearance to others, and simulates desirable and dramatic poses that are fabricated or synthesized to create an appealing image of self.” (Millon 2011 351)

**Infantile Pleasuring Personality Type:** “This personality variant often demonstrates a compound of histrionic and borderline personality features. It is akin to what Kernberg (1967) has referred to as the infantile personality, noted by labile and diffuse emotions, childlike pouting, and demanding-clinging behaviors, as well as a crude and direct sexual provocativeness. In certain ways, this adult subtype might be spoken of as a primitively developed and poorly organized SPH type. Descriptively, we might characterize the infantile personality as labile, high-strung, and inclined to express volatile emotions. They display a childlike hysteria, typified by a pouting and demanding attachment to others; they fasten and clutch to significant others, seemingly fused to them, if not clinging and ‘‘hanging on.’’” (Millon 2011 354)


“Does the Pleasuring type deteriorate further? Regression to a full-blown Histrionic disorder stems from the increasing failure of this personality to evoke supportive attention from others. Their intense search for approval will begin to undermine their social efforts, leading to increasingly pervasive histrionic behaviors.” (Millon 2011 355)

**Disingenuous Histrionic Personality Disorder: “**The disingenuous histrionic’s behavior is typified by a veneer of friendliness and sociability. Although making a superficially good impression on acquaintances, a more characteristic unreliability, impulsive tendencies, and deep resentments and moodiness are seen frequently among family members and other close associates. A socially facile lifestyle may be noted by a persistent seeking of attention and excitement, often expressed in seductive behaviors. Relationships are shallow and fleeting, frequently disrupted by caustic comments and impulses that are acted on with insufficient deliberation.” (Millon 2011 355)

**Tempestuous Histrionic Personality Disorder: “**The tempestuous histrionic’s behavior is typified by a high degree of emotional lability and short periods of impulsive acting out, alternating with depressive complaints, moodiness, and sulking. Notable also are a hypersensitivity to criticism, a low frustration tolerance, immature behaviors, short-sighted hedonism, and a seeking of excitement and stimulation. Emotions surge readily to the surface, untransformed and unmoderated, evident in a distractible, flighty, and erratic style of behavior. Whatever inner feelings—guilt, anger, or desire—may be sensed, they spill quickly to the surface in pure and direct form.” (Millon 2011 356)

The greatest level of co-morbidity between SPH and other Axis II disorders is with CEN. Other strong associations are with DAD, UBC, and ADA. There’s some modest overlap with DRN and RCC.” (Millon 2011 357)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the SPH Spectrum


(Millon 2011 373)

### Confident Styles, Egotistic Types, Narcissistic Disorders: The CEN Spectrum


“These patients, according to the evolutionary model, are one of two ‘‘independent’’ personality patterns. They exhibit a primary reliance on self rather than others, and have learned that maximum pleasure and minimum pain is achieved by diminishing the significance of others and turning passively to the high status they assign to themselves. Although equally ‘‘imbalanced’’ as are dependent patterns in the self-other polarity, theirs is in the direction of self rather than other. They are opposite in orientation to DAD dependent and SPH histrionic personalities. These latter spectra look to others to provide the reinforcements of life. Both the CEN narcissistic (confident styles, egotistic types, narcissistic disorders) and ADA antisocial (assertive styles, denigrating types, antisocial disorders) spectra (described fully in this and the next chapter) turn to self for gratification, having learned to rely on themselves rather than others for safety and self-esteem (Britton, 2004). Weakness and dependency are threatening to CEN and ADA spectrum personalities.” (Millon 2011 375)

“Because both CEN narcissists and ADA antisocials are preoccupied with aggrandizing personal adequacy, power, and prestige, status and superiority are always sought to be in their favor. They fear the loss of self-determination, proudly display their achievements, and strive to enhance themselves and to be ascendant, stronger, more beautiful, wealthier, and more important than others. In sum, it is what they think of themselves, not what others say or can provide for them that serves as the touchstone for their security and contentment.” (Millon 2011 375)


#### Figure 8.1 from Millon 2011

(Millon 2011 388)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the CEN Spectrum

(Millon 2011 389)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the CEN Spectrum

(Millon 2011 389)

**Intrapsychic Content: Contrived: “**The internalized representations of past experiences are deeply embedded and serve as a template for evaluating new life experiences. For CENs, these object-representations are composed far more than usual of illusory and changing memories. Problematic past relationships are readily refashioned so as to appear entirely consonant with the CENs high senses of self-worth. Unacceptable impulses and deprecatory evaluations are quickly transformed so as to enable these individuals to maintain their preferred and contrived image of both themselves and their past. Fortunately for most CEN narcissists, they were led by their parents to believe that they were invariably lovable and perfect, regardless of what they did and what they thought. Such an idyllic existence could not long endure; the world beyond home is seldom so benign and accepting. As a consequence, the CEN narcissist must transform the less palatable aspects of the past so they are consistent with what the person wishes they were rather than what they were in fact.” (Millon 2011 391)

“With the exception of the historically well-to-do and those of regal stature, the CEN narcissistic personality spectrum may be considered a pattern of behavior unique to the late 20th century. And even during this period, as writers such as Lasch (1978) have noted, it may be more or less distinctive to the upper and upper middle social classes of the United States. As conferences of an international character have demonstrated, narcissistic styles are not prevalent among clinical populations in most nations; the failure of the ICD-10 to include the narcissistic disorder attests to the preceding. Nevertheless, in ‘‘narcissistic societies’’ such as ours, the center or fulcrum of life’s activities have increasingly been focused on the achievement of personal gratification and self-enhancement, that is, until the most recent ‘‘great recession.’’ The descriptions that follow reflect this ‘‘normal’’ style of functioning; the body of this chapter comprises both normal and severe extremes of this pattern.” (Millon 2011 393)

**Resourcefully Confident Personality Style:** :Resourceful confidents are oriented to seeing the bright side of life, to being optimistic about the future, to easily enjoying themselves and, in general, to dealing with life’s ups and downs with imagination and relative equanimity. Although needing a good measure of freedom, they are pleased with the relationships and activities that compose their lives, as well as possessing attitudes that not only foster and enrich life but lead them to seek out experiences that are both invigorating and pleasurable.” (Millon 2011 394)

**Masterly Confident Personality Style: “**The masterful personality is busy, conscientious, and practical, viewing his experiences as being determined by his own peerless actions rather than by circumstances beyond his control. In his work and social relationships he invariably makes his own decisions with little advice from others. As with other CEN spectrum personalities, neither does he tend to be concerned about pleasing others, preferring to do things his own way and taking the consequences of doing so. Comfortable with himself as well as with the world he has created by virtue of his expertness and willpower, he is able to accomplish much as a pragmatic, self-directed, and self-actualizing person. Logical, organized, practical, and concerned with the tangible and the present, the masterly confident seeks to impose a clear structure upon his life, to operate efficiently, and to make impersonal, objective decisions and judgments. Assuming a takecharge attitude with people, he attempts as well to be systematic, consistent, and conscientious in all of his actions. Firmly avoiding any display of indecisiveness or vacillation, he endeavors to act in a responsible and dependable manner as well as conveying the correctness of his opinions.” (Millon 2011 395)

“Will those of the normal Confident style succumb to a more severe level? A Confident personality does not usually collapse in psychic cohesion. However, the patient’s haughtiness and entitled behaviors may provoke annoyance and withdrawal on the part of others. Rather than adapt by subduing their habitual annoying behaviors, the Confident personality usually intensifies their style into a pervasive Egotism.” (Millon 2011 396)

**Elitist Egotistic Personality Type: “**Reich (1949) captured the essential qualities of what we are terming the elitist egotist when he described the ‘‘phallic-narcissist’’ character as a self-assured, arrogant, and energetic person ‘‘often impressive in his bearing ... . and are ill-suited to subordinate positions among the rank and file.’’ As with the compensatory narcissist disorder, elitist egotist narcissists are more taken with their inflated self-image than with their actual self. CEN types create a false facade that bears minimal resemblance to the person they really are. Compensatory narcissists, however, do not know that they are a fraud in fact, and that they put forth an appearance different from the way they are. By contrast, elitist egotists, perhaps the purest variant of the narcissistic schema, are deeply convinced of their superior self-image, although it is grounded on few realistic achievements. To elitists, the appearance of things is perceived as objective reality; their inflated self-image is their intrinsic substance. Only when these illusory elements to their self-worth are seriously undermined will they be able to recognize and acknowledge their deeper shortcomings.” (Millon 2011 396-397)

**Exploitive Egotist Personality Type: “**The distinctive feature of this CEN exploitive personality type is an aggrandizing and seductive orientation, often building up of one’s self-worth by engaging members of the opposite gender in the game of sexual temptation. Possessing features of both the ADA antisocial and the SPH histrionic, they show an indifferent conscience, an aloofness to truth and social responsibility that, if brought to the exploitive egotist’s attention, elicits an attitude of nonchalant innocence. Though totally self-oriented, these individuals are facile in the ways of social seduction, often feign an air of dignity and confidence, and are rather skilled in deceiving others with their clever glibness. These exploiters are skillful in enticing, bewitching, and tantalizing the needy and the naive. Although indulging their selfenhancing desires, as well as pursuing beguiling objects at the same time, they are strongly disinclined to become involved in realistic tasks or genuine intimacy. Rather than investing their efforts in one appealing person, for example, they may seek to acquire a coterie of amorous objects, invariably lying and swindling as they weave from one pathological relationship to another. The qualities just outlined are strongly suggestive of the observation that these exploitive types possess numerous characteristics that are characteristic of antisocial and histrionic personalities.” (Millon 2011 397-398)


“Under what conditions does the Egotist decline into Narcissism? The persistence of Egotistic entitlement and expansive, self-inflating cognitions often leads to negative social reactions and increasing personal humiliations, which can result in unprincipled behaviors or the ‘‘false’’ compensatory developments of Narcissism.” (Millon 2011 401)

**Unprincipled Narcissistic Personality Disorder: “**The unprincipled narcissist has been seen more often these past two or three decades in drug rehabilitation programs, centers for youth offenders, and in jails and prisons. Although these individuals often are successful in society, keeping their activities just within the boundaries of the law, they enter into clinical treatment rather infrequently.” (Millon 2011 402)

**Compensatory Narcissistic Personality Disorder: “**Compensatory narcissists deviate in a fundamental way from other CEN narcissistic types as well as from the prototypal narcissist. The origins that undergird their overtly narcissistic behaviors derive from an underlying sense of insecurity and weakness, rather than from genuine feelings of self-confidence and high self-esteem (Akhtar, 1997). Beneath their surface pseudo-confidence, the posture they exhibit publicly, this narcissist is driven by forces similar to those who overtly display characteristics more akin to the DRN negativistic (Chapter 11) and SRA avoidant (Chapter 15) personalities.” (Millon 2011 405)

“Several personality disorders often covary with the narcissistic (CEN) spectrum. Most notable among these are the antisocial (ADA) (Gunderson & Ronningstam, 2001; P. Kernberg, 1989) and histrionic (SPH) spectrum variants. Also listed are covariations seen with the sadistic (ADS), paranoid (MPP), negativistic (DRN) personality spectra, as well as borderlines (Plakun, 1987; Ronningstam & Gunderson, 1991). Features of these co-morbid personalities and the basic narcissistic pattern often play a significant part in producing several of the adult types described previously” (Millon 2011 406)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the CEN Personality Spectrum


(Millon 2011 413)

### Aggrandizing Styles, Devious Types, Antisocial Disorders: The ADA Spectrum


“Those whom we characterize according to evolutionary theory as exhibiting the active-independent orientation resemble the outlook, temperament, and socially unacceptable behaviors of the DSM antisocial personality disorder, recently upgraded in the DSM-5 preliminaries as the antisocial/psychopathic type. Formulated in this book as the broad and diverse ADA spectrum, these personalities act to counter the expectation of derogation and disloyalty at the hands of others; this is done by actively engaging in clever, duplicitous, or illegal behaviors in which they seek to exploit others for self-gain. Skeptical regarding the motives of others, these individuals desire autonomy and wish revenge for what are felt as past injustices.” (Millon 2011 423)

“Reviewing Figure 9.1, we can see the prominence assigned to both the self (individuating) and active (modifying) polarities. What this suggests is that the antisocial is driven, first, to benefit himself and, second, to take vigorous action to see that these benefits do accrue to himself. This pattern is similar to, yet different, than seen in narcissists, where an unjustified self-confidence assumes that all that is desired will come to them with minimal effort on their part. The antisocial assumes the contrary. Recognizing by virtue of past experience that little will be achieved without considerable effort, cunning, and deception, the antisocial knows that desired ends must be achieved through one’s own actions. Moreover, these actions serve to fend off the malice that one anticipates from others, and undo the power possessed by those who wish to exploit the antisocial.” (Millon 2011 441)


#### Figure 9.1 from Millon 2011

(Millon 2011 441)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the ADA Spectrum

(Millon 2011 442)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the ADA Spectrum

(Millon 2011 443)

“In the minds of many psychiatrists and psychologists, the antisocial personality is almost invariably seen as a severe character type and rarely conceived as potentially normal. A major reason for this perception is the pejorative implication of the antisocial label. If the syndrome were formulated in clinical rather than social terms, it might be recognized that the behaviors that characterize the disorder are not necessarily repugnant in their social consequences. Rather, the diverse manifestations of this personality should be viewed and interpreted as expressions of the individual’s latent psychic makeup. From this broader, more clinical viewpoint, we know that the latent components of this personality often express themselves in behaviors that are minimally obtrusive, especially when manifested in sublimated forms, such as independence strivings, ambition, competition, risk-taking, and adventuresomeness (King, Kidorf, Stoller, Carter, & Brooner, 2001)” (Millon 447-448)

**Covetously Aggrandizing Personality Style: “**In what we are terming the covetous aggrandizer we see, in its most distilled form, the essential feature we judge as characterizing the ADA spectrum personalities, the element of greedy self-enhancement. Here we observe individuals who feel that life has not given them their due, that they have been deprived of their rightful level of emotional support and material rewards, that others have received more than their share, and that they personally never were given the bounties of the good life. What drives these personalities is envy and a desire for retribution. These goals can be achieved by the assumption of power, and it is best expressed through avaricious greed and voracity. To usurp that which others possess is the highest of rewards for the covetous aggrandizer. Not only can they gain retribution, but they can fill the emptiness within. As noted previously, as much pleasure comes from taking as in merely having.” (Millon 2011 449)

**Disaffected Aggrandizing Personality Style: “**Although this aggrandizer often finds himself struggling to arrange events to suit his needs and wants, he continues to have a desire to ensure that the good things in life come his way. He is unsure, however, as to what those things are for him. Efforts to intervene in the affairs of others to ensure a measure of satisfaction are spasmodic, unorthodox, and at times impulsive. Substantially transforming his environment is difficult, given that he is adventurous and oppositional, as well as attracted to the unachievable, unconventional, and adventurous. He desires to have hisexperiencesdeterminedby hisown actions,no matter how unattainable they may be. Disaffected aggrandizers generally dislike relying on others in their work and relationships, usually making decisions with little or no advice from others.” (Millon 2011 449)

“Unless the person’s Aggrandizing efforts are successful and meet with a measure of social support, there may be a move toward achieving one’s desires through Devious means, hence leading, in turn, to the more severe actions of risk-taking or a need to defend oneself against one’s critics.” (Millon 2011 450)

**Risk-Taking Devious Personality Type: “**Risk taking is often carried out for itself, for the excitement it provides, for the sense of feeling alive and engaged in life, rather than for purposes such as material gain or reputationdefending. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, some people respond before thinking, act impulsively, behaving in an unreflective and uncontrolled manner. Beyond this inability to control their behaviors and feelings, the risktaking deviate appears to be substantially fearless, unblanched by events that most people experience as dangerous or frightening. They give evidence of a venturesomeness that appears blind to the potential of serious consequences. Their riskiness seems foolhardy, not courageous. Yet, they persist in a hyperactive search for hazardous challenges and for gambling with life’s dangers. Descriptively, we may characterize these deviates as being dauntless, intrepid, bold, and audacious. Perhaps more significantly, they are recklessly foolhardy, seem uninhibited by genuine hazards, and disposed to pursue truly perilous ventures. We see here an admixture or commingling with both exuberant and histrionic features.” (Millon 2011 451)

**Reputation-Defending Devious Personality Type: “**Not all ADA types desire to fill their sense of emptiness by pursuing material acquisitions It is their reputation and status that they wish to defend or enlarge. For some, their deviate acts are self-enhancing, designed to ensure that others recognize them as persons of substance— people who should ‘‘not be trifled with.’’ These ADA variants need to be thought of as invincible and formidable persons, indomitable and inviolable; others should be aware that they possess qualities of strength and invulnerability. In these latter features, we see a strong amalgamation between the characteristics of the reputation-defending ADA antisocial and those of the CEN narcissistic personality.” (Millon 2011 453-454)


“What leads the Devious personality to retreat into a pervasive ADA disorder? The pervasive disorder of an Antisocial personality reflects a socially unacceptable effort on the part of the individual either to withdraw from society (nomadic subtype) or to turn aggressively against it (malevolent subtype)” (Millon 2011 454)

**Nomadic Antisocial Personality Disorder: “**It is commonly held that the central features that characterize ADA antisocials are their overtly oppositional, hostile, and negativistic behaviors, intentionally enacted to undermine the values of the larger society. Although this characterization may apply to many who are labeled antisocial, it would be incorrect to overlook other individuals whose adjustments are equally problematic from a social viewpoint. In what we are here terming the nomadic antisocial personality, we find individuals who seek to run away from a society in which they feel unwanted, cast aside, and abandoned. Instead of primarily reacting antagonistically to this rejection by seeking retribution for having been denied the expected benefits of participating in social life, these antisocials passively drift or actively escape to the periphery of society. They now scavenge what little remains they can find of what they could not achieve through acceptable social means. These individuals are angry at the injustices to which they were exposed, but now feel sorry for themselves and have distanced themselves from conventional social affairs because they have little influence on others and fear being further rejected. These peripheral drifters and vagrants feel jinxed, ill-fated, and doomed in life. They are gypsylike in their roaming, itinerant vagabonds and wanderers who have become scavenging misfits or dropouts from society.” (Millon 2011 455)

**Malevolent Antisocial Personality Disorder: “**This disorder variant epitomizes the least attractive of the antisocial disorders because it includes individuals who are especially vindictive and hostile. Their impulse toward retribution is discharged in a hateful and destructive defiance of conventional social life. Distrustful of others and anticipating betrayal and punishment, they have acquired a cold-blooded ruthlessness, an intense desire to gain revenge for the real or imagined mistreatment to which they were subjected in childhood. Here we see a sweeping rejection of tender emotions and a deep suspicion that the goodwill efforts expressed by others are merely ploys to deceive and undo them. They assume a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, a readiness to lash out at those whom they distrust or those whom they can use as scapegoats for their seething impulse to destroy.” (Millon 2011 458)

“The antisocial (ADA) personality disorder overlaps most frequently with the narcissistic (CEN) and sadistic (ADS) personality spectra. The correspondence with the narcissistic personality derives in part from their common selforientation. In addition to the preceding two co-morbid personalities, we find that the basic antisocial disorder covaries with the histrionic (SPH), borderline (UBC), negativistic (DRN), and paranoid (MPP) personality spectra. A number of other variants of the antisocial personality may be seen in the patterns described under the Adult Subtype section.” (Millon 2011 459)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the ADA Spectrum

(Millon 2011 473)

### Reliable Styles, Constricted Types, Compulsive Disorders: The RCC Spectrum


“The RCC personality spectrum displays a picture of distinct other-directedness, a consistency in social compliance and interpersonal respect: Their histories usually indicate having been subjected to constraint and discipline, parental strictures and high expectations. Beneath an overtly passive veneer they experience intense desires to rebel and assert underlying oppositional feelings, a covert self-oriented desire and impulse. Trapped in their ambivalence they are often unable to make decisions or act (Rothenberg, 1998).” (Millon 2011 479)

“Feeling ambivalent and experiencing conflict are inevitable parts of living. Each of us faces these no-win struggles periodically, but some individuals are constantly plagued because ambivalence is an ongoing and intrinsic part of their psychological makeup. The conflicts most persons experience are fairly obvious and conscious, but some—usually the more troubling ones—tend to be kept from awareness (i.e., are unconscious). Certain conflicts may be considered as especially troublesome in the sense that they disrupt significant segments of life or lead to resolutions that have broad and enduring effects. One of these more troublesome conflicts is relevant to the insecurely ambivalent personality spectrum discussed in this chapter. It relates to whether individuals turn primarily to themselves or to others to find the security and rewards they desire. Stated in the form of the conflict it represents, it is a struggle between obedience and defiance, the descriptive terms suggested by Rado (1959). What distinguishes these ambivalent personalities from other pathological types is their failure to adequately resolve this yes-no conflict.” (Millon 2011 480)

“The conflict within the RCC compulsive personality spectrum may be understood best as comprising the diametrically opposite qualities of two nonconflicted pathological spectrum patterns, the DAD dependent and the ADA antisocial personalities. RCC personalities are like the ADA antisocial in that they possess a strong, albeit unconscious, desire to assert themselves, act independent, and even defy the regulations imposed by others. At the same time, their conscious attitudes and overt behaviors are akin to the DAD dependent; they are not only overly obedient but fully incorporate the strictures of others and submerge most vestiges of individuality. Inwardly, they churn with defiance like the antisocial; consciously and behaviorally, they submit and comply like the dependent. To bind their rebellious and oppositional urges, and to ensure that these do not break through their controls, RCC compulsives become overly conforming and overly submissive. Not only do they adhere to societal rules and customs, but they vigorously espouse and defend them. As a consequence, they are often seen as moralistic, legalistic, and self-righteous. Their insistence that events and relationships be systematized and regulated becomes a caricature of the virtues of order and propriety. Proceeding meticulously through their daily routines, they are likely to get lost in the minutiae, in the form and not the substance of everyday life. These rigid behaviors are necessary if RCC compulsives are to succeed in controlling their seething, if repressed, antagonisms. Moreover, they cling grimly to the rules of society because these help restrain and protect them against their own rebellious impulses. They dare not risk deviating from a rigid adherence to these injunctions lest their anger burst out of control, and lest they expose to others and themselves the resentments they really feel (Pollak, 1979)” (Millon 2011 481)

“A brief summary of the obsessive-compulsive personality pattern as interpreted by the evolutionary model is portrayed in the polarity schema of Figure 10.1. Notable here is the dominance of the passive (accommodating) and other (nurturing) polar extremes. Worthy of note also is the arrow that is placed between the ‘‘self’’ and ‘‘other’’ boxes, which signifies the conflict experienced between these two orientations. As has been described previously, and as will be elaborated in later pages, the RCC compulsive is one of two ‘‘insecurely ambivalent’’ personality pattern disorders; both RCC compulsives and DRN negativists struggle between doing the bidding of others versus doing their own bidding. The RCC compulsive resolves this conflict by submerging all indications of self-interest, and devoting in its stead all efforts toward meeting the desires of others. The weak intensity seen in the self/individuating polarity according to evolutionary theory and the contrasting strong intensity in the other/nurturing polarity represent this resolution. To ensure that one’s unconscious selfdesires do not become overtly manifest, the RCC compulsive is extraordinarily accommodating, never taking the initiative about matters, always awaiting signals from others as to what they should do. Notable also in the polarity figure is the relative strength of the preservation focus over that of enhancement. This difference signifies the strong interest on the part of RCC personality compulsives to protect themselves against potential harm and criticism, and a contrasting indifference to the experience of pleasure and joy; it is here where we can see the grim and cheerless demeanor that typifies these personalities.”(Millon 2011 489)

#### Figure 10.1 of Millon 2011

(Millon 2011 489)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the RCC Spectrum

#### (Millon 2011 491)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the RCC Spectrum

#### (Millon 2011 491)

**Intrapsychic Content: Concealed: “**It is of special importance to the RCC that only those internalized representations of the past that are socially acceptable be permitted into conscious awareness or given expression behaviorally. Inner impulses and attitudes, as well as residual images and memories are all highly regulated and tightly bound. Forbidden impulses are sequestered in the unconscious. Similarly, current personal difficulties and social conflicts anchored to past experiences are defensively denied, kept from conscious awareness, and maintained under the most stringent of controls.” (Millon 2011 493)

**Intrapsychic Architecture: Compartmentalized: “**The structure of the RCC’s mind is rather distinctive among the personality patterns. To keep oppositional feelings and impulses from affecting one another, and to hold ambivalent images and contradictory attitudes from spilling forth into conscious awareness, the organization of their inner world must be rigidly compartmentalized. There is a tightly consolidated system that is clearly partitioned into numerous, distinct, and segregated constellations of dispositions, memories, and feelings. Crucial is that these compartments be tightly sealed, hence precluding any open channels through which these components can interrelate.” (Millon 2011 494)

“Perhaps more than any other personality style, especially in advanced and successful societies, are those who evince a mild variant of the obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. Here we see not so much the driven, tense, and rigid adherence to external demands and to a perfectionism that typifies the disordered state; rather we see a well-disciplined and organized lifestyle that enables individuals to function efficiently and successfully in most of their endeavors. When things go wrong, there is a measure of discomfort that leads to a resolution, not indecisiveness and anxiety. Those reading this text are themselves likely to possess partial traits of the compulsive style; how else could one be sufficiently diligent to get through graduate or medical school?” (Millon 2011 495-496)

**Conscientiously Reliable Personality Style: “**The behavior of the conscientiously reliable person is typified, more than any other RCC spectrum personality, by a conforming dependability, an adherence to rules and authority, and a willing submission to the wishes and values of others. There is a tendency to be self-effacing, a hesitation in expressing independent self-assertion, and a surface yielding to the expectations and demands of others. They voice a strong sense of duty, feeling that others must not have their expectations unmet. Their self-image, on the surface, is that of being a considerate, thoughtful, and cooperative person, prone to act in an unambitious and modest way. There are deep feelings of personal inadequacy as conscientious personalities tend to minimize attainments, underplay tangential attributes, and grade abilities by their relevance to fulfilling the expectations of others. We may characterize these individuals by the following descriptive adjectives: accommodating, duty-bound, prudent, hardworking, yielding, circumspect, and acquiescent. Dreading the consequences of making social indiscretions or a public faux pas, they react to situations that are unclear or ambiguous by acting indecisively and inflexibly, evincing marked self-doubts and hesitations about taking any course of action. From the foregoing, we can see that the basic RCC spectrum structure of these individuals combines in a variety of significant ways with features associated primarily with the DAD dependent personality spectrum. They are obliging, dutiful, overly respectful, and overtly conciliatory.” (Millon 2011 496-497)

**Perfectionistically Reliable Personality Style: “**Most central to the psychic makeup of these patients is the dread of making mistakes and the fear of taking risks. There is a persistent reworking over of things, a feeling of never being satisfied with the results of their efforts, and a concomitant anxiety of being unprepared for any new task. Their scrupulous attention to perfection reflects a deep sense of inadequacy, of potential failure, and the ultimate exposure of inner deficiencies and socially untenable impulses” (Millon 2011 497)

“What conditions of the Reliable style’s life result in this retrogression to personality Constriction? The Reliable and Conscientious personality style usually fits in well with the individual’s ecosystem. Only when the pressures of conforming become too stressful does the person ‘‘draw in,’’ become totally constricted, and seek to avoid failure through a bureaucratic rigidity or everyday parsimony.” (Millon 2011 498)

**Bureaucratically Constricted Personality Type: “**Not unlike other RCC compulsive personalities, the variant we are labeling the bureaucratically constricted personality finds that an alliance with time-tested traditional values, established authorities, or formal organizations, works extremely well. Instead of feeling angered and oppressed by authoritarian and organizational rules, these RCCs feel strengthened and comforted by these associations. Being part of a group or a bureaucracy makes them feel that they are not alone and that their ability to act firmly and decisively has thereby been empowered. They feel that their alliance with a company, a union, or a religious organization fortifies their selfesteem. The group not only provides a powerful identification, but an established set of rules and values that gives them a framework and a direction for action. Moreover, it is of great comfort to them to have the structure and goals of their group organize their lives and show them what ‘‘really’’ matters in life.” (Millon 2011 499)

**Parsimoniously Constricted Personality Type: “**Fromm’s discussion of the hoarding orientation gets close to the characterization of the parsimonious constricted type. What is most notable in these individuals is their miserliness, the protective wall they place between themselves and the outer world, keeping tight to that which they possess, being ungiving and unsharing. These individuals are notably niggardly, tightfisted, and penny-pinching. Their parsimony, as we view it, reflects a wariness and a self-protective stance against the exposure that would permit the possibility of loss.” (Millon 2011 500)


“What are the precipitants that result in the Constricted person’s degeneration to a pervasive Compulsive disorder? Struggling to keep control over the welling upsurge of their own oppositional impulses, the Constricted personality will become either overwhelmed by deeply contrasting feelings (bedeviled subtype) or become even more the rigid and Puritanical constraint of a fullfledged Compulsive disorder.” (Millon 2011 503)

**Puritanical Compulsive Personality Disorder: “**The puritanical compulsive is typified by an austere, self-righteous, highly controlled, but deeply conflictful conformity to the conventions of propriety and authority. The intense anger and resentment felt by these individuals is given sanction, at least as they see it, by virtue of their being on the side of righteousness and morality. Evident are periodic displays of suspiciousness, irritability, obsessional ideation, and severe judgmental attitudes. There is a tendency toward denial, with an extreme defensiveness about admitting emotional difficulties and psychosocial problems. However, despite the preceding efforts, there are clear signs that these personalities are unusually tense and high-strung. Anticipating public exposure and humiliation, periods of self-deprecation and self-punishment give way to outbursts of extrapunitive anger and persecutory accusations. This conflictual struggle against expressing emotions and directing anger endangers their efforts at maintaining control.” (Millon 2011 503)

**Bedeviled Compulsive Personality Disorder: “**As with some variants of both DRN negativistic and RCC compulsive ambivalent personality types, this disordered individual possesses an amalgamation of both prototypes. These individuals experience a deep struggle beneath the surface between the need to comply with the wishes of others one moment, and the desire to assert their own interests the next. Contending somewhat unsuccessfully with this ambivalence is what undermines the personality we are calling the bedeviled compulsive. For part of the time, self-denial works satisfactorily for these individuals; they submerge their oppositional desires, and put forth a proper and correct front. For others, however, notably the bedeviled disordered, this strategy has not held. Although appearing on the surface to be in psychic control, underneath they are going around in circles, unable to decide which course to follow, increasingly unsure of who they are and what they want to do. When these persons are expected to act decisively, they oscillate and procrastinate, feel tormented and befuddled, become cautious and timid, delaying decisions and using complex rationales to keep their inner confusion under control. Unable to get a hold of who they are, feeling great pressure to meet their obligations, they begin to doubt what it is that they believe and what it is that they want. Caught in their upsurging ambivalence, with one part of themselves accelerating in one direction, and the other part resisting movement, they may become exhausted, grumpy, and discontent but, more than anything else, perplexed and confused, driven by thoughts and impulses that can no longer be contained and directed. There is a feeling of being overwhelmed against both one’s will and one’s better knowledge. Thoughts and impulses that are usually contained and that adhere to guiding principles, seem contradictory and uncontrolled. Inner uncertainties come to the fore, arising from unknown conflictual attitudes and feelings.” (Millon 2011 504-505)

“The RCC personality disorder covaries to a modest degree with just a few other personality types. As noted, the core RCC may be found to be co-morbid with the DAD dependent personality and the AAS schizoid personality. Each of the preceding two personalities share with the RCC a passive style of accommodating to the environment, evincing minimal intrusions or interventions on their part. This passive constellation, however, is not seen where the RCC covaries with the MPP paranoid and DRN negativistic personality disorders. In these latter co-morbidities, we see much more of the irritabilities and obduracy that characterize certain of the subtypes of the RCC personality. It should be noted in general that the RCC personality pattern tends to be fairly circumscribed when compared with other personality disorders; the frequency of co-morbidity is perhaps the lowest among the Axis II classifications.” (Millon 2011 508)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the RCC Spectrum


(Millon 2011 524)

### Discontented Styles, Resentful Types, Negativistic Disorders: The DRN Spectrum

“Those persons whom the evolutionary theory refers to as ambivalent are oriented toward both self and others, but there is an intense conflict between the two. A number of these patients, originally represented in the DSM as the passive aggressive personality, vacillate between giving primacy one time to others and then to self the next, behaving obediently one time, and reacting defiantly the next. Unable to resolve their ambivalence they weave an actively erratic course.” (Millon 2011 526)


“A final commentary in this contemporary section on the negativistic personality turns our attention toward the evolutionary model and the polarity characterization represented in Figure 11.1. Little stands out in this portrayal, other than the element of conflict and ambivalence signified by the double pointed arrow between the self and other polarities. What this indicates is the inability of DRN personalities to find a comfortable ground between acting on their own behalf versus doing so for others. They cannot find a consistent or single-minded purpose. As a consequence, they shift erratically back and forth, manifesting fluctuating attitudes and unpredictable behaviors. If they move toward the fulfillment of what others desire, they become irritated and annoyed with themselves for doing so, quickly shifting their thoughts and feelings in favor of doing their own thing. In so doing, however, they jeopardize the security and support they need from others, leading them quickly to become contrite and to reverse their position again. DRN persons are active, not passive, shifting from one moment to the next in their behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. Little joy is experienced in this process; fear and self-preservation predominate. Whichever direction they take, there are discomforting consequences to pay. It is this unsettled character of the self-other orientation that keeps negativists in a perpetual state of discontent and dysphoria.” (Millon 2011 535)

#### Figure 11.1 from Millon 2011


(Millon 2011 535)

Seeing all of the strengths so low besides Active, I’m surprised after the earlier descriptions.

#### Table of Trait Domains of the DRN Spectrum

(Millon 2011 536)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the DRN Spectrum

(Millon 2011 536)

**Intrapsychic Content: Vacillating: “**The inner templates of the past among negativistic personalities are composed of complexly conflicting images and memories. Few components of this template are composed of internally consistent qualities. Most internalized objects are associated with contradictory feelings, countervailing inclinations, and incompatible memories. Hence, the foundation of dispositions that serve to organize the negativist’s ongoing perceptions and personal relationships are divergently oriented and in a constant state of flux. Adding to these internally vacillating objects is the fact that they are generally colored by negative emotions, resulting in a disposition to undermine the pleasures and achievements of self and others, without necessarily appearing to do so.

The behaviors of these overtly ambivalent personalities are even more erratic and vacillating than we might expect from their reinforcement history. They appear to have labored under a double handicap. Not only were they deprived of external consistency and control in childhood but, as a consequence of these experiences, never acquired the motivation and competencies of internal control. Unsure of what their environment expects of them and unable themselves to impose self-discipline and order, these persons seem adrift in their environment, bobbing up and down erratically from one mood to another

As is noted in later paragraphs, these individuals failed to experience consistent parental discipline. What they did acquire was largely through implicit modeling. In essence, they imitated the contradictory or capricious style of their parents. Deprived of conditions for acquiring self-control and modeling themselves after their opposing or erratic and ambivalent parents, these personalities never learn to conceal their moods for long and cannot bind or transform their emotions. Whatever inner feelings well up within them—be it guilt, anger, or inferiority—they spill quickly to the surface in pure and direct form.” (Millon 2011 538-539)

**Intrapsychic Dynamics: Displacement: “**A distinguishing clinical feature of negativists is their paucity of intrapsychic controls and mechanisms. Their moods, thoughts, and desires tend not to be worked out internally. Few unconscious processes are employed to handle the upsurge of feelings, and, as a consequence, these come readily to the surface, untransformed and unmoderated. These negativistic persons are like children in that they often react spontaneously and impulsively to passing emotions. As a result, there is little consistency and predictability to their reactions.” (Millon 2011 539)

**Intrapsychic Architecture: Divergent: “**The pattern of morphologic structures in the negativistic personality exhibits a clear division among its components. Hence, controls and defensive maneuvers are often employed to achieve incompatible goals and purposes. Major conflicts may remain unresolved, therefore, and full psychic cohesion may become impossible to achieve because the fulfillment of one goal or purpose will nullify or undo and reverse another.

Weakness of intrapsychic control would not prove troublesome if the negativist’s feelings were calm and consistent, but they are not. Rooted in deep personal ambivalences, negativists experience an undercurrent of perpetual inner turmoil and anxiety. Their equilibrium is unstable. Their inability to anticipate the future as consistent or predictable gives rise to a constant state of insecurity. The frustration and confusion they feel turn readily to anger and resentment. Guilt often emerges and frequently serves to curtail this anger. In short, the actively ambivalent suffers a range of intense and conflicting emotions that, because of weak controls and lack of self-discipline, surge quickly and capriciously to the surface.” (Millon 2011 539-540)

“Popular literature in the 1940s and 1950s spoke frequently of the ‘‘neurotic personality.’’ In laypeople’s terms, these individuals exhibited features of emotional lability, erraticism, capriciousness, combined with sadness, contrition, guilt-ridden feelings, as well as a smattering of hostility and occasional irritability and negativism. Here was seen a mix of troublesome emotions that served to unsettle not only the individual but those around him or her as well. Although the roots of the concept of a negativistic personality disorder may be partially traced, at least historically, to the syndrome labeled passive-aggressive, a more complete portrayal can be found in the literature of neurotic personalities. “ (Millon 2011 541-542)

**Disputatiously Discontented Personality Style:** “This discontented individual is definitely not oriented to look for the bright side of life, to attempt to be optimistic about the future, to find a way to enjoy himself and, in general, to deal with life’s ups and downs with relative equanimity. Testy and hard-headed about the relationships and activities that comprise his life, he waits for things to happen rather than making them occur to his suiting. He often finds himself having to struggle to counteract the turn of events in order to suit his needs. He wants to ensure good outcomes for himself but is unsure or argumentative about what exactly to strive for. His efforts to influence the affairs of life in seeking satisfaction are spontaneous and inconsistent. It is difficult for him to substantially transform his environment, given his indecisiveness, as well as his attraction to the novel and adventurous. Nevertheless, he can be insistent in his desire to have his experiences determined by his own actions rather than by forces outside his control.” (Millon 2011 542)

**Ambivalently Discontented Personality Style: “**The ambivalently discontented are oriented to avoid problematic situations, to keep their distance from troublesome relationships, to find a niche that maximizes security and psychic stability, and to arrange their affairs to ensure a measure of social comfort and interpersonal predictability. Often upset by disappointments, ambivalents evince a concern that the better things of life rarely last and that its pleasures and joys often are ephemeral, neither genuine nor durable. Hence, they judge it wise to minimize social discomforts and to work at making sure that mistakes not be a function of their own actions. They believe that life can be made most gratifying by being independent and unburdened (goals only occasionally achieved by themselves), not by seeking to generate personal pleasures or by engaging in social risks.” (Millon 2011 543)

“What leads the Discontented individual to fall back into pervasive Resentfulness? The Discontented style of the mild DRN spectrum will often proceed downward as their obvious irritability and contrary behavior result in social rejection and personal humiliation. At first, the person is likely to waver increasingly, sometimes irritable, oppositional and embittered, sometimes ambivalently conforming, but invariably erratic and vacillating, slipping as a consequence into the moderately severe level of maladaptive Resentfulness” (Millon 2011 544)

**Vacillating Resentful Personality Type: “**Although the primary characteristic of the vacillating resentful is seen among most negativists, the quality of rapid fluctuation from one emotional state or interpersonal attitude to another is particularly notable in this group. These individuals are experienced by others as upsetting and frustrating because of their sharp and frequent reversals of mood and behavior. At times they are affectionate and predictable, as well as interesting and charming. Before one can blink an eye, they may become irritable, oppositional, and disagreeable. The next moment they may act self-assured, decisive, and competent; before one can get accustomed to these behaviors, vacillating resentfuls may revert to being dependently clinging and childlike. Tantrums are quite common, frequently moving to the foreground, and evidencing their characteristic recalcitrant behaviors and emotional instabilities. They can become almost childlike in other ways, being disagreeably disobedient one moment, and submissively conforming the next. What is most characteristic, however, is their bewildering and enigmatic emotions, their inability to fathom their own capricious and mystifying moods, as well as their subjective wavering and intrapsychic fluctuations.” (Millon 2011 544-545)

**Circuitously Resentful Personality Type: “**The circuitous subtype of the DRN negativistic personality spectrum closely corresponds to the classification previously labeled in the DSM as the passive-aggressive personality disorder. Here we see a prominent, if not singular, feature that is characterized by a resistance to the expectations of others that is expressed indirectly rather than directly. Despite the passive nature of their resentments, these personalities are grumbling and oppositional, habitually angry at those who demand of them a level of performance that they are deeply unwilling to carry out. As noted, their oppositional behaviors are displayed indirectly, and as the descriptive label suggests, in a circuitous fashion through maneuvers such as procrastination, dawdling, stubbornness, forgetfulness, and a general, but intentional inefficiency.” (Millon 2011 545)


“In contrast to the DSM-III and DSM-III-R formulations, the passive-aggressive/negativistic personality has been introduced into the appendix of DSM-IV to represent a comprehensive pattern of traits. This wider ranging concept of the disorder will result in part in overlaps and combinations with other personality disorders. As such, we should anticipate finding amalgams and mixtures that display the features of several personalities, a number of which will be described in the following paragraphs” (Millon 2011 548)

**Abrasively Negativistic Personality Disorder: “**In contrast to DRN circuitous types, who exhibit the struggle between doing what others wish and doing what they wish in an oblique, if not passive, manner, abrasive negativists act in an overtly and directly contentious and quarrelsome way. An irascible and derogating personality, to the abrasive negativist everything and anyone serves as a sounding board for discharging inner irritabilities, readily available objects for nagging and assaulting, if not for litigious action. More than merely irritable in a general way, these persons are intentionally abrasive and antagonistic. Not surprisingly, many of these negativists exhibit features usually associated with the sadistic personality prototype.” (Millon 2011 549)

**Irritably Negativistic Personality Disorder: “**Somewhere between the circuitous and abrasive DRN personalities lies the pattern we have termed the irritable negativist. These individuals are embittered, complaining, and pessimistic, but they are neither indirect in their expression of disillusion and displeasure nor are they intentionally contentious and abrasive. These negativists are consummate gripers. They do not assault others in a harsh and brutal fashion; rather they attack under cover, from behind some pretense, one not readily transparent, from which they take piecemeal potshots, evincing niggling and annoying criticisms and complaints. There is a nonplayful teasing, a nottoo-subtle dig, and various clever innuendoes. They leave their object of criticism somewhat unprotected, often with no clear response to make. Descriptively, we might note this variant of the DRN negativist spectrum is notably testy, cranky, petty, complaining, vexed, and fretful, one who avoids direct confrontation but is constantly griping with marginal and trivial complaints. Many exhibit features akin to melancholic personalities, especially those of the ill-humored type, with its sour and grumbling qualities.” (Millon 2011 552)

“The DRN spectrum is notable by the large number of other personality spectra with which it covaries. Features of irritability and resentment often manifest themselves jointly with the characteristics of several of the major personalities we have previously discussed, and will be elaborating later in the text. More specifically, co-morbidities are particularly pronounced with the paranoid (MPP), the borderline (UBC), and the sadistic (ADS) personality spectra. Each of these co-morbid types demonstrate features that typify the negativistic, notably their anger and hypersensitivity to signs of displeasure and rejection. However, the traits of the negativist are themselves contradictory; hence, certain features may be found to covary with disorders that are substantially different from the three preceding types. For example, there are negativistic features that overlap with the melancholic (DFM), the avoidant (SRA), and the masochistic (AAM) personality spectra. Here we see the covariance with the negativist’s self-rejecting and guiltridden psychic characteristics. And, once more, at the opposite end of the scale, we see strong negativistic combinations with the histrionic (SPH) and the antisocial (ADA) personalities.” (Millon 2011 543)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the DRN Personality Spectrum

(Millon 2011 569)


### Abused Styles, Aggrieved Types, Masochistic Disorders: The AAM Spectrum

“As with the assertive-denigrating-sadistic spectrum, this troubled AAM spectrum of abused, aggrieved, and masochistic personalities stems largely from a reversal of the pleasure-pain polarity. These patients engage in relationships that are at variance with this normal polarity balance. To this personality spectrum, pain may have become a preferred experience, passively accepted if not encouraged in intimate relationships.” (Millon 2011 572)


“Figure 12.1 provides Preservation (Pain) Nurturance (other) Modification (Active) Individuation (Self) Accommodation (Passive) Enhancement (Pleasure) Reversal between Polarities Weak on Polarity Dimension Strong on Polarity Dimension Average on Polarity Dimension FIGURE 12.1 Status of the AAM Personality Spectrum in Accord with Evolution’s Polarity Model a visual picture of the strength of the three major polarities of the theory. As can be seen, the major pathologic component is the reversal between the pain and pleasure segments of the first polarity. This signifies that the individual has learned to experience pain in a manner that makes it preferable to experiences of pleasure. Of course, this preference may be a relative one, that is, the individual may be willing to tolerate significant discomfort and abuse as long as it is the lesser of greater degrees of anguish and humiliation (Filippini, 2005). To be moderately distressed and disheartened may be better than to be severely pained and demoralized (Haller & Miles, 2004).

The masochistic, self-defeating disorder is passive and accommodating in a manner similar to the depressive personality. The distinction is a fine one, but is significant nevertheless. For depressives, passivity indicates an acceptance of their fate, a sense that loss and hopelessness are justified and that depression is inevitable; further, that these experiences can never be overcome and, hence, the depressive should accept his or her state and the irretrievability of happiness. In the self-defeating, there is a measure of both control and desirability in giving in to their suffering and discomfort. For them, a measure of moderate anguish may be a preferable state, that is, it may be the best of all possible alternatives available to the person. Passivity, therefore, indicates an acceptance of pain as a realistic choice, given the individual’s inescapable options, not a final and irretrievable state of hopelessness.” (Millon 2011 582-583)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the AAM Spectrum

(Millon 2011 583)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the AAM Spectrum

(Millon 2011 584)

**Intrapsychic Architecture: Inverted: “**As is typical of personalities who are intrapsychically ambivalent or discordant, such as the AAM person, their intrapsychic structures possess contrasting and dual qualities. One segment of their inner world is structured in a more or less conventional fashion; the other reflects opposing or contradictory components. Thus, AAMs exhibit a reversal of the pain-pleasure polarity, experiencing pleasure when pain would be more appropriate, and vice versa. As a consequence, they exhibit a repetitive undoing of intention and affect. There is a frequent transposition of channels of need-gratification so that frustration results. Most problematic, their inverted structural organization and dynamic processes result in actions that produce perplexing— and often antithetical, if not self-undoing— consequences.

As with most complex phenomena, the structure of personality undergirds many functions in the economy of the mind. Conventionally structured, the components of the mind serve to gratify instinctual drives, impose social constraints by means of psychic expiation and punishment, and provide methods of adapting to life’s realities. As in the case of the sadist, the compulsive, and the negativist, the masochist possesses intrapsychic structures that are in intrinsic opposition. For example, structural inversion of the basic polarities results in masochists assuming that they are loved most when they suffer most, generating the conviction that when they desire love, they must first seek to suffer. Rather than pursue affection in a straightforward fashion, AAMs may need to engage in a form of ‘‘naughtiness,’’ hoping thereby to elicit a rejecting or scolding response from the significant other; the assumption that carries them forward is the belief that forbidden behaviors will ultimately evoke love in return.

It is often quite puzzling and perplexing to track these reversals of what are usually straightforward and natural orientations. By defeating themselves, AAMs seek not only to avoid being beaten and humiliated, but to elicit nurture and affection. The direct pursuit of pleasure threatens them by evoking experiences of anxiety and guilt. Whether these processes stem from ‘‘internalized bad objects’’ is one analytic way to formulate the problem. What this means simply is that the person has internalized a punitive system that must be enacted when normal affectional desires are sought. One must suffer, therefore, to be loved. This is seen most readily in their sexual suffering when some AAMs were brutalized in their first sexual/love excitements. To be loved again they ‘‘need’’ to suffer concurrently” (Millon 2011 587)

“As with other personality spectra, the AAM pattern often arises as a consequence of cultural values and customs rather than a patient’s unique personal experiences. There are societies today that still foist on certain individuals, particularly women, roles that are self-demeaning and servile, creating the impression for them and others that this is a deserved role, even one that the individual should feel is ordained and should be proud to assume. Such are the values of some societies” (Millon 2011 588)

**Subserviently Abused Personality Style: “**Subserviently abused persons tend to put needs of others before their own, assuming that few things will come their way. He dislikes relying on people, usually making decisions to remain in ‘‘servitude’’ no matter what. He tries to always please others, but in his own way. Not particularly comfortable either with himself or with his environment, he is self-abasing and socially deferential, rarely achieving life in as optimistic and self-actualizing a way as he would like.” (Millon 2011 588-589)

**Prudently Abused Personality Style: “**This personality is inclined to be cautious, to keep his distance from problematic situations, to avoid troublesome relationships, to find a niche that maximizes security and psychic stability, and to arrange his affairs to ensure a good measure of social comfort and interpersonal predictability. Often upset by the actions of others, he evinces a concern that good relationships in life do not last and that its pleasures and joys often are ephemeral, neither genuine nor durable. Hence, he judges it wise to minimize social discomforts and to make life most gratifying by being prudent and sensible and by acting in a levelheaded and judicious way, not by seeking to generate personal pleasures or by engaging in social risks” (Millon 2011 590)

“Why does the Abused person lose ground and decline into an Aggrieved pattern? The acceptance of abuse can be tolerated just so long. Its continuance frequently results in overt displays of discontent, and assumes the pattern of the Aggrieved person. Though still deferential and dysphoric, the person either draws inward, trying to control others (possessive pattern) or trying to make a virtue of their suffering.” (Millon 2011 591)

**Virtuously Aggrieved Personality Type: “**These AAM personalities are proudly unselfish and self-sacrificial. Their self-denial and asceticism are judged, at least by themselves, to be noble and righteous acts that signify that they are, in essence, meritorious, if not saintly. Rather than negate their altruism, depreciate their esteem in the eyes of others, and accept the inferior status that typifies most other AAMs, prideful or virtuous aggrieved types assert a sense of specialness and the high status and veneration in which they should be seen. Have they not consistently demonstrated their concern for the welfare of others, have they not deprived themselves of the good life, have they not sacrificed themselves at the altar of others?” (Millon 2011 591)

**Possessively Aggrieved Personality Type: “**As with other AAMs, these aggrieved types are constantly giving of themselves. Insinuating themselves may be perhaps a more descriptive and pertinent way of describing their actions. They are unable to let go of those to whom they are attached. Their need to be indispensable is so intensely self-sacrificial that others are unable to withdraw from the masochist without feeling irresponsible, unkind, or guilty. The possessive person entraps others, draws them into a reciprocal dependency, disarmed by the depth of concern and interest the possessive type feels for them. Sacrificial to a fault, these possessive types find ways to make others feel simultaneously needy and fulfilled, less capable of functioning without the kindnesses and labors the possessive type engages in to meet their narcissistic desires. In effect, they control others by an obligatory dependence. Moreover, they are jealously overprotective and indispensable collaborators, dominating those they possess by sacrificing themselves in every way others desire. This pattern of behaviors is seen in personality admixtures composed of core AAM trait components permeated by characteristics most common to the narcissistic and negativistic personalities.” (Millon 2011 594)


“What precipitates the further decline from an Aggrieved level of pathology to that of a fullfledged Masochism? The persistence of unjust abuse and justified grievances may fail to lead to adaptive tolerance on the part of the patient. Beset by continued misery, a pervasive sense of being oppressed may emerge, or an active self-undoing pattern may take hold, further intensifying their depressive unhappiness” (Millon 2011 595)

**Oppressed Masochistic Personality Disorder: “**The oppressed masochists make use of all kinds of psychic symptoms and physical diseases to dominate and make their families and friends feel guilt. Anyone who is not responsive to the maneuver of psychological or medical illness may be quickly prompted to fall in line by their guilt-inducing moans and groans, saying, in effect, ‘‘Don’t let my suffering make you think twice about me; overlook my suffering if you will and do only what you think is best for you.’’ Ultimately, the apparent victim, the oppressed masochist, effectively triumphs over his or her true victims by making them feel guilty and obligated. Let us not be misled into thinking that oppressed masochists are merely feigning their anguish; they experience genuine misery and despair, feel tormented, and are often physically ill. However, these grievances are used secondarily, but quite effectively, to create guilt in others, enabling masochists to vent the resentments they feel, and exempting them from responsibilities they may normally be asked to carry out. As can be inferred from the preceding, these masochists frequently form an amalgam with features seen most prominently in the depressive personality disorder, accounting in part for their frequently judged coalescence by knowledgeable clinicians (Kernberg, 1988a).” (Millon 2011 595)

**Self-Undoing Masochist Personality Disorder: “**The classical psychoanalytic conception of the masochist represents individuals who have actively and repetitively, although unconsciously, sought out circumstances that lead to their own suffering, if not destruction. These behaviors do not necessarily bring pleasure, but may be the less distressing choice of two painful states. What is most notable is that these persons ostensibly create or provoke circumstances in which they will experience misfortune or abuse. They achieve what Reik (1941) called ‘‘victory through defeat’’ or what Freud (1916/1925) described as patients ‘‘wrecked by success.’’ They appear, at least from an outsider’s perspective, to be gratified by experiencing their own personal misfortunes, failures, humiliations, or ordeals. They eschew their own best interests, choosing in their stead to be disgraced, victimized, even ruined.” (Millon 2011 598)

“Preliminary research suggests that several other personalities combine with the AAM personality spectrum. AAMs are associated primarily with the dependent (DAD), borderline (UBC), and melancholic (DFM) personalities; all give evidence of reduced self-esteem, depressive symptomatology, and a tendency to devalue themselves with others (the traits just described are prominent only in a subset of borderline covariants). Also notable is a conjunction with the avoidant (SRA) pattern and, to a lesser extent, with the obsessive-compulsive (RCC), the negativistic (DRN), and the schizotypal (ESS) personality types and disorders.” (Millon 2011 599)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the AAM Personality Spectrum

(Millon 2011 613)

### Assertive Styles, Denigrating Types, Sadistic Disorders: The ADS Spectrum

“There are patients in whom the usual properties associated with pain and pleasure are conflicted or reversed. As with the masochistic described in Chapter 12, these patients not only generate rather than moderate painful events, but experience them as pleasurable. This paradoxically discordant variant of pleasure-pain reversal considers pain (stress, fear, cruelty) rather than pleasure to be the preferred mode of relating actively to others.” (Millon 2011 616)

“There are patients in whom the usual properties associated with pain and pleasure are conflicted or reversed. As with the masochistic described in Chapter 12, these patients not only generate rather than moderate painful events, but experience them as pleasurable. This paradoxically discordant variant of pleasure-pain reversal considers pain (stress, fear, cruelty) rather than pleasure to be the preferred mode of relating actively to others.

Stated differently, the four personalities in this section are double-minded, to use Kierkegaard’s descriptive term. They are not, as are most personality spectra, single-minded. At the most fundamental level, the primary motives that guide their lives conflict directly with one another. No matter what their other inclinations may be, their internal orientations move in opposing ways; to remain at war with oneself is intrinsic to their psychic makeup. To illustrate, RCC compulsives take great pride in controlling their lives, leaving little to chance, constantly evaluating both their own and others’ actions. However, they play multiple roles: prosecutor, defendant, and judge. These multiple perspectives not only fail to resolve their internal conflicts but are likely to intensify them. Thus, if the defendant wins the case, the prosecutor must lose, and vice versa. For example, individuals in the AAM masochistic spectrum of personalities consciously hold high expectations of others who almost invariably fail to meet them. As a consequence, masochists unconsciously wish retribution by derogating others, but to do so would mean assaulting the very persons they hope will love and care for them. As the saying goes, these personalities cannot win for losing, nor can they lose for winning.


More specifically, in both the ADS sadistic and AAM masochistic spectra, the conflict between the pain-pleasure polarities represents a transposition such that normally pleasurable experiences are viewed as painful, and normally painful experiences are felt as pleasurable. (Blizard, 2001; Murphy & Vess, 2003). In the RCC compulsive and DRN negativistic spectrum of personalities, it is the self and other polarities that are in conflict—the more they are disposed toward one component of the polarity pair, the more they are inclined to reverse themselves and turn toward the second. In sum, in the ADS sadistic and AAM masochistic personalities we find a psychic dissonance between the survival functions of pain and pleasure, and in the RCC compulsive and DRN negativistic personalities, we find an ambivalence between the survival functions of the self-other polarity. This chapter focuses on the ADS sadistic personality spectrum, where we find a marked discordance between the most fundamental of the polarities that represent the basic survival functions of enhancing and of preserving life. The three levels of his spectrum—the normal level of assertive styles, the abnormal level of denigrating types, and the clinical level of sadistic disorders—are differentiated in the latter sections.” (Millon 2011 616-617)

“As with many of the DSM personalities, prevalence results are highly ambiguous, depending greatly on the setting and purposes of the studies. Results range from less than 1% to as high as 25% to 30%. Issues of legality and ethics play a significant role in attitude and assessment (Kaminer & Stein, 2001). Gender studies indicate that males are more frequently diagnosed by a factor of 5 or more.” (Millon 2011 618)

“ we turn attention to the evolutionary model, specifically viewing the polarity schema as presented in Figure 13.1. As can be seen, the primary focus for the spectrum centers in the pain (preservation) and active (modifying) polarities. At first glance, one might be inclined to note that the polarity focus is essentially the same as seen in the SRA avoidant personality spectrum, where both pain and active polarities Preservation (Pain) Nurturance (other) Modification (Active) Individuation (Self) Accommodation (Passive) Enhancement (Pleasure) Reversal between Polarities Weak on Polarity Dimension Strong on Polarity Dimension Average on Polarity Dimension FIGURE 13.1 Status of the ADS Personality Spectrum in Accord with Evolution’s Polarity Model are preeminent as well. However, the SRA avoidant actively anticipates and escapes from abuse, whereas the ADS sadist actively assaults and degrades others. Both are active, but one imposes pain, whereas the second avoids pain. The reversal sign in the ADS sadistic figure signifies that sadists engage in discordant behaviors intrinsically at odds with the aims of the pleasure polarity, that is, seeking joy, optimism, and pleasure in relating to one’s environment


In its stead, the sadist acts in a hostile and malevolent manner, actively working toward harmful and ruinous ends. Rather than uplifting and preserving life, the sadist is actively evil, violent, and deadly, assaulting and demeaning others instead of encouraging and enhancing them.” (Millon 2011 627)

#### Figure 13.1 from Millon 2011


(Millon 2011 627)

This figure’s depiction of the Pleasure/Pain Polarities being reversed is strange given before he only mentioned Pain’s inverted content. If we were to seek a more detailed picture, our framework should unpack the reversal, and more generally the contents of each of these. When I write the next draft I will bring in the sources to work on that.

#### Table of Trait Domains of the ADS Spectrum

(Millon 2011 628)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the ADS Spectrum

(Millon 2011 629)

“While others may aspire to leadership, Aggressive men and women move instinctively to the helm. They are born to assume command as surely as is the top dog in the pack. Theirs is a strong, forceful personality style, more inherently powerful than any of the others. They can undertake huge responsibilities without fear of failure. They wield power with ease. They never back away from a fight. They compete with the supreme confidence of champions... . When put to the service of the greater good, the Sadistic personality style can inspire a man or women to great leadership, especially in the times of crisis. (p. 336)” (Millon 2011 633)

**Revengefully Assertive Personality Style: “**Inclined to ‘‘get back’’ at others for having mistreated him, at least as he sees it, seeking rewarding experiences in whatever environment he finds himself, the revengeful asserter aims toward achieving life’s rewards by dint of humiliating others. Being dominant and controlling is what he finds satisfying and fulfilling in life. His social, emotional, and intellectual energies are stimulated by and organized around the pursuit of derogating and dominating those he believes had done him ill or may do so again in the future. Optimistic about his chances of achieving retribution, he also believes that good things are likely to come his way by virtue of his blunt and autocratic behavior. Confident of his ‘‘rights,’’ he rarely looks favorably on those around him, anticipating that he will be dominant in most interactions and endeavors. Envious bullies of childhood or adolescent life display these patterns quite overtly; some persist in their revengeful ways into adulthood.” (Millon 2011 633)

**Intimidatingly Assertive Personality Style: “**Intimidators put others down by virtue of their assertive style, cutting them off as they speak, putting their own thoughts and goals to the forefront. As with the revengeful asserter, the intimidating asserter is inclined to display power and control affairs in whatever environment he finds himself. He aims toward achieving that which he finds self-fulfilling. His social and intellectual energies are stimulated by and organized around the pursuit of dominating others, not necessarily to wreak vengeance. With a strong will and thick skin, he views his chances of success as excellent. Typically pleased with the world he has created for himself, he looks to make sure that his assertive talents will succeed with positive outcomes from most interactions and endeavors” (Millon 2011 635)

“What conditions lead the Assertive individual to display the more pernicious qualities of the Denigrator? Those with an Assertive style can usually find an ecosystem within which their dominating behavior is valued, such as in a variety of business or military settings. However, should their conduct grow abrasive and their moods pervasively hostile, their ability to ‘‘fit in’’ to society will become more tenuous. To re-assert themselves, the person may begin to downgrade others, to ‘‘put them in their place,’’ to denigrate them as official enforcers or to oppress the weak or fragile scapegoats.” (Millon 2011 636)

**Enforcing Denigrating Personality Type: “**There are military sergeants, cops on the beat, deans in universities, and judges who sit on the bench, to name just a few whose hostile inclinations are employed ostensibly in the public interest. These individuals fall within the subtype we are naming the enforcing denigrator. They represent persons who feel they have the right to control and punish others, who know when rules have been broken, and how these violators should be dealt with, even violently and destructively. Operating under the guise of sanctioned roles to meet the ostensive common interest, the deeper motives that spur these denigrating type’s actions are of questionable legitimacy owing to the extraordinary force with which they mete out condemnation and punishment. As socially sanctioned referees, protectors of the weak, and arbiters of disputes, they search out rule-breakers and perpetrators of incidental infractions that fall within their societally endorsed roles, exercising whatever powers they possess to the most severe degree. Rather interestingly, these enforcing ADS types have permeated within their configuration of characteristics some of the major features of the compulsive personality, those who are sticklers for rules, but now can openly discharge their otherwise deeply repressed angers against the weak and condemnable” (Millon 2011 637)

**Spineless Denigrating Personality Type: “**Not all ADS persons are intrinsically powerful and vicious executors of others. This spineless type acts so only periodically, and is often troubled and contrite about the consequences of his or her irrational actions. The tyrannical and enforcing varieties more closely fit the prototype of the sadist. However, there are types that are deeply insecure and irresolute, often fainthearted and cowardly, in fact. Much of their anger derives from their low status in early schooling and their subsequent minimal life achievements, often struggling insecurely near or at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Their acting out springs from new-found opportunities to assault and undermine ‘‘the elites’’ of yesteryear. For them, their denigrating actions are responses to felt weaknesses and fears. Their aggression signifies an effort to show others that they are not anxious, nor ready to succumb to the inner weaknesses and external pressures they experience. It is these craven and cowardly types that we are calling the spineless denigrators. These personalities commit violent acts as a means of overcoming their fearfulness and need to secure revenge. They are basically insecure, bogus, and cowardly personalities whose venom and cruelty is essentially a counterphobic act. Anticipating real danger, projecting their hostile fantasies, they strike first, hoping thereby to forestall their antagonist and ask questions later. An analysis of the psychic structure of these ADS types indicates that their overt hostility and abuse maps onto a covert pattern of avoidant personality characteristics.” (Millon 2011 638)


“The degeneration to Sadism stems from what precipitants? Failing to keep others ‘‘at bay,’’ the Denigrating type’s emotions may take over and erupt in uncontrolled and explosive outbursts; others may constrain their precipitate outbursts, but discharge their venom in harsh actions of a tyrannical nature.” (Millon 2011 640)

**Explosive Sadistic Personality Disorder: “**The unpredictability and sudden emergence of hostility differentiates the explosive sadist from other variants of this personality type. The explosive sadist manifests adultlike tantrums, uncontrollable rage, and fearsome attacks on others, most frequently against members of his or her own family. Before its intensive nature can be identified and constrained, there is a rapid escalation of fury in which unforgivable things are said and unforgettable blows are struck” (Millon 2011 641)

**Tyrannical Sadistic Personality Disorder: “**Along with the malevolent antisocial, the tyrannical sadist stands among the most frightening and cruel of the personality disorder subtypes. Both relate to others in an attacking, intimidating, and overwhelming way, frequently accusatory and abusive, and almost invariably destructive. Some are crudely assaultive and distressingly ‘‘evil,’’ whereas others are physically restrained, but overwhelm their victims by unrelenting criticism and bitter tirades. There is a verbally or physically overbearing character to their assaults, and minor resistances or weaknesses seem to stimulate tyrannical sadists, encouraging attack rather than deterring and slowing them down. It is the forcefulness, the unrestrained character, and the indiscriminate anger that is most notable. Descriptively, these sadists appear to relish the act of menacing and brutalizing others; forcing their victims to cower and submit seems to provide them with a special sense of satisfaction. Among those who are not physically brutal, we see verbally cutting and scathing commentaries that are both accusatory and demeaning. Many intentionally heighten and dramatize their surly, abusive, inhumane, and unmerciful behaviors. Although these individuals are in many respects the purest form of the ‘‘psychopathic’’ sadist, they do exhibit some features of other personality types, most notably the negativistic and/or the paranoid.” (Millon 2011 642)

“There are major covariations seen among patients with an ADS sadistic personality. The conjunction with other personality disorders is most notable with the negativistic (DRN) and antisocial (ADA) types. In the negativistic, we see a strong common thread of resentment and anger. In the antisocial, the common theme appears to be a sense of having been reacted to with hostility and debasement by significant others, as well as society at large. Also associated with the sadistic pattern are features of the paranoid (MPP), borderline (UBC), turbulent (EET), and narcissistic (CEN) personality spectra. Several of these combinations are seen in the earlier sections of this chapter.” (Millon 2011 645)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the ADS Personality Spectrum

(Millon 2011 657)

### Apathetic Styles, Asocial Types, Schizoid Disorders: The AAS Spectrum


“On what basis can pathology in the level or capacity of either the pain and pleasure polarities be seen as relevant to personality disorders? Several possibilities present themselves. In what we have labeled the AAS spectrum here, we see patients in which both pleasure and pain polarity objectives are deficient, that is, they lack the capacity, relatively speaking, to experience life’s events either as painful or pleasurable. Without these motivations, they are likely to sit passively as life goes by.” (Millon 2011 663)

“We begin our presentation of this emotionally extreme spectrum with personalities that are grouped together by virtue of their notable and distinct pleasure deficiencies: the capacity to experience that crucial component of the polarities pertaining to life enhancement and life preservation. The personality patterns in this classification group, for one reason or another, lack the ability to experience the rewards, joys, and positive experiences of life. Included among them are the AAS schizoid and SRA avoidant personality prototypes. In the first category, the AAS spectrum of this chapter, there appears to be a significant deficit in the person’s intrinsic capacity to experience the joyful and pleasurable aspects of life. Patients in the second category, the SRA personality spectrum in the next chapter, show an excessive preoccupation and oversensitivity to the stresses of life, such that they invest all their energies in avoiding pain and misfortune; their hyperalertness to the possibility of troublesome events appears to preclude their ability to attend, to seek, and hence to experience the pleasures of life. Theirs is not an intrinsic deficit, but a preoccupation with matters of danger and distress. They would rather not expose themselves to the possibility of pleasure for fear that it will either not be forthcoming, or would prove ultimately to be deceptive and disappointing. Thus, for different reasons, intrinsic deficiency, preoccupation elsewhere, or despairing its possibility, we see personalities take similar but different forms of expression—AAS and SRA spectra.

As noted, the present chapter focuses on the AAS personality spectrum, individuals distinguished by their aloof, introverted, and seclusive nature. They have difficulty in establishing friendships, prefer distant or limited involvements with others, and seem uninterested in (if not aversive to) social activities. In general, they appear to gain little satisfaction in personal relationships. Two personality spectra, AAS schizoid and SRA avoidant, comprise what we have differentiated as the passive and active variants of a ‘‘socially detached’’ pattern. Although neither of these types is entirely homogeneous, each exhibits distinctive clinical features and experiential histories. The first type, the passively detached variant, or what has been labeled the schizoid personality in the DSM, displays emotional and cognitive deficits that hinder the development of close or warm relationships. The second variant, the actively detached, or DSM avoidant personality, includes individuals whose experiences of interpersonal rejection and deprecation have led them to be mistrustful of and to keep distance from close relationships.” (Millon 2011 663-664)

“The polarity schema for the schizoid (Figure 14.1) shows that they possess a marked deficiency in the capacity to experience both psychic pleasure (enhancement) and pain (preservation). In other words, they are unmotivated to seek out joy and gratification, are unable to view life enthusiastically, and also, they experience none of the distressing affects of life, such as sadness, anxiety, and anger. As a consequence of these deficiencies, AAS personalities have little motivation to seek out rewards or to distance themselves from potentially discomforting experiences; the result is a rather passive (accommodating) individual, who is ill-disposed to modify life circumstances or to participate actively in life’s events. Owing to these deficiencies and inclinations, there is little motivation to become involved in the affairs of others (nurturance). Hence, by default, if nothing else, they tend to be self-involved (individuated). The deductive model presented in this figure reflects the manner in which the theory formulates a personality disorder; it is essentially the same procedure by which Costa and Widiger articulate the components of these disorders using quantitatively derived five factors as their model, as well as the manner in which Cloninger does likewise, employing his biologically anchored tripartite schema of harm-avoidance, novelty-seeking, and reward-dependence. The key distinction between Millon’s model and those of a quantitative or neurobiological character is its grounding in a theory that transcends the particular forms of expression in which personality disorders manifest themselves (lexical, biochemical). Rather, it is anchored to the deeper elements of nature, as found in evolutionary principles that apply to all major biological disciplines of science.” (Millon 2011 676)

#### Figure 14.1 from Millon 2011


(Millon 676)

Imagine the most extreme example of a Schizoid. Pleasure, Pain, Active, and Other are all completely unused. This would manifest as catatonia.

#### Table of Trait Domains of the AAS Spectrum

(Millon 2011 678)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the AAS Spectrum

(Millon 2011 678)

“As with most personality disorders, the pattern of characteristics seen in the pathological form may also be seen in milder form among individuals who may be considered within the normal range. Hence the AAS schizoid prototype can be considered dimensional, that is, distributed on a continuum of severity from normal at one end to seriously pathological at the other.” (MIllon 2011 682)

**Reserved Apathetic Personality Style: “**Reserved apathetics strive with great difficulty to see the bright side of life, to be optimistic about the future, or find ways to enjoy themselves, and, in general, to deal with life’s ups and downs with relative equanimity. Deficient in the capacity for affect, they struggle, albeit feebly, to be pleased with the relationships and activities that compose their lives, as well as to possess attitudes that foster and enrich their rather meager existence. As is most notable among apathetics, the reserved style is markedly unable to experience major affective states. Life for them is especially bland if not stark, leaving their inner world devoid of most sensibilities. Here they contrast with the introspective apathetics whose inner world is full of cognitive ideas and processes, though they also are rarely sensitive and concerned with human affairs.” (Millon 2011 683)

**Introspectively Apathetic Personality Style: “**What differentiates the reserved and the introspective apathetic most notably, as just recorded, is the latter’s fertile imagination, rich in its complexity, although not with regard to human affairs. Searching within themselves, these introspective personalities cannot grasp the subtleties of their own thoughts and emotions, often suffering intensely over the futility of who they are. Aware of the emptiness that inheres within them, they are able to generate imaginative understandings that are unrelated to human affairs, filling in their inner void with subjects of an inanimate or technological character. In this way they are able to find a way out of the despair of their isolation and painful emptiness.” (Millon 2011 684)

“What leads the Apathetic style to decline into Asociality? The Apathy that characterizes the AAS normal style does not fit well in society. There are just a few places for the person to gain what little pleasures of life they may seek. As a result, further isolation and impassivity may develop, and they may recede into the Languidly Asocial or the Remotely Asocial personality pattern.” (Millon 2011 685)

**Languidly Asocial Personality Type: “**As with other AAS variants, the asocial abnormal pattern we are calling languid can be traced either to life experiences or to inherent disabilities. Here we are likely to find some individuals who have been subjected to marked stimulus impoverishment in the sensorimotor-autonomy stage, leading to the underdevelopment of relevant neural substrates. Among these, it is a failure to receive ‘‘psychic nourishment’’ requisite to the stimulation of their inherent activation and pleasurable potentials. For others, these deficits may stem from an inborn deficiency. What we see clinically among these persons is a mixed pattern that reflects a core asocial makeup that has been interpenetrated with features of the depressive personality.” (Millon 2011 685)

**Remotely Asocial Personality Type: “**Another set of difficulties that can result in the isolated and withdrawn AAS pattern may be spoken of as the remote asocial. Youngsters subjected to intense parental/family hostilities and rejection very early in life may protectively withdraw in a manner so extreme as to reduce their original potential to feel and relate to the external world. Defensive maneuvers of this intensity and youth can be so severe as to make the child incapable of subsequent feeling and relating. We believe this to be an unusual adaptive maneuver, but a possibility nevertheless. The sequence just described is more likely to eventuate in an SRA avoidant rather than an AAS schizoid personality spectrum. Here youngsters are quite capable of desiring relationships and feeling emotions intensely but such desires and emotions result in extreme anguish and disillusionment. Hence, they do not lack the capacity to feel and to relate to others, as do other AAS types, but have protectively damped down these emotions and wishes to such an extent as to be possibly unaware of them. Depending on the time and intensity of these overwhelming negative experiences, the child may exhibit signs that are more like the intrinsically deficient AAS variant than the protectively SRA spectrum pattern: Most of these youngsters, we believe, retain the wish for affective bonding, but are deeply convinced that it will not be forthcoming. Nevertheless, what we see when we examine the more moderately severe subclincial remote personalities is a commingling of both core schizoid and avoidant features.” (Millon 2011 688-689)


“The prototypes that constitute the body of the personality disorder chapters in this text represent derivations based essentially on theoretical deduction. They are given their descriptive characterizations from the vast literature provided by earlier clinicians and theorists, as well as from the texts of the DSM-III, III-R, and IV. What is presented is, in great part, a series of ‘‘ideal’’ or pure textbook conceptions of each disorder.” (Millon 2011 692)

**Affectless Schizoid Personality Disorder: “**In what may best be termed the affectless schizoid type, we believe that the isolated, emotionally detached, and nonsocially communicative features of this personality are likely to be a consequence in part of constitutional deficiencies. Perhaps these individuals have marked neurological deficits in those regions of the nervous system that subserve the capacity to relate with warmth and sensitivity to other humans, some lesion perhaps or structural aplasia in relevant systems (e.g., limbic). Here we are dealing with persons who are at the lower end of the normal distribution of affective sensibility; as noted, this diminished capacity is probably attributable largely to inborn limitations. Given these spiritless and emotionally diminished qualities, affectless schizoids are likely to show up clinically as possessing features that interweave with those seen in compulsive personalities.” (Millon 2011 693)

**Depersonalized Schizoid Personality Disorder: “**This variant of the schizoid is notable by the individual’s dreamily distant qualities. Upon initial observation, one might think that these schizoids are enjoying the contemplation of some inner vision, some inner reality that draws them more and more into their isolated state. As with other schizoids, they are extremely inattentive and disengaged from the real world. But more than the others, they have not only deteriorated into a state of obliviousness, appearing as if they were preoccupied inwardly but, in fact, they are preoccupied with nothing in particular. Though present in the world of others, they appear to be staring into empty space, relating neither to the actions and feelings of others, nor to those that emanate from within themselves. These features bring this schizoid into a close amalgamation with the schizotypal personality such that many of their characteristics blend and unite.” (Millon 2011 693-694)

“Patterns of co-morbidity for the AAS schizoid are fairly consistently obtained with most methods and populations. The most prevalent association may be found between the AAS and the SRA avoidant personality; here co-diagnoses occur in 30% to 35% of cases. Almost as prevalent is the concurrence of AAS and ESS schizotypal personalities, where covariation appears in approximately 25% to 30% of the cases. As with all sources of prevalence data, there is a high degree of variability in co-morbidity statistics. Whether these AAS, SRA, ESS covariations reflect intrinsic commonalities, or stem from the eye of the beholder owing to a belief in their joint association with the schizophrenic syndrome (or even to confusions stemming from the similarity in their names) cannot be ascertained. There are also modest levels of AAS co-morbidity with DAD dependent, RRC obsessive-compulsive, and DRN negativistic spectra” (Millon 2011 694)


#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the AAS Personality Spectrum

(Millon 2011 707)


### Shy Styles, Reticent Types, Avoidant Disorders: The SRA Spectrum

Another combination from problems in the pleasure-pain polarity comprises those with a diminished ability to experience pleasure while also possessing an unusual sensitivity and responsiveness To them, life is frustrating and filled with anguish. Thus, they are hypervigilant and actively seek to avoid the anticipation of pain (Millon 2011 708).[[34]](#footnote-33)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the SRA Spectrum

(Millon 2011 719)[[35]](#footnote-34)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the SRA Spectrum

(Millon 2011 719)

“‘‘Normal’’ avoidants are not people that we generally deal with in everyday therapeutic transactions. Though their characteristics may not reach the level of severity that justify the label disorder, they do evidence the central features of this personality spectrum, that of hypersensitivity and distancing from relationships in which they feel their status is unsure or questionable. What we see in these individuals is an alertness to the possibility of rejection, a general social hesitation and a lowered sense of self-esteem. Yet, many of these somewhat shy and hesitant individuals, when placed in functions or settings that are congenial to their need for social security, are able to carry out their personal and vocational responsibilities with considerable competence.” (Millon 2011 725)

**Anxiously Shy Personality Style:** The anxiously shy person is a highly private person, immersed deeply in the complexities of his own tense feelings and fearful thoughts. He interprets events and relationships subjectively, seeing them through the prism of a rich inner world of worrisome ideals, concerns, values, and anxieties that lie behind what may appear to look like a calm and seemingly composed exterior. Although reticent and gentle in manner, he has an intensely active and concerned interior life. Always anticipating problems and searching for escape through self-knowledge, he seems to be lost at times in a never-ending quest for self revelation, a quest that has at its core a desire for achieving psychic peace of mind. Willing to explore what is intuitively felt, he reflects on all possibilities that may provide a measure of quietude for himself and in his relationship with others, a search that inevitably generates more questions than answers. This search for calmness and peace is undone in part by a persistent sense that pain and anguish form an essential element of human existence, a pernicious presence that intrudes again and again upon his life. Dismayed by those who focus on trivialities, who fail to recognize the complexities and problematic character of life, and who invest their energies and thoughts in the superficial and insubstantial, he often withdraws into self to seek privacy, especially in new situations involving others he does not know well, or in which he does not know how he will be received” (Millon 2011 725-726)

**Imaginatively Shy Personality Style: “**This personality is likely to have a fertile imagination with active reveries that are quite rich in their content and complexity. Nevertheless, he is inclined to be cautious socially, to keep his distance from problematic situations, to avoid troublesome relationships, to find a niche that maximizes security and psychic stability, and to arrange his affairs to ensure a good measure of social peace and predictability. Often upset by the actions of others, he evinces a concern that good relationships in life do not last and that their pleasures and joys often are ephemeral, neither genuine nor durable. Hence, he judges it wise to minimize social discomforts and to make life most gratifying by being prudent and sensible and by acting in a levelheaded and judicious way, not by seeking to generate personal pleasures or by engaging in social risks.” (Millon 2011 726-727)

“What conditions lead the Shy individuals into a fully Reticent pattern? The Shy level of the SRA spectrum may lead to further anguish and isolation. The patient may self-protectively set into motion greater isolation and hence fewer opportunities for change and growth. What little social contact they have may be actively avoided as the person’s Reticence takes on a hypersensitivity or Phobic quality” (Millon 2011 728)

**Hypersensitively Reticent Personality Type: “**In what may be termed the hypersensitively reticent person, we see many of the general features characteristic of the basic SRA personality core, but in an accentuated form. The behavior of these patients is characterized by a high-strung and prickly manner, a hyperalertness to signs of rejection and abuse, and an excessive weariness that leads to a peevish and wary attitude toward their environment. As such, these hypersensitive individuals display a fusion of basic SRA characteristics permeated with features more central to the MPP paranoid personality.” (Millon 2011 728)

**Phobicly Reticent Personality Type: “**Phobic syndromes are seen among many and diverse personality types. Some are active and energetic, expressing their fears in rapid and dramatic ways. Those who are more constrained may show a motor restlessness, a general worrisomeness about being exposed as being weak and inadequate. Personalities of a more irritable nature seem perennially on edge even when feared objects are not present; their imagination does not permit them a moment of rest or refuge. Others, perhaps of a more compulsive variety, seek to bury their anxieties behind their public reserve but, under close observation, can be seen as tense and anxious. Among the SRA types, there are individuals who rarely achieve freedom from their state of generalized anxiety. Seeking to limit the many sources of their anguish, they are disposed to find highly specific phobic precipitants, which, though fewer in number, almost invariably overwhelm their defenses and undo their psychic controls.” (Millon 2011 731)


“Caught in the trap of their own reticence, can Reticent personalities retreat further without regressing into a more serious Avoidant pattern? Their anguish and fretful behavior increases when social acceptance is no longer forthcoming. In its stead there is more rejection and humiliation, leading the person to drift into a more pervasive and intense avoidance pattern.” (Millon 2011 732)

**Conflicted Avoidant Personality Disorder: “**More than is typical of the ‘‘ordinary’’ SRA types, the behavior of these notably conflicted personalities is the struggle they face between desiring detachment from others and fearing to be independent. Conflicted avoidants would like to be close and show affection but anticipate experiencing intense pain and disillusionment. Complicating the concern about venturing into close relationships is a markedly deflated self-esteem. Thus, any effort to make a go at independence is constrained by the fear that it will fail and result in humiliation. Although they have no alternative but to depend on supporting persons and institutions, this behavior overlies deep resentments. Others have either turned against these avoidants or disapproved their efforts to achieve autonomy. They are often petulant and negativistic, and on occasion will attack others for failing to recognize their need for affection and nurturance. The dependency security they seek is seriously jeopardized under these circumstances. To bind their conflictful feelings and anger, and thereby protect against humiliation and loss, they become anxious and withdrawn, experiencing a persistent and pervasive dysphoric mood. As evident from the foregoing, we should expect to find that the unresolvable angst of these conflicted individuals often results in a blending of core avoidant features with those seen among negativistic personalities.” (Millon 2011 732-733)

**Self-Deserting Avoidant Personality Disorder: “**As with other personalities of this type, selfdeserting avoidants draw more and more into themselves as a means of avoiding the discomforts of relating to others. In so doing, they find themselves increasingly aware of the psychic contents of their inner world. Whereas they may have used fantasy initially to make their life more bearable, fantasies often bring no surcease. They begin to recognize that turning inward only centers their thoughts on the misery of their lives and the pain and anguish of past experiences. Although spared the difficulties of public exposure and personal humiliation, they have not been successful in avoiding their inner sorrows and torments. There are moments, of course, when their fantasies provide them with fulfilling images and longings, but these become fewer and fewer over time.” (Millon 2011 733)

“The SRA spectrum is associated with eight or so different co-morbid personality disorders that deserve notation. The overlap is greatest with the schizoid, depressive, dependent, and paranoid personalities; also noted are correspondences with the masochistic, schizotypal, borderline, and negativistic patterns. Reference should also be made to the prior SRA Adult sections. These types reflect partial co-morbidities with the basic SRA spectrum prototypes.” (Millon 2011 736-737)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the SRA Personality Spectrum


(Millon 2011 751)

### Dejected Styles, Forlorn Types, Melancholic Disorders: The DFM Spectrum


“Chronic feelings of sadness and depression are typical of DFM spectrum persons who persist, even during periods of objective good-fortune, in being downhearted and gloomy. According to the Darwinian evolutionary model, they are oriented to the pain polarity, characteristically behaving in a passive giving up manner. The three levels of the spectrum differ in the intensity and breadth of their depressive symptomatology. Mild dejected styles are run-ofthe mill persons who evince a persistent tendency to see life pessimistically and problematically. The moderate or abnormal level, those we have labeled forlorn types are, in addition, selfdenigrating, viewing their future as likely to be more of the same sad and forsaken past. The melancholic disorder is seriously, pervasively, and persistently disconsolate and depressed” (Millon 2011 754)

“If we review the theoretically generated polarity model, as illustrated in Figure 16.1, we should note a strong representation in both the preservation polar extreme and the accommodating ecological adaptation style. This signifies, first, an overconcern with pain and anguish, and second, that the person has ‘‘given up,’’ essentially succumbing to what is judged to be the inevitability of continuing suffering and misery. Despite important similarities, this depressive pattern contrasts in significant ways from the schema representing the SRA avoidant spectrum personality. In both personality disorders, there is an adaptive focus on preservation and pain reduction; similarly, in both disorders there is an inattention to the pleasures and gratifications that could enhance life. The core distinction in ecological adaptation is that the SRA avoidant personality actively seeks to minimize pain by anticipating its eventuality and taking steps to distance from or avoid that possibility. By contrast, the depressive no longer attempts to avoid the anguish and despair of life. Rather, he or she has accepted it as if it were inevitable and insurmountable. Melancholics remain passive, resigned to the distressing realities that they have suffered, no longer seeking to eschew it, but to surrender to it.” (Millon 2011 766)


#### Figure 16.1 from Millon 2011

(Millon 2011 765)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the DFM Spectrum

(Millon 2011 767)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the DFM Spectrum

(Millon 2011 767)

“Despite its recency as a formal DSM classification, the history of DFM depressive syndromes is a long and rich one, many elements of which can be drawn on for the following personality presentations (Jackson, 1986). Some exhibit their depressive mood with displays of dramatic gesture and pleading commentary; others are demanding, irritable, and cranky. Some verbalize their thoughts in passive, vague, and abstract philosophical terms. Still others seem lonely, quietly downhearted, solemnly morose, and pessimistic. Common to all, however, is the presence of self-deprecatory comments, feelings of apathy, and marked discouragement and hopelessness. Their actions and complaints usually evoke sympathy and support from others, but these reassurances provide only temporary relief from the prevailing mood of dejection.” (Millon 2011 772)

**Voguishly Dejected Personality Style: “**Both Schnieder and Kraepelin noted a tendency of certain DFMs to display vanity and voguishness. To these personalities, suffering is seen as something noble, permitting them to feel special, if not elitist. They, thereby, acquired a philosophical refuge that could enable them to ponder ‘‘the bitterness of earthly life.’’ Some of these voguish dejected personalities display an aesthetic preoccupation, a way of dressing and living that gives stature to their unhappy moods. They philosophize about their ‘‘existential sadness’’ or the worrisome alienation that we all share in this ‘‘age of mass society.’’ This use of fashionable language provides them with a bridge to others. It gives them a feeling of belonging during times when they are most isolated from the attachments they so desperately seek. As such, these mild DFM melancholics are often seen to exhibit histrionic personality characteristics and, to a lesser extent, those of the narcissistic personality.” (Millon 2011 773)

**Despairingly Dejected Personality Style: “**Social frustrations of not being well understood by this dejected personality may produce grave uncertainties and public withdrawals, followed by stubbornness, discontent, and moodiness.” (Millon 2011 774)

“Why do these Dejected styles degenerate into a more severe DFM pattern? A Dejected style, with its pessimistic outlook, worthless self-image, and defenseless posture creates a self-fulfilling prophesy. Few people continue to display empathic overtures after their initial efforts fail to rouse these persistently depressed persons. Hence, a regression to the Forlorn pattern is likely.” (Millon 2011 775)

**Ill-Humored Forlorn Personality Type: “**In these personalities, well described by Kraepelin and Schneider, we see a constant barrage of complaints, irritability, and a sour grumbling discontent, usually interwoven with hypochondriacal preoccupations and periodic expressions of guilt and self-condemnation. Their habitual style of acting out their conflicts and ambivalent feelings becomes more pronounced, resulting in extreme vacillations between bitterness and resentment, on the one hand, and intropunitive self-deprecation on the other. Self-pity and bodily anxieties are extremely common and may serve as a basis for distinguishing them from other depressive types. A review of empirical and clinical studies suggests that the characteristics of these DFM forlorn types interweave, as do those evincing disgruntled styles, with features seen most commonly among negativistic personalities.” (Millon 2011 775)

**Self-Derogating, Forlorn Personality Type: “**Feelings of helplessness and futility readily come to the fore when these self-derogating, forlorn types are faced either with burdensome responsibilities or the anticipation of social abandonment. The actual loss of a significant person almost invariably prompts severe dejection, if not a psychotic depression. Anticipation of abandonment may prompt these patients to admit openly their weaknesses and shortcomings as a means of gaining reassurance and support. Expressions of guilt and selfcondemnation typically follow because these verbalizations often successfully deflect criticism from others, transforming their threats into comments of reassurance and sympathy” (Millon 2011 778)


“Why do many Forlorn types decline further and wither into a severe Melancholic disorder? As matters persist with episodes of depression and social isolation, the Forlorn patient becomes chronically Melancholic, spiraling on a downhill course that is only sporadically relieved by pharmaceutical or electroconvulsive treatments. Cognitive approaches are more likely to be sustainably beneficial.” (Millon 2011 778)

**Morbidly Melancholic Personality Disorder:** A deep paralysis of action is what comes to characterize the morbidly melancholic personality, a style that frequently blends into Axis I clinical depressions. These morbid types experience deep feelings, contrasting markedly with the emotional flatness of certain schizoids. The gloom and profound dejection are clearly conveyed as these patients slump with brow furrowed, body stooped, and head turned downward and away from the gaze of others, held in their hands like a burdensome weight. Various physical signs and symptoms further enable us to distinguish these disorders from other DFM personality disorders. Many of these morbid melancholics lose weight and look haggard and drained. Not uncommonly, they follow a characteristic pattern of awakening after two or three hours of sleep, turn restlessly, have oppressive thoughts, and experience a growing dread of the new day” (Millon 2011 779)

**Despairingly Melancholic Personality Disorder: “**These personalities often covary with avoidant personalities, creating a pattern of characteristics that reflect the features of both. Typically anguished and agitated, these mixed personalities exhibit a wrought-up despair, vacillating between fretfulness and confusion at one time, and dysphoria and despondence the next. They evidence a perturbed discontent as they think about the anguish others have caused them, venting little of the displeasure and vexation they feel. Should they ventilate their disquieted and unsettled moods, they invariably will restrain their acts of irritability and disillusionment by turning them inward, manifesting a despondency and sour disaffection with themselves. These shifting and vacillating attitudes serve to discharge their tensions and relieve them of their deep unhappiness and resentfulness. Nervous, fretful, distracted, these despairing melancholics manifest a sequence of brittle moods—usually shortlived and intense—affects and attitudes that ultimately become increasingly self-destructive.” (Millon 2011 782)

“Given the recency of the DFM personality spectrum as an organized designation, there is little research available to guide our choice of covariant personality disorders. The following notations are highly speculative, therefore, based entirely on theoretical deduction rather than empirically derived prevalence data. As conceived in this fashion, the primary covariations are likely to be found with the SRA avoidant spectrum and AAM masochistic spectrum. Also noteworthy are correspondences with the DAD dependent, UBC borderline, and DRN negativistic personalities.” (Millon 2011 782)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the DFM Personality Spectrum


(Millon 2011 796)

### Ebullient Styles, Exuberant Types, Turbulent Disorders: The EET Spectrum

“This group of individuals is unusual by virtue of the central role they give to their active pursuit of the pleasurable side of the pain-pleasure polarity. Typically energetic and buoyant in manner, they may become overly animated, scattered, and manic.” (Millon 2011 798)


“The polarity schema to characterize the ebullient/exuberant/turbulent personality according to the evolutionary model is presented in Figure 17.1 The elements that stand out are similar to those articulated by Jamison (2004), that is, the Enhancement/Pleasure component and the Modification/Active component. Average levels are found in the Individuation/Self and Nurturant/Others dimensions; both Preservation/Pain and Accommodation/Passive are noted in the figure as weak dimensions” (Millon 2011 809)

#### Figure 17.1 from Millon 2011


(Millon 2011 809)

You can imagine this somewhat easily as exemplified on the extreme by a Manic who fully believes she’s divine and immune to any real harm, and also constantly thrill-seeking.[[36]](#footnote-35)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the EET Spectrum

(Millon 2011 810)

#### Figure of Salience of the EET Spectrum Trait Domains

(Millon 2011 811)

**Vivacious Ebullient Personality Style:** A frequent association has been found between the sociable and ebullient styles. Prevalence data indicate that this covariation occurs with considerable frequency in settings such as drug treatment programs, marital counseling clinics, and centers for handling female youth offenders” (Millon 2011 815)

**Innovative Ebullient Personality Style:** Gaining his stimulation from others and having insight into their strengths and weaknesses, the innovative ebullient person is skillful in handling them, especially if his efforts are recognized. His optimism and goodwill are broad-ranging, particularly when applied in conjunction with his fertile imagination and creative impulses. Keenly stimulated to improvise novel ways of performing conventional tasks as well as possessing the spontaneity and energy to start (if not necessarily to complete) them, he takes special pleasure in tackling all challenges and is often quite versatile in meeting them. Full of ideas and rather confident of his own worth, he might be inclined to pursue any curiosity or future possibility. This inclination periodically results in somewhat impulsive decisions and actions.” (Millon 2011 816)

“What precipitates Ebullients into the less functional Exuberant level? The normal Ebullient style will find many social ecosystems within which they can function satisfactorily. However, their persistent high-spirited behavior, intrusiveness and mercurial temperament can begin to irritate others, leading them to be annoyed and dismissive. As an adaptive initial step, the patient may ‘‘up the ante,’’ becoming more dominating and insistent, progressing then to a level of Exuberance, either euphoric or zealous” (Millon 2011 817)

**Euphoric Exuberant Personality Type: “**The dominant characteristic of this subtype is their cheerfulness and buoyancy, their desire to enjoy life, to follow the ‘‘pleasure principle,’’ to experience events in a jovial manner, to be carefree and happy-go-lucky. If events and experiences are not immediately gratifying and mirthful, they are ready to pick up and move on to something else that may be. To be in the company of others who are similarly inclined or receptive to them dominates their aspirations. They are social entertainers. Nothing is more wonderful and exulting than to be in the company of people open to their cheerful glibness. They race from one person to another, constantly seeking a jubilant and gleeful response to their entreaties. Social conviviality is their goal. Most cannot be public performers or comedians, of course, but the euphoric exuberant will attempt in his small personal world to engage in clever chit-chat, jokes, shocking commentaries, and outrageous humor.” (Millon 2011 817-818)

**Zealous Exuberant Personality Type: “**Most notable about this subtype is their entrepreneurial spirit, their eagerness, liveliness, vitality, and optimism. They are enthusiastic promoters of ideas and plans. They are passionate and effusive in their pursuit of their goals, evidencing at times an irrepressible spirit that drives them to pursue one implausible venture after another. Some refer to these zealots as masterminds of grand schemes and plans. These arm-waving boosters are able to provide others with a dizzying array of idea-aminute lectures and proposals. They champion numerous amusements, as well as numerous ways of engaging others to pursue and promote them. Their passion and ebullience, however, is short-lived; most peter out as they leap from one passing exciting venture to another. Many naive persons are drawn to these exuberant’s enterprises and gambles because enthusiasm is infectious. But these risky undertakings are not sustainable: exuberants are too readily bored; they lack the ‘‘staying power’’ and consistency necessary to complete projects. Ideas emerge quickly in full form, but not necessarily thoughtfully or sensitive to practicalities. Getting serious or detail-oriented is not their forte. Excited by variety, novelty, and change, their consistency consists of inconsistency.” (Millon 2011 819-820)

“Under what circumstances do Exuberants ‘‘collapse,’’ disintegrating into the Turbulent level? If the patient fails to redeem him/her self at the Exuberant level, that is, to become less-and-less a tolerated member of the ecosystem, behaviors may become more extreme, ‘‘reckless,’’ erratic, and manic-like. Not uncommonly, this manic pattern may lead to depressive exhaustion.” (Millon 2011 820)

**Recklessly Turbulent Personality Disorder: “**As matters deteriorate for the exuberant, they gradually decompensate to the turbulent level of malfunctioning. What we see is a pattern of heedless behavior, scattered thinking, and brash and impetuous actions and moods. They appear desperately impetuous, engaging in careless and unmindful behaviors, acting impulsively and abruptly as they generate irresponsible and harebrained schemes. In their effort to keep functioning while they seek to deny the pressure of an upsurging depression, they race wildly, almost completely out of control. Their actions, thoughts, and moods become erratic and unpredictable; their behaviors and emotions become akin to the manic breakdown of compulsive personalities.” (Millon 2011 820)

**Exhausted Turbulent Personality Disorder: “**This personality disordered person represents a state of collapse. The exhausted turbulent appears worn out, drained, consumed, depleted. These persons look weary and haggard in their appearance now that they have finally succumbed to the upsurge to their deeper depressive feelings. Having engaged in an extended bout of wild, desperate, and reckless activities, they find that they have pushed themselves beyond the limits of their psychic and physical endurance. This breakdown indicates that they have been swamped by the sadness they have failed to keep at bay.” (Millon 2011 822)

“In appraising the diagnosis of exuberance/ turbulence it is usually wise to review the patient’s history, not only with the patient him or herself, but also where possible with a knowledgeable and close family member. When a patient presents milder levels of hypomania or exuberance it may be necessary to differentiate between a normal elevated mood and that of a clinical level of exuberance. Although the threshold for differentiating the presented symptoms may be elusive and variable, it would be advantageous to determine whether the exuberant presentation is limited in time or whether it has extended over longer periods. Similarly, it would be useful to note whether the symptoms are out of proportion to real life circumstances and environmental influences. Also, among those who manifest a clinical level of malfunctioning, one should see a lifelong history of social or vocational difficulties. Notable as well is the usual fact that clinical subtypes of this personality often lack insight into their symptoms; that is, they are unable to acknowledge that their behaviors and attitudes fail to accord with normal social conduct and outlook. Axis II co-morbidities co-occur most frequently with narcissistic and histrionic variants. Less frequently, but notable nevertheless are covariations with antisocial, negativistic, and paranoid personality subtypes.” (Millon 2011 823)

### Eccentric Styles, Schizotypal Types, Schizophrenic Disorders: The ESS Spectrum

“According to the Darwinian evolutionary model, this personality spectrum represents an especially deficient orientation in the pleasure-pain polarity schema. These personalities experience minimal pleasure, but also have notable difficulties in the cognitive realm. ESS types fail consistently in differentiating between self and other strategies, as well as in utilizing effectively either or both active or passive modes of adaptive functioning. Many regress into social isolation, evidencing minimal personal attachments and obligations.

Differences among the three levels we have distinguished in the ESS severity spectrum are more marked than among the levels of most of the other personality spectra. The mild or eccentric style often does not manifest any distinctly pathological features, evidencing at most only one or two DSM ‘‘schizotypal’’ criteria. They are most notable for doing ordinary things in unusual or peculiar ways. Everyday domestic life may reflect extraordinary beliefs or habits, such as exhibiting unusual socializing, eating, or sleeping behaviors. These occasionally reflect a lack of understanding social conventions, a need to re-create or transform oneself, and are often evident in peculiar counter-conventional lifestyles. Moving toward the mid-level severity of the schizotypal type we see more of the DSM’s aberrant criteria, such as perceived body distortions, marked social withdrawal, vague or metaphorical speech, odd beliefs, severe cognitive and neuromotor abnormalities, feelings of estrangement, as well as a family schizophrenic history. The extremely severe segment of the ESS spectrum, that of the schizophrenic disorder itself, we observe clear psychotic-level cognitive processes. Here is a markedly diminished reality awareness and severe behavioral abnormalities and emotional dyscontrols.” (Millon 2011 831)

“Structure and style coexist, of course. Style relates largely to the functional manner in which the individual relates to the internal and external world. It represents dynamic processes that transpire within the mind and between the self and the person’s psychosocial environment. As has been described in earlier chapters, functional styles represent expressive modes of regulatory action. By contrast, structural elements represent deeply embedded and relatively enduring templates of imprinted memories, attitudes, needs, fears, conflicts, and so on, which undergird and transform the character of ongoing life events (Gottesman & Gould, 2003; Meehl, 1962, 1990a, 2001). Psychic structures, in addition to serving as the underlying architecture of the mind, have a fundamental preemptive effect in that they alter the character and impact of subsequent experiences so as to make them fit preformed inclinations and expectancies. They serve selectively to lower experiential thresholds or transactions so that these events become consonant with constitutional proclivities and early learnings (Tsuang, Stone, & Faraone, 2000). As a consequence, ongoing events are often experienced as minor variations of the past.” (Millon 2011 832)

“For purposes of definition, structures may be considered to be a quasi-permanent framework. They comprise a network of interconnecting substrates, the internalized residues of the past that serve as the undergirding foundation for action, thought, and feeling. For our purposes, it is necessary to recognize that the overall architecture that serves as the structure of one’s psychic interior may display weaknesses in its cohesion, or exhibit deficient coordination among its components, or possess few mechanisms to maintain balance and harmony, or regulate internal conflicts, or mediate external pressures. The concept of structural organization refers to the strength, interior congruity, and ultimate functional and stylistic efficacy of the personality. As a complex system of internal dispositions and traits, the structure and organization of the mind is almost exclusively derived from inferences of intrapsychic phenomena; hence the difficulty in articulating their strength and character.

The concept of psychic structure is similar to current psychoanalytic notions of normal, neurotic, borderline, and psychotic ‘‘organizational levels’’ (Kernberg, 1967). We recognize the utility of these analytic notions in the following chapters where descriptions of defective structures and decompensated structures are occasionally made. This usage is somewhat limited inasmuch as it relates essentially to quantitative degrees of structural pathology, not to their variations in character or configuration. In this regard, we are following the innovative model, but not the content, of Kernberg’s proposals. For example, we have introduced stylistic variants of structure in our formulation of ‘‘intrapsychic architecture’’ domains (see Chapter 3), proposing a distinctive style for each personality spectrum. In this and the following two chapters, we have recognized that there are differing degrees as well as styles of structural cohesion. The schizotypal, borderline, and paranoid styles are represented as exhibiting moderately severe defects in their personality organization (Chapters 18, 19, and 20); more severe forms of pathology, the schizophrenic, cyclophrenic, and paraphrenic personalities exhibit the most serious degree of decompensation in their organizational structure

Although all these personalities display an adaptive inflexibility, tend to promote selfperpetuating vicious circles, and hang on a tenuous emotional balance, there are substantive grounds for differentiating them in terms of levels of severity. Before doing so, it should be restated that personality structure is composed of complex traits that lie on a continuum of adaptiveness. Adaptiveness is a gradient, a matter of degree, and not a dichotomy. Notions such as health versus disease, abnormal versus normal, or psychotic versus nonpsychotic are polar extremes of a continuum that has intervening shades or gradations. An infinite number of discriminations may be made along the spread of a clinical spectrum, but for certain purposes refined distinctions may be neither feasible nor necessary. As long as we keep in mind that all the pathological trait dimensions of each personality spectrum lie on a continuum, it has sufficed in this book to differentiate patients into a few broad classes, such as mild styles, moderate types, or severe disorders.” (Millon 2011 833)


“Two features distinguish these moderately severe defective personality structures from those at less severe levels. The first has been termed deficit social competence (Millon, 1969) and refers to the erratic personal history of these patients and their failure to attain a level of social achievement commensurate with their natural aptitudes and talents. Faulty starts and repeated disruptions characterize their educational, vocational, and marital life. In contrast to the less severe types, who progress and achieve a modicum of social and vocational effectiveness, structurally defective personalities create endless complications for themselves and experience the same setbacks time and again. Despite these failures, many are fortunate in having strongly supportive or beneficent environments. Hence, they are able to pull themselves together periodically and make a go of it again. This rapid recovery process contrasts with the fate of those at more severe levels of personality decompensation, such as seen in schizophrenia, cyclophrenia, and paraphrenia who exhibit a more persistent downhill regression that eventuates in prolonged and often total social invalidism.

As evident from the foregoing, the second distinguishing feature of the moderately defective or abnormal group is their periodic, but reversible, psychotic episodes. These severe but usually transient disorders are characterized by the loss of reality contact and by both cognitive and emotional dyscontrol. Although psychotic eruptions occur with some frequency, their reversibility differentiates them from those at the severe or structurally decompensated level. Thus, in the structurally defective patient, the reality break is brief and transitory, whereas in severely decompensated personalities, it is prolonged and often permanent. Caught in their own adaptive inflexibilities and tendencies to foster new difficulties and self-defeating vicious circles, defective personalities experience constant upsets in their equilibrium and are subject to emotional eruptions and uncontrollable behaviors and thoughts. Once these intense feelings are discharged, however, these patients typically regain a modicum of psychic balance—until such time as their tensions again mount beyond manageable portions.” (Millon 2011 835-836)

“As a final illustration of contemporary proposals, we turn briefly to the evolutionary polarity model as presented in Figure 18.1. The primary theme illustrated is the vacancy or weakness that exists in each of the six polarity boxes. Notable, however, are the reversal signs between each of the three pairs. In essence, this signifies that none of the survival motives and aims of the schizotypal have a firm grounding. Rather, they are feeble in their intensity and focus, and can be easily reversed or distorted in their usual objectives and goals. The figure portrays their rather ineffectual existence, as well as the meaningless and eccentric character of their activities. Possessing little spark or drive, these individuals become increasingly estranged from social conventions, resulting in the purposeless nature of their behaviors, the curious character of their thoughts, and the frequent inappropriateness of the emotions they express.


In line with the view that the moderately and markedly severe personality disorders are largely structural pathologies, rather than stylistic ones, an understanding of these patients requires that we combine the particular structural pathology of the patient with the less severe personality style with which it is often an outgrowth. Schizotypals may demonstrate either an historic schizoid or an avoidant stylistic pattern. The features of these less severe pathological styles then conflate with the pathology of structure that typifies the schizotypal, thereby producing the particular configuration of characteristics of the patient under study. “ (Millon 2011 847-848)

#### Figure 18.1 from Millon 2011


(Millon 2011 848)

The pleasure-pain reversal was addressed in the S&M-themed chapters, but note that in those cases they were sought while the ESS has weakened polarities across the board. This is a rare combination of weak polarities for both Active and Passive. What having none of these aims is to not participate in personality, at least not one based strongly on the normal human structure of personality.

#### Table of Trait Domains of the ESS Spectrum

(Millon 2011 850)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the ESS Spectrum

(Millon 2011 850)

**Intrapsychic Content: Chaotic: “**The inner world of the schizotypal and schizophrenic is grounded in a piecemeal jumble of early memories, perceptions, and feelings (Mohr, Blanke, & Brugger, 2006). The inner template that comprises this chaotic melange of objects, ´ impulses, and thoughts is almost random, resulting in an ineffective and uncoordinated framework for regulating the patient’s tensions, needs, and goals. Perhaps for the greater part of their lives, these internalized representations have been only fitfully competent for accommodating to their world, binding their impulses, and mediating their interpersonal difficulties.” (Millon 2011 852)

**Intrapsychic Dynamics: Undoing: “**It appears that many of the bizarre mannerisms and idiosyncratic thoughts of these patients reflect a retraction or reversal of previous acts or ideas. Intrapsychically, this undoing regulatory mechanism may serve to counteract feelings of anxiety, conflict, or guilt. By utilizing this dynamic process, the patient ‘‘repents for’’ or nullifies the ostensive misdeed or ‘‘evil thought.’’ The outcropping of this undoing process may be seen in their magical beliefs and ritualistic behaviors.

This persistent undoing mechanism, combined with the ESS patient’s periodic disavowal of self, may come to characterize the unreal and meaningless quality of their lives and may give rise to their frequent and frightening sense of emptiness and nothingness. As already noted, schizotypals and schizophrenics are often overwhelmed by the dread of total disintegration, implosion, and nonexistence—feelings that may be countered by imposing or constructing new worlds of self-made reality, an idiosyncratic reality composed of superstitions, suspicions, illusions, and so on. The more severe attacks of depersonalization may precipitate psychotic episodes, irrational outbursts in which these patients frantically search to build a sense of reality to fill their vacant existence.” (Millon 2011 852)

“Intrapsychic Architecture: Fragmented If one looks into the intrapsychic organization of these patients’ minds, one is likely to find highly permeable boundaries among psychic components that are commonly well segregated. There is a haphazardly ordered and loose assemblage of morphologic structures. As a consequence of these less than adequate and poorly constructed defensive operations, primitive thoughts and impulses are usually discharged in a helterskelter way, more or less directly and in a sequence of desultory actions. The intrinsically defective nature of the patient’s internal structures results in few reality-based sublimations and few successful achievements in life. These defects make the patient vulnerable to further decompensation—even under modest degrees of stress (Chang & Lenzenweger, 2005).

The inner structures of some ESS types may be overwhelmed by excess stimulation. This is likely to occur when social demands and expectations press hard against their preferred uninvolved or withdrawn state. Unable to avoid such external impositions, some of these patients may react either by ‘‘blanking out,’’ drifting off into another world, or by paranoid or aggressive outbursts. Undue encroachments on their complacent world may lead them to disconnect socially for prolonged periods, during which they may be confused and aimless, display inappropriate affect and paranoid thinking, and communicate in odd, circumstantial, and metaphorical ways. At other times, when external pressures may be especially acute, they may react with a massive and psychotic outpouring of primitive impulses, delusional thoughts, hallucinations, and bizarre behaviors. Many of these patients have stored up intense repressed anxieties and hostilities throughout their lives. Once released, these feelings burst out in a rampaging flood. The backlog of suspicions, fears, and animosities has been ignited and now explodes in a frenzied cathartic discharge.” (Millon 2011 852-853)

“ESS Mild (Normal) Adult Eccentric Personality Styles [CT-4] Among the notable characteristics of the three mild (normal) structurally defective spectrum personalities—the eccentric, the unstable, the mistrustful—is the high probability that they can at times function in a socially acceptable fashion. Each possesses characteristics that make them capable of relating to their environments in a reasonably competent or everyday normal way. These personalities are neither too withdrawn and peculiar (eccentric), nor too impulsive and unpredictable (unstable), nor too suspicious and antagonistic (mistrustful).” (Millon 854)

“Disengaged Eccentric Personality Style We will begin the ‘‘normal’’ level of the ESS spectrum with two case presentations. The first, the case of Neal, a disengaged eccentric who became a problematic drug addict; the second case is that of Ariane, an ‘‘apprehensive’’ eccentric.” (Millon 2011 854)

“ESS Moderate (Abnormal) Adult Schizotypal Personality Types [CT-7] Why does Eccentricity fail to be maintained as a normal style? Eccentricity rarely finds a satisfactory niche in society. Hence, the likelihood of sinking into a Schizotypal level is fairly high. Fragmented, haphazard, estranged, the traits of the ESS spectrum are not features conducive to the roles and expectancies of contemporary ecosystems.” (Millon 2011 858)

“Timorous Schizotypal Personality Type As with their less severe avoidant and eccentric counterparts, timorous schizotypals are restrained, isolated, apprehensive, guarded, and shrinking. Protectively, they seek to ‘‘kill’’ their feelings and desires, bind their impulses, and withdraw from social encounters, thereby defending themselves from the pain and anguish of interpersonal relationships. The surface apathy and seeming indifference of these patients is not, as it is in the insipid schizotypal, owing to an intrinsic lack of sensitivity but to their attempt to restrain, damp down, or deaden excessive sensitivity. In addition to their social isolation, timorous schizotypals depreciate their self-worth. There is an abandonment of self and a disowning and remoteness from feeling and desire. The ‘‘real’’ selves of these personalities have been devalued and demeaned, split off, cast asunder, and rejected as humiliating or valueless. Not only are these schizotypals alienated from others, then, but they find no refuge and comfort in turning to themselves. Their isolation is twofold. So little is gained from others, and only a despairing sense of shame is found within themselves. Without the rewards of self or others to spur them, they drift into personal apathy and social isolation. As described previously, this timorous schizotypal pattern either emerges from or is interwoven with the more basic avoidant personality style.” (Millon 2011 861-862)

“ESS Severe (Clinical) Adult Schizophrenic Personality Disorders [CT-9] Most Schizotypals stabilize as such, but why do others atrophy or decline further? Although tenuous in psychic stability, a small percent of Schizotypals, despite their estrangement and cognitive dysfunctions, can gain the support needed to avoid regression to a chronic schizophrenic level. Medication and counseling, as well as family nurturance, can often obviate the hospitalization experience. Nevertheless, half-way houses and mental hospital care may be required and useful.” (Millon 2011 864-865)

“Immobile Schizophrenic Personality Disorder Most striking among immobile types is their lethargy and seeming indifference to their surroundings. They move listlessly, are apathetic, and even stuporous. Clothes are drab and their face appears lifeless and masklike. Speech is slow, labored, and often blocked, whispered, or inaudible. They seem passively withdrawn and unresponsive to their environment, cannot participate or feel involved, and tend to perceive things about them as unreal and strange. There is an emotional poverty, a dreamy detachment, a tendency to stand immobile or fixed in one place for hours. They habitually sit in cramped, bent over, and peculiar positions, to which they return repeatedly if they are distracted or dislodged. Some not only show a total lack of initiative, but display an automatic obedience to the requests of others, even when these directives could result in severe physical discomfort or danger. Others are so profoundly detached that they fail to register reactions of distress to painful stimuli such as a slap or a pinprick” (Millon 2011 866)

“Disorganized Schizophrenic Personality Disorder Disorganized schizophrenic patients are identifiable by their incongruous and disoriented behavior. They seem lost, scattered, confused, and unclear as to time, place, and identity. Many exhibit posturing, grimacing, inappropriate giggling, mannerisms, and peculiar movements. Their speech tends to ramble into word salads composed of incoherent neologisms and a chaotic mishmash of irrelevancies. The content of their ideas is colored with fantasy and hallucination and scattered with bizarre and fragmentary delusions that have no apparent logic or function. Regressive acts such as soiling and wetting are common, and these patients often consume food in an infantile or ravenous manner. For most patients, schizophrenic disorganization signifies a surrendering of all coping efforts. Thus, every pathological pattern may exhibit the disorder. In some personalities, however, disorganization may be an active coping maneuver, thereby increasing the likelihood of its occurrence in these types. Furthermore, some patterns are more disposed than others to surrender their controls and thus collapse into a disorganized state. In short, although all personalities may succumb to the disorganized disorder, some are more likely to do so than others. Some exhibit prominent delusions and auditory hallucinations, despite only a partial loss of cognitive and affective functions.” (Millon 866-867)

“Those in the ESS spectrum covary most frequently with the AAS schizoid, SRA avoidant, and MPP paranoid personalities. As has been discussed in prior sections of the text, the ESS pattern often develops insidiously, becoming an increasingly integral, but more dysfunctional and structurally defective pattern that supersedes a less severe avoidant, schizoid, and eccentric personality disorder. Hence, what we observe clinically in a number of schizotypals is a mixture of its own constellation of traits superimposed on either a passively detached schizoid style or an actively detached avoidant style. The co-morbidity derives from a different source in the schizoid and paranoid disorders. Their personality features covary by virtue of a shared severity of pathology and a tendency in common to be fearful and suspicious of the motives of others. Lesser co-morbidities are found with the UBC borderline, AAM masochistic, and DAD dependent personalities. The conjunction with the UBC borderline spectrum derives primarily from the fact that they share a more severe, structurally defective personality pattern.” (Millon 2011 870)

#### Table of **Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the ESS Personality Spectrum**

(Millon 2011 899)

### Unstable Styles, Borderline Types, Cyclophrenic Disorders: The UBC Spectrum

“Patients within this broad spectrum correspond to the theory’s emotionally dysfunctional and maladaptively ambivalent polarity orientation. Conflicts exist across the board, between all three evolutionary polarities—pleasure and pain, active and passive, self and other. They seem unable to take a consistent, neutral, or balanced position among these polar extremes, tending to fluctuate from one end to the other. These persons experience intense endogenous moods, with recurring periods of dejection and apathy, often interspersed with spells of anger, anxiety or euphoria.

We simplify our communication of this spectrum with the acronym UBC. The core midrange label borderline is also relatively new. Whereas unstable is employed to signify a mild or stylistic form of the UBC spectrum, perhaps manifesting no more than two or three of the DSM borderline criteria, the ‘‘borderline’’ or mid-level UBC type is likely to exhibit four or five criteria, and the cyclophrenic label, the most severe of the UBC spectrum, may show as many as five to seven of the DSM criteria, as well as being the most problematic of the group.

The mild unstable-style variants are noted for their occasional inconsistent behaviors and unpredictable moods; they will act impulsively and mercurially at times and, at others, be withdrawn and moody. The so-called borderline abnormal type evidences more of the DSM criteria for the spectrum, is frequently capricious and volatile, with intense and variable moods that are typically ephemeral. The most severe cyclophrenic disorder extreme of the UBC spectrum evidences a chaotic psychic unsteadiness and hypervariability, an ever-present breakdown in cohesion and control with frequent irrational and disorganized thoughts, emotions, and behavior (Bennett & Ryle, 2005).” (Millon 2011 890)

“The evolutionary model presented states that when the milder personalities prove intrinsically deficient or falter under the strain of persistent environmental stress, they will frequently deteriorate into what we have labeled the borderline or cyclophrenic personality structure. For example, a dependent personality, faced with intense problems in areas of special vulnerability, will experience a sense of helplessness and hopelessness; these persons will exhibit brief, frantic, but futile efforts either to assert themselves and stand on their own, or to recapture by behaving in a forced, cheerful, and outgoing manner the attachment and support they desperately need. Similarly, the characteristic gregarious interpersonal conduct of a histrionic personality may reach a feverish pitch of euphoric excitement, only to fall into the depths of futility, despondency, and self-destructiveness, should the person’s restitutive efforts fail. A collapsing self-image of a troubled narcissistic personality may lead the person to vacillate among marked self-condemnation, protestations of piety and good intentions, and impulsive outbursts of anger, followed by feelings of intense shame and feelings of emptiness. The pre-borderline pattern of behavior vacillation in a negativistic personality will continue under increased stress, but reach a more intense, unpredictable, and erratic pace, swinging into profound gloom at one time, and irrational negativism and chaotic excitement the next (Holmes, 2005). It is the instability of both behavior and affect, combined with their shared search for acceptance and approval, which justifies bringing these patients together into a common but more ‘‘structurally defective’’ UBC borderline level, despite their divergent histories and coping styles (Crowe, 2004).” (Millon 2011 892)


“UBC spectrum disorders have been one of the most frequently diagnosed disorders since they were first introduced into the DSM III, comprising some 20% of all inpatients and 10% of outpatients in psychiatric practice. A high proportion make significant suicide attempts (McGlashan, 1986), as well as frequently use emergency room and other medical services (Ellison, Blum, & Barsky, 1989; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, & Silk, 2004).” (Millon 2011 893)

“The Darwinian evolutionary model for the borderline personality construct, as seen in the polarity schema of Figure 19.1, shows that all the usual motives and aims reflected in the model are present, albeit to a moderate degree. What is most significant is that all three pairs of polarities are in conflict, as indicated by the double-pointed arrows between them. This signifies the intense ambivalence and inconstancy that characterizes all persons in the UBC spectrum, their emotional vacillation, their behavioral unpredictability, as well as the inconsistency they manifest in their feelings and thoughts about others.

This conflictual pattern contrasts with the other two moderately severe structural pathologies, the mid-severity schizotypal level of the ESS spectrum and the paranoid mid-level of the MPP spectrum. The borderline possesses distinct polarity inclinations, but they clash and are disharmonious; hence, the borderline switches back and forth, going from one direction and then to its opposite. By contrast, the intensity of the polarity inclinations in the schizotypal is diffuse and undirected, hence producing the randomness and eccentricity that characterizes their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. In the paranoid, the structural problem is one of rigidity and compartmentalization. There is an unbending and unvarying character to their polarity inclinations, an unwillingness to change their attitudes, behaviors, and emotions despite good reasons to do so. No such difficulty is evident in the borderline. In their case, each polarity position is but a temporary one, quickly jettisoned for its opposite.


As has been noted, the severe or structural pathologies, which include the schizotypal, paranoid, and borderline disorders, almost invariably coexist with one or another of the stylistic personality disorders (e.g., avoidant, histrionic, negativistic). Hence, in evaluating a patient with distinct but conflictual structural defects that characterize the borderline, it is necessary to consider which stylistic personality pattern is also present. The polarity model requires the integration of both stylistic polarity features and structural borderline defects. A fusion of the two, style and structure, is necessary for a thorough and accurate assessment.” (Millon 2011 908-909)

#### Figure 19.1 from Millon 2011


(Millon 2011 908)

I suspect making this more precise will involve a lot more double-headed arrows.

#### Table of Trait Domains of the UBC Spectrum

(Millon 2011 911)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the UBC Spectrum

(Millon 2011 911)

“Interpersonal Conduct: Paradoxical Although UBCs need attention and affection, they act in an unpredictably contrary, manipulative and volatile manner in their interpersonal relationships. These paradoxical behaviors frequently elicit rejection rather than the support they desperately seek (Modestin, 1987). In an unpredictable and frantic reaction to their fears of abandonment and isolation, they may become mercurially angry and explosive, hence damaging their security rather than eliciting the care they seek.

As a secondary consequence of their unsure or unstable self-identities, these personalities have become exceedingly dependent on others, if they were not so already. Not only do they need protection and reassurance to maintain their equanimity, but they become inordinately vulnerable to separation from these external sources of support. Isolation or aloneness may be terrifying not only because they lack an inherent sense of self but because they lack the wherewithal, the knowhow, and equipment for taking mature, selfdetermined, and independent action. Unable to fend adequately for themselves, they not only dread potential loss but often anticipate it, ‘‘seeing it’’ happening when, in fact, it is not.

Those of the UBC spectrum are more ambivalent about relationships with others than are most personality syndromes. Moreover, these individuals have been less successful in fulfilling their dependency needs, suffering thereby considerably greater separation anxieties. Their concerns are not simply those of gaining approval and affection but of not submitting to others, yet preventing further loss. Because they already are on shaky grounds, UBCs’ actions are directed less toward accumulating additional reserves of support and esteem than toward preserving the little security they still possess (Gunderson, 1996).

At first, many UBCs will employ their characteristic coping styles with increased fervor in the hope that they will regain their footing. Some may become martyrs, dedicated and selfeffacing persons who are ‘‘so good’’ that they are willing to devote or sacrifice their lives for some greater purpose. The usual goal of these patients is to insinuate themselves into the lives of others who will not merely ‘‘use’’ them but need them and, therefore not desert them. Self-sacrificing though they may appear to be, these UBCs effectively manipulate others to protect against the separation they dread. Moreover, by sacrificing themselves, they not only assure continued contact with others but serve as implicit models for others to be gentle and considerate in return. Virtuous martyrdom, rather than a sacrifice, is a ploy of submissive devotion that strengthens the attachments they need.” (Millon 2011 912)

“Cognitive Style: Changeable It is characteristic of UBCs to experience rapidly changing, fluctuating, and antithetical perceptions and thoughts concerning persons and passing events. Not only do they experience contrasting emotions, but they have ambivalent attitudes toward themselves and others; for example, they may perceive a spouse with love one moment, feel rage the next, and then experience guilt thereafter. Most problematic is that their vacillating and contradictory perceptions evoke in others similarly conflicting and confusing feedback. This perpetuates the vicious circle of experiencing again and again that which prompted their actions in the first place.

A major problem for the UBCs is the lack of a consistent purpose or direction for shaping attitudes, behaviors, or emotions (Judd, 2005). Unable to give coherence to their existence, they have few anchors or guideposts to either coordinate their actions, control their impulses, or construct a goal-oriented means for achieving their desires. Feeling scattered and unintegrated, they vacillate, responding as a child would to every passing interest or whim and shifting from one momentary course to another. In effect, UBCs appear to have deteriorated increasingly toward primary-process thinking. Under the press of upsurging affects and their inability to maintain a clear focus, there is a regression to a psychoticlike thought process, occasionally reflected in quasi-paranoid ideation and severe dissociated symptoms.” (Millon 2011 913)

“Self-Image: Uncertain It is typical of the UBC to experience the confusions of an immature, nebulous, or wavering sense of identity, often with underlying feelings of emptiness. They have considerable difficulty in maintaining a stable sense of who they are, conveying rapidly shifting presentations of self, or in formulating any clear sense of their personal image. They remain aimless, unable to channel their energies or abilities, incapable of settling down on some path or role that might provide a basis for fashioning a unified and enduring sense of self (Berlin & Rolls, 2004). Seeking to redeem their precipitate actions and changing self-presentations accounts in part for their expressions of contrition, and for their self-punitive behaviors. Likewise, UBCs demonstrate highly contradictory self-representations. These reflect their lack of inner cohesion and the so-called splitting maneuvers that they employ (Zanarini, Ruser, Frankenburg, & Hennen, 2000). Portions of their schismatic psyche may be split off and projected onto others as a means of bewildering or controlling them, a defensive maneuver designed in part to create confusion in others that mirrors their own inner ambivalences.”(Millon 2011 913)

“Intrapsychic Content: Incompatible Inferring the internalized representations of those in the UBC spectrum on the basis of their thoughts and behaviors suggests that their inner objects comprise rudimentary and extemporaneously derived dispositions and images. Early learnings regarding significant others are likely to have been repetitively aborted, resulting in conflicting memories, discordant attitudes, contradictory needs, erratic impulses, and clashing strategies for conflict resolution (Modell, 1963). In effect, their inner templates for perceiving and thinking about current events are composed of complex antithetical dispositions.

Because UBCs are likely to devalue their selfworth, it is difficult for them to believe that those on whom they have depended in the past could ever have thought well of them. Consequently, at a deep intrapsychic level, they are exceedingly fearful that others will inevitably depreciate them and perhaps cast them off. With so unstable an inner template of self-esteem, and lacking the means for assuring their autonomous existence, these personalites remain constantly on edge, prone to the anxiety of separation and ripe for anticipating inevitable desertion. Anchored to these internalized objects stirs up deep fears that efforts at restitution such as idealization, self-abnegation, and attention-gaining acts of self-destruction or, conversely, self-assertion and impulsive anger, will inevitably fail. As a result of the schisms that characterize both their overt and covert psychic processes, UBCs fail to recognize that other persons possess a mix of both positive and negative feelings and attitudes. Instead, the inner templates of the UBC are sharply divided, split, so to speak, into polar extremes, that is, others are seen either as totally good or totally bad. Consequentially, as life experiences progress with significant others, these personalities may alternate on a regular basis between idealizing these persons, and then abruptly devaluing them, a process that both reflects their inner schisms and creates erratic shifts in the reactions of others.

Matters are bad enough for UBCs, given their identity diffusion and separation anxieties, but their internalized images and impulses are in intense conflict regarding dependency needs. Not only do they feel guilt for past attempts at self-assertion and independence, but these quests for self-determination and self-identity may have been subjected to ridicule and isolation, resulting in increased feelings of distrust and resentment toward others. Moreover, should they seek to become close to another, two contrasting, but distressful consequences come to mind. First, they fear that they will be engulfed by the person, thereby losing what little sense of autonomy and identity they possess. On the other hand, there is the fear that they will, without forewarning, be precipitously abandoned.” (Millon 2011 913-914)

“Intrapsychic Dynamics: Regression What is most significant among the regulatory mechanisms employed by UBC individuals is the tendency to retreat under stress to developmentally earlier levels of anxiety tolerance, impulse control, and social adaptation. Among adolescents who exhibit UBC tendencies, we find an inability to cope with adult demands and life’s conflicts, as evident in immature, if not increasingly infantile behaviors (Perry & Cooper, 1986).

gly infantile behaviors (Perry & Cooper, 1986). The hostility expressed by these patients poses a serious threat to their security. To experience resentment toward others, let alone to vent it, endangers them since it may provoke the counterhostility, rejection, and abandonment they fear. Angry feelings and outbursts must not only be curtailed or redirected toward impotent scapegoats but may be intrapsychically reversed and condemned. To appease their conscience and to assure expiation, they may reproach themselves for their faults, and purify themselves through acts of self-esteem to prove their virtue. To accomplish this regulatory goal, their hostile impulses may be dynamically inverted. Thus, aggressive urges toward others may be turned on themselves. Rather than vent their anger, they will openly castigate and derogate themselves, and voice exaggerated feelings of guilt and worthlessness. These patients become notably self-recriminating. They belittle themselves, demean their abilities, and derogate their virtues, not only to dilute their aggressive urges but to assure others that they themselves are neither worthy nor able adversaries. The selfeffacement of these personalities is an attempt, then, both to control their own hostility and to stave off hostility from others.

Among other UBC variants, where hostile impulses are more deeply ingrained as a form of self-expression, these feelings must be counteracted more forcefully. Because these patients are likely to have displayed their anger more frequently and destructively, they must work all the harder to redeem themselves. Instead of being merely self-effacing and contrite, they will often turn on themselves viciously, as do those at the cyclophrenic level, claiming that they are despicable and hateful persons. These condemnatory self-accusations may at times reach delusional proportions, and such patients may reject every rational effort to dissuade them of their culpability. In these cases, the struggle to redeem oneself often leads to self-mutilation and physical destruction.” (Millon 2011 914)

“Intrapsychic Architecture: Split The structural concept termed split is especially apt in characterizing the intrapsychic organization of UBCs. Their mind comprises inner structures that exist in sharply segmented and conflictful configurations. There is a marked lack of systematic order and congruency among the elements of the mind. Levels of consciousness often shift to and fro. Similarly, rapid movements take place across boundaries that should separate contrasting perceptions, memories, and affects (Mauchnik, Schmahl, & Bohus, 2005). This lack of control and cohesion produces periodic but serious schisms in psychic order and cohesion, resulting in a susceptibility to transient, stress-related psychotic episodes.

UBCs cannot help but be intrapsychically ambivalent. To assert themselves endangers the security and protection they desperately seek from others by provoking the latter to reject and abandon them. Yet, given their past, they know they can never entirely trust others nor fully hope to gain the security and affection they need. Should their anxiety about separation lead them to submit as a way of warding off or forestalling desertion, they expose themselves to even further dependency and, thereby, an even greater threat of loss. Moreover, they know they experience intense anger toward those on whom they depend, not only because it shames them and exposes their weakness but also because of others’ power in having ‘‘forced’’ them to yield and acquiesce. This very resentment becomes then a threat in itself. If they are going to appease others to prevent abandonment, they must take pains to assure that their anger remains under control. Should this resentment be discharged, even in innocuous forms of self-assertion, their security will be severely threatened. They are in a terrible bind. Should they strike out alone, no longer dependent on others who have expected too much or have demeaned them, or should they submit for fear of losing what little security they can gain thereby?

To secure their anger and to constrain their resentment, UBCs often turn against themselves in a self-critical and self-condemnatory manner. Despising themselves, they voice the same harsh judgments they have learned to anticipate from others. They display not only anxiety and conflict but overt expressions of guilt, remorse, and self-belittlement. It is these feelings that occasionally take hold, overwhelm them, as occurs at the cyclophrenic level, and lead to their characteristic self-damaging and periodic self-destructive acts.” (MIllon 2011 915)

“Mood/Temperament: Labile The most striking characteristic of UBCs is the intensity of their affect and the changeability of their actions. Most fail to accord their unstable mood levels with external reality. They tend to show marked shifts from normality to depression to excitement. There are periods of dejection and apathy, interspersed with episodes of inappropriate and intense anger, followed by brief spells of anxiety or euphoria

As noted previously, rapid shifts from one mood and attitude to another are not inevitable aspects of the everyday behavior of the milder subtypes of the UBC spectrum, but they do characterize extended periods when there has been a break in control. Most UBCs exhibit a single, dominant outlook or frame of mind, such as a self-ingratiating depressive tone, which gives way periodically, however, to anxious agitation or impulsive outbursts of temper or resentment (Schmahl & Bremner, 2006). The selfdestructive and self-damaging behaviors that often occur, are usually recognized subsequently as having been irrational and foolish.” (Millon 2011 915)

“Dissatisfied Unstable Personality Style We start with a typical mild variant of the UBC spectrum, one of the two variants we present of the unstable personality style.

A second feedback loop relates the consequences of perceived abandonment to self-image. UBCs frequently feel worthless and empty. Because we tend to regard ourselves as others regard us, and because they perceive others as likely to abandon them, they eventually begin to express their dissatisfaction with life, concluding that abandonment is all they are worth. The tumult created by intense relationships, often in conjunction with a chronic history of physical abuse for sons and sexual abuse for daughters (Stone, 1993), naturally leads to dissatisfied feelings of being empty and worthless, supported by such cognitions as ‘‘I am disposable, and no one will love me,’’ ‘‘I am worthy only of being abandoned,’’ and ‘‘I exist to satisfy the temporary pleasure of others, not to be loved for myself.’’ Once again, we find exactly this in Arlene, for whom dissatisfaction, depression, despair, and feelings of worthlessness are part of everyday life.” (Millon 2011 916-918)

“Unpredictably Unstable Personality Style However, not all UBCs solely desire fusion with a nurturing figure. Fusion brings a powerful intimacy that banishes feelings of emptiness and worthlessness (at least someone thinks enough of the subject to want to merge their two souls together as one), while conferring the equally powerful feeling of being protected against harm. However, fusion also leads to a fear of engulfment. When UBCs do not sabotage their relationships by creating endless cycles of chaos, they may have equally powerful fears of losing their identity in the relationship or of being capsized by the reality of their helpless dependency. Dissatisfaction at not being attached to fantasies of fusion, usually idealization of a magical romantic figure, leads in turn to a need for total dependence on someone else for a sense of self-worth and self-esteem. Greater intimacy exaggerates fears of being vulnerable and exposed, leading back to desires for separation but also to chronic and unstable feelings of worthlessness and depression. The answer to this paradox, of course, is to never let any relationship become too stable. Here, chaos is not just a pathological outcome, but also an instrumental strategy. When relationships become too normal or things are going too well, contentment must be sabotaged. By keeping others frustrated and exasperated, the UBC patient creates an unstable soap opera that keeps each side of the dilemma just barely tolerable.” (Millon 2011 918)

“UBC Moderate (Abnormal) Adult Borderline Personality Types [CT-7] What leads so many at the normal Unstable level to disintegrate into frank Borderline functioning? The Unstable level of the UBC personality spectrum is no guarantee of ‘‘fitting in’’ society. These patients have intense labile emotions that are expressed spasmodically. Their erratic and changeable behaviors constantly recreate old problems and precipitate new and paradoxical social difficulties. There is little of their characteristic traits that is likely to forestall further deterioration. If anything, their traits will likely repetitively intensify their troubles.” (MIllon 2011 920-921)

“Impulsive Borderline Personality Type Impulsive borderlines typically are structurally defective UBC abnormal variants of their less pathological counterparts, primarily the unstable, the histrionic, and the antisocial personalities. Each is evasive, superficial, and seductive. However, at the borderline level, strategies are instrumentally less successful than heretofore. As a consequence, we observe more extreme efforts to cope with events, many of which serve only to perpetuate and deepen their difficulties. For example, former histrionics may not have mastered the techniques of soliciting approval and ensuring a stream of support and encouragement; because of an excessively flighty and erratic style of personal relationships, they may experience long periods in which they lack a secure base and a consistent source of attention.” (Millon 2011 921)

“Petulant Borderline Personality Type Petulant borderlines are often difficult to distinguish from certain of their less structurallydefective counterparts, notably the unstable and negativistic personalities. Simply stated, we can say that the petulant borderline’s overt symptoms are more intense and that psychotic episodes occur with somewhat greater frequency than in the unstable and negativist. Petulant borderlines may be best characterized by their extreme unpredictability and by their restless, irritable, impatient, and complaining behaviors. Typically, they are defiant, disgruntled, and discontent, as well as stubborn, sullen, pessimistic, and resentful. Enthusiasms are short lived; they are easily disillusioned and slighted, tend to be envious of others, and feel unappreciated and cheated in life.” (Millon 2011 921)


“UBC Severe (Clinical) Adult Cyclophrenic Personality Disorders [CT-9] Are there ways to forestall the Borderline’s further decompensation into a Cyclophrenic chronicity? The regression downward of the Borderline level of the UBS spectrum would be highly probable were it not for the substantial efforts of mental health professionals to understand and ‘‘treat’’ these impulsive and self-destructive patients.” (Millon 2011 922)

“Discouraged Cyclophrenic Personality Disorder Discouraged cyclophrenics typically have been pliant and submissive individuals who shun competition, are lacking in initiative, and are frequently, chronically sad or depressed. They may have attached themselves to one or two other persons on whom they depend, with whom they have been able to display affection and thoughtfulness and to whom they have been loyal and humble.” (Millon 2011 927)

“Self-Destructive Cyclophrenic Personality Disorder As with other UBC subtypes, the self-destructive cyclophrenic vacillates perpetually, first finding one course of action unappealing, then another, then a third, and back again. To give in to others is to lose hope of independence, but to withdraw is to be isolated. They have always resented their dependence on others and often hate those to whom they have turned to seek security, love, and esteem. As with other UBC variants, they are indecisive and oscillate between apologetic submission, on the one hand, and stubborn resistance and contrariness on the other. In a manner similar to the petulant borderline, self-destructive subtypes are unable to ‘‘get hold of themselves’’ and unable to find a comfortable niche with others. However, in contrast to the petulant type, self-destructive borderlines do not become increasingly testy and bitter over time. Although expressing their discontent in an erratic and changeable manner, they become more inward turning and most typically vent their anger in an intropunitive way. Many have a long history of depressive or masochistic traits, and these features may now interpenetrate the UBC’s defective psychic structure.” (Millon 2011 928)

“Because the UBC personality spectrum is so varied in its symptomatology, there is a high probability that its features will be co-morbid with a wide range of other personality disorders (Becker, Grilo, Edell, & McGlashan, 2000). Furthermore, the cyclophrenic has been conceived as a more advanced or structurally defective level of pathology that interpenetrates several of the less severe personality styles. On both accounts, therefore, its protean pattern of symptomatology and its dysfunctional level of pathology, we find that the UBC spectrum disorders overlap considerably with numerous other personality disorders. Most notably, the borderline level overlaps to a considerable extent with the negativistic (DRN) and masochistic (AAM) spectrum types. To a lesser degree, and reflecting the more impulsive and hostile features of certain borderlines, we see conjunctions with the antisocial (ADA), sadistic (ADS), and histrionic (SPH) disorders. Signifying the more introversive and intropunitive characteristics of certain UBC types is their tendency to be associated with the melancholic (DFM), avoidant (SRA), and schizotypal (ESS) spectrum personality disorders, the latter overlap also reflecting their common level of structural defect.” (Millon 2011 929-930)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the UBC Personality Spectrum

(Millon 2011 950)

### Mistrustful Styles, Paranoid Types, Paraphrenic Disorders: The MPP Spectrum


“All members of this spectrum display a vigilant mistrust of others and an edgy defensiveness against anticipated criticism and deception. Driven by a high sensitivity to pain (rejection—humiliation) and oriented strongly to the self polarity, these MPP patients exhibit a touchy irritability, a need to assert themselves, not necessarily in action, but in an inner world of self-determined beliefs and assumptions.” (Millon 2011 953)

“In terms of the evolutionary model of the paranoid personality, as seen in Figure 20.1, what is most notable is the presence of a double box and a block between each pair of the polarity groups. This signifies the rigid enclosure and compartmentalization of the paranoids’ thoughts and feelings about themselves and others, as well as the unyielding and constricted nature with which they perceive and relate to the world. Whatever motives and aims they have developed in life remain concealed, firmly fixed, unchangeable, and uninfluenced by life circumstances.


The obduracy and inelasticity of their polarity inclinations characterizes paranoids and distinguishes them from the two other severe/structural pathological types, the schizotypal and borderline. Despite commonalities in the eccentricity of their beliefs and attitudes, the schizotypal comes to this characterization by virtue of excessive structural fluidity, whereas in the paranoid it reflects an unwillingness to adapt to external realities, and a fixity in one’s psychic structure that is unbending and inelastic. Similarly, the paranoids’ inflexibility and rigidity differs from the borderlines’ extraordinary inconstancy and changeability.

As with the two other severe/structural pathologies, the MPP group of disorders almost invariably covaries with one or more of the usually less severe personality ‘‘styles.’’ In reviewing cases of most paranoids, we are likely to see a conflation of paranoid structural pathologies combined with a stylistic disorder (e.g., paranoid-avoidant, paranoid-antisocial, paranoid-obsessive/compulsive). The task of the clinician is not to disentangle these components, but to recognize that they almost invariably coexist as a stylistic/structural fusion. These mixtures result in what we have described as prototypal variants or subtypes in prior chapters; they will be illustrated in later paragraphs of this chapter.” (Millon 2011 962)


#### Figure 20.1 from Millon 2011

(Millon 962)

#### Table of Trait Domains of the MPP Spectrum

(Millon 2011 966)

#### Figure of Salience of the Trait Domains in the MPP Spectrum

(Millon 2011 966)

“MPP Mild (Normal) Adult Mistrustful Personality Styles [CT-3] Among the several mild MPP types we note two variants in the following paragraphs, a self-righteous style inclined to assume they are justified in their mistrust of others; hence, their need to maintain rigid control over those they wish to dominate; the second variant, the obdurate mistrustful style is grim and humorless, as well as perfectionistic.” (Millon 2011 976)

“Self-Righteously Mistrustful Personality Style Autonomy is so important that these mistrustful preparanoids sometimes imagine themselves as being, ideally, something like a fascist state: totally self-sufficient, yet fearsome enough to intimidate aggressors on their borders. No person is an island, but self-righteous types nevertheless require total control over those who end-up in their own life. The case of Chester, to be presented shortly, provides the arch example of this, ruling his classroom with an iron fist and keeping careful records of all his activities as an educator. No one is going to surprise Chester with something unanticipated. He knew that he was ‘‘on the right side,’’ that he always ‘‘spoke the truth,’’ that he justly was ‘‘holierthan-thou.’’” (Millon 2011 970-971)

“Obdurately Mistrustful Personality Style Obdurate mistrustfuls are often pathological variants of the compulsive personality disorder, where rule-bound and rigid characteristics typically mesh and unite with the suspicious traits of MPPs. However, in contrast to their compulsive counterparts, who retain the hope of achieving gratification and protection through the good offices of others, obdurate mistrustfuls break their self-other conflict, renouncing their dependency submission and taking on a stance of self-assertion. Despite their growing hostility and repudiation of conformity as a way of life, obdurate MPPs retain their basic rigidity and perfectionism; they remain grim and humorless, tense, controlled and inflexible, small-minded, unyielding and implacable, dyspeptic, peevish and cranky, as well as legalistic. These features of their basic psychic makeup are deeply embedded, internalized as a fixed system of habits, feelings, and thoughts. Though obdurate mistrustfuls may find it necessary to discard others as their primary source of security, the remnants of lifelong habits of overcontrol and faultlessness are not so readily abandoned; the basic compulsive personality style remains immutable” (Millon 2011 973)

“MPP Moderate (Abnormal) Adult Paranoid Personality Types [CT-7] Can the Mistrustful normal style be sustained or is it inevitably to degenerate into a Paranoid pattern? If Mistrustful personalities can keep their provocative actions in check they may be able to stabilize at a normal level reasonably well. But such is not usually the case. Their suspiciousness, projective accusations, and general irascibility are not traits that fit well into any social ecosystem. Hence, deterioration to the Paranoid level with its insularity and querulousness becomes highly probable.” (Millon 2011 974)

“Querulously Paranoid Personality Type These personalities may be differentiated from several of their less structurally defective counterparts by the presence of both overt hostility and frank delusions. Along with their milder variants, such as the negativistic style with whom shared characteristics continue to coexist, querulous paranoids are noted by their discontent, pessimism, stubbornness, and vacillation. However, at this defective-structural level, the pathology is more aggressively negativistic and faultfinding, sullen, resentful, obstructive, and peevish at all times, and openly expressive of feelings of jealousy, of being misunderstood, and of being cheated. As a consequence, querulous paranoids rarely can sustain good relationships, creating endless wrangles wherever they go. Demoralized by these events, they forego all hopes of gaining affection and approval from others, and decide to renounce these aspirations in preference for self-determination. Notable as characteristics distinguishing the querulous paranoid are the following adjectives: contentious, fractious, resentful, choleric, jealous, waspish, and whiny.” (Millon 2011 974)

“Insular Paranoid Personality Type Notably hypervigilant, the insular paranoid type is extremely moody and apprehensive, overly reactive to criticism, particularly in response to judgments made of the person’s status, beliefs, and achievements. In earlier stages of their pathology, these patients often are avoidant personalities, frequently withdrawn from the world, increasingly reclusive and isolated. Extremely vulnerable, many insular paranoids seek solace in a variety of self-focused ways; for example, some engage in abstruse intellectual activities to enhance their fantasied self-esteem, others indulge in alcohol or drugs as a way of calming the frightening nature of troublesome fantasies; still others pursue sexual escapades with prostitutes, not only to provide a measure of physical relief from their insular state, but also to purchase a willing ear to listen to their fears and grandiosities.” (Millon 2011 974-975)


“MPP Severe (Clinical) Adult Paraphrenic Personality Disorders [CT-9] Is a further decline into severe Paraphrenic inevitable or can it be forestalled, even reversed? Further deterioration to the Paraphrenic level is usually sporadic and of brief duration. Institutionalized, these patients often are given proper meds and supportive counseling, enabling them to ‘‘quiet their furies,’’ until the next time their defensive suspicions are tweaked and exacerbated” (Millon 2011 978)

“Fanatic Paraphrenic Personality Disorder The fanatic paraphrenic is similar to a less structurally defective parallel, the narcissistic/selfrighteous/paranoid personality, with whom the fanatic is often interwoven. Each seeks to retain their admirable self-image, act in a haughty and pretentious manner, are naively self-confident, ungenerous, exploitive, expansive, and presumptuous, as well as display an air of supercilious contempt and benign arrogance toward others.” (Millon 2011 983)

“Malignant Paraphrenic Personality Disorder Malignant paranoids tend to be structurally defective variants of the sadistic personality, whose features frequently commingle and blend with those of the paranoid. They are characterized best by their power orientation; by their mistrust, resentment, and envy of others; and by their autocratic, belligerent, and intimidating manner. Underlying these features is a ruthless desire to triumph over others, to vindicate themselves for past wrongs by cunning revenge or callous force, if necessary.” (Millon 2011 986)

“Aspects of these covariant features are described in earlier descriptions of adult variants of this personality. Notable levels of conjunction are found with the narcissistic (NAR), the borderline (BDL), and the avoidant (AVD). Less frequent covariances are seen with the schizotypal (SZT) and the antisocial (ATS), both of which are also of more than modest frequency. Notable symptoms simultaneously exist with the schizotypal given their frequent peculiar speech, eccentric ideas and unusual perceptual distortion. Overlapping with the borderline’s ‘‘intense anger,’’ is the avoidant’s ‘‘preoccupation with being criticized or rejected’’ (Millon & Martinez, 1995). Morey (1988) reported that following overlapping results were obtained between MPP types and avoidant (48.4%), borderline (48.0%), and narcissistic (35.9%) personalities.” (Millon 2011 988-989)

#### Table of Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the MPP Personality Spectrum

(Millon 2011 1008)

## Review

Given we just finished covering Millon’s book, now seems like an obvious time to review, particularly as this will culminate in my final maps based directly on Millon. The next section then expand on the model. While we have already reviewed the first five chapters after covering them, it will be worth revisiting them anyway as that initial abstract foundation should come alive now with all of the personalities we’ve explored.

### Preface-Chapter 5

### Chapter 6-Chapter 20

### Final Unification

Since he ends his book with no conclusion, I will instead.

## Doing it Better

Millon’s model is good. It could be better. I’m in a great position now to at least detail some of the main avenues for development. By “main avenues”, I mean within the logical space of possibility. I’ll also suggest which ones might have which uses. I should note up front that the next three chapters of this dissertation will build models that have interfunctionality with this one. I’ll address those directions first. As in Chapter 2, some of the Personality Trait Domain contents include what seem to be the pieces needed to construct DID. Alongside DID’s high comorbidity with most personality disorders, and how the apparent personalty of a human with DID seems to change often and often be in multiple places at once, it seems maybe DID should be understood as multiple personalities.

The connections between trauma and abnormal personality have been mentioned, though yet to be deeply explored. Given BPD’s major role in both this role and our understanding of the pathological dissociative effects of trauma, it will prove a useful connection point. More on this in the next chapter.

### Map of Personality and Trauma-related Dissociation



Looking at Chapter 3’s contribution, we return to the Environment which for the most part we’ve so far considered rather vaguely. Looking at the development of personality, we spent some time on it, and thereafter mostly as an object for a person’s activity or passivity.

### Map of Personality in Context



Maybe Chapter 4 should hypothesize a Good-Evil polarity to demonstrate that there’s no such thing as good or evil people.Following this we can figure out the real relationship between them.

Looking beyond, the ways to expand the model can be divided into

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# Chapter 2: Dissociation

Another chapter will seek to further understand personality particularly as it is affected by traumatic experience, especially the complex, chronic, and severe traumatic experiences. For this I will look first to *The Haunted Self* by Onno van der Hart, Ellert Nijehuis, and Kathy Steele. This book describes a model of dissociation of parts of the personality, caused by trauma. It explains Borderline Personality Disorder, and it will be a central aim of this chapter to make this model compatible, coherent, and consistent with the model put forward in the first chapter. *The Haunted Self* includes at its most complex an explanation of Dissociative Identity Disorder, relevantly formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophers have done some interesting work on DID, but before I get to it, I will need to contextualize personality. (In Chapter 3.)

Chapter 2 is successful if I explain what DID is, how trauma divides the personality, how BPD is created by trauma, which shows us a cause of a personality that we have on our map.

Dissociative Identities and Personal Identity

The literature on personal identity and personhood answers questions from “What counts as a person?” to “How can we count persons?” The general lack of consensus on answers to these questions poses a challenge when seeking answers to cases like “Can multiple people share a body?” or, as this text will explore, “Are dissociative identities distinct persons?”

The three standard views can be put as follows:

* **Single Person View (SPV)**: Dissociative identities within a single body are the same person or parts of the same person.
* **Multiple Persons View (MPV)**: Dissociative identities are distinct persons.
* **Eliminativist View (EV)**: Dissociative identities are not persons, nor parts of persons.

These views do not exhaust the possibilities. Loaded into the views are answers to multiple questions, as made obvious by the two SPVs. Suppose some human A has DIs B and C. Is A a person? Are B and C persons? Is A identical with B? Is A identical with the composition of B and C? Is B identical with C? If B and C are both persons and not identical with each other, then MPV is true. Thus MPV leaves the question of A’s personhood unanswered. If B and C are both persons and identical with each other, then they must be identical with A, and thus A must be a person and SPV is true. If B and C are not persons, but A is a person, then SPV is true. If none of the three are persons, then EV is true.

This mess is wanting for clarity, and the above phrasing is optimized for getting the ideas intuitively clear before developing precision. On some views of personhood, for instance, no humans are persons, as persons are parts of humans, independently existing entities, etc., though still maintain some important relation between each human and a person. Thus I’ll call the collection of dissociative identities of a single human plus whatever is normally part of a person in addition to one’s (non-dissociated) identity a *system*.

The two identified variants of SPV, identifying DIs as either identical with or parts of systems, provide the same answer to our question, as well as the closely related population question. Having both in mind will be useful, however, as different theories of personal identity may implicate either.

We can also identify two interestingly different variants of MPV, differing on whether systems are themselves persons. Can a person be composed of other persons? In at least some contexts we consider it to be the case, such as those in which corporations are considered persons. This doesn’t alone determine that systems are persons, but when persons in separate bodies compose persons, it stands to reason that persons in the same body could.

Another possibility is that “Are DIs distinct persons?” is an empty question. A problem with this view is that personal identity seems practically significant enough to our way of living that the question must have some significance. Perhaps we will abandon the concept someday, and maybe we should; one could argue that DIs demonstrate the deficiency of the concept. However, I think we may as well augment it until a superior conceptual schema takes hold.

I posit that our concerns of personal identity can be usefully categorized as those about consciousness and those about agency. Consciousness concerns are clearest when considering from the first-person. In the teletransporter thought experiment, the worry about whether teletransporting is death is a worry about whether one will continue to experience things afterwards; the agential properties stay essentially the same. On the other hand, when concerned with responsibility and moral status, one’s agential properties are important. Some common concerns like self-interest seem to not fit into one category more than the other, but these can be divided into their conscious and agential aspects.

There’s also a significant social aspect to personhood and our application of the person concept. EV may be objectionable inasmuch as exclusion of humans from personhood has long been a component of oppression and social exclusion. I think this is a strong reason to reject EV in, for instance, legal contexts, at least unless some ethically sound alternative to personhood is constructed. However, I take it that the philosophical term “person”, the legal term “person”, and the colloquial term “person” are, while related, different. Whether they’re different definitions of the same word or different words, and whether they’re referring to truly distinct concepts or different aspects, contexts, or applications of the same concept I don’t know, but I take it nothing hangs on these issues. We can proceed to consider how our person concepts lead us to understand DIs independently of the ethics of ordinary use of the word.

A desirable way to be able to approach this is to consider the question on each theory of personal identity, but when I attempt this, the answers are all indeterminate or trivial.

## Conceptual Grounds

### Basic philosophical treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder


Dissociative Identity Disorder is a mental disorder. But what is a mental disorder? This will be answered based on future work in Chapter 1. Here I will ask what is meant when we say that Dissociative Identity Disorder in particular is a mental disorder? To start, we mean simply that DID is a state of minds that is incongruent with normal mental processes in a way that is dysfunctional, personally or socially. We can expect existing study on DID from psychology and medical fields. This is not to ignore the existence of non-disordered plurality, but merely to focus on one manifestation of disordered plurality. The extensions of plurality and mental disorder overlap but neither is a subset of the other. A human is plural if they have multiple personal identities claiming and embodying the same body. We return to plurality later in this chapter.

Research in DID is wrought with controversy, and as such, the language in the literature is inconsistent, so at this point, I will stipulate the following terms so as to be as value-neutral as possible and avoid ambiguities: The term ``system'' refers to a human with DID, or another form of plurality. The term ``singlet'' refers to most humans. The members of a system are called ``alters''. So then, we could reframe this paper as asking whether systems or alters are people. Some might object that ``alters in a system'' is awkward, but I take it to be no more awkward than ``people in a group.'' Similarly, just as I might describe systems as doing something, I don't take this to presuppose the single personhood of a system any more than we take a sports team to be one person when we describe its activities.

## Dell’s 2006 Model of DID

Dell (2006) presents a model of DID to improve upon the DSM-IV’s description with empirical findings. According to the DSM-IV, a person who has DID switches from one personality to another, each personality has her own identity, and a host personality has amnesia for activities of others. According to Dell, this misses the dissociative phenomena. The three models he considers are DSM-IV’s classic picture, Dell’s subjective/phenomenological model, and the socio-cognitive model. See the below table from Dell 2006 on the dissociative symptoms.

### Table of Dissociative Symptoms of DID



Let’s take a look at each of the symptoms. Amnesia can present as time loss, fugues, being told of remembered actions, temporary loss of well-known skills, finding objects among one’s possessions, finding evidence of one’s recent actions, objects missing, apparent strangers knowing one, and amnesia for personal identity. Things disremembered include personal identity, childhood memories, abilities, name, other alters being conscious, legal name, age, large pieces of their childhoods. A further problem is amnesia for amnesia; not only are systems missing time, but it's so normal, that they don't remember.

Our use of ``amnesia'' here isn't without complication. In true cases of amnesia, something is known and then forgotten. Looking at a system, this appears to be the case: Say a system knows some things, and then because of a switch, she no longer knows them. However, as Braude (1996) argues, each alter didn't know the ``forgotten'' memories in the first place and so could not have forgotten them.(47) In our example, an alter knows some things, and then because of a switch, a different alter is conscious but doesn't know the things because she never knew. Meanwhile the first alter never forgot, and when she returns to consciousness, she still knows. Amnesia will matter in our investigation of personal identity because of its role in separating alters and in theories of personal identity. In most singlets, psychological continuity is more or less confirmed by one's ability to remember her memories. If alters did remember what each other do, it would be a lot easier to think of systems as single persons. Amnesia complicates this, as it's weird to suggest someone can be so unaware of her own activities. From the point of view of an alter, her inability to remember other alters' experiences extends the problem of other minds from external persons to her own alters.

Systems experience conversion symptoms, which is to say that mental changes cause serious physical changes like blindness, mutism, and paralysis, for a period of time. Something may startle one alter and make her unable to move her body or speak. An alter that is co-conscious with another may sense herself internally trying to move her body or mouth, but cannot exercise any control. Other conversion symptoms include things like neurasthenia and self-analgesia. An alter may be able to perform substantially greater feats of strength and tolerate much more physical exertion and damage because she is able to ignore pain almost completely. This in fact can become a struggle later in treatment as integrating diminishes this ability, so systems may be hesitant to integrate. Conversion symptoms are often understood as alter behavior. Thus when we consider the actions alters are performing, we need to look beyond what they do while fronting and consider what determines performership of an action.

Almost everyone with DID hears voices. The voices are located ``in the head'' (Dell 2006, 3) The voices can be understood by alters in various ways. Some rationalize them as being ``just me'' or one's own conscience. Because of the social unacceptability of reporting hearing voices, children learn early to somehow keep the voices a secret even if they, as some do, recognize the voices as alters. As treatment progresses, the voices play a role as alters are able to communicate with one another. So, again, we have to consider how alters are behaving even when they are imperceptible from the outside (without a brain scanner).

There are further symptoms that affect individual alters that don't appear to be based on other alters, but they come as part of DID. In perhaps most contexts, the multiplicity of alters is a secondary concern when handling life with DID. The psychopathologies involved establish that no alter has a typical psychology, even abstracted from her system.

Depersonalization and derealization are also dissociative symptoms. Trance states are another dissociative symptom. Alters hypnotize each other and themselves. Being in a trance state lowers the barrier between imagination and perception.

Another dissociative symptom of DID is self-alteration, the ``subjective experience of undergoing sudden, inexplicable, and often ego-alien changes in one's sense of self. These experiences are obviously similar to depersonalization, but they do not have depersonalization's quality of generalized detachment and alienation. In self-alteration, for example, one does not feel so much detached from one's body, thoughts, or urges as one feels that one's body, thoughts, or urges belong to someone else.' (Dell 2006, 4) This is distinct from the Schneiderian symptoms . To be clear, self-alteration is distinct from alter-switching.

Because of some symptoms that appear psychotic, DID has and is often confused with schizophrenia in popular and clinical settings. However, in cases of DID, these symptoms have important related differences in character and function. Alters have auditory hallucinations, but they have three possible referents: the voices of other alters, dissociative flashbacks, and genuinely psychotic auditory hallucinations. (Dell 2006, 5) This distinction matters because communication between alters can be meaningful and productive.[[37]](#footnote-36). In cases of, say, comorbid DID and schizophrenia,alters have the additional challenge of distinguishing the meaningful content communicated by other alters and meaningless hallucinations. A similar line of reasoning can be applied to visual hallucinations, which are similarly often present. As schizophrenia is a genetic neurological disease and DID is the result of trauma, it's unsurprising that these are compatible. (Dell 2006 6-7) The hallucinations can take on a variety of characters.

Identity confusion is another symptom.(Dell 2006, 5) Flashbacks are a common feature of DID and their presence foreshadows the etiology to come. Like those with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), alters can find themselves having flashbacks ranging in intensity from hard-to-notice emotional returns to traumatic experiences to immersive sensory experiences accompanied by belief that the traumatic experience is continuing.

The influences aren't just perceptual, either. Schneiderian first-rank symptoms, that is, the symptoms particularly indicative of schizophrenia are also common with DID. As opposed to second-rank symptoms which are common to schizophrenia but also common to other mental illnesses. But again, unlike singlets with schizophrenia, systems' symptoms are dissociative rather than psychotic and thus referential rather than areferential. Example: If Mary (alter) doesn't oblige Natalie's (alter) command to brush her teeth, Natalie may take control of her arm and try to brush anyway. Or she could be sneaky. Maybe she's very upset and changes Mary's occurrent affective state to match. This would be a ``made'' feeling. Mary has no idea where this sadness came from; if she introspects, she'll find it's not even hers.

Dell clusters the symptoms into two categories, switching and intrusions. The DSM-IV describes the switching symptoms. The intrusive symptoms have received little attention as of 2006.

The subjective/pheomenological model is generalized formulation of the eight Schneiderian passive experiences. It has four corollaries:Pathological dissociation can affect every aspect of human experience, most dissociation phenomena are subjective and invisible, two major kinds of pathological dissociation are intrusions and amnesia, and most dissociative symptoms are not fully dissociated from consciousness.

### Box from Dell 2006

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Notice the evidence of general and partial dissociative symptoms.

### Dell 2006 table on the incidence rates of symptoms

High scores on 21 of 23 across over 90% of sampled DID patients indicate the validity of the model. The clinical picture generally only captured the objective side, missing the subjective features. The invisible, subjective symptoms do not fit with the sociocognitive model as the model cannot explain them, and they are not widely reported or known, so they would not be due to external influence such as media.

### Manifestation in Life

``What does this look like in life?'' we ask. While it's evident that there's more to DID than the behavior that appears like multiple personalities, we're concerned with how DID and personal identity work, so we need to see how the multiple behavior looks.

The condition can be hard to see, as evidenced by Dell’s subjective/phenomenological model. The prevalence and appearance of DID varies. Measures of prevalence tend between 0.5% and 2%.The DSM-V reports a US study showing a prevalence of 1.5% in a general population, and Akyüz et al found a rate of 1.7% in Turkey. (Akyüz 1999) To get a reference on the population size, then, it's worth noting that this is about the same as the prevalence of chronic major depressive disorder and higher than that of autism.

In different times and places, DID is interpreted as other things, such as demonic possession. This will be expanded upon in Chapter 3. For now, however, we'll focus on cases in which the system is in a social environment that recognizes DID.

There's also often extensive comorbidity with other mental disorders, which causes theoretical and practical confusion. There are a variety of lifestyles to consider in conjunction with DID, as systems range from assisted living to success in demanding professions. Despite this diversity, the rate of childhood sexual or physical abuse is 95--97\%.(Brand 2014, 2) Moreover, while the ability ceiling may be high, these need not be common--most studies indicate a much higher than typical hospitalization rate, and for instance, in one study, only 12% of patients with DID were employed. (Boon 1993, 128)

While many media presentations of DID include florid personality states that undergo dramatic switches, only about one in twenty systems is like this. A more usual presentation will include numerous episodes of attempted and failed psychiatric treatment and self-harm or suicide attempts. The severe emotional dysregulation, post-traumatic stress symptoms, and other immediate dysfunction take a more prominent role in therapy than multiplicity does. (Brand 2014, 2) Here, we are concerned with the multiplicity of alters, but we should keep in mind that this multiplicity tends to be discreet. Any picture of DID we work with mustn't depend on the rarer, dramatic presentation of DID, unless we mean to only say anything about that subpopulation.

## The Development of DID

``What brings about these symptoms?'' we ask. DID is currently best explained by the theory of structural dissociation (SD) under which DID is the manifestation of tertiary structural dissociation (TSD). I’ll consult Ross 2014 for criticism of the theory, but note that the theory’s fit for DID is uncontroversial.

To understand how DID works, then, we'll need some basic understanding of this theory. Put simply, ``Structural dissociation is a particular organization in which different psychobiological subsystems of the personality are unduly rigid and closed to each other.(Hart 2006, 7) We begin with a Janetian understanding of psychology with which we understand the personality as a structure comprised of psychobiological subsystems of ideas and functions. Dissociation, then, involves divisions among these systems. (Hart 2006, 14) It is a process that provides protective psychological containment, detachment from, and physical analgesia for overwhelming experiences. It is defined as a disruption of several usually integrated functions.

Consciousness's disruption takes the form of trance states, non-epileptic seizures, and pseudo-delirium. Memory's disruption impairs autobiographical memory. The disruption of awareness of body or self is just depersonalization, and of the environment derealization. Finally disruption in identity manifests as confusion about one’s identity.

One experiences discrete and discordant senses of self, which lead to the elaboration of alters. (Brandt 2014, 1) These are manifestations of dissociation: How does it work underneath?

### Action Systems

Structure is how the component parts are composed, with reference to the positional and functional interdependence of the parts. A Janetian psychobiological system (not to be confused with ``system'' in the sense we've been using) is a collection of elements that are all part of a whole in some sense. The divisions between subsystems in dissociation occur between action systems in particular.(Hart 2006,14-15)

There are two major categories of action systems: those geared primarily toward approaching attractive stimuli, and those away from aversive stimuli. Notice here the similarity between the categories of action systems in this theory and the pleasure and pain aims of the Millonian theory of personality from Chapter 1. Some of the former can include a subsystem geared toward acquiring food or a subsystem geared toward pleasing one's companion. Some of the latter can include a subsystem geared toward fleeing danger or a subsystem geared toward freezing and submitting to a dangerous person. Each subsystem, however, involves ``particular innate propensities to act in a goal directed manner,”(Hart 2006, 15) and as such are called action systems.

Action systems can share some action tendencies, like speaking and walking, and keep some to themselves, like attaching to one's mother. Action tendencies are distinct from actions in that while actions are executed, action tendencies include latency, readiness, initiation, execution, and completion of actions. (Hart 2006, 15-16)

Whereas in typical cases these action systems are activated adaptively and are generally accessible to a person, alters are dissociated from some action systems. The symptoms of DID are caused by divisions between these action systems. Action tendencies may also be shared by different action systems, and thus be employed by alters driven by different action systems. For example, while Mary uses sex to barter for nurturing, Anna uses it as a way to avoid her traumatic feelings.

### Apparently Normal Parts & Emotional Parts

SD comes in three kinds, each of which dissociates action systems from one another. In any form of structural dissociation, there are what are referred to as Apparently Normal Parts (ANPs) and Emotional Parts (EPs). Each is driven by a collection of action systems. ANP and EP are what alters are. However, note that this theoretical division isn't so nice in reality; some alters are a fuzzy blend of ANP and EP. The two co-exist and alternate their control. ANPs are directed by action systems for trying to go on with normal life, such as those for exploration, caretaking, and attachment. EPs are directed by action systems like defense or sexuality or subsystems like hypervigilance, flight, or fight. These two are generally rigid and closed to each other, though sometimes alters can blend together. (Hart 2006, 7)

Mental energy is probably also a term I should define. The balance of one's mental energy and one's capacity to apply that energy in adaptive behavior is one's mental efficiency.(Hart 2006, 13) ANP and EP can have different levels of mental efficiency. How? So what? These are questions for a future draft. EPs in particular can be overwhelmed by vehement emotions, which differ from merely intense emotions in that their expression is unhelpful. An EP in a vehement rage allowed to express her rage is likely to just become more upset rather than realizing any benefit of catharsis.

### Forms of SD

Tertiary structural dissociation (TSD) is more easily understood in contrast with primary structural dissociation (PSD) and secondary structural dissociation (SSD). PSD, SSD, and TSD are ordered by complexity. In cases of PSD, there is a single ANP and a single EP. The ANP controls most of life, and the EP remains neither autonomous nor elaborated. This is usually, though not uncontroversially, understood to underlie PTSD. See Ross (2014). There is a web of institutional pressures complicating the understanding of the connections between dissociation and PTSD.

In cases of SSD, there's a single ANP and multiple EPs. Different defensive action (sub)systems are dissociated from one another, each able to have her own combination of affects, cognitions, perceptions, and motor actions. Van der Hart et al include the following example: Martha was a patient with the diagnosis of complex PTSD and borderline personality disorder.[[38]](#footnote-37) She had a childhood history of serious physical abuse and profound neglect. One part of her personality (EP) tended to become enraged at the smallest perceived slight, another (EP) froze in terror when she was triggered, a third (EP) was constantly on the lookout for danger, a fourth (EP) was always searching for somebody to take care of her, and a fifth (ANP) functioned quite well at work as long as relationships did not feel threatening to her. (Hart 2006, 19)

Cases of TSD are distinguished, then, by the existence of multiple ANPs, and the autonomy and elaboration of ANPs and EPs. By autonomy I mean perceiving themselves as separate from each other and having an apparently high degree of independence of thought and action from each other. By elaboration I mean having possibly their own names, ages, genders, preferences, and so on.

In severe cases of SSD the EPs may start to take over large parts of life and experience strong identity-related symptoms. In all cases of TSD, multiple parts are elaborate, and autonomous. (Hart 2006, 19)

### Switching's Underlying Mechanism

Some sort of lower level psychobiological system must mediate ANP and EP. Van der Hart et al present five criteria that must be met based on what would be able to perform such a function:

``they must be self-organizing and self-stabilizing within windows of homeostasis, time, and context to control and integrate all the rather coherent complexes of psychobiological phenomena exhibited by ANP and EP, they should be functional systems that have been developed in the course of evolution, and should be analogous to mammalian biological systems', survivors should be very susceptible to classical conditioning, because (...) EP and ANP strongly respond to unconditioned and conditioned threat cues, these systems should involve stable characteristics, but also allow for case- dependent variation as well, as ANP and EP exhibit both invariants and idiosyncratic variations, and these systems should be available early in life, since dissociative disorders can manifest from a very early age. Action systems meet all of these requirements: they are organizational, evolution derived, functional, flexible within limits, and inborn but epigenetic.” (Hart 2006, 43-44)

A future draft of the Dissertation will explain what this means in simpler terms and connect it with Millon’s theory.

### Brains

Thus far our explanations have been entirely psychological. One may wonder about the neurological underpinnings. Because of how early the disorder develops, the different parts of the brain are less connected than in singlets. (e.g. Sar 2008) The significantly reduced connections in the corpus callosum is interesting, though, as at a neurophysical level, tertiary structural dissociation involves a partially split brain. Compared with a nondissociative, nontraumatized control group, some systems have diminished perfusion (blood flow) bilaterally in orbitofrontal regions (which are regions of the prefrontal cortex involved in decision making) and increased perfusion in the left (dominant) lateral temporal region, parts involved in language, memory, and emotion, among other functions of the brain. Different senses of self track different regional blood flow patterns. When at least two distinct mental states of self-awareness with distinct access to autobiographic trauma-related memory, activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior associative cortices seem to have an integral role in conscious experience and multiplicity. (Sar 2008 236)

Essentially, underlying the divided psychology is a functionally divided brain. It's not the case that each alter is just part of the brain, though if people are identical with or otherwise defined by patterns of brain activity, then alters may be understood as different patterns. Notice how the same can be said of personalities.

### Traumagenesis of TSD

Human children begin life without an integrated personality. Prior to somewhere between ages six and nine, all humans are yet to develop a single, unified identity to coordinate different action systems. This might be more intuitive if you think about how easily young children seem to switch between emotions and activities, often one activity influencing the next only very little, much unlike singlet adults. Repeated trauma during this period prevents the unification of these as the not-yet-unified mind learns to dissociate as a way of coping with traumatic experiences instead of the normal methods people use to tolerate and make sense of things that happen to them.

For instance, if a young child is being yelled at to get out of bed to go to preschool, and she knows that she'll be abused if she goes but also punished severely for not getting up on her own, without the skills to deal with both being true, she can create a self that just gets up and goes, dissociated from the reasons against doing so. If this is a common occurrence, then two ANPs may develop instead of the usual one. If she's raped, the action systems that employ the stress reactions fight, flight, and freeze may all be activated and conflict without compromise. She's pulled between fighting, fleeing, and freezing, and without any way to integrate these three intense compulsions, she has to dissociate. If this is a common occurrence, the EPs develop and continue to experience the trauma. If they grow up without trauma or other interference, they grow into an adult singlet, a human with a unified personality. The action systems that largely depend on instinct to activate them in infancy come under the control of a single conscious agent. However, trauma can disrupt this development.

To be clear, ``A comprehensive definition of psychic trauma is the loss of cohesion in internal world, in external reality, and between them; creating loss of psychic harmony in a given time point and across the life span.'' (Sar 2008, 228) Trauma, then, is not an event but rather an emotional wound (Hart 2006, 36), and this wound results in parts of a child's mind following an alternative developmental track, towards multiplicity rather than unity.

Rachel Nickeas, who worked as a professional manager (R.N.) and as an academic nurse (T.S.), helpfully details her experience with the development of DID: Rachel found the unpredictable, violent and explosive nature of her mother’s actions terrifying. She felt her whole life was being threatened and that she could die in a very unpleasant way. In order to cope with such persistent abuse, Rachel began to 'sit beside herself' so that it didn't seem to be happening to her. She found a way of watching what happened rather than endure it herself. From an early age, Rachel often thought of suicide because then she could be in control of when and how she would die, rather than her mother. She would choose a pleasant death, not a terrible one like her mother threatened. Rachel realized early on that if she showed fear, it made her mother worse. She made a positive decision, even before school age, to show no reaction. While her head felt like exploding with fear, Rachel saw herself in a black circle with flashes of red. Rachel pushed these fears down by counting and stood as still as she could. She often saw herself standing still and emotionless. In this way, she felt safer and perhaps she wouldn't need to die.

Rachel developed the art of thinking herself into a dream. She could imagine sitting outside the cupboard when she was actually locked inside it. She could see herself sitting quietly inside it. When Rachel was being sexually abused, she also `dreamed'. She developed the ability to be sitting next to her self or even outside the room. In this way, Rachel felt nothing, either emotionally or physically. She no longer felt pain when she was hit, and she was able to stop crying with fear.(Stickley 2006, 183) As a child, Nickeas had few options available to her to cope with her mother. She couldn't just leave, nor had she had a chance to learn how to just tolerate it. Mental barriers between herself and her body, her life, reality, pain, and so on worked for her in her environment.

Once she started school, Rachel `dreamed' a lot. Sometimes she couldn't remember how she had gotten to school. She often became mentally absent during lessons, almost constantly daydreaming, and was often accused of being erratic by teachers who thought her intelligent but not working to the best of her abilities. As a teenager, Rachel thought she could sleep anywhere at any time. If something was frightening her, she simply went to sleep. Rachel could sleep for 5--10 min to 1 or 2 h, at strange times and strange places; during playtime at school, going to the shops, on a bus, while reading and at odd times when at home. Rachel would often wake up in a different classroom or find herself on the wrong road on the way back from doing the shopping for her mother. She sometimes woke up to find herself walking across the fields near her house.

Throughout her childhood, teenage years and college years, Rachel either slept or dreamed significant periods of her life away. She couldn't understand that nobody commented about it, not even the boyfriend who was to become her husband. Rachel was puzzled and frightened, but didn't know what to do about it or how to explain it. She always had a lot of noise in her head; like lots of people talking all at once, she also saw herself, at different ages around her, in the room for much of the time.

As no one else talked about this sort of thing, Rachel knew it was strange.

She decided not to talk about such things, for fear of being regarded as `mad'. As she progressed into adulthood, Rachel would frequently experience becoming a 6-year-old child. During these periods, she would not know where she was and would tell people that she was 6 years old. Rachel experienced other alters too, but the 6-year-old girl was the most frequently experienced.(Stickley 2006, 183)

In her story, we see several of the symptoms of DID. While Rachel went to `sleep', alters could be out without her knowledge. While it was strange to her that nobody said anything, if she had an outside perspective, she'd see that her body continued to act like a person when she was `asleep'. Other alters, such as the 6-year-old, she was clearly aware for the presence of. Thus we see the alter who shared this story has awareness of some other alters, but amnesia for others.

She hallucinates and has an unstable understanding of her own properties. Experiences are, by most people at most times, integrated; that is, there's ``a process involving ongoing mental actions that help both to differentiate and link experiences over time within a personality that is both flexible and stable.'' (Hart 2006, 24)

Integration involves two major mental actions: synthesis and realization. Synthesis is the action ``in which we bind (link) and differentiate a range of internal and external experiences within a moment and across time.'(Hart 2006 24) Put more simply, synthesis is the mental action via which we compare and contrast things in our mind. These can be sensory perceptions, one's sense of sense, movements, thoughts, and affects. It's synthesis that enables ``the individual's normative unity of consciousness and history,'' (Hart 2006 24) which is to say that we understand ourselves as unified entities at a time and across time because we synthesize.

Realization is a yet higher level integrative mental action, involving ``the mental actions of developing awareness of reality as it is, accepting it, and then reflectively and creatively adapting to it.'' (Hart 2006 24) Because ANPs lack full realization of traumatic experiences, they deny or experience amnesia of them. EPs, on the other hand, don't realize that their traumatic experiences have ended. When ANPs learn to be phobic of EPs and their intrusions and emotions, structural dissociation is maintained. While in nontraumatized adults the personality is already integrated enough to have the ability to hold together at least a unified ANP, young children lack these coping skills and instead learn to dissociate as their response to stress. (Hart 2006 26)

### The practical mechanics of alters and switching

The phobias of alters that maintain SD play a major role in their functioning. Alters within a system share some memories, a human body and brain, a legal identity, and usually a social identity. However, that they do share the last two is conventional, and we may change these conventions.

Alters within a system can have different experiential or traumatic memory, semantic memories, abilities, handwriting, senses of self, beliefs, desires, values, goals, relationships, and feelings. In addition to the usual `outer world' we all perceive and interact in, many systems have an `inner world' that alters can perceive in addition to or as an escape from the outer world. They may also interact with one another in this world as they have separate bodies. Within a system's inner world, the alters have different appearances, and they can see their external appearance differently in the outer world as well. That is, some alters may hallucinate a body that matches their self image rather than reality.

Most systems have some alters that age-regress, or have a different sense of what age they are from the age of their body. Alters within a different may also have different gender identities.

Take the case of Rachel Nickeas again. As a professional manager, she had to handle the stresses of a demanding career alongside the problems presented by her DID, though before she knew about her having DID:

“Rachel became extremely organized at work in order to compensate for her absences. Her record keeping and note taking at meetings was excellent. If Rachel had `dreamed' her way through a meeting, she would get a copy of someone else's notes as soon as she could. Rachel would always try and read the notes before the next meeting. If she still couldn't remember anything about the purpose of a meeting she was chairing, she learned the knack of starting the meeting by agreeing its purpose with those present.” (Stickley 2006, 184)

Many systems hide their plurality via some alters suppressing or passing themselves off as each other. They may blend their characteristics, transfer personality elements, or funnel personality elements to other alters. (Franklin 1988, 27)

### Living With Phobias Maintaining SD

ANPs are afraid of their inner lives, or rather, of some mental actions. This phobia maintains their dissociation as they're unable to integrate. (Hart 2006, 27) One example is due to the nature of chronic trauma, different alters within a system will have phobias of attachment and loss of attachment. Much like the paradigmatic `I hate you, don't leave me' paradox of BPD, the two create a vicious cycle.

Consider the following example: Mary (alter) is phobic of attachment loss, so when she thinks someone may leave her, she becomes very distressed. One night when Devin (singlet) fell asleep before texting her back, she feared she had done something to upset him to the point that he would never speak with her again. During her emotional breakdown, her phobic-of-attachment alter Anna comes out and leaves a threatening voicemail. When Mary returns, she's in a worse situation as Devin is now reasonably upset with her. She attempts to repair the relationship, and hopes Anna stays away.

Van der Hart et al have this helpful example:

“as ANP, Miriam was constantly terrified of losing her child, and was overprotective in the extreme. When she went to the mall with her son, she could not focus on what she needed to buy, but only on watching him. She perceived every approaching stranger as a threat, and insisted on holding her son’s hand tightly, even though he was 9 years old and terribly embarrassed by his mother’s behavior. Her mind was filled with the urgent need to protect her child at all cost, and nothing else.” (Hart 2006, 47)

Action tendencies may also be shared by different action systems, and thus be employed by alters driven by different action systems. While Mary uses sex to barter for nurturing, Anna uses it as a way to avoid her traumatic feelings.

### Treatment

The treatment process sheds further light on DID, and it provides us with what may be a case of fusion of persons. For information on diagnosis, see Dell (2006) “Multidimensional”.

The treatment takes place in three stages. In the first stage, the mental level and adaptive actions of the dominant alters are raised.(Hart 2006, 30) This stage is essentially controlling the most immediately pressing symptoms, saving processing of traumatic memories for once life is under control. This is also the stage in which rudimentary skills of cooperation among alters are developed. In the second stage, the traumatic memories are processed, so as to resolve the phobias maintaining structural dissociation.(Hart 2006, 31) This brings us to the third stage, in which alters may fuse. ``What does fusion entail?'' we ask.

The treatment process

``involves painful grief work that is necessary for deepening realization to occur, relinquishment of strongly held substitute beliefs, and the struggle to engage in the world with new coping skills that require high degrees of sustained mental efficiency and energy.' (Hart 2006, 32)

When alters fuse, the dissociative barriers between them are eliminated, and the fusing alters become a single alter. Both survive as a single, fused alter (or singlet). While there has been a popular conception of a system being composed of one ``real person'' and a collection of alters, there's in fact only alters. While one alter may have developed a little earlier than another, there's no original in any significant sense. Some systems may have one alter that fronts[[39]](#footnote-38) most of the time, though that's a matter of circumstance. Given our causal understanding of DID, there's no room for an original identity, unlike in cases of primary and secondary structural dissociation, because multiple identities were formed from the start. Given the nondiscrete nature of development, different identities can be at different stages of development, so even picking a first identity will depend on an arbitrary choice of first past what point of development. The first identity to start being autonomous won't necessarily be the first to reach a mostly stable point of ``completed'' development. Looking directly at fusion again, what we see isn't any alters being destroyed, but rather the dissociative barriers between alters being removed, and the unification of the mental (sub)systems pressed to develop.

There are some substantial difficulties standing between a system and fusion. For instance, alters often fear fusion. Alters may express particularly strong fear of certain other alters. This brings us to a pressing philosophical question: Does fusion of alters fuse persons? If alters are different people, then it must. If alters are parts of a single person, then it doesn't. And if systems aren't even yet people, then fusion begins the existence of a person.

This chapter clearly gets a lot more into DID than one may expect from earlier descriptions of the chapter. Now, the sort of puzzle to connect these two can be roughly stated as follows: BPD is SSD and DID is TSD, but BPD is one personality and I argue in cases of DID there are multiple personalities. The next step on this chapter is reading The Haunted Self again, doing what I did with Disorders of Personality.

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## The Ability to Dissociate

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## Primary Structural Dissociation

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## Secondary Structural Dissociation

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## Tertiary Structural Dissociation

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## Dissociation and Personality

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# Chapter 3: Context

Another chapter, then, will focus on the factors, general and particular, that contextualize each person’s personality. Here is where the effect of culture and socialization will play most prominently as I describe how they affect how personality is shaped. I will draw on Nietzsche as a source of philosophy of culture,[[40]](#footnote-39) and use this understanding alongside the thus-covered understanding of personality to explain how personality makes sense in today’s America and, to a lesser extent, world, with some eye to the future, both for the practical utility and the future verifiability added when I make claims about what hasn’t happened yet. These contemporary conditions will be particularly useful for explaining the contemporary appearance of DID, as will the better understanding of psychoses enabled by the proverbial edges of our map of personality.

Chapter 3’s goals can be understood, then, as explaining the contemporary appearance of DID and explaining psychoses, as well as explaining the origin of personality in history, media, literature, humanity, and computer simulation.

I also wanted to mention that I've been retraining in software development. Nobody has really made a solid competitor to Animal Crossing or The Sims. I think a weakness of both is the NPC personalities, or rather the lack of deep or realistic personalities. Given what computers are affordable now, and what skills I have, I think I could use the information and expertise from the dissertation to build an interesting, useful, and fun people simulator. The interest and fun are nice in-themselves, the utility I'm thinking of is for experimental philosophy of personality. If the software is realistic enough, then we could do all sorts of stuff to the simulated people that ethics prohibit on human people. At least I think we can. Obviously others disagree.



In this chapter I’ll draw on W.B. Gallie’s Philosophy & the Historical Understanding, 2nd Edition particularly for understanding the influence of the historical understanding on personality. Gallie takes the historical understanding to affect politics, science, and philosophy. His project is a revivalism of the tradition of understanding history as Windelband, Rickert, Croce, and Collingwood did. To them, the historical understanding is the understanding of all purposive thought and action, which is radically unlike the understanding of natural phenomena like scientific law or theory. The historical understanding pertains to particular thoughts and actions, so to understand what happened is to understand why it happened. The Windelband-Collingwood school as defended by Gallie regards the concept of a story as a form of human understanding sui generis and as a basis of all historical thought and knowledge.

Gallie draws on Karl Popper in claiming, “as in the sciences there is always a theory, so in history there is always a story, or at least the presumption or hope of a story” (2). There are many forms of historiography, but Gallie takes narrative history as the basic form.

Gallie criticizes philosophers for neglecting that large sections of our conceptual framework have a perfectly well-known history. The changes in the conceptual and empirical meanings prove to be overlapping and reinforcing (6-7).

Chapter 3 is successful if it anchors the text in history and culture.

However, before moving into the rest of the chapter, it will be beneficial to establish a clear vocabulary. The words “persons”, “selves”, and “humans” require careful distinction. “Persons” is the hardest to define, and this chapter will attempt to later. For now, we can understand it simply as the object of discussion about personal identity. While “selves” is used many ways by different people, for our purposes I will only use it to refer to conscious egos. To avoid phrasings that imply plural humans are one or more persons before coming to a conclusion, I will frequently use “humans” to avoid person language and refer to the less ambiguously defined Homo sapiens sapiens.

### Personal Identity

I do not take personal identity to be a basic feature of humans, but rather a special feature of contemporary humans. When we ask questions about personal identity and personhood, the concerns motivating the inquiries can be divided, though not without fuzziness, into the agential and the phenomenal. That is, some questions about personal identity and personhood have to do with the objective features of persons as agents. With these concerns, we ask questions about the ethical demands of and for persons, the social and political lives of persons, and epistemic questions about persons demanded by our ethical and social practices. The phenomenal questions have to do with the subjective features of persons as conscious entities, often pursued from the first person to highlight this facet of the inquiry. Put more simply, we want to know how to get along with people and the bounds of our own consciousness.

Philosophical questions about personal identity include many basic questions about persons such as ``What is it to be a person?'', ``Under what conditions does a person persist through time?", and ``How do we determine how many persons there are in a population?" We can organize these questions into three groups: Metaphysical questions are about the relations between persons and existence. Epistemological questions are about the relations between persons and knowledge. Ethical questions are about the relations between persons and goodness. Each of these kinds of questions can be further broken down, which will also clarify what each of the three relations is. Metaphysical questions include those that use understanding of existence to further understand persons. These often apply the tools of metaphysics more broadly to persons. For example, metaphysics more broadly considers the conditions of persistence of things, and these considerations can be brought to bear on persons as things. Metaphysical questions also include those that use understanding of persons to understand existence. Whatever is true of persons must be compatible with reality, and so by understanding persons we can make inferences about reality. A common argument along these lines uses the subjective and objective features of persons to argue for phenomenal and physical features of reality.

A major subset of questions is those that apply understanding of persons to understand existence of persons. Epistemological questions can be organized with a similar pattern. Some use our understanding of knowledge to further understand persons. This usually operates at a metaphilosophical level, asking about our access to answers to all of these questions. Others have the opposite direction of elucidation, a major subset being those that apply understanding of persons to understanding of knowledge of persons. Finally, ethical questions again can be organized with a similar pattern. Those with the direction of understanding going from goodness to persons are often about how we ethically ought to conceptualize persons. Note a similar normative question arises from knowledge to persons: how we rationally ought to conceptualize persons. With the direction reversed, from persons to goodness, we usually ask how, given what persons are, how we ought treat them, or how they ought behave. This organization is not complete. Some fundamental questions are excluded (as fundamental) by the original trifurcation, such as those regarding aesthetics and persons. Perhaps the relations between persons and existence, knowledge, and goodness excludes something else of fundamental importance, such as how to beautifully conceptualize persons. Even within the three kinds listed, there are further subareas that have received significant philosophical attention that I've left unlisted. For example, while I listed existence of and knowledge of persons, existence for and knowledge for persons are major subsets. Both of these varieties of questions can be classified within the three kinds, though not as fundamental. This choice is intended only to limit this paper's focus to mainstream views in contemporary Anglophone philosophy. If I were attending more to Indian philosophy, I'd make the aesthetic-personal questions fundamental, and if I were attending more to Phenomenology, I'd have listed the being-for and knowing-for questions as major subsets alongside the being-of and knowing-of questions. Despite these limitations, the six-way division created by the three kinds and the two directions of elucidation for each kind's relation provides us with a functional map of the questions this project must engage with. This map will allow us to see both what we need to figure out and also why it matters. More precisely, the relations to persons determine how we must answer questions about persons, and the relations from persons make our inquiry worthwhile.

These questions are hardly the exclusive domain of philosophers. If you were to poll the general population for their answers to personal identity questions, then you would see a limited range of views with significant representation. Most people are able to competently use person concepts most of the time, unless some radical view happens to be correct, but even in that case, our social practices at least appear to be functioning well as far as our person concepts go. That is, at least for those fully included in the moral community of persons. For those not fully included, our social practices may not appear to be functioning so well. Some humans are denied personhood as a feature of a community's norms, and to them and those who care about them the practices are functioning rather poorly. If, as many argue, some non-human animals or computers are persons, then we're horrifically mistreating some people. Arguments for the illegalization of abortion often appeal to the personhood of the unborn. In these cases, we see criticisms of our answers to metaphysical questions from ethics, as will be common in critiques of answers to metaphysical questions later in this work. The epistemic norms regarding persons of a community are inaccessible to some people. People with prosopagnosia, often called ``face blindness'', often experience difficulty distinguishing individuals by sight. Our social practices generally operate with an assumption that people can recognize faces. However, most people will occasionally misidentify people. Moreover, the difficulty here is obviously the result of contingent features of social norms. If a population consisted entirely of people with prosopagnosia, then their norms of identifying persons would depend on something other than facial recognition. Likewise, blindness and deafness can make our casual practices of identifying persons practically impossible, but this is still only a speed barrier. None of these sensory disabilities actually prevents someone from knowing who is who, how many people there are, and so on, given some other perceptual access. On the other hand, even with senses intact, illusions and delusions can make one unable to participate in the norms. Someone who persistently perceives too many or too few people may not be able to acquire reliable information. Someone who cannot understand the concept of persons will not be able to make sense of information about persons. Putting our two categorizations together, we have the following table of categories of questions about personal identity:

### Table of Six Personal ID Question Categories

|  | Metaphysical | Epistemological | Ethical |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Agential | Relation of agents and personal being | Relation of agents and personal knowledge | Relation of agents and personal goodness |
| Phenomenal | Relation of selves and personal being | Relation of selves and personal knowledge | Relation of selves and personal goodness |

Dissociative identity disorder (DID) frustrates our intuitions about all kinds of questions. Looking at the agential/phenomenal distinction, our paradigmatic archetype of a person is a modern adult human a typical psychology. DID is a condition in which, among other features, multiple personalities appear to manifest in a single human. It's not clear whether these apparent multiple personalities are distinct agents. On the one hand, many of them will self-describe as distinct agents, and those in close relationships with them will as well. But on the other hand, some do not, considering themselves all parts of one rightly-considered whole.

Clinical perspectives are also divided, and the current state of our understanding of persons and personality is complicated enough that the disagreements tend fundamentally philosophical. The phenomenological questions aren't clearer, even the basic question concerning the number of conscious entities involved remaining without a path to an answer.

These questions, pressing enough as they are given their impact on the lives of those with and around those with DID, also present problems for the mainstream of Philosophy. The agential questions make us think again about how we treat and relate to others. For instance, the importance of compensation and retribution are often highlighted in personal identity inquiries, but our personal social lives have many distinct concerns from our legal social lives. What matters in friendship includes non-moral matters like hobbies and temperament. The phenomenal questions are also complicated by considering DID. For instance, some people think that it's apparent that conscious entities are able to self-distinguish, but the unsurity of many with DID pose a serious challenge to this view. A modified problem of other minds emerges as one ``personality'' wonders whether the others are conscious entities and whether they are distinct from her, whether they can be conscious in parallel or only is series, and whether she may be significantly outlived by someone else in her body.

This chapter is much less complete than the previous two. The next step might just be to organize it so I can reassess. Or else pick the texts I’m synthesizing and get to it.

## 

## The Text Itself

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## Personality

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# Chapter 4: Evil

I take it, finally, that a chapter is needed addressing moral psychology in particular as well as the ethical payoffs of the preceding. I intend to model values as fundamentally in relation to one another, and much of our moral psychologies as constituted by our prioritizations of values, understandings of their contents, and understandings of their relations to each other and ourselves. For this I will draw from, in addition to the preceding chapters’ developments, the texts, lectures, and discussions from a class titled Evil, taught by Eric Schwitzgebel, Tom Hanauer-Rehavia, Chris McVey, and Howie Wettstein. Many of the reasons people have for doing evil can be explained in terms of personality, and many cannot. This chapter will seek to describe those, as dividing off what personality does and does not, and then working out the good side of what personality does, as well.

Some goals, then, for Chapter 4 are describing the reasons personality provides for evil, the failures of personality as explanation for people doing evil, and a positive role for personality.

I take it initially that we can aim to be good, aim to bring about the most good, aim to be right, aim to do the right things, and aim for other aims involving the good or right. Debates between consequentialists and deontologists are had based on these occasionally clashing values. I take it that blamelessness or innocence is another aim one can have. The different possible prioritizations of doing right, being good, and avoiding blame result in different behaviors. For example, in the liberal white American middle class, innocence is generally prioritized above righteousness, and both much above goodness, on the whole. When considered in detail it of course is more complicated; they promote their own good,but to avoid revealing to themselves how they exploit others, they focus entirely on doing the right things and avoiding doing the blameworthy, bad things. The global working class, on the other hand, has a more common proclivity to aim for their common good, but dire conditions generally deprive these people of their claim to righteousness and innocence. That is, poverty is generally traumatizing.

In this chapter I will engage with David Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. The Inquiry opens with a claim about personalities, that those who are obstinate are the most irksome in disputes, except those who are entirely disingenuous from the spirit of opposition or desire of showing wit and ingenuity superior to the rest of mankind. Notice that both the obstinate and the disingenuous expect unquestioned adherence to their own arguments. So since neither derives their tenets from reasoning, Hume concludes that one must speak to their affections.



This chapter is perhaps the draftiest of the draft. Each chapter does build on the preceding, so it makes sense that the last chapter is currently like the narrow part of a pyramid. This text will become a column in time. Well, this one probably shouldn’t, but the Dissertation will. This one is intentionally asymmetrical.

## 

## Situations Influence People

## People Influence Situations

## Persons=Situations; Who=What

# Appendix of Millon’s Historical Antecedents

### Historical Antecedents

Millon begins with the Western tradition of formal personality characterization, which can be traced to the early Greeks. A survey of these can be found in Allport (1937), Millon (2004a), and Roback (1927). (Millon 2011 5)[[41]](#footnote-40)

#### Ancient Humoral Notions

We consider first the humoral theory of personality, which continues to appear as a basic compass in contemporary discussions.

“One of the first explanatory systems to specify personality dimensions is the doctrine of bodily humors posited by early Greeks some 25 centuries ago.

Hippocrates identified four basic temperaments—the choleric, melancholic, sanguine, and phlegmatic—these corresponded, respectively, to excesses in yellow bile, black bile, blood, and phlegm. Modified and expanded by the imaginative second-century physician, Galen, centuries later (Millon, 2004a) he posited nine temperamental types derived from the four humors. Among them the choleric temperament, associated with a tendency toward irascibility, the sanguine temperament prompted the individual toward optimism, the melancholic temperament, characterized by an inclination toward sadness, and the phlegmatic temperament, conceived as an apathetic disposition.” (Millon 2011 6)

These temperaments and some historical descriptions of them is organized in the follow table:

##### Table of Hippocrates’ Four Humours




Image from [Hippocrates, Galen & The Four Humours](https://www.thecolourworks.com/hippocrates-galen-the-four-humours/).

Millon next compares this with the earlier theories posed in China:

“Similar in some respects to the ideas of Hippocrates and Galen were notions of temperament in China, (Millon, 2004a; Yosida, 1973) proposed some one or two millennia earlier. To them, healthful balances stemmed from energy flows rather than humoral disparities. Also notable were their assertions that temperament was markedly variable, influenced by climate, diet, and seasonal variations” (Millon 2011 6)

The central differences highlighted here are between energy flows and humoral disparities as the source of balances, and between variable and static temperaments. I take it that the first difference can be understood as a difference of emphasis. Both understand personality to be understood as a collection of balances, and neither would deny that these balances are dynamic. Whether one focuses primarily on disposition or velocity of these balances will not result in an understanding incompatible with the other. I take it that the second difference is no longer seriously controversial. We know that temperament, i.e. our natural dispositions, varies in how it influences behavior based on climate, diet, and season.[[42]](#footnote-41)

#### Early Physiognomic/Phrenologic Conceptions

The body is one of the primary influences of personality. While our current neuroscience provides a much more precise and accurate understanding than the early models, it’s worth looking at the history of our understanding of this and the other influences. As Chapter 3 will illustrate, our context influences the expression of our personalities significantly, so having accounts from other times can help us distinguish between the bounds of human personality and the mere bounds of our time.

“The ancients speculated also that body structure was associated with the character of personality. Whereas the humoral doctrine may be seen as the forerunner of contemporary psychiatric neurobiology, phrenology and physiognomy may be conceived as forerunners of modern psychiatric morphology.” (Millon 2011 6)

Gall was one of the first to claim that there is a direct relationship between the human mind and the ‌ body. Gall argued that the brain was the central organ of thought and emotion, and the intensity and nature of thoughts and emotions would depend on differences in the size and shape of the brain or its ‌ cranium. So, Gall argued that just as it is logical to assume that persons with large bicep muscles are stronger than people with small ones, so it would stand to reason that individuals with large cranial projections would exhibit corresponding psychological traits disproportionately to those with smaller ones.

#### Literary Portrayals

Allport describes “character writing” as a minor literary style originating in Athens, likely invented by Aristotle and developed into its finest and most convincing form by‌ ‌ Theophrastus. Among literature’s most “incisive and brilliant portrayals” are the character depictions found in the works of Butler, Carlyle, Chaucer, Donne, Eliot, La Bruyere, La Rochefoucauld, Montesquieu, Pascal, Proust, Stendhal, and Tolstoy. (Millon 2011 7)

#### Turn-of-the-20th-Century Character Proposals

“Late 19th-century French psychologist, Ribot (1890), attempted to formulate character types in a manner analogous to botanical classifications. By varying the intensity level of two traits, those of sensitivity and activity, Ribot sought to construct several major types.’” (Millon 2011 7-8)

I organize Ribot’s types in the following graph.

##### Graph of Ribot’s Character Types



“A similar method of permutation was applied by another French theorist, F. Queyrat (1896), in his formulation of nine normal character types; this was achieved by intensity combinations of three dispositions: emotionality, activity, and meditation. Where only one disposition was preeminent, the character took the form of a pure emotional, active, or meditative type. A second group of normal characters were noted by the simultaneous predominance of two dispositions, yielding an active-emotional, or ‘‘passionate,’’ type; an active-meditative, or ‘‘voluntary,’’ character; and a meditative-emotional, or ‘‘sentimental,’’ personality. In the third set of characters, Queyrat identified those in which the three dispositions were balanced: Here were noted the ‘‘equilibrated,’’ the ‘‘amorphous,’’ and the ‘‘apathetic’’ characters. When one or more of the three tendencies functioned irregularly or erratically, Queyrat designated them as semimorbid characters, specifically the ‘‘unstable,’’ the ‘‘irresolute,’’ and the ‘‘contradictory’’ types. “ (Millon 2011 8)

I organize Queyrat’s normal character types in the following graph.

##### Graph of Queyrat’s Normal Character Types



“Writing a decade or so later were a number of theorists from other European nations. Most notable among them were the Dutch psychologists Heymans and Wiersma (1906–1909). On the basis of a series of highly sophisticated empirical studies, they identified three fundamental criteria for evaluating character: activity level, emotionality, and susceptibility to external versus internal stimulation. These criteria anticipated identical threefold schemas (each based, however, on highly dissimilar theoretical models) developed by McDougall (1908/1932), Meumann (1910), Freud (1915/1925b), and Millon (1969). By combining these criteria, Heymans and Wiersma deduced the presence of eight character types:

1. The ‘‘amorphous’’ character, reflecting the interplay of passive, nonemotional, and external susceptibility.

2. The ‘‘apathetic’’ character, developing from a passive, nonemotional, and internal orientation.

3. The ‘‘nervous’’ character, a product of a passive, emotional, and external responsiveness.

4. The ‘‘sentimental’’ character, who is passive, emotional, and internally impressed.

5. The ‘‘sanguine’’ character, noted as active, nonemotional, and externally receptive.

6. The ‘‘phlegmatic’’ character, typified by active, nonemotional, and internal tendencies.

7. The ‘‘choleric’’ character, reflecting an active, emotional, and external susceptibility.

8. The ‘‘impassioned’’ character, representing an active, emotional, and internal sensitivity.” (Millon 2011 8)

I organize their character types into the following table.

##### Table of G. Heymans and E. Wiersma’s Character Types

| Low Activity/Passive | | | | High Activity | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Low Emotionality | | High Emotionality | | Low Emotionality | | High Emotionality | |
| External orientation | Internal orientation | External orientation | Internal orientation | External orientation | Internal orientation | External orientation | Internal orientation |
| Amorphous | Apathetic | Nervous | Sentimental | Sanguine | Phlegmatic | Choleric | Impassioned |

The psychiatrist Hirt, director of a German asylum and author of *Die Temperamente*,[[43]](#footnote-42) extrapolating from work with institutionalized cases, divided temperament in accord with the classical four humors. Also, he attempted to find their parallels among psychiatric populations. Hirt believed that those who possessed an accentuated phlegmatic temperament were inclined to exhibit a morbid apathy such as seen in cases of dementia praecox. These patients were not only inactive but lacked insight, seemed detached from the world, and were too apathetic to complain. Patients endowed with a sanguine temperament to an extreme degree were characterized by “superficial excitability, enthusiasm, and unreliability,” and were therefore commonly diagnosed as hysterical types. Hirt thought their primary motivations for action were vanity, a longing for attention, and the desire for enjoyment. There were many subgroups of patients with the choleric temperament. They included suspicious characters who were forever anticipating treachery and ill will, and grumbling types who were invariably critical of others, claiming their personal superiority to all if only they were given a chance.[[44]](#footnote-43) Those of a melancholic disposition were divided into two categories: those of an active inclination were filled with an irritable pessimism and bitterness, and those more passively inclined were found among speculative and brooding types. (Millon 2011 9)

The best known in the United States was William McDougall. He proposed the ‘‘consolidation of sentiments’’ in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, first published in 1908. Like Heymans and Wiersma, McDougall derived eight ‘‘tempers’’ based on different combinations of three fundamental dimensions: the intensity (strength and urgency), the persistency (inward versus outward expression), and the affectivity (emotional susceptibility) of behavioral impulses. (Millon 2011 9)

“Combining these three dimensions led McDougall to form the following eight tempers:

1. The ‘‘steadfast’’ temper, noted by high intensity, high persistency, and low affectivity.

2. The ‘‘fickle’’ temper, characterized by low intensity, high persistency, and high affectivity.

3. The ‘‘unstable’’ temper, defined by high intensity, low persistency, and high affectivity.

4. The ‘‘despondent’’ temper, distinguished by high intensity, low persistency, and low affectivity.

5. The ‘‘anxious’’ temper, designated by low intensity, high persistency, and high affectivity.

6. The ‘‘hopeful’’ temper, identified by high intensity, high persistency, and high affectivity.

7. The ‘‘placid’’ temper, depicted by low intensity, high persistency, and low affectivity.

8. The ‘‘sluggish’’ temper, specified by low intensity, low persistency, and low affectivity.” (Millon 2011 9)

The similarity between McDougall’s temperament typology and Heymans and Wiersma’s characterology is noteworthy, “especially with regard to parallels between their basic dimensions of intensity and the polarity of activity-passivity, between persistency and the internal versus external orientation, and between affectivity and the emotions of pain and pleasure.” (Millon 2011 9)

The eminent German psychologist Meumann proposed a temperamental theory in his 1910 text *Intelligenz und Wille*. He identified eight fundamental qualities of feeling. They centered around the polarity of pleasure versus displeasure and the two excitation modes, the active and the passive. He also considered other, less important characteristics, like easyness of excitability and intensity of emotion. To account for the four classical humors, Meumann combined pleasure-displeasure and active-passive dimensions: the active mode is combined with the pleasurable quality to form‌ ‌the‌ ‌ sanguine‌ ‌temperament; an active mode with displeasurable feelings to form the choleric temperament; a passive mode with a pleasurable feeling for the phlegmatic temperament; and the passive and displeasure amalgam for the melancholic temperament. (Millon 2011 9-10)[[45]](#footnote-44)

#### Modern Formulations

“Attempts to classify nosological systems are doubly problematic. One useful distinction that may be made differentiates those that focus on normal as opposed to abnormal personalities. In accord with this distinction, our discussion separated theorists of character and temperament, who concern themselves with nonpathological traits and types, from psychiatric theorists, who are likely to attend to pathological symptoms and syndromes.” (Millon 2011 10)

“The majority of theorists presented in this section are of European origin, as were most scientific contributors in the early decades of the 20th century” (Millon 2011 10) Millon is wrong here, which I will expand on later.[[46]](#footnote-45)

#### Early Twentieth Century Descriptive Psychiatrists

Until the eighth edition of his major text in 1913, Emil Kraepelin paid little attention to personality disturbances, instead focusing on the two major syndromes of his time, dementia praecox and maniacal depressive insanity. He discovered two premorbid types: the ‘‘cyclothymic disposition,’’ exhibited in four variants, each inclined to maniacal-depressive insanity; and the ‘‘autistic temperament,’’ disposed to dementia praecox. The four types of the cyclothymic disposition were labeled the hypomanic, the depressive, the irascible, and the emotionally unstable.

He also wrote about several “morbid” personalities, that is, those he judged as disposed toward criminality and other commonly disapproved activities. Among these he included the shiftless, impulsive types, liars and swindlers, troublemakers, and other disreputable characters.(Millon 2011 10-12)

Kurt Schneider proposed the best-known European classification of disordered personalities (Schneider 1950), first published in 1923 and revised through several editions. Rare for his time, he considered personality pathology to be a separate group of entities from other psychiatric conditions that covaried with them. This is now the received view, as modeled by the DSM’s distinction between Axis I and Axis II disorders. He is an inheritor of Kraepelin’s descriptive psychiatry and a disciple of Jaspers and his phenomenological perspective. As Kraepelin sought to objectify mental disorders, Schneider wanted to illuminate the patients’ inner lives. (Millon 2011 12)

I want to highlight the hyperthymic personality Schneider proposed as a prelude to the Ebulient-Exuberant-Turbulant spectrum later in this chapter:

“Hyperthymic personalities reflect a mix of high activity, optimism, and shallowness; Those in the second category, the depressive personalities, have a skeptical view of life, tend to take things seriously, and display little capacity for enjoyment. They are often excessively critical and deprecatory of others; at the same time, they are full of self-reproach and exhibit hypochondriacal anxieties” Fanatic personalities are expansive individuals inclined to be uninhibited, combative, and aggressive in promoting their views; they are often querulous and litigious. Among the attention-seeking personalities are those with heightened emotional responses, who delight in novelty and give evidence of excess enthusiasms, vivid imaginations, and a striving to be in the limelight; they are showy and capricious, many are boastful and are inclined to lie and distort.” Labile personalities do not evidence a simple chronic emotionality but are characterized by abrupt and volatile mood changes, impulsive urges, sudden dislikes, and a shiftless immaturity.” (Millon 2011 12)

#### Early-Twentieth-Century Constitutional Theorists

“Perhaps the most perceptive observer of human character, Shakespeare, wrote the following in Julius Caesar (Act I, Scene 2):

Let me have men about me that are fat;

Sleek-headed men and such as sleep o’nights;

Yon Cassius has a lean and hungry look;

He thinks too much; such men are dangerous.” [[47]](#footnote-46)

Ernst Kretschmer is the modern constitutionalist exemplar. In his early research (Kretschmer 1926), he categorized individuals by physical build and tried to relate morphological differences to schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis. In his later work, he expanded the presumed relationship of physique to severe pathology, as well as to premorbid personality and ‘‘normal’’ temperament. “He proposed that people could be grouped into four basic physical types: the pyknic, viewed as compactly built, with a large thorax and abdomen, soft and poorly muscled limbs, and a tendency toward obesity; the athletic, noted for extensive muscular development and a broad skeletal endowment; the asthenic, seen as fragile, possessing thin muscularity and a frail bone structure; and the dysplastic, a mixture of the other three variants that formed an awkwardly constructed bodily structure.” His early investigations led him to claim that there was a strong relationship between pyknic mental illness and the pyknic build, as well as a similar correlation between schizophrenia and the asthenic type. He “considered psychotic disorders to be accentuations of essentially normal personality types”, rare for his time. So on his model, the schizophrenic, the schizoid, and the schizothymic possess different quantities of the same disposition. Likewise, cycloids and cyclothymic personalities are variants of manic-depressive psychosis. Then he argued that normal asthenic individuals were inclined toward introversion, timidity, and a lack of personal warmth, which is just lesser intensities of schizophrenia. Likewise, pyknics are gregarious, friendly, and interpersonally dependent, like the manic-depressive. Then he expanded into the four fundamental reaction types:

“The first, the asthenic reaction, was noted by depressive lethargy, a tendency toward sadness and weariness, and an inability to gather sufficient energy to be anxious about life’s events. The second, the primitive reaction, was to be found in individuals who discharged the impact of their experiences immediately, who lacked a capacity to retain and integrate experience—a pattern Kretschmer found most clearly among those he termed the explosive, shiftless, delinquent, instinct-driven, and immature personality types. The third set, the expansive reactions, included patients who were highly vulnerable to distressing events, overly sensitive to the thoughts of others, and unable to deal with social frustrations; their supersensitivity and irritability disposed them toward suspicious and aggressively paranoid behaviors.The fourth reaction pattern was labeled the sensitive type, and was distinguished by inclinations to dam up emotions, a high level of intrapsychic activity, and poor powers of expression—all of which resulted in a brooding, anxious, restricted, and unconfident behavioral style. In addition, Kretschmer identified a number of intermediary types, notably the placating, the submissive, and the histrionic.” (Millon 2011 13-14)[[48]](#footnote-47)

#### Early-20th-Century Temperament Theorists

[The next few sections obviously still need some work, but I can only handle so much of this history review at a time.]

“A major Scandinavian theorist of personality was J. Sjobring (1914, 1973). Influenced primarily by Dutch psychologist Heymans and, to a lesser extent, Janet and Kraepelin, Sjobring formulated his first ideas about temperament in 1913. Writing over a 45-year span, he termed the various temperaments as basic physiological constructs that underlie interindividual or personality variations. The four main constructs were labeled: capacity, denoting the genetic substrate for intellectual development; validity, indicating the degree of energy available for nervous system functioning; stability, meaning the maximum potential achievable given the person’s nervous substrate; and solidity, signifying the extent to which this potential must be replenished by experience to maintain its maximum level.” (Millon 2011 15)

“An early classification of temperaments for personality pathology was also constructed by E. Kahn, in 1931. Interweaving the concepts of impulse, temperament, and character, Kahn constructed several innovative types. In line with earlier theorists, Kahn identified a number of basic dimensions, notably: the polarities of activity versus passivity, self-orientation versus non–self-orientation, negative versus positive outlook, and so on. On the bases of their interaction, Kahn deduced the presence of four basic temperaments: the hyperthymic, noted by excitability, rapidity, and explosiveness; the athymic, characterized by dull or weak affect; the dysphoric, identified by an anxious timidity and peevishness; and the poikilothymic, distinguished by a high degree of emotional lability. Unusual among temperament theorists was Kahn’s proposal that biological bases may exist to orient the person either toward the self and individual needs or toward others and the external environment.” (Millon 2011 15)

“Another early system of temperament classification was constructed by M. Tramer in 1931. Twelve types were derived from his schema: The hyperthyme was noted by a ready emotionality and a sanguine disposition; in its extreme form were categorized the troublemakers, the shiftless, and the unreliable. The depressive personality was characterized by a phlegmatic and sluggishly reacting temperament; among them were found the morose and ill-tempered depressives. The labile types and the impulsive characters were distinguished by their inflammable moods, which died down quickly after discharge; among them were the cyclothymics and those disposed to immature acting out” (Millon 2011 15)

#### 20th-Century Psychoanalytic Scholars

“Psychoanalytic theorists have stressed the importance of early childhood experiences because it is these experiences that dispose the individual to lifelong styles and disorders of adaptation. In what has been termed the psychogenetic hypothesis, early events establish deeply ingrained defensive systems that may lead the individual to react to new situations as if they were duplicates of what occurred in childhood.” (Millon 2011 16)

“It was Sigmund Freud (1908/1925, 1931/1950), Karl Abraham (1927a, 1927d), and Wilhelm Reich (1933) who laid the foundation of the psychoanalytic character typology. These categories were conceived initially as a product of frustrations or indulgences of instinctual or libidinous drives, especially in conjunction with specific psychosexual stages of maturation. Because the essentials of this typology may be traced to Freud, it may be of value to note alternative formulations he proposed at different times as potential schemas for personality, based on conceptions other than psychosexual theory” (Millon 2011 16)

“Jung is among the more seminal thinkers in psychopathology. Most practitioners and laypeople are acquainted with his distinction between extroversion and introversion; few, however, are aware of their subdivisions and characteristics. To refresh the reader’s memory, extroversion represents the flowing of energy toward the outer world, whereas introversion is a flow inward (Jung, 1921). Extroverts explain events from the viewpoint of the environment, seeing things as coming from without. The introvert’s approach is essentially subjective, drawing from the environment whatever is perceived as necessary to satisfy inner inclinations. Interacting with introversion and extroversion are four psychological modes of adaptation or functioning: thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition: Thinking refers to logical and directed thought such that situations are approached in a cool, detached, and rational fashion. Feeling is a subjective and value-laden process to be distinguished from emotion in that the former is a more rational and less impulsive activity. Sensation refers to perceptions geared to the present moment that are experienced immediately by the senses and by bodily excitations. Intuition, in contrast, relates to a future orientation that anticipates situational possibilities. Thinking and feeling are conceived as rational functions, whereas sensation and intuition are viewed as irrational.” (Millon 2011 19)

“As the reader may recall, the cardinal concept in Adler’s (1964) theoretical system is that of overcompensation, an inborn tendency to counteract deficiencies or inadequacies through reparative striving. Compensation for feelings of inferiority takes the form of what Adler referred to as fictive goals, that is, unrealistic aspirations by which the individual could redress shortcomings. Compensating strategies, which Adler termed neurotic safeguards, help the individual keep fictive goals intact by various protective maneuvers. The individual’s ‘‘style of life’’ represents distinctive patterns of striving that derive from shortcomings and the adaptive compensations employed to cope with them. Adler formulated his lifestyle typology on the basis of two polarities, active-passive and constructive-destructive. The active-passive dimension reflects whether the individual has learned to be a giver and initiator as opposed to being a receiver or getter. The constructive-destructive polarity refers essentially to levels of social interest. High levels of social interest reflect the constructive orientation, and low levels signify a destructive orientation. Combining the two polar extremes led Adler to propose four basic lifestyles: active-constructive, passive-constructive, active-destructive, and passive-destructive: It is the active-constructive lifestyle that is considered the healthy or ideal individual. These persons are described as feeling at home in life and sensing their existence to be worthwhile; such individuals are disposed to face advantages and disadvantages with equal firmness, to be concerned with serving humanity,and to overcome difficulties with creative efforts. The passive-destructive style is characterized by oppositional tendencies. These individuals are seen as accusatory; they are inclined to fix blame, expect to get things from others, lean on them, and act in a passive-aggressive and despairing fashion—or what are described as a neurotic style of life. The passive-constructive lifestyle is noted by attention seeking, behaving in a charming manner, and seeking to gain recognition simply by being oneself rather than for what one has achieved. The final group, the active-destructive style, is one in which attention getting takes the form of becoming a nuisance, of behaving in a rebellious, vicious, tyrannical, and often delinquent manner with others.” (Millon 2011 20-21)

“Karen Horney’s descriptive eloquence is perhaps without peer; nevertheless, difficulties arise in attempting to summarize what she refers to as the major solutions to life’s basic conflicts. Faced with the insecurities and inevitable frustrations of life, Horney identified three broad modes of relating that will emerge: moving toward people, moving against people, or moving away from them. In her 1945 book, Horney formulated three character types to reflect each of these three solutions: Moving toward is found in a compliant type; moving against, in an aggressive type, and moving away, in a detached type. In 1950, Horney reconceptualized her typology in line with the manner in which individuals solve intrapsychic conflicts. Corresponding roughly to the prior trichotomies, they were termed the self-effacement solution, the expansive solution, and the solution of neurotic resignation.” (Millon 2011 21)

“Erich Fromm (1947) was one of the early theorists to reinterpret Freud’s psychopathological theories along social lines. Although constructing his model in accord with themes first formulated by Freud, Fromm questioned the relevance of libidinous forces as the prime elements in character development. Primary emphasis was given to the interpersonal transactions at each stage between parent and child. For example, the compulsive pattern was seen to result not from frustrations experienced at the anal stage but from the behavioral models exhibited by a rigid and meticulous parent who imposed cleanliness and orderliness as standards for the child during toilet training.” (Millon 2011 22)

#### Contemporary Proposals

“Despite the decline in the status and centrality of psychoanalysis over the past 30 or 40 years, adherents of this school of thought have continued to be highly productive and insightful. Many of the most innovative and illuminating papers and books on the personality disorders originate in psychoanalytic foundations. Of special significance have been contributions by ego-analytic theorists and the British objectrelations school, as well as proposals from a number of contemporary thinkers of special note, each of whom has helped illuminate and organize our understanding of these disorders.” (Millon 2011 23)

“Otto Fenichel (1945), perhaps the most impressive of psychoanalytic scholars, classified character traits into sublimation and reactive types, depending on whether normally maturing instinctual energies were compatible with the ego, and thereby fashioned into conflict-free or neutral patterns (sublimation), or whether they were dammed up by the aims of the ego and countermanded by conflict-resolving defensive measures (reactive). In making this distinction, Fenichel was the first to recognize that instinctual energy can develop into character forms free of conflict resolution. Although Fenichel considered the sublimation character traits to be as deeply ingrained as the reactive types, he viewed them to be nonpathological and, hence, paid little attention to the diverse forms into which they might take shape. In this regard, he failed to recognize the possibility that pathological personality traits could arise from conflict-free sources, simply as a result of deficient or other inappropriate experiences that set the seeds for maladaptive learnings. Fenichel limited his attention to reactive characters and differentiated them into the avoidance and oppositional types, each representing a major form of defensive control.” (Millon 2011 23-24)

“Heinz Hartmann (1958), David Rapaport (1958), and Erik Erikson (1950) also recognized that the origins of character may be found in instinctual energies that are independent of conflicts and their resolutions. To both Hartmann and Rapaport, the ego and id instincts derived from a common matrix of biological potentials, differentiating into separable energies for adaptive functioning. Termed autonomous apparatuses, these ego potentials were seen as ‘‘preadapted to handle average expectable environments.’’” (Millon 2011 24)

“Several major thinkers from Great Britain began to formulate new directions for psychoanalytic theory in the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most inventive of these theorists was Melanie Klein (1948), one of the originators of child psychoanalysis. It was her view that fantasy was a major primitive ability; furthermore, that these fantasies exhibit a regular developmental sequence that reflects the infant’s relationship with its mother. The key element of Klein’s object-relations theory is that the mind is composed of preformed internal representations of the infant’s external relationships (i.e., its objects). This contrasted with Freud’s view that the mind possesses instinctual urges that are object-seeking, but are not preformed in their character; in this formulation, objects become part of the mind only secondarily. Klein believed that the mind possessed ‘‘prewired’’ fantasies, implying unlearned knowledge that gave shape to and prepared the child for subsequent experiences.” (Millon 2011 24)

“Taking steps to develop a new characterology, Kernberg constructed a useful framework for organizing established types in terms of their level of severity. Breaking away from a rigid adherence to the psychosexual model, Kernberg proposed another dimension as primary, that of structural organization. Coordinating character types in accord with severity and structural organization led Kernberg to speak of ‘‘higher, intermediate, and lower levels’’ of character pathology; both intermediate and lower levels are referred to as borderline personality organizations. To illustrate his ordering of types, Kernberg assigns most hysterical, obsessive-compulsive, and depressive personalities to the higher level. At the intermediate level of organization, Kernberg locates the infantile and most narcissistic personalities. Last, clear-cut antisocial personalities are classified as distinctly of a lower borderline organization.” (Millon 2011 24-25)

“Factor and cluster analyses are statistical methods that calculate intercorrelations among a large group of variables such as traits, behaviors, and symptoms. Patterns or groupings among these correlations are referred to as first-order, or primary: The elements making up these factors or clusters are interpreted to provide them with relevant psychological meaning. Secondor higher-order groupings may be derived from the original components by combining them into larger units; it is usually these second-order groupings that possess the scope necessary to encompass the breadth of a concept such as personality.” (Millon 2011 26)

“Cognitivists stress that individuals react to the world in terms of their unique perception of it. No matter how unconsciously distorted these perceptions may be, it is the person’s way of construing events that determines behavior. Concepts and therapies must be formulated, therefore, not in terms of objective realities or unconscious processes, but in accord with how events are interpreted by the individual. Any datum that represents the person’s portrayal of his or her experience is grist for the cognitivist’s mill.” (Millon 2011 30)

“The interpersonal perspective on personality and personality disorders has become a major direction of thought in recent decades. Despite variations among theorists in the specific constructs and rationales employed, there is agreement that personality can best be understood in terms of recurrent interpersonal tendencies that shape and perpetuate styles of behavior, thought, and feeling. Those of the interpersonal point of view usually suggest that a circumplical structural model can serve best as a framework for organizing their fundamental dimensions. All share the view that there are maladaptive causal sequences between interpersonal perceptions, behavioral enactments, and psychosocial reactions. These interpersonal sequences are rigid and extreme, being activated regardless of their ultimate inappropriateness across numerous social situations. As instrumental styles of coping, these behaviors prove self-defeating in that they are adaptively inflexible and tend to perpetuate and foster difficulties rather than resolve them. As McLemore and Brokaw (1987) have noted, the avoidant personality, for example, enacts a consistently fearful and self-effacing stance toward an environment that resists exhibiting the very experiences of acceptance and intimacy so desperately desired. Such avoidant behaviors usually elicit rejection or allow others to be ignoring, and hence reinforce the person’s avoidant tendencies.” (Millon 2011 32)

“There are those who would view the preceding approaches and theories as being too doctrinaire in their assumptions and focus. In fact, the majority of theorists do recognize the interplay of several different sources of data and a variety of diverse influences. Even though we have categorized them for pedagogic purposes, the majority of theorists described previously are quite comprehensive and broad-ranging in their approach to the field. Some have made an effort to integrate the diversity of data relevant to understanding personality disorders (e.g., Cloninger). Despite these pioneering efforts at partial integration, no theorist discussed thus far starts out with an integrative model as he or she seeks to locate the place and character of personality disorders. The following presentation represents approaches that are oriented to an integrative worldview of personology. It states that ‘‘nature is one,’’ that all facets, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, are unified by common principles, and compose an interwoven network of characteristics that have been segmented for either scientific or pedagogic purposes. Thus, chemistry is not merely an emergent property of physical phenomena; biological systems are not reducible to chemical and physical but are, in effect, one and the same thing, facets of nature expressed in different forms and processes. These formal and traditional subjects view nature from different vantage points, and analyze nature employing different methodologies.” (Millon 2011 40)

#### 1980 DSM-III Personality Disorders

“1. The passive-dependent pattern (Millon Submissive personality; DSM-III Dependent disorder) was characterized by a search for relationships in which one can lean on others for affection, security, and leadership. This personality’s lack of both initiative and autonomy was considered to be a consequence largely of parental overprotection. As a function of these early experiences, these individuals simply learned the comforts of assuming a passive role in interpersonal relations, accepting whatever kindness and support they found, and willingly submitting to the wishes of others in order to maintain their affection.

2. The active-dependent pattern (Millon Gregarious personality; DSM-III Histrionic disorder) shows an insatiable and indiscriminate search for stimulation and affection. This personality’s sociable and capricious behaviors give the appearance of considerable independence of others, but beneath this guise lies a fear of autonomy and an intense need for signs of social approval and attention. Affection must be replenished constantly and must be obtained from every source of interpersonal contact.

3. The passive-independent pattern (Millon Narcissistic personality; DSM-III Narcissistic disorder) is noted by an egotistic selfinvolvement. As a function of early experience, these persons have learned to overvalue their self-worth; their confidence in their superiority may, however, be based on false premises. Nevertheless, they assume that others will recognize their specialness, maintain an air of arrogant self-assurance, and, without much thought or even conscious intent, benignly exploit others to their own advantage.

4. The active-independent pattern (Millon Aggressive personality; DSM-III Antisocial disorder) reflects a learned mistrust of others and a desire for autonomy and retribution for what are felt as past injustices. There is an indiscriminate striving for power and a disposition to be rejecting of others; these actions are seen as justified because people are unreliable and duplicitous. Autonomy and hostility are claimed to be the only means to head off deceit and betrayal.

5. The passive-ambivalent pattern (Millon Conforming personality; DSM-III Compulsive disorder) is based on a conflict between hostility toward others and a fear of social disapproval. These persons resolve their ambivalence not only by suppressing resentment but by overconforming and overcomplying, at least on the surface. Lurking behind this front of propriety and restraint, however, are anger and intense oppositional feelings that, on occasion, break through their controls.

6. The active-ambivalent pattern (Millon Negativistic personality; DSM-III Passiveaggressive disorder) represents an inability to resolve conflicts similar to those of the passive-ambivalent; however, this ambivalence remains close to consciousness and intrudes into everyday life. These individuals get themselves into endless wrangles and disappointments as they vacillate between deference and conformity, at one time, and aggressive negativism, the next. Their behavior displays an erratic pattern of explosive anger or stubbornness intermingled with moments of guilt and shame.

7. The passive-detached pattern (Millon Asocial personality; DSM-III Schizoid disorder) is characterized by social impassivity. Affectionate needs and emotional feelings are minimal, and the individual functions as a passive observer detached from the rewards and affections, as well as from the demands, of human relationships.

8. The active-detached pattern (Millon Avoidant personality; DSM-III Avoidant disorder) represents a fear and mistrust of others. These individuals maintain a constant vigil lest their impulses and longing for affection result in a repetition of the pain and anguish they have experienced with others previously. Only by active withdrawal can they protect themselves. Despite desires to relate, they have learned that it is best to deny these feelings and keep an interpersonal distance. Three additional personality patterns are identified at the moderately severe or borderline level of pathology. These are differentiated from the first eight by several criteria, notably deficits in social competence and periodic (but reversible) psychotic episodes. Less integrated and effective in coping than their milder personality counterparts, they appear especially vulnerable to the strains of everyday life. Their major features and similarities to the 1980 DSM-III personality disorders are briefly summarized.

9. The cycloid personality corresponds to the DSM-III Borderline personality disorder and represents a moderately dysfunctional dependent or ambivalent orientation. These personalities experience intense endogenous moods, with recurring periods of dejection and apathy interspersed with spells of anger, anxiety, or euphoria. Many reveal recurring self-mutilating and suicidal thoughts, appear preoccupied with securing affection, and display a cognitive-affective ambivalence evident in simultaneous feelings of rage, love, and guilt toward others.

10. The paranoid personality is described in a similar fashion in both Millon and the DSMIII. Here are seen a vigilant mistrust of others and an edgy defensiveness against anticipated criticism and deception. There is an abrasive irritability and a tendency to precipitate exasperation and anger in others. Expressed often is a fear of losing independence, leading this personality to vigorously resist external influence and control.

11. The DSM-III Schizotypal disorder and Millon’s schizoid personality both display a constellation of behaviors that reflect a poorly integrated or dysfunctional detached personality pattern. These persons prefer isolation with minimal personal attachments and obligations. Behavioral eccentricities are notable, and the individual is often perceived by others as strange or different. Depending on whether the pattern is passive or active, there will be either an anxious wariness and hypersensitivity, or an emotional flattening and deficiency of affect.” (Millon 2011 46-48)

#### Review

We’ve come a long way through history in these sections, covering many of the major thinkers in the West. It’s regrettable that Millon fails to spend much time on the work done in the majority of the world, and condemnable that he seems mostly only aware of white people’s work. If he were to simply say that he’s working in a particular tradition and it’s beyond the scope of his work to consider others, that would be reasonable, but to instead claim that the others don’t exist is rather blatant white supremacism.[[49]](#footnote-48)

He begins with the early Greeks and their humoral theory of personality, which continues to appear as a basic compass in contemporary discussions. Again, the four basic temperaments are choleric, melancholic, sanguine, and phlegmatic.The central differences between them and the earlier theories of Ancient China are between energy flows and humoral disparities as the source of balances, and between variable and static temperaments. Both understand personality to be understood as a collection of balances, and neither would deny that these balances are dynamic, and we know that temperament, i.e. our natural dispositions, varies in how it influences behavior based on climate, diet, and season. Next we considered the early Physiognomic and Phrenologic conceptions of personality. Gall was one of the first to claim a direct relationship between the mind and body. Considering literary portrayals, “character writing” was a minor literary style originating in Athens, likely invented by Aristotle and developed by‌‌ Theophrastus. Among literature’s most “incisive and brilliant portrayals” are the character depictions found in the works of Butler, Carlyle, Chaucer, Donne, Eliot, La Bruyere, La Rochefoucauld, Montesquieu, Pascal, Proust, Stendhal, and Tolstoy. (Millon 2011 7) From these pre-20th-century models we see already many deep lines of inquiry and theorizing into personality had already been done. However, one may note looking back now that a lot of ideas tended to keep re-emerging. It’s in the last century that we started seeing deliberate progression making rapid advances.

So, moving right along to the turn-of-the-20th-century character proposals, late 19th-century French psychologist Ribot tried to formulate character types in a manner analogous to botanical classifications. He varied the intensity of sensitivity and activity to construct several major types. (Millon 2011 7-8) Another French theorist F. Queyrat permuted intensity combinations of three dispositions: emotionality, activity, and meditation into nine character types. Dutch psychologists Heymans and Wiersma identified three fundamental criteria for evaluating character: activity level, emotionality, and susceptibility to external versus internal stimulation. The German psychiatrist Hirt divided temperament in accord with the classical four humors and attempted to find their parallels among psychiatric populations. The American William McDougall proposed the ‘‘consolidation of sentiments’’ and derived eight ‘‘tempers’’ based on different combinations of three fundamental dimensions: the intensity (strength and urgency), the persistency (inward versus outward expression), and the affectivity (emotional susceptibility) of behavioral impulses. (Millon 2011 9) The German psychologist Meumann identified eight fundamental qualities of feeling which centered around the polarity of pleasure versus displeasure and the two excitation modes, the active and the passive. To account for the four classical humors, Meumann combined pleasure-displeasure and active-passive dimensions. (Millon 2011 9-10) These all anticipate Millon’s model inasmuch as they identify some basic polarities, some which we still use, and construct categories from permutations of different values of each.

Millon’s classification of modern nosological systems differentiates those that focus on normal as opposed to abnormal personalities. Early twentieth century Descriptive Psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin paid little attention to personality disturbances, instead focusing on the two major syndromes of his time, dementia praecox and maniacal depressive insanity. He discovered two premorbid types: the ‘‘cyclothymic disposition,’’ exhibited in four variants, each inclined to maniacal-depressive insanity; and the ‘‘autistic temperament,’’ disposed to dementia praecox. Kurt Schneider proposed the best-known European classification of disordered personalities (Schneider 1950), He considered personality pathology to be a separate group of entities from other psychiatric conditions that covaried with them. (Millon 2011 12) These respectively anticipate our current understanding of normal and abnormal personalities as existing on spectra with each other and of personality as distinct from psychiatric syndromes.

The early-twentieth-century Constitutional Theorist Ernst Kretschmer tried to relate morphological differences to schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis and considered psychotic disorders to be accentuations of essentially normal personality types. The early-20th-century Temperament theorist Scandinavian J. Sjobring termed the various temperaments basic physiological constructs that underlie personality variations. The four main constructs are capacity, validity, stability, and solidity. (Millon 2011 15) E. Kahn used the concepts of impulse, temperament, and character to construct several new types. He identified a number of basic dimensions and then deduced the presence of four basic temperaments. M. Tramer proposed twelve types, notably including the hyperthyme, the depressive, and the labile types and the impulsive. (Millon 2011 15) 20th-century Psychoanalytic scholars stressed the importance of early childhood experiences. (Millon 2011 16) Freud, Abraham, and Reich laid the foundation of the psychoanalytic character typology, conceived as a product of frustrations or indulgences of instinctual or libidinous drives. (Millon 2011 16) Jung distinguishes extroversion and introversion, and interacting with introversion and extroversion are four psychological modes of adaptation: thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. (Millon 2011 19) Adler’s system focuses on overcompensation. Compensation for feelings of inferiority takes the form of fictive goals, and compensating strategies help protect fictive goals. (Millon 2011 20-21) Horney identified three broad modes of relating: moving toward people, moving against people, or moving away from them; and formulated three character types to reflect each. Then she reconceptualized her typology in line with how people solve intrapsychic conflicts. (Millon 2011 21) Fromm reinterprets Freud’s psychopathological theories along social lines though questioned the relevance of libidinous forces. Instead, primary emphasis was given to the interpersonal transactions at each stage between parent and child. (Millon 2011 22) At this point already we can see the origins of our contemporary schools within psychology, psychotherapy, and psychopathology. We may also notice the continuous re-emergence of schizophrenic and bipolar disorders as primary conditions of interest as well as the growing understanding of how they arise from the same basic systems giving rise to all personalities.

Finally we arrive at contemporary proposals. Psychoanalysis has continued to be highly productive and insightful, especially by ego-analytic theorists and the British object-relations school. (Millon 2011 23) Otto Fenichel classifies character traits into sublimation and reactive types, and thus recognizes that instinctual energy can develop into character forms free of conflict resolution. (Millon 2011 23-24) Hartmann (1958), Rapaport (1958), and Erikson (1950) recognize the origins of character may be found in instinctual energies free of conflict resolution. For Hartmann and Rapaport, the ego and id instincts derive from a common matrix of biological potentials, differentiating into separable energies for adaptive functioning “‘preadapted to handle average expectable environments.’’” (Millon 2011 24) Klein (1948), argues that fantasy was a major primitive ability that exhibit a regular developmental sequence reflecting the infant’s relationship with her mother. On her object-relations theory, the mind is composed of “preformed internal representations of the infant’s external relationships”. Thus the mind possesses ‘‘prewired’’ fantasies, which in turn implies unlearned knowledge that shapes the child. (Millon 2011 24) Kernberg constructed a framework for organizing types by level of severity and proposed a dimension of structural organization as primary. (Millon 2011 24-25) Factor and cluster analyses calculate intercorrelations among a large group of variables such as traits, behaviors, and symptoms. (Millon 2011 26)

“Cognitivists stress that individuals react to the world in terms of their unique perception of it. No matter how unconsciously distorted these perceptions may be, it is the person’s way of construing events that determines behavior.” (Millon 2011 30) Interpersonal theories put personality in terms of “recurrent interpersonal tendencies that shape and perpetuate styles of behavior, thought, and feeling.” McLemore and Brokaw (1987) note the avoidant personality enacts a consistently fearful and self-effacing stance toward an environment that resists exhibiting the very experiences of acceptance and intimacy so desired. (Millon 2011 32)

# Most theorists recognize the interplay of different sources of data and diverse influences. While some have tried to integrate data relevant to understanding personality disorders, no theorist discussed starts out with an integrative model to locate personality disorders. (Millon 2011 40) That it does is, again, what I take to be the central virtue of Millon’s theory.

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1. In response to the objection to this little recursion, I just point to [UC Riverside Academic Senate: Committee on Committees](https://senate.ucr.edu/committee/?do=info&id=7). Working with the administration here often felt like the Board from *The Good Place.* [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. UC Riverside likes to advertise its status as the most diverse UC campus. I’d argue there is a lot of good work (like this) that can only be created with an environment of very different people, and so that is one of the biggest boons to research we have and need. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. The other is making the world more good. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. Chapter 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. See also *Toward a New Personology: An Evolutionary Model* by Theodore Millon [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. See also the work of Seth Grossman, Roger Davis, Bob Meagher, Addi Geist Agar, Michael Antoni, Robert Tringone, Neil Bockian, George Everly, Flo Grabel, Rose Wilansky, Audrey Melamed, Naomi Grossman, Sally Perlis, Jean Jones, Mary-Lou McGinnis, Leila Foster, JoAnn Lederman, Jeffrey Magnavita, Joseph Zubin, Paul Meehl, Allen Frances, Don Klein, Jean Endicott, Nancy Andreasen, Bob Spitzer, Larry Siever, Kathy Phillips, Tracie Shea, Tom Widiger, Bob Hirschfield, Bruce Pfohl, Roger Blashfield, John Gunderson, Elsa Ronningstam, Mary Zanarini, Ed Murray, Paul Blaney, Bob McMahon, Otto Kernberg, Michael Stone, Lorna Benjamin, Aaron (Tim) Beck, Gerry Klerman, Erik Simonsen, Gunilla Øberg, Morten Birket-Smith, Bent Rosenbaum, Fini Schulsinger, Niels Strandbygaard, Jan Derksen, Wim van den Brink, Franz Luteyn, Herman Groen, Theo Bouman, David Bernstein, Robert Abraham, Hedwig Sloore, Gina Rossi, Robert Weinryb, Marie Asberg, Svenn Torgersen, Per and Sonya Vaglum, Bjørn Østberg, Alv Dahl, W. John Livesley, Joel Paris, Steve Strack, Darwin Dorr, Frank Dyer, Joseph McCann, Jim Choca, Carol Watson, Joe Grosdidier, Theo Jolosky, Christine Carlson, Kristie Thoenen, Christine Thompson, John Kamp, Larry Weiss, Aurelio Profitera, Herb Reich, Peggy Alexander, Tisha Rossi, Kelly Franklin, Jo Ann Miller, Isabel Pratt, Judi Knott, Linda Indig, Tracey Belmont, Donna Meagher, Alyssa Boice, Gardner Murphy, Kurt Goldstein, Ernst Kris, Mel Sabshin, Drew Westen, Robert Bornstein, Robert Krueger, Aaron Pincus, Mark Lenzenweger, Mark Blais, Brent Roberts, Mike Antoni, Caryl Bloom, Neil Bockian, Roger Davis, Seth Grossman, Carrie Millon, Sarah Minor, Steve Strack, and Robert Tringone. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
7. See also Lytton Strachey 1931 and Millon 2004a, 1969, 1990, 1996, 2010b. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
8. See also Gardner Murphy 1930. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
9. “Despite the decline in the status and centrality of psychoanalysis over the past 30 or 40 years, adherents of this school of thought have continued to be highly productive and insightful. Many of the most innovative and illuminating papers and books on the personality disorders originate in psychoanalytic foundations. Of special significance have been contributions by ego-analytic theorists and the British object-relations school, as well as proposals from a number of contemporary thinkers of special note, each of whom has helped illuminate and organize our understanding of these disorders.” (Millon 2011 23) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
10. “Otto Fenichel (1945), perhaps the most impressive of psychoanalytic scholars, classified character traits into sublimation and reactive types, depending on whether normally maturing instinctual energies were compatible with the ego, and thereby fashioned into conflict-free or neutral patterns (sublimation), or whether they were dammed up by the aims of the ego and countermanded by conflict-resolving defensive measures (reactive). In making this distinction, Fenichel was the first to recognize that instinctual energy can develop into character forms free of conflict resolution. Although Fenichel considered the sublimation character traits to be as deeply ingrained as the reactive types, he viewed them to be nonpathological and, hence, paid little attention to the diverse forms into which they might take shape. In this regard, he failed to recognize the possibility that pathological personality traits could arise from conflict-free sources, simply as a result of deficient or other inappropriate experiences that set the seeds for maladaptive learnings. Fenichel limited his attention to reactive characters and differentiated them into the avoidance and oppositional types, each representing a major form of defensive control.” (Millon 2011 23-24) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
11. “Heinz Hartmann (1958), David Rapaport (1958), and Erik Erikson (1950) also recognized that the origins of character may be found in instinctual energies that are independent of conflicts and their resolutions. To both Hartmann and Rapaport, the ego and id instincts derived from a common matrix of biological potentials, differentiating into separable energies for adaptive functioning. Termed autonomous apparatuses, these ego potentials were seen as ‘‘preadapted to handle average expectable environments.’’” (Millon 2011 24) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
12. “Several major thinkers from Great Britain began to formulate new directions for psychoanalytic theory in the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most inventive of these theorists was Melanie Klein (1948), one of the originators of child psychoanalysis. It was her view that fantasy was a major primitive ability; furthermore, that these fantasies exhibit a regular developmental sequence that reflects the infant’s relationship with its mother. The key element of Klein’s object-relations theory is that the mind is composed of preformed internal representations of the infant’s external relationships (i.e., its objects). This contrasted with Freud’s view that the mind possesses instinctual urges that are object-seeking, but are not preformed in their character; in this formulation, objects become part of the mind only secondarily. Klein believed that the mind possessed ‘‘prewired’’ fantasies, implying unlearned knowledge that gave shape to and prepared the child for subsequent experiences.” (Millon 2011 24) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
13. “Taking steps to develop a new characterology, Kernberg constructed a useful framework for organizing established types in terms of their level of severity. Breaking away from a rigid adherence to the psychosexual model, Kernberg proposed another dimension as primary, that of structural organization. Coordinating character types in accord with severity and structural organization led Kernberg to speak of ‘‘higher, intermediate, and lower levels’’ of character pathology; both intermediate and lower levels are referred to as borderline personality organizations. To illustrate his ordering of types, Kernberg assigns most hysterical, obsessive-compulsive, and depressive personalities to the higher level. At the intermediate level of organization, Kernberg locates the infantile and most narcissistic personalities. Last, clear-cut antisocial personalities are classified as distinctly of a lower borderline organization.” (Millon 2011 24-25) [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
14. “Factor and cluster analyses are statistical methods that calculate intercorrelations among a large group of variables such as traits, behaviors, and symptoms. Patterns or groupings among these correlations are referred to as first-order, or primary: The elements making up these factors or clusters are interpreted to provide them with relevant psychological meaning. Secondor higher-order groupings may be derived from the original components by combining them into larger units; it is usually these second-order groupings that possess the scope necessary to encompass the breadth of a concept such as personality.” (Millon 2011 26) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
15. “Cognitivists stress that individuals react to the world in terms of their unique perception of it. No matter how unconsciously distorted these perceptions may be, it is the person’s way of construing events that determines behavior. Concepts and therapies must be formulated, therefore, not in terms of objective realities or unconscious processes, but in accord with how events are interpreted by the individual. Any datum that represents the person’s portrayal of his or her experience is grist for the cognitivist’s mill.” (Millon 2011 30) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
16. “The interpersonal perspective on personality and personality disorders has become a major direction of thought in recent decades. Despite variations among theorists in the specific constructs and rationales employed, there is agreement that personality can best be understood in terms of recurrent interpersonal tendencies that shape and perpetuate styles of behavior, thought, and feeling. Those of the interpersonal point of view usually suggest that a circumplical structural model can serve best as a framework for organizing their fundamental dimensions. All share the view that there are maladaptive causal sequences between interpersonal perceptions, behavioral enactments, and psychosocial reactions. These interpersonal sequences are rigid and extreme, being activated regardless of their ultimate inappropriateness across numerous social situations. As instrumental styles of coping, these behaviors prove self-defeating in that they are adaptively inflexible and tend to perpetuate and foster difficulties rather than resolve them. As McLemore and Brokaw (1987) have noted, the avoidant personality, for example, enacts a consistently fearful and self-effacing stance toward an environment that resists exhibiting the very experiences of acceptance and intimacy so desperately desired. Such avoidant behaviors usually elicit rejection or allow others to be ignoring, and hence reinforce the person’s avoidant tendencies.” (Millon 2011 32) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
17. I use “to exist” as a synonym for “to be”, and I do so loosely. If someone wants to argue Meinong with me and can find a way to make it matter to my point, I’ll change. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
18. At least until their practical payoff. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
19. The Preface explaining my lack of person-first language for personalities and mental disorders mostly applies here, although in this case I should flag that it’s only appropriate to focus on the human animal side of them here because we are focused on the biology. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
20. To be clear, this is a section on the other polarity, not a leftovers sections. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
21. There are going to be a lot of pun opportunities, aren’t there? [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
22. Note: “Before we turn to some of the indexes and views of the self-other polarity, let us be mindful that these conceptually derived extremes do not evince themselves in sharp and distinct gender differences. Such proclivities are matters of degree, not absolutes, owing not only to the consequences of recombinant ‘‘shuffling’’ and gene ‘‘crossing over’’ but to the influential effects of cultural values and social learning. Consequently, most ‘‘normal’’ individuals exhibit intermediate characteristics on this as well as on the other two polarity sets.” (Millon 2011 54) [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
23. “However, if the person-environment interaction is pervasively constrained by personologic factors, the variability of an individual’s thoughts and behavior may no longer be appropriate and proportional to what the environment requires. The interaction is driven by the person. When the alternative strategies employed to achieve goals, to relate to others, and to cope with stress are few in number and rigidly practiced (adaptive inflexibility), when habitual perceptions, needs, and behaviors perpetuate and intensify preexisting difficulties (vicious circles), and when the person tends to lack resilience under conditions of stress (tenuous stability), we speak of a clinically significant personality pattern. Borrowing terminology from the medical model, we may even say that a personality ‘‘disorder’’ exists, if we keep in mind that the disorder is an interactional aberration that admits of degrees, shading gently from normality to subclinically to clinically, and has at a latent level no single underlying cause or disease pathogen, but instead must be as multidetermined as the personality system itself is multifaceted.” (Millon 2011 67) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
24. “For pedagogical purposes, the multifaceted personality system can be heuristically decomposed into various trait domains that reflect the person’s cognitions, interpersonal conduct, and so forth. Although these facilitate clinical investigation and experimental research, no such trait divisions exist in isolation. Personality development represents the complex interplay of elements within and across each of these trait domains. Not only is there an interaction between person and environment, there are also trait interactions and complex feedback loops operating within the person, as well as at levels of organization both biological and psychological. It is the essentially probabilistic character of these interactions, representing the person’s own unique history, that binds the individual together as an organic whole with its own unique coloration we call personality. Our guiding metaphor, then, is organismic and dynamic, rather than mechanistic and reductionistic.” (Millon 2011 67) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
25. “For pedagogical purposes, it is necessary to separate biogenic from psychogenic factors as influences in personality development; as noted, this bifurcation does not exist in reality. Biological and experiential determinants combine in an inextricable interplay throughout life. Thus, constitutional dispositions not only shape the character of experience but also are themselves modified through constant transactions with the environment. This sequence of biogenicpsychogenic interaction creates a never-ending spiral; each step in the interplay builds on prior interactions and creates, in turn, new potentials and constraints for future reactivity and experience. There are no unidirectional effects in development; it is a multideterminant transaction in which unique biogenic potentials and distinctive psychogenic influences mold each other in reciprocal and successively more intricate ways. The circular feedback and the serially unfolding character of the developmental process defy simplification, and must constantly be kept in mind when analyzing the background of personality disorders.” (Millon 2011 68) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
26. “That characteristics of anatomic morphology, endocrine physiology, and brain chemistry would not be instrumental in shaping the development of personality is inconceivable. Biological scientists know that the central nervous system cannot be viewed as a simple and faithful follower of what is fed into it from the environment; not only does it maintain a rhythmic activity of its own, it also plays an active role in regulating sensitivity and controlling the amplitude of what is picked up by peripheral organs. Unlike a machine, which passively responds to external stimulation, the brain has a directing function that determines substantially what, when, and how events will be experienced. Each individual’s nervous system selects, transforms, and registers objective events in accord with its distinctive biological characteristics.” (Millon 2011 68) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
27. “The role of heredity is usually inferred from evidence based on correlations among traits in members of the same family. Most psychopathologists admit that heredity must play a role in personality disorder development, but they insist that genetic dispositions are modified substantially by the operation of environmental factors (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001). This view states that heredity operates not as a fixed constant but as a disposition that takes different forms depending on the circumstances of an individual’s upbringing (Boomsma, Busjahn, & Peltonen, 2002). Hereditary theorists may take a more inflexible position, referring to a body of data that implicate genetic factors in a wide range of psychopathologies. Although they are likely to agree that variations in these disorders may be produced by environmental conditions, they are equally likely to assert that these are merely superficial influences that cannot prevent the individual from succumbing to his or her hereditary inclination. The overall evidence seems to suggest that genetic factors serve as predispositions to certain traits, but with few exceptions, similarly affected individuals display important differences in their symptoms and developmental histories. Moreover, genetically disposed disorders can be aided by psychological therapies, and similar symptomatologies often arise without such genetic dispositions.” (Millon 2011 68-69) [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
28. “The general role that neurological lesions and physiochemical imbalances play in producing pathology can be grasped with only a minimal understanding of the structural organization and functional character of the brain. However, it is important to avoid naive misconceptions. Among these is the belief that psychological functions can be localized in neurohormonal depots or precise regions of the brain. Psychological processes such as thought, behavior, and emotion derive from complex and circular feedback properties of brain activity (Plomin & Crabbe, 2000). Unless the awesomely intricate connections within the brain that subserve these psychological functions are recognized, the result will be simplistic propositions that clinical or personality traits can arise as a consequence of specific chemical imbalances or focal lesions (Purves & Lichtman, 1985). Psychological concepts such as emotion, behavior, and thought represent diverse and complex processes that are grouped together by theorists and researchers as a means of simplifying their observations. These conceptual labels must not be confused with tangible events and properties within the brain (Benjamin, Ebstein, & Belmaker, 2002). Certain regions are more involved in particular psychological functions than others, but it is clear that higher processes are a product of brain area interactions. For example, the frontal lobes of the cortex orchestrate a dynamic pattern of impulses by selectively enhancing the sensitivity of receptors, comparing impulses arising in other brain spheres and guiding them along myriad arrangements and sequences. In this regnant function, it facilitates or inhibits a wide range of psychological functions.” (Millon 2011 69-70) [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
29. “The studies of a number of research groups (Escalona, 1968; Escalona & Heider, 1959; Escalona & Leitch, 1953; Kagan, 1994; LeDoux, 2000; Murphy, 1962; Murphy & Moriarty, 1976; Rothbart, 1986; Rubin, 1993; Thomas & Chess, 1977; Thomas et al., 1963, 1968) have been especially fruitful in this regard. Their work has contributed not only to an understanding of personality development in general but also to the development of personality pathology in particular. Several behavioral dimensions were found to differentiate the temperament patterns of infants. Children differ in the regularity of their biological functions; including autonomic reactivity, gauged by initial responses to new situations; sensory alertness to stimuli and in adaptability to change; characteristic moods; and in intensities of response, distractibility, and persistence (Goldsmith & Gottesman, 1981). Although early patterns were modified only slightly from infancy to childhood, this continuity could not be attributed entirely to the persistence of innate endowments. Subsequent experiences served to reinforce the characteristics that were displayed in early life (Kagan, 1989). This occurred in great measure because the infant’s initial behaviors transformed the environment in ways that intensified and accentuated initial behaviors (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000).” (Millon 2011 71) [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
30. “Because any classification system is a simplification of nature, the most important aspect of a taxonomy is where the boundaries are drawn. The author believes the evolutionary system’s conception, linked to fundamental stages of development, provides the most secure foundation for dissecting the personologic sphere. Accordingly, and in contrast to earlier formulations (e.g., Freud, Piaget, Erikson), it seems more reasonable to construct a developmental model based on evolutionary phases and their related neuropsychological stages and tasks rather than on ones oriented to psychosexual or cognitive processes and periods. As noted, part-function models such as the latter two fail to encompass the entire person, are unconnected to the deeper laws of evolutionary progression and, hence, cannot form either a comprehensive or a firm grounding for a modern developmental theory.  
    A qualification should be noted before describing the developmental stages derived from the model. First, individuals differ with regard to the degree to which they are constrained at each level of organization. Biologically speaking, children of the same chronological age, for example, often are not comparable in the level and character of their biological capacities. Not only does each infant start life with distinctive neurological, physiochemical, and sensory equipment, each also progresses at his or her own maturational rate toward some ultimate but unknown level of potential. The same is true for constraints of a sociocultural nature.  
    Second, although I differentiate four seemingly distinct stages of development in the following section, it is important to state at the outset that all four stages and their related primary processes begin in utero and continue throughout life—they proceed simultaneously and overlap throughout the developmental process. For example, the elements that give shape to ‘‘gender identity’’ are underway during the sensory-attachment phase, although at a modest level; and the elements that give rise to attachment behaviors continue and extend well into puberty. Stages are differentiated only to bring attention to peak periods of development when certain processes and tasks are prominent and central. The concept of sensitive periods implies that developmental stages are not exclusionary; rather, they merely demarcate a period in life when certain developmental potentialities are salient in their maturation and in their receptivity to relevant life experiences.  
    The characteristics and consequences of the four ‘‘overlapping’’ stages of neuropsychological development are discussed next, as are their roots in the evolutionary phase theory.” (Millon 2011 82) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
31. “We might pause briefly, before going further, and note what is meant by the term pathogenic. Three types of events may be described to illustrate the concept: 1. First, there are events that provoke undue anxiety within the individual because they make demands beyond the child’s capacity, or because they otherwise undermine his or her feelings of security and comfort. Persistence of these emotionally disruptive events elicit coping reactions that, ultimately, may lead to the learning of generalized defensive strategies. These strategies may be successful in diminishing certain feelings of discomfort, but they may prove detrimental in the long run to healthy functioning in that they may be applied to circumstances for which they are ill-suited. 2. The second class of pathogenic events is emotionally neutral conditions that lead to the learning of maladaptive behaviors. These conditions do not activate protective or defensive behaviors as do emotionally disruptive events; they merely teach or reinforce styles of behavior that prove deleterious when generalized inappropriately to settings other than those in which they were acquired. The roots of these difficulties, therefore, do not lie in stress, anxiety, or unconscious mechanisms of defense, but rather in the simple conditioning or imitation of maladaptive behavior patterns. 3. The third source of psychopathology arises from an insufficiency of experiences requisite to the learning of adaptive behavior. Thus, general stimulus impoverishment, or minimal social experience, may produce deficits in the acquisition of adaptive behaviors. The sheer lack of skills and competence for mastering the environment is a form of pathological underlearning that may be as severe as those disorders generated either by stressful experiences or by defective or maladaptive learning.” (Millon 2011 97) [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
32. “We have taken the liberty in this section of bringing together many of the diverse notions and findings that theorists have used to identify the principal psychogenic sources of personality pathology; only briefly have we commented on the adequacy of these data, or the methods employed in obtaining them. Our presentation would be amiss if we failed to appraise briefly the soundness of the evidence.  
    The view that the particular setting and events of early experience play a decisive part in determining personality is assumed by psychologists of all theoretical persuasions. But where, in fact, are the ‘‘hard data,’’ the unequivocal evidence derived from well-designed and well-executed research? Such data, unfortunately, are lacking. Most of the research in the field can be faulted on methodological grounds, biased populations, poor assessment techniques, unreliable diagnostic categories, and, most significantly, failures to include appropriate control groups by which comparative evaluations can be made. Without controls, for example, it is impossible to determine whether the specific parental attitude, training procedure, or traumatic event under investigation can be assigned the significance attributed to it.  
    There are disconcerting findings that show us that there may be no substantial difference in deleterious childhood experiences between normal men and psychiatric patients. It is known, furthermore, that many adults who have been reared in seemingly devastating childhood environments not only survive but thrive, whereas adults raised under idealistic conditions often deteriorate into severe pathological patterns. The combination of factors, and the sequence of events involved in producing pathology, is awesomely complex and difficult to unravel. Unless future lines of research are based on sound premises and executed with the utmost of methodological care, investigators will continue to go around in circles, confirming only what their naive prejudices incline them to find.  
    The importance of well-reasoned and welldesigned studies is nowhere more evident than in the investigation of psychogenic sources of personality pathology; few studies of the past have met the basic criteria of good research. We have minimized reference to specific studies in this section lest we lead the student to believe that there are data from well-designed research to support the notions presented. The student should view these notions as propositions that will be confirmed or disconfirmed as a result of future research.” (Millon 2011 105) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
33. Nicholas Hanson-Holtry asks me why self-indulging is categorized as interpersonally imbalanced. I answer that the category label “interpersonally imbalanced” refers to an imbalance between the levels of the interpersonal polarities of personality functioning, self and other. Thus the imbalanced possibilities among just these two polarities are an imbalance in favor of self and an imbalance in favor of other. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
34. “A word or two regarding the prevalence of this ‘‘new’’ spectrum. Torgersen, Kringlen, and Cramer (2001) found a 5% rate in a community sample, as did Ekselius, Tillfors, Furmark, and Fredrikson (2001). More recent studies suggest the rate as increasing as more clinicians become acquainted with the disorder (Alden, Laposa, Taylor, & Ryder, 2002).” (Millon 2011 709) [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
35. “We can review the features of the avoidant personality prototype using the Darwinian theoretical model of polarities by examining Figure 15.1. As discussed in Chapter 14, we may best conceive the polarity model as a framework of ecological adaptations that represent styles of dealing with life circumstances based on constitutional dispositions and early learning. Personalities that are termed disordered represent different forms of maladaptation, modes of ecological functioning that are not only pathological, but also pathogenic. In some persons, such as the SRA personalities, we may find an inborn sensitivity to ‘‘pain,’’ a biologically based extreme fearfulness, even in relatively benign circumstances, a tendency to feel anxiously disrupted when facing potential or actual physical or psychic stress. No less likely in the history of otherwise normally endowed youngsters we may find a fearful reactivity when the child had been repeatedly exposed to threatening life circumstances, such as having been reared by rejecting and hostile parents. As a result, there may be a deficiency in the capacity to experience the pleasures of life, the joys, the rewards, the means by which life is enhanced and extended. Conversely, we may see an overconcern and preoccupation with activities that center on the preservation of life, that is, avoiding the sadness and the anxiety that is generated as emotional responses to psychic pain. What is central here is a hyperalertness to the possibility that life will likely get worse rather than better. On the one hand, there is a focus on preserving oneself, and on the other, an inattention to experiences that can make life more gratifying and pleasurable. On the second pair of polarities, we see an excessive utilization of the active mode of adaptation (modifying one’s ecological niche). Interpretively, this signifies a necessary element in preserving life, a hypervigilant awareness and avoidance of events that may portend rejection, denigration, humiliation, and failure. At the third polarity level, the role of self versus others is of minimal consequence: They are only background factors in orienting and motivating the life of the avoidant. In effect, the central features of the avoidant personality are most clearly seen in their hyperalertness and reactivity to the possibility of psychic pain.” (Millon 2011 717) [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
36. See my autobiography for more detailed examples. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
37. This may say something interesting about private language [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
38. SSD underlies complex PTSD (CTPSD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD), as well as other specified dissociative disorder subtype 1 (OSDD-1). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
39. i.e. is conscious and in control of her body [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
40. Nicholas Hanson-Holtry suggests also consulting Jung. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
41. See also Blashfield, Flanagan, & Raley 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
42. I notice in myself, for example, that moving from the Chicago area to the much sunnier Riverside, California resulted in a much more active and pleasure-oriented personality. While confirmation bias inevitably plays some role, this does at least illustrate the principle. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
43. “A brief note should be made of the work of the Russian psychologist Lazursky, whose book An Outline of a Science of Characters was first published in 1906. Lazursky had been greatly influenced by the experimental approach of Pavlov and his colleagues. Foreshadowing personality dimensions that were given special significance in later decades, Lazursky concluded, following a series of ‘‘systematic’’ studies, that the seeming diversity among characters can be grouped into three higher-order types: (1) those who relate to society negatively, appear detached from everyday affairs, and are only minimally adapted to the demands of their environment; (2) those who are molded by their environment and are dependent on external circumstances to guide their behavior and actions; and (3) those who are masters of their fate, controlling their environment and capable of functioning independently of the will of others.” (Millon 2011 8) [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
44. Note that Hume talks about these kinds of people. He calls them insufferable. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
45. “Another schema was formulated by the Hungarian psychiatrist Kollarits in his Charakter und Nervositat, published in 1912. Here again, the dimensions of pleasantness versus unpleasantness and of excited (active) versus calm (passive) were brought to the foreground as a basis for deriving major character types. For example, Kollarits spoke of the pleasantly toned ‘‘calm euphoric,’’ whom he contrasted with both the ‘‘calm depressive,’’ who is unpleasantly toned, and the ‘‘indifferent,’’ who lacks the capacity to experience both pleasant and unpleasant affects. In a manner similar to Meumann, Kollarits related these dimensions to the four humors. In his schema, the sanguine temperament reflected an interaction of the calm and unpleasant modes, the choleric was an excited and unpleasant blending, and the phlegmatic corresponded essentially to the indifferent type.” (Millon 2011 10) [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
46. See also Clark 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
47. “As noted earlier, observant persons since times of antiquity have noted that bodily form was in some way related to characteristics of behavior. Despite its brief popularity in some quarters, Cesare Lombroso (1911) asserted that body type and facial characteristics were associated with criminal inclinations.” (Millon 2011 13) [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
48. “William H. Sheldon is the best-known American constitutional theorist (1940, 1954; Sheldon & Stevens, 1942). A disciple of Kretschmer, Sheldon also formulated a series of hypotheses concerning the relationship between body physique, temperament, and psychopathology. He identified three basic dimensions in his morphological schema: first is endomorphy, noted by a predominance of body roundness and softness; second is mesomorphy, characterized by muscular and connective tissue dominance; and third is ectomorphy, identified by a linearity and fragility of structure.

    In his temperament typology, Sheldon specified three clusters: viscerotonia, somatotonia, and cerebrotonia. The viscerotonic component, which parallels endomorphy, is characterized by gregariousness, an easy expression of feeling and emotion, a love of comfort and relaxation, an avoidance of pain, and a dependence on social approval. Somatotonia, the counterpart to mesomorphy, is noted by assertiveness, physical energy, low anxiety, courage, social callousness, indifference to pain, and a need for action and power when troubled. Cerebrotonia, corresponding to ectomorphy, is defined by a tendency toward restraint, self-consciousness, introversion, social awkwardness, and a desire for solitude when troubled. Correlating measures of morphology and temperament to psychiatric syndromes led Sheldon to construct what he termed the three primary components of psychopathology.” (Millon 2011 14) [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
49. One may ask me why I chose to center his text, being plainly aware of this problem. Epistemically, you can challenge his authority based on this part of his thinking. Ethically, you can challenge his work being promoted. On the epistemic point, I agree that this is a major point to challenge him on. My point in arguing for his authority earlier in the chapter, however, was to satisfy people who wanted to see fancy academic credentials on display early on. That is to say, I used his good reputation to get me into the conversation. Which parts of his theory stand or fall will depend on the evidence. I do think that he happened to get a lot right, and besides, his eminence in the field makes him the target to attack in arguing for the supremacy of my theory. On the ethical point, I think his work on the whole is helpful to anti-racism, and since he’s dead I don’t really have much to worry about his moral desert, only the effects on those with life left to live. Maybe I should be more critical of him earlier on. I should also note that only by centering his work do I have the space to thoroughly critique it. Given it is such a prominent model in the field, it’d be good to identify and eliminate whatever problems his racism may have bled into the science. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)