



Photo by Allan Mas from Pexels


Risk management during development

TDT 4237 2025


Per Håkon Meland

Agenda


- Risk Management Framework (RMF)
 - Security requirements
- Risk quantification
 - Security economics
 - Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)



Risk Management Framework (RMF)




2006




2008


<https://www.garymcgraw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/bsi3-risk.pdf>




ISO/IEC 27005:2022 Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Guidance on managing information security risks




Basic idea: identify, rank, track, and understand software security risk as it changes over time.





1. Understanding the business context


- Business goals
 - Circumstances to care about
 - Risk scales (Impact and likelihood)
- (Business) assets - What are you trying to protect?
- Stakeholders
 - Users, regulators, attackers, etc.



Who
cares?



1. Understanding the business context (cont')




- Business goal examples
 - Increase revenue by 27%
 - Meeting the service level agreements 98% of the time
 - Reducing development costs by 2%
 - Reducing operational costs by 4 million bucks annually
 - High return on investment (>2%)
 - Provide values to the society
 - Receive positive user satisfaction ratings above 80%
 - Etc.

Example: Digital exams




Image: Jönköping University



- **Exams are created, solved and graded online**
- **Personal computers**
- **Confined room (or at home)**
- **Actors:**
 - Professors, TAs, external examinators
 - Student(s)
 - Software developers, administrators

Business assets of the digital exam system

- Exam assignments
- Individual answers
- Grades
- Users
- University reputation




The image contains two side-by-side screenshots. The left screenshot is from the NRK Nyheter website, showing a news article with a blue header bar and a white body. The right screenshot is from the UA news website, showing a news article with a grey header bar and a large image of a computer monitor displaying a software interface.

NRK Nyheter

UA

Feil i Inspera: Eksamener ble ikke vist som levert

Eksamenssystemet NTNU benytter sliter i hele landet for øyeblikket.



Inspera er verktøyet NTNU benytter for majoriteten av sine eksamener. Foto: Inga Skogvold Rygg

Benedikt Erikstad Javorovic
Journalist

Ditt bidrag Torsdag 03. juni 2021 - 15:13 Sist oppdatert Fredag 04. juni 2021 - 08:59

programmering. Det dreier seg om rundt 50 timer, der studentene er mistenkt for å ha jukset som par.

[F](#) [Twitter](#) [Email](#) [Instagram](#)

Examples of business goals for the digital exam system

BG1:	Create high quality exams
BG2:	Reduce cost and errors - less manual handling of answers
BG3:	Students can do online exams remotely with 99,9% availability
BG4:	Save ink by 99%
BG5:	Trustworthy exams

Risk dimensions and scales

- Likelihood
 - Attacker-centric (see threat modeling lecture)
 - Expected frequency

Low	Medium	High	Extreme
Once every 10 years or less	Once per year or less	Once per month or less	Every week

- Impact/consequence (next page)





<https://www.unit.no/aktuelt/hvordan-minimere-risiko-ved-digital-eksamen>

Dimension	Low	Medium	High	Extreme
Confidentiality	No or minimal exposure of internal information or individual personal data.	Exposure of internal information or individual personal data.	Exposure of confidential information or sensitive or personal data of many.	Exposure of secret information or all personal data.
Availability	Tasks can be performed with delays or poorer quality.	Unsatisfactory quality or severe delays.	Limited ability to perform tasks.	Not possible to perform critical tasks.
Financial	Lesser economic loss that can be restored.	Significant economic loss that can be restored.	Irreparable economic loss	Significant and irreparable economic loss
Reputation	No loss of reputation and little influence on trust.	Reputation and trust can be damaged.	Damage to reputation, serious loss of trust.	Serious damage to reputation and trust.


2. Identify business risks

Business risks directly threaten one or more of a customer's business goals.




- Data – sensitive data stolen
- Time - processing delay
- Money - can't make sales, can't process transactions
- Reputation and brand - loss of trust
- Legal - compliance, contractual regulation

Examples of business risks to the digital exam system




- BR1: System too difficult to use (unnecessary mistakes)
- BR2: System unavailable (unable to do deliver answers)
- BR3: User identity is disclosed (legal penalty)
- BR4: Individual answers are disclosed (legal penalty)
- BR5: Automatic checking fails (incorrect grades)
- BR6: Exam assignments leaked (retake exams)
- BR7: Results cannot be trusted (wrong grades)
- BR8: Too expensive to implement the system (more costly than paper exams)

2. Identify technical risks and link them with business risks



- Technical risks
 - Various threats and attacks that may bring negative impacts on business
- Inputs to identify technical risks could be:
 - Documents: System design, requirements, code
 - User feedback, interviews, discussions
 - Testing
 - Threat intelligence
- Tools to help identify technical risks
 - Misuse cases, attack trees, data flow diagrams, etc.

Example of technical risks



ID	Technical risks
TR1	Network jammed by DOS attack
TR2	Web server crashes under attack
TR3	Attacker types in wrong password several times to lock user accounts
TR4	Session hijacking is used to access answers of other students
TR5	Laptop can communicate with parallel network
TR6	SQL injection attacks against database
TR7	Safe exam browser runs in virtual machine
TR8	A student can login to several accounts at once

Linking

BG2: Reduce cost
and errors

BG5: Trustworthy
exams

BR3: User identity is
disclosed

BR5: Automatic
checking fails

BR7: Results can
not be trusted

TR6: SQL injection attacks
against database


TR4: Session hijacking is used to
access answers of other students

TR8: A student can login to
several accounts at once


TR7: Safe exam browser
runs in virtual machine



Traceability!



3. Synthesize and prioritize Risks





Likelihood

	Low	Medium	High	Extreme
Low	L	L	M	H
Medium	L	M	H	H
High	M	H	H	E
Extreme	H	H	E	E

Impact

Ranking of technical risks

ID	Technical risks	Likelihood	Impact	Risk
TR1	Network jammed by DOS attack	Medium	High	High
TR2	Web server crashes under attack	Medium	Medium	Medium
TR3	Attacker types in wrong password several times to lock user accounts	Medium	Medium	Medium
TR4	Session hijacking is used to access answers of other students	Low	Medium	Medium
TR5	Laptop can communicate with parallel network	Low	Medium	Medium
TR6	SQL injection attacks against database	High	High	High
TR7	Safe exam browser runs in virtual machine	Low	Medium	Medium
TR8	A student can login to several accounts at once	Low	Medium	Medium




Ranking of business risks

Exposure of confidential information (Impact high)
Irreparable economic loss (Impact high)
Damage to reputation (Impact high)

Business risks	Likelihood	Impact	Risk
BR1: System too difficult to use (unnecessary mistakes)	High	High	High
BR2: System unavailable (unable to do deliver answers)	Medium	High	High
BR3: User identity is disclosed (legal penalty)	Low	High	Medium
BR4: Individual answers are disclosed (legal penalty)	Low	High	Medium
BR5: Automatic checking fails (incorrect grades)	Low	Medium	Low
BR6: Exam assignments leaked (retake exams)	Low	High	Medium
BR7: Results can not be trusted (wrong grades)	Low	High	Medium
BR8: Too expensive to implement the system (more costly than paper exams)	Medium	High	High

Present risks




		Likelihood			
		Low	Medium	High	Extreme
Impact		Low	Medium	High	Extreme
Low					
Medium	BR5				
High	BR3, BR4, BR6, BR7	BR2, BR8	BR1		
Extreme					

4. Define the risk mitigation strategy

- Reducing the likelihood of the risk
- Reducing the severity of risk impacts
- Derive security requirements

*A **security requirement** is a statement of needed security functionality that ensures one of many different security properties of software is being satisfied.*



Examples of security requirements

Technical risks	Security requirements
TR3: Attacker types in wrong password several times to lock user accounts	<p>Two-factor authentication should be required.</p> <p>Logs should contain source and results of login attempts.</p>
TR6: SQL injection attacks against database	<p>User inputs should always be validated and sanitized.</p>

Criteria for good requirements

- What you require, not how to achieve it
 - Being open to different solutions
 - Avoid premature design or implementation decisions
- Understandability, clarity (not ambiguous)
- Cohesion (one thing per requirement)
- Testability
 - Clear acceptance criteria
 - Often requires quantification



Donald G. Firesmith

Firesmith, D. (2003). Engineering security requirements. *J. Object Technol.*, 2(1), 53-68.

Tøndel, I. A., Jaatun, M. G., & Meland, P. H. (2008). Security requirements for the rest of us: A survey. *IEEE software*, 25(1), 20-27.

Security requirement examples

- **Bad ones**
 - The system shall encrypt all confidential data using the RSA algorithm
 - Be secure
 - There should be no vulnerabilities in the code
 - The Web-server should log all access attempts and users should have unique identifiers
 - There could be password hashing in the user database table
- **Better ones**
 - The upload / download of customer data should be encrypted
 - The encryption keys must be generated by a specified party (provider/customer/3rd party)



OWASP

Application Security Verification Standard 4.0.3

Final

October 2021

The OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)


- A catalogue of available security requirements and verification criteria

V2.5 Credential Recovery

#	Description	L1	L2	L3	CWE	NIST §
2.5.1	Verify that a system generated initial activation or recovery secret is not sent in clear text to the user. (C6)	✓	✓	✓	640	5.1.1.2
2.5.2	Verify password hints or knowledge-based authentication (so-called "secret questions") are not present.	✓	✓	✓	640	5.1.1.2
2.5.3	Verify password credential recovery does not reveal the current password in any way. (C6)	✓	✓	✓	640	5.1.1.2

<https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/>

5. Carry out fixes and validate



- Fixes
 - Implementation of mitigation strategies
- Validate
 - Risk-based testing (risk mitigated?)
 - Focusing on security requirements
 - Make test plan to test security requirements
 - Link test cases with technical risks/requirements
 - Prioritize test cases by risks (and costs)


Example of a test plan

Related risk	Test Case ID	Test priority (1-3)	Test description
User inputs should always be validated and sanitized.	TC6.1	2	Check if OR 1=1 possible on login
	TC6.2	2	Insert metacharacters in query
	TC6.3	1	Automated tests - fuzzing
	TC6.4	1	Static code analysis

Ideas can come from the OWASP testing guide



RMF summary




Let's try...

Business Goal 6: Avoid exam cheating

www.menti.com

Risk quantification







Source: <https://passive-components.eu/reliability-and-mtbf-we-think-we-know-what-we-mean-but-do-we/>

Safety deals with the effects of random failure

In security we assume a **hostile** opponent who can cause some of the components of our system to fail at the **least convenient** time and in the **most damaging** way possible



Data like attack frequency, attack type distribution, number of successful attacks, number of prevented attacks and loss per attack are often not available.



NOISE

A Flaw in Human Judgment

DANIEL
KAHNEMAN

AUTHOR OF *THINKING, FAST AND SLOW*

OLIVIER
SIBONY
CASS R.
SUNSTEIN

DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD
& RICHARD SEIERSSEN

HOW TO
MEASURE
ANYTHING
IN

CYBERSECURITY
RISK

Forewords by
DANIEL E. GEER, JR.
& STUART MCCLURE

WILEY



*90% certain
estimates ...*

*... wrong 65%
of the time*

R. Anderson (2001): “Why information security is hard –
an economic perspective”

Risks



Security
economics





Risks

Security
economics



Schechter & Smith (2003): “Economic threat models”



Defender investment

Defender reactive cost

Defender loss

Defender reimbursement

Source: Meland, P. H. (2021): "Storyless cyber security: Modelling threats with economic incentives"



Defender investment
Defender reactive cost
Defender loss
Defender reimbursement




Attacker investment
Attacker penalty
Attacker profit
Attacker supplier profit
Attacker opportunity cost

Source: Meland, P. H. (2021): "Storyless cyber security: Modelling threats with economic incentives"

Possible sources:

- Expert/specialist opinions,
- cyber loss events,
- coverage estimations,
- incident claims,
- retail price lists,
- dark net markets,
- coin crypto market cap,
- profit simulations,
- ...



Example: Cryptojacking

*"...in the latter part of
2017, it (cryptojacking)
overshadowed almost
all other malware
threats"*



Example: Ransomware



"I think that the reason [ransomware] is proliferating – we've seen twice as many attacks this year as last year in the UK – is because it works. It just pays."

Jeremy Fleming

The head of the UK spy agency GCHQ



Example: Attack outsourcing

Category	Product	Avg. Dark Web Price (USD)
Social Media	Hacked Facebook account	\$65
	Instagram followers x 1000	\$5
	Twitter retweets x 1000	\$25
Hacked Services	Netflix 4K 1 year	\$4
Email Database Dumps	Private USA dentists database 122k	\$50
DDOS Attacks	Unprotected website, 10-50k requests per second, 1 hour	\$15
	Unprotected website, 10-50k requests per second, 1 week	\$500
	Premium protected website, 20-50k requests per second, multiple elite proxies, 24 hours	\$200


Source: Dark Web Price Index 2021

Let's try...

Spending!

Defender's dilemma


Breaches are inevitable because defenders have to be right 100% of the time whereas attackers only have to be right once



Common Vulnerability Scoring System

<https://www.first.org/cvss/>

- A standardized way of measuring the technical severity of a vulnerability
- Gives a score between 0-10
- Consists of a:
 - Base: constant over time and across user environments
 - Threat: characteristics of a vulnerability that change over time
 - Environmental: unique to a user's environment
 - Supplemental: do not modify the final score, gives additional insight
- Not a direct risk value by itself (CVSS != Risk)
- A high CVSS does not necessarily mean a high risk likelihood



Source: <https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document>

Let's try...

Goto:

<https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0>

Derive a score for the following scenario:

After login in to Inspera, you find out that you can manipulate the URL to change the user ID and get read access to exercises of other students.



Bonus example



An issue was discovered in the Calendar feature in Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.x before 8.8.15 patch 30 (update 1), as exploited in the wild starting in December 2021. An attacker could place HTML containing executable JavaScript inside element attributes. This markup becomes unescaped, causing arbitrary markup to be injected into the document.

CVSS v4 Score: Base 5.1

Metric	Value	Comments
Attack Vector	Network	The vulnerable system is accessible from remote networks.
Attack Complexity	Low	No specialized conditions or advanced knowledge are required.
Attack Requirements	None	No attack requirements are present.
Privileges Required	None	No privileges are required for an attacker to successfully exploit the vulnerability.
User Interaction	Active	A targeted user must click a malicious link that is provided by an attacker.
Vulnerable System Confidentiality	None	There is no direct impact to the web application confidentiality.
Vulnerable System Integrity	None	There is no direct impact to the web application integrity.
Vulnerable System Availability	None	There is no direct impact to the web application availability.
Subsequent System Confidentiality	Low	An attacker could read data from the user's browser.
Subsequent System Integrity	Low	An attacker could modify data in the user's browser.
Subsequent System Availability	None	There is no direct availability impact to the user's browser.

Summary

- Security is about risk management
- Use a systematic and sensible approach
- Security is a game of economics
.... but beware of irrational attackers!



Don't!
(probably a
scam)



CHANGE YOUR SCHOOL
GRADES 100% LEGIT



A screenshot of a website with a green header bar containing the text "CHANGE YOUR SCHOOL GRADES 100% LEGIT". Below the header is a large image of a pink and silver "DATA RECOVERY STICK". To the left of the stick is a cartoon character pointing upwards. On the right side of the image, there is a user profile with the handle "@pregantsales", a "Gold Account" badge, a "3 lvl" badge, and a "5" badge. Below the image, there is a message: "Are you having a hard time graduating from school? Have you always wanted to be counted among the best, but couldn't get". At the bottom of the page, there is a price box with "300 USD" and a "Digital" label.

Next time!



Static Analysis and Tools for Security



Pen Testing for Web Applications

