

FALL 2015

PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES

Date	Time	Location	Event
Wednesday 14 October	1200 - 1330	RA Park	Distinguished Speaker - Irving Shipbuilding representative
Wednesday 4 November	evening	RA Park	Remembrance Dinner
Wednesday 11 November	1030 for 1100	RA Park	Remembrance Parade
Wednesday 18 November	1200 - 1330	RA Park	Distinguished Speaker – M Cousineau & dog Thai, on veterans affairs
Wednesday 9 December	1200	RA Park	RUSI(NS) seasonal meet and greet
Wednesday 13 January	1200 - 1330	RA Park	Distinguished Speaker
Wednesday 10 February	1200 - 1330	RA Park	Distinguished Speaker
Wednesday 10 February	TBD	RA Park	Annual General Meeting
Wednesday 9 March	1200 - 1330	RA Park	Distinguished Speaker
Wednesday 13 April	1800	RCMP H Div HQ	Distinguished Speaker
Wednesday 11 May	1200 - 1330	RA Park	Distinguished Speaker
Wednesday 8 June	1200 - 1330	RA Park	Distinguished Speaker

The Distinguished Speaker event for November is the third Wednesday of the month rather than the usual second Wednesday as the latter is Remembrance day.

Distinguished Speaker events, unless otherwise indicated, commence with gathering at noon for a 1230 hours start of presentation, at Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess, 1575 Queen Street, Halifax (<http://www.cg.cfpsa.ca/cg-pc/Halifax/EN/Messes/rapark/Pages/default.aspx>). Remarks and Q&A last to 1330 hours. Word will be passed on lunch arrangements. For enquires, please contact the mess manager, Tina MacNeil, at Tina.MacNeil@forces.gc.ca or 902-427-4453.

If you have a comment on the program, or would like to recommend a Distinguished Speaker or tour, please contact the Vice-President, Colin Darlington.

The Chatham House Rule (<http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule>) applies to Distinguished Speaker events when declared: "When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed."

Guests are usually welcome. Please do not invite media unless the speaker has approved their attendance.

Dispatches

The current edition of *Dispatches* is available to members only by being posted to the ‘members only’ page of the RUSI(NS) web site (<http://rusi.ca/rusins-members>). If you do not have the password, please check with the RUSI(NS) Chief Information Officer, Richard McNair. Earlier editions of *Dispatches* are made publicly available by being posted to the *Dispatches* web page (<http://rusi.ca/dispatches>).

If clicking on a link does not appear to work, try copying the link and pasting it into your browser. If that does not work, please contact an editor.

If you have an idea for any of the sections of *Dispatches*, please forward it to an editor.

From the Corner Office

The Royal United Service Institute of Nova Scotia is an inclusive organization, often self-described as advocating for the defence and security of Canada and her interests, both at home and abroad. I want to focus briefly on that second element, the *security* of our country, and in particular, the brand of security prosecuted by police forces within our borders.

Policing has come under considerable fire this past decade and a half or so, resulting in calls for better civilian oversight, improved training and equipment and in some cases, a re-make of entire organizations. Reported – and at times substantiated – issues have ranged from in-custody deaths, inappropriate use of force and overstepping the legally-imposed constraints to unhealthy workplaces, ineffective response in answering calls for service and just plain rude behavior. Reasons for this ostensibly sudden uptick in policing shortcomings vary, but chief among them is the fact that police operate today in a very different theatre than did their colleagues of, say, 30 years ago. Our Charter quite properly protects citizenry from inappropriate enforcement action; information technology has placed just about everything – including policing – squarely within the real-time beam of a ubiquitous and immediate spotlight; police are trained and equipped to deal with certain threats through application of military-style tactics to cite just three of these very real alterations to the environment in which our police forces function. Policing mandates have also expanded substantially. Consider for example, that police officers serve alongside Canadian military personnel in areas of conflict around the globe, providing training, advice and on-the-ground support to local authorities. These are relatively new police duties, bringing with them new responsibilities, risks and of course, rewards.

It’s clear that in some cases, policing methods need tweaking while in others a complete refit is in order. While these necessary improvements take place, it’s



incumbent on organizations like RUSI (NS) to support our police. One way we can do this is to continue to ensure representatives are invited to fully participate as members of the Institute, while another is for the Institute to acknowledge the contribution of civilian policing through projects such as the RCMP *St. Roch* Project, culminating in a public ceremony and placement of a plaque in 2007.

But I’m convinced we can expand on these initiatives: Not completely unlike military operations, policing is often fraught with dangers, pitfalls and political sensitivities. And not unlike military operations, good, effective policing requires continued public support in two forms: appropriate acknowledgement for work well done and constructive inputs where change is needed. RUSI(NS) has traditionally taken an active role in supporting the security of Canada at home, and I’m happy to note that we have expanded on this over the past several years. Let’s keep up the good work by encouraging others in our community to take an active, constructive and, where necessary critical approach to policing. Let’s do it, though, with a view to our role in advocating for the defence and *security* of Canada and Canadians.

Dan Tanner
President

RUSI(NS) Writings

Potentially, we have tens of writers amongst the RUSI(NS) membership. If everyone in the Institute wrote even just once a year, whether paper, commentary, book review or whatever, we would have more than enough new material for new editions of *Dispatches* (and it would make the editors' lives easier!). By more output, we more readily achieve the Institute's purpose of broadening understanding of Canadian defense and security affairs. There are many ways material can be used and re-used. Short material can be posted on Facebook or in *Dispatches*. Longer material can be promulgated as papers, if needed with the editorial assistance of the Security Affairs Committee. Articles of a history or heritage aspect can be posted to the RUSI(NS) web site (<http://rusi.ca/history-heritage>).

If you have an idea for a topic, please contact the editors of *Dispatches*. Tim Dunne is also the chair of the Security Affairs Committee; the committee members are interested in ideas, or can help authors with research and writing. Peter Dawson is assisting with history and heritage matters, and can receive material in those areas.

Ideas for papers and comments can be readily found in the RUSI(NS) tweets and Facebook postings. You can easily access those social media through the RUSI(NS) website.

RUSI(NS) 'Comments' are posted to the Institute's web site and included in *Dispatches*. Comments tend to be topical and do not need to be long or involved many points, so they are easy to write.

RUSI(NS) 'Notes' are posted to the Institute's web site and included in *Dispatches*. Notes are very short informative/factual pieces.

Battle of the Atlantic Veterans Return to HMCS Sackville

For many out of province Second World War veterans a visit to Canada's fabled wartime 'East Coast Port' can be a memorable occasion. This was certainly the case for Larry Hartman of Vancouver and Philip Clappison of Waterloo, ON, both 91, when they travelled to Halifax in late April to take part in events marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Battle of the Atlantic (BoA) and the war.

Both had served in the Flower Class corvette HMCS *Sackville* during the 1942-1944 period (the height of the Battle of the Atlantic), Hartman as a telegrapher and Clappison a stoker. Neither had been aboard *Sackville*, the last of the RCN's 123 wartime corvettes since the end of hostilities.



Rear Admiral John Newton, Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic, greets Battle of the Atlantic veterans Larry Hartman, left, of Vancouver and Philip Clappison of Waterloo, ON, at the CNMT/HMCS *Sackville* BoA dinner 1 May at the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic.

It was a moving experience for both former sailors who were accompanied by members of their family. In Hartman's case, he was accompanied by his daughter, a son and two grandsons that he took on a tour of the ship, including the radio room (behind the wheelhouse) where he spent much of his time at sea.

While in Halifax Hartman and Clappison took part in a busy week of BoA activities, a number of which were supported by the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust which maintains and operates *Sackville*. They were joined by other veterans and a delegation from the Royal Naval Association of Londonderry, Northern Ireland. Events included a Friday night (May 1) reception aboard *Sackville* and CNMT BoA dinner at the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic, and on Sunday the memorial service at the Sailor's Memorial at Point Pleasant Park and committal of ashes service at sea.

Sackville was designated Canada's Naval Memorial by the Government of Canada in 1985.

Both Larry Hartman and Philip Clappison enjoyed active careers following their naval service. Hartman worked in radio production in Alberta before commencing a lengthy stint with the CBC in British Columbia. Clappison established and remains active in Clappison Developments that manages industrial malls for clients in the Waterloo area.

Len Canfield

Comments

Comments by members are welcome. Comments on these comments are also welcome.

Canada's been traffic cop in the Indian Ocean (by Tim Dunne)

For more than four months, the Royal Canadian Navy's Commodore Brian Santarpia was the chief traffic cop of the Indian Ocean. He assumed command of the multinational counter-terrorism task force, Combined Task Force 150, from Commodore Sajid Mahmood of the Pakistan navy at Bahrain on 4 Dec 14.

From his headquarters in Bahrain, Commodore Santarpia and the multinational forces under his command were responsible for an area of operation of over five million square kilometres, covering the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman. It also incorporates the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandab, all narrow waterways where vessels are required to pass closely between two coastlines, allowing for limited manoeuvrability and increased vulnerability than in open waters.

"The mission of CTF-150 is a counter-terrorism mission as part of Combined Maritime Forces which is a coalition of 30 partner nations now," Commodore Santarpia explained. "Many are from the region, but others are from Europe and North America and from southeast Asia, and all of these nations that are part of the Combined Maritime Forces agree that it is in all our interests that this region be safe for maritime traffic."

Combined Task Force 150 is one of three task forces operated by Combined Maritime Forces. The activities of CTF-150 directly influence events ashore, as terrorist organizations are denied a risk-free method of conducting

operations or moving personnel, weapons or income-generating narcotics.

The task force's area of responsibility is a critical artery of global trade with the main shipping routes from the Orient to Europe and North America, with over 23,000 shipping movements per year. More than one-third of the world's oil passes through these waters. Any interruption of the flow of goods through this region would immediately effect virtually everyone in the western hemisphere.



Commander CTF-150, Commodore Brian Santarpia, RCN, meeting an RCMP representative to discuss mutual cooperation.

Maritime security is vital to global trade, which is enhanced by maritime security operations such as CTF-150, contributing to regional and global stability and prosperity. They pre-empt use of the maritime environment for terrorism and complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of nations using the Indian Ocean's trade routes.

CTF-150 began as a US Navy formation under the control of the United States Naval Forces Central Command. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep 01, it was re-established as a multinational coalition to undertake counter-terrorism operations at sea as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The coalition has evolved beyond that operation's scope to encompass and address threats to member states and their values.

The 30 partner nations participating in the coalition come



from an alphabet soup of maritime nations: the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, and their many seas, gulfs and straits. Participation is voluntary, with no nation asked to carry out any duty that it is unwilling to conduct.

Commodore Santarpia deployed to Bahrain with 24 Canadian staff members. Australian Navy Capt Nick Stoker, CTF-150's deputy commander, and six key staff members from Australia made it a joint headquarters staff.

"You'd be hard-pressed to find two countries more alike than Canada and Australia," he noted. "In terms of attitudes, work ethic and sense of humour, a lot of the things are the same, so it's a lot easier to work together than I would have imagined. And Nick Stoker's experience included a year working in HMCS *Mackenzie* on the west coast a long time back, so he has lots of experience working with Canadians. It was seamless to fold in with them."



During his term as task force commander, Commodore Santarpia visited 10 countries in 20 days, in Europe, the Middle East and South Africa to discuss the important work of CTF-150. He described how the multinational naval organization denies international terrorists the use of the seas to exploit or attack those using the region's ocean commons for legitimate purposes or to illegally transfer people, weapons or other illicit materials.

Maritime security operations are conducted under international maritime conventions to help ensure security and safety in international waters so that all commercial shipping can operate freely on the ocean

commons. CTF-150 vessels also assist mariners in distress and humanitarian efforts.

Commodore Brian Santarpia passed command of CTF-150 to Capt René-Jean Crignola of the French navy in Bahrain on 6 April 2015, as command is rotated among participating nations on a four-to six-month basis.

CTF-150 website: <http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-150-maritime-security/>

Free Flowing Strategic Discussion (by Darrin Antler and Colin Darlington)

On 24 June, on the Bridge at the top of Juno Tower, Canadian Forces Base Halifax played host to a cadre of sailors, soldiers and air personnel of all ranks and occupations for a very interesting "Free Flowing Strategic Discussion." The event was organized by the RUSI(NS) in collaboration with the Base Commander, Captain Angus Topshee. What was special about this particular discussion was its format. Unlike traditional town hall or lecture settings, the discussion was conducted in the framework of an interesting 'thought experiment.' Attendees were separated into small work groups with mixed representation of service, occupation, rank and background along with one senior participant at each table from the RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee. The thought experiment was set as follows:

The Canadian government has acquired two Mistral-class amphibious ships from the government of France, originally intended for Russia, with delivery to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) to take place on 21 October 2015 (Niobe Day). Given that outside of this one time acquisition there are no other variations or alterations to the budgetary situation, and given the realities of today's Canadian society:

1. What would this mean to the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Canada at large?
2. Is this a good thing?



Captain Topshee, Base Commander, and Ken Hoffer of the RUSI(NS) security affairs committee at a group table during the “Free Flowing” Strategic Discussion

After an hour of open discussion in groups answering the two questions, each group had the opportunity to present their findings. The table discussions were thoughtful, with a variety of perspectives including costs, crewing, training, logistics, engineering and the strategic and operational implications of employment of the ships. All ranks had an opportunity to participate, and few held back. Generally, participants agreed on the utility of the capability, but a number noted the huge impact having such ships could have on the Royal Canadian Air Force and Canadian Army in addition to the RCN.

Although there was no unanimity reached during the thought experiment, there was one item that all who participated could agree on: the event was a very stimulating and positive experience. The open and inclusive nature allowed for a valuable sharing of ideas and perspectives from CAF members who represented a wide array of experiences, backgrounds, and points of view. Talk during and after the event definitely supported the idea of holding similar discussions in the future. Ideas are being considered for the next discussion’s ‘game changing’ scenario affecting all the CAF.

RUSI(NS) thanks the Base Commander, Captain Topshee, for his support and very active engagement in the “Free Flowing” discussion, and wishes him well in his next appointment. Captain Moss, Chief of Staff, Maritime Forces Atlantic, is supporting the next discussion. A call to participate and great opportunity to think and talk strategically will be coming out this fall.

The C6 Upgrade: A Big Deal or a Little Electioneering? (by Marcel Boudreau and Mike Gray)

NATO Association of Canada article
(<http://natocouncil.ca/the-c6-upgrade-a-big-deal-or-a-little-electioneering/>)

The Canadian Army C6 general purpose machine gun (GPMG) is an area weapon and should continue to be used as one. Tracer rounds are used when engaging targets at distance, which results in a 'beaten zone.' The addition of an Elcan sight might be of use for target recognition selection. A better night visibility option would be nice but in theory it could be mounted and dismounted as required, e.g., add a modern thermal sight to the sustained fire (SF) kit (tripod kit) but do not strap it on every time a platoon moves on foot.



The C6 GPMG needs refurbishment. The Canadian Army has had the option to fit an optic night vision (6x power) on the gun for years now, using a side-mount bracket. The option to place a military standard (MILSTD) sight rail on the gun is supported - hopefully it would not be on the body cover like the C9 light machine gun. Also supported is the use of the optic sight for target engagement (better view for hits and walking the gun onto target – the optic sight does not make the beaten zone any smaller). The article fundamentally misunderstands the difference between the direct fire sight (C79 or iron) and the C2 sight for indirect fire, and draws the incorrect conclusion that it is either C2 sight or C79 sight. The M60 is no longer in general service in the US Army - they use the M240 which

is also an FN MAG variant.

As an aside, the Armoured Corps has had C6 longer than the infantry, having bought them with the Leopard tanks.

It is believed that the GPMG modernization was broken out of the original Small Arms Replacement project when it was split into the Ranger rifle, GPMG refurbishment, and Small Arms Modernization projects.

Lastly, not every government purchase is political in nature. Some are, some are not. If there is talk about issuing the contract now, you can be sure the project is years old now and that the file has probably been with Treasury Board for at least six months if not longer

The RUSI(NS) paper “Naming Ships” has been published in the “Warrior,” magazine of the Shearwater Aviation Museum Foundation:
<https://www.samfoundation.ca/Archived%20Newsletters/Spring-2015.pdf>

Arctic Bases [by RUSI(NS) member]

Graphic “Russia's Militarization of the Arctic”
(<https://twitter.com/rcnnewsmag/status/630518822194257920>).



This graphic or similar has been receiving much play in social media. Interestingly, the original sources are all

Russian, raising suggestion of deliberate provocation by Russia to generate reaction. If true, there are audiences, especially in the US, who are rising to the bait, advocating unprecedented military investment in Arctic capabilities at the expense of other theatres. Given external reports that the Russian Arctic initiatives are real but paper thin, it is possible Russia is exercising its proclivity for influence operations in an attempt to divert waning western (and particularly US) military resources into a theatre Russia deems less threatening.

There is also a question as to what extent the map's publisher, Business Insider, is reviewing content. Website use of provocative titles and pictures to maximize ad revenue raises questions of journalistic integrity but also makes such sites ideal platforms for launching disinformation campaigns by media savvy protagonists. The building of bases is part of laying down markers in the 'game' of asserting sovereignty, whether those bases are major infrastructure or minor sites. Likewise are public declarations, especially in the wild of social media space, whether those declarations are well founded or not.

Expansion of the Canadian Forces Reserves (by John McLearn)

On 17 August 2015, the government of Canada announced an expansion of the Expansion of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Reserves. The CAF is constituted¹ of three forces: the Regular Force, the Reserve Force and the Special Forces. The Reserve Forces consists of members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service. The announcement included:

- “accelerating the expansion of the Primary Reserve from 24,000 personnel currently to reach 30,000 within the next mandate;
- improving training for reservists to respond to domestic emergencies such as floods and forest fires, and enhancing the role of the naval reserve in protecting Canada's coastal and offshore waters;
- taking steps to streamline and shorten the current reserve recruiting process;

- d. providing predictable, sufficient and sustainable budgets for reserve units;
- e. connecting with Canadians by expanding the role of reserve units in ceremonial and other public duties; and
- f. investing in maintaining effective reserve infrastructure and regional armouries as well as naval facilities in communities across Canada.

The announcement is generally positive.

The Reserve, however, is a mere shadow of its former self. Pre-Second World War, it was between 60,000 and 70,000 troops, generally all male. The main role was to have a military presence across the country and to provide scope for mobilization for war. The artillery had coastal defence troops, field artillery and underwent a key expansion just prior to the Second World War. It remained in a similar size post Second World War until the government of Lester Pearson decided to start cutting military expenditures. In 1964, as a result of the Glasgow Commission, the Reserve were virtually annihilated going from the high of 70,000 to a mere 15,000. They became responsible for what the Reserves call the “snakes and ladder” period based on a national survival scenario.

The other major change was to downgrade the Reserve as a major part of defence. The Regular Force or professional forces became the key component of defence. The Reserve was and is looked down upon despite being nearly 50% of the Army and a significant portion naval and air manpower, at least of paper. The Reserve budget however is less than 10% of defence spending, something under a billion dollars. However, this is seen by the Regular Force as an area to cut in recent years. The Reserve have little capability officially to deter the Regular Force from being preyed upon for their budget.

Recruiting is considered to be a key problem area and

a major problem area for the Reserve. They are part of a joint recruiting system, one that was modified to meet the requirements of the 1990s when few were recruited. It is both bureaucratic and unresponsive with virtually untrained staff. The US military actually select and train personnel to do this work, and it is a separate “trade” within their military. They also do one-stop shopping with the proviso that if something is found that would preclude service then the person would be released without penalty by either party.



No, this is not a NDHQ depiction of the latest weapons acquisition project for the Canadian Reserve.

The other issue with recruiting is the recruiting of retiring military personnel, which is not done effectively. The current Reserve structure actually makes it difficult to hire these very expensively trained people with enormous skill sets. Until recently, various pension regulations made it almost impossible for former members to join and serve. Many just wanted to keep their affiliation on a part time basis without the problem of being posted as an example. The Reserve is now having problems with getting people to stay long enough to become leaders at the Sergeant to Warrant Officer level and at the Lieutenant to Major level. A retiree friendly program could help alleviate this issue.

How the new numbers in the announcement are allocated is another issue. Conflict is changing with information warfare being a key component in most of our current adversaries' inventories. There are key components missing in the CAF in regard to this effort such as intelligence, influence activities, geomatics, legal, electronic warfare, and public affairs. As well, missing are key logistics components such as maintainers and logistics specialists beyond first line or unit level, medical specialists, engineers both field and construction, and locating specialists in the artillery. More infantry, armour and field artillery are not needed and are overborne. Some were mentioned in the announcement.

The main problem is that "Regular Force standards" have made it virtually impossible for some of these trades to occur. An excellent example are the maintainers who have virtually destroyed their reserve component. Community colleges across the country are more than capable of providing sound training to mechanics and other parts of the trade if asked and given the specifications. The main reason for not doing this is the maintenance (pardon the pun but pun intended) of the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers school. This is true of several other schools. There is a very real need to have the military schools justify their very expensive existence and also justify their standards.

These are just some of the areas needing some thought. As both a Regular and Reservist, I have seen some pretty awful decisions that badly affected the Reserve – this could be another. I also see no real re-equipment program either.

I am skeptical that the public cares as the veterans have absconded with media and their ABC campaign.

Note: 1. National Defence Act, R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 15 (<http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/n-5/>, accessed 17 August 2015)

- (3) There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service

when not on active service.

- (4) The maximum numbers of officers and non-commissioned members in the reserve force shall be as authorized by the Governor in Council, and the reserve force shall include such units and other elements as are embodied therein.

Expansion of Canadian Armed Forces Reserves (by Brian Wentzel)

The challenge for the CAF with this expansion will be to entice and efficiently process applications from interested persons. An increase of 6000 from the present 24,000 establishment limit (not achieved) would be significant, and it is doubted that the current system can effectively do the recruiting and processing in one year. There is no 'war' to excite the young folks to join!

The Royal Canadian Navy and Operation CARIBBE (by Brian Wentzell)



The presentation 15 Jun 15 by Commander Plaschka, commanding officer HMCS ATHABASKAN, is posted at the RUSI(NS) website: http://rusi.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RCN_CARIBBE.pdf

The real issue underlined but not answered in the presentation is what right is there for Canada being the transportation provider for a foreign law enforcement team, enforcing its nation's extra territorial laws, and what risks arise for Canada from participation in such activities? This might be a good discussion issue in the future.

Book Reviews

Book reviews by RUSI(NS) members are welcome.

War at Sea: Canada and the Battle of the Atlantic (by Ken Smith, reviewed by John Boileau)

(This review originally appeared in the Halifax Chronicle Herald on 13 July 2015, and is reprinted with permission of the author.)

It was the longest and hardest battle ever fought at sea. It was arguably also the most decisive struggle of the Second World War and lasted for the duration of that conflict in Europe.

In March 1941, British Prime Minister Churchill dubbed it the Battle of the Atlantic.

There have been several excellent books written about this prolonged conflict, many of them about the Canadian role in it. Unfortunately, this is not one of them.

While it does provide some useful information about certain aspects of that momentous naval and air battle, its structure precludes the reader from developing any sense of the bigger picture. There is no smooth narrative flow, as Bathurst author Ken Smith has chosen to tell the story in four discrete chapters.

Chapter 1 - Ships and Weapons of the RCN - provides a fairly good summary of the various classes of ships used by the navy during the Battle of the Atlantic, except that several types are omitted. Armed merchant cruisers, Algerine minesweepers and armed yachts are not mentioned. The weapons section, on the other hand, is quite well done and provides a good overview of the weapons systems used. Yet, despite the chapter's designation, one-third of it focuses on German weapons and detection systems, which should have been a separate chapter.

Chapter 2 - RCN Ships Lost 1940-1945 - makes up half the book, with each loss listed chronologically and described in a few paragraphs. But every ship Smith notes as lost was not in the Battle of the Atlantic; some of them were in other waters.

With his focus on Canadian ships lost, Smith does not include the stories of many of the navy's successes against Germany. This is perhaps the strangest omission because Allied navies won the battle. This chapter is also the most disjointed, as individual descriptions of various sinkings do not help the reader put them into the context of the overall conflict.

Bizarrely, the author also includes the sinking of the Cape Breton-Newfoundland passenger ferry, the *Caribou*, while noting that "technically" it was "not classified as an Allied ship of war."

Chapter 3 - Merchant Ships Lost in the St. Lawrence - is the shortest one and should not have been limited to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The safe passage of merchant ships and troop carriers in convoys across the Atlantic was the overwhelming reason why the battle was fought, yet convoys are hardly mentioned in the book, an unforgivable oversight.

Clearly it would have been impossible to provide details of every merchant ship sunk during the battle of the Atlantic, but at least Canadian ones could have been included. Besides giving short shrift to convoys, the author rarely mentions the important role of the Royal Canadian Air Force, a key partner in winning the Battle of the Atlantic.

Chapter 4 - Civilian Encounters with U-Boats - is also short and is completely out of place, as some of the events described are unrelated to the Battle of the Atlantic.

The book is cluttered with minor errors, as well. For example, neither the author nor his editor seem able to distinguish between "sank" and "sunk," Leonard Murray is referred to as an "RCN Naval Rear-Admiral" (as opposed to an army or air force one?), Ostend is placed in France and imperial and metric measurements are used interchangeably, among many others.

Knowledgeable readers will immediately be put off by the author's continuous use of the HMCS (ship's name). While it's bad enough that rushed newspaper, radio and television journalists frequently make this grating error, it is inexcusable in a book that should have been thoroughly researched and then subjected to a rigorous editing and fact-checking process - the latter preferably by someone with a knowledge of naval history.

Precision and Purpose - Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (by RAND Corporation; free PDF at http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR676.html) (Editor's note: chapter 9 is the Canadian experience, Operations MOBILE.)

Abstract - Between March and October 2011, a coalition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and several partner nations waged a war against Muammar Qaddafi's Libyan regime that stemmed and then reversed the tide of Libya's civil war, preventing Qaddafi from crushing the nascent rebel movement seeking to overthrow his dictatorship and going on to enable opposition forces to prevail. The central element of this intervention was a relatively small multinational force's air campaign operating from NATO bases in several countries, as well as from a handful of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships in the Mediterranean Sea. The study details each country's contribution to that air campaign, examining such issues as the limits of airpower and coordination among nations. It also explores whether the Libyan experience offers a potential model for the future.

Key Findings

Airpower Prevented an Early Regime Victory

- The air campaign enabled the opposition to survive Qaddafi's offensive in March 2011.
- Imposition of the no-fly zone and the continuation of coalition air strikes had a profound effect on the Libyan rebels beyond the protection those strikes provided from air and ground attacks.

Airpower Enabled Rebels to Go on the Offensive

- Aerial intervention made possible not merely a victory against Qaddafi, but a Libyan victory.
- The availability of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, especially of developed targets, was central to the conduct of the air campaign.

Intervention Was Done Cheaply and Effectively

- No coalition personnel were killed, or even seriously wounded, carrying out operations over (or in) Libya.
- Target planners and aircrews generally succeeded in their considerable efforts to avoid civilian casualties.
- The war is estimated to have cost the coalition several billion dollars, a relatively low figure compared to other conflicts.
- Several nations' air forces were stretched to the limit of their abilities to sustain aircraft deployments.

Airpower Was Intertwined With Politics

- The Libyan aerial intervention was unusual in having a rationale that explicitly revolved around a mandate to protect civilians.
- The Arab states' most important strategic contribution was in the political domain and in providing assistance to

the Libyan rebels.

- The United Nations' endorsement of the intervention heavily influenced the participation of some countries.
- Applying the "Libya model" of using airpower to enable victories by indigenous ground forces to other settings is potentially powerful but will often be more difficult, especially where political conditions are less favorable than in Libya.



A CC150 Polaris accompanied by seven CF188 Hornets complete a multi-aircraft flypast over Parliamentary Hill during the Operation MOBILE Mission Recognition and Commemoration Parade, Thursday, 24 November 2011.

Recommendations

- Develop provisions among NATO countries to enhance their ability to operate as an alliance within ever-changing coalitions, anticipating that it will be hard to predict the roster of players in some future endeavors.
- Prepare to deal with the unanticipated absence of significant allies.
- Build capabilities for cooperation with indigenous forces, which is all-important in cases such as Libya and should be first among many areas of further investigation into improving strategies and techniques for aerial interventions.
- Develop standardized procedures and templates for information sharing (to include classification protocols) with "NATO-plus" partners to ease transition and integration issues.
- Invest in munitions with limited kinetic effects, such as Brimstone, which demonstrated their worth in Libya.
- For non-U.S. members, plan to address shortfalls in available capacity for air refueling, suppression of enemy air defenses, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance collection and analysis, and other "enabling" functions that the United States predominantly contributed to the Libya campaign.
- Recognizing what airpower cannot do — and communicating this effectively to national leaders — is as important as envisioning what it can do.



Journals, Reports, etc., of Interest

The RUSI(NS) paper "Naming Ships" has been published in the "Warrior," magazine of the Shearwater Aviation Museum Foundation: <https://www.samfoundation.ca/Archived%20Newsletters/Spring-2015.pdf>

Embassy, "Canada's only newspaper that exclusively covers the country's international portfolios of diplomacy, defence, immigration, trade, and development," issue policy briefing of several articles, including one by Ken Hansen of the RUSI(NS) SAC, on the Arctic: <http://www.embassynews.ca/pb>
International Law Studies is a professionally edited and peer-reviewed journal of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the United States Naval War College: <http://stockton.usnwc.edu/ils/about.html>

US Army War College Library Periodical Articles for Current Awareness (PAC):

<http://usawc.libguides.com/currentawareness>

Some of the article links are not accessible outside the College intranet, while others are available on the Internet.

Starshell, national magazine of the Naval Association of Canada, summer 2015 edition: <http://navalassoc.ca/naval-affairs/starshell/>

Links of Interest

Canadian Armed Forces operations are listed at: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations.page>. Updates can be found at: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations/update.page>

Admiral's View. Monthly, the Commander of Maritime Forces Atlantic shares his thoughts on current trends, obstacles, and achievements of relevance to the Royal Canadian Navy, with a focus on the Atlantic Coast: <http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/about/structure-marlant-admiral.page>

August - Inspiring a Navy and a Nation – HMCS William Hall

National Defence Public Affairs Office Atlantic Region Updates:

Other updates can be accessed at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news-defence-connexion/index.page>

Video. A CH149 Cormorant is maintained before starting and taking off from the tarmac at Cambridge Bay, Nunavut during Operation NUNALIVUT on 14 April 2015. This is one of the most northern locations that the CH149 has landed: <https://www.facebook.com/rcacf1924/videos/10152858557131237/>

Video. Search & Rescue "Boat Camp 2015" portrays the intense training Search and Rescue Technicians require to succeed in a complex working environment: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMENIJMVARM>

NATO's thematic bibliography "Drone Aircrafts," though somewhat dated, is a collection that provides an interesting perspective: http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=10701664

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service publishes various unclassified information products on a wide range of national security and intelligence issues: <https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/index-en.php>

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Academic Outreach, with links to World Watch - Expert Notes, Occasional Papers - Priority Issues, Global Futures Forum and other documents: <https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/bts/cdmctrch-en.php>

International Peace Institute paper "Safety and Security Challenges in UN Peace Operations": <http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IPI-E-pub-Safety-and-Security-in-Peace-Ops.pdf>

Informative presentation on Canadian Armed Forces operations in the North and Arctic:

http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/management/ti/media/docs/U_du_Man_Sevigny.pdf

Some members may recall the briefing given a few years ago by Captain(N) Doug Young, Operations Officer, Maritime Forces Atlantic on search and rescue. As an update, responsibility for the National Search and Rescue Secretariat has been moved from the Minister of National Defence to the Minister of Public Safety. See "Government of Canada announces improvements to Canada's Search and Rescue system": http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&ctr.page=1&nid=1006749&ctr.tp1D=1&_ga=1.13711991.1977369016.1431541874

RCAF organization poster: http://www.rcf-arc.forces.gc.ca/assets/AIRFORCE_Internet/images/map-carte-eng-2013-hr.jpg

The RCN's new enhanced boarding parties (noted during the service updates at our February 2015 meeting) of the Maritime Tactical Operations Group provide the navy a significant capability, relevant to modern naval operations: <http://natocouncil.ca/the-canadian-navys-new-boarding-parties>

Defence Connexion July 2015: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news-defence-connexion/index.page>

The Submarine Institute of Australia is the nation's premier organisation for the promotion of submarine matters <http://www.submarineinstitute.com/>

International Crisis Group monthly report "Crisis Watch" (<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/2015/144.aspx>) with interactive map of crises: <http://crisisgroup.be/maps/crisiswatch/index.html>

Contemporary Issues & Geography has excellent posters ("fact sheets") depicting (often with silhouettes of aircraft, ships, etc.) the USAF, USMC <http://cigeography.blogspot.fr/>

The film "Reunion of Giants," shot by an Ontario company, details the once-in-a-lifetime get-together of the world's last two airworthy Lancaster bombers in 2014. The 88 minutes feature is expected to screen on Remembrance Day at Cineplex Entertainment movie houses nationwide - admission will be free: <http://militaryhistorynow.com/2015/08/15/reunion-of-giants-film-about-2014-lancaster-tour-hits-theatres-in-november/>

Defence Acquisition Guide 2015. Fascinating listing of military projects: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-defence-acquisition-guide-2015/index.page>

Books

NATO Multimedia Library Latest Acquisitions List (April-May 2015); site also has thematic bibliographies and much more: http://www.natolibguides.info/library/find/library_pubs#ACQLIST

NDHQ's Directorate of History and Heritage features a number of books related to Canadian Military History (<http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/pub/boo-bro/index-eng.asp>):

A Commemorative History of Aboriginal People in the Canadian Military

Canada's Victoria Cross

No Higher Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1945 Volume II Part 1

A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1945 Volume II Part 2

Canada and the Korean War

A History of Women in the Canadian Military

Canada's Air Force 1914-1999
Canada and the Battle of the Atlantic
Military History of Quebec City 1608-2008

Art

Propaganda (posters): Second World War Approach: <http://thediscoverblog.com/2015/07/30/propaganda-second-world-war-approach/>

History & Heritage

If you have ideas for RUSI(NS)'s history and heritage efforts, please contact Peter Dawson. RUSI(NS) has a History & Heritage page to its web site; submissions are welcome.

Veterans Affairs Canada Memorials in Canada: <http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/canada>

Veterans Affairs Canada National Inventory of Canadian Military Memorials (NICMM):
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials>

NICMM also accessible via Directorate of History and Heritage (click on NICMM image): <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/index-eng.asp>

Canadian Warplane Heritage Museum: <http://www.warplane.com/>

Fire Services Play Last Post. Every evening at 8:00 pm since 1928 the Last Post has been played under the Menin Gate Memorial in Ieper (Ypres), Belgium, by the city fire brigade, to remember and honour the dead of the First World War. On 9 July 2015 the Last Post was blown for the 30,000th time. To celebrate the occasion fire stations around the world were invited to join in and play the Last Post at whatever local time equates to exactly 8:00 pm Ieper time, 9 July. The Menin Gate Memorial bears the names of more than 54,000 officers and men who fought in the battle of the Ypres Salient and whose graves are not known. Commonwealth War Graves Commission: [http://www.cwgc.org/find-a-cemetery/cemetery/91800/YPRES%20\(MENIN%20GATE\)%20MEMORIAL](http://www.cwgc.org/find-a-cemetery/cemetery/91800/YPRES%20(MENIN%20GATE)%20MEMORIAL)

United States Army Air Force Glossary and Abbreviations. A Warbirds Resource Group website. The WRG was formed to provide a starting point for anyone looking to learn about historical military aviation, primarily centered around World War II but to include from the end of World War I to the beginning of the Vietnam War:
<http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/URG/glossary.html>

The Spring 2015 "Warrior," newsletter of the Shearwater Aviation Museum Foundation:
<https://www.samfoundation.ca/index.php/warriors>

Naval Toasts of the Day <http://readyayeready.com/tradition/naval-toasts-of-the-day.php>

Canada's Aviation Hall of Fame: <http://www.cahf.ca/>


Second World War Canadian Army Air Photos data base: <http://lmharchive.ca/second-world-war-air-photos/>

US Museum Ships (regret there is not a similar list for Canada): <http://museumships.us/>

Canadian Wing - unofficial website of the history and heritage of the Royal Canadian Air Force:
<http://www.canadianwings.com/>

Half-masting of the Flag Notices: <http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1311704914994>

Bomber Command Museum of Canada: <http://www.bombercommandmuseum.ca/index.html>



Canadian Forces War of 1812 Commemorative Banner

<http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/gal/cm-bc/index-eng.asp>

As approved by His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, C.C., C.M.M., C.O.M., C.D., Governor General and Commander-In-Chief Of Canada, and entered on 20 October 2011 in volume VI page 72 of the Public Register Of Arms, Flags And Badges Of Canada

Badge

Gules on a Canadian pale Argent two swords in saltire proper, hilts and pommels Gules, surmounted by an anchor Or fouled Gules and flanked by two tomahawks addorsed, the whole ensigned by the Royal Crown proper and above two scrolls Or edged Gules and inscribed 1812-1815 and DEFENCE OF CANADA - DÉFENSE DU CANADA in letters Sable.

Symbolism

The banner honours those who defended British North America during the War of 1812; the Royal Navy and Provincial Marine, the British Army and colonial militias, and their First Nations allies. The three fighting elements are represented by the anchor, the swords and the tomahawks respectively

Maritime Museum of British Columbia Update <http://rcnnewsmagazine.blogspot.ca/2015/07/maritime-museum-of-british-columbia.html>

Library and Archives Canada Second World War Propaganda posters: <https://www.flickr.com/photos/lac-bac/sets/72157655119246999>

Royal Canadian Dental Corps Centennial: <http://www.cda-adc.ca/en/about/forces/>

Further to earlier info and links about honorary colonels, special advisers to the CDS, and commodores-in-chief, there is another element, the Canadian Army elders, that officially or not can be looked upon as part of the Canadian Armed Forces honourees program (article "An unofficial Canadian Army Elder: Drawing on experience and cultural sensitivity to bridge lines of communication" <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=an-unofficial-canadian-army-elder-drawing-on-experience-and-cultural-sensitivity-to-bridge-lines-of-communication/i9se2i7v>)

Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society, HMCS Niobe's Arrival in Halifax, 21 October 1910: <http://rnshs.ca/?p=511>

The Memory Project is a Canadian that connects veterans and Canadian Armed Forces personnel with Canadians, to share their stories in classrooms and community fora. In addition to the speakers bureau, the Memory Project has created a record of Canada's participation in global conflicts, including the Second World War and Korean War, through oral interviews, digitized artefacts, and memorabilia: <http://www.thememoryproject.com/>

Social Media

You can follow RUSI(NS) on Twitter at @RUSI_NS. If you do not have a Twitter or Facebook account, you can access RUSI(NS)'s tweets and postings by clicking on the Twitter or Facebook icons on the from page of RUSI(NS)'s website <http://rusi.ca>.

Even if you are not on Twitter or Facebook, your ideas and content that can be tweeted or posted are welcome. Ideas and content do not have to be finished – editorial staff can tweak them. A sentence or so can be edited to 140 characters (including a picture helps) and tweeted. Longer content can be posted to Facebook. Submissions are welcome from anyone, whether member or not.

A Request to Readers

The United States Naval Institute News has published the Office of Naval Intelligence's "China People's Liberation Army Navy [PLA(N)] And Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) 2015 Recognition And Identification Guide"

(<http://news.usni.org/2015/08/07/document-office-of-naval-intelligence-chinese-military-and-coast-guard-ship-identification-guide>). Such depictions of national fleet inventories are always useful for press, naval enthusiasts and the general public, that they may understand better the vessels being written about, especially in current affairs articles. There used to be similar graphics, including pocket versions, available including for the United States Navy, and from the UK's excellent "Joint Services Recognition Journal." Such guides still have a use. Readers are asked where electronic versions of guides may be found. Results will be listed on the RUSI(NS) website.

★ CF Operations favored your Tweet

7m

16m: Thank you @CanadianForces! By initial RFA #Saskatchewan sought certain effects. Certainly #CAF will deliver! #SKfire twitter.com/CanadianForces...



RUSI(NS) @RUSI_NS · 46s

Thank you @CanadianForces! By initial RFA #Saskatchewan sought certain effects. Certainly #CAF will deliver! #SKfire

Canadian Forces @CanadianForces

@RUSI_NS The initial Request for Assistance estimated at least three weeks; we'll assist as long as we are required. 1/2

3:50 PM - 13 Jul 2015 · Details



Canadian Forces @CanadianForces · 26m

@RUSI_NS The situation is assessed on a continual basis in an effort to transition back to provincial resources as soon as possible. 2/2

[View conversation](#)



Canadian Forces @CanadianForces · 27m

@RUSI_NS The initial Request for Assistance estimated at least three weeks; we'll assist as long as we are required. 1/2

FAVORITE

1



3:18 PM - 13 Jul 2015 · Details



[Hide conversation](#)



RUSI(NS) @RUSI_NS · 6h

What is #OpLENTUS mission end-state, conditions @CanadianForces will terminate assistance to #Saskatchewan #SKfires?



Canadian Forces @CanadianForces

#OpLENTUS in support of #Saskatchewan Forest Fire Fighting Efforts ow.ly/Psqe3 #skfire



1



An example of some of the interaction between RUSI(NS) and others on Twitter.
(Read up from the bottom of the screen capture.)

Humour Check

From Rod Morrison, an active RA Park member, via Bill MacDonald. Bill comments: "Many of the RUSI members including myself have been to Curacao so very likely will have crossed the floating bridge in the harbour either by foot or vehicle hence making the read more interesting."

During the external International Safety Management audit of a particular vessel, one of our auditors was sifting through the logbook of accident reports. A serious situation was noted. The vessel had entered Willemstad, Curacao. The harbor pilot was on board. The ship's cadet had just returned to the wheelhouse from changing the signal G flag (I require a pilot) for the H flag (I have a pilot onboard). It being his first trip, the cadet was having difficulty in properly rolling up the G flag, so the captain proceeded to show him. Coming to the last part of the flag, the captain instructed the cadet to "let go." The cadet did not listen, and it was repeated again in a louder tone. At that moment, the second officer appeared from the bridge wing. Hearing the captain's order, he radioed the chief officer on the bow to let go the anchors. The port anchor, having been cleared away but not walked out, was promptly let go. The effect of letting the anchor drop from the hawse pipe while the vessel was proceeding at full harbor speed proved too much for the windlass brake. The entire length of the port chain was pulled out to its bitter end. The braking effect of the port anchor naturally caused the vessel to shear in that direction; right toward the floating bridge that spans the entrance channel to Willemstad. The floating bridge operator showed great presence of mind by moving the bridge for the vessel. Unfortunately, he did not think to stop the vehicular traffic. This resulted in the bridge being partly opened. A Volkswagen, two cyclists, and a poultry truck were deposited into the ship's side. Several chickens from the truck did make their way on deck, but were reported by the crew as under control. Subsequently, a fine was issued by customs for not properly declaring these live animals upon arrival. In an effort to fully stop the progress of the vessel, the chief officer also dropped the starboard anchor. This action was too late to be of practical use, for it fell on the floating bridge operator's control cabin. After the port anchor was let go and the vessel started to shear, the captain gave a double ring — full astern — on the main engines. He also telephoned the engine control



room to apprise them of the situation. He was told that the sea temperature was 73 degrees and asked if there was a movie tonight. Interview with the chief engineer indicated that the captain's response did not constructively add to the accident investigation. Immediately upon hearing the anchor being let go, the third officer on the stern was supervising the making fast of the assist tug. He was lowering the ship's spring line down onto the tug. The sudden braking effect of the port anchor caused the tug to run under the stern of the vessel, just at the moment when the propeller was answering the double ring. The third officer was prompt in his action to secure the spring line. It delayed the sinking of the tug by several minutes, thereby allowing the safe abandoning of the tug. Simultaneous to letting go of the port anchor, there was a power cut ashore. The fact that the vessel was passing over a cable area at that time might suggest that something may have touched on the sea bottom. A medical team was summoned to the bridge for the pilot, as he was huddled in the corner of the chartroom, huddled in a fetal position and crying. Additionally, the tugboat captain reacted so violently that he had to be forcibly restrained by the bosun. The tugboat captain was handcuffed and placed in the ship's security room. Due to this security breach, the ship security officer raised the ISPS security level to Level III. The ship security alert system was activated and the company security officer notified. The chief officer collected names and addresses of the drivers and insurance companies of the vehicles that damaged the port side. Legal action was pending against these individuals. Thankfully, no cargo was damaged in the situation and all shipboard personnel were safe. In conclusion, following a thorough review of the company's Safety Management System, the designated person ashore identified multiple nonconformities. However, he issued only a single procedural revision to the port arrival checklist. It now advises the cadet that there is no need to fly pilot flags after dark.



Following naval tradition, the youngest sailors of HMCS NANAIMO painted the ship's bullring blue after the ship crossed the Arctic circle 17 August 2015 (photo: Mike Feltham)



Seeking New Members

A suggestion: keep a RUSI(NS) brochure at hand to give to potential new members. Brochures may be obtained from the Vice-President, Colin Darlington.

Keep Engaged in Your Institute

The board, editors and social media gurus of RUS(NS) welcome any member to assist with the work of the Institute. Contact the Secretary, Tom Birchall, or Vice-President, Colin Darlington.

Dispatches is the official newsletter of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

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We welcome submissions, contributions and comments. Please address your correspondence to either of the co-editors by email. The co-editors reserve the right to edit or decline all material intended for publication.

Photos are DND unless otherwise indicated.