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Placement

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Education

Ph.D. Economics, University of California at Los Angeles, 2020.
M.A. Economics, University of Texas at Austin, 2013.
Dual B.S. Mathematics, Economics George Washington University, 2011.

Honors and Awards

UCLA Graduate Dissertation Year Fellowship, 2019-2020
All-UC Group Student Grant, 2017
Center for Economic History Student Grant, 2017
Proctor of the Year, 2016
UCLA Graduate Research Mentorship, 2016-2017
UCLA Graduate Summer Research Mentorship, 2016
UCLA Graduate Fellowship, 2013-2014

Fields

Labor Economics and Personnel Economics

Job Market Paper

The Inverted Job Ladder in Skilled Professions [\[PDF\]](#)

How do workers initially match with firms, and how do these matches improve over time? An influential perspective is known as the job ladder. In the job ladder, poached workers tend to move to better firms, while displaced workers who are shocked into unemployment tend to reemploy into worse firms. This

paper combines theory and evidence to suggest an alternative hypothesis for reallocation in the skilled professions. I use historical data on lawyers to document an inverted job ladder. Lawyers switching from surviving firms move to worse firms, while lawyers switching from dissolved firms move to better firms. I complement this with evidence that (1) law firms specialize in different degrees of talent, and (2) law firms privately learn how talented their lawyers are. I combine these two features into a model that predicts an inverted job ladder. In the model, private learning creates a lemons problem where job switching workers are adversely selected. Firms that are willing to poach lemons from their rivals tend to be lower on the ladder, and thus more specialized in lemons. Meanwhile, workers who are retained up until the time of firm dissolution are revealed ex post to have been above average talent, and thus reemploy with better firms. The model's incorporation of firm heterogeneity and infinite horizon Markov dynamics allows it to more realistically portray market efficiency compared to the previous generation of private learning models. I structurally estimate the model in order to quantify misallocation due to private learning.

Working Papers

Collusive Capacity [\[PDF\]](#) (with Daehyun Kim)

We add collusive capacity to the theory of collusion in dynamic oligopolies. In our model, firms accumulate just enough capacity to inflict standard Nash-reversion punishments. This voluntary restriction in capacity is both easily enforced, and significantly reduces incentives for individual firms to deviate from a collusive regime. As the number of firms goes to infinity, the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion converges to a number that is strictly below 1. Thus, our model challenges the standard intuition that collusion becomes harder as the number of firms increases.

Retention and Adaptive Paysetting in Large Organizations (with Moshe Buchinsky and John deFiguereido)

Should government wages be marked to market indices? If so, which indices—occupational or spatial ones? Using administrative payroll data from the US federal government, we study the benefits of pay-indexation by estimating a structural model of employee quit behavior. To estimate the model, we exploit a natural experiment in federal pay-setting—the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1991 (FEPCA). FEPCA was designed to measure and correct pay gaps at a detailed occupation-by-location level. However, when it implemented FEPCA, the government averaged these pay gaps across 32 localities, targeting these macro pay gaps with locality-specific pay supplements, producing a Bartik-like variation in total pay. We use our estimated model to simulate the effects of other pay-indexation methods.

Employment

Teaching Assistant: University of California at Los Angeles 2015–2019.

Consultant: Bates White LLC 2011–2013.

Service

CC2PhD Program Mentor , 2018-2019

UCLA Graduate Economics Association Graduate Student Mentor

References

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