Security: reduce paths inspected on common OSes #31
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The changes in #2 and #4 are pretty esoteric and inappropriate for most users. This PR compiles them out based on
target_os.Most importantly, nothing really guarantees that
/datais a good place for look for anything on a common OS. In the security report we received yesterday againstrustls-native-certs(which uses this crate), it was theorized that a rust binary running in a minimal docker image that operates on untrusted input mounted into/datawould be tricked into trusting root certs included in the untrusted data. That is both surprising and very bad.The haiku case is marginal because
/bootis at least blessed in FHS. However I think this list of search paths should be minimal, since it is security-sensitive for much of the rust ecosystem.