1 Syntax

An $All\text{-}Or\text{-}Nothing\text{-}Transform\ AONT\ specifies\ two\ algorithms\ (AONT\ Transform\ AONT\ Inverse),}$ and a block length AONT.bl. We have that AONT.Transform: $\{\{0,1\}^{\mathsf{AONT.bl}}\}^* \to \{\{0,1\}^{\mathsf{AONT.bl}}\}^*$. We call the domain of this function "message sequences" and the range "pseudo-message sequences". Then AONT.Inverse is the inverse of this function, meaning that AONT.Inverse: $\{\{0,1\}^{\mathsf{AONT.bl}}\}^* \to \{\{0,1\}^{\mathsf{AONT.bl}}\}^*$, a mapping that only needs to be defined on pseudo-message sequences that can be generated by AONT.Transform. AONT.Transform can (and should) be randomized, while AONT.Inverse is not randomized.

The correctness condition for AONT is

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{AONT}.\mathsf{Inverse}(\mathsf{AONT}.\mathsf{Transform}((m_1,m_2\dots m_s)) = (m_1,m_2,\dots m_s))\right] = 1$$

where the probability is taken over all possible message sequences $(m_1, m_2 \dots m_s)$ and all possible randomness of the AONT. Transform function.

- 2 Rivest (1997)
- 3 Boyko (1999)/ Canetti et. al (2000)
- 4 To dos
 - Prove that the package transform with OAEP/ OWFs work (explicitly) for the Rivest definition/ strong-Rivest definition
 - What is AONT used for and what kind of security do we need for that
 - What is the application I was thinking of and what kind of security do we need for that?