



American
Immigration
Council

PRACTICE ADVISORY¹
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MOTIONS FOR A CONTINUANCE

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I. Introduction

Continuances are an essential part of the everyday practice of any immigration attorney who appears in immigration court. In any removal case, it is often necessary to delay a hearing to best represent a client. This practice advisory aims to provide an overall review of continuance practice in immigration court, relevant case law and analysis of various scenarios in which a respondent may seek a continuance.

II. Overview of Continuances

What is a continuance?

A continuance is a docket-management tool that an Immigration Judge (IJ) may utilize to move an upcoming hearing from one scheduled date to another or to pause an ongoing hearing and move it to a future date.

Two regulations authorize continuances in removal cases: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, which permits IJs to continue a hearing for good cause shown, and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6, which permits IJs to grant a “reasonable adjournment at his or her own instance” or for good cause shown by a requesting party. Though the regulations do not provide guidance as to what factors constitute “good cause”

memorandum requires that 85% of all detained removal cases be completed within 60 days of filing an NTA and that 85% of all non-detained removal cases be completed within 365 days of filing the NTA.⁸ As with OPPM 17-01, the memorandum appears to acknowledge that IJs may not consider case completion goals in making decisions and advises that “the designation of a case as a priority is not intended to limit the discretion afforded an immigration judge … nor is it intended to mandate a specific outcome in any particular case.”⁹

In late 2017, EOIR began the process of implementing the new case completion goals into the collective bargaining agreement with the National Association of Immigration Judges, tying goals directly to IJ performance reviews.¹⁰ On March 30, the EOIR director shared new performance metrics with all IJs, announcing they will be implemented on October 1, 2018.¹¹ If implemented, these goals would put pressure on IJs to deny continuances to resolve cases more rapidly.

Matter of Castro-Tum’s impact on continuance practice

The Attorney General’s decision in *Matter of Castro-Tum* seriously limited the availability of administrative closure in immigration proceedings.¹² Previously, individuals in removal proceedings were routinely able to obtain administrative closure when, for example, they were awaiting adjudication of a relevant collateral matter such as an application with USCIS, after receiving deferred action, if they had mental competency issues, or when they sought a I-601A provisional waiver. Now, IJs and the BIA may only administratively close cases as a matter of course pursuant to an existing Department of Justice (DOJ) regulation or judicially approved settlement.¹³ *Matter of Castro-Tum* suggested continuances were a more appropriate alternative. According to the Attorney General, a continuance that meets the good cause standard “gives judges sufficient discretion to pause proceedings in individual cases while also preventing undue delays.”¹⁴ In many instances where administrative closure may have been the preferred course, continuances will now be the only option.

training, court management, creative thinking and planning, and/or other action as appropriate.” Id at 5.

⁸ See *id.* at Appendix A. Given the current backlogs, the memorandum admits that some of these goals are merely “aspirational.” *Id.* at 5.

⁹ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁰ See, e.g., American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Imposing Numeric Quotas on Judges Threatens the Independence and Integrity of Courts (Oct. 12, 2017); Case Priorities and Immigration Court Performance Measures (January 17, 2018) at 5 n.6 (noting that bargaining was ongoing).

¹¹ The requirements include completing 700 cases per year, a reversal rate of less than 15 percent, and other benchmarks—including how quickly decisions must be issued after reviewing a case or in a bond hearing. See American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, EOIR Issues Guidance Implementing Immigration Judge Performance Metrics (March 30, 2018).

¹² *Matter of Castro-Tum* 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018).

¹³ *Id.* at 272, 292-93.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 13.

For a detailed analysis of administrative closure after *Matter of Castro-Tum*, see the American Immigration Council's practice advisory, Administrative Closure Post-Castro-Tum.

Matter of L-A-B-R- and continuances to pursue collateral matters

On August 16, 2018, Attorney General Sessions issued a decision in *Matter of L-A-B-R-*, a case addressing when "good cause" exists to grant a continuance for a respondent to pursue a collateral proceeding.¹⁵ The decision does not overturn previous case law establishing a multi-factor test for determining "good cause,"¹⁶ but cautions against "unjustified continuances," describing them as a "significant and recurring problem" and the *L-A-B-R-* decision as necessary guidance to protect against "abuse" of continuances.¹⁷

L-A-B-R emphasizes the holding in *Matter of Hashmi*, that an immigration judge should rely primarily on two factors in making a good cause determination: 1) the likelihood the respondent will receive the collateral relief sought, and 2) whether the relief will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings.¹⁸ Other factors to be considered in a decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance include: 1) the respondent's diligence in seeking collateral relief; 2) DHS's position on the motion; 3) administrative efficiency; 4) the length of continuance requested; 5) the number of hearings held and continuances granted previously; and 6) the timing of the continuance motion.¹⁹

Though the immigration judge must use discretion in balancing the relevant factors supporting a continuance grant, *L-A-B-R* states that due diligence may be absent when the respondent intends to pursue collateral relief at a future date or "appears to have unreasonably delayed filing for collateral relief" until just prior to a hearing.²⁰ If there was a diligent good faith effort to proceed, however, the respondent will meet this prong.²¹ In addition, under *L-A-B-R-* DHS' decision to consent, oppose or fail to take a position on a continuance motion should not be dispositive.²²

Citing the 2017 EOIR memo, *L-A-B-R* emphasizes efficiency in the good cause analysis. Immigration judges' interpretation of this part of the decision will be critical in how *L-A-B-R*

¹⁵ *Matter of L-A-B-R-*, 27 I&N Dec. 405, 406 (A.G. 2018).

¹⁶ *Id.* at 413 ("The good-cause standard in [8 C.F.R.] section 1003.29 requires consideration and balancing of all relevant factors in assessing a motion for continuance to accommodate a collateral matter.") (citing BIA precedent decisions *Matter of Hashmi*, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009); *Matter of Rajah*, 25 I&N Dec. 127, 135–36 (BIA 2009); and *Matter of Sanchez Sosa*, 25 I&N Dec. 807, 812–13 (BIA 2012)).

¹⁷ *Matter of L-A-B-R-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 407 ("...the use of continuances as a dilatory tactic is particularly pernicious in the immigration context.") 拖延战术

¹⁸ *Id.* at 413.

¹⁹ *Id.* at 415.

²⁰ *Id.* at 416.

²¹ *Matter of L-A-B-R-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 415.

²² *Id.* at 416.

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ultimately impacts court practice. For example, the decision seems to leave room to take IJ case completion quotas into consideration when denying a continuance. Though *L-A-B-R* states that case completion goals cannot be the sole consideration in deciding a continuance motion,²³ it is unclear from the wording of the *L-A-B-R*- decision how case completion goals will be factored into the balancing test in the good cause analysis on continuances moving forward.

L-A-B-R also outlines evidentiary and procedural hurdles that must be met for the continuance grant to be upheld on appeal. Evidence to assess the speculative nature of a respondent's collateral matter and whether a continuance will impact the outcome of the proceeding should include, for example, copies of relevant submissions in collateral proceedings and supporting affidavits.²⁴ *L-A-B-R* introduces a requirement that the IJ state the reasons for granting a continuance on the record or in a written decision.²⁵ This is intended to "aid the Board's review of a continuance order" where if evidence in support of good cause is not sufficient from the record, the BIA would be required to vacate the order granting the continuance.²⁶

It remains to be seen how judges will implement *L-A-B-R*- in individual cases. The Council will be monitoring how individuals demonstrate "diligence" in pursuing collateral relief, for example, and what level of deference will be paid to government attorneys who oppose continuances. Despite the limiting language in the decision, individual judges continue to have significant discretion in deciding when to grant continuances such as in determining what evidence sufficiently demonstrates the likelihood an individual will benefit from collateral relief.

Who may request a continuance?

你和DHS都可以提出, continuance

Either the respondent or DHS may request a continuance, or the IJ may *sua sponte* continue a case.²⁷ Except in specific circumstances detailed below, neither party is entitled to automatic continuances and both the respondent and DHS must show good cause to justify a continuance.²⁸

When should you ask for a continuance?

Continuances may be granted in a variety of circumstances, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. To request time for the respondent to acquire an attorney;
2. To request time for attorney preparation or evidence-gathering;
3. When a medical problem or other emergency prevents either the respondent or the attorney from appearing at a hearing;

²³ *Id.* at 416.

²⁴ *Id.* at 418. This is consistent with Board precedents, which have acknowledged the importance of such documentary evidence. *See Hashmi*, 24 I&N Dec. at 791–92; *Rajah*, 25 I&N Dec. at 136; *Sanchez Sosa*, 25 I&N Dec. at 813–14.

²⁵ *Matter of L-A-B-R-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 418.

²⁶ *Id.* at 418–19.

²⁷ 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.29, 1240.6.

²⁸ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.

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4. When either the attorney or the respondent has an unexpected conflict with a scheduled hearing;
5. When the respondent is awaiting adjudication of an application or petition outside of immigration court (such as an I-130, I-360, I-140, I-730, application for labor certification or U or T visa petition);
6. To pursue a family court order when seeking Special Immigrant Juvenile Status;
7. When the respondent is not competent to proceed;
8. To await the outcome of a pending direct appeal of a criminal conviction;
9. To give DHS the opportunity to correct a defective or incomplete Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and to permit the respondent an opportunity to respond to the new charges.

As with all continuances, the party requesting the continuance—in these examples, the respondent—bears the burden of proof to show good cause for the continuance.

What is the difference between a continuance and administrative closure?

Administrative closure is a docket management tool in which a case currently pending in immigration court or at the BIA is removed from the court or BIA’s active docket. Unlike a continuance, an administratively closed case remains off the court’s active docket until either the respondent or DHS moves to “recalendar” it to the active docket.

What is the effect of a continuance on an asylum EAD clock?

A request for a continuance by a respondent will stop the asylum EAD clock.²⁹ Additionally, the asylum clock will stop if both parties request a continuance.³⁰ By contrast, the EAD clock will continue to run if the IJ continues the case sua sponte or grants a DHS motion for a continuance.³¹ For that reason, practitioners may wish to take no position on DHS requests for a continuance.

How long does a continuance last?

An IJ has discretion to determine the length of a continuance, so long as the period is reasonable.³² 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6. However, the BIA has advised against continuances or similar deferments that would indicate that the IJ is attempting to exercise prosecutorial discretion (that is, delay proceedings indefinitely) or otherwise unreasonably delay removal of a removable noncitizen.³³

²⁹ EOIR Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 13-02: The Asylum Clock (Dec. 2, 2013), at 12.

³⁰ EOIR Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 17-02: Definitions and Use of Adjournment, Call-up, and Case Identification Codes (Oct. 5, 2017), at 6.

³¹ EOIR Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 13-02: The Asylum Clock (Dec. 2, 2013), at 12.

³² See *Matter of W-Y-U-*, 27 I&N Dec. 17, 19-20 (BIA 2017) (holding that DHS has “exclusive jurisdiction” over prosecutorial discretion and cautioning against “unreasonable

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The length of a continuance often depends on the size and flexibility of the IJ's docket and whether the respondent is included in the Executive Office of Immigration Review's ("EOIR") case processing priorities.³³ Continuances in detained cases, for example, often are shorter than those in non-detained cases.³⁴ Average continuance times vary among courts, depending on the practices of individual judges and the number of pending cases. Local practitioners familiar with judges' dockets are the best resource for determining the likely length of a continuance.

III. Requesting Continuances

How do you make a motion for a continuance?

A motion for a continuance may be made orally or in writing. If submitted in writing, the motion must comply with the Immigration Court Practice Manual. It should "set forth in detail the reasons for the request," and "include the date and time of the [upcoming] hearing, as well as preferred dates" for a rescheduled hearing.³⁵ Because the requester bears the burden of showing good cause, a motion to continue should be supported with evidence of the good cause.³⁶

In *L-A-B-R-*, the Attorney General emphasized that if an IJ determines, after weighing and balancing the relevant factors, that good cause exists to grant a continuance, she should state those reasons on the record or in a written decision. *Id.* at 418. As a practical matter, in many cases it will be beneficial to file a written motion for a continuance (rather than simply making an oral motion in open court) and include with that motion both legal arguments in support of the continuance and supporting documents to establish a factual basis for the good cause argument. Submitting a motion in writing 1) gives the IJ a roadmap to follow, clearly setting forth

delay" in adjudication of removal proceedings), *overruled on other grounds by Matter of Castro-Tum*, 27 I&N Dec. 271; *Matter of J-A-B- & I-J-V-A-*, 27 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 2017) (reiterating that IJs have a "duty to adjudicate" cases before them and may not act in a way that "impinges upon the [DHS's] exclusive authority to control the prosecution of [removable] aliens" (citing *Matter of Roussis*, 18 I&N Dec. 256, 258 (BIA 1982))).

³³ Pursuant to a 2018 memorandum, EOIR is required to prioritize "all cases involving individuals in detention or custody," as well as "cases subject to a statutory or regulatory deadline, cases subject to a federal court-ordered deadline, and cases otherwise subject to an established benchmark for completion." See EOIR Director James McHenry, *Case Priorities and Immigration Court Performance Measures* (Jan 17, 2018), at 2 (hereinafter "2018 Case Priorities Memorandum"). This memorandum supersedes all previous case processing priorities and rescinds previously issued guidance. See Chief Immigration Judge MaryBeth Keller, *Case Processing Priorities*, EOIR (Jan 31, 2017).

³⁴ The average length of a continuance to find counsel was 24 days for detained respondents and 119 days for those never detained. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, *A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court*, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 36 n.137 (2015).

³⁵ *Immigration Court Practice Manual* (ICPM) at § 5.10(a).

³⁶ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29

arguments in support of a good cause determination; 2) creates a record for appeal, in the event the judge denies the motion and declines to continue the case; and 3) in the event DHS does not respond to the written motion within the timeframe laid forth in the Immigration Court Practice Manual (ICPM), requires that the judge deem the motion unopposed.³⁷

The fact that a motion is unopposed does not mean that the judge is required to grant it, but will simply applies the relevant legal standard (whether good cause has been shown to grant the motion) without giving the DHS the opportunity to weigh in.³⁸

Can you oppose a DHS request for a continuance?

Yes. A significant percentage of continuances are requested by DHS.³⁹ However, like the respondent, DHS must still articulate good cause for the continuance.⁴⁰ Because the IJ should not grant pro forma continuances to DHS, practitioners should be prepared to argue against an unreasonable or unsupported motion from DHS. Practitioners also should be aware that one of the most common reasons DHS requests a continuance is to conduct background checks and biometrics prior to an IJ's grant of relief.⁴¹ Because such background checks are required by regulation, the IJ almost always will grant such a continuance.⁴²

Because DHS bears the burden to establish removability of a deportable noncitizen,⁴³ practitioners should consider opposing any DHS request for additional time to gather evidence of removability. Alternatively, practitioners should consider requesting that the IJ set a deadline for DHS to submit any documents establishing removability.

If DHS has not produced sufficient evidence to establish removability, practitioners should consider a motion to terminate proceedings, especially where DHS has been granted multiple continuances and still has not produced sufficient evidence to establish removability.

³⁷ The ICPM has strict timeframes for the submission of filings and responses to them, and it provides clear consequences for untimely filings. Among other things, it provides that if the non-moving party does not respond to a motion within the prescribed timeframe, the motion must be deemed unopposed. ICPM § 5.12.

³⁸ *Matter of L-A-B-R-*, 27 I&N Dec. 405, 416.

³⁹ *GAO Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog*, *supra* note 2, at 124 (showing that Respondent-related continuances were 66% of total continuances, compared to 14% DHS-related, 11 % IJ-related, and 9% "operational-related").

⁴⁰ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29

⁴¹ *GAO Report: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog*, *supra* note 2, at 128.

⁴² 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47. The regulations permit IJs to continue the case for a reasonable period to permit DHS to complete background checks. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.47(e)-(f).

⁴³ See INA § 240(c)(3)(A).

Respondent 提出的 continuance は 多く 要求

awaiting the adjudication of either a labor certification from the Department of Labor an I-140 Petition for Alien Worker with USCIS.

Where the respondent is awaiting the adjudication of a pending application for labor certification, there is no presumption that a continuance should be granted because labor certification may take years.⁶⁶ Where the respondent's labor certification has been granted but the respondent is awaiting a pending I-140, the IJ should primarily consider visa availability, such that a respondent may not be able to demonstrate good cause for a continuance if "visa availability is too remote."⁶⁷ However, even where visa availability is remote, the IJ must "evaluate the individual facts and circumstances relevant to each case."⁶⁸

Practitioners seeking a continuance in this scenario should be prepared to submit information to the IJ regarding the processing times for labor certifications and the availability of employment-based visas.

Continuances to seek an attorney

Because respondents have a right to counsel of their own choice at no expense to the government, an IJ must ensure that respondents have "a reasonable and realistic period of time to provide a fair opportunity for a respondent to seek, speak with, and retain counsel."⁶⁹ The right to counsel may be violated if the IJ does not give a respondent sufficient time to seek counsel.⁷⁰ While there is no bright-line rule, courts have generally found continuances for less than a month

⁶⁶ In *Baval v. Gonzales*, the court found denial of the motion for continuance where a respondent was given only "five working days" to retain counsel. *Id.* at 136; see also *Castañeda-Deignan*, 1 N.S. 525 F.3d 799, 119 I.A.D.C. 100 (2008) (right to counsel violated by single two-day continuance). See also *Guadalupe v. INS*, 100 F.3d 1515, 19 I.N.M. 31, 2517 (1995), aff'd, 195 F.3d 1515, 21 I.N.M. 31, 2517 (2000), holding that the respondent was not afforded a reasonable and realistic period of time to seek counsel. But see *Matter of Hernandez*, 2017 WL 4946094, at *1 (BIA Sept. 2017) (denying continuance from April 7, 2017 to May 1, 2017).

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 137. The respondent may submit evidence showing that adjudication is imminent, such as "evidence that the application has been filed with the DOL, that the employer is prepared to file the I-140 within the 180-day validity period, and that the offer of employment, as prescribed in the labor certification, remains available," as well as "[d]ocumentation establishing that the relevant DOL processing times are imminent." *Id.* at 137 n.11.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 136.

⁶⁹ *Id.*; see "What should you do if requesting a particularly lengthy continuance" below for suggestions on how to argue for good cause in this situation.

⁷⁰ *Matter of C-B-*, 25 I&N Dec. 888, 889 (BIA 2012); see INA § 292 (right to counsel).

⁷⁰ *Matter of C-B-*, 25 I&N Dec. at 890.

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violate the right to counsel.⁷¹ In OPPM 17-01, EOIR has further instructed IJs that “it remains general policy that at least one continuance should be granted” to obtain legal counsel.⁷²

At least in the Ninth Circuit, the right to counsel may also be violated if the IJ denies a continuance where a respondent’s attorney unexpectedly fails to appear, and the respondent requests a reasonable continuance so that the attorney may appear.⁷³

Continuances for attorney preparation or evidence-gathering

Attorney preparation is another common ground for seeking a continuance.⁷⁴ In *Matter of Sibrun*, the BIA held that an attorney seeking a continuance “at least must make a reasonable showing that the lack of preparation occurred despite a diligent good faith effort to be ready to proceed and that any additional evidence he seeks to present is probative, noncumulative, and significantly favorable to the [respondent].”⁷⁵

Thus, practitioners should be prepared to submit evidence of the need for attorney preparation. For example, an attorney who is awaiting results of a FOIA request should be prepared to articulate why the FOIA results are necessary, and to provide evidence that the FOIA was submitted as well as a printout showing the request’s position in the processing queue. In general, the more concrete the evidence of a specific need for a delay, the better. Practitioners should be prepared to articulate timelines or specific dates wherever possible. Such evidence is especially important as the BIA only will reverse if the respondent can show that the denial of a continuance caused “actual prejudice and harm and materially affected the outcome of his case.”⁷⁶

⁷¹ In *Biwot v. Gonzales*, the court found a denial of the right to counsel where a respondent was given only “five working days” to procure counsel. 403 F.3d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); see also *Castaneda-Delgado v. I.N.S.*, 525 F.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1975) (right to counsel violated by single two-day continuance to acquire counsel). Similarly, the BIA has overturned an IJ where a respondent was given only “two weeks” to procure counsel. *Matter of Gaitan*, 2017 WL 1951549, at *1 (BIA Mar. 31, 2017) (finding that the respondent “was not afforded a reasonable and realistic period of time in which to obtain counsel”). But see *Matter of Herrera*, 2017 WL 4946954, at *1 (BIA Sept. 5, 2017) (single continuance from Apr. 7, 2017 to May 3, 2017 to procure counsel satisfied *Matter of C-B-*).

⁷² See OPPM 17-01, *supra* note 19, at 4 (emphasis added). OPPM 13-01 previously instructed that “absent good cause shown, no more than two continuances should be granted ... for the purpose of obtaining legal representation.” OPPM 13-01, *supra* note 19, at 2-3 (emphasis added). OPPM 17-01 does not appear to significantly alter the previous policy.

⁷³ See *Mendoza-Mazariegos v. Mukasey*, 509 F.3d 1074, 1080-84 (9th Cir. 2007).

⁷⁴ See GAO Report: *Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog*, *supra* note 2, at 125.

⁷⁵ *Matter of Sibrun*, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 356 (BIA 1983). The BIA has characterized the standard for a continuance set forth in *Sibrun* as a “high standard” establishing the “minimum” required for a continuance for attorney preparation. *Matter of Hashmi*, 24 I&N Dec. at 788.

⁷⁶ *Matter of Sibrun*, 18 I&N Dec. at 356-57.

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The right to a full and fair hearing also may be violated if an IJ denies a continuance without providing sufficient time for respondents to prepare applications or gather evidence.⁷⁷ Similarly, respondents may be entitled to a continuance where DHS presents material evidence at a hearing without providing the evidence in advance or permitting sufficient time to review it.⁷⁸

Continuances to await a pending direct appeal of a criminal conviction or postconviction relief

When the respondent's removability or eligibility for relief from removal hinges on the existence of a criminal conviction, the IJ's willingness to continue proceedings to allow him to pursue a direct appeal or postconviction relief can be critical.

In *Matter of L-A-B-R-*, the Attorney General cast doubt that a continuance should be granted for a pending collateral attack on a criminal conviction, calling the possibility of success on the collateral matter too "speculative."⁷⁹ L-A-B-R- acknowledges, however, that a determination on a continuance is a "balancing analysis" where the multiple factors set forth in *Hashmi* should be considered, with a stronger showing on one factor compensating for a weaker showing on another.⁸⁰

L-A-B-R- is clear that, in general, IJs should not grant continuances solely to allow respondents to pursue post-conviction relief. But when the offense in question is the subject of a direct appeal, the conviction is not final and where other factors support a continuance, a continuance may be merited.⁸¹

⁷⁷ See, e.g., *Cruz Rendon v. Holder*, 603 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the denial of a continuance to gather evidence violated due process where less than one month had passed between the respondent's first appearance with counsel and the merits hearing).

⁷⁸ See *Cinapian v. Holder*, 567 F.3d 1067, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2009) ("When the government fails to notify Petitioners in advance of the hearing of evidence and also does not take reasonable steps to make the preparer of that evidence available for cross-examination at the hearing, the proper course is for the IJ either to grant a continuance or to refuse to admit the evidence.").

⁷⁹ *L-A-B-R-*, 27 I & N Dec. at 417.

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ *Matter of Montiel*, 26 I&N Dec. 555, 557 n.3 (BIA 2015). The BIA distinguished a direct appeal—an appeal by right made immediately after a conviction—from a "pending post-conviction motion to collaterally attack a conviction," noting that the latter did not implicate issues of finality for the purposes of removal. *Id.* at 557 n.2. If the conviction on direct appeal does not affect removability or eligibility for relief from removal, the IJ should generally deny the continuance absent other good cause. See, e.g., *Matter of Soriano-Diaz*, 2017 WL 4418369, at *1 (BIA July 13, 2017) (affirming denial of a continuance to await direct appeal of a controlled substance offense because the respondent was "not charged with any ground of removability based on the controlled substance conviction"); *Matter of Hernandez*, 2016 WL 4120597, at *2 (BIA July 6, 2016) (rejecting argument that a pending direct appeal merited a continuance because "here, removability is not at issue").

(必须给 respondent 预备 application 和 证据的副本)

also be made on the near [sic] relative, guardian, committee, or friend," the IJ should ensure that any continuance for proper service is long enough to allow DHS to identify such an individual.⁸⁷

~~Continuances to respond to charges newly filed by DHS~~

During the course of a removal hearing, DHS may file additional charges of inadmissibility or deportability or amend the factual allegations in the Notice to Appear.⁸⁸ This is usually done through the filing of a Form I-261, Additional Charges of Removability. If DHS files additional charges of removability, IJs are required to inform respondents that they "may be given a reasonable continuance to respond to the additional factual allegations and charges."⁸⁹ While the BIA has not held that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) entitles respondents to an automatic continuance, it has held that respondents must be given a "reasonable opportunity" to respond to any new grounds of removability.⁹⁰

~~Continuances where respondent is not competent to proceed~~

Respondents in removal proceedings who are not competent to proceed must be provided adequate safeguards to "protect [their] rights and privileges."⁹¹ Under *Matter of M-A-M-*, IJs are required to "take measures to determine whether a respondent is competent to participate in proceedings."⁹² Because this determination requires evidence, IJs should grant requests for continuances to "allow the parties to gather and submit evidence relevant to these matters," which could include anything from medical reports documenting a respondent's competency to "letters and testimony from [] third party sources that bear on the respondent's mental health."⁹³ If a respondent is not competent, the IJ must provide adequate safeguards for removal proceedings to continue.⁹⁴ A continuance may be necessary to establish safeguards. For example, "a continuance or motion to change venue may be granted to enable a respondent to be closer to family or available treatment programs."⁹⁵ If an IJ believes that a respondent may become

⁸⁷ See *Matter of M-J-K-*, 26 I&N Dec. 773, 778 (BIA 2016).

⁸⁸ 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e).

⁸⁹ *Id.* IJs also are required at that time to inform unrepresented respondents of their right to counsel. *Id.*

⁹⁰ See, e.g., *Matter of Salazar*, 17 I&N Dec. 167, 169 (BIA 1979); *Matter of Malich*, 2007 WL 4699740, at *1 (BIA Dec. 6, 2007) (noting that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) entitles respondents to a "reasonable opportunity to respond" to new charges).

⁹¹ INA § 240(b)(3).

⁹² *Matter of M-A-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 480 (BIA 2011). For more information on *Matter of M-A-M-*, see the American Immigration Council's practice advisory, Representing Clients with Mental Competency Issues under Matter of M-A-M-.

⁹³ *Matter of M-A-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. at 481. See also *Matter of Castro Tum*, fn 13 (citing *M-A-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. 474, 480 (BIA 2011)).

⁹⁴ *Id.*

⁹⁵ *Id.* Because of the important role family may play where the respondent is not competent, the BIA has noted that "continuances for the respondent's counsel to investigate sources of biographical information may be warranted." *Matter of M-J-K-*, 26 I&N Dec. at 778.

competent after treatment, the IJ “can continue proceedings to allow for further evaluation of competency or an assessment of changes in the respondent’s condition.”⁹⁶ In *Matter of Castro-Tum*, the Attorney General pointed to continuances, instead of administrative closure, as the appropriate tool to assess the competency of a respondent in removal proceedings.⁹⁷

Continuances to gather corroborating evidence for asylum applications

Under INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), IJs may require that asylum applicants submit “evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony” of persecution. While respondents are not entitled to an automatic continuance to gather corroborating evidence when the IJ requests it, the IJ may still grant a continuance to seek corroborating evidence if requested.⁹⁸ However, if the IJ determines that the respondent “was not aware of a unique piece of evidence that is essential to meeting the burden of proof,” a continuance should generally be granted to provide the respondent with an opportunity to obtain that evidence.⁹⁹

Similarly, where DHS confronts a respondent with new evidence contradicting a key part of an asylum claim, the IJ should grant a continuance to permit the respondent to respond.¹⁰⁰ Thus, even though the respondent bears the burden to authenticate documents and provide corroborating evidence, the IJ should permit a respondent a reasonable opportunity to respond to newly provided DHS evidence which contradicts the respondents’ own evidence.¹⁰¹

Importantly, the Ninth Circuit has found that INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) requires IJs to grant respondents an opportunity to produce corroborating evidence, once the IJ concludes that such evidence is necessary.¹⁰² Respondents in the Ninth Circuit are entitled to “notice and an opportunity to either produce the evidence or explain why it is unavailable” once the IJ determines that corroboration is required.¹⁰³ The Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have

⁹⁶ *Matter of M-A-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. at 481.

⁹⁷ *Matter of Castro-Tum*, 27 I&N Dec. 271, n. 13 (citing *Matter of M-A-M-*, 25 I&N Dec. at 480).

⁹⁸ *Matter of L-A-C-*, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 522 (BIA 2015). If the IJ requires the submission of specific corroborating evidence, respondents must be given “an opportunity to explain why [they] could not reasonably obtain [the] evidence.” *Id.* at 521.

⁹⁹ *Id.* at 522.

¹⁰⁰ See *Bondarenko v. Holder*, 733 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2013). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that it violated due process where the respondent was denied a continuance to investigate a DHS forensic report suggesting that the respondent’s evidence was fraudulent.

¹⁰¹ See also *Cinapian v. Holder*, 567 F.3d 1067, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2009).

¹⁰² *Ren v. Holder*, 648 F.3d 1079, 1090-92 (9th Cir. 2011). This requirement applies only to respondents who are “deemed credible.” *Id.* at 1092 n.13.

¹⁰³ *Id.* at 1090-92. The Ninth Circuit has further held that failure to provide notice and an opportunity for the respondent to produce corroborating evidence violates the INA. See, e.g., *Bhattarai v. Lynch*, 835 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n IJ cannot articulate for the first time in her decision denying relief that key corroborative evidence is missing.”).

respondent, making it an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance based on external court-related goals.¹¹⁷

As mentioned earlier, it is not clear how immigration judges will interpret language regarding case completion quotas in *L-A-B-R-* and if they will feel they can take quotas into consideration when denying a continuance in a case where the respondent is pursuing a collateral matter. Though *L-A-B-R-* stated that case completion goals cannot be the “sole” consideration in deciding a continuance motion, it pointed to the need for efficiency and the number of continuances requested previously in the case as appropriate factors to consider.¹¹⁸

However, the recent continuance policy changes laid out in EOIR OPPM 17-01 (as detailed in Section II *infra*), along with Attorney General Sessions’ repeated attacks on immigration lawyers for dilatory motions and the January 17, 2018 EOIR memorandum on case priorities, may place IJs under significant pressure to resolve cases expeditiously.¹¹⁹ This pressure likely will be exacerbated by EOIR’s creation of IJ quotas, which would directly tie performance review metrics to case completion goals.¹²⁰

OPPM 17-01 contains suggestions and “guidance” that may encourage IJs to depart from the rule that each case be considered on its individual merits. For example, OPPM 17-01 asks IJs to “carefully consider administrative efficiency, case delays, and the effects of multiple continuances on the efficient administration of justice in the immigration courts.”¹²¹ Similarly, OPPM 17-01 instructs IJs to “review[] very carefully all requests to continue an individual merits hearing because “the continuance of an individual merits hearing necessarily has a significant adverse ripple effect on the ability to schedule other hearings across an Immigration Judge’s docket.”¹²²

Immigration Judges should not cite such goals in decisions relating to continuances.”); *see also Hashmi v. Att’y Gen.*, 531 F.3d 256, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a denial of a continuance based on case completion goals is an abuse of discretion); *Keller v. Filip*, 308 F. App’x 760, 763 (5th Cir. 2009) (“case disposition targets” are not “fetters” on IJ discretion).

¹¹⁷ See, e.g., *Hashmi*, 531 F.3d at 261 (noting that it is “impermissibly arbitrary” to decide a continuance motion “with no regard for the circumstances of the case itself”); *Matter of Rajah*, 25 I&N Dec. at 136 (holding that “the Immigration Judge must evaluate the individual facts and circumstances relevant to each case”) (citing *Ahmed v. Holder*, 569 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2009)).

¹¹⁸ *L-A-B-R-*, 27 I&N Dec. at 407.

¹¹⁹ Indeed, the official position of the DOJ is now that “[t]he timely and efficient conclusion of cases serves the national interest. Unwarranted delays and delayed decision making do not.” Attorney General Sessions, *Renewing Our Commitment to the Timely and Efficient Adjudication of Immigration Cases to Serve the National Interest*, Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 5, 2017).

¹²⁰ See generally Nat’l Ass’n of IJs, NAIJ Has Grave Concerns Regarding Implementation of Quotas on Immigration Judge Performance Reviews (Oct. 18, 2017) (letter to Senate Judiciary Committee).

¹²¹ OPPM 17-01, *supra* note 19, at 3.

¹²² *Id.* at 5. The guidance concludes that “Immigration Judges generally should not continue individual merits hearings absent a genuine showing of good cause or a clear case law basis.” *Id.*

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At least one court has found that denying a continuance because of the lengthy delays in merits hearing is improper.¹²³ Practitioners may consider appealing a denial of a continuance when an IJ follows EOIR's guidance and denies a continuance because of the effect of multiple continuances on the court's docket.¹²⁴

IV. Seeking Review of a Denial of a Continuance

Can an IJ's grant or a denial of a continuance be appealed?

Generally, yes. An appeal from a grant or denial of a continuance may take the form of an interlocutory appeal or an appeal of a final order of removal. The BIA will hear an interlocutory appeal only if a decision is "necessary to address important jurisdictional questions regarding the administration of the immigration laws or to correct recurring problems in the handling of cases by Immigration Judges."¹²⁵ Thus, while it is unusual for the BIA to take an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a continuance, the BIA has granted interlocutory appeals—usually from DHS—appealing the grant of a continuance in situations where it determines that the IJ is abusing the power to grant continuances.¹²⁶

The most common scenario for appeal of a continuance is upon review of an order of removal entered following a denial of a continuance. Denials of continuances are reviewed under a *de novo* standard of review.¹²⁷ A denial of a continuance "will not be reversed [by the BIA] unless

¹²³ In *Mendoza-Mazariegos v. Mukasey*, the Ninth Circuit overturned the denial of a continuance where a respondent sought a continuance because his newly-acquired counsel was unprepared to move forward. See 509 F.3d at 1078, 1085. The continuance was denied largely because the next open merits hearing date was two years in the future. *Id.* at 1078. The Ninth Circuit rebuked the government for punishing respondents for delays caused by court congestion: The IJ, BIA, and the government all repeatedly lament that Mendoza's proceeding had stretched on for almost five years. It should be clear to the government that Mendoza should not be blamed for [this] fact ... [nor] is it Mendoza's fault that the short continuance [his] attorney [] requested would have required another two-year delay. It is disturbing that an individual petitioner was, in effect, punished for the crowded docket of the immigration courts. Petitioners should not be forced to proceed without counsel because of the scheduling problems of the immigration court.

Id. at 1084.

¹²⁴ See *Hashmi*, 531 F.3d at 261 (finding abuse of discretion when IJ relied only on his "perceived 'obligation' to 'manage his calendar' and 'complete cases within a reasonable period of time'" (internal alterations omitted)).

¹²⁵ *Matter of Avetisyan*, 25 I&N Dec. 688, 688-89 (BIA 2012), overruled on other grounds by *Matter of Castro-Tum*, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018).

¹²⁶ See, e.g., *Matter of Silva-Rodriguez*, 20 I&N Dec. at 449.

¹²⁷ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) ("The Board may review questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of immigration judges *de novo*.").

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the [noncitizen] establishes that that denial caused him actual prejudice and harm and materially affected the outcome of his case.”¹²⁸

Practitioners should also reserve¹ the right to appeal the denial of a continuance even if seeking more than one form of relief. For example, a respondent seeking both adjustment of status through a visa petition, as well as asylum, may seek a continuance to await adjudication of the visa petition. If the continuance is denied, and the asylum application subsequently is denied, the merits of the asylum claim and the denial of the continuance both may be litigated on appeal.

What standard do circuit courts use to review denials of continuances?

Circuit courts generally review a denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion.¹²⁹ Because IJs have “broad discretion” to grant or deny continuances, review of their decisions at the circuit court level is deferential.¹³⁰ All circuits—with the exception of the Ninth—review a denial of a continuance under each respective circuit’s general abuse of discretion standard.¹³¹ Although each circuit applies a slightly different abuse of discretion standard, the courts generally are in agreement that a continuance only will be overturned if the decision rests on an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious; for example, if the decision rested on a clearly erroneous factual finding, inexplicably departed from established policies, was without rational explanation, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination.

In the Ninth Circuit, review of a denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion is a “case by case” determination that “cannot be decided through the application of bright-line rules.”¹³² Some factors to be considered are “(1) the nature of the evidence excluded as a result of the denial of the continuance, (2) the reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously granted.”¹³³

¹²⁸ *Matter of Sibrun*, 18 I&N Dec. at 356-57.

¹²⁹ See, e.g., *Sheikh v. Holder*, 696 F.3d 147, 149 (1st Cir. 2012) (“We review the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion.”).

¹³⁰ See, e.g. *Sanusi v. Gonzales*, 445 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the deferential standard of review for appeals from denials of continuances).

¹³¹ *Cruz-Bucheli v. Gonzales*, 463 F.3d 105, 107 (1st Cir. 2006); *Pedreros v. Keisler*, 503 F.3d 162, 164 (2d Cir. 2007); *Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft*, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003); *Onyeme v. I.N.S.*, 146 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1998); *Cabral v. Holder*, 632 F.3d 886, 890 (5th Cir. 2011); *Abu-Khalil v. Gonzales*, 436 F.3d 627, 634 (6th Cir. 2006); *Calma v. Holder*, 663 F.3d 868, 878 (7th Cir. 2011); *Thinran v. Holder*, 599 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2010); *Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder*, 642 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 2011); *Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen.*, 714 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2013).

¹³² *Ahmed v. Holder*, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Cui v. Mukasey*, 538 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 2008)).

¹³³ *Id.* (citing *Karapetyan v. Mukasey*, 543 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008)).

In appropriate circumstances, practitioners also may appeal the denial of a continuance on the argument that the denial violated a constitutional right, such as the right to due process.¹³⁴ Such a claim would be reviewed under each circuit's respective standards for appealing the denial of a constitutional right.

Are there any circumstances where you cannot appeal a denial of a continuance?

Yes. If your client is removable on the basis of certain criminal convictions, you may not be able to appeal a denial of a continuance to a circuit court in a Petition for Review of the final order of removal because of the jurisdiction-stripping provision at INA § 242(a)(2)(C).¹³⁵ Notwithstanding this jurisdiction-stripping provision, INA § 242(a)(2)(D) permits review of any "constitutional claims or questions of law." There are circuit splits on whether and how INA § 242(a)(2)(C) interacts with INA § 242(a)(2)(D), and whether it bars review of the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion where the respondent has a criminal conviction.¹³⁶

The Ninth Circuit retains full jurisdiction, finding that INA § 242(a)(2)(C) "does not bar review of the denial of a procedural motion (such as a motion to continue) that is not predicated on the fact that the movant has been convicted of a qualifying crime."¹³⁷

The Second Circuit, and to a lesser extent the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, retain at least some jurisdiction to review denials of continuances for abuse of discretion where INA § 242(a)(2)(C) is at issue. The Second Circuit has held that a respondent's claim that "the agency failed to assess [a] continuance motion under the correct legal standard" is a "question[] of law" under INA § 242(a)(2)(D).¹³⁸ However, whether the court would have jurisdiction where the

¹³⁴ See, e.g., *Bondarenko v. Holder*, 733 F.3d at 906-07 (holding that the denial of a continuance, which prevented the respondent from having the opportunity to respond to newly presented evidence, violated due process).

¹³⁵ "[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 237(a)(2)(A)(i)." This provision covers all criminal grounds of inadmissibility, all aggravated felonies, all controlled substance offenses, all firearms offenses, and certain miscellaneous crimes at INA § 237(a)(2)(D).

¹³⁶ For many years, the government also argued that circuit courts did not have jurisdiction to review denials of continuances because INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of decisions committed to the Attorney General's discretion. However, in *Kucana v. Holder*, 558 U.S. 233, 244 (2010), the Supreme Court held that INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies "only when the statute itself specifies the discretionary character of the Attorney General's authority." Because the INA does not mention continuances, the government has abandoned this argument post-*Kucana*.

¹³⁷ *Garcia v. Lynch*, 798 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2015). See generally *Unuakhaulu v. Gonzales*, 416 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (establishing the sweep of INA § 242(a)(2)(C)).

¹³⁸ *Flores v. Holder*, 779 F.3d 159, 163 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015) (reviewing denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion).

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abuse of discretion was based on “clearly erroneous factual findings” alone remains an open question.¹³⁹

The Eleventh Circuit has suggested in dicta and directly stated in unpublished decisions that, notwithstanding INA § 242(a)(2)(C), it retains jurisdiction under INA § 242(a)(2)(D) to review denials of continuances where the BIA or the IJ applied the wrong legal standard.¹⁴⁰ However, the court has also held that a “garden-variety abuse of discretion argument” challenging the denial of a continuance is not a “legal question,” leaving the court with no jurisdiction to review the denial where INA § 242(a)(2)(C) applies.¹⁴¹

While the First Circuit has not issued any decisions directly on point, it has found jurisdiction to review claims of abuse of discretion in a similar context, maintaining jurisdiction notwithstanding INA § 242(a)(2)(C) where the “BIA committed a material error of law or failed to articulate its reasoning adequately.”¹⁴² Similarly, although the Sixth Circuit has not issued any decisions directly on point, it has found that INA § 242(a)(2)(C) does not bar “claims that require an evaluation of whether the BIA adhered to legal standards or rules of decision articulated in its published precedent.”¹⁴³

The Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that INA § 242(a)(2)(C) removes their jurisdiction to review denials of continuances for abuse of discretion alone.¹⁴⁴ In a series of

¹³⁹ *Sanusi*, 445 F.3d at 199 (establishing standard of review for abuse of discretion); *see also Kulyak v. Mukasey*, 277 F. App'x 116, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2008) (expressing doubt that INA § 242(a)(2)(C) applied to continuances and reviewing whether the IJ's decision “rested on a ‘clearly erroneous’ factual finding” (citation omitted)). However, even following *Flores*, the Second Circuit has been inconsistent in the application of INA § 242(a)(2)(C) to continuances. Compare *Balbuena v. Sessions*, 700 F. App'x 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2017) (reviewing a denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion notwithstanding INA § 242(a)(2)(C)), with *Lora v. Sessions*, No. 17-133, __ Fed. App'x __, 2017 WL 5713229, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 28, 2017) (“An IJ's continuance ruling does not ordinarily implicate a constitutional claim or question of law, because IJs are accorded wide latitude in calendar management, and such decisions are reviewed under a highly deferential standard of abuse of discretion.” (internal citations omitted)).

¹⁴⁰ *Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 524 F.3d 1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008); *Paris v. U.S. Att'y Gen.*, 564 F. App'x 986, 990 (11th Cir. 2014) (“An argument that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard presents a legal question that we have jurisdiction to review pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(D).”).

¹⁴¹ *Alvarez Acosta*, 524 F.3d at 1196-97.

¹⁴² *Aponte v. Holder*, 610 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2010) (remanding where BIA mailed briefing schedule to incomplete address and then denied motion to reopen on grounds of inadequate notice in decision which included unsupported contention that counsel had received previous filings with same incomplete address).

¹⁴³ *Ettienne v. Holder*, 659 F.3d 513, 517 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that these are “nondiscretionary ‘questions of law’” reviewable under INA § 242(a)(2)(D)).

¹⁴⁴ See *Rachak v. Att'y Gen.*, 734 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that the court had “no jurisdiction over [a] denial of [a] motion for a continuance” because “discretionary

unpublished decisions, the Tenth Circuit has also adopted this position.¹⁴⁵ In general, these circuits have held that the BIA's failure to follow its own precedent is not a "legal question" under INA § 242(a)(2)(D),¹⁴⁶ or that abuse of discretion as a whole does not present a legal question.¹⁴⁷ There are no Fourth Circuit reported decisions on the issue, and in unpublished decisions the court has come down on both sides of the issue.¹⁴⁸ Despite the circuit split on review for abuse of discretion, all circuits agree that they retain jurisdiction under INA § 242(a)(2)(D) to review a challenge to the constitutionality of the denial of a continuance; however, most circuits have rejected respondents' attempts to frame a garden-variety denial of a continuance as a denial of a constitutional right.¹⁴⁹

decisions, as here, do not raise a constitutional claim or question of law covered by [INA § (a)(2)(D)'s] judicial review provision" (internal citations omitted)); *Ogunfuye v. Holder*, 610 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a claim of abuse of discretion in denying a continuance "does not present a constitutional claim or issue of law that this court has jurisdiction to consider"); *Moral-Salazar v. Holder*, 708 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the "jurisdictional bar on reviewing 'any final order of removal' [in INA § 242(a)(2)(C)] includes prior procedural orders like a motion for continuance"); *Waugh v. Holder*, 642 F.3d 1279, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that a claim of abuse of discretion in denying a continuance "raises neither a constitutional nor a legal issue, so we are without jurisdiction to review it").

¹⁴⁵ See, e.g., *Tejeda-Acosta v. Holder*, 506 F. App'x 785, 788 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing to *Waugh v. Holder* for the proposition that it had no jurisdiction to review a denial of continuance for abuse of discretion); *Taufu'i v. Holder*, 589 F. App'x 881, 883 (10th Cir. 2014) (same).

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., *Waugh*, 642 F.3d at 1285.

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g., *Ogunfuye*, 610 F.3d at 307.

¹⁴⁸ Compare *Cespedes v. Holder*, 542 F. App'x 227, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that INA § 242(a)(2)(C) applied except for the provisions of INA § 242(a)(2)(D), then evaluating the merits of a claim of abuse of discretion), with *Owusu v. Holder*, 474 F. App'x 153, 154 (4th Cir. 2012) ("Because our review of the denial of Owusu's request for a continuance is for abuse of discretion, he does not raise a reviewable constitutional claim or a question of law." (citations omitted)).

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g. *Waugh*, 642 F.3d at 1284-85 ("Petitioner attempts to frame this argument as a denial of due process, suggesting the BIA ignored its own (unidentified) precedents. It appears petitioner's true objection, however, is to the way the IJ and BIA exercised their discretion...."); see also *Jarbough v. Att'y Gen.*, 483 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Recasting challenges to factual or discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction under [INA § 242(a)(2)(D)]."); *Alvarez Acosta*, 524 F.3d at 1197 (holding that a denial of a continuance did not present a due process claim because the respondent had no liberty interest in obtaining a discretionary continuance).

Circuit Split on