Detection Against Adversarial Attacks

Logistics of presentation



We are always making trails in our life!

- We will keep the portal of ratings for presentations open
  - I will design algorithms to detect abnormal rating patterns and we will reveal that in the end of the semester
  - *Outlier detection*: you have to convince enough people to rate as yours
  - *Classification*: you have to mimic "benign" students for enough rantings
- For status report, and final report, we will apply exponential decay for the score based on the submission time

$$s = \frac{s_g}{e^{\max\{t-t_0,0\}}}$$

Exploring the space of adversarial images

- Adversarial examples in both linear and deep classifiers
- Probe the pixel space of adversarial images using noise of varying intensity and distribution
- Adversarial examples are isolated? Or do they form large, compact regions?

Exploring the space of adversarial images

- Adversarial instance generation

$$\begin{aligned} \underset{D}{\text{minimize}} \quad & \|D\| \\ \text{subject to} \quad & L \leq X + D \leq U \\ & p = f(X + D) \\ & \max(p_1 - p_c, ..., p_n - p_c) > 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \underset{D}{\text{minimize}} \quad & \|D\| + C \cdot \mathrm{H}(p, p^A) \\ \text{subject to} \quad & L \leq X + D \leq U \\ & p = f(X + D) \end{aligned}$$

L-BFGS-B to solve the opt, and bisection search for C

- Adversarial space exploration
  - Probe the space around the images with small random perturbation
    - Round, compact regions: classifier will be consistent
    - Sparse, discontinuous regions: classifier will be erratic

Exploring the space of adversarial images

- Add noise to instance x and calculate the fraction that keep or switch labels
  - Gaussian noise $\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \lambda\sigma^2)$
  - Sample from empirical distribution from a non-parametric observation $\epsilon \sim M$





Exploring the space of adversarial images



(a)



(b)





Adding non-parametric empirical noise



(a) MNIST / logistic regression



(b) MNIST / convolutional network



(c) ImageNet / OverFeat

Exploring the space of adversarial images

- Classifiers for MNIST are more resilient against adversarial images than ImageNet
- MNIST/logistic behaves differently than the deep MNIST/ConvNet
- i.i.d. Gaussian noise has spatial correlations, and no important higher-order momenta; therefore we also sample noise from nonparametric empirical distribution
  - For imageNet, the curves for non-parametric noise fall before that of Gaussian noise
  - The behavior tailed noise affects the images more even without the spatial correlation

Takeaways

- Adversarial images are not necessarily isolated, spurious points: many of them inhabit relatively dense regions of the pixel space
- This may helps to explain the transferability
- An important next step: understand the spatial natural of the adversarial distortion
- Susceptibility of adversarial attacks is attributed to the linearity in the network but here it shows the phenomenon may be more complex
  - A relatively more linear classifier seems no more susceptible to adversarial images than a strong, deep classifier

Beyond the Min-max Game

- What if we have more knowledge about our learning tasks?
  - Properties of learning tasks and data
  - General understanding about ML models

Characterize Adversarial Examples Based on Spatial Consistency Information for Semantic Segmentation

- Attacks against semantic segmentation
  - State-of-the-art attacks against segmentation: Houdini [NIPS2017], DAG [ICCV 2017]
  - We design diverse adversarial targets: hello kitty, pure color, a real scene, ECCV, color shift, strips of even color of classes
  - Cityscapes and BDD datasets

Benign

Adversarial Examples

Spatial Context Information

- Spatial consistency is a distinct property of image segmentation
- Perturbation at one pixel will potentially affect the prediction of surrounding pixels $\mathcal{H}(m) = -\sum_j \mathcal{V}_m[j] \log \mathcal{V}_m[j]$

(a) Benign example



(b) Heatmap of benign image



(c) DAG | Kitty



(d) DAG | Pure



(e) Houdini | Kitty



(f) Houdini | Pure

Perturbation on single patch may loss its adversarial effect

- Spatial consistency: the consistency of segmentation results for randomly selected patches from an image
- Such spatial consistency information from benign and adversarial instances are distinguishable
- We apply mIOU to compare the segmentation results between patches
  - For each class, Intersection over Union (IOU) is calculated as TP/(TP+FP+FN). Here we calculate the relative mIOU for each pair of patches



Pipeline of spatial consistency based detection for adversarial examples on semantic segmentation

We apply mIOU to evaluate the consistency information for patches from benign and adversarial instances quantitatively

- Detection



Adaptive Attack Against Spatial Consistency Based Detection

- Adaptive attack:
  - Assume the attacker has perfect knowledge of #selected patches: K
  - We generate perturbation that the selected k patches can all be mis-segmented to the corresponding regions within adversarial target



(a) Adaptive attack against image scaling



(b) Convergence analysis of adaptive attack



(c) Adaptive attack against spatial consistency

Detecting adversarial instances based on spatial consistency information

- Both the spatial consistency based detection and the scaling based baseline achieve promising detection rate on different attacks
- The scaling based baseline fails to detect strong adaptive attacks while the spatial based method can

Method		Model	mIOU	Detection				Detection Adap			
				DAG		Houdini		DAG		Houdini	
				Pure	Kitty	Pure	Kitty	Pure	Kitty	Pure	Kitty
Scale (std)	0.5	DRN (16.4M)	66.7	100%	95%	100%	99%	100%	67%	100%	78%
	3.0			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	97%	0%
	5.0			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	71%	0%
Spatial (K)	1	DRN (16.4M)	66.7	91%	91%	94%	92%	98%	94%	92%	94%
	5			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	10			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	50			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Takeaways

- Spatial consistency information can be potentially applied to help distinguish benign and adversarial instances against segmentation models.
- Strong adaptive attacker can hardly succeed when large randomness is incorporated into the model

Adversarial Frames In Videos

Attacks on segmentation

Attacks on pose estimation

Attacks on object detection

Defensing Adversarial behaviors in Videos – Temporal Dependency



Task	Attack Method	Target	Previous Frames	Detection			Detection Adap		
				1	3	5	1	3	5
Semantic Segmentation	Houdini	CVPR	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Remapping	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Stripe	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
	DAG	CVPR	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Remapping	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Stripe	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Human Pose Estimation	Houdini	shuffle	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
		Transpose	Benign	100%	100%	100%	98%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	98%	99%	100%	98 %	99%	100%
Object Detection	DAG	all	Benign	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	100%	100%	100%	98%	100%	100%
		person	Benign	99%	100%	100 %	100%	100%	100%
			Adversarial	97%	98%	100%	96 %	97%	100%

- The results show that choosing more random patches can improve detection rate while k=5 is enough to achieve AUC 100%
- The spatial consistency based detection is robust against strong adaptive attackers due to the randomness in patch selection


Original Video
Benign
Adversarial
After Detection
Segmentation
Human pose Estimation
Object Detection

Beyond the Min-max Game

- What if we have more knowledge about our learning tasks?
  - Properties of learning tasks and data
  - General understanding about ML models

Important Concept: data manifold

- Data Manifold theory:
  - Manifold: the subspace that has local Euclidean space properties
  - The data we observed were actually mapped from a low-dimensional space
  - We use PCA/autoencoders etc. to “unwrap” the manifold
  - We assume the data points from testset and trainset are all from a same manifold
  - Not the case if we consider adversaries



[ICLR 2018]

Previous Measures



- K-means distance
  - Distance to k nearest neighbors
- Kernel density
  - non-parametric
  - estimate the pdf (probability density function) of a random variable

$$\hat{f}(x) = \frac{1}{nh} \sum_{i=1}^{n} k(\frac{x - x_i}{h})$$

- Can fail to distinguish the sub-manifold that a test case lies in

Estimation of Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID)

- The sub-manifolds are not parametric
  - given by data points instead
- We use estimation
  - Sample a small set of size larger than k
  - compute their distance to x, take closest k
  - $r_k(x)$ is the maximum of the neighbor distances

$$\widehat{\mathrm{LID}}(x) = -\left(\frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \log \frac{r_i(x)}{r_k(x)} \right)^{-1}$$

Use LID to characterize the sub-manifold

- LID of benign x
  - The dimension of S (the sub-manifold x lies in)
  - Should be small since S is under some intrinsic constraints
- LID of adversarial x':
  - Full degrees of freedom afforded by the representational dimension of the data domain
  - Attacks generally allow modification of all pixels




Train a detector
random samples
1
normal minibatch X^j_{norm}
2
attack
adv minibatch X^j_{adv}
L layer network
input
$i-1$
i
$i+1$
output
i^{th} layer
3
3
i^{th} layer representation $L^i(X^j_{norm})$
i^{th} layer representation $L^i(X^j_{adv})$
for $x \in X^j_{norm}$
for $x_{adv} \in X^j_{adv}$
4
5
k nearest neighbors
4
$L^i(X^j_{adv})$
6
next layer
5
4
NO
all layer done
LID(x) of the i^{th} layer
LID(x_{adv}) of the i^{th} layer
YES
adv
$N \times L$ LID matrix for X^j_{adv}
N : number of samples, L : number of layers
normal
$N \times L$ LID matrix for X^j_{norm}
N : number of samples, L : number of layers
X^j
LID detector
X^{j+1} ...
... ...
Detection
test image x
L layer representations
LID(x) in all layers: $1 \times L$ LID vector
LID detector
normal minibatch X_{norm}
L layer representations
k nearest neighbors
normal
adv

Characterizing Adversarial Examples

AUC of different detection methods against various attacks

Dataset	Feature	FGM	BIM-a	BIM-b	JSMA	Opt
MNIST	KD	78.12%	99.14%	98.61%	68.77%	95.15%
	BU	32.37%	91.55%	25.46%	88.74%	71.29%
	KD+BU	82.43%	99.20%	98.81%	90.12%	95.35%
	LID	**96.89%**	**99.60%**	**99.83%**	**92.24%**	**99.24%**
CIFAR-10	KD	64.92%	68.38%	98.70%	85.77%	91.35%
	BU	70.53%	81.60%	97.32%	87.36%	91.39%
	KD+BU	70.40%	81.33%	98.90%	88.91%	93.77%
	LID	**82.38%**	**82.51%**	**99.78%**	**95.87%**	**98.93%**
SVHN	KD	70.39%	77.18%	99.57%	86.46%	87.41%
	BU	86.78%	84.07%	86.93%	91.33%	87.13%
	KD+BU	86.86%	83.63%	99.52%	93.19%	90.66%
	LID	**97.61%**	**87.55%**	**99.72%**	**95.07%**	**97.60%**

Attack Failure Rate of Strong Adaptive Attacks Against LID Detector

	MNIST	CIFAR-10	SVHN
Attack Failure Rate (one-layer)	100%	95.7%	97.2%
Attack Failure Rate (all-layer)	100%	100%	100%

SaftyNet: Detecting and Rejecting Adversarial Examples Robustly

- Use RBF-SVM to perform classification based on the discrete codes computed from late stage ReLUs



SaftyNet: Detecting and Rejecting Adversarial Examples Robustly

- Quantize each ReLU at some set of thresholds to generate a discrete code (binarized code in the case of one threshold)

$$f(\mathbf{c}) = \sum_{i}^{N} \alpha_i y_i \exp(-||\mathbf{c} - \mathbf{c}_i||^2 / 2\sigma^2) + b$$

SceneProof


Image
Depth
Attacked Depth
Depth Diff
Type I Attack
True to False
Type I Attack
False to True
Type II Attack
True to False
Type II Attack
False to True