PSC7475: Varying Effects by Group

Week 8: Lecture 13

Prof. Weldzius

Villanova University

Slides Updated: 2025-03-10

• QSS Tidyverse Tutorial 6 due tomorrow

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- Proposal for final project due Wednesday by midnight (upload to Blackboard)

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- Midterm: will discuss next week


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- This week: finishing up regression!


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
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
• primary2004 whether the person voted in 2004, before the experiment.




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 - Subsets, subsets, subsets.



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- Do 2004 voters react differently to social pressure mailer than nonvoters?
- Two approaches:
 - Subsets, subsets, subsets.
 - Interaction terms in regression.

 Easy way to estimate heterogeneous effects: our old friend, filter(), group_by(), and summarize(). Woo!

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 - First, get the data

```
data(social, package="qss")
```

• Now, estimate the ATE for the **voters**:

• Now, estimate the ATE for the voters:

```
VotersATE <- social %>%
 filter(primary2004 == 1,
         messages %in% c("Control", "Neighbors")) %>%
  group by (messages) %>%
  summarize(primary2006_mean = mean(primary2006)) %>%
 pivot_wider(names_from = "messages",
              values_from = "primary2006_mean") %>%
 mutate(ate_v = Neighbors - Control) %>%
  select(ate v)
VotersATE
## # A tibble: 1 x 1
```

Filter approach

• Now, estimate the ATE for the **nonvoters**:

Filter approach

• Now, estimate the ATE for the **nonvoters**:

```
NonvotersATE <- social %>%
 filter(primary2004 == 0,
        messages %in% c("Control", "Neighbors")) %>%
  group by (messages) %>%
  summarize(primary2006_mean = mean(primary2006)) %>%
 pivot_wider(names_from = "messages",
              values from = "primary2006 mean") %>%
 mutate(ate_nv = Neighbors - Control) %>%
  select(ate nv)
NonvotersATE
## # A tibble: 1 x 1
```

Difference in effects

• How much does the estimated treatment effect differ between groups?

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```
VotersATE$ate_v - NonvotersATE$ate_nv
```

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## [1] 0.02722908
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• How much does the estimated treatment effect differ between groups?

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VotersATE$ate_v - NonvotersATE$ate_nv
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• Any easier way to allow for different effects of treatment by groups?

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$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{turnout}_i &= \alpha + \beta_1 \mathsf{primary2004}_i + \beta_2 \mathsf{neighbors}_i + \\ & \beta_3 \big(\mathsf{primary2004}_i \times \mathsf{neighbors}_i \big) + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned}$$

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- Primary 2004 variable multiplied by the neighbors variable.
 - Equal to 1 if voted in 2004 (primary 2004 == 1) and received neighbors mailer (neighbors == 1)

• Can allow for different effects of a variable with an interaction term:

turnout_i =
$$\alpha + \beta_1$$
primary2004_i + β_2 neighbors_i+ β_3 (primary2004_i × neighbors_i) + ε_i

- Primary 2004 variable multiplied by the neighbors variable.
 - Equal to 1 if voted in 2004 (primary2004 == 1) and received neighbors mailer (neighbors == 1)
 - Easiest to understand by investigating predicted values.

Predicted values from non-interacted model

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$$\begin{array}{c|c} & \mathsf{Control}\; (Z_i = 0) & \mathsf{Neighbors}\; (Z_i = 1) \\ \hline \mathsf{non\text{-}voter}\; (X_i = 0) & \hat{\alpha} & \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_2 \\ \mathsf{voter}\; (X_i = 1) & & & \end{array}$$

•

0

• Let $X_i = \text{primary} 2004_i$ and $Z_i = \text{neighbors}_i$:

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• Let $X_i = \text{primary2004}_i$ and $Z_i = \text{neighbors}_i$:

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- Effect of Neighbors for voters: $(\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_2) (\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_1) = \hat{\beta}_2$

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$$\hat{Y}_i = \hat{lpha} + \hat{eta}_1 X_i + \hat{eta}_2 Z_i + \hat{eta}_3 X_i Z_i$$

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$$\hat{Y}_i=\hat{lpha}+\hat{eta}_1$$
primary $2004_i+\hat{eta}_2$ neighbors $_i$ $+\hat{eta}_3$ (primary $2004_i imes$ neighbors $_i$)

12 / 14

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2004 primary non-voter	$\hat{\alpha}$	$\hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_2$
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• $\hat{\alpha}$: turnout rate for 2004 nonvoters in control group.

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- $\hat{\beta}_1$: avg difference in turnout between 2004 voters and nonvoters.

$$\hat{Y}_i=\hat{lpha}+\hat{eta}_1$$
primary $2004_i+\hat{eta}_2$ neighbors $_i$ $+\hat{eta}_3$ (primary $2004_i imes$ neighbors $_i$)

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- $\hat{\alpha}$: turnout rate for 2004 nonvoters in control group.
- $\hat{\beta}_1$: avg difference in turnout between 2004 voters and nonvoters.
- $\hat{\beta}_2$: effect of neighbors for 2004 nonvoters.

$$\hat{Y}_i=\hat{lpha}+\hat{eta}_1$$
primary $2004_i+\hat{eta}_2$ neighbors $_i$ $+\hat{eta}_3$ (primary $2004_i imes$ neighbors $_i$)

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- $\hat{\alpha}$: turnout rate for 2004 nonvoters in control group.
- $\hat{\beta}_1$: avg difference in turnout between 2004 voters and nonvoters.
- $\hat{\beta}_2$: effect of neighbors for 2004 nonvoters.
- $\hat{\beta}_3$: difference in the effect of neighbors mailer between 2004 voters and nonvoters.

• You can include an interaction with var1:var2:

```
social.neighbor <- social %>%
  mutate(neighbors = ifelse(messages=="Neighbors",1,
                            ifelse(messages=="Control",0,NA)))
  select(primary2006,primary2004,neighbors) %>%
  drop na()
fit <- lm(primary2006 ~ primary2004 + neighbors +
          primary2004:neighbors, data = social.neighbor)
coef(fit)
             (Intercept)
##
                                   primary2004
```

```
## 0.23710990 0.14869507

## neighbors primary2004:neighbors

### 0.6020617

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```

```
coef(fit)
              (Intercept)
##
                                      primary2004
##
               0.23710990
                                       0.14869507
```

neighbors primary2004:neighbors ## 0.06929617 ## 0.02722908

```
coef(fit)

## (Intercept) primary2004
## 0.23710990 0.14869507
## neighbors primary2004:neighbors
## 0.06929617 0.02722908
```

Compare coefficients to earlier approach:

```
NonvotersATE$ate_nv
```

```
## [1] 0.06929617
```

```
coef(fit)

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Compare coefficients to earlier approach:

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VotersATE$ate v - NonvotersATE$ate nv
```

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