

there exists a computerized procedure P that if allowed to run indefinitely will produce a list of all of the Gödel numbers of α 's axioms and which will list no other Gödel number besides these. Using this notation, we can now give the statement of a stronger version of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem:

Theorem 2 *Every consistent recursively enumerable axiom system α is unable to prove some logically valid Π_1^* sentence. (Also, α cannot prove every logically valid Π_1 sentence.)*

The proof of Theorem 2 has a generally similar structure to Theorem 1's proof. However, its details (which appear in Mendelson's textbook) are somewhat more complicated. They will not appear here.

Comment 2.6. Theorem 2 is stronger than Theorem 1 because it indicates that no computerized algorithm can be used to generate an axiom system that enables us to find all true Π_1^* or Π_1 sentences ! It can be viewed as saying that Artificial Intelligence will never be able to reach the full goal that at least science fiction writers have set for it ! The theory of NP-hardness is also related to this issue.

Comment 2.7. In my view, the main philosophical implication of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem is that computer science and computers can never achieve a set of over-ambitious goals, because of the "undecidability problems" raised by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. Rather a more mature approach for computer science is to restrict itself to well-defined narrowly constructed engineering-style problems — where the essentially "undecidable tasks" that are unrealistically over-ambitious are avoided.

The opening paragraph of an article about Gödel in the March 19, 1999 issue of Time Magazine [6] stated that “many scholars consider Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem to be the *most important result* of 20-th century mathematics”. The editors of Time Magazine were very careful to use the word “many” in the preceding sentence because there is no unanimous opinion among scholars about what are the say five most important results in 20th century mathematics. However my point is that while some scholars may not agree with the cautious skepticism I expressed in Comment 2.7 about the importance for Computer Science focusing on narrowly defined problems, there should be no question that the Incompleteness Theorem is an important result, that has implications about what directions Computer Science can and cannot profitably pursue.

But what does the Incompleteness Theorem really mean? And what does it imply to for computer science when Theorem 2 applies to all “recursively enumerable” axiom systems?

The answer to these questions are likely to be quite challenging. They may not be resolved during our life times. Or ever?

We will now add the new Remarks 2.8 and 2.9 into this Year-2020 version of our notes.

Remark 2.8 The main core result of this chapter is its Theorem 1. This may, at first, appear to be mysterious because Theorem 1’s self-referencing mechanism is similar to a puzzling maze of mirrors that can be found in an amusement park. It is known that if a human stands between two mirrors (one behind him and the other in front of him) then he will see an almost endless cascade of reflections of himself.

This near endless cascade of images can be quite stunning but it is not caused by one or EVEN TWO mirrors in pure isolation. Instead, its mesmerizing effect is caused by combination of four objects. These are the two mirrors combined with:

1. A point-like Light Source generating photons bouncing between these mirrors.
2. A human being (with eyes and a brain) observing his many stunning images generated by the two puzzling mirrors with their reflecting photons

The point is that this almost-infinite cascade of reflections is not generated by one of its components in isolation. Rather, it is due to their subtle interaction.

And so analogously, Theorem 1's subtle Incompleteness Effect *CANNOT be attributed to ONE ISOLATED fundamental cause*. Instead, it is due to the complex interaction between four agents. (These are the two sentences appearing in Lines (22) and (23), interacting with the paradigms specified by Lemmas 5 and 6.)

In other words, it is an over-simplification to examine any of Lines (22) and (23) or Lemmas 5 and 6 *in isolation* from its other interacting agents. Thus just as a mirror in a cascade of mirrors cannot be fully appreciated without viewing its interaction with the other mirrors, *with* their basic common light source *and with* their joint mental observer, Lines (22) and (23) *can only* be fully appreciated *when their combination with Lemmas 5 and 6 is jointly considered*. Then the penultimate implications of Gödel's Theorem does suddenly become very apparent.

Remark 2.9. My wise friend, the Prof Harry Hunt, once told me that the job of a professor is “to interpret” rather than simply reiterate the contents of a textbook. Fortunately when class notes are written, one can be more flexible and switch back-

and-forth between a formal discussion and their intuitive interpretations. Thus, it is noteworthy that:

The preceding page did not mean *to exactly suggest* that Lines (22) and (23) and Lemmas 5 and 6 should only be considered automatically together.

Obviously, each such object should be initially treated individually, as well. However, their most interesting implication does not arise from each item's ISOLATED INTERPRETATION.

Instead, the *main significance* of Lines (22) and (23) and Lemmas 5 and 6 follows when they are seen as four components of a dizzying machine interacting with itself.

Thus, a more Go-SLOW approach is needed, where one patiently watches the photons bounce between our analogs of mirrors to bring about their forced collective conclusion.

3 The Second Incompleteness Theorem

The axiom system Peano Arithmetic (PA) was defined by Section 3.1 of Mendelson's textbook. It essentially has three function symbols corresponding to Addition, Multiplication and Successor and thus recognizes these three operation as "total" (using Definition 1.9's notation). Its chief feature is that it includes the Principle of Induction as an axiomatic assumption (i.e. see page 150's "S-9" axiom scheme.)

 **Definition 3.1.** Let α and β denote two axiom systems. We will say β is an

Extension of α and write $\beta \supset \alpha$ iff β can prove all α 's theorems.

In Gödel's 1931 paper [1], both his First and Second Incompleteness Theorems had appeared. The former states that neither Peano Arithmetic nor any recursively enumerable extension of it can prove all the true Π_1 sentences. The Second Incompleteness Theorem states that if α represents either Peano Arithmetic or any recursively enumerable extension of it, then α must be unable to prove its own consistency.

 Generalizations of the Incompleteness Theorem, subsequent to 1931, have shown both the First and Second Incompleteness Theorems also apply to many axiom systems weaker than Peano Arithmetic (PA). One of the main authors to develop partial exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem was Willard (for certain axiom systems weaker than PA).

We will not discuss my work in this handout. Our goal will instead be to prove a version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. My work will be discussed in a later course in more detail and perhaps summarized in the last two weeks of this course (if time allows).

 **Definition 3.2.** The axiom system PA+ will be defined to be a minor extension of Peano Arithmetic (PA) that contains function symbols for all the U-Grounding Functions, in addition to the function symbols for Addition and Multiplication. Thus, PA+ will include the nine axioms given in Section 3.1 of Mendelson's textbook plus the 36 axioms listed in Table I, defining the U-Grounding functions. You should note that:

1. PA+ recognizes the validity of the Principle of Induction because it includes the axiom scheme S-9 from page 155 of Mendelson's book.
2. The 36 axioms from Table-I will cause PA+ to be an essentially trivial extension of PA, via its use of the U-Grounding function symbols and their natural implications under the "S-9" inductive schema.

Fact 3.3 The key point in understanding Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem is that Lemma 5's proof can be formally done by the axiom system PA+ (indeed also by PA). This means that PA+ can prove the following sentence:

** No consistent and regular Δ_0^* axiom system α can prove the sentence $U(\alpha)$.

The intuitive reason that PA+ can prove ** is that it contains the axioms of the Principle of Induction. (The formal verification of ** via PA+'s inductive methodology is quite routine, and it is omitted.)

Definition 3.4. The symbol $\text{Cons}(\alpha)$ will denote a Π_1^* formula declaring the axiom system α is consistent.

Clarification: Let $\bar{\alpha}$ denote the integer that is the Gödel number of the formula that defines the axiom system " α ". Combining Definition 3.4 with $\bar{\alpha}$'s notation, we can now rewrite statement ** as the following essentially equivalent Π_2^* encoded sentence:

*** $\forall \bar{\alpha}$ If $\bar{\alpha}$ is a regular Δ_0^* axiom system satisfying $\text{Cons}(\bar{\alpha})$ then $\bar{\alpha}$ cannot prove the sentence $U(\bar{\alpha})$.

- PA+ recognizes the validity of the Principle of Induction because it includes the axiom scheme S-9 from page 155 of Mendelson's book.
- The 36 axioms from Table-I will cause PA+ to be an essentially trivial extension of PA, via its use of the U-Grounding function symbols and their natural implications under the "S-9" inductive schema.

Fact 3.3 The key point in understanding Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem

is that Lemma 5's proof can be formally done by the axiom system PA+ (indeed also by PA). This means that PA+ can prove the following sentence:

** No consistent and regular Δ_0^* axiom system α can prove the sentence $U(\alpha)$.

The intuitive reason that PA+ can prove ** is that it contains the axioms of the Principle of Induction. (The formal verification of ** via PA+'s inductive methodology is quite routine, and it is omitted.)

Definition 3.4. The symbol $\text{Cons}(\alpha)$ will denote a Π_1^* sentence declaring the axiom system α is consistent.

Clarification: Let $\bar{\alpha}$ denote the integer that is the Gödel number of the formula that defines the axiom system " α ". Combining Definition 3.4 with $\bar{\alpha}$'s notation, we can now rewrite statement ** as the following essentially equivalent Π_1^* encoded sentence:

*** $\forall \bar{\alpha}$ If $\bar{\alpha}$ is a regular Δ_0^* axiom system satisfying $\text{Cons}(\bar{\alpha})$ then $\bar{\alpha}$ cannot prove the sentence $U(\bar{\alpha})$.

The reason it is desirable to rewrite ϕ into ψ 's equivalent form is that the latter expression is technically the *precise sentence* which is written in the *exact language* used by PA+

We have developed two possible proofs of the Second Incompleteness Theorem that employ the formalisms of Definition 3.4 and statement **. Our first proof was used in course notes during 2004-2018, and a second more succinct and better proof is given below:

3.1 A Succinct Proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem

Our proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem will focus around the following Lemma

Lemma 7 *Let us assume the axiom system PA+ is consistent (because all of conventional mathematics would collapse if it was not). The axiom system PA+ then cannot prove the Π_1^0 theorem, $\text{Cons}(\text{PA}+)$, declaring its own consistency.*

The rough intuitive reason Lemma 7 holds is that is that PA+ is one example of an axiom system that satisfies the if-clause for requirements applied to π in formula $\phi \rightarrow \pi$. (In particular, this invariant is a simple consequence of Fact 3.3 and our observation that $\phi \rightarrow \pi$ is just a rewrite of ϕ in a different notation).

We will now provide the reader with the exact details behind Lemma 7's proof. It uses, exactly, the formal language that PA+ employs. Our formal discussion also uses the following notation:

1. $\lceil \Phi \rceil$ will denote Φ 's Gödel number,
2. Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) will be an abbreviation for

$$\exists p \text{ Prf}_{PA+} (\lceil \Phi \rceil, p) \quad (26)$$

3. $\overline{\text{Verify}}(\lceil \Phi \rceil)$ is simply the Gödel number for “ Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) ” (We will always use this over-line symbol to denote the Gödel numbers for our stipulated proof encodings.)
4. Double-Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) is an abbreviation for

$$\exists q \text{ Prf}_{PA+} (\overline{\text{Verify}}(\lceil \Phi \rceil), q) \quad (27)$$

This notation may look complicated, but the idea behind it is actually quite simple. Thus Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) indicates that there is a proof of Φ from PA+, while the construct Double-Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) indicates that there is *proof of the EXISTENCE of a formalized proof of statement Φ* (from again the base axiom system of PA+).

Logicians usually don't worry about the distinction between a verification and a *double-verification* because it is usually an unimportant distinction. This is because PA+ can trivially prove the following fact:

- If Φ satisfies Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) then it also satisfies Double-Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$).

The proof of • follows by an easy induction argument. It is often not explicitly formalized in many logic textbooks because the Invariant • is quite obvious. (It stems from the fact that all proofs, by definition, have finite lengths. This implies that “double” verifications also do trivially generate finite-sized proofs, whose properties are also naturally characterized by the Principle of Induction.)

The reason for our interest in • is that it will lead to a nicely compact proof for our needed Lemma 7. (Hilbert-Bernays [3] were the first to notice the usefulness of an analog of •'s identity for helping prove basic analogs of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. We will now slightly modify their methods.)

Proof of Lemma 7 *For the sake of constructing a proof-by-contradiction,* let us entertain the “temporary” assumption that PA+ could prove $\text{Cons}(\text{PA}^+)$. Recall that Fact 3.3 noted that PA+ had a capacity to prove the statement **. Since PA+ can trivially prove that it is a regular axiom system, it can easily apply ** to verify² the statement that:

PA+ cannot prove $\mathfrak{U}(\text{PA}^+)$.

We next observe that the statement # can be easily inferred by PA+ to be logically equivalent to the sentence $\mathfrak{U}(\text{PA}^+)$. (This is essentially because PA+ can easily show that the only integer K satisfying $\text{Subst}(N, K)$ in Equations (23) through (25) is $\mathfrak{U}(\text{PA}^+)$'s Gödel number.)

Thus, the “temporary” italicized assumption (from the preceding paragraph) has established that PA+ can BOTH prove # and prove that # is logically equivalent to the sentence $\mathfrak{U}(\text{PA}^+)$. This implies that PA+ also has a simultaneous capacity

1. to prove the sentence $\mathfrak{U}(\text{PA}^+)$ (since it is obviously equivalent to #), and
2. also to disprove the same sentence $\mathfrak{U}(\text{PA}^+)$. (The latter is an immediate consequence of the definition of $\mathfrak{U}(\text{PA}^+)$ and of our prior invariant of •.)

²This proof is entirely trivial because of our observation that ** and *** are logically identical statements, except for a slight difference in notation.

Hence using this kind of "diagonalization paradox", we can conclude that if PA+ proves Cons(PA+), then it must be inconsistent because Items 1 and 2 will then demonstrate it would prove both a sentence $\mathbb{U}(\text{PA+})$ and its natural formalized negation (i.e. the sentence $\neg \mathbb{U}(\text{PA+})$).

Since PA+ is presumed to be consistent by conventional mathematics, it follows that PA+ must be unable to prove its own consistency, to avoid this clearly impossible circumstance.

Clarification 3.5. Let me now repeat the last part of this proof in slow motion so that you understand, line-for-line, what it exactly has done. Suppose that you have proven the following two sentences:

1. $X \Rightarrow Y$
2. $\neg Y$

Then of course, you could conclude that $\neg X$ is true, via a proof by contradiction. The point is that the preceding proof of Lemma 7 uses essentially this kind of reasoning where

- A. X is the statement that "PA+ proves Cons(PA+) "
- B. Y is the statement that "PA+ is inconsistent".

Then since one usually presumes that PA+ is consistent, one must naturally conclude that $\neg Y$ and hence also $\neg X$ are formally true statements. But $\neg X$ amounts to the assertion that PA+ is unable to prove Cons(PA+). (This is exactly the statement that Lemma 7 sought to prove !!!!)

Thus, what I did in the preceding Paragraph 3.5 was repeat in slow motion the last part of Lemma 7's proof, so that you can have a somewhat better understanding of its underlying mechanism.

Theorem 3 (A version of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem) *Let α denote any Δ_0^* encodeable axiom system that is an extension of PA+ and which is consistent. The axiom system α then cannot prove the Π_1^* theorem, $\text{Cons}(\alpha)$, declaring its own consistency.*

Proof: By similar reasoning as was used in Lemma 7's proof. In particular, the same reasoning that Lemma 7 used to establish that PA+ was unable to prove $\text{Cons}(\text{PA}+)$ will also show that α cannot prove $\text{Cons}(\alpha)$. \square

Comment 3.6. The original version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem by Gödel was slightly stronger than Theorem 3. It used PA (rather than PA+) as its base axiom system. It stated that no recursively enumerable axiom system that was an extension of PA could formally prove its own consistency.

Also, let Q^* denote an axiom system, identical to PA, except that the Principle of Induction is removed. (This means that Q^* differs from PA's definition on Page 155 by removing all the S-9 axioms.) In 1985, a JSL paper by Pudlak [5] essentially showed that no extension of Q^* could prove its own consistency.

Comment 3.7. We will discuss the Second Incompleteness Theorem in more detail during a second course. Our discussion will include the generalizations of it (by myself and others) and also partial boundary-case exceptions to it that I have developed [8, 9, 11].

Doesn't
plan
me.
K.

3.2 Philosophical Comments

Although the Second Incompleteness Theorem is technically correct, there is a very deep philosophical question it raises — with broad implications for Computer Science and other disciplines. It is the following question

Why do Human Beings choose to think and cogitate if they did not have faith that Thinking is a useful process? The problem is that Theorem 3 states that any formalism having faith in its own consistency will collapse in inconsistency. How do Human Beings manage to grapple with this inherent dilemma in their day-to-day life? How do Human Beings motivate themselves to gather the energy to think if they did not have faith in the consistency of their thought processes — notwithstanding the problems raised by Gödel's two theorems? And how will the computers of the future attempt to imitate the higher Human Thinking process when they confront the same problem?

My papers about Self-Justifying axiom systems will be discussed in a later course. They will illustrate how some non-conventional Logics can escape the reach of Gödel's Second (but not First) Incompleteness Theorem and possess some knowledge about their own consistency.

I don't want to over-state the importance of what I am doing because both Gödel's theorems are technically correct. On the other hand, the web site for the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* describes itself as "Logic's foremost journal", and my paper [8] was the longest of the 120+ papers published by the JSL during 2001. It described

non-conventional logics that evade the Second Incompleteness Theorem. If you are interested, they will be discussed next semester.

4 Other Comments about Incompleteness and this Course



In addition to exploring Section 2.7 in detail during this course, I also plan to do briefly survey Section 2.8 through 2.10. That survey will include a description of the statements proven in these sections, but not their formal proofs.

For example, the main Proposition 2.28 of Section 2.9 will explain that there is no meaningful difference between the axiom systems that I call PA and PA+ in these lecture notes. If L' is a language that only has function symbols for representing the operations of Addition, Multiplication and Successor then both these axiom systems will prove the same set of theorems about the language L' , by Proposition 2.28.

Some logic books would call PA+ a “conservative extension” of PA because it proves added theorems only when one examines language primitives not in PA’s language (i.e. the sentences about the “U-Grounding Functions”).

Proposition 2.28 implies such a result when one (after an essentially very minor change in notation) sets $K = PA$ and $K^{\#} = PA+$. And so you may wonder why I chose to use the axiom system PA+ rather than PA during these lecture notes when there is no meaningful difference between them when they use the language of PA ??

The answer to this question is solely pedagogic. The main theorems are easier to prove when one uses a broader language. This is because of a phenomena, similar to

the Deduction Theorem occurs, where one can compress a proof sharply by taking certain shortcuts.

And so the results about PA+ turn out to be easier to prove than their analogs about PA, although the latter is only a conservative extension of the former.

On the other hand, there is a historic reason why logicians have chosen mostly to work in the framework of PA, rather than PA+. It is that PA is the historic language of the simplest branch of Mathematics, since its basic function primitives are Addition and Multiplication (and nothing more). Gödel's 1931 version of the Incompleteness Theorem shocked the world of Mathematics because it showed that undecidability results arose in such a foundational branch of Mathematics.

It also answered an open question that was explicitly raised by the mathematician David Hilbert.

5 Baby Set Theory and the Completeness Theorem

Let Γ be a set of axioms for some language L , and Ψ be any sentence in L 's language. Gödel's Completeness Theorem states essentially that if Ψ is valid in every model for Γ 's axioms then Ψ will have a proof from Γ using the Hilbert-deduction method, appearing in Section 2.3 of Mendelson's textbook. It thus explains why Section 2.3's proof formalism is very natural (by showing that the Hilbert Deduction system proves exactly the full set of theorems that one would want to have formally proven).

It is not our intention in this Section to repeat the proof of the Completeness

Theorem that Mendelson presents in Section 2.7 (because we do not know a better way to present it). However, my impression is that Section 2.7's proof will be easier to read if a student examines my discussion in this section first. This is because Section 2.7 presumes a knowledge of Baby Set Theory, only briefly surveyed in the book's preface. I believe that I can make Mendelson's Section 2.7 easier to read, if I first present some short 4-page introduction to Baby Set Theory that will help you understand Section 2.7.

In our discussion, letter such as S and T , will denote sets. We will say S has cardinality less-than-or-equal to T 's cardinality (and write $S \preceq T$) iff there exists a one-to-one function, called say F , from the set S into T . We will say that S and T have the same cardinality (and write $S \cong T$) if the function F is an "onto" function from S to T . That means every member of T has some member of S mapping onto it under our function F .

Also, the symbol $S \prec T$ denotes the identity:

$$S \preceq T \wedge \neg S \cong T \quad (28)$$

Below are three well known facts about the cardinality operator proven somewhere in Chapter 4 of Mendelson's book:

$$\forall S \forall T [S \preceq T \wedge T \preceq S] \Leftrightarrow S \cong T \quad (29)$$

$$\forall S \forall T S \preceq T \vee T \preceq S \quad (30)$$

$$\forall S \forall T S \cong T \Leftrightarrow T \cong S \quad (31)$$

Some of the results about the cardinality operator are a bit counter-intuitive. For example, let I be set of all positive integers, and let E be the set of positive even

numbers. Then the following lemma holds:

Lemma 8 $I \cong E$

Proof: Consider a function F that maps the integer x onto $2x$. Since F is a 1-to-1 and onto function, it implies $I \cong E$. \square

Let $\text{Power}(S)$ be defined as the set of all subsets of the set S . It is so-named because the power-set of a finite set of n elements has a cardinality of exactly 2^n elements.

Also, define $S \times T$ to be the cross product of the sets S and T . (It consists of all ordered pairs (x,y) where $x \in S$ and $y \in T$.) We will also use the symbol $\text{Square}(S)$ to denote the cross-product set $S \times S$.

For sets of finite cardinality, it is of course true that:

$$S \prec \text{Power}(S) \quad (32)$$

$$S \prec \text{Square}(S) \quad (33)$$

However, the generalization of the above two inequalities is more complicated for sets with infinite cardinalities. It turns out that Equation (32) holds for all sets S of infinite cardinality. However, Equation (33) does not also hold. Among infinite-sized sets, Equation (33) should be replaced by:

$$S \cong \text{Square}(S) \quad (34)$$

For the sake of simplicity, I will prove the validity of Equations (32) and (34) for the case where S is the set of positive integers denoted as I . It should be emphasized these identities also hold for ALL SETS of infinite cardinality.

numbers. Then the following lemma holds:



Lemma 8 $I \cong E$

Proof: Consider a function F that maps the integer x onto $2x$. Since F is a 1-to-1 and onto function, it implies $I \cong E$. \square

Let $\text{Power}(S)$ be defined as the set of all subsets of the set S . It is so-named because the power-set of a finite set of n elements has a cardinality of exactly 2^n elements.

Also, define $S \times T$ to be the cross product of the sets S and T . (It consists of all ordered pairs (x,y) where $x \in S$ and $y \in T$.) We will also use the symbol $\text{Square}(S)$ to denote the cross-product set $S \times S$.



For sets of finite cardinality, it is of course true that:

$$S \prec \text{Power}(S) \quad (32)$$

$$S \prec \text{Square}(S) \quad (33)$$

However, the generalization of the above two inequalities is more complicated for sets with infinite cardinality. It turns out that Equation (32) holds for all sets S of infinite cardinality, while Equation (33) does not also hold. Among infinite-sized sets,

(34)

prove the validity of Equations (32) and (34)

of positive integers denoted as I . It should be

for ALL SETS of infinite cardinality.

Lemma 9 $I \prec \text{Power}(I)$

Proof: Let T_i denote an arbitrary subset of I . Define the characteristic sequence of T_i to be an infinite sequence of Boolean values $b_i^1, b_i^2, b_i^3, \dots$ where

1. $b_i^j = 1$ when $j \in T_i$
2. $b_i^j = 0$ when the above membership relation fails.

We will prove Lemma 9 by using a proof-by contradiction. Let us therefore temporarily entertain the hypothesis that the lemma was false. Then there would exist a 1-to-1 function from I onto $\text{Power}(I)$. We will show that this is impossible by constructing a subset, called T_* of I , that does not have any integer $x \in I$ mapping onto it (under F).

Let us define the bit sequence c^1, c^2, c^3, \dots to have c^j represent the Boolean value of $\neg b_j^j$. Let us define T_* to be the subset of I whose characteristic sequence is c^1, c^2, c^3, \dots .

It is apparent that for each i that $T_i \neq T_*$ (because their two characteristic functions will differ in their i -th bit values). Hence, our proof-by-contradiction has accomplished its purpose because it demonstrated that it is impossible for any integer i to have $F(i) = T_*$.

□

Comment 5.1. The above proof was devised by Cantor during the 19-th century.

It is the historically first example of what logicians call a “Diagonalization Proof”.
(All diagonalization proofs, similar to the Incompleteness proofs in the prior two

sections, are proofs-by-contradiction. They thus always have a non-constructive flavor to them.)

Lemma 10 $I \cong \text{Square}(I)$

Proof: Consider a function F that has the following definition:

1. F maps the integer 1 onto the ordered pair (1, 1).
2. F maps the integers 2 and 3 onto the ordered pairs of (2, 1) and (1, 2).
3. F maps the integers 4, 5 and 6 onto the ordered pairs of (3, 1), (2, 2) and (1, 3).
4. F maps the integers 7, 8, 9 and 10 onto the ordered pairs of (4, 1), (3, 2), (2, 3) and (1, 4).
5. etc.

It is obvious that such a function F establishes that $I \cong \text{Square}(I)$ \square

Definition 5.2 The literature calls a set S Denumerable or Countable iff it has the same cardinality as the set of positive integers. Thus, for example the sets E and $\text{Square}(I)$ were shown to be “denumerable” (or “countable”) by Lemmas 8 and 10, while Lemma 9 showed that $\text{Power}(I)$ was not also denumerable.

Comment about Mendelson’s Book. It often uses the words “Denumerable” or “Countable” from Definition 5.2. However, the definitions of these constructs appears only in a very tersely written passage in the textbook’s preface. That is the

main reason why I felt it would be helpful to write this section. It should help you better understand Section 2.7's discussion.

Definition 5.3 The symbol \aleph_0 has also been used to denote the cardinality of the set of positive integers. Under set theory notation, \aleph_{i+1} is the cardinality of a set whose size is equivalent to the power-set of a set of \aleph_i cardinality.

How This Section Should Have Helped You: Each of the concepts defined above appear in Section 2.7 of Mendelson's textbook, and that is why I thought it might be helpful for my lecture notes to have a short 4-page section reviewing these definitions. I am not sure whether or not I will cover Corollary 2.20 in this course. I will definitely not do the parts of Section 2.7 that come after it. (You should read at

least Corollary 2.20's statement — although perhaps not its proof.)

Appendix A : Summary of Gödel Encoding Method

This appendix will briefly summarize our formal method for generating Gödel numbers for logical sentence and proofs. This encoding scheme will be roughly analogous to the natural B-adic encoding methods described by Hájek-Pudlák [2] and Wilkie-Paris [7] — insofar as the number of utilized bits to encode a semantic object will be approximately proportional to the length of such an expression written by hand.

Our encoding scheme will use the following 24 language symbols to formalize a logical sentence or proof:

1. The standard connective symbols of \wedge , \vee , \neg , \rightarrow , \forall and \exists .
2. The left and right parenthesis symbols, and also a comma symbol (to separate the input arguments for a function).
3. Ten function symbols for representing the ten U-grounding functions of subtraction, division, logarithm, etc.
4. The relation symbols of “ = ” and “ \leq ”.
5. The symbol \hat{V} for designating the presence of a basic variable symbol.
6. The symbol \hat{C} for designating the presence of a constant symbol C .
7. A special period symbol for separating the formulae that appear within a proof

Let a byte denote an unit of six bits. Define a proof as being either a sequence of

bytes (or equivalently being an integer, written in base 64). Each of the 24 symbols (above) will be given some unique 6-bit code, ranging between 32 and 55. Our method

for representing the presence of the i -th variable v_i will be to encode it as a string of $\lceil \log_{32}(i + 1) \rceil + 1$ bytes, where the first byte is the “ \hat{V} ” symbol and the remaining bytes encode i as a base-32 number. The same convention will be used to denote the presence of the i -th constant symbol C_i except its first byte will be the “ \hat{C} ” symbol.

Our byte-styled encoding method will produce proof strings whose length is approximately proportional to the effort write down such a proof by hand. The Logic literature uses the phrase Gödel Number or Gödel Encoding to describe the positive integer N that represents the sequence of characters $D_1, D_2, D_3, \dots D_n$ as a Base-64 integer. (Actually, the literature offers several different possible Gödel-like encoding schemes, and the one used in Section 3.4 of Mendelson’s textbook [4] is more complicated than the variant defined in this Appendix.)

There are many analogs of such types of encodings in the prior literature (see for example the Hájek-Pudlák textbook [2]). Such compressed encodings are usually considered to be preferable and more efficient than an uncompressed encoding method, using say the Chinese Remainder Theorem in Mendelson’s textbook [4]. All our theorems have analogs under such uncompressed encoding methods, but they are substantially more meaningful when one uses efficiently compressed encodings.

PA + well s Bt h
Appendix B : How to Construct the Proof of $\neg \vee(PA +)$ and \checkmark
If (?) PA + could verify its own consistency

I should probably delete Appendix B because my new 2020 version of Class notes does not use Appendix B after I revised Section 3’s proof so it is no longer necessary.

I have retained Appendix B simply because I am nervous deleting it, although it

seems to no longer have a purpose.

In particular, this short appendix will not be needed again unless I revise Section 3 in the future.

This appendix will explain line-by-line how if Q was a proof of $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}+)$ then we could also expand Q into a longer proof of the opposing sentence $\neg \mathcal{U}(\text{PA}+)$. My proof is similar to techniques employed in Section 2. However, I feel no guilt repeating those techniques here because students may likely be feeling confused during the first few times that they witness diagonalization proofs. Essentially, the proof in this appendix is similar to the earlier discussion, except that I will be replacing the phrase $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$ with $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}+)$.

*first
no nesL fix e9/26*

*Following
Section 2's
analog,
I pl*

To achieve our task, we need to first encode the sentence $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}+)$. Let us recall how Section 2 had done this. We will again let $\Gamma(g)$ denote the following formula

$$\forall h \forall p \quad \{ \text{Subst}(g, h) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Prf}_{\text{PA}+}(h, p) \} \quad (35)$$

Let N denote the Gödel number of Equation (35)'s formula, and let us recall that the term \bar{N} was defined by Comment 1.1. Then as Section 2 had explained, the Π_1^1 sentence that encoded $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}+)$ was the sentence $\Gamma(\bar{N})$.

In other words from Equation (35), this implies that $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}+)$ (which is the same as $\Gamma(\bar{N})$) is the following sentence:

$$\forall h \forall p \quad \{ \text{Subst}(\bar{N}, h) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Prf}_{\text{PA}+}(h, p) \} \quad (36)$$

Let K denote $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}+)$'s Gödel number. Then since Q is assumed to be a

*B4/1) fo- fhsr vrodn wh wih h sxe
a vepehto!*

proof of $\mathcal{U}(PA+)$, the statements in Equations (37) and (38) are both true.

$$\text{Subst}(\bar{N}, \bar{K}) \quad (37)$$

$$\text{Prf}_{PA+}(\bar{K}, \bar{Q}) \quad (38)$$

Since Equations (37) and (38) represent logically valid Δ_0^* formulae, it follows from Lemma 2 that both these sentences are provable from $PA+$.

hex

The final point is that it is trivial to verify that the conjunction of Equations (37) and (38) implies Equation (36) is false. Hence since $PA+$ can prove (37) and (38), it must be able to prove $\neg \mathcal{U}(PA+)$, because $\neg \mathcal{U}(PA+)$'s proof is constructed from the proofs of (37) and (38) via an entirely routine expansion of these other two proofs.

Homework Problem: Suppose that p_1 and p_2 are proofs of the Δ_0^* sentences in Equations (37) and (38). Finish the last paragraph of the above proof by showing how to construct from p_1 and p_2 a third proof, called say p_3 , of the sentence $\neg \mathcal{U}(PA+)$.

Added Remark. I will repeat a comment that was made on Page 1. You are the first class to receive these lecture notes. Therefore, I ask you to let me know what typos you have found and which points confuse you? For example, if I did not carefully define some construct that you wish to understand, please let me know what it is?

These lecture notes will be improved by your feedback.

Very PAH

Appendix C: A Simpler Proof of Löb's Theorem

This appendix will provide a brief outline of a simpler proof for Löb's Theorem than appears in Mendelson's textbook.

I saw a published version of this proof. For the sake of simplifying its notation, it had assumed the germane axiom system was Peano Arithmetic and that the germane deduction method was the Hilbert-style formalism (appearing in Mendelson's textbook).

I am almost 100 % certain this technique could generalize for the paradigm appearing in Mendelson's textbook. However for simplicity, I will stick with the assumptions made by prior authors.

We will use the following notation:

1. $\Box(\Phi)$ will mean that there is a Hilbert-style proof of Φ from Peano Arithmetic (PA).
2. $\text{PA}^{-\Psi}$ will denote the union of the axiom system PA with $\neg\Psi$, in a context where Ψ is *some special fixed axiom* that will be defined later.
3. $\Box^{-\Psi}(\Phi)$ will mean that there is a Hilbert-style proof of Φ from $\text{PA}^{-\Psi}$.

Obviously in general, $\Box^{-\Psi}(\Phi)$ and $\Box(\Phi)$ WILL FAIL to be equivalent to each other for most sentences Φ . However, there is one almost-silly-looking exception to this rule. That funny-looking exception leads to a much simpler proof of Löb's Theorem than had appeared in his 1955 paper (or most subsequent textbooks).

It is described on the next two pages. It employs the special variants of $\Box^{-\Psi}(\Phi)$ and $\Box(\Phi)$ where the Ψ (used in $\Box^{-\Psi}$'s superscript) formally replaces Φ :

Lemma 11 *The statements $\Box\neg\Psi(\Psi)$ and $\Box(\Psi)$ are logically equivalent to each other.* (This strange-looking result holds roughly because “ $\Box\neg\Psi$ ” was defined to mean that the *special sentence* “ $\neg\Psi$ ” is an additional axiom permitted in a proof.)

Proof. Almost Trivial. It is well known that Ψ has a proof from PA if and only if it has a proof from PA that begins with the temporary assumption of $\neg\Psi$ and ends with the contradictory statement of Ψ (itself). I forgot the theorem numbers, but this result has appeared in both the Enderton and Mendelson books.

The point is that by definition “ $\Box\neg\Psi(\Psi)$ ” is the contradiction proof mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Hence, it trivially follows that the statements $\Box\neg\Psi(\Psi)$ and $\Box(\Psi)$ are logically equivalent to each other.

Lemma 12 *The statement of Lemma 11 can be proven by Peano Arithmetic itself.*

Proof. Entirely routine generalization of Lemma 11's proof and omitted. (This “routine generalization” is messy to formalize, but trivial to intuitively appreciate.)

Theorem 4 (Löb's Seminal Theorem) *If PA proves $\Box(\Psi) \Rightarrow \Psi$, then PA will also prove Ψ (by itself).*

Proof by Contradiction: Suppose for the sake of establishing a contradiction that PA proved Equation (39), BUT IT DID NOT ALSO PROVE Ψ

$$\Box(\Psi) \Rightarrow \Psi \tag{39}$$

Then $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ must be consistent (since otherwise PA could prove Ψ via a proof-by-contradiction).

However, it turns out we can show that Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem will also imply that the prior sentence is false. This fact will enable us to prove Löb's Theorem (via a proof-by-contradiction) because the last sentence in the previous paragraph CANNOT be simultaneously true and false !

More precisely, $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ must be able to prove Equation (39) because PA could do this (and because $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ is an extension of PA). Also by definition $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ contains $\neg\Psi$ as an axiom. Hence, it can combine the latter fact with Equation (39) to derive

$$\neg\Box(\Psi) \quad (40)$$

Furthermore since PA (and therefore also $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$) can prove Lemma 11, it follows that $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ can use its knowledge of Equation (40)'s truth that to derive that Equation (41) is also true.

$$\neg\Box\neg\Psi(\Psi) \quad (41)$$

However, we will now deliver the punchline that will prove Löb's Theorem.

It is that from the definition of " $\Box\neg\Psi$ ", it must be true that $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ can prove (41) ONLY IF IT HAS KNOWLEDGE of its own consistency. But Gödel's Second Theorem specifies no consistent extension of PA can recognize its own consistency. Hence $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ must consequently be inconsistent.

The latter statement brings our proof-by-contradiction to its sought-after awkward end. This is because the last sentence of the first paragraph of Theorem 4's proof indicated that $\text{PA}^{\neg\Psi}$ was consistent, and the prior paragraph contradicted that assumption !

Hence, we have proven Theorem 4 because we have shown that the temporary assumption that it was false has led to a contradiction.

DECIDED NOT TO GIVE THESE QUESTIONS IN 2010

Two Thinking Exercises that You Might Wish to Try: A Henkin Sentence is a sentence (defined with the Fixed Point Theorem) that says “There IS a proof of me from Peano Arithmetic.” Note that the Henkin Sentences do differ from Gödel Sentences by replacing the phrase “IS NOT” with “IS”. Here are two thinking questions:

1. It takes only a couple of sentences to explain how one may use Löb’s Theorem to verify PA can prove the Henkin Sentence. What does this short tiny explanation look like?
2. Now here is a harder problem that may take you a day or more to do. *Without using Item 1’s result*, prove that PA proves the Henkin sentence.

The second problem is very hard because it took mathematicians 20 years to answer Henkin’s open question about whether or not PA proved the Henkin sentence. It is feasible for you to answer this question because it involves unpacking my current proof so that it proves the Henkin Sentence from first principles. However, it took me a weekend to do this seeming straightforward task; and it will also take you some time *if you choose to try it ?*

Table I: List of Π_1 Axioms Defining The U-Grounding Functions and The Relation Predicates of $=$, \leq and $<$

1. $\forall x \forall y \quad x < y \Leftrightarrow y > x$
2. $\forall x \forall y \quad x \leq y \Leftrightarrow y \geq x$
3. $\forall x \forall y \quad x \leq y \Leftrightarrow [x = y \vee x \leq y - 1]$
4. $\forall x \forall y \forall z \quad x + y = z \Leftrightarrow [z - x = y \wedge z \geq x]$
5. $\forall x \quad x + x = \text{Double}(x)$
6. $\forall x \quad x = x$
7. $\forall x \forall y \quad x = y \Rightarrow y = x$
8. $\forall x \forall y \forall z \quad \{x = y \wedge y = z\} \Rightarrow x = z$
9. $\forall x \forall y \quad x = y \Rightarrow \text{Predecessor}(x) = \text{Predecessor}(y) \wedge \text{Logarithm}(x) = \text{Logarithm}(y)$
10. $\forall x \forall y \forall a \forall b \quad \{x = a \wedge y = b\} \Rightarrow x - y = a - b \wedge \frac{x}{y} = \frac{a}{b} \wedge$
 $\text{Count}(x, y) = \text{Count}(a, b) \wedge \text{Maximum}(x, y) = \text{Maximum}(a, b) \wedge \text{Root}(x, y) = \text{Root}(a, b)$
11. $\forall x \forall y \forall a \forall b \quad \{x - y = a - b \wedge y = b\} \Rightarrow x = a$
12. $\forall x \forall y \forall a \forall b \quad \{x = a \wedge y = b \wedge x < y\} \Rightarrow a < b$
13. $\forall x \forall y \quad x = y \vee x < y \vee y < x$
14. $\forall x \forall y \forall z \quad \{x < y \wedge y < z\} \Rightarrow x < z$
15. $\forall x \quad \neg x < x$
16. $\forall x \quad x < 1 \Rightarrow x = 0$
17. $\text{Predecessor}(0) = 0$
18. $\forall x \quad x \neq 0 \Rightarrow \text{Predecessor}(x) < x$
19. $\forall x \forall y \quad \neg [\text{Predecessor}(x) < y < x]$
20. $\forall x \forall y \exists z \leq y \quad x < y \Rightarrow x = \text{Predecessor}(z)$
21. $\forall x \quad x - 0 = x$
22. $\forall x \forall y \quad y \neq 0 \Rightarrow x - y = \text{Predecessor}(x - \text{Predecessor}(y))$
23. $\forall x \forall y \quad x < y \Rightarrow \frac{x}{y} = 0$
24. $\forall x \quad \frac{x}{0} = \frac{x}{1} = x$

25. $\forall x \forall y \quad x \geq y \geq 1 \Rightarrow [\frac{x}{y} > 0 \wedge \frac{x}{y} - 1 = \frac{x-y}{y}]$
26. $\forall x \forall y \{ x \geq y \Rightarrow \text{Maximum}(x, y) = x \} \wedge \{ y \geq x \Rightarrow \text{Maximum}(x, y) = y \}$
27. $\text{Logarithm}(0)=0 \wedge \text{Logarithm}(1)=1 \wedge \text{Logarithm}(2)=2$
28. $\forall x \quad x \geq 3 \Rightarrow \text{Logarithm}(x) - 1 = \text{Logarithm}(\frac{x}{2})$
29. $\forall x \quad \text{Count}(x, 0) = \text{Count}(0, x) = 0$
30. $\forall x \quad x > 0 \Rightarrow \text{Count}(x-1, 1) \neq \text{Count}(x, 1) \leq 1$
31. $\forall x \forall y \{ \text{Count}(x, 1) > 0 \vee \text{Count}(\frac{x}{2}, y-1) > 0 \} \Rightarrow \text{Count}(x, y) > 0$
32. $\forall x \forall y \quad \text{Count}(x, y) - \text{Count}(x, 1) = \text{Count}(\frac{x}{2}, y-1)$
33. $\forall x \quad \text{Root}(0, x) = 0 \wedge \text{Root}(x, 0) = \text{Root}(x, 1) = x$
34. $\forall x \forall y \geq 2 \quad \text{Root}(x, y) \leq \text{Root}(\frac{x}{\text{Root}(x, y)}, y-1)$
35. $\forall x \forall y \geq 2 \forall z \quad z > \text{Root}(x, y) \Rightarrow z > \text{Root}(\frac{x}{z}, y-1)$
36. $\forall x \forall i \quad \text{Bit}(x, i) = \text{Count}(x, i) - \text{Count}(x, i-1)$

It is essentially unimportant, but I hope I did not leave out any axioms. I did not have the axioms 1-5 or 36 in my JSL 2001 article because it used a different notation.

References

- [1] K. Gödel, "Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und Verwandte Systeme I", *Monatshefte für Math. Phys.* 37 (1931) pp. 349-360.
- [2] P. Hájek and P. Pudlák, *Metamathematics of First Order Arithmetic*, Springer 1991.
- [3] D. Hilbert and P. Bernays, *Grundlagen der Mathematik*, Springer 1939.
- [4] E. Mendelson, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, Fifth Edition, Chapman & Hall (2010).
- [5] P. Pudlák, "Cuts, Consistency Statements and Interpretations", *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 50 (1985) pp.423-442.
- [6] March 29, 1999 issue of Time Magazine, pages 132-134.
- [7] A. J. Wilkie and J. B. Paris, "On the Scheme of Induction for Bounded Arithmetic", *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* (35) 1987, 261-302
- [8] D. Willard, "Self-Verifying Systems, the Incompleteness Theorem and the Tangibility Reflection Principle", *Journal Symbolic Logic* 66 (2001) 536-596.
- [9] D. Willard, "How to Extend The Semantic Tableaux And Cut-Free Versions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem Almost to Robinson's Arithmetic Q", *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 67 (2002) pp. 465-496.
- [10] D. Willard, "Some New Exceptions for the Semantic Tableaux Version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem", in *Automated Reasoning with Semantic Tableaux and Related Methods*, Springer-Verlag LNAI#2381, (2002) 281-297.
- [11] Willard, D. E.: "On the Tender Line Separating Generalizations and Boundary-Case Exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem under Semantic Tableaux Deduction", in Proceedings of LFCS 2020 conference (see pp. 268-286 of Volume 11972 of Springer's LNCS series).

2 The First Incompleteness Theorem

›

This section will sketch a proof of a version of the First Incompleteness Theorem. I will omit some details in the proof that are basically trivial to verify. Our version of the First Incompleteness Theorem will be less powerful than the stronger version in Mendelson's textbook [4]. However, its main virtue is that it is quite easy to prove. Also, our discussion will capture the core intuition behind the Incompleteness Theorem without going into excessive details.

›

Each formal proof in the Predicate Order Logic can be thought of as a string of characters, encoded as an integer. There are many methods for encoding such a proof. One sample method is illustrated in the Appendix A . It uses an alphabet of 55 characters for encoding a formula. If each character is represented by a symbol D_i that corresponds to an integer between 0 and

54, then a sentence consisting of n characters can be thought of as an integer $D_1, D_2, D_3, \dots D_n$, written as a number in base 64 whose value falls between 64^{n-1} and $64^n - 1$. (See the Appendix A for one example of such an encoding method.)

The method for encoding a proof will be similar to a formula's encoding, except that it will need a 56-th symbol (called the period symbol) for separating the distinct formulae that appear in sequential order in the proof. As before, the sequence of n digits $D_1, D_2, D_3, \dots D_n$, describing a proof, will again be written as a number in base 64, whose value falls between 64^{n-1} and $64^n - 1$.

Major Notation Convention: The Logic literature uses the phrase Gödel Number or Gödel Encoding to describe a positive integer N that represents the sequence of characters $D_1, D_2, D_3, \dots D_n$ as a Base-64 integer. (Ac-

tually, the literature offers several different possible Gödel-like encoding schemes, and the one used in Section 3.4 of Mendelson's textbook [4] is much more complicated than the variant I define in Appendix A.)

Definition 2.1. An axiom system α will be said be a Δ_0^* axiom system if there exists a Δ_0^* formula $\text{Ax}_\alpha(s)$ which yields a value of True for exactly those integers s which correspond to Gödel encodings for one of α 's axioms.

Comment 2.2. It turns out that all conventional axiom systems have Δ_0^* encodings. (This is because any axiom system that fails to be Δ_0^* encodeable is difficult for a Human Being to interpret and contemplate !!)

Lemma 3 *Assume that α is a Δ_0^* axiom system. Then it is possible to construct two Δ_0^* formula $\text{Logical}(x)$ and*

$\Prf_\alpha(p, t)$ with the following two properties

A. *Logical(x) is true exactly when x is the Gödel number of one of Mendelson's Logical axioms.*

B. *$\Prf_\alpha(t, p)$ is true exactly when p is the Gödel number of a proof using α 's proper axioms whose last sentence has t's Gödel number. (Here t is called the "theorem" proven by p's list of sentences.)*

Proof Sketch. The method for proving Claims A and B is essentially the same type of methodology as would be employed to write a computerized language translator, similar to a compiler, assembler or interpreter. Interestingly, Gödel conceived of this method before any computer had been formally built.

We will not provide a formal proof of Claims A and B because the formal proofs are almost as lengthy as the writing

of a computerized language translator — while at the same time they are conceptually as trivial and as routine as such a computerized object. \square

Lemma 4 *It is possible to encode a Δ_0^* formula, called $\text{Subst}(g, h)$, that yields a value of True precisely when (g, h) satisfies the following condition:*

The integer g designates an encoding of a formula and

h encodes a sentence identical to g , except that all

free variables in g are now replaced with the term \bar{g}

(defined by Comment 1.1's last sentence).

Proof Sketch. Once again, the Δ_0^* encoding for $\text{Subst}(g, h)$ is routine and omitted for the sake of brevity. If you are interested in going through the details, analogs of this encoding can be found in many logic textbooks. For instance, Items 9 and 10

on page 193 of Mendelson's textbook are essentially analogous to our treatment of $\text{Subst}(g, h)$. (These items are awkward to read line-by-line because their meticulous reading requires knowledge of perhaps two dozen pages preceding them.) \square

Added Comment: As with Lemma 3's proof, the proof of Lemma 4 is essentially analogous to the writing of a straightforward computer program (using our language for the U-Grounding

Functions and the Δ_0^* formulae to achieve the claimed functionality). It therefore should be trivially obvious to a computer science student that both these lemmas are true.

Definition 2.3. Let us recall that the deduction system, defined in Section 2 of Mendelson's textbook, is called a "Hilbert-style" proof. Let α again denote a Δ_0^* axiom system. We will now define a Π_1^* sentence, called $U(\alpha)$, whose translation into English amounts to the following sentence

* There is no Hilbert-style proof of **THIS SENTENCE** (looking at itself) from the axiom system α .

To achieve this task, we let $\Gamma(g)$ denote the following formula

$$\forall h \forall p \quad \{ \text{Subst}(g, h) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Prf}_\alpha(h, p) \} \quad (22)$$

Let N denote the Gödel number of Equation (22)'s formula,

and let us recall that the term \bar{N} was defined by Comment

1.1. Then the Π_1^* sentence that encodes * (whose formal name is often written as “ $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$ ”) is the sentence $\Gamma(\bar{N})$.

In other words from Equation (22), this implies that our $\Gamma(\bar{N})$ sentence (that is often written as “ $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$ ”) has the following encoding:

$$\forall h \forall p \quad \{ \text{Subst}(\bar{N}, h) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Prf}_\alpha(h, p) \} \quad (23)$$

Definition 2.4. A Δ_0^* axiom system α will be called **Regular** iff it either includes all Table I's axioms or at least can

prove all Table I's axioms as theorems. (The latter condition is as good as containing Table I's axioms because after proving Table I's 36 statements, α can use them as if they were axioms during the proof of any other theorem.)

Lemma 5 *Suppose that α is a Regular Δ_0^* axiom system that is consistent. Then α must be unable to prove the sentence $U(\alpha)$.*

Proof: For the sake of constructing a proof-by-contradiction, let us assume that Lemma 5 was false and therefore that Q represented a proof of $U(\alpha)$ from the axiom system α . Let K denote $U(\alpha)$'s Gödel number. Then by definition, the statements in Equations (24) and (25) are both true.

$$\text{Subst}(\overline{N}, \overline{K}) \tag{24}$$

$$\text{Prf}_\alpha(\overline{K}, \overline{Q}) \tag{25}$$

Since Equations (24) and (25) represent logically valid Δ_0^* formulae, it follows from Lemma 2 that both these sentences are provable from α .

The next point is that it is trivial to verify that the conjunction of Equations (24) and (25) implies Equation (23) is false. Hence since α can prove (24) and (25), it must be able to prove $\neg U(\alpha)$. (This is easy to prove as a homework exercise.)

Next, we recall that the opening paragraph of our proof-by-contradiction had entertained the temporary assumption that α could prove $U(\alpha)$. Hence from the last sentence of the prior paragraph, we conclude that α would then be inconsistent, since it would then prove both $U(\alpha)$ and its negation $\neg U(\alpha)$ (via the prior paragraph's construction).

The latter observation will now enable our proof-by-contradiction to reach its desired end. This is because Lemma 5's hypoth-

esis indicated that α was consistent, but the last paragraph contradicted this assumption of α 's consistency.

Hence to avoid this contradiction, we are forced to conclude the temporary assumption in our proof's first sentence (that α could prove $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$) must be false. The negation of this temporary assumption demonstrates that Lemma 5 must be valid (because its negation is inherently contradictory). \square

Lemma 6 *Again, suppose that α is a Regular Δ_0^* axiom system that is consistent. Then the sentence $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$ must be true.*

Proof: Lemma 5 demonstrated that α is unable to prove $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$. However $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$'s formal statement (given in statement *) amounts to saying “There is no proof of $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$ from the axiom system α ”. Therefore, we are forced to conclude that $\mathcal{U}(\alpha)$ is a formally true statement. \square

Theorem 1 (A weak version of Gödel's First Incompleteness

Theorem) Again, suppose that α is a Regular Δ_0^* axiom system that is consistent. Then there exists a Π_1^* sentence that is true but not provable from α .

Proof: From Lemmas 5 and 6, it follows that $\tilde{U}(\alpha)$ is a formally true Π_1^* sentence that cannot be provable from α . \square

Definition 2.5. An axiom system α is called Recursively Enumerable iff there exists a computerized procedure P that if allowed to run indefinitely will produce a list of all of the Gödel numbers of α 's axioms and which will list no other Gödel number besides these. Using this notation, we can now give the statement of a stronger version of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem:

Theorem 2 Every consistent recursively enumerable axiom system α is unable to prove some logically valid Π_1^*

sentence. (Also, α cannot prove every logically valid Π_1 sentence.)

The proof of Theorem 2 has a generally similar structure to Theorem 1's proof. However, its details (which appear in Mendelson's textbook) are somewhat more complicated. They will not appear here.

Comment 2.6. Theorem 2 is stronger than Theorem 1 because it indicates that no computerized algorithm can be used to generate an axiom system that enables us to find all true Π_1^* or Π_1 sentences ! It can be viewed as saying that Artificial Intelligence will never be able to reach the full goal that at least science fiction writers have set for it ! The theory of NP-hardness is also related to this issue.

Comment 2.7. In my view, the main philosophical im-

plication of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem is that computer science and computers can never achieve a set of over-ambitious goals, because of the “undecidability problems” raised by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. Rather a more mature approach for computer science is to restrict itself to well-defined narrowly constructed engineering-style problems — where the essentially “undecidable tasks” that are unrealistically over-ambitious are avoided.

The opening paragraph of an article about Gödel in the March 19, 1999 issue of Time Magazine [6] stated that “many scholars consider Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem to be the *most important result* of 20-th century mathematics”. The editors of Time Magazine were very careful to use the word “many” in the preceding sentence because there is no unanimous opinion among scholars about what are the say five most

important results in 20th century mathematics. However my point is that while some scholars may not agree with the cautious skepticism I expressed in Comment 2.7 about the importance for Computer Science focusing on narrowly defined problems, there should be no question that the Incompleteness Theorem is an important result, that has implications about what directions Computer Science can and cannot profitably pursue.

But what does the Incompleteness Theorem really mean? And what does it imply to for computer science when Theorem 2 applies to all “recursively enumerable” axiom systems?

The answer to these questions are likely to be quite challenging. They may not be resolved during our life times. Or ever?

We will now add the new Remarks 2.8 and 2.9 into this Year-

2020 version of our notes.

Remark 2.8 The main core result of this chapter is its

Theorem 1. This may, at first, appear to be mysterious because Theorem 1's self-referencing mechanism is similar to a puzzling maze of mirrors that can be found in an amusement park. It is known that if a human stands between two mirrors (one behind him and the other in front of him) then he will see an almost endless cascade of reflections of himself. This near endless cascade of images can be quite stunning but it is not caused by one or EVEN TWO mirrors in pure isolation. Instead, its mesmerizing effect is caused by combination of four objects. These are the two mirrors combined with:

1. A point-like Light Source generating photons bouncing between these mirrors.

2. A human being (with eyes and a brain) observing his many

stunning images generated by the two puzzling mirrors with

their reflecting photons

The point is that this almost-infinite cascade of reflections is not generated by one of its components in isolation. Rather, it is due to their subtle interaction.

And so analogously, Theorem 1's subtle Incompleteness Effect *CANNOT be attributed to ONE ISOLATED fundamental cause*. Instead, it is due to the complex interaction between

four agents. (These are the two sentences appearing in Lines (22) and (23), interacting with the paradigms specified by Lemmas 5 and 6.)

In other words, it is an over-simplification to examine any of Lines (22) and (23) or Lemmas 5 and 6 *in isolation* from its other interacting agents. Thus just as a mirror in a cascade of mirrors cannot be fully appreciated without viewing its inter-

action with the other mirrors, *with* their basic common light source *and with* their joint mental observer, Lines (22) and (23) *can only* be fully appreciated *when their combination with Lemmas 5 and 6 is jointly considered*. Then the penultimate implications of Gödel's Theorem does suddenly become very apparent.

Remark 2.9. My wise friend, the Prof Harry Hunt, once told me that the job of a professor is “to interpret” rather than simply reiterate the contents of a textbook. Fortunately when class notes are written, one can be more flexible and switch back-and-forth between a formal discussion and their intuitive interpretations. Thus, it is noteworthy that:

The preceding page did not mean *to exactly suggest*

that Lines (22) and (23) and Lemmas 5 and 6 should

only be considered automatically together.

 Obviously, each such object should be initially treated individually, as well. However, their most interesting implication does not arise from each item's ISOLATED INTERPRETATION.

Instead, the *main significance* of Lines (22) and (23)

and Lemmas 5 and 6 follows when they are seen as

four components of a dizzying machine interacting with

itself.

 Thus, a more Go-SLOW approach is needed, where one patiently watches the photons bounce between our analogs of mirrors to bring about their forced collective conclusion.



3 The Second Incompleteness Theorem

The axiom system Peano Arithmetic (PA) was defined by Section 3.1 of Mendelson's textbook. It essentially has three function symbols corresponding to Addition, Multiplication and Successor and thus recognizes these three operation as "total" (using Definition 1.9's notation). Its chief feature is that it includes the Principle of Induction as an axiomatic assumption (i.e. see page 150's "S-9" axiom scheme.)

Definition 3.1. Let α and β denote two axiom systems. We will say β is an **Extension** of α and write $\beta \supset \alpha$ iff β can prove all α 's theorems.

In Gödel's 1931 paper [1], both his First and Second Incompleteness Theorems had appeared. The former states that neither Peano Arithmetic nor any recursively enumerable ex-

tension of it can prove all the true Π_1 sentences. The Second Incompleteness Theorem states that if α represents either Peano Arithmetic or any recursively enumerable extension of it, then α must be unable to prove its own consistency.

Generalizations of the Incompleteness Theorem, subsequent to 1931, have shown both the First and Second Incompleteness Theorems also apply to many axiom systems weaker than Peano Arithmetic (PA). One of the main authors to develop partial exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem was Willard (for certain axiom systems weaker than PA).

We will not discuss my work in this handout. Our goal will instead be to prove a version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. My work will be discussed in a later course in more detail and perhaps summarized in the last two weeks of this course (if time allows).

Definition 3.2. The axiom system PA+ will be defined to be a minor extension of Peano Arithmetic (PA) that contains function symbols for all the U-Grounding Functions, in addition to the function symbols for Addition and Multiplication. Thus, PA+ will include the nine axioms given in Section 3.1 of Mendelson's textbook plus the 36 axioms listed in Table I, defining the U-Grounding functions. You should note that:

1. PA+ recognizes the validity of the Principle of Induction because it includes the axiom scheme S-9 from page 155 of Mendelson's book.
2. The 36 axioms from Table-I will cause PA+ to be an essentially trivial extension of PA, via its use of the U-Grounding function symbols and their natural implications under the “S-9” inductive schema.

Fact 3.3 The key point in understanding Gödel's Second

Incompleteness Theorem is that Lemma 5's proof can be formally done by the axiom system PA+ (indeed also by PA). This means that PA+ can prove the following sentence:

* * No consistent and regular Δ_0^* axiom system α
can prove the sentence $U(\alpha)$.

The intuitive reason that PA+ can prove ** is that it contains the axioms of the Principle of Induction. (The formal verification of ** via PA+'s inductive methodology is quite routine, and it is omitted.)

Definition 3.4. The symbol $\text{Cons}(\alpha)$ will denote a Π_1^* sentence declaring the axiom system α is consistent.

Clarification: Let $\bar{\alpha}$ denote the integer that is the Gödel number of the formula that defines the axiom system " α ".

Combining Definition 3.4 with $\bar{\alpha}$'s notation, we can now rewrite

statement ** as the Π_1^* sentence given below:

*** $\forall \bar{\alpha}$ If $\bar{\alpha}$ is a regular Δ_0^* axiom system satisfying

$\text{Cons}(\bar{\alpha})$ then $\bar{\alpha}$ cannot prove the sentence $\mathcal{U}(\bar{\alpha})$.

The reason it is desirable to rewrite ** into ***'s equivalent form is that the latter expression is technically the *precise* sentence which is written in the *exact language* used by PA+.

We have developed two possible proofs of the Second Incompleteness Theorem that employ the formalisms of Definition 3.4 and statement **. Our first proof was used in course notes employed during 2004-2018, and a second more succinct proof is given below:

3.1 A Succinct Proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem

Our proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem will focus around the following Lemma

Lemma 7 *Let us assume the axiom system PA+ is consistent (because all of conventional mathematics would collapse if it was not). The axiom system PA+ then cannot prove the Π_1^* theorem, $\text{Cons}(\text{PA}+)$, declaring its own consistency.*

The rough intuitive reason Lemma 7 holds is that is that PA+ is one example of an axiom system satisfying the if-clause of statement ***'s requirements for $\bar{\alpha}$ (This implication is a consequence of Fact 3.3 and our observation that *** is just a rewrite of ** in a different notation).

We will now provide the reader with the more exact details of Lemma 7's proof In our discussion, we will use the following notation:

1. $[\Phi]$ will denote Φ 's Gödel number,

2. Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) will be an abbreviation for

$$\exists p \text{ Prf}_{PA+} (\lceil \Phi \rceil, p) \quad (26)$$

3. $\overline{\text{Verify}}(\lceil \Phi \rceil)$ is simply the Gödel number for “ Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) ”

(We will always use this over-line symbol to denote the Gödel numbers for designating proof encodings.)

4. Double-Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) is an abbreviation for

$$\exists q \text{ Prf}_{PA+} (\overline{\text{Verify}}(\lceil \Phi \rceil), q) \quad (27)$$

This notation may look complicated, but the idea behind it is actually quite simple. Thus Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) indicates that there is a proof of Φ from PA+, while Double-Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) indicates that there is *proof of the existence of a proof* of statement Φ (from again the base axiom system of PA+).

Logicians usually don't worry about the distinction between

a verification and a *double-verification* because it is usually

an unimportant distinction. This is because PA+ can trivially prove the following fact:

- If Φ satisfies Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$) then it also satisfies Double-Verify($\lceil \Phi \rceil$).

The proof of • follows by an easy induction argument. (It is often not explicitly formalized in Logic textbooks because Invariant • is obvious. (It stems from the fact that all proofs, by definition, have finite lengths. This implies “double” verifications also trivially have finite-sized proofs, whose properties are characterized by the Principle of Induction.)

- The reason for our interest in • is that it will lead to a very nice simple proof of our needed Lemma 7. (Hilbert-Bernays [3] were the first to notice the usefulness of how an analog of •’s simple identity will help prove the Second Incompleteness Theorem.)

Proof of Lemma 7 *For the sake of constructing a proof-by-contradiction, let us entertain the “temporary” assumption that PA+ could prove Cons(PA+). Recall that Fact 3.3 noted that PA+ had a capacity to prove statement **. Since PA+ can trivially prove that it is a regular axiom system, it can easily apply ** to verify ² the statement that:*

PA+ cannot prove $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA+})$.

We next observe that the statement # can be easily proven by PA+ to be logically equivalent to the sentence $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA+})$. (This is simply because PA+ can trivially verify that the only integer K satisfying Subst(N, K) in Equations (23) through (25) is $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA+})$ ’s Gödel number.)

Thus, the “temporary” italicized assumption (from the pre-

²This proof is entirely trivial because of our observation that ** and *** are logically identical statements, except for a slight difference in notation.

ceding paragraph) has established that PA+ can **BOTH** prove

and prove that # is logically equivalent to the sentence $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}^+)$. This implies that PA+ also has a simultaneous capacity

1. to prove the sentence $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}^+)$ (since it is obviously equiv-

alent to #).

2. and also to **disprove** the sentence $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}^+)$, as an

immediate consequence of the definition of $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}^+)$ and

our prior-mentioned trivial invariant • .

Hence using the above kind of “diagonalization paradox”, we

can conclude that if PA+ proved $\text{Cons}(\text{PA}^+)$, then it would

be inconsistent because Items 1 and 2 (above) show that it

would then prove both a sentence (i.e. $\mathcal{U}(\text{PA}^+)$) and its

negation (i.e. $\neg \mathcal{U}(\text{PA}^+)$).

can conclude that if $\text{PA}+$ proved $\text{Cons}(\text{ PA}+)$, then it would be inconsistent because Items 1 and 2 (above) show that it would then prove both a sentence (i.e. $\mathcal{U}(\text{ PA}+)$) and its negation (i.e. $\neg \mathcal{U}(\text{ PA}+)$).

Since $\text{PA}+$ is presumed to be consistent by conventional mathematics, it follows that $\text{PA}+$ must be unable to prove its own consistency, to avoid this clearly impossible condition.

Clarification 3.5. Let me do the last part of the proof above in slow motion so that you understand, line-for-line, what it exactly has done. Suppose that you have proven the following two sentences:

$$1. \quad X \Rightarrow Y$$

$$2. \quad \neg Y$$

Then of course, you could conclude that $\neg X$ is true, via a

In particular, since one usually presumes that $\text{PA}+$ is consistent, one must consequently also presume that $\neg Y$ holds true (as item 2 requires). Moreover, Item 1 must also be true because the heart of Lemma 7's proof had verified it. Hence, we can conclude that $\neg X$ is true, which is exactly what Lemma 7 had claimed !!!

In other words, what I did in the Paragraph 3.5 (above), was repeat in slow motion the last part of Lemma 7's proof, so that you can have a better understanding of its underlying intuition !!!!

Theorem 3 (A version of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem) *Let α denote any Δ_0^* encodeable axiom system that is an extension of $\text{PA}+$ and which is consistent. The axiom system α then cannot prove the Π_1^* theorem, $\text{Cons}(\alpha)$, declaring its own consistency.*

proof by contradiction. The point is that the preceding proof

of Lemma 7 uses essentially the above reasoning where

A. X is the statement that “PA+ proves Cons(PA+) ”

B. Y is the statement that PA+ is inconsistent.

In particular since our usually presume

~~Since~~ we know PA+ is consistent, we can presume that $\neg Y$

is true (as item 2 requires). Moreover, Item 1 must also be true

because the heart of Lemma 7’s proof had verified it. Hence, we

can conclude that $\neg X$ is true, which is exactly what Lemma

7 had claimed !!!

In other words, what I did in the Paragraph 3.5 (above), was

repeat in slow motion the last part of Lemma 7’s proof, so that

you can have a better understanding of its underlying intuition

!!!!

Theorem 3 (A version of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness The-

orem) Let α denote any Δ_0^* encodeable axiom system that is an extension of $PA+$ and which is consistent. The axiom system α then cannot prove the Π_1^* theorem, $Cons(\alpha)$, declaring its own consistency.

Proof: By similar reasoning as was used in Lemma 7's proof. In particular, the same reasoning that Lemma 7 used to establish that $PA+$ was unable to prove $Cons(PA+)$ will also show that α cannot prove $Cons(\alpha)$. \square

Comment 3.6. The original version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem by Gödel was slightly stronger than Theorem 3. It stated that no recursively enumerable axiom system that was an extension of PA (not $PA+$) could prove its own consistency. Also, let Q^* denote an axiom system, identical to PA , except that the Principle of Induction is removed. (This means that Q^* differs from PA 's definition on Page 155 by

removing all the S-9 axioms.) In 1985, a JSL paper by Pudlak [5] essentially showed that no extension of Q^* could prove its own consistency.

Comment 3.7. We will discuss the Second Incompleteness Theorem in more detail during a second course. Our discussion will include the generalizations of it (by myself and others) and also partial boundary-case exceptions to it that I have developed [8, 9, 11].

3.2 Philosophical Comments

Although the Second Incompleteness Theorem is technically correct, there is a very deep philosophical question it raises — with broad implications for Computer Science and other disciplines. It is the following question

Why do Human Beings choose to think and cogitate if

they did not have faith that Thinking is a useful process? The problem is that Theorem 3 states that any formalism having faith in its own consistency will collapse in inconsistency. How do Human Beings manage to grapple with this inherent dilemma in their day-to-day life? How do Human Beings motivate themselves to gather the energy to think if they did not have faith in the consistency of their thought processes — notwithstanding the problems raised by Gödel's two theorems? And how will the computers of the future attempt to imitate the higher Human Thinking process when they confront the same problem?

My papers about Self-Justifying axiom systems will be discussed in a later course. They will illustrate how some non-conventional Logics can escape the reach of Gödel's Second (but

not First) Incompleteness Theorem and possess some knowledge about their own consistency.

I don't want to over-state the importance of what I am doing because both Gödel's theorems are technically correct. On the other hand, the web site for the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* describes itself as "Logic's foremost journal", and my paper [8] was the longest of the 120+ papers published by the JSL

during 2001. It described non-conventional logics that evade the Second Incompleteness Theorem. If you are interested, they will be discussed next semester.

4 Other Comments about Incompleteness and this Course

In addition to exploring Section 2.7 in detail during this course, I also plan to do briefly survey Section 2.8 through 2.10. That survey will include a description of the statements proven in