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# Lesson 1 Quiz

### **Q1**

0 Points

Read the acknowledgement and then upload a scan of your signature.

- I acknowledge that I have reviewed the syllabus and understand that exams for the course represent only 25% of the grade and that doing well in the course will require keeping pace with weekly homework and participation assignments.
- I acknowledge that I understand the use of online sites like Chegg is not acceptable and such use (either uploading content from the course or copying solutions) will be treated as an academic integrity violation.
- I acknowledge that any assignments submitted in the course must represent my own effort and understanding.


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#### **Q2**

4 Points

Consider the extensive form game with perfect information shown. There are two players, P1 (player 1) and P2 (player 2) and payoffs are listed in the usual way: If the payoffs are  $(p_1,p_2)$ , then  $p_1$  is the payoff to P1 and  $p_2$  is the payoff to P2.



- (a) Determine each player's strategy set.
- (b) Analyze the game through backward induction. Indicate the outcome and the path of play.
- (c) Determine whether or not there is another outcome that both players would prefer.
- (d) Write down the corresponding normal form game.

Upload your solutions here:



## **Q3**

1 Point

In the Ultimatum game discussed in lecture, Player 1 is given 100 \$1 bills. Player 1 decides how many of these \$1 bills to offer to Player 2. Player 1's offer must be a positive integer, n between 1 and 100.

Player 2 then either accepts or rejects Player 1's offer. If Player 2 accepts, Player 2's payoff is n and Player 1's payoff is the amount remaining, 100-n.

Determine the size of each player's strategy set.

Your solution should contain a (very) brief description of your reasoning. Upload your solution here:

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